Building Research Establishment Evidence - Monday 14th February 2022 (2/2)

Full transcript

00:00:29 would you ask dr colwell to come back in please

00:00:44 all right dr colwill now we still don't have the transcript operating i'm afraid but we've decided that it's better to press on without it so when you're ready with scrange yes thank you yes i want to ask you some questions now about the fire at a block

00:00:57 questions now about the fire at a block of flats called noseley heights that occurred in liverpool on the 5th of april 1991 and if we can pull up your witness statement page 7 paragraph 34 you say this you say i'm aware that a

00:01:08 you say this you say i'm aware that a fire took place in the noseley heights tower block on the 5th of april 1991 and that the fire spread involved the external cladding of the building which had recently been refurbished i had no professional involvement in relation to

00:01:20 professional involvement in relation to this fire and so my basic knowledge is based on publicly available information and general discussions that would have taken place in bre at the time in respect of which i have no particular recollections

00:01:32 recollections now we know that the fire was investigated by the bre and a report was prepared by penny morgan derrick jones and sharon clinch um at paragraph 36 of your witness

00:01:43 um at paragraph 36 of your witness statement you explained that you were we can see it on that page not involved in any aspect of the investigation or the preparation of the report yes correct now moving down to paragraph 38 to 40

00:01:57 now moving down to paragraph 38 to 40 and i'm summarizing but you explained that you have read the bre's fire investigation report into this file previously in or around 1996 or 1997 as part of a briefing pack that you were

00:02:09 part of a briefing pack that you were given

00:02:10 given at the time when you began to work on developing a large-scale fire test yes yes

00:02:15 yes have you read the report again at any stage since that time

00:02:21 no i don't recall really reading again since no

00:02:24 since no you go on to say at paragraph 41 on page 8 when asked about your views on the adequacy or accuracy of the report you say i do not have any particular views regarding the adequacy and or accuracy

00:02:36 regarding the adequacy and or accuracy of the report as i was not involved in the investigation and i am not a fire investigator now can you help us did were you told the reason for the inclusion of the report

00:02:47 report into this fire in the briefing fat pack which was provided to you when you first started moving over into large-scale testing yes it was cited as an example of

00:03:00 yes it was cited as an example of an external cladding fire that had um led to discussions and was a was an example of the type of um events we were we're looking at

00:03:11 we're looking at right i see so just that just that it was an example of the type of events you were looking at

00:03:17 at were you told anything more specific than that no i didn't speak to anyone who had investigated uh that particular event right can you remember whether or not you formed any views on any aspect of the vre's report

00:03:29 views on any aspect of the vre's report into this fire at the time you read it no i i read it as a statement of um a report of that event yeah paragraph 42 of your statement on that

00:03:41 paragraph 42 of your statement on that same page you say i do not recall any particular discussions about this or the report with bre employees or officials of government the fire is regularly referred to in general discussions on fires involving

00:03:53 general discussions on fires involving cladding but i do not recall any specific conversations about it or the report is that right yes that's correct so you tell us that this was a fire which was regularly referred to in

00:04:04 which was regularly referred to in general discussions on fires involving cladding yes yes now you may well not remember the specific details of those conversations but can you explain why that fire was referred to regularly

00:04:17 why that fire was referred to regularly in those conversations what was it about that fire that was a particular note it was an example of external fire spread there were not um

00:04:31 very many reference points um within the um

00:04:39 sort of environment to to to refer to so it was one that was generally referred to as this was an example of right by their fire did you discuss with the bre with bre colleagues any particular lessons that

00:04:51 colleagues any particular lessons that had been learned about this particular fire the nature of the fire spread or the regulatory regime surrounding it it was

00:05:00 it was generally referenced as work that underpins um the development of the large scale tests so

00:05:09 tests so in that context uh where i had that from uh dr connolly right when i moved into the group that was talking about that was the type of event that we were looking to um

00:05:20 that we were looking to um understand and to replicate right yeah now if we go to your witness statement to the metropolitan police met 3080530

00:05:31 met 3080530 at page seven

00:05:38 met3080530

00:05:43 page seven

00:06:08 we had it on the screen earlier so i know it should work mat3080530

00:06:17 here we go so at page seven looking at the fourth paragraph down on that page um there's a sentence which begins i've been shown nuix reference

00:06:28 begins i've been shown nuix reference and then there's a reference and you say which is a presentation that colleagues and i have delivered on a num on a number of times and on in the next paragraph

00:06:40 and on in the next paragraph um we can see that you're referring to delivering this presentation at a cwct agm on the 7th of october 2014 yes correct

00:06:52 yes correct and if we go to the last line on page seven

00:06:56 seven you say um right at the bottom of that page at the beginning of the slides are a number of previous files including and then at the top of page eight nosley heights is one of them

00:07:06 of them yes yes

00:07:08 yes yes and moving down page eight just under that list of fires you say at the time for us and the area that we were working in those fires were our anchor points

00:07:20 those fires were our anchor points they were the reference points that we were using in terms of moving guidance and understanding now just help us an anchor point for what what was nosley high an anchor

00:07:31 what what was nosley high an anchor point for an example of external fire spread

00:07:36 spread and how was any aspect of that fire used in terms of moving guidance and understanding as i explained that was the work that uh dr connolly used as

00:07:47 the work that uh dr connolly used as when in describing his pro project to to me when i moved into the group as being one of his reference points and understanding of fire spread i see

00:07:59 i see do you remember any discussion within the bre at any time about the combustibility of the cladding panels at nosley heights

00:08:10 panels at nosley heights no i have no recollection of any conversation around that do you ever remember any discussion about the omission of cavity barriers at nosley heights

00:08:24 no i i don't recall having a conversation about that fire directly with as i say anyone who was involved in investigating or following up on it at the time right and when you were giving

00:08:35 the time right and when you were giving these presentations when you were delivering these presentations in respect of which noseley heights was an anchor point what were you saying about nosley heights

00:08:44 heights that it was a a reference point it was an example at that time of an external cladding fire i see let's look at the

00:08:55 cladding fire i see let's look at the report that the bre produced on that fire it's a bre three zeros three five three eight five we could have that up on the screen

00:09:14 so this is we can see it summary of fires investigated between april 1991 and march

00:09:20 march 1992. i want to look briefly at some of the sections of this report with you if we go to page three

00:09:45 so there's a heading at the bottom of that page called the building and i want to look at the second paragraph down below that and we can see picking it up in the second sentence

00:09:58 second sentence so that's in the third line of that second paragraph it says the 1988 scheme involved the use of a class naught grp rain screen cladding on aluminium

00:10:11 grp rain screen cladding on aluminium support rails do you see that yes and then the very last sentence of that paragraph if we pick it up four lines from the bottom of that paragraph says cavity barriers were not fitted to

00:10:24 says cavity barriers were not fitted to allow unrestricted air movement and under doe bre guidance at the time could be omitted where the cladding system was non-combustible

00:10:35 system was non-combustible yes yes

00:10:37 yes yes now what is grp can you help us with that first um

00:10:45 glass reinforced um plastic i believe yes yeah glass reinforced plastic were you aware that the nose the that noseley heights

00:10:57 that the nose the that noseley heights had been clad in a national class naught grp rain screen cladding

00:11:05 as reported in that document yes that was the

00:11:09 was the that was the description given did you understand that grp rain screen cladding to be combustible or non-combustible uh

00:11:18 uh it's class o according to the description that's given here yes does that mean it's combustible or non-combustible in in the context of uh the adb

00:11:31 in in the context of uh the adb description it could not be non-combustible right so it was combustible cladding yes it was a classic combustible cutting yeah

00:11:41 yeah do you know was it widely understood within the bre that these were combustible cladding panels at nosley heights

00:11:51 the

00:11:54 authors and those involved in it of reading the report would have taken that yes right

00:12:01 yes right did you notice when you read this report or any stage when it was being used as a reference point that there is no reference in this report specifically to the combustibility of the grp rain

00:12:12 the combustibility of the grp rain screen cladding

00:12:17 it's stated as class o yes but that doesn't tell us anything about its combustibility does it

00:12:27 because the national class naught tests don't test its combustibility do they we don't test for combustibility we test for non-combustibility and limited

00:12:38 for non-combustibility and limited materials limited combustibility so

00:12:41 so products aren't defined as combustible in general presentation i see did you ever notice that the report doesn't contain any discussion surrounding the degree to which the rain

00:12:53 surrounding the degree to which the rain screen product or the fact that it was a combustible product on the external face of the building may have contributed to the fire spread

00:13:06 didn't read it in that in that way when you say you didn't read it in that way i think what i'm asking you is did you notice that there's no discussion about the contribution the panels

00:13:17 about the contribution the panels themselves made to the external fire spread did you ever notice that when you were reading this report

00:13:28 i read it in the context that there had been fire spread and that was the mechanism of fire spread right

00:13:38 right but you can't help us as to why we don't see express reference to that being a mechanism of fire spread or the the fact that the panels themselves being grp rain screen panels contributed to the

00:13:51 rain screen panels contributed to the extent or speed of fire spread i

00:13:55 i i say i'm i can't speak for the authors of the of the report okay we just looked at that section on on page three that second paragraph down

00:14:06 page three that second paragraph down which tells us that no cavity barriers were fitted because that was permitted at the time in non-combustible cladding systems

00:14:13 systems can we agree that the clear inference of that paragraph is that this was a non-combustible system otherwise why would that sentence read as it does at the end

00:14:35 i'm sorry i i can't speak for for what the authors were was suggesting with that as

00:14:45 as as a class o product it was not non-combustible therefore

00:14:52 therefore one would have expected barriers to be fitted quite did you notice that when you were reading the report in 96 i wouldn't have it wouldn't have been of

00:15:05 a reference if we go on within this report to page four and i want to look at the first paragraph under the heading fire damage the report notes if we look three lines

00:15:16 the report notes if we look three lines down it says this fire spread vertically up the cavity behind the cladding melting the aluminium supports and also attacking the window reveals via the strand board and the upvc frames

00:15:30 and if we go back to page three

00:15:35 the third paragraph down

00:15:39 i want to look at the third sentence so three paragraphs down from the top there's a paragraph beginning the fire was started deliberately and three lines down within that paragraph on the right hand side we can

00:15:50 paragraph on the right hand side we can see it says this the time of call to the fire brigade was zero to 43 hours probably a good half hour after the fire was started on arrival the brigade found flames

00:16:02 on arrival the brigade found flames apparently issuing from windows on all floors plus involvement of the roof do you see that yes and if we go to page five and the first paragraph on page five

00:16:17 it says this at the top there is no reason to suggest a life risk associated with cladding unless there are cavities large enough to allow vertical fire spread

00:16:29 to allow vertical fire spread and below that there's an image of the damaged block now just focusing on that statement there there is no reason to suggest a life risk associated with cladding unless there are cavities large enough

00:16:41 unless there are cavities large enough to allow vertical fire spread do you agree with that statement

00:16:48 i can't speak with the authors of of the report i would need to to review it to understand what they were actually saying to take a snapshot is slightly difficult in isolation there is always life

00:17:00 there is always life risk associated with fire spread quite yes i mean it does look like a slightly odd sentence can we agree that that it's saying there's no reason to suggest a life risk associated with clouding

00:17:12 life risk associated with clouding unless there are cavities large enough to allow vertical fire spread that statement

00:17:17 statement is is a rather odd one isn't it

00:17:23 out of context of the rest of the report that they would must have they must have had some rationale behind making that statement i can't speak for there for them on that i'm sorry i can't help

00:17:35 for them on that i'm sorry i can't help you with this because there would be a life risk associated with cladding if the cladding itself was combustible yes there's a life risk associated with fire spread yes yes

00:17:50 can you help us with this in 1996 or any other time did you or anyone else give any consideration to advising government about the possibility of restricting the combustibility

00:18:01 combustibility of external cladding systems

00:18:08 in 96 i would imagine that the i wasn't party to those conversations i was

00:18:15 was not engaged in that part of the program i don't know what implicat what discussions would have between parties at that that time but

00:18:23 but for them to have commissioned the work would suggest that they were interested in looking at what the implications were around that right can you help us was the possibility of restricting or even banning the use of

00:18:34 restricting or even banning the use of combustible materials ever discussed at the bre in the period after this fire i wasn't party to any of those conversations no i don't know right

00:18:45 conversations no i don't know right if we can turn um to a different report this is at bre 3021415

00:18:51 we can see a page one this is a bre global client report and there's no title so this may be a draft but this is the only copy the inquiry has been provided with

00:19:03 inquiry has been provided with if we go to page two we can see that the report was prepared by yasin gellam allah who was a graduate consultant in july 2016

00:19:14 consultant in july 2016 and it's authorized by you as director of fire suppression again on the same day in july 2016. do you see that yes do you remember uh approving this report

00:19:26 do you remember uh approving this report or authorizing it no it seems to be 2016 so it's more recent than the period we were just looking at [Music]

00:19:35 [Music] if we look at page three and we look at the um last line of text it says this this document sets out outlines and consolidates the

00:19:46 outlines and consolidates the development of the bs 8414 test series yes

00:19:51 yes does that help yes yeah can you help us for whom was this report prepared do you know

00:20:01 it was a piece of work to bring together as the opening statement

00:20:07 statement talks about where

00:20:13 the development of the test methodology had come had come from yes do you know who it was prepared for was it fair for government or a commercial client

00:20:24 commercial client i

00:20:25 i i don't recall directly i believe it was uh something that was done internally for the

00:20:31 for the for for our own reference to to bring everything together i don't right i don't um

00:20:37 don't um i don't recall apologies as i say i don't recall it um going beyond being being drafted up as a as a document for reference yes okay let's look at page 21.

00:20:50 let's look at page 21. at paragraph 2.3.1 well 2.3 there's a heading events leading to bs8414 and then below that 2.3.1 there's a heading nosely

00:21:00 nosely and then some background now we're not going to go through the whole of this section but do you remember reading the report into the noseley heights fire again in 2016 when you approved this

00:21:11 again in 2016 when you approved this report

00:21:15 i don't remember reading it independently of of the document no if we look at page 22 of the report section

00:21:26 section 2.3.1.2 there's a heading there cladding construction at the top and we can see from the first two paragraphs that the building is described and the cladding is described as

00:21:37 as rain screen grp board do you see that at the beginning of the second paragraph the facade was overclouded with a rain screen grp board on aluminium rails

00:21:48 screen grp board on aluminium rails do you have that yes and if we look at the third paragraph it says

00:21:53 says mineral fiber rock wool insulation of a 100 millimeter thickness was held into the wall of the building with plastic fixings and to allow air movement within the cavity no cavity barriers were

00:22:04 the cavity no cavity barriers were installed and according to the regulation in force at this time cavity barriers could be omitted when the building was considered non-combustible do you see that yes

00:22:15 do you see that yes there's no reference in that section or indeed in the whole of this report to the fact that the grp panels installed on noseley height were combustible is there

00:22:25 there no

00:22:26 no in fact this report repeats the content of the 1991 report we just looked at that cavity barriers could be omitted where the building was considered non-combustible yes

00:22:38 non-combustible yes this report is a consolidation of that information it's not a revisiting of the of the events so this

00:22:47 so this this would have been taken as a literature review from that from that commentary yes but the point i'm getting at is once you know it's grp glass reinforced plastic board

00:23:00 glass reinforced plastic board um

00:23:01 um can you explain why it said cavity barriers could be emitted when the building was considered non-combustible because that was a was what was written in that original

00:23:12 original um

00:23:14 um report it's not saying that it was correct it was saying that was presuming the rationale behind it well why don't we see a footnote anywhere or an extra paragraph saying

00:23:25 an extra paragraph saying we've noticed that in fact the gl we can see that the grp board was a combustible board it wasn't non-combustible and so when you're referencing this fire

00:23:37 and so when you're referencing this fire that's that's a consideration why don't we see that anywhere

00:23:44 given that i don't recall the context of this being issued

00:23:51 and given that it was a summary of that position

00:23:57 to read as a reader recognized grp as being a combustible product

00:24:07 then that would have been the and the fact that they were omitted and that was the basis on which they were admitted it's not saying that that physician was correct it's the statement

00:24:19 physician was correct it's the statement of what what had what has occurred as a result of it i see but it doesn't make much sense reading it without kind of further commentary does it because

00:24:30 commentary does it because it's implying that it was okay in that building to have omitted cavity barriers because the building was considered non-combustible but that's undermined by the reference earlier to the grp board yes if you roll

00:24:43 earlier to the grp board yes if you roll down to two three one four to the discussion does that pick it up at that point there i i don't know if it does it doesn't i have no recollection and say no i don't think it does

00:24:54 no i don't think it does if we could move um to section two three one three the origin of fire and causes of fire spread which is immediately below that do you have that yeah we can see that it says in the

00:25:07 yeah we can see that it says in the second paragraph several factors caused the fire to propagate through the tower block yes

00:25:14 block yes and then a number of factors are listed now in the first paragraph it says use of combustible materials such as wooden studs aluminium upvc

00:25:27 studs aluminium upvc yes yes but it doesn't say use of combustible material the grp rain screen cladding panels does it

00:25:38 it doesn't highlight them specifically no did you give any consideration um to whether or not the combustible grp panels ought to be added to the list of factors which caused the fire to

00:25:49 factors which caused the fire to propagate from the base of the tower to the roof within minutes

00:25:59 given that grp was combustible it could have been highlighted yes yes if we go to the bottom of the page the the section you were just referring me to at 2.3.1

00:26:10 to at 2.3.1 under discussions and implications for regulation it says this the noseley fire has highlighted several areas of concern regarding fire and external cladding for high-rise buildings

00:26:21 high-rise buildings and the need of developing a guidance was therefore crucial to assess the following issues and one is the question of the cavity barriers was raised and it was debatable whether a system with barriers would

00:26:32 whether a system with barriers would have performed much better in this case yes

00:26:36 yes and then two it says the combustibility of the materials involved was questioned and even if the flake board achieved a class naught under the building regulations the other side of the open

00:26:47 regulations the other side of the open cavity should have been assessed as well yes yes

00:26:53 yes yes did you

00:26:54 did you do do you remember approving that wording

00:26:59 i say i don't recall this report ever being formally issued so i'm i apologize if i've to to be presented with this now i've got no context to it i'm i'm sorry i

00:27:11 got no context to it i'm i'm sorry i can't speak to it in any more detail that i don't know whether this was a first draft whether this was something that was even taken any further than i discussed a discussion a discussion piece at that time i don't know i i

00:27:23 piece at that time i don't know i i apologize for that no that's fine if your name appears on the front of it would you have expected that you would have read it at some point i would expect it to have gone through and and actually

00:27:34 and and actually had had a higher degree yes right yes just looking at that first what bullet point there at the top of the page do you agree that it was debatable whether a system with barriers would

00:27:45 whether a system with barriers would have performed much better in this case yes given the experience of um

00:27:51 um large-scale testing cavity barriers the type of character barriers and the character barriers that are used are critically important right yes in the second paragraph do you agree

00:28:02 in the second paragraph do you agree that the combustibility of the materials involved was questioned

00:28:14 in in that it was a class o board then yes that was something that needed needed to be addressed and that was as i said previously with the connelly work something that

00:28:26 something that um

00:28:27 um led to the development of those large-scale tests right can you help us with

00:28:31 with was questioned what does that mean the combustibility of the materials involved was questioned

00:28:38 question when by who do you know no and do you know what this meant by the term flake board the type of laminate board is that the cladding panel or

00:28:51 is that the cladding panel or the substrate the the external board itself right

00:28:57 as far as you're aware was this report or any part of it ever published at any stage

00:29:02 stage i really don't recall

00:29:07 does this report represent an accurate overview of the way in which the fire at nosley heights was used as a reference point in terms of moving guidance and understanding that's what you said in

00:29:19 understanding that's what you said in your i would need to read the report right

00:29:24 so help us with this what were the lessons or matters to be addressed from the noseley heights fire in your view

00:29:33 uh the individual component testing does not tell you the overall performance of the system right was one of the lesson points from this fire related to the combustibility

00:29:45 fire related to the combustibility of external panels used on high-rise buildings which in the case of noseley heights had allowed for rapid uncontrolled vertical fire spread as i said it's

00:29:57 as i said it's about not just the individual components but it's how they work together as a system and that's why the large scale tests were developed yes so i want to turn now to some questions about the testing work that was carried

00:30:08 about the testing work that was carried out by dr raymond connolly which culminated in his april 1994 report which was titled investigation of the behavior of external cladding systems in fire report on 10 full-scale tests

00:30:22 fire report on 10 full-scale tests let's just look at that on screen briefly to orientate ourselves it's at rco701

00:30:36 rco701

00:30:47 so there we have it this is the connolly report from april 1994. now

00:30:53 now are you broadly familiar with this report in terms of the purpose of the experimental work and the conclusions reached in it

00:31:01 prior to the release of this report to the

00:31:04 the inquiry

00:31:06 inquiry i didn't hold a full copy of that document so

00:31:11 the knowledge i had of it was partial to that up into the release of this yes right

00:31:20 right so does that mean that it wasn't a copy available within the bre's database or library for you to look at a complete there was no complete copy available right did you ever see

00:31:33 right did you ever see a full copy of this report as part of your work on large-scale file testing

00:31:40 if i did i have no recollection of it because i have no reference i have no reference copy of it the copy i had um was only in part and the copy held by barry is only in part

00:31:51 part i see so it was an incomplete copy of the report yes so do you think you'd only ever read an incomplete copy of the report

00:32:01 i i imagine i would have read the full 94 copy because that would have been made available to me at the time right and was was it your understanding that this work had been instigated because of the fire at nosley heights in 1991 yes

00:32:14 the fire at nosley heights in 1991 yes let's turn to uh dr raymond connolly's witness statement to the inquiry which is at bre three zeros four seven six six seven

00:32:22 seven and i want to look at page six just about seven lines up from the end of the page there on the right hand side of the paragraph there's a

00:32:33 paragraph there's a some words beginning it was always so let's look at what he says there he says it was always obvious to me from the department's consistent support funding of the research being undertaken

00:32:45 funding of the research being undertaken at bre into external wall systems from 1992 onwards that the department was aware of potential limitations with their historical approach to the issue

00:32:56 their historical approach to the issue the department modified slash improved their guidance between the 1985 and 1992 versions of approved document b in respect of external wall systems

00:33:07 respect of external wall systems however the conflict between fire safety requirements in terms of providing cavity barriers and the need for ventilation of cavities to avoid dampness posed challenges

00:33:19 to avoid dampness posed challenges for the department and then it goes on my recollection is that resolution of these conflicting requirements by employing a more holistic approach to fire safety design was one of the prime motivating factors

00:33:31 was one of the prime motivating factors behind the department's support of the new research i'll stop there now

00:33:38 now does that accord with your understanding when you joined dr connolly's team about the motivating factors behind the research that he had undertaken and which had led to his 1994 report

00:33:51 my my understanding was twofold one one that was part of that yes and the other was an understanding that individual component performance was not telling uh the

00:34:03 performance was not telling uh the complete story of fire performance so it was it was a two-part yes

00:34:09 yes did you ever discuss um the drivers for this project with dr connolly at the time you joined the team yes i would have done

00:34:20 did you share the view in 1996 or thereafter perhaps during the development of fire note 3 or fire note 9 or 8414

00:34:28 9 or 8414 that the department was aware of potential limitations with their historical approach to the issue yes

00:34:39 yes can you help us um when did you consider that government first became aware of such limitations to its approach to the issue it would have been based on the discussions and that i had with um uh dr

00:34:53 discussions and that i had with um uh dr connolly and tony morris and with whom at the department did those discussions take place who was at the department that was made aware of the limitations it would have been the

00:35:05 the limitations it would have been the um

00:35:07 um the team looking after the approved documents at that time so who was that can you help us oh gosh um darren hobbs no prior to that anthony

00:35:18 darren hobbs no prior to that anthony bird prior to that um um

00:35:25 i i'm sorry uh i think it was even prior to tony edwards

00:35:30 edwards paul everall no no okay

00:35:36 do you consider that the department uh has been aware of limitations in relation to reliance on small-scale testing

00:35:45 testing as the sole means of assessing external war behavior yes

00:35:51 dr crowder when he gave evidence last week referred to a shared understanding that he had with mr martin mr brian martin in and around 2008 that the class naught tests 476 part 6

00:36:04 that the class naught tests 476 part 6 and part 7 were far from ideal as a way of

00:36:08 of testing fire performance and external walls

00:36:13 walls when did you become aware that the department knew about limitations with such fire testing

00:36:20 testing ninety nine two thousand ninety ninety thousand so around the time of the select committee yes right but we'll come on to that parliamentary select committee

00:36:32 and what about the conflict that dr connolly describes in in that paragraph of his witness statement between fire safety requirements and the need for ventilation to avoid dampness

00:36:43 ventilation to avoid dampness do you consider that to have posed a challenge to government over the years to government and to industry yes yeah

00:36:53 now if we go to your witness statement at page 11 paragraph 63 now

00:37:06 so bre 3047 page 11.

00:37:17 and if we look at paragraph 63 you were being asked about the development of fire note 3 which we're going to come on to in relation to the theoretical basis under underlying fire note 3 you say at

00:37:30 under underlying fire note 3 you say at paragraph 63 that it was as set out in dr connolly's 1994 report is that right that's correct

00:37:40 and at paragraph 64 uh below that you go on to quote from dr connolly's report yes yes we'll come back to that and if we go down to paragraph 67

00:37:51 and if we go down to paragraph 67 you tell us that dr connolly's report was uh taken into account in the development of fire note 3 is that right that's yes that's correct can

00:38:03 that right that's yes that's correct can you just help us with this what aspects of dr connolly's report in particular were taken into account in the development of fire note 3 dr connolly's report looked at

00:38:15 dr connolly's report looked at the scale the geometry the location of the

00:38:20 of the fire sources and the mechanisms of fire development for developing a standard methodology those were taken into account when looking at the

00:38:31 taken into account when looking at the development of what was effectively a test protocol in writing fire note 3 yes thank you let's go to dr connolly's report again that's rco yeah seven zeros

00:38:44 report again that's rco yeah seven zeros one and if we look first at the objectives on page three

00:38:51 and the first paragraph we can see it says this report details an experimental investigation into the performance of external cladding systems on exposure to fire a

00:39:03 cladding systems on exposure to fire a description is given ten full scale fire tests undertaken at bre's cardington laboratory the objective of the investigation was to assess the effectiveness of

00:39:14 to assess the effectiveness of installation of fire barriers in reducing the fire hazard do you see that yesterday so focusing on that final sentence was that your understanding of the principal objective of this work

00:39:25 the principal objective of this work which was the to assess the effectiveness of the installation of fire barriers in reducing the fire hazard

00:39:34 yes um as i say i was this work had been completed by the time i joined the group so i was taking out from their description of the project and the

00:39:45 their description of the project and the rationale behind it yes and if we turn back to dr connolly's witness statement um bre

00:39:54 um bre six six 304767 page nine and look at paragraph twenty one at little a at the top of the page he tells us this he says the tests were designed to try to discriminate between different external

00:40:06 discriminate between different external wall systems in terms of their fire performance the main focus was on developing the most appropriate heat source

00:40:14 source i think you referred to that earlier in your answers by heat source do you understand him to mean the crib are you the source of the fire in the test rig yes yeah

00:40:26 and again does it accord with your understanding that that was a main focus of his experimental work yes it does yeah

00:40:33 yeah and if we look down paragraph 21 at little d

00:40:37 little d he tells us this um he says i cannot recollect but um basically saying the systems were likely to have been chosen as being representative of systems commonly in

00:40:49 representative of systems commonly in use within the industry do you see that i do yes

00:40:53 i do yes and at paragraph 21g little two at the very end of that page he says the nature of the research proposal would likely in my opinion to have been to identify a problem in this

00:41:05 have been to identify a problem in this case real for world fire incidents as exemplified by noseley heights and real world technical constraints associated with the need to maintain open ventilated cavities to avoid dampness

00:41:17 ventilated cavities to avoid dampness and to identify a potential solution i.e a means of examining all of the relevant variables in a holistic manner by means of a full-scale test

00:41:28 of a full-scale test rather than relying on the existing component-by-component rules eg class naught cheating and provision of story level cavity barriers yes yes

00:41:38 yes again is that consistent with your understanding of the drivers behind his work yes and for that reason as he goes on to explain in his statement one of the

00:41:49 explain in his statement one of the tests

00:41:50 tests test two of the ten was designed to be representative of though not to replicate exactly the external cladding system used at noseley heights is that your understanding

00:42:02 heights is that your understanding i

00:42:03 i i can only take from the report as as given right

00:42:09 staying with dr connolly's witness statement and looking at page 10 now and if we look at paragraph 22 e

00:42:18 e i want to look at the first six lines he says this

00:42:22 says this i had no expectations that a reaction to fire rating of class naught would be sufficient to mitigate against fire spread over the surface of the material in the context of subject test class

00:42:34 in the context of subject test class naught is determined based on what i would term loosely as a bench test i say this recognizing that the bs 476 part 7 radiant panel test is not strictly speaking bench scale

00:42:46 speaking bench scale class naught is a surface based measure of performance appropriate to wall and ceiling linings and offers no information about the combustibility

00:42:57 information about the combustibility of the material or its mechanical integrity at high temperatures stopping there do you agree with that last sentence that class naught is a surface-based

00:43:10 that class naught is a surface-based measure of performance appropriate to wall and ceiling linings and offers no information about the combustibility of the material or its mechanical integrity at high temperatures

00:43:26 yes i i agree with with the context of what's been said the the issue arises again and i think it's something we keep returning to in in different forms is the definition of combustibility

00:43:39 the definition of combustibility because

00:43:41 because combustibility has no formal

00:43:46 um definition in in a way that is easy to um

00:43:51 um to present we talk about non-combustible against different benchmarks we talk about materials limited combustibility in terms of

00:44:01 terms of again

00:44:02 again performance characteristics so

00:44:05 so in terms of going back to your earlier point about glp being combustible as class o

00:44:13 this is all this is saying exactly the same it

00:44:17 same it classo is a surface-based test

00:44:21 test that that allows you to see flame propagation or flame spread on the surface of the the product therefore

00:44:31 therefore it gives you a measure of combustibility in that context in that the material is involved in the combustion process right so i apologize for not answering it as clearly perhaps as you would you would

00:44:42 clearly perhaps as you would you would hope but i it's a little bit of a difficult it's not a word that assists as clear definition if i might suggest yes i understand just to pick you up on one point you mentioned there

00:44:54 you up on one point you mentioned there you said class naught is a measure of flame propagation yes and we know that one of the tests is a propagation test um what's your understanding of what information you get from the bs 476 part

00:45:07 information you get from the bs 476 part 6 test

00:45:11 the part 6 test is is more the characteristics of the evolution of the combustible material

00:45:23 it relies on the the product being heated uh ignited and then we take the temperatures that are coming off from that within an enclosed environment so it's not a direct measure of the time it takes to move from point a to point b

00:45:35 takes to move from point a to point b it's effectively an evolution of how much heat is released under a given set of conditions right so again it's it's a it's a different set of parameters that are looking at uh the contribution to

00:45:47 are looking at uh the contribution to the fire right now let's look at test two and at some of dr connolly's conclusions which are all set out in his report if we go to page 12

00:45:57 page 12 of dr connolly's report we can see details of the components of uh test two there and the second bullet point in the list

00:46:08 and the second bullet point in the list we can see there's a um a polyester bound sheet do you see that yes test two and at the bottom of page 12 under the heading five properties of sheet cladding materials

00:46:20 cladding materials we can see we're told in the top three lines

00:46:23 lines that the polyester bound sheet and the thermosetting resin bound sheet achieve a class naught rating as described in adb on both the front and the rear faces yes yes

00:46:36 yes yes and if we go down to page 18 and the final paragraph there which are the conclusions from test two we can see that it tells us there that

00:46:48 we can see that it tells us there that there was unlimited vertical spread of the fire over the full height of the test facility the flames would probably have spread to upper stories had they been present

00:47:01 upper stories had they been present do you see that

00:47:05 yes yes

00:47:10 and staying with that final paragraph on on page 18 if we just look four lines up from the bottom we can see a sentence beginning it is clear and it says it is clear that the

00:47:22 clear and it says it is clear that the reaction to fire properties of the sheeting material do not give a true indication of the potential fire hazard

00:47:30 hazard there is clearly a need for some form of fire barrier protection with the polyester bound sheet cladding do you have that i do yes and then if we turn to page 46

00:47:45 here dr connolly is summarizing his work as a whole and in the fourth paragraph down on page 46 he says this it is clear that the bs 476 part 6 and 7

00:47:56 it is clear that the bs 476 part 6 and 7 tests do not accurately reflect the fire hazards that may be associated with cladding systems reasons may include the fact that the flame movement in a real cladding fire

00:48:08 flame movement in a real cladding fire is in the vertical direction as opposed to the horizontal direction in the test do you see that i do yes and looking at the final paragraph on that page he says this it is clear from the

00:48:20 he says this it is clear from the experimental work undertaken at cardington that a cladding material achieving class naught rating may suffer extensive surface burning this burning

00:48:31 extensive surface burning this burning often spread to the top of the test building some nine metres and would have spread further if possible few fire barrier systems successfully reduced the fire spread

00:48:42 reduced the fire spread do you see that i do yes so can we agree here that he is expressly saying that the national class naught classification was not a reliable way in which to assess the fire hazard presented by

00:48:54 assess the fire hazard presented by external cladding panels yes and did you agree with that conclusion when you first read it based on the test evidence yes

00:49:05 based on the test evidence yes what was your reaction when you first read these conclusions

00:49:13 it explained the background to why the work that i was being asked to become involved with was being undertaken right were you surprised by that that a material in a large scale test or

00:49:25 that a material in a large scale test or a cladding material which had achieved class naught might perform so poorly in a large scale test uh

00:49:34 uh given that the work was being undertaken i that that was my assumption that something was the work was being undertaken because of that reason that it wasn't behaving as

00:49:45 that reason that it wasn't behaving as expected

00:49:46 expected i see so it didn't come as a surprise to you when you read that no because i was aware that the work was being undertaken to to address problems that have been identified yeah

00:49:57 problems that have been identified yeah in his witness statement to the inquiry and i'm summarizing there's no need to go back to it dr connolly explains that this was not a new discovery and he expresses the view that there was no reason that it would have needed any

00:50:08 no reason that it would have needed any kind of emergency response from the department that's at paragraph 24c of his witness statement on page 13. now effectively he says this was common

00:50:19 now effectively he says this was common knowledge

00:50:20 knowledge is that right at that time i can't comment i was new i only came into this in 96 so i had no reference point prior to that to be able

00:50:31 reference point prior to that to be able to comment on that in the light of this report did you at any stage consider the reliance in approved document b on diagram four and in diagram 40 on

00:50:42 on diagram four and in diagram 40 on small-scale testing to be a matter that needed to be addressed my understanding was the department had commissioned the work to enable them to undertake

00:50:53 the work to enable them to undertake that review to it to address that

00:51:01 yes but i understand that about the department um but did you consider the reliance in approved document b via diagram 40 on small-scale testing to be a matter which needed to be addressed

00:51:14 yes the the pick-up from what what i was being told and have been explained to me suggested that that was what

00:51:25 um was going to be addressed because they had found evidence that it wasn't appropriate did you consider that it was a matter which needed to be addressed as a matter of urgency

00:51:36 of urgency at that point i had no reference point to to say whether that was what what the context of that urgency was right

00:51:45 was right did any discussions take place to your knowledge between the bre and the department following the completion of this research and for example during the development of fire note 3 about the possibility of

00:51:56 of fire note 3 about the possibility of doing away with diagram 40 or its equivalent in adb and

00:52:02 and and the reliance on national class naught

00:52:05 naught i i was i'm not aware of any conversations around that no do you recall anyone else talking about this as a matter of some urgency either within the bre or outside of it

00:52:17 within the bre or outside of it those who were engaged with the department at that time i i wasn't party to those i don't know what conversations were being held right at that stage if we look at some of the conclusions that dr connolly reached about the

00:52:29 that dr connolly reached about the effectiveness or otherwise of cavity barriers if we could go back to his conclusions at page 48 of his report and if we look together at first paragraph 5

00:52:41 paragraph 5 he says this the only fire barriers found to be adequate and effectively reducing the fire hazard were those which were substantially fixed to the masonry substrate and fitted independently of the aluminium sheeting

00:52:53 independently of the aluminium sheeting rails

00:52:55 rails and then at paragraphs nine and ten he says nine at the bottom of that page the nature of the fire barriers required to prevent fire spread depends on the nature of the cladding

00:53:06 depends on the nature of the cladding material itself while certain types of fire barrier systems were found to be adequate with some sheeting materials they were inadequate with others and then if we go over

00:53:17 over page to paragraph 10 the only fire barriers which substantially reduce the fire hazard require that the vertical sheeting rails be cut at regular intervals so do you

00:53:28 at regular intervals so do you understand what to mean by that that the only ones that were effective required the the cladding itself to be cut at regular intervals yes

00:53:37 yes and he says consequently such a barrier system may be unwieldy and expensive to fit in practice yes yes and then at 11 any attempt to limit the fire hazard by specification of details

00:53:49 fire hazard by specification of details of a satisfactory fire barrier system will prove very difficult without consideration of the nature of the cladding material itself to decide on the necessary fire protection each cladding system needs to be evaluated in

00:54:01 cladding system needs to be evaluated in its own right yes yes that's my understanding now did you agree with those four conclusions when you read this report

00:54:13 given as as i say this was the baseline that i was being brought into and and have these things explained to me as to what had

00:54:24 things explained to me as to what had happened and why this was this work was going forward then i the evidence and the

00:54:30 and the the mentoring around that was my baseline understanding so yes i was in the agreement with that yeah what about now do you think it's correct to say now that appropriate cavity

00:54:41 to say now that appropriate cavity barrier systems can only be decided by consideration of the specific cladding product with which they are to be used

00:54:55 given my knowledge and experience i would say that the the cladding uh the barrier systems need to have been um

00:55:06 to have been um tested with the systems they are being used with yes right and that the whole system including the cavity barrier needs to have undergone a large-scale fire test is that is that your opinion

00:55:17 your opinion for um

00:55:19 for um for these systems yes i believe that's the only way to determine the performance of all the elements right as i as i've um explained in 135 that that's the approach that was was

00:55:32 that that's the approach that was was set out yes and and i just want to press you

00:55:36 you is it your evidence that that's the only way that you can determine properly the fire performance of this these systems for um

00:55:45 for um systems involving the combustible elements yes i see

00:55:52 i see now

00:55:53 now was this aspect of the report about the effectiveness or otherwise of clarity barriers ever uh discussed or considered by you with any colleagues within the bre

00:56:03 bre this this report yes yes

00:56:06 yes yes and the conclusions about cavity barriers and their effectiveness do you remember having specific discussions about that they formed part of the rationale and the basis for the development of the

00:56:17 the basis for the development of the note 3 note 9 and the guidance so yes yeah

00:56:21 yeah now just before we move on to another topic i want to ask you about another of the conclusions arrived at if we go um within this report to page 49 and look at paragraph 12.

00:56:32 at paragraph 12. it we can see that the final conclusion is as follows it says for the rational design of cladding systems there is a clear need for full-scale testing of performance in fire such tests would help determine the adequacy of fire

00:56:44 help determine the adequacy of fire barrier systems when used in conjunction with a particular sheeting system yes yes

00:56:49 yes and again did you agree with that conclusion when you read the report yes

00:56:59 do you agree that one option one next logical step would have been for dr connolly or somebody else at the bre to consider um

00:57:09 um looking directly at the combustible nature of for example the rain screen panels

00:57:15 panels as part of a next logical step in this research

00:57:26 sorry so let me try it like this um

00:57:32 the degree to which the fire might spread in the absence of a combustible rain screen is not interrogated or discussed in this report yes yes do you agree that that might have been the next logical step

00:57:44 been the next logical step to have considered the extent to which a fire might spread in the absence of a combustible rain screen as the next as the next step

00:58:02 given the next stages of the programs

00:58:06 i that

00:58:10 that followed through you think that did follow through do you the the next set of pii programs we're looking at different types of um cladding systems i see

00:58:23 um cladding systems i see let's turn now then um to fire note 3 and if we can go to bre405868

00:58:33 we can see that this document is called fire note 3 test method to assess the fire performance of external cladding systems yes yes and it's published by the bre in 1998

00:58:47 and it's published by the bre in 1998 the date is in very small print actually on page two you can take it from me that it says first published in 1998 yes

00:58:57 yes on that page and we can see going back to page one that you are listed as an author of fire note 3 alongside w a morris d schmidt is that david smith yes

00:59:10 d schmidt is that david smith yes uh a andrews and dr connolly yes yes and if we go um just at this point over to page four

00:59:22 just at this point over to page four within this report

00:59:28 and just read paragraph 1.1 under scope it says this this test method enables an assessment of the behavior of non-load-bearing exterior wall assemblies including external cladding

00:59:39 assemblies including external cladding systems rain screen over cladding systems external wall insulation systems and curtain walling when exposed to an external fire yes yes so just to be absolutely clear what fire note 3 is

00:59:51 absolutely clear what fire note 3 is doing is setting out a method for doing a large-scale fire test yes yes and a method for assessing the performance of a particular cladding system yes yes

01:00:02 a particular cladding system yes yes it's not a piece of research that reported on the combustibility or otherwise of products is it no it was the output from a series of

01:00:15 the output from a series of additional tests that were undertaken following

01:00:18 following the connolly work to enable the test method to be

01:00:24 presented yes i see now if we go in your witness statement at page nine paragraph 49 um

01:00:34 um you're asked about when discussions as to the development of this test method began and you tell us you say i don't know when discussions began as i joined the project team part way through the program as part of the experimental

01:00:46 the program as part of the experimental team so was not involved in the development stages of the project is that right that's correct can you help us when was it that you joined the project team was it in 1996 when you went over to large-scale fire

01:00:58 when you went over to large-scale fire testing that's correct and at what stage was the project when you joined it can you help us as to what work had already been carried out the

01:01:09 the majority of the fire actual fire tests have been completed against the um

01:01:15 um draft protocol that became fine note 3 right

01:01:19 right and you refer to joining the experimental team what other teams were there working on this project

01:01:27 so i

01:01:29 i became involved in actually um undertaking the testing itself uh the other the project leaders uh dr connolly and

01:01:41 the project leaders uh dr connolly and um tony morris were more involved with the actual um drafting and discussions around the the direction of the project right

01:01:52 the the direction of the project right and if we go to page on page nine and look at paragraph 52 towards the bottom of that page you say in respect to fine note 3 you say my understanding was that the test was being developed to extend work

01:02:04 was being developed to extend work already going on in the international organization for standardization iso to enable the benchmarking of fire spread involving external cladding systems yes yes

01:02:15 yes now from where or from whom did you come to understand that this work was intended to extend the work already being undertaken in the international organization for standardization tony morris right and

01:02:28 standardization tony morris right and what was that work that was already taking place um iso had um a a technical committee that were looking at developing a large scale fire

01:02:40 looking at developing a large scale fire test scenario for

01:02:43 for external planning systems right and was the bre involved in that work as well yes

01:02:50 yes and do you know who at the bre was involved in it tony morris right and were there any other specific drivers which led to the development of this test method or was it really just a continuation of the work which had been

01:03:01 continuation of the work which had been carried out by dr connolly my understanding was that it was

01:03:08 the primary driver was to formalize the findings from dr connelly's work to provide a methodology and that that methodology would feed into other standardization work that was going on right yeah

01:03:20 going on right yeah and if we go to page paragraph 53 on the same page

01:03:24 same page um we can see you were asked um what was the specific circumstances or drivers which led to the development of this test method and you say i believe that the test was developed to benchmark

01:03:35 that the test was developed to benchmark fire spread involving external cladding systems but have no other specific knowledge is that right that's correct and again what do you mean by to benchmark do you mean to be able to compare fire spread as between one

01:03:46 compare fire spread as between one system and another yes

01:03:53 and did you have any other understanding of the purpose and aims of the project you were working on no my understanding the development fire note 3 was to provide a test protocol

01:04:04 note 3 was to provide a test protocol that could be used for the

01:04:07 for the standardized test method and if we go to page 10 of your statement in paragraph 59 we can see you say you say that i joined the project team comprising wwa maurice

01:04:19 the project team comprising wwa maurice d schmidt a andrews and dr raymond connolly when the project was already underway as a result i was not involved in the development of the project my role was to assist with the coordination of the outputs of the fire tests and

01:04:31 of the outputs of the fire tests and data analysis yes yes now at a practical level what did that role actually involve what did you do on a day-to-day basis

01:04:41 the team were already established the experimental program was already in place um

01:04:47 place um so

01:04:49 so was there to support with the

01:04:53 with the um

01:04:54 um once the data was collected um interpretation and processing right you tell us in your statement that tony morris was the senior technical and

01:05:05 tony morris was the senior technical and delivery delivery lead for the project yes yes that's at paragraph 60 and you tell us that david smith and alan andrews conducted fire tests under the direction of mr morris and dr connolly

01:05:17 direction of mr morris and dr connolly yes

01:05:21 with what tasks or what work were you specifically engaged with

01:05:28 reviewing the data from the from the tests that had been presented [Music]

01:05:34 [Music] and

01:05:36 and developing um protocols

01:05:39 protocols for

01:05:40 for actually presenting the test state or presenting the data in standardized test forms right and when you were reviewing the data from the tests what were you reviewing it with a view to what kind of

01:05:51 reviewing it with a view to what kind of advice were you giving on the basis of that test data to look at where we were at at the measurement locations we were using to see what information we were gaining to see what we could discern

01:06:02 see what we could discern from from the actual test evidence i see so you're looking at say the thermocouple levels and what you could discern in terms of the temperatures at those thermocouple levels

01:06:13 levels so yes temperature temperature measurements whether we needed to measure at every element whether we needed to measure surface whether we need to measure a mid

01:06:24 surface whether we need to measure a mid uh

01:06:25 uh mid depth of product also

01:06:28 also whether or not the use of heat flux was a sensible test parameter to measure as well right and over what period of time were you working on this project

01:06:41 working on this project um

01:06:42 um from 96 to um early

01:06:50 so mid mid 97

01:06:54 mid 97 when i and then i had a period out of the

01:06:57 the um

01:06:57 um the group

01:06:59 the group and i returned in june of um

01:07:03 um 98. right

01:07:06 98. right if we go back to raymond connolly's witness statement to the inquiry bre three zeros thank you and look at page 17 paragraph 27b

01:07:16 27b he says this he says i left bre in 1996 before the publication of fire note 3 in 1998.

01:07:23 1998. my expectation is that tony morris my former line manager led the research program

01:07:28 program i believe that sarah colwell took over my role in respect of day-to-day project manager

01:07:35 manager and then he says both alan andrews and david smith were laboratory technicians as per my evidence above i had been contracted in late 1996 to produce an

01:07:46 contracted in late 1996 to produce an earlier draft of the test procedure my memory is that i was named on the 1998 report out of courtesy i may well have assisted tony morris or sarah caldwell by reviewing a draft of the report but i have no specific

01:07:58 the report but i have no specific memories of that matter now taking this in stages first is it correct that alan andrews and david smith were laboratory technicians that's correct yes were you senior to both of them yes i

01:08:10 were you senior to both of them yes i was you were a senior scientific officer at this point yes is dr connolly correct when he says that you took over his role as the day-to-day project manager

01:08:27 my direct recollection is that by that stage the project was coming towards completion so yes i probably was i probably was taking it forward to its conclusion of that at that point yes

01:08:39 conclusion of that at that point yes yeah

01:08:40 yeah and is it the case that dr connolly reviewed a draft of fire note 3 alongside you and tony morris i have no recollection right i i would i would suggest the fact that we've named

01:08:51 would suggest the fact that we've named him on the um as authorship he would have had an involvement we wouldn't have done that without without him being um at least have had sight to it yeah did debbie smith have any involvement in

01:09:02 did debbie smith have any involvement in any aspect of the work carried out on fire note 3

01:09:10 probably not no right

01:09:13 right um

01:09:14 um if we turn back to your statement at page 10 and look at paragraph 58 of it

01:09:22 you tell us that you say i do not know when the development of this test method began

01:09:27 began and i've not been able to identify any documentation that would clarify this i understood that the project had been established as a partners in innovation program by mhclg in conjunction with industrial partners

01:09:40 in conjunction with industrial partners which was to be delivered by bre now when you say i understood the project had been established as one of these pii programs what do you mean when you understood

01:09:52 what do you mean when you understood that

01:09:54 that so

01:09:55 so as as say previously by the time i was involved the project was up and up and running it was

01:10:06 it was referred to as pii so my i'd say my understanding was therefore that the

01:10:14 the mhclg

01:10:16 mhclg and the

01:10:17 and the um

01:10:18 um industrial partners were um

01:10:25 delivering that as as the program with bre actually undertaking the fire tests and the data analysis right so when you joined the project was it still being carried out under that program in conjunction with the department and

01:10:36 conjunction with the department and industrial sponsors yes who were the industrial partners can you help us oh gosh

01:10:43 oh gosh um

01:10:50 i believe

01:10:53 i'm sorry but it really is a very distant record i believe what they may have been trespa you turn it and

01:11:08 i'm sorry i would i would need to i would need to check kingspan were they part of this no they this these would have been this particular phase of the program was um external range screen

01:11:21 external range screen manufacturers yeah there was another program which was going on in combination with that which was involving

01:11:29 involving insulated renders as well right but it was being operated under a different

01:11:36 different there were two contracts going on at that time do you remember any of the industry partners who were involved in the insulated renders work

01:11:51 no it would be it would be wrong with me to speculate i'm sorry and you know how and by whom these industry partners were selected

01:12:03 in practice my experience in later later pio projects was that we would go to the trade associations and they would then ask of their their bodies did any

01:12:16 their bodies did any groups wish to be be involved and that would then be managed by by the department because obviously there were contractual relationships associated with that right i see

01:12:27 right i see um

01:12:28 um at paragraph 62 of your statement over the page

01:12:31 the page you tell us that the um the selection of the systems tested and the subsequent direction and drafting of fire note 3 were based on the findings from the fire test and they were then reviewed and discussed with government

01:12:43 reviewed and discussed with government and industry partners sponsoring the project

01:12:48 project now can you remember were there regular formal meetings at which these matters were discussed with government and the industry partners

01:13:00 my recollection

01:13:04 gosh at that time

01:13:11 a draft a draft of the fine note 3 was

01:13:18 was in circulation data from the tests was also in circulation and shared with with all parties and there was a meeting to discuss that proposal and those

01:13:30 to discuss that proposal and those findings

01:13:32 findings there i'm sure would have been other meetings around that but i do apologize it's such a passage of time i really can't remember fair enough did you yourself attend any of these meetings with the industry partners i remember i

01:13:43 with the industry partners i remember i remember the the latter meeting which is why i can can speak to it but right apologies do you remember any suggestions or queries being raised by any of the industry partners in respect

01:13:54 any of the industry partners in respect of this

01:13:55 of this project

01:13:57 project i

01:13:58 i i would imagine there was quite detailed conversation around it because each of their systems would have been tested so they would have wanted to understand that the data that was was being presented and yeah how that was

01:14:09 being presented and yeah how that was being used collectively but i have no specific examples i can cite i'm sorry did they make any suggestions about the method by which the the fire note 3 ought to recommend the

01:14:20 fire note 3 ought to recommend the testing of these systems

01:14:27 in terms of its application yeah so you've explained that one of the things you had to work out was you know what type of

01:14:41 um so i think we'll carry on until i told you just just keep going you've explained that one of the things you were working out

01:15:01 well the noise is being investigated but i think

01:15:03 i think what it is you better carry on um i'll try for the third time you've explained that one of the things you were looking at is what kind of data you were going to gather from these tests and where the data point you know

01:15:15 tests and where the data point you know where the thermocouples were going to be in the middle of the panel the outside of the panel the inside of the panel all that was being worked out did these industry partners make suggestions about the test methodology and how it ought to

01:15:26 the test methodology and how it ought to be set out in fire note 3. they they would have that would have been at the initial stages and they would have they would have had involvement in defining that test methodology but as

01:15:38 defining that test methodology but as saying that was based on what had already come from connolly's work in 94 so there's very likely to have been very little discussion around that that said that speculation on my part because i wasn't part of those conversations by

01:15:50 wasn't part of those conversations by the time i'm meeting with industry the test work

01:15:53 test work has been carried out to a defined protocol so i'm looking at the data in terms of what are the resulting outcomes from that

01:16:01 from that i see yes

01:16:05 and at paragraph 62 we just looked at that you say in the second line that the the selection of the systems tested were based on the findings from the fire test are you talking about dr connolly's

01:16:16 are you talking about dr connolly's tests

01:16:18 tests there

01:16:19 there no the the the subsequent direction and drafting of note 3 was based on the pii projects

01:16:25 projects right so the selection of the the systems tested had come from the pii

01:16:30 the pii grouping and the um analysis was that that i was looking at was based on the methodology that had been used to test those systems yes i see now

01:16:42 used to test those systems yes i see now can you help us with this what fire tests were conducted under that pii part of the project um because there is no record of those tests we've that we've been provided

01:16:54 tests we've that we've been provided with

01:16:55 with can you help us as to what those systems were that were tested so there were a range of rain screens and there were a range of insulated

01:17:06 and there were a range of insulated renders

01:17:08 renders and they would have been um presented by the uh

01:17:16 uh uh

01:17:18 uh in case of the the rain screens the uh

01:17:22 the uh industry

01:17:23 industry um

01:17:24 um systems in the same way as they'd been in final and uh the connelly work and in the case of the um

01:17:33 um insulated renders that was um again um set from from their parameters for for typical systems right and with the rain screen do you remember any aluminium panels being tested

01:17:45 aluminium panels being tested no

01:17:46 no any composite panels being tested

01:17:50 no i believe they were hpl as i say my recollection is that from the rain screen side it was three uh rain screen companies who were actually part of that process and i

01:18:01 actually part of that process and i think

01:18:02 think um

01:18:05 if with the select committee i think it was eternity that were actually one of the representatives of that as part of that that process right i think that's and just help us with this you were carrying out these large-scale tests on

01:18:17 carrying out these large-scale tests on different systems from those that connelly had tested yes how was that helping you to decide what should go in the fire note 3 methodology what were you what were you

01:18:28 you what were you getting from those extra tests so the connelly worker had used a range of fire scenarios and a range of systems

01:18:38 systems the idea with these tests was to use what was

01:18:42 what was the proposed fire note 3 test method so it was to enable us to get that benchmark of a number of different systems tested against a single baseline protocol i see and when you did those

01:18:54 protocol i see and when you did those tests against that baseline protocol did some fail and some pass yes is that what you were looking for yeah we were looking to the idea was to see where the um performance characteristics were

01:19:05 um performance characteristics were right

01:19:06 right and and were you kind of looking for some kind of midpoint or collection of information so that you could select your pass fail criteria you just looking to see how repeatable how again within

01:19:20 to see how repeatable how again within the process testing similar systems were they actually performing um in ways that were anticipated that could then be um

01:19:30 um compared on a similar basis as you would do with any standard test and as you say to look for different different characteristics that may or may not enable you to differentiate good

01:19:41 may not enable you to differentiate good performance from uh not good performance right so did you see some poor performance in those tests yes and what kind of systems were performing poorly again it was dependent on the um the

01:19:54 again it was dependent on the um the makeup of the designs and i've whether or not they contained um different types of fire barriers whether they were open and they're varying degrees of of process

01:20:06 process mr chairman i'm mid topic but and this is as good a moment as any shall we should we break that yes we'll have a short break now then uh the doctor go well we'll come back at 25 to 4 please and again no talking about your own

01:20:18 and again no talking about your own music

01:20:27 all right thank you 25 to 4 please

01:37:05 would you ask dr coldwell to come back in please

01:37:20 right all right dr colwell thank you ready to carry on risk was great yes thank you yes before the break we were discussing the tests which led up to the formulation of fire note 3. yes um can you help us with this

01:37:32 note 3. yes um can you help us with this did you attend all of those tests not all of them no right um

01:37:38 um did any of the industrial sponsors or officials from the department attend those tests they would have been invited but i couldn't tell you which guests they would have been party to yeah

01:37:49 been party to yeah and can you explain to us this why don't we see a report like we do for a contract uh the 1924 contract that we'll come on to why don't we see a report setting out the data from these tests

01:38:02 setting out the data from these tests and what conclusions were drawn for them which is the precursor to fire note 3. why don't we see that report

01:38:10 my recollection is that it was

01:38:14 it was done as a data collection activity to develop test three so

01:38:20 so the data sets around that would have been generated but what happened to them in the passage of time i i have no recollection of i

01:38:31 of time i i have no recollection of i don't have them i've i have checked back on records obviously as part of this

01:38:36 this but

01:38:38 but i've got no formal um set to that so you can't explain why we don't see those tests written up in a formal report so that people understand the

01:38:51 report so that people understand the backdrop to fire note 3 and how those tests impacted on the methodology in far note 3.

01:38:59 note 3. i say i believe it exit they did exist because they would have been part of the pii

01:39:06 pii project

01:39:08 project contract yeah and can you remember any particular conclusions being drawn from the tests which led directly into the methodology they would have all been bench marked

01:39:19 they would have all been bench marked against the development of fine note 3 so 503 is

01:39:23 so 503 is the conclusion of that of that work so that the characteristics that were set in the classification would have been um taken on board from that

01:39:34 on board from that right i see and um

01:39:37 and um did you also review the outputs of the fire test that dr connolly had done in his work when you were looking at fire note 3 yes they they would have fed into that because um the data

01:39:48 the data sets that were applicable would have would would have flowed forward to that and did any other testing or research contribute to the theoretical basis

01:40:00 contribute to the theoretical basis underlying the test method in fire note 3

01:40:03 3 so the

01:40:04 so the work that was going on in the other standards bodies and the other wider context would have would have fed into that that activity as well

01:40:15 as well just the normal sharing of knowledge between research organizations right yes now if we go to page 12 paragraph 68 of your witness statement

01:40:26 your witness statement you explain you say that the assessment of performance this is in fire note 3 was evaluated against three criteria these were external fire spread internal fire spread and three mechanical

01:40:38 fire spread and three mechanical response

01:40:39 response no pass failed criteria was set for mechanical response this was purely a visual observation the performance of the pass fail criteria for external fire spread and internal fire spread was

01:40:51 spread and internal fire spread was based on the experiments done in this program

01:40:56 now can you explain um how the specific performance criteria in fire note 3 were chosen

01:41:05 chosen so

01:41:06 so my understanding was that they fed from dr conley's work that had already previously taken place when they were looking at the different characteristics that could be measured

01:41:17 characteristics that could be measured and determined

01:41:20 the conversations and discussions that i was involved with around this were looking at using this as a method for determining the rate of fire

01:41:33 method for determining the rate of fire spread and as such we're looking at selecting reference suitable reference points

01:41:40 points against which the

01:41:43 the evaluation could be undertaken in context of the mechanical response it was

01:41:52 it was so system dependent that setting a

01:41:56 setting a criteria for that was found to be

01:42:02 in a standardization process something that couldn't be achieved and even today in the later most recent work in this area by other bodies that performance value still has not been uh

01:42:14 performance value still has not been uh formalized it's it's a quite a technical challenge no i'll come back to that but the in sorry i do apologize yeah no help us with this what are those

01:42:25 no help us with this what are those criteria deemed to represent so we know that there's a criteria for external fire spread if the thermal couples at the level two get to 600 degrees within a certain time frame of the start of the

01:42:36 a certain time frame of the start of the test then it's a pass or a fail just stand back what is that telling you what is the test a aiming at so

01:42:47 so the the test is is um looking at independent fire spread away from the ignition source so

01:42:55 so if you take the um

01:42:59 the the test

01:43:02 test frame on its own with no systems with nothing added to the

01:43:07 the to that

01:43:09 to that and you use the ignition source that was derived from the original program you will develop a flame

01:43:17 flame shape that is around about two meters in in height and that's regardless of what is on the actual surface of the the product itself the actual dynamic of the

01:43:29 product itself the actual dynamic of the of the fire load it's a very large fire source it generates a fire plume so

01:43:37 so the acceptance is that anything in that region

01:43:40 region will be engulfed by the fire it will be subject to that fire source and in in and of itself we're not

01:43:47 we're not looking at that as a transmission route or a spread of fire because it is it is engaged

01:43:55 engaged the benchmark was to say out outside of that point will the fire continue to burn will it sustain itself given the system that is in place and if it does

01:44:07 that is in place and if it does how far

01:44:08 how far will it sustain itself as a system and how quickly will it travel as a system right hence the reason that level one on the on the system is set up um

01:44:21 is set up um two meters above the the height of the the half itself so you're measuring from two meters above to the the next level of thermocouples above above that so the

01:44:32 of thermocouples above above that so the the indicator for the start of the the testing is to say at that first level we're interested in when the array of um thermocouples on that

01:44:43 the array of um thermocouples on that front face reach the trigger point yes so we know we have effectively a fully developed fire on the surface yeah and then how

01:44:54 how uh how quickly or indeed does the fire travel from that level one

01:45:00 level one through any part of the system on the um on the test facility to level two so be that on the surface be that in the

01:45:11 that on the surface be that in the cavities of the void be that in any of the component elements within that hence the reason level two has a multiplicity of

01:45:17 of yes of thermocouples placed within that so we're interested in in

01:45:22 in which routes and are those routes developed because of the fire source itself yes so not just does it travel on the external surface but does it travel through the

01:45:34 through the the system in its own right yes but help us with this on the pass fail criteria why is a system which doesn't quite get to 600 degrees within the 15 minutes but just gets just below that

01:45:45 minutes but just gets just below that why is that a pass but then if you get to 601 degrees for the right and i know it has to be for a certain number of seconds why is that a fail

01:45:54 fail what is that telling you about the system and what what were you aiming for in terms of objectives for this test that's what i'm interested in it

01:46:07 it's the rationale of is the fire self-sustaining and self-propagating away from that very large ignition source so in the same way you use

01:46:17 you use in part 7

01:46:18 in part 7 vsa 476 part 7 you have a number of gateways

01:46:24 gateways distances and time yeah that give you different levels of performance in the same way

01:46:30 same way with this particular test you have a set of times and distances against which that that criteria um could perform yes but now you know

01:46:43 um could perform yes but now you know whether it's self-sustaining or self uh propagating by watching it by looking at visual observations for example um why why a pass fail

01:46:54 um why why a pass fail what were you aiming for there the the reason for having the thermocouples within the system is you won't visually see

01:47:02 see um

01:47:03 um so you won't visually see whether the fire's propagating no um i see i can understand that maybe behind the fire within the system if if fire enters into

01:47:14 within the system if if fire enters into a multi-layer system you could well have unseen fire spreading in voids which are being generated because of the actual fire that's propagating its own

01:47:25 actual fire that's propagating its own right

01:47:26 right or you can have spread of flame in because of ignition of another element that isn't necessarily directly exposed at the first point of of combustion

01:47:37 at the first point of of combustion within the within the system hence the reason that at level two there are a number of um measurement points being being taken and can you explain what the quite how

01:47:48 and can you explain what the quite how you reach the criteria as

01:47:51 as ms grange was asking you why 600 degrees and not

01:47:54 and not 550 or 650 in taking 600 the um

01:48:02 um the idea was to look for flame as opposed to hot gas so we're looking for a actual flame temperature rather than a a fire gas temperature and a sustained

01:48:14 a fire gas temperature and a sustained temperature as well and and should i infer from that that the flame temperature is going to be not less than 600.

01:48:22 600. 600 in the context of of the work we were looking at was a a sound reference point there will be people who will argue that obviously you can have much higher much lower but

01:48:33 can have much higher much lower but as a as a reference point 600 was considered to be an acceptable uh benchmark

01:48:41 benchmark for that thank you in that final sentence of paragraph 68 you say

01:48:46 you say the performance of the pass fail criteria for external fire spread and internal fire spread was based on the experiments done in this program can you just help us with that what aspects of

01:48:57 just help us with that what aspects of those experiments determined the performance of the pass fail criteria so the data collected from those tests as as we said were presented um as a comparison against that

01:49:10 um as a comparison against that standardized methodology and

01:49:13 and um mhclg as the regulating um authority and um

01:49:21 um the

01:49:22 the other stakeholders were presented with that as a as a baseline and a number of discussions around where those lines could could be drawn were

01:49:34 those lines could could be drawn were were made

01:49:36 were made and i'm still searching for what the overall

01:49:40 overall parameter was you were seeking to guard against

01:49:43 against the functional requirement it varied at different times sometimes was to resist the spread of fire sometimes was to adequately resist the spread of fire what what we what did you have in your

01:49:54 what what we what did you have in your mind were you looking for adequate resistance were you looking for resistance to the spread of fire what were you looking for when setting these performance criteria

01:50:04 looking for something that did not propagate that at rate so adequate i would guess would be the best description of it had an acceptable rate of of external fire spread it was

01:50:15 of of external fire spread it was accepted

01:50:16 accepted from the outset that fire spread would occur

01:50:20 occur at no point was it ever suggested that we were looking for um

01:50:27 um a total

01:50:28 a total cessation that it never got to level two that was not the criteria that we were being

01:50:33 being asked to work to it was a case of what was an acceptable level of spread but help me with this what is an acceptable rate of external fire spread

01:50:44 acceptable rate of external fire spread how how can you just determine that in the abstract so

01:50:50 so given the um what was what was observed from the process given the general mechanism of fire spread as well which is fire will spread

01:51:01 spread as well which is fire will spread um

01:51:02 um [Music]

01:51:04 [Music] on the outside of a building um

01:51:07 um through the normal uh passage of of stepping uh through windows et cetera et cetera yeah um

01:51:16 there is an accept there was a a a discussion around what was that acceptable rate and

01:51:23 and that 15 minutes was accepted by the parties as being a a suitable benchmark so that was accepted by what the department and by industry as being a suitable benchmark

01:51:35 industry as being a suitable benchmark right yes by the way all involved in that activity and why why 15 minutes it

01:51:43 it fed to work that had and

01:51:46 and values that were already in place and understood around intervention times and around

01:51:54 previous work

01:51:56 work looking at

01:52:00 limiting fire spread yes help me with this doesn't the acceptability of the rate of fire spread or the level of fire spread entirely depend on your fire strategy for the

01:52:11 depend on your fire strategy for the particular building you're involved with

01:52:16 in terms of presenting this type of information then and and the regulation associated with that then that's where those that are regulating would need to

01:52:28 those that are regulating would need to to set what is that acceptable level right but with a stay put strategy for a high-rise building help me with this why is any form of fire spread or fire propagation

01:52:40 of fire spread or fire propagation acceptable with a stay-put strategy i'm sorry i can't speak to that it's not it's not it's not an area i have the knowledge or experience to understand why

01:52:50 why that

01:52:51 that that approach or how that approach works with

01:52:55 with i'm i'm not an um i'm not an expert in in the development of that wider um adb development so all i can share with you is

01:53:04 is this was what was presented as being a route

01:53:08 route to understand the um

01:53:11 um the propagation and this was um presented to those that knew and understand that wider context and was accepted as as being something

01:53:22 and was accepted as as being something they were were happy to to work with as being a root i understand you're saying it may be for others to answer these questions as well but i want to understand at the time did you understand

01:53:33 understand that the basic premise behind approved document b was that there would be a stay put strategy for high-rise buildings

01:53:41 buildings yes yes

01:53:42 yes yes so

01:53:43 so just take that explain how any form of fire spread whether it's 15 minutes to you know 601 degrees or whatever explain how that is

01:53:55 degrees or whatever explain how that is compatible with a stay put strategy because by definition if you've got spread from one component to the other your stay put strategy is is violated isn't it it's already

01:54:07 is violated isn't it it's already violated by the mechanisms of fire spread

01:54:10 spread because fire spread will will step as the um stevenage uh fire demonstrated with no combustible material on the outside of the the building there was a stepping post

01:54:23 the building there was a stepping post that stepping process occurred when i understand you correctly to put it in this if i would put it in this way you adopted certain measurement tests

01:54:34 measurement tests which reflected someone else's assessment of an acceptable risk yes yeah i thought so okay thank you let's look at the performance criteria within fire note 3 if we go within it

01:54:46 within fire note 3 if we go within it bre 40 5868 look at page nine and paragraph ten point one there we've got those three performance criteria and we can see at 10.3 and 10.4 we've

01:54:58 and we can see at 10.3 and 10.4 we've been discussing it that there is specific criteria set for external and internal fire spread we've got reference to the 600 degrees for at least 30 seconds within 15 minutes of the start

01:55:09 seconds within 15 minutes of the start time

01:55:10 time now

01:55:12 now no criteria are set for mechanical response if we go over to page 10 and paragraph 10.5 it simply states that observation shall be made of any collapse or partial

01:55:23 be made of any collapse or partial collapse of the system which is judged to be hazardous now i think you said earlier that it was just all too difficult to set failure criteria for mechanical response is that right that's correct it will depend entirely on the

01:55:34 correct it will depend entirely on the system

01:55:36 system under test if you have a large

01:55:44 large panel system that's reliant on mechanical fixings those mechanical fixings may fail and the whole of the the system may um

01:55:52 um fall away from the face equally you may have a system that is an insulated render system um which nothing actually falls away but you may have a running pool fire as a result of

01:56:04 have a running pool fire as a result of it so trying to

01:56:08 regulate every scenario

01:56:11 scenario is not applicable and you may miss some so on that basis the the view has always been taken that um it is to be reported and then the end users then need to decide whether that form of collapse is

01:56:23 decide whether that form of collapse is um of risk or not to the to the process i see so in terms of these visual observations is it fair to say that what was to be done with those visual observations was that simply they were

01:56:34 observations was that simply they were for use by the end user yes um and that's all okay

01:56:40 okay um we may come back to that if we look at your witness statement page 11 paragraph 66 you explain you say the drafting of the document this is finite three was undertaken by the authors

01:56:52 undertaken by the authors um including yourself and dr connolly in a format recognized by fire testing organizations and standard makers to enable the test method to be

01:57:03 makers to enable the test method to be used by a wider audience yes yes now did the bre have the british standards institute in mind at that time when you were drafting fire note 3

01:57:14 when you were drafting fire note 3 actually it was the the

01:57:16 the iso in european but yes it would have been through two british stands the expectation was that the document would would be used by multiple um organizations and and taken up

01:57:29 organizations and and taken up right and if we look at paragraph 67 um you go on and you say the drafting followed a consensus approach where various drafts are prepared and discussed and developed by the authors the development of the draft took into

01:57:40 the development of the draft took into account the work of dr raymond colony and the experience gained from the fire testing program undertaken in the project including the measurements locations

01:57:49 locations of instrumentation temperature readings heat flux and visual records of events such as system collapse

01:57:58 now we don't get

01:58:01 get any information in fire note 3 itself about for example the systems which collapsed or which did not the heat flux is recorded for the different systems or any visual observations of what systems passed or failed do we

01:58:15 of what systems passed or failed do we no

01:58:15 no no and again can can you explain why we don't see that anywhere the

01:58:23 the heat flux

01:58:24 heat flux is

01:58:25 is part of the definition of the

01:58:30 heat source and

01:58:32 and the visual records were

01:58:37 were as

01:58:39 as indicated over a record of of what was seen there was no i have no recollection of any of the systems

01:58:48 systems um failing catastrophically right you tell us at page 18 of your statement paragraph 120 that fire note 3 was submitted to the department by the bre in 1996 yes is

01:59:00 department by the bre in 1996 yes is that right but you tell us you don't know who from the bre submitted it um can you help us to whom at the department was it submitted do you know yes it would have been submitted to the

01:59:11 yes it would have been submitted to the contract lead so that would have been um whoever was in in that role at that time um

01:59:19 um that would have been predecessor to um probably tony edwards right and do you know were any amendments made to the content after it had been submitted to the department no they would have been

01:59:30 the department no they would have been part of the drafting process so when that was issued that would have been the consensus document of all stakeholders right and you know why fire note 3 was not published until 1998

01:59:41 not published until 1998 despite having been sent to the department in 1996

01:59:47 i i can't speak from fact but i i can only suggest that i was away from from the business for a a period of time in that and it may be that it coincided with dr

02:00:00 and it may be that it coincided with dr connolly leaving and my return right but but if all the the amendments had been dealt with in the drafting process do you know why it took the department two years for it to be

02:00:11 department two years for it to be published i don't no no um turning now to some questions about the garnet court fire in irvine on the 11th of june 1999 were you aware of the circumstances of

02:00:22 were you aware of the circumstances of this fire at the time yes and like noseley heights it was a local authority block of flats which had been refurbished in this case in 1991 the year of the fire at noseley and it was

02:00:33 year of the fire at noseley and it was also clad in grp panels yes glass reinforced plastic panels i understand that to be the case yes yes

02:00:43 yes yes were you aware at the time that it was clad in grp panels the feedback from those that went to investigate said that that was the case yes

02:00:54 said that that was the case yes and did you understand that those would have been combustible panels

02:01:01 uh as as we've already discussed yes that would yes yeah yes now following the garnet caught fire we're aware that the bre investigated and produced three reports into this fire the first one i want to ask you

02:01:13 fire the first one i want to ask you about about was produced for the department for the environment transport and the regions if we go to bre 3035375

02:01:22 it's dated august 2000 and uh you tell us in your statement we don't need to go to it at paragraph 88 that you were not involved in the bre's investigation into this fire or the

02:01:33 investigation into this fire or the preparation of the report is that right that's correct but you tell us in your statement paragraph 87 that you did read the report

02:01:41 report around the time of the fire yes yes and you also tell us that the fire would have been discussed generally by yourself and others in the fire safety group although you don't have a specific recollection of those conversations is

02:01:52 recollection of those conversations is that right correct um

02:01:57 as a team working together if people were picking up information it would just be general conversation there was not a formal sit-down discussion around that and who were the others in the fire safety group at this time can you help

02:02:08 safety group at this time can you help us with that

02:02:14 2 000

02:02:17 um

02:02:21 debbie smith um

02:02:30 those working on the investigations that would probably have been penny and

02:02:36 penny morgan and martin ship right imagine yes now in your witness statement that we looked at to the metropolitan police um the garnet court fire is also listed as one

02:02:48 garnet court fire is also listed as one of the fires that you describe as one of the anchor points for the bre yes yes can you explain for what purpose was the fire at garnet caught an anchor point for the bre it led to the select

02:03:00 for the bre it led to the select committee which led to the um additional um

02:03:06 um testing program that developed the uh british standard right do you can you help us as to what lessons were learned from the fire at garnet court by the bre

02:03:23 that the system hadn't been tested as would

02:03:26 as would would have been expected tested to what to one of the to the fire notes that would have been probably the only particular issue we could have potentially picked up on

02:03:43 that that that mechanism would have been in place if they wish to use it i see was that the only learning point that was taken away from the garnet caught fire that there hadn't been a large-scale fire test

02:03:58 in my area that was the only one i was particularly aware of yes right

02:04:04 right i can't speak for the others

02:04:08 if we go back sorry within this report um if we look um at page 15 of it

02:04:23 i beg your pardon um

02:04:27 did you notice when you read the report that uh the findings which concluded that the plume will have ignited the grp and remained in contact with it and generated a self-propagating fire

02:04:39 generated a self-propagating fire that's at um paragraph four of the report on page seven we can go back to that

02:04:48 paragraph four of that

02:04:55 in in the middle of that big paragraph towards the bottom of the page halfway down it says the plume will have ignited the grp the grp and remained in contact with it and generated a self-propagating fire do you remember being aware of that

02:05:07 fire do you remember being aware of that when you read this report that was my understanding of of the propagation route yes did you notice that the report contained no analysis whatsoever of the properties

02:05:19 no analysis whatsoever of the properties of the grp cladding panels

02:05:27 no because i'm not

02:05:30 i'm not these reports were um used

02:05:36 used as as some as summaries of the events i'd already had the conversations with colleagues around what they believed the root route to have been

02:05:46 have been so the the style and the context of these these reports i'm not i'm not aware that of what the audience were expecting from them right did you notice that the report was silent on

02:05:59 notice that the report was silent on whether or not the panels had achieved national class naught as i say

02:06:04 as i say um

02:06:06 the the report in its context i don't know what were the expectation of the

02:06:13 of the the feedback to the department around that okay would be you can't help with that i'm sorry no we know that the bre prepared two additional reports into the fire at garnet court both for north ayrshire council

02:06:24 ayrshire council um if we can just look quickly at those if we go to bre three zeros three five three seven seven at page two

02:06:37 we can see here's a report we can see it's prepared by penny morgan brian martin and tony morris dated or um it's actually dated that september 8th

02:06:48 it's actually dated that september 8th of september 1999 if you look at the um handwritten text that's the final approval yes yes and then there's another report that was

02:06:59 and then there's another report that was prepared to north ayrshire council that's at bre 303537

02:07:05 page 22. yes here's the other report dated the 5th of may 2000. now were you aware of those reports those additional reports for north airship council no

02:07:19 you were did you ever read those reports i had no recollection of reading them no i wasn't

02:07:26 i wasn't aware of them

02:07:29 so even though you were giving presentations on these files and using this as one of your anchor points you didn't read all of the bre's reports into this fire

02:07:43 the presentations were around the development and the

02:07:48 the methodology to present and undertake the fire tests not the wider context around that so they were examples of fires involving external cladding

02:08:00 cladding not a description of the rationale behind those or how they were used

02:08:05 used if we could turn um to an email string at bre

02:08:09 at bre 3035378

02:08:11 3035378 and i want to look at page 19 yes of this email string we can see the first email in the chain second down on the page

02:08:17 page it's dated the 16th of august 1999 and it's sent at 1840 by penny morgan and it's sent to you charles sterling and brian martin and

02:08:28 charles sterling and brian martin and the first paragraph reads dear all i attached my draft report and a covering letter please amend as you wish and forward to martin's ship who will sign it off there is a hard copy on brian's desk all the papers are on my

02:08:40 brian's desk all the papers are on my desk please show it to tony morris for comment too the photos are not mounted but numbered on the back and there is a list of captions now in your witness statement you said you've got no recollection of this email

02:08:51 you've got no recollection of this email exchange do you think it's likely that you would have read this email and the documents attached at the time probably not no you probably wouldn't have read it i

02:09:03 you probably wouldn't have read it i probably wouldn't have read the um the attachments and why wouldn't you have read those attachments at the time

02:09:14 at that point the um

02:09:19 um the drafting of fire investigation reports would have been um with

02:09:26 with the fire investigation team i'd had the conversations explaining what those for in their view what they were and i would have had nothing further to add to that right

02:09:38 that right so

02:09:39 so you can't help as to why you're being sent this

02:09:42 sent this and asked

02:09:44 and asked well you and a number of others are asked to look at it please amend as you wish and forward to martin's ship who will sign it off it was probably done as a courtesy

02:09:55 it was probably done as a courtesy i see

02:09:56 i see given the date of this email that said this is the 16th of august 1999. can we agree it's likely that the report attached to this email is the report dated the 8th of september 1999

02:10:08 dated the 8th of september 1999 for north ayrshire council which we know came shortly after this email exchange i

02:10:17 i without

02:10:19 without checking records i couldn't i couldn't comment i'm sorry right you were asked in your witness statement whether you considered these reports to be adequate accurate and comprehensive and you you answered at paragraph 102

02:10:31 and you you answered at paragraph 102 since i was not involved in the production of the reports i did not and don't have a view about whether the reports are adequate accurate or comprehensive does that remain your your evidence yes

02:10:45 now there's one aspect of the reporting of this fire by the bre that i want to ask you about now we've performed a side-by-side comparison between the first two reports which were produced for north ayrshire

02:10:57 produced for north ayrshire and

02:10:58 and it was also produced for the procurator fiscal in scotland versus the report submitted to the department under the august 2000 investigation of real fires framework now the reports to north ayrshire

02:11:10 now the reports to north ayrshire council make numerous references to class naught and in particular to the fact that the cladding at garnet court should have had a national class naught classification whereas the bre's investigation of real

02:11:21 whereas the bre's investigation of real fires report makes no mention of class naught at all is that something you've ever been aware of no

02:11:31 of no so let's just look at the north ayrshire report from september 99 at three five bre seven seven and go on to page six under 3.1.1 remedial measures

02:11:44 under 3.1.1 remedial measures we can see the following it says the council have made the decision to remove all the material associated with the 1991 window replacement and start again technical services describe their

02:11:55 technical services describe their approach which has still to be finalized they've opted for composite aluminium and timber windows and then it says this the spandrel panel to be an external insulated render of panels between the windows of

02:12:08 render of panels between the windows of either a non-combustible or class naught material

02:12:11 material the render to be taken around the corner do you see that there yep and if we keep that page up on the screen but bring up bre 3035375 at page four

02:12:25 3035375 at page four next to it this is the bre's august 2000 report to the department of the environment and transport and the regions and if we look at the top of the page we can see

02:12:36 look at the top of the page we can see under remedial measures exactly the same paragraph

02:12:40 paragraph but instead of reference to class naught there's a sentence uh three lines down it just says the span or panel to be an external insulated render or panels between the windows of a non-combustible

02:12:52 between the windows of a non-combustible material

02:12:54 material so the reference to class naught material has been deleted

02:12:59 and then if we go back to the north ayrshire report on page six and look at the final paragraph sorry it's actually the final paragraph on page nine

02:13:10 on page nine which runs over to page ten it reads in the case of the firing garnet court the severity of the initial fire in its position close to the window has resulted in the plume of smoke and hot gases from the fire

02:13:22 hot gases from the fire moving out of the building um initially the plume would have been small due to the close proximity of the fire to the open window and therefore would have tended to have a deer to the surface of the building and the grp

02:13:34 surface of the building and the grp and there's a bit more um information there

02:13:37 there and then there's a paragraph below that it says although the material used in 1991 should have been class naught we have reservations about its current performance

02:13:48 performance do you see that yes so that's to north ayrshire

02:13:52 ayrshire if we keep that up on the screen but bring up the august report august 2000 report to the department again um at page seven and in the fourth paragraph down on that

02:14:04 and in the fourth paragraph down on that page

02:14:08 sorry it's page seven i want in that report on the right hand side um there's a paragraph beginning in the case and we have exactly the same text repeated word for word in that that

02:14:20 text repeated word for word in that that paragraph

02:14:22 paragraph but then

02:14:23 but then the next paragraph which appeared in the uh report for north ayrshire has been deleted

02:14:31 deleted the paragraph that reads although the material used in 1991 should have been class naught we have reservations about its current performance that's not there do you see that yes

02:14:40 yes and then it goes on and has exactly the same paragraph below that about the remedial measures planned um

02:14:47 um do you know anything about this discrepancy in the reporting of this fire i'm sorry i've got no um ex

02:14:55 no um ex no experience or knowledge of this you can't help us as to whether the reference to class naught was removed at the request of the department and i say i i have no um

02:15:07 and i say i i have no um interaction development of it at all so i i and being fire investigation it would have been dealt with by that particular team so any discussions that held with the department would have been through the department were you aware at

02:15:18 through the department were you aware at the time that the department was keen to play down

02:15:22 play down any references to concerns about national class naught or the deficiencies in national class naught was that something you were aware of at this time no um

02:15:33 not at all i mean the my engagement was to support the select committee as a result of the fire so i i felt they were keen to to understand what was going on

02:15:45 keen to to understand what was going on but let's say i i can't speak to to any of the other discussions that were happening around the reporting in this fire it's not an area i was involved with at all i'm afraid

02:15:57 right um just briefly another section of the north asia council report if we go um to page 24 and items two and three

02:16:08 um to page 24 and items two and three the report reads it's highly unlikely that the material used as cladding for garnet court and the four sister blocks was class naught at the time of the fire and at three it's also highly likely that the grp supplied would never have

02:16:19 that the grp supplied would never have achieved class naught can you think of any reason why the bre would not set these observations or findings out in clear terms to the department in the report for the department

02:16:32 department no

02:16:33 no now you're aware i think that following this fire the garlic court fire a parliamentary select committee inquiry was established by what was then the environment subcommittee of the environment transport and regional

02:16:45 environment transport and regional affairs committee yes yes so you attended the evidence session to that inquiry on the 20th of july 1999 didn't you i did yes with your colleagues tony

02:16:56 i did yes with your colleagues tony morris and peter field yes yes can you help why were you chosen to attend

02:17:02 attend on behalf of the bre to this parliamentary select committee my understanding was that they wanted to talk about the development of a large-scale test method right

02:17:14 right now i want to look at some of the recommendations that were made by the select committee in their report following the evidence that the committee heard if we go to the report it's at clg 3019478

02:17:28 it was published this report on we can see the date towards the bottom of the page on the 14th of december 1999 um did you read this report yes at the time

02:17:39 at the time and if we go on to page 9 and look at paragraph 20 here i want to focus on this recommendation it says here we believe that all external cladding systems

02:17:50 that all external cladding systems should be required either to be entirely non-combustible or to be proven through full-scale testing not to pose an unacceptable level of risk in terms of fire spread

02:18:03 level of risk in terms of fire spread we therefore recommend that compliance with the standard set in the test for assessing the fire performance of external cladding systems which has

02:18:13 which has been submitted to the british standards institution for adoption as a british standard be substituted in approved document b for previous requirements relating to the fire safety of external cladding

02:18:25 the fire safety of external cladding systems

02:18:27 systems yes yes

02:18:28 yes yes now did you understand this recommendation to mean that small-scale testing for national class naught under bs 476 part 6 and part 7

02:18:39 part 7 would be replaced by a full-scale test method

02:18:43 method yes or the system had to be non-combustible yes is that how you understood the recommendation yes let's go to the department's response to the committee's recommendations this is

02:18:55 the committee's recommendations this is at clg one four zero three four seven it starts at the bottom of that page we can see it's headed government response to the first report of the the committee

02:19:07 the committee did you read this response we know it was dated

02:19:10 was dated april 2000

02:19:15 i don't recall reading it no if we go to page two we can see in paragraph five that the department is setting out details of a consultation which had

02:19:27 details of a consultation which had taken place on amendments to the 1992 version of approved document b yes yes

02:19:35 and if we move down to paragraph six the first sentence there reads during the review there was no suggestion that the guidance given in the approved

02:19:46 that the guidance given in the approved document was insufficient or if followed would tend to create an unsafe scenario in a fire situation with respect to the external cladding

02:19:57 with respect to the external cladding do you see that sentence

02:20:00 yes leaving aside whether or not there was any such suggestion within the responses to the government's consultation um at that time did you agree in 2000

02:20:11 um at that time did you agree in 2000 april 2000 that there was no suggestion that the guidance given in the approved document was insufficient or if followed would tend to create an unsafe scenario in a fire situation with respect to the

02:20:23 in a fire situation with respect to the external

02:20:28 cladding my ex my experience and understanding was that the recommendation was being um

02:20:36 um put into place which was to take um 509 into the british standard and that would be the reference scenario i

02:20:46 i don't have didn't have a day-to-day working relationship with diet with with section 12 so i would wasn't engaged with the consultation process or the the feedback

02:20:57 consultation process or the the feedback from that but let's say

02:21:01 let's say my my understanding was that that was what was was being requested of them i see

02:21:07 see but it let's leave aside the consultation in 2000 if you'd been asked is the guidance given in the approved document um sufficient uh in relation to dealing with external

02:21:20 uh in relation to dealing with external cladding what would your answer have been

02:21:24 as i sit here now i i would need to see what it said in 2000. i i don't have it as a as a working um a working document i'm afraid i think we'll come on to that so it is

02:21:35 i think we'll come on to that so it is your evidence that at this point you we know you've attended the parliamentary select committee what that you simply hadn't formed any view about the appropriateness or otherwise of the guidance in the approved document at

02:21:47 guidance in the approved document at this point no my evidence would be that i was of the understanding that they were moving to that position of requiring testing of the system rather

02:21:58 requiring testing of the system rather than individual components right

02:22:01 right but

02:22:03 but logically it follows from that that they were moving to that what because of a recognized deficiency in the guidance in the approved document yes

02:22:12 yes because that was the recommendation from the

02:22:15 the committee and if the commit and and that would have arisen because there was a feeling that something needed to be done to review that yes

02:22:22 that yes yes and that was because it had been recognized hadn't it that national class nor was no longer an appropriate performance metric for external walls yes yes of independent individual components couldn't be

02:22:34 individual components couldn't be addressed in that way yes now

02:22:37 now the development of fire note 9 now um

02:22:41 um i just want to look briefly at fire note 9 with you which is at ctar 6019

02:22:48 6019 this is entitled assessing the fire performance of external cladding systems a test method and we can see from page one that you and david smith are the authors of this test method yes yes and in 1999 was

02:23:01 test method yes yes and in 1999 was david smith still a lab technician yes so you were the senior of the two yes and

02:23:08 and if we turn to your witness statement page 19 paragraph one two four you explain there you say i can't recall i cannot recall when discussions as to the development of this test method

02:23:19 the development of this test method began but i believe they began following fire note 3 yes yes do you mean following the publication of fire note 3 in 1998 yes

02:23:31 note 3 in 1998 yes and you tell us at paragraph one two five and one two six that any discussions about this would have taken place between the department and your colleagues peter field and tony morris is that right and you can't recall being

02:23:42 is that right and you can't recall being involved i don't recall the trigger for moving from three to nine no right i see

02:23:49 i see um if we look at the top of page 20 you tell us at paragraph one two eight you say i understand that fire note 9 was developed in response to the recommendations of the 1999 select

02:24:00 recommendations of the 1999 select committee inquiry and then you give the name of the inquiry

02:24:04 inquiry we don't think that can be right because if we look back to the select committee's recommendations that we were looking at at clg 3019

02:24:16 on page 9 paragraph 20 we can see if we look at the top line of

02:24:24 of page 10

02:24:26 page 10 that by the date of the select committee's report in december 1999 fire note 9 had already been submitted to the british standard institute for adoption as a british standard

02:24:38 adoption as a british standard do you see that because the committee are recording that so my recollection is that it was triggered around that that point i don't remember the full

02:24:49 that point i don't remember the full details but if you look at the changes that were

02:24:52 that were made between three and nine it's turning it into and updating it to be closer to a

02:24:58 a document that the british standard could uh

02:25:02 uh work with and do less development of so it was um

02:25:06 it was um probably being worked on as a as a document in that intervening period yes i see

02:25:12 yes i see now um at paragraph 127 of your witness statement on page 19 you explain that fire note 9 did not develop a new test method it was just a revision of fire note 3 and is this right it contained no

02:25:24 note 3 and is this right it contained no technical changes to the methodology or the assessment criteria from fire note 3 that's correct and you tell us that the primary revisions were and you set them out setting a limit on the maximum

02:25:35 out setting a limit on the maximum thickness of a sample which could be tested yes yes inclusion of a definition section correct and a graphical example of determination of test start time and temperature is that right yes

02:25:48 temperature is that right yes and if we go to paragraph 138 of your statement on page 21 you tell us that the test method in fine note 9 simply incorporated the test method from far note 3 yes yes

02:26:00 method from far note 3 yes yes and you also tell us at paragraph 134 back on page 20. you say the process by which fire note 9 was developed can be described as a review of the format in which fire

02:26:12 a review of the format in which fire note 3 was presented in order to bring it in line with the approach used by standardization bodies such as the bsi and to confirm with mhclg and industry stakeholders that the classification methodology and associated performance

02:26:24 methodology and associated performance limits based on the work already completed in the development of five note 3 were still acceptable is that right yes

02:26:32 right yes can you help us with this was the format of fire note 3 not already in line with the approach used by standardization bodies

02:26:40 bodies yes it was yes because you told us that in a separate part of your witness statement

02:26:46 statement that when you were drafting fire note 3 it was in a format recognized by standards makers why did that need to be done again in 1999 three um didn't did not contain a

02:26:57 three um didn't did not contain a definition section and

02:27:00 and um

02:27:01 um it was felt it would uh better or easier for end users to have a recognition of the

02:27:11 data analysis using a graphical presentation so it was a clarification right and also um the

02:27:19 the thickness of the systems needed to be defined to ensure they could be fitted onto the test facilities right and if we go back to one three four of your statement on the

02:27:30 one three four of your statement on the bottom of page 20 and we focus on the last section of that paragraph three lines down you say

02:27:39 you say that part of what was going on is it was it was to confirm with mhclg and industry stakeholders that the classification methodology and associated performance limits based on the work already completed

02:27:51 the work already completed in the development of fire note 3 were still acceptable who were the industry stakeholders that you were confirming the acceptability of this method with the original uh pii partners right

02:28:03 the original uh pii partners right so

02:28:04 so um

02:28:06 um i think you said trespa uh

02:28:09 uh return it and there is another but i i'm sorry i can't remember the details and from whom at the department was confirmation thought that this test

02:28:20 confirmation thought that this test method was remained acceptable in 99 that would probably have been anthony bird right thank you um

02:28:29 um mr turner i've got a little bit more to go on this topic and i won't finish before um 4 30. so i think why don't we stop that yes all right well it's probably been a long enough day anyways dr caldwell we'll stop there

02:28:42 day anyways dr caldwell we'll stop there we'll resume please at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning thank you again please remember what i said to you about not discussing your evidence with anyone of the adjournment and we'll look forward to seeing you in the morning thank you very much we'd

02:28:54 the morning thank you very much we'd like to go with the ocean please

02:29:08 good thank you very much miss grange 10 o'clock tomorrow thank you

02:29:39 you