BRE expert testimony on fire testing standards, examining failures of small-scale tests for external cladding, inadequacy of Class O vs limited combustibility, and post-Knowsley Heights recognition that testing regime was insufficient.
00:00:20 Would
00:00:27 you ask Dr. Smith to come back in, please?
00:00:34 [Music]
00:00:44 Right, Dr. Smith, are you ready to carry on?
00:00:46 on? Yes, thank you. Thank you very much. Yes, Mr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, Dr. Smith, can I next move on to the Eurocclass system, which I think you will agree was introduced into the United Kingdom in
00:00:57 introduced into the United Kingdom in 2002 as a result of the European construction product directive. Yes.
00:01:02 Yes. Yes.
00:01:03 Yes. Uh, and the just accept from me, I think you know this anyway, that the standard which explains how Eurolass B is derived is EN3501
00:01:13 is EN3501 part one.
00:01:14 part one. Yes, correct. Can we look please at the British standard in force at the time of the Grenful Tower refurbishment at BSI 401738.
00:01:25 Let's look at page one first of all to identify the document and then go in it to page 40. There it is on page one. And at page 40 we have the classification criteria.
00:01:49 Page 40, please.
00:02:12 Well, before and perhaps I can take this more shortly if there's a problem with the document. You've got it now. I think we've got it. Table one, classes of reaction to fire performance for construction products excluding floorings and linear pipe thermal
00:02:24 floorings and linear pipe thermal insulation products. Now, if you look just down the the screen, you can see that there are various classes ranging from A1 at the top to F at the bottom. Yes.
00:02:33 Yes. Yes. Uh and there are various classes that rely not on one single test but a combination of tests. Yes.
00:02:40 Yes. And that's true of class B as well, isn't it?
00:02:42 isn't it? Yes, it is. Yeah, we have two there. EN 13823 and also uh ENISO um 11925 part two. Now, now 13823 is the single burning
00:02:54 Now, now 13823 is the single burning item or SBI test, isn't it? Yes, it is. Do you agree that the SBI test was in basic terms introduced in order to replace the room corner test by providing a method by which the results
00:03:05 providing a method by which the results of that test could be inferred without incurring the same cost in time and money?
00:03:09 money? No.
00:03:10 No. No, you don't agree. No, I don't. Um, the room corner test was the reference scenario which was used for the development of the single burning item test. It was never
00:03:23 burning item test. It was never intended, as far as I'm aware, that the root classification would be using the ISO 9705 test method. It was a reference scenario.
00:03:34 scenario. Uh, and the reference, I think this is right, remained, didn't it, uh, a fire within a room? Yes, it did. It did. Yes. Did Did you ever yourself consider whether that test was useful for
00:03:45 whether that test was useful for assessing fire behavior in circumstances far removed from the test scenario? for example, on the external face of a high-rise building. Yes, I did consider that and um it
00:03:56 Yes, I did consider that and um it clearly is not suitable for that. And much of the work in Europe has focused very much on the identification of relevant reference scenarios which then form the basis for the development of
00:04:10 form the basis for the development of a European test standard. Well, let's just break that down a little bit if we may. First, when did you consider or stop to consider the suitability of the um single burning
00:04:22 suitability of the um single burning item test for um the external face of a high-rise building? Sorry, could you repeat that? Well, I I asked you whether you had ever considered whether the test was useful.
00:04:33 considered whether the test was useful. Yes.
00:04:33 Yes. For assessing fire behavior in circumstances far removed from the test scenario, namely namely by example external face of a building. and you said you did. My question is when?
00:04:45 said you did. My question is when? I don't know exactly when. Um but from the time that I became involved in the European system, it was very evident of you know the way that the test standard
00:04:57 you know the way that the test standard for the single burning item test etc was being developed um in relation to reference scenarios and there were discussions at the outset that a reference scenario was required
00:05:10 that a reference scenario was required for external fire performance as well. Was that at the time when you were looking at uh harmonization in 2001? Um yes I mean the work obviously went on
00:05:23 Um yes I mean the work obviously went on for very many years and I wasn't involved in it during that whole period. Um it started I think in 1989 something like that. Um and um you know other colleagues had been involved in that but
00:05:35 colleagues had been involved in that but yes I think I I became involved around 2001.
00:05:40 2001. And what made you think at the time uh that the single burning item test was not useful for assessing fire behavior in relation to any element of an
00:05:52 in relation to any element of an external face of a high-rise building? Well, it relied on the um classification derived from the um ISO 9705
00:06:03 derived from the um ISO 9705 room corner test which was internal linings within that room. And um you know it was very um
00:06:15 know it was very um that there was a correlation derived between that one and the results from the single burning item test to the extent that that was used to then define
00:06:27 extent that that was used to then define the class limits which you now see in this table in front of you. So and that was related to whether the room flashed over or not. Yeah. It's about flashover, isn't it? Yes, it is. Yeah. And and did during that process
00:06:40 Yeah. And and did during that process harmonization or or later did you ever say in very very simple almost lay terms if I may look why have we got a test based on flashover being applied to the
00:06:53 based on flashover being applied to the external buildup of a high-rise building?
00:06:57 building? Um not in those terms. No, but I mean it was well understood through the fire sector in in the UK and and in Europe
00:07:09 sector in in the UK and and in Europe that
00:07:10 that the whole premise of the classification systems were based on reference scenarios and there's a a European guidance document that exists that sort
00:07:21 guidance document that exists that sort of explains all of that. Um, in your own mind, were you confident at all times that government understood what you just told us?
00:07:31 told us? Yes.
00:07:33 Yes. So, Anthony Bird, Brian Martin, Bob Ledson, so far as far as you know, I don't know about Bob Ledom. I mean, I never really had any Okay. contact with Bob. All right. But Bri but Anthony Bird,
00:07:45 All right. But Bri but Anthony Bird, Brian Martin. Yes. Right. Now on the concept of limited combustibility and again this may be oversimplifying it but could you just tell us your understanding of that term?
00:07:58 understanding of that term? Um well basically you you can claim that your product your material is of limited combustibility if you have carried out the tests as defined in the approved
00:08:09 the tests as defined in the approved document B and achieved the um the pass criteria.
00:08:14 criteria. Uh and
00:08:15 Uh and and it's a term that's you know it's defined within that that context and approved document B it's table A7 I think isn't it? Yes. Yes.
00:08:23 Yes. Yes. And just just again this is over oversimplification please tell me but is it the case that in the Euro norms uh a limited combustibility is achieved by attaining A1 or A2 classes. Um A2
00:08:37 attaining A1 or A2 classes. Um A2 A2 Well A1 wouldn't necess wouldn't necessarily achieve limited combust well it's non-combustible it's non-combustible yes exactly A2 or better
00:08:47 better yes
00:08:48 yes right uh but but B C and and on down are not materials are limiting combustibility correct
00:08:56 correct uh and and was there a a UK class a national classification or standard for limiting combustibility there was wasn't there
00:09:04 there yes that's what I just explained. I mean, it's it's how it's linked to the results that you get in the BS476 um part four, not part four, part 11.
00:09:15 um part four, not part four, part 11. 11. Yeah,
00:09:15 11. Yeah, it's 11, isn't it? Yes. And 11 combustibility. Yes. And 11 part 11 is what's mentioned in table A7, I think. Correct. Right. Did you consider
00:09:26 Correct. Right. Did you consider well did you know and was were you clear in your own mind throughout your time at the BR that a classification to class N and a classification of limited
00:09:37 and a classification of limited combustibility were different? Yes.
00:09:40 Yes. Yes. And can you explain the difference? Well, for a start, you can only claim each of the relevant classes dependent upon the outcomes from the test that
00:09:52 upon the outcomes from the test that you've carried out. So, you carry out a different set of tests for part um for class O than you do for limited combustibility.
00:10:04 combustibility. But you can Sorry, sorry. Go on. Yes. And is those different are those differences uh the differences between national class 476
00:10:16 national class 476 part 11 for limited combustibility as opposed to BS 476 part six and seven. Yes. Absolutely. For class N. Yes.
00:10:23 Yes. And in the Euroorms they're on the screen so we can keep to them. Yes.
00:10:27 Yes. A A2 or better as opposed to B different slightly different tests or or or make up of separate tests. Yes.
00:10:36 Yes. But it's right, isn't it? Also, I think that
00:10:40 that class N was always defined as being achievable in respect of a material uh or or the surface of a composite product. Uh if it achieved
00:10:52 composite product. Uh if it achieved limited combustibility, um I don't know whether it always was. Do you know what it first was? No. And
00:11:02 No. And we'll may look into that. Yes.
00:11:04 Yes. In a little bit more detail later on. Has there any been any stage in your career when you were unsure about the definitions or meanings or relationships between class n and limited
00:11:16 between class n and limited combustibility? No.
00:11:21 No. I mean listening to you today it sounds like it's always been obvious meat and drink to somebody in your position at the B. Is that fair? I
00:11:33 your position at the B. Is that fair? I I mean in so far as it's clearly defined in the approved documents then yes I suppose it is um it's always been clear. Have you ever been aware at any time in
00:11:45 Have you ever been aware at any time in your career um up to and including 2017 of of others confusing or conflating the concepts of class N on the one hand and
00:11:56 concepts of class N on the one hand and limited combustibility on the other? Not that I was aware of. No, not in the BRE. No, not in government. No,
00:12:04 No, not in industry more widely. No, not not that people ever came to me to discuss that. No. Was it always your view looking at the
00:12:15 Was it always your view looking at the Converse that the UK construction industry always clearly understood the difference between those concepts?
00:12:23 Um, I had no reason to believe they didn't.
00:12:26 didn't. Right. So, you never had any experience. You never saw anything which might lead you to think that industry had confused or conflated class N was limited combustibility?
00:12:37 combustibility? No. No.
00:12:42 Did anybody ever come to you from government or other uh bodies, trade bodies, industry bodies and draw to your attention the fact that there might be such a confusion?
00:12:53 such a confusion? Not that I can recollect. I want to ask you about Nosley Heights fire in Liverpool 5th of April 1991. Um, and if I'm wrong about the date,
00:13:05 Um, and if I'm wrong about the date, please correct me. Um, can I take it that you are or were aware of that fire? Um, I wasn't at the time. Um, I was on maternity leave during 1991.
00:13:19 maternity leave during 1991. Um,
00:13:20 Um, so I wasn't involved at all in the fire investigation or whatever. I say my area of work at that time was on the uh computer modeling and fire dynamics um research work.
00:13:32 um research work. When did you first come to learn of the Nasley Heights fire? Um I guess I I don't know the exact date, but it would have been probably um around the time that the second edition
00:13:45 around the time that the second edition of BR135 was being drafted. So that would been just before or in 2003.
00:13:52 2003. Yes. around that sort of time. And what brought it to your attention? Do you remember? Um, it would probably have been, and I don't recall directly, but probably been around discussions that I might have had
00:14:05 around discussions that I might have had with Sarah, for example, Sarah Cowwell. Did you read the reports about that fire at that time? No,
00:14:11 No, you didn't. No.
00:14:14 No. Now
00:14:16 Now again correctly correct me please if I've got this wrong but the in 1988 Nosley Heights had been refurbished and and overclouded as part of a a pilot scheme between the FRS and the and the
00:14:29 scheme between the FRS and the and the estates action scheme um designed to improve energy efficiency and conditions in existing high-rise buildings. Do do you know that? No, I didn't know that. You didn't know that? Can I take it that you had no
00:14:41 Can I take it that you had no involvement in any aspect of that program at the time? No, I didn't. Have you ever subsequently heard that program being discussed within the BRE or anywhere else? No, other than recently in the context
00:14:53 No, other than recently in the context of um you know the evidence to the public inquiry. Now I want to show you a document and see if you could help me with it. Could we go please to INQ3014755?
00:15:05 Now this is a manuscript document. Uh it's a handwritten note to a Mr. sage from Lynn and it bears the date at the top if you can see it's it's 11th of of
00:15:17 top if you can see it's it's 11th of of April.
00:15:19 April. Uh
00:15:21 Uh well in fact it's at the bottom I think 11th of April 1991. The date doesn't particularly matter. The the month may be more important. It's April 1991. It's not a particularly easy document to read. So I just want to show you what it
00:15:33 read. So I just want to show you what it says where relevant. And it starts with a little one in the margin. You will wish, it says, to be aware of Allison Curtis's comments on the recent fire. First of all, do you know anybody called
00:15:44 First of all, do you know anybody called Allison Curtis who might no had anything to do with the fire? No. Second, two, it says, "We have received via HMEA a request from M Street Press
00:15:55 via HMEA a request from M Street Press Office to play down the issue of the fire. Our briefing for SOFS is purely factual and as far as I'm aware, Nosley will not be making an issue of the
00:16:06 will not be making an issue of the fire."
00:16:07 fire." Now, first, have you ever seen this document before? No.
00:16:12 No. Now, we know from a BR document that I'm going to show you shortly that in fact Allison Curtis was of was came from housing management and estates action at the DOE at the time.
00:16:23 the DOE at the time. Okay.
00:16:23 Okay. Um,
00:16:27 have you ever heard anybody discussing this fire, Nosley Heights, in these terms or anything similar? No, I haven't. So you never heard anybody discussing a request from
00:16:38 anybody discussing a request from government to play the Nosby Heights fired down? No. No. I mean around that time I would not have been involved in the fire investigation activities at all. Now let's in the light of that answer
00:16:50 Now let's in the light of that answer let's see how we go with the next few questions. We know and correct me again. The Nosley fire was investigated by the BR and a report was produced in November 1992 under the investigation of real
00:17:03 1992 under the investigation of real fires contract. Did you know that? Um, no. Not until Not not at the time. No, I didn't. Right. Can we look at it? It's BR 3035385.
00:17:15 Um, there's the first page of it. Do we take it that you had no involvement into any aspect of the BR's investigation into this fire? Correct.
00:17:23 Correct. And no involvement in any aspects of the report produced. That's correct. Do you remember whether you've ever read this document? Um to my recollection, no
00:17:35 this document? Um to my recollection, no I have not. Even in preparation to give evidence here,
00:17:39 here, um
00:17:41 um I may have um I did help in terms of pulling all of these documents together so that they could be photocopied and submitted to
00:17:52 could be photocopied and submitted to you in evidence. Right.
00:17:53 Right. Um but no, I didn't sit down and sort of read every every page of those. Well, let's take it let's take it in stages. Let's see how we go. Can we go please to page three, paragraph five
00:18:04 please to page three, paragraph five under the heading the building. Um, and it refers to the 1988 refurbishment to reduce energy consumption. And then if you look at page six, sorry, paragraph six, paragraph six, uh, which,
00:18:19 six, paragraph six, uh, which, uh, I think it's been cut off on the left hand side. Uh it
00:18:26 Uh it uh says in the um second paragraph under the word under the words of the building in the third line uh the 1988 scheme involved the use of a class N GRP
00:18:37 involved the use of a class N GRP rainscreen cladding on an alum on aluminium support rails and it goes on after the reference there uh to Gunnak uh and it says that uh cavity barriers were not fitted to allow
00:18:50 cavity barriers were not fitted to allow air unrestricted movement and under the DPR RE guidance at the time could be omitted where the cladding system was non-combustible. Um, were you aware that Nosley Heights
00:19:01 Um, were you aware that Nosley Heights had been clad in class N GRP rain screen?
00:19:04 screen? Not at the time. Not at the time. Okay.
00:19:09 Um, if I asked you detailed questions about this report, I take it from your answers that you wouldn't be able to help me very much. No, I'm afraid I can't. I mean the right
00:19:20 No, I'm afraid I can't. I mean the right person that would be able to potentially is uh Martin Ship may have a right
00:19:25 right a better
00:19:26 a better so far as you're concerned we can take this as read pardon sorry so far as you're concerned we can take this document as as as read um yes I mean I've got no comments that I can make on it
00:19:37 I can make on it would it be right to say I'm so sorry would it be right to say that in in terms of external fire spread the fire at Nosley Heights at the time was considered to be a major fire event and one discussed and referred to in various
00:19:49 one discussed and referred to in various pieces of research on external fire spread over the following years. Uh yes, I believe so. And that would include B research. Um yes, potentially. Yes.
00:20:02 Let's look at your statement then, please. Page 8, paragraph 24.
00:20:36 And uh at paragraph 24 you say this. Following a fire in a refurbished block of flats in Liverpool in 1991, it was accepted that a large-scale fire test method was needed to provide a better means for assessing and controlling the
00:20:48 means for assessing and controlling the potential fire hazards associated with external clatting systems. That test would involve the complete system installed as closely as possible to what would actually be installed onto a building. This was a clear recognition
00:21:00 building. This was a clear recognition that it was not possible to rely on smallcale fire test data on individual elements, materials or components in a cladding system as a means to try to predict and thereby control the fire
00:21:13 predict and thereby control the fire performance. Reliance on small-cale fire tests had been tried and had been shown to be inadequate. Now, is the fire that you're referring to there in the first line of that paragraph the Nosley Heights fire?
00:21:25 paragraph the Nosley Heights fire? Uh, yes, I believe so. And when you say it was accepted that a large scale fire test method was needed, um who was it accepted by? Um that was
00:21:38 Um that was um in relation to the work that then followed on. But who was it who accepted the need for a large scale fire test? um presumably the government department as well as the
00:21:51 the government department as well as the the research staff that were working in this area at BR. Right. You say presumably do do you know?
00:22:02 Well, I mean it I don't know the individuals precisely that that would have been involved in that decision, but judging by the fact that that is the direction that the work took,
00:22:14 direction that the work took, right?
00:22:14 right? Then clearly there was an acceptance that that was the right direction to be going in.
00:22:19 going in. I see. Do you know when that acceptance uh was
00:22:24 uh was uh
00:22:25 uh when was that accepted? Is there a moment when people in the BRE or in government to your knowledge realized or thought that a full large a large scale test was required? I think it was first flagged prior to
00:22:37 I think it was first flagged prior to this fire in fact in 1988 in the first edition of BR135. Um and then obviously there there was the follow-on
00:22:48 obviously there there was the follow-on work that then was conducted after this fire by um Raymond Con Connelly um and Tony Morris um that then you know continued through
00:23:00 um that then you know continued through the 1990s really was that was there a sense in which although in 1988 the first edition of BR BR135 had come out that there wasn't a general acceptance
00:23:11 that there wasn't a general acceptance that a large scale fire test method was needed. needed, but the Nasley Heights fire
00:23:16 fire was the catalyst for the acceptance of that.
00:23:19 that. Um, yes, I would say so. I see.
00:23:21 I see. I mean, the BR135 in 1988 was sort of flagging trends that had been seen and issues that um were potentially occurring and and the the the follow on
00:23:34 occurring and and the the the follow on work and the funding to enable that um followed through the 1990s, right? And
00:23:42 what did you understand at the time you became familiar with the lazy fire about what what the combustibility of the elements of the cladding system was it
00:23:53 elements of the cladding system was it non-combustible limited combustibility combustible? Do you know it was combustible? And was that why it was then that there was acceptance of the need for a large
00:24:05 was acceptance of the need for a large scale fire test method? Um, yes, I believe so. And you say that a large scale test was needed, quote, to provide, as you can see, a better means for assessing and
00:24:17 see, a better means for assessing and controlling the potential fire hazards associated with external cladding systems. A better means than what the um smallcale fire test methods. So
00:24:28 the um smallcale fire test methods. So the class O methodology had been shown to not be um applicable within this case. Right. So the BS 476 part six and seven
00:24:39 Right. So the BS 476 part six and seven tests on which guidance for the fire safety of external cladding systems was based.
00:24:45 based. Yes.
00:24:45 Yes. So the route to class not. Yes.
00:24:48 Yes. Right now focusing on the section of paragraph 24 where you say there was a clear this was a clear recognition. Do you see? You say this was a clear recognition that it was not possible to rely on small-cale fire test data on
00:25:00 rely on small-cale fire test data on individual elements, materials or components in a cladding system as a means to try to predict and thereby control the fire performance. Clear recognition, you say, by whom? By whom was this clearly recognized?
00:25:13 was this clearly recognized? by the researchers at what was the fire research station and um given that they were working for the government customer
00:25:24 government customer the government customer also right so does that tell us that at some point before 200 two or three at least so far as you know
00:25:35 two or three at least so far as you know and
00:25:37 and at a time after 1991 the government was aware ware that smallcale fire tests were an inadequate
00:25:50 were an inadequate basis
00:25:51 basis uh for trying to predict and control a fire in the external cladding of a high-rise building. Yes, I think the evidence was there from that one fire incident.
00:26:03 that one fire incident. Was that a consensus or were there dissenting voices? I I don't know. Now we we we don't see any evidence in the BRE November
00:26:14 see any evidence in the BRE November 1992 report on Nosley of this clear recognition of which you speak. Do you know whether there's a document you've ever seen within the BRE which actually records that
00:26:25 records that clear recognition? No, I don't don't recall seeing a document in those terms. Right. But you say it was widely shared. Was it within the BR and so far as you know within government? Well, the the person that was leading on on this work
00:26:37 person that was leading on on this work at the time was um Tony Morris in the fire research station and um you know it was your impression anyway there was
00:26:48 it was your impression anyway there was this clear recognition? Absolutely. Yes.
00:26:52 Yes. Does it does it follow that from your perspective, it would be extremely dangerous to rely on the data generated by a BS476 part
00:27:04 on the data generated by a BS476 part six and seven test to try to predict the fire performance of external planning systems or or to control the fire hazards associated with them. Um
00:27:15 Um well, at that time I I wouldn't have had a particular view. Um but now and looking at that now yes of course
00:27:26 course right at that time I think you probably mean at some point between 1991 and 200 two or three. Yes.
00:27:32 Yes. Did there not then come a time after 2003.
00:27:36 2003. Mhm.
00:27:37 Mhm. Say with the publication of BR135 edition 2. Uh that you you you espouseed the views to which you speak here in paragraph 24 of your statement about smallcale tests.
00:27:48 of your statement about smallcale tests. Yes. I mean I I think it was and it was absolutely my view and I think that of of other colleagues that um the way to control
00:28:00 um the way to control um the fire performance of the cladding system
00:28:04 system would be um to use the large scale test method and the classification. This is rather a broad question, forgive
00:28:15 This is rather a broad question, forgive me, but did you ever think to point out to government in the clearest possible terms that the retention of class N in ADB
00:28:26 of class N in ADB at least from 1992 if not earlier in relation to the external wall was was dangerous? Um, not in those terms. No.
00:28:39 Um, not in those terms. No. Why is that? um because
00:28:44 ADB provided a range of measures and it was not solely relying on class O. It it relied on um also materials of
00:28:56 It it relied on um also materials of limited combustibility etc. That's not right is it? from 1992 at least in the 1992 edition if one looked
00:29:08 least in the 1992 edition if one looked at from recollection it's 12A of ADB referred to the definition of class N being achievable um by by one of two routes one was limited combustibility
00:29:20 routes one was limited combustibility and the other was the other alternative route was was achieving the correct test result under 476 part six and seven so I I I wasn't involved in approved
00:29:31 so I I I wasn't involved in approved document B back in 199 92 either. Um but you know when I was involved from 200 um and one onwards
00:29:42 um and one onwards then you know that there was a clear understanding of the direction that this was heading or I believe there was a clear understanding of the direction
00:29:54 clear understanding of the direction that this was heading with the department. And what direction was that? in the sense that they were going to reference based on the um work of the um
00:30:08 based on the um work of the um government House of Commons select committee and the inquiry after the Garnet Court fire to basically produce a standard and a classification system
00:30:20 standard and a classification system that could then be used for external cladding systems. and it would be more representative and um would be an adequate means for controlling the
00:30:32 adequate means for controlling the hazards associated with those cladding systems.
00:30:38 systems. Nonetheless, you never said did you in all the years whether at the time of the um select committee
00:30:47 committee uh investigation and report or the subsequent harmonization process. You never said to government you need to get class N out of ADB
00:31:00 class N out of ADB when it in relation to external wall panels because it relies on small-cale tests and is therefore dangerous. No, I didn't. But then I wasn't involved
00:31:13 No, I didn't. But then I wasn't involved in the parliamentary select committee either.
00:31:17 either. Let's we'll come back to that. Sorry. Had you finished? Yes. Sorry. Yeah. I'm we'll come back to to that. I apologize for oversp speaking.
00:31:26 speaking. Um
00:31:32 in paragraph 24 in the last line you say reliance on small-cale fire tests had been tried and had been shown to be inadequate. Had they been shown to be inadequate by the fire at Nosley Heights? Is that what you're referring
00:31:44 Heights? Is that what you're referring to? Um
00:31:49 in well and in the experimental program that followed
00:31:57 what um the the experimental programs that followed that work
00:32:02 that work the research projects basically right no I'm I'm asking you this I mean there were a number but are you referring to the Connelly tests yes and there were a number but so there
00:32:13 yes and there were a number but so there was a growing body of evidence Right.
00:32:22 Did did you give any consideration apart from your conclusions about the dangers of reliance on small scale scale test data after Nosley to the possibility of restricting combustibility
00:32:35 restricting combustibility of external cladding systems.
00:32:45 restricting combustibility in in what way? What do you I'm not sure I follow what you mean. Well, in so far as combustibility is different from class N or limited
00:32:56 is different from class N or limited combustibility or non-combustibility as separate concepts. Did you ever give any consideration to whether or not external cladding systems should be limited by
00:33:07 cladding systems should be limited by reference to combustibility standards? All right. So I mean my view is and still remains that combustibility non-combustible is a binary concept. A
00:33:20 non-combustible is a binary concept. A material is either tested and is non-combustible or it's combustible. Yes.
00:33:28 Yes. And limited combustibility is a degree of combustibility. So, you know, it it's not
00:33:39 Yeah. I mean, that's my view and it it always has been and that's the way it was always explained to me in the way that I've always understood it.
00:33:51 Let's um let's turn then to the work of Dr. Raymond Connelly in 1994 which I think was the the um first perhaps major set of tests done on full scale um full
00:34:03 set of tests done on full scale um full scale test structures. Now just on Dr. Connelly, it's right to think that he joined the BR in 1991. Yes.
00:34:11 Yes. Um I couldn't confirm the date precisely. I mean if that's what he said he when he joined, I'd have no reason to Yes.
00:34:17 Yes. disagree with that. Yes. I mean did I think he was a co-orker of yours? No, I never worked with you Roman. Okay. Uh he he left I should just say in 1996
00:34:28 Uh he he left I should just say in 1996 which might help you. But um I want to ask you about RCO701 please.
00:34:36 Uh and this is his report
00:34:41 RCO701.
00:34:46 Now, um, this is a document we got from him, not the BRE, I should just tell you, and it's dated the dated April 1994, and it's entitled, "Investigation of the behavior external cladding
00:34:58 of the behavior external cladding systems in fire report on 10 full-scale fire tests." Did you have any involvement in any aspect of the testing or the preparation of this report? No, I didn't.
00:35:09 No, I didn't. Have you ever read this report before? Um, I've read a partial copy. um fairly recently because that that is all that BR had in its right um archive.
00:35:21 all that BR had in its right um archive. So you didn't read it at the time? No, I would have had no no reason to. I wasn't working in that area. Do you know what caused it to be commissioned by the DOE?
00:35:32 commissioned by the DOE? Um I'm assuming it was to do with Nosley Heights.
00:35:38 Are you aware of the findings in this report or or not at all? Um I'm aware of the conclusions. Right.
00:35:49 Although you weren't involved in the testing or the report at the time, were you aware it was going on? Um, I suppose vaguely. I mean, the the
00:36:00 Um, I suppose vaguely. I mean, the the thing to um mention here is that all of this work, large scale work was done up at the Cardington laboratory, which was remote from the um headquarters, if you
00:36:11 remote from the um headquarters, if you like, of the forest search station. So, you know, unless you were up there, you wouldn't know or be aware of exactly what was going on up at Cardington. Was this report disseminated internally
00:36:22 Was this report disseminated internally and available to everybody at the BRE or or or was it Not that I'm aware of. No, not. Do Do you remember discussing at least the conclusions with any of your colleagues at the time or later?
00:36:34 your colleagues at the time or later? No. No, I didn't see it at the time. No. Are you able to tell us why when the inquiry asked for a copy of this
00:36:45 inquiry asked for a copy of this document from the B there was none in the B's possession?
00:36:51 I can only assume um that obviously Raymond Connelly had left the business and he would have handed all of this information over to Tony Morris at the
00:37:03 information over to Tony Morris at the time. one I I would assume and and then Tony Morris equally left the business and over the years documents get moved around and and documents get cleared out
00:37:15 around and and documents get cleared out as well. Um you know to make space you you know we don't you don't have a an infinite
00:37:23 infinite archive available. So from time to time people will clear things out and and if it was in a bundle of um information,
00:37:34 it was in a bundle of um information, you know, it may have got inadvertently um thrown away. Can we look please at CLG1003883.
00:37:56 This is a an email on your screen uh uh in an exchange in uh July 2009 between you and Brian Martin with Anthony Bird
00:38:08 you and Brian Martin with Anthony Bird and Sarah Cowwell copied in. And we can see on the screen your email of 8th of July 2009 at 2:27 p.m. And in the
00:38:19 8th of July 2009 at 2:27 p.m. And in the first paragraph you say this. Hi, Brian. I tried to call you earlier, but you were not available. I've spoken with Sarah this morning, and she has retrieved the attached report, which reports that there were over 3,000 tower
00:38:30 reports that there were over 3,000 tower blocks in the UK representing about 225,000 homes capable of housing almost 1 million people. This is based upon a client report written by Ray Connelly in
00:38:41 client report written by Ray Connelly in 1994. Sarah has also located a CD with all the reports from the external cladding project. Please let us know if you would like a copy at this stage.
00:38:52 you would like a copy at this stage. Now, were you sending Dr. Connley's 1994 research report itself to Brian Martin or or were you sending a different document which quoted from or referred
00:39:03 document which quoted from or referred to Dr. Cony's report? I don't recall. I I don't know. Do you know why you were sending whatever it was you were sending at the time?
00:39:12 time? No. Is there any other any other emails in the chain?
00:39:21 Well, because I've lost my remote system at the moment, I can't tell you. But uh I I can ask I can ask you this question. Um this email was sent uh 5 days after
00:39:32 Um this email was sent uh 5 days after the fatal fire at Lacel House which happened on the 3rd of July 2009. Right.
00:39:36 Right. My question is was Lacol the was it the fire at Lacel House what prompted this discussion? Um, it may well have been, but I can't confirm that.
00:39:48 but I can't confirm that. Uh, had Brian Martin, do you remember, asked for some particular information from the BRE in the wake of Lacnull? It looks as though he was asking if we had anything associated with the number of tower
00:39:59 associated with the number of tower blocks, etc. Right. I see. C, can we take it from the use of your word retrieved that by 2009, Dr. Conny's 1994 report wasn't readily available uh
00:40:12 1994 report wasn't readily available uh at least to you and Sarah Cowwell. Um that may well have been the case, but I don't I don't recall that. Can we go please to Raymond Connleyy's
00:40:23 Can we go please to Raymond Connleyy's statement? That's at B3047667.
00:40:28 And I'd like to go to page six, please. Uh and about six lines up from the bottom of the page
00:40:38 uh he says it was always on the right hand side. Can you see? Yes. Yes.
00:40:42 Yes. Yes. He says it was always obvious to me from the department's consistent support or funding of the research being undertaken at BR into external wall systems from 1992 onwards that the department was
00:40:53 1992 onwards that the department was aware of potential limitations with their historical approach to the issue. The department modified stroke improved their guidance between the 1985 and 1992 versions of approved document B in
00:41:05 versions of approved document B in respect of external wall systems. However, the conflict between fire safety requirements in terms of providing cavity barriers and the need for ventilation of cavities to avoid dampness posed challenges for the
00:41:17 dampness posed challenges for the department. My recollection is that resolution of these conflicting requirements by employing a more holistic approach to fire safety design was one of the prime motivating factors behind the department's support of the new research. Uh are you able to uh
00:41:32 new research. Uh are you able to uh agree with what he says there? I I don't know whether that was the main motivation for it or not. I'm not aware that it was to do with um conflicting
00:41:44 to do with um conflicting right
00:41:46 right requirements. Did you share the view in 1994 or after that perhaps that the um the department was aware of potential limitations with the historical approach to the issue?
00:41:57 to the issue? Um
00:41:59 Um yes, I think so. And what what led you to that? Well, the very fact that they were continuing to fund further work in this area.
00:42:10 area. And what limitations in particular do you think the department was aware of in relation to their historical approach? Um
00:42:19 Um the basically the um the inadequacy as we've already discussed of the um smallcale test right
00:42:29 right methods.
00:42:39 Now did you understand that the principal objective of of the work and again bearing in mind what you've told us about your familiarity with it but do you did you understand that the
00:42:51 but do you did you understand that the objective of the work was to assess the effectiveness of installation of fire barriers in reducing the hazard the fire hazard
00:43:00 what of Dr. Conny's work. Yes.
00:43:02 Yes. Um,
00:43:05 Um, yes. I mean, I guess that that was part of the the issue. If we stick with his report, please, and go to page nine, paragraph 21, he says at a on that page, the test at
00:43:18 he says at a on that page, the test at top of the screen, it's now gone. There it is. The tests were designed to try to discriminate between different external wall systems in terms of their fire performance. The main focus was on developing the most appropriate heat source.
00:43:30 source. Now help us heat source. Does that mean the crib?
00:43:35 the crib? Yes, it does. Yes, it will do. And does that accord with your understanding that that was the a main focus of his experimental work so far as you were familiar with? I mean it would obviously be part of
00:43:46 I mean it would obviously be part of what you had to do on route to developing a methodology and you would have to look at you know what what was relevant in terms of the thermal exposure. Looking at D,
00:43:59 exposure. Looking at D, uh he he says uh I cannot recollect but likely to have been chosen as representative of systems commonly used within the industry.
00:44:11 commonly used within the industry. And then if you look please at G at the very foot of the screen uh at the very end of the page uh he
00:44:22 uh he says the nature of the research proposal would likely in my opinion to have been to identify a problem in this case real world fire incidents as exemplified by nosy heights and real world technical
00:44:33 nosy heights and real world technical constraints associated with the need to maintain open ventilated cavities to avoid dampness and to avoid a potential and to identify a potential potential solution, i.e. a means of examining all of the relevant variables in a holistic
00:44:45 of the relevant variables in a holistic manner by means of a full-scale test rather than relying on the existing component by component rules for example class N sheeting and provision of story level cavity barriers.
00:44:57 level cavity barriers. And he goes on to say um that um test two
00:45:03 two was designed to be representative of although not to replicate exactly the external cladding system used at Nasley Heights. Now, does all of that that I've just read to you and told you accord
00:45:14 just read to you and told you accord with your understanding of the focus and aim of Dr. Conny's work? I can understand what he's saying there.
00:45:25 I can understand what he's saying there. And if that's his account of the um aim of the work, then I have no reason to uh dispute that. And if we look please at the next page of his statement paragraph
00:45:37 the next page of his statement paragraph 22E
00:45:39 22E he says I had no expectations that a reaction to fire rating of class N would be sufficient to mitigate against fire spread over the surface of the material in the context of subject test.
00:45:51 in the context of subject test. Class N is determined based on what I would term loosely a bench test. I say this recognizing that BS476 part 7 radiant test panel is not strictly strict speaking bench scale. And then he
00:46:04 strict speaking bench scale. And then he says class N is a surface-based measure of performance appropriate to wall and ceiling linings and offers no information about the combustibility of the material or its mechanical integrity at high temperatures. Now I think given
00:46:16 at high temperatures. Now I think given your evidence earlier Dr. Smith you would agree with that last last sentence. Um, predominantly, although it is possible to have a product that has a
00:46:27 is possible to have a product that has a very thin coating that gets burnt away and then exposes the material or substrate beneath that and then of course you are actually carrying out the
00:46:39 course you are actually carrying out the test on the on the substrate the material beneath that. So there are there are a few you know um exceptions to that
00:46:48 to that but generally speaking your point about the the unreliability of these small scale tests. Yeah. I mean the I mean the key thing with these small scale tests and in the
00:46:59 with these small scale tests and in the case of class O and um the part six and part seven tests is that you unable to install them
00:47:10 is that you unable to install them um with a representative fixing system. Um, you can you can go as far as to install them with a different substrate
00:47:22 install them with a different substrate behind them or with an air gap, but that's about as far as you can go. So, you can't replicate some of the, you know, important design variables that
00:47:34 know, important design variables that are potentially important when it comes to um, you know, largecale systems. Did you or the government consider either before or particularly after the
00:47:47 either before or particularly after the Connelly 1994 work whether class N was an appropriate classification requirement for external surfaces of a tall building given the nature of the tests and its origins as a
00:47:59 nature of the tests and its origins as a measure of performance for wall linings. So I don't know what um the government considered or what they didn't. Um and I say it wasn't until um sort of 2001 when
00:48:14 say it wasn't until um sort of 2001 when I became aware of this sort of work and um with the involvement of a new research project in this area that we gave any thought or consideration to it
00:48:26 gave any thought or consideration to it personally. I mean there may have been others at BR or fire search station that did of course. Uh now just looking at test two and I'll
00:48:37 Uh now just looking at test two and I'll take this quickly with you Dr. Smith um given your um evidence about your familiarity with this report. But can we go please to the report itself? RC701
00:48:49 go please to the report itself? RC701 page uh 12
00:48:59 uh and under the heading uh at the very foot of your screen fire properties of sheet cladding materials it says um the polyester band sheet and the
00:49:10 um the polyester band sheet and the thermosetting resin band sheet achieve a class N rating as described in approved document B of the building regulations 19912 two on both the front and rear faces. A class not rating is derived
00:49:21 faces. A class not rating is derived from performance of the material in both the surface spread of flame and fire propagation tests described in BS 476 parts six and seven. Mhm.
00:49:29 Mhm. In fact, the other way round doesn't matter.
00:49:31 matter. Yeah.
00:49:32 Yeah. Uh and then if you go please to page 16, we can see the report for test two which that's where it starts and you can see it says polyester bound
00:49:43 and you can see it says polyester bound sheet with no fire barriers and there's the system description. And then if you go please to page 18 in the last paragraph on that page. These are the conclusions from the um test two test and it says this.
00:49:55 and it says this. There was unlimited vertical spread of the fire over the full height of the test facility. Uh the flames would probably have spread to upper stories had they been present. The horizontal spread of fire was
00:50:06 The horizontal spread of fire was limited however and it appears that the aluminium sheeting rails are effective fire barriers even though they do melt. Uh it is clear that the reaction to fire properties of the sheeting material do not give a true indication of the
00:50:17 not give a true indication of the potential fire hazard. There's clearly a need for some form of fire barrier protection with the polyester bound sheet cladding. Uh and it uh
00:50:28 Uh and it uh uh at page 46 if we go to that please in the fourth paragraph down in the report uh it says it is clear that BS476 parts six and seven do not accurately reflect the fire hazards that may be associated
00:50:39 the fire hazards that may be associated with cladding systems. Reasons may include the fact that the flame movement of a real cladding fire is in the vertical direction as opposed to the horizontal direction in the test.
00:50:50 horizontal direction in the test. Uh and then the last paragraph on that page says it's clear from the experimental work undertaken at Cardington that a cladding material achieving a class N rating may suffer
00:51:01 achieving a class N rating may suffer extensive surface burning. This burning often spread to the top of the test building some 9 meters and would have spread further if possible. few fire barrier systems successfully reduced the
00:51:12 barrier systems successfully reduced the fire spread. Now he's he is isn't he expressly saying here the class N classification was not a reliable way in which to assess the fire hazards presented by external cladding panels at
00:51:24 presented by external cladding panels at least on the basis of the results of test two here. That's my reading of that. Yes. Yes. And do I take it from your evidence that you've given so far that you you wouldn't express surprise at that
00:51:36 wouldn't express surprise at that conclusion? No. given that this is part of the evidence that I would use to derive that view as well. So yeah, so it's a bit tortological. Yes, I see that. I understand that uh in
00:51:49 Yes, I see that. I understand that uh in his witness statement and I'm summarizing there's no need to go back to it. He he Dr. Connelly tells us that this was not a new discovery and that there was no reason that it would have needed any kind of emergency response
00:52:00 needed any kind of emergency response from the government. Now did you your for your your part at any stage consider the reliance and approved document B on class N through diagram well diagram 40 as it became on
00:52:13 diagram well diagram 40 as it became on smallcale testing to be a matter which needed to be addressed as a matter of urgency.
00:52:18 urgency. Um I mean I wouldn't have had a view at the time that this report was written um because as I say I wasn't involved in this work at all. No. But later did you ever come to a con
00:52:30 No. But later did you ever come to a con to the conclusion uh that the reliance in approved document B and particularly diagram 40 on class N was something which needed to be addressed urgently.
00:52:42 which needed to be addressed urgently. I mean I think we came to the view that the fire performance of cladding systems in general did need to be addressed and that was obviously promulgated as well by the Garnuk Court fire.
00:52:55 by the Garnuk Court fire. Mhm. Um and I say and that's what led to the work that followed on from that and that was done um as quickly and expediently as possible um for the very
00:53:07 expediently as possible um for the very reason that that would yield a means by which those hazards could be controlled better.
00:53:15 better. Well, it would yield a a means by which those hazards could be controlled better if they were the means if they were the sole route to compliance with ADB. But they weren't were they class not
00:53:26 they weren't were they class not remained uh the one of the linear routes to compliance um on its own it's it wasn't a means for compliance.
00:53:37 compliance. You couldn't just test the outer surface and ignore everything else in a cladding system.
00:53:43 system. That that's my reading of um the approved document. Well, we're getting ahead of ourselves, but would you accept this much? Class N remained in diagram 40 and in
00:53:56 Class N remained in diagram 40 and in what became 12.6 of approved document B right up until the time of the Grenfield Tower fire. It was never removed. Um, yes, that's correct.
00:54:08 And yet class not relying as it did on small scale tests which you were known by you to be unreliable as a predictor of external fire spread and proven to be so by test two here.
00:54:21 Sorry is that a question or a statement? Um
00:54:25 Um yes, but I mean the the content of the approved document is
00:54:32 is in itself um something that BRE even back when we were part of um government had very little
00:54:44 government had very little autonomy over in terms of controlling that content. It always went through, as far as I understand it, a process, and
00:54:55 far as I understand it, a process, and I'm certainly familiar with the process that's been followed in more recent years. Um, and ultimately the decisions are taken by the B committee and the um
00:55:07 are taken by the B committee and the um and the government of the of the day. Um so I mean certainly when the European classes were introduced in 2002 there
00:55:18 classes were introduced in 2002 there had been an expectation shared by you know a number of people including myself that the old national classes would all be removed at that
00:55:30 classes would all be removed at that stage.
00:55:31 stage. M
00:55:32 M um however they they were not and that was a a decision taken by B the department etc based on decisions and views around
00:55:46 etc based on decisions and views around potential costs to industry if that happened um and costbenefit analyses and that that were carried out. So, you know, that there were higher
00:55:59 know, that there were higher um
00:56:02 um decision makers, I guess, that that were dictating what could and couldn't be done.
00:56:07 done. Who were they? I wouldn't know. I mean, we we were I was never involved in B. Um I don't know what the recommendations were around that at the time.
00:56:19 that at the time. Um, and ultimately, you know, as I've always understood it, the Secretary of State has to sign off on the approved documents before they're published.
00:56:31 documents before they're published. So, these issues around cost to industry etc. would have been debated within the department and and the views formulated
00:56:49 Let's uh we'll come back to that I think in in due course when we look at the harmonization and your involvement in it in 2000 2001. For the moment though let's just look at what Dr. Connelly
00:57:00 let's just look at what Dr. Connelly says about cavity barriers. Can we please go to uh the report here at page 48 just two pages on uh and just look at one or two of his conclusions on that
00:57:11 one or two of his conclusions on that briefly. Paragraph five he says under the conclusions the only fire barriers to be found to be inadequate to be found to be adequate in effectively reducing the fire hazard were those which were substantially fixed to the masonry
00:57:22 substantially fixed to the masonry substrate and fitted independently of the aluminium sheeting rails. Now the paragraph nine at the foot of the page he says the fire nature of the fire barriers required to prevent fire spread
00:57:33 barriers required to prevent fire spread depends on the nature of the cladding material itself. While certain types of fire barrier systems were found to be adequate with some sheeting materials, they were inadequate with others. And then 10 over the page.
00:57:47 If we turn the page 10, the only fire barriers which substantially reduce the fire hazard require that the vertical sheeting rails be cut at regular intervals. Consequently, such a barrier system may be unwieldy and expensive to
00:57:58 system may be unwieldy and expensive to fit in practice. And then 11. Any attempt to limit the fire hazard by specification of details of a satisfactory fire barrier system will prove very difficult without consideration of the nature of the
00:58:09 consideration of the nature of the cladding material itself. To decide on the necessary fire protection, each cladding system needs to be evaluated in its own right. Um now when you first saw this report um
00:58:21 this report um or or perhaps even now, did you or do you agree with those four conclusions? Um, I suppose my only concern with the conclusions as written and without seeing the rest of the report is it's
00:58:34 seeing the rest of the report is it's not clear what fire barriers he's talking about and what types of fire barriers were actually tested. And given that this was back in 1994,
00:58:46 that this was back in 1994, um
00:58:48 um how relevant that is now to practice today and the types of systems that are available today in terms of barriers. I that that would be my my
00:58:59 barriers. I that that would be my my concern around that. Do you think it's right to say that that appropriate cavity barrier systems can only be decided by consideration of the specific cladding product with which they are to
00:59:10 cladding product with which they are to be used?
00:59:12 be used? Um
00:59:15 details in principle. Yes. Yes. And do you remember whether that aspect of the report was ever discussed by you or any of your colleagues at the B internally?
00:59:27 colleagues at the B internally? I don't know. Or what about with government? Do you know?
00:59:30 know? No, I don't know. Uh, finally on this, can I just ask you about what he says at page 49 under paragraph 12? Uh, where he says, "For the rational
00:59:41 Uh, where he says, "For the rational design of cladding systems, there is a clear need for full-scale testing of performance in fire. Uh, such tests would help determine the adequacy of fire barrier systems when used in conjunction with a particular sheeting
00:59:52 conjunction with a particular sheeting system." And I think you told us you you we we covered this before. You agree with that? Yes.
00:59:58 Yes. Yes. And we'll come on to discuss later the BR's development of full-scale testing which culminated in BSA414 part one
01:00:06 one and then part two but just for now do do you know whether any consideration was given by the B or the department to any options other than the development of a
01:00:18 options other than the development of a full-scale test as a response to this work?
01:00:22 work? I don't.
01:00:23 I don't. You don't? No. Um, so do we take it from that that there was no consideration given to restricting the combustibility of external cladding panels?
01:00:35 external cladding panels? I I don't know. And we can see that the combustible nature of the rain screen as an element in the external wall buildup is not directly addressed in Dr. Connelly's
01:00:46 directly addressed in Dr. Connelly's 1994 report. Is it the case that it wasn't intended to address that problem or question? Do you know?
01:00:54 you know? No, I don't know. Um, but you know, research, you present the results and the facts that you've unearthed and then you, you know, sometimes you reveal
01:01:05 you, you know, sometimes you reveal something that you didn't intend to reveal, but you don't, you know, you're you're open with that and and that's exactly what's happened here. So, it wouldn't matter really if that was an objective or not. If that's what
01:01:16 was an objective or not. If that's what the research showed then and that's what's been reported that that is that is that
01:01:22 is that do I take it that from that answer and and indeed the other answers that you've been giving that from 1994 nobody that nobody at the BR or within government or between the two ever considered either
01:01:37 between the two ever considered either getting rid of class N or or um reinforcing the um non-combustible nature of external cladding.
01:01:47 cladding. I I can't comment on that. I mean, I say the person that was leading on all of this research and that Raymond Connelly reported to was Tony Morris and he had a
01:02:00 reported to was Tony Morris and he had a regular dialogue with um the department at the time. So, I'm sure you know a number of these things probably would have been discussed. No reason to think
01:02:11 have been discussed. No reason to think they wouldn't have been. Um, but of course there's no there's no evidence to say one way or the other. But I'm asking you about your recollection rather than Well, I I wouldn't I have no
01:02:22 Well, I I wouldn't I have no recollection because I just was not involved. So, I'd like to turn next to the development of fire note 3 and the submission to the department as it was then the DETR. Um,
01:02:34 department as it was then the DETR. Um, can we please go to BR 405868?
01:02:40 And there is fire note three. Uh uh and it is authored by Tony Morris, Sarah Cowwell, David Smith, uh uh and two others including Mr. Connelly himself,
01:02:51 others including Mr. Connelly himself, Ray Connelly there, who was a consultant. Okay.
01:02:54 Okay. And uh it was published by the BR I think in 1998.
01:03:00 Is that right? Um it will say when it was published page two, I think we can probably cure. Yeah, it says 1988. You could just see that there. Yes.
01:03:11 You could just see that there. Yes. Yes.
01:03:12 Yes. Yes. Now, um in simple terms, is this right? Uh it's a method being proposed here for full-scale testing of the fire performance of a cladding system. Uh that's my understanding.
01:03:25 Uh that's my understanding. Did you have any involvement in any in any aspect of the development of Fire Note 3?
01:03:29 Note 3? No.
01:03:30 No. Do you know which team or division within the BR was responsible for the development of Fire Note 3? Yes, it was the team that was led by Tony Morris. Tony Morris's team as we can see from the title. Um, in 199 in 19 uh 98, you
01:03:46 the title. Um, in 199 in 19 uh 98, you were head of the reaction to fire team, weren't you? Uh, yes. Yes. And computational simulation. Yeah. And we can see as I've just shown you, let's go back to page one. One of the authors of the of Fire Note 3 included Sarah Cowwell, didn't it?
01:03:58 Sarah Cowwell, didn't it? Yes. Um, and you told us earlier that you uh oversaw Sarah Cowwell's work from I think 1997 onwards. Um, yes.
01:04:09 Um, yes. So, did that include her work on Fire Note 3?
01:04:12 Note 3? No.
01:04:12 No. Why is that? because Tony Morris would have been the project leader on this and as I explained earlier um if there were cross
01:04:22 cross departmental projects then the people working on that project would report into
01:04:29 into um you know the project manager. Did you see this report at all at the time?
01:04:33 time? I don't recall seeing it at the time. No. And I would have had no reason to. I mean, if it was published in 1998, I I the work would have been completed before that
01:04:45 before that um and the draft report would have been published before that. I don't know how long before that, but um because it takes a period of time for them to be published in this way.
01:04:57 published in this way. Do you know what Sarah Cowwell's role on that project was? Um not in detail. No, I don't. Now do you know what the specific circumstances
01:05:08 you know what the specific circumstances or um what the impetus was which led to the development of this test method? Uh no I don't.
01:05:17 Do you know whether it was developed in conjunction with industry or particular manufacturers? Um no I don't.
01:05:29 Do you know how the specific performance criteria in far 3 was selected? Uh, no I don't. Do you know why no failure criteria was set for mechanical response?
01:05:40 set for mechanical response? No, you don't. I don't.
01:05:51 Uh, let's then move on to Garnet Court. Um that's a fire which happened at Garnet Court in Irvin in Scotland on the 11th of June 1999, wasn't it?
01:06:04 11th of June 1999, wasn't it? Uh yes.
01:06:05 Uh yes. I mean you may not recall the precise date, but take it from me because it was um you mentioned this fire in your statement at paragraph 28 at page nine. I don't think I need to take you to that, but you mentioned the
01:06:17 take you to that, but you mentioned the vertical fire spread. Mhm.
01:06:19 Mhm. Um that is that the fire you're you're referring to? Were you aware at the time of the fire of the circumstances of that fire?
01:06:27 fire? No.
01:06:29 No. You described it in your statement as significant. Would you agree that in the the timeline, if you like, of the history of fire events in the United Kingdom, it was another major fire event on that timeline? Yes, I would.
01:06:40 Yes, I would. Uh, and is that partly because it resulted in a fatality? Um,
01:06:46 Um, yes. and
01:06:49 yes. and the fact that the fire spread from you know up the entire side of the building. Yes. Now like Nasley Heights Garner Court was another local authority block
01:07:00 Court was another local authority block of flats which had been refurbished wasn't it? Um I believe so I don't know all the details.
01:07:05 details. Uh take it from me. In fact it was refurbished in 1991 the year of the Nasley fire and clad in GRP glass reinforced plastic panels. Okay. Um, I mean, were you were aware of
01:07:16 Okay. Um, I mean, were you were aware of that at the time of the fire? No,
01:07:18 No, we weren't. We know we know that from the subsequent BR report. I can show it to you if you like. But that's fine. Yes, I think you agree that. Do you remember when you first learned about the gun that caught fire?
01:07:29 the gun that caught fire? Um, I would have been sort of vaguely aware um in in the sense that it led to the parliamentary inquiry and and the subcommittee
01:07:40 subcommittee um sort of investigation. And I was aware that obviously Sarah Cowwell and Peter Field and Tony Morris were going to give evidence.
01:07:51 to give evidence. Yes. We'll come to that. Yeah. Shortly. Um before we look at that, do did you know what GRP was? Yes, I did know what GR. You'd heard of it? Yes.
01:08:01 Yes. Uh now, um did you know that GRP was combustible? Um, I'm not sure I'd ever carried out any experiments with GRP personally.
01:08:15 any experiments with GRP personally. Um, but I would have expected it to have been.
01:08:21 Now, after the fire, the inquiry has become aware that the BR investigated and produced in fact three reports into the fire. Let me just tell you what they are and we can identify them by
01:08:32 are and we can identify them by reference. The first um was the report uh prepared for the North Air Asia Council um bearing the reference 79902 dated the 8th of September 1999
01:08:45 dated the 8th of September 1999 and that is that BR 3035377.
01:08:51 Uh we'll have a look at it in a moment. The second was was date was prepared for North Asia Council and bears the reference 81310
01:09:02 and bears the reference 81310 and is dated the 5th of May 2000. The reference to which is B305377
01:09:10 at page 22. And the third is a report from August 2000 dated um I think in fact dated August 2000 for the DER
01:09:23 fact dated August 2000 for the DER Anthony Bird and that's BR 3035375
01:09:28 and entitled the DER framework project report investigation of real fires project number 76572 June 1999 to April 2000. No. Um, first, did you have any
01:09:41 2000. No. Um, first, did you have any involvement in any aspect of the investigation into the fire at Garnet Court?
01:09:46 Court? No, I didn't. And what about any involvement in the preparation of any of the three reports I referred to? No, I didn't. Do you know who was involved in that work?
01:09:55 work? Um, in terms of the fire investigation, uh, I don't off the top of my head. No, I mean,
01:10:02 I mean, you don't? No. Have you read these reports before? Um, no.
01:10:07 Um, no. You've never read them? No. Now, there's one there's one aspect of the reporting of this fire that we are keen to get the BR's assistance on, and we we've already asked a number of
01:10:19 we we've already asked a number of witnesses. Let me ask you about it. I'd like to have up, please, on the screen. Um the uh
01:10:27 Um the uh um the first of the two reports prepared for North Asia, namely BR035377.
01:10:35 [Music]
01:10:38 Uh and also on the screen at the same time, the reports submitted to the department in August 2000 under the investigation of real fires framework at
01:10:49 investigation of real fires framework at BR035375.
01:10:54 Now just in general terms if we can have them both up on the screen at the same time please.
01:11:01 So the left hand side as you can see is the uh September 1999 report to North Asher and the right hand side is the August 2000 report under the framework
01:11:12 August 2000 report under the framework investigation of real fires project prepared for Anthony Bird. Now, just in general terms, you may have heard the questions put to previous witnesses, but the reports to North Asia Council make
01:11:23 the reports to North Asia Council make numerous references to class N and in particular to the fact that the cladding at Gar Court should have had a class N classification, whereas the BR's investigation of real fires report to
01:11:35 investigation of real fires report to the DETR makes no mention of class N at all.
01:11:39 all. First, is that something you've ever been aware of? No, not until um the evidence presented right
01:11:47 right here.
01:11:48 here. I see.
01:11:51 I see. So you can't explain why the references to class N have been removed? No.
01:11:56 No. The BR?
01:11:57 The BR? No, I can't. Have I mean presumably Martin Ship has been asked that question. But I'm asking you. You can't tell me.
01:12:08 But I'm asking you. You can't tell me. No, but he he would be I would suggest the person that would be most likely to be able to help you with that. Right. Let's just try one um one
01:12:19 Right. Let's just try one um one reference to this and see how we go. Um could we please have up at the same uh time please? Um if we go please to uh the on the left hand side of the page um
01:12:31 the on the left hand side of the page um page six paragraph 3.1.1
01:12:37 uh and you'll see and at the same time on the right hand side let's please have page four top of the page we've got the paragraph that says remedial measures and on in the
01:12:50 says remedial measures and on in the left hand side on the left hand side you can see there's a sentence which says the spandrel panel. Can you see halfway down?
01:12:58 down? Yes.
01:12:59 Yes. The spandrel panel to be an ex external insulated render of panels between the windows of either a non-combustible or class N material. And if you look at the right hand side, third line down, it
01:13:10 right hand side, third line down, it says the spandrel panel to be an external insulated render of panels between the windows of a non-combustible material. No reference to class not there.
01:13:18 there. Mhm.
01:13:18 Mhm. Do you know why not? No, I don't. And this and can we take it and we could shorten this. Can we take it that the same would apply if one does a comparator comparison between both reports?
01:13:29 reports? Yes.
01:13:30 Yes. You can't help. No, I can't. I wasn't involved in either and obviously I didn't see the report at the time. C can you think of any reason why the BR would not set out the
01:13:43 why the BR would not set out the observations that they'd set out about class N and combustibility to North Asia in in in the same way to DETR?
01:13:55 in in in the same way to DETR? Well, the No, I can't really. Um the only possibility might be that more information became available if they were done at different times.
01:14:07 if they were done at different times. And I don't know which one was done first, but you know, may maybe the information was clarified. Um, best practice would be then to um
01:14:19 Um, best practice would be then to um revise the other report to reflect any changes, but no, I can't.
01:14:35 Right. But can you think of any new information that came up as a result of any further investigation which would justify the deletion of all reference to class N in the report that went to the
01:14:46 class N in the report that went to the DUTR?
01:14:52 No, I can't. But that that's the only um possibility. you know, more information became available from the fire service or the council or whatever that meant that whatever was
01:15:05 whatever that meant that whatever was there originally wasn't wasn't correct.
01:15:11 You you don't know. No, I don't. But you're speculating, I think. Yes, I am. Now, let's then turn to the 1999 select committee recommendations. And Mr. Chairman, I think you're looking at the time now would be an appropriate moment
01:15:22 time now would be an appropriate moment for the break. Right. Well, we always have a break during the session, so we'll take a break now. We'll resume, please, at half three
01:15:31 three and while we're out of the room, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything to do with it. All right. Thank you. Thank you very much.
01:15:48 Thank you, Mr. Minut three. Thank you.
01:31:12 Would
01:31:22 you ask Dr. Smith to come back in, please?
01:31:37 Right, Dr. Smith, all ready to keep going?
01:31:39 going? Yes.
01:31:39 Yes. Thank you very much. Yes, Mr. Bill. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, Dr. Smith, um, I'd like now to turn to the 1999 select committee and the recommendations. And now you mention the
01:31:50 recommendations. And now you mention the committee hearings in your statement at paragraph 28 on page nine. We don't need to go to them, but I think you are aware that following the Garnet caught fire, a parliamentary select committee inquiry was established by what was then the
01:32:02 was established by what was then the environment subcommittee of the environment, transport, and regional affairs committee uh to investigate the potential risks of fire spread posed by external cladding
01:32:13 fire spread posed by external cladding systems. Yes. Yes.
01:32:14 Yes. Yes. Now, it's right, I think, that you didn't yourself attend the evidence session to that inquiry in July 1999. That's correct. But Sarah Cowwell, Tony Morris, and Peter Fields, so far as we
01:32:26 Morris, and Peter Fields, so far as we can see from the record, did attend. That's my understanding. Uh, and now Tony Morris, you've mentioned his name a number of times. We've seen his name as a project lead on Fire Note 3.
01:32:37 project lead on Fire Note 3. Uh, and he and I think he was the project leader on Fire Note 9, wasn't he?
01:32:42 he? Uh, yes, that's my understanding. Yes.
01:32:44 Yes. I just want to look at some of the recommendations made by the select committee in their report after the evidence. Um, we can find that at CLG3019478.
01:33:02 Now, we've gone in on page eight. Let's go to page one, please, because we'll get the date of this document, which is the 14th of December, 1999, as you can see on your screen.
01:33:13 you can see on your screen. Um, did you read this document at the time it was published? Um probably not at that time. Why? Why? So um it wasn't an area that I was actually
01:33:24 um it wasn't an area that I was actually involved in. Right.
01:33:29 Right. Were you not interested to uh follow what had happened at this select committee? I would have probably read it around 2000 with the subsequent work, but I
01:33:41 2000 with the subsequent work, but I don't I don't actually recall when I read it, but obviously I have read it. Right. C can we take it? You say from about 2000. I mean about 2000 happened two weeks after the 14th of December
01:33:52 two weeks after the 14th of December 1999. But short I mean in the months after it was published. Yes I think. Yeah. Okay. Now let's look at page eight please. Let's look at page eight paragraphs 14 to 16 together. At the
01:34:03 paragraphs 14 to 16 together. At the foot of the page it says the inquiry also prompted further research at the fire research station of the building research establishment BRE. The conclusions arising from this research
01:34:14 conclusions arising from this research which was carried out in 1994 support the claims of our witnesses that the small-cale tests upon which the existing guidance relies are insufficient properly to evaluate the performance of complete cladding systems in a fire and
01:34:26 complete cladding systems in a fire and that there is therefore a clear need for full scale testing. And then there's a footnote 24. And if you just scroll please or have scrolled to you at the very foot of the page
01:34:37 to you at the very foot of the page you'll see that the reference uh um under footnote 24 is to the Connelly work in April 1994 isn't it? Yes.
01:34:46 Yes. Yes. Uh and if you then go on please to page nine of paragraph 15 top of your screen it says um BR proceeded to develop an appropriate fullscale fire
01:34:58 develop an appropriate fullscale fire test known as a test for assessing the fire performance of external cladding systems. This test was submitted to the DETR in 1996 uh and then get there's a footnote
01:35:09 uh and then get there's a footnote there. Witnesses suggested that this test would be a considerable improvement on the small-cale testing which is currently carried out to ascertain the fire performance of materials used in external cladding systems. And then 16
01:35:20 external cladding systems. And then 16 other witnesses suggested that this test would not be suitable for all external cladding systems and in particular it would not be a suitable method of testing the fire performance of infill systems such as that which was develop
01:35:31 systems such as that which was develop which was involved in the fire at Irvin. However, we note the view of Peter Field of BRE, which developed the test, who told us, quote, "We believe the test facility itself could be accommodated to assess the fire performance of systems
01:35:43 assess the fire performance of systems which are not the same as total cladding systems and may involve windows and decorative panels." Close quotes. The advice we have received concurs with this opinion. Now against that background can we
01:35:55 Now against that background can we please then uh go to paragraph 19 under the heading the adequacy of the regulations pertaining to their use and paragraph 19 we can see the following
01:36:06 paragraph 19 we can see the following recommendation in bold it says notwithstanding what we've said in paragraph 18 we do not believe that it should take a serious fire in which many people are killed before all reasonable
01:36:18 people are killed before all reasonable steps are taken towards minimizing the risks and then it says in ordinary print. The evidence we've received strongly suggests that the small-cale tests which are currently used to
01:36:29 tests which are currently used to determine the fire safety of external cladding systems are not fully effective in evaluating their performance in a quote live unquote fire situation. As a more appropriate test for cl external
01:36:40 more appropriate test for cl external cladding systems now exists, we see no reason why it should not be used. And then 20. We believe that all external cladding systems should be required either to be entirely
01:36:52 required either to be entirely non-combustible or be proven through full-scale testing not to pose an unacceptable level of risk in terms of fire spread. and then in bold the recommendation. We therefore
01:37:04 in bold the recommendation. We therefore recommend that compliance with the standard set in the test for assessing the fire performance of external planning systems which has been submitted to the British standards institution for adoption as a British
01:37:15 institution for adoption as a British standard be substituted in approved document B for previous requirements relating to the fire safety of external cladding systems. Now, when you read that, as you say, you
01:37:26 Now, when you read that, as you say, you did in the early months of 2000, that recommendation that I've just read to you at the bottom of page nine and on to page 10 in paragraph 20. What did you understand that recommendation to mean?
01:37:39 understand that recommendation to mean? Um
01:37:41 Um basically that we needed to move towards um
01:37:47 um more reliance on the large scale fire test method as an alternative to a system being non-combustible.
01:37:58 non-combustible. As a simultaneous alternative or as a replacement Dr. Smith as a replacement. Yes.
01:38:05 Yes. So you understood that it it meant that smallcale testing would be replaced by a full-scale test method if this recommendation was carried into effect. Yes.
01:38:15 Yes. Yeah.
01:38:17 Yeah. Let's now go to the department's response to the committee's recommendations. We find that at CLG1 40347.
01:38:28 Now, it's difficult to attribute a date to this, but we understand that it was published on the 6th of April, 2000. Uh, and if we go to page, well, page one, it the title is government
01:38:40 one, it the title is government response. Just go back to page one. I'm so sorry. Government response to the first report of the environment, transport, and regional affairs committee on on potential risk of fire spread in buildings via external planning systems. And then if you go to
01:38:52 planning systems. And then if you go to page two please in paragraph five it uh it's sets out the department's details of the consultation which has taken place on the amendments to the
01:39:03 taken place on the amendments to the 1992 version of approved document B which was the the version of ADB as it then stood. Yes.
01:39:11 Yes. Yes.
01:39:12 Yes. I'm I'm summarizing it perhaps inelegantly. Um did you see that at the time do you think uh what the revi the proposals for the amendments? Yes. Um
01:39:24 Um I doubt I would have seen those. Did you do you remember whether you saw this report in general? Um
01:39:31 Um no I don't remember whether I saw this report in general and it's unlikely at that time that I would have seen it. Right. Let's just look at paragraph six. It says this. During the review, there
01:39:42 It says this. During the review, there was no suggestion that the guidance given in the approved document was insufficient or if followed would tend to create an unsafe scenario in a fire situation with respect to external
01:39:53 situation with respect to external cladding.
01:39:55 cladding. Now, leaving aside Dr. Smith the question of whether or not there was any such suggestion within the responses to the government's consultation on approved document B at the time did you agree in 2000 when you looked at
01:40:08 did you agree in 2000 when you looked at this that there was no suggestion that the guidance given in approved document B was insufficient or if followed would tend to create an unsafe scenario in a fire situation with regard to external
01:40:20 fire situation with regard to external setting
01:40:21 setting as I said earlier I don't recall seeing this at the time I mean who who prepared prepared this. Well, this is written by Nick Reignsford, MP, who was the sponsoring minister effectively.
01:40:32 sponsoring minister effectively. Okay. Because it said um talking about him giving evidence. Um I I don't recall seeing this. Well, you said you did earlier. I just
01:40:43 Well, you said you did earlier. I just wonder.
01:40:43 wonder. Um not this. It was the previous document.
01:40:47 document. See, so you didn't see this report? No, I don't recall seeing this report. The government This is the government's response, isn't it?
01:40:52 it? This is the response. You didn't see this at the time? I don't recall seeing this. My no but my my question let me let me try and get it at a a different way on what you knew at the time and looking at what you read in
01:41:03 the time and looking at what you read in the report at the time you do say you read um was it your view that there was no suggestion as a fact that the
01:41:14 no suggestion as a fact that the guidance given in approved document B was insufficient or if followed would tend to create an unsafe scenario in a fire situation with respect to the external platting. I mean it's an odd statement given that
01:41:26 I mean it's an odd statement given that there had been a fire that and there had been an inquiry that had led c can I just interrupt it if I read this correctly Mr. Mitt the first line of paragraph six is referring to the review
01:41:38 paragraph six is referring to the review which is described in paragraph five so there was a review by the brack working group and during that review which of course I think Dr. Smith will not have
01:41:49 course I think Dr. Smith will not have seen. Not sure we have either. There was no suggestion that the guidance was insufficient. It doesn't follow that that is Dr. Smith's own view. But I think the question perhaps should be put
01:42:01 think the question perhaps should be put in a more direct way. Yes. Let me try it differently. I I I I see the I I accept that. Um let's it's let me try it this way. I think it's wrong, isn't it, to say that if if you
01:42:13 wrong, isn't it, to say that if if you were yourself asked whether the guidance given approved document B was insufficient or if followed would tend to create an unsafe scenario in a fire situation with respect to external clatting, your answer would be uh that
01:42:25 clatting, your answer would be uh that it was insufficient and would tend to create an unsafe scenario. Um probably if I'd been asked the question at the time. Yes.
01:42:35 And did that view
01:42:39 that view [Music]
01:42:41 [Music] Counterfactually though it may have been uh did that view of was that view formed as a result at least in part of the Ghana caught fire?
01:42:52 Ghana caught fire? Yes.
01:42:52 Yes. Yes.
01:43:01 Now I think you've you say that the committee recommended that BR135 should be revised to reflect the types of products and cladding systems that were then in use and that a large scale fire
01:43:14 then in use and that a large scale fire test standard should be published by British Standards Institute. That's paragraph 29. We'll come on to look at that. But that that's right, isn't it? That's your recollection. Uh yes.
01:43:22 Uh yes. Yes. Now I'd like to look at how this then developed. Fire Note 9 is the next um stopping point. Um Far Note 9 I think was dated 1999, wasn't it?
01:43:34 was dated 1999, wasn't it? Um
01:43:36 Um I I don't know without looking, but it should be in the inside cover. Uh let's go to CTA 619.
01:43:46 Uh and you can see there it is. It's it's authored by uh Sarah Cowwell and David Smid and it's entitled Assessing the Fire Performance of External Planning Systems, a test method. And if we go to page two uh you say you see as
01:43:59 we go to page two uh you say you see as you rightly say the date 1999. Yes. Um,
01:44:06 Yes. Um, now, uh, do you know whether this was published before or after the evidence given to the select committee, which of course was in July 1999?
01:44:17 course was in July 1999? I don't know that. Um, I mean Sarah Cowwell may have a recollection of that. Now, at the time it was published, I think you were head of the reaction to
01:44:28 think you were head of the reaction to fire team, correct? Would would it have been you who approved this document? Um
01:44:36 Um I don't know. I don't recall approving it. Um and I would not have been the final signary anyway. It would have been um the final
01:44:47 anyway. It would have been um the final signary would have been Peter Field, right?
01:44:53 right? Final signature Peter Field. But Sarah Cowwell
01:44:57 Cowwell reported to you at this time. Yes, she did. Um, if Tony Morris was the project manager under which this was developed, then she would have reported to him in relation
01:45:09 would have reported to him in relation to this work. Right. That doesn't necessarily mean you didn't see it at the time, does it? No, it doesn't. I mean, I I've seen it since, of course, and it's very difficult to remember
01:45:21 difficult to remember at the time whether I actually saw it then and and, you know, right, made any comments on it. All right. Now, let let's try it this way. Did you understand Sarah Cowwell to be leading
01:45:32 understand Sarah Cowwell to be leading on the development of F09, subject to the supervision of Peter Field? Um, yes. Yes. Now, let's go to her statement, please. Um, BR30's 47571,
01:45:43 Um, BR30's 47571, page 19, paragraph 127. She says this. Fire Note 9 did not develop a new test method method. It was a revision of Fire Note 3. Fire Note 9 contained no
01:45:55 Note 3. Fire Note 9 contained no technical changes to the methodology or assessment criteria in Fire Note 3. The primary revisions were A setting a limit on the maximum thickness of sample which could be tested, B inclusion of a
01:46:06 could be tested, B inclusion of a definition section, and C a graphical example of determination of test start time and temperature. Now, from what you know of this, is that right? Um, yes, as far as I'm aware, yes. She
01:46:19 Um, yes, as far as I'm aware, yes. She goes on to say uh at the if you go to page 20 please at the foot of that page paragraph 134 uh she uh says that the process by which
01:46:31 uh she uh says that the process by which note 9 was developed can be described as a review of the format in which note 3 was presented in order to bring it in line with the approach used by standardization bodies such as the BSI and to con conform she that should be
01:46:43 and to con conform she that should be conform with MHLG and industry stakeholders that the classification methodology and associated performance limits based on the work already completed in the development of 583 were
01:46:54 completed in the development of 583 were still acceptable. Do you agree with that?
01:46:58 that? Um, if that's what Sarah's recollection is, then I have no reason to disagree with that. Was that your understanding of the way in which Note 9 came to be developed? Um I don't recall
01:47:11 I don't recall with whom at the MCLG were the matters listed there from 583 confirmed or conformed with with uh as still acceptable. I don't know that.
01:47:22 I don't know that. Do you know who the industry stakeholders were that she refers to? Um no I don't. Can we look at your witness statement, please? page 8, sorry, page uh 8,
01:47:34 please? page 8, sorry, page uh 8, paragraph 25.
01:47:38 And at the foot of the page, we can see paragraph 24 is the one we read before about reliance on smallcale test data. You see that? And then if you look at paragraph 25,
01:47:51 And then if you look at paragraph 25, you say this. As a result, a department of the environment DOE and industry collaborative research project was established to develop the first large-scale fire test methodology. This resulted in the publication in 1999 by
01:48:02 resulted in the publication in 1999 by BRE of Fire Note 9 assessing the fire performance of external cladding systems, a test method.
01:48:11 Uh, and then it goes on the test method set out in Fire Note 9 was first referenced in the 2000 edition of approved document B, Fire Safety. And there's a reference which is one of the
01:48:23 there's a reference which is one of the guidance turn the page documents to the building regulations 2000 published by the office of the deputy prime minister along with the first edition of BR135 which was published in 1988. And if we
01:48:34 which was published in 1988. And if we go on please on page 9 to paragraph 27 you said this. This test method was published in reference to control the hazards that might arise due to developments in the products, materials, and components of cladding systems and
01:48:46 and components of cladding systems and also included criteria to demonstrate an acceptable level of fire safety performance for cladding systems on the outside of masonry buildings. Mhm.
01:48:54 Mhm. Now, where from where or from whom did you learn about the reason for the development of Far Note 9 that you've set out here?
01:49:06 Far Note 9 that you've set out here? Um, it would have been in discussions with at the time, I'm sure, Peter Field, um, and Sarah Cowwell. And what was your involvement in those discussions?
01:49:17 discussions? Um, very little. I wasn't involved at all in the development of 59. Well, you were involved enough to be able to glean and the PII project that or the whatever
01:49:28 and the PII project that or the whatever it was the the the collaborative project that was carried out that was referred to
01:49:35 to Maybe we're at cross purposes. Um I asked you where from where or from whom did you learn about what you've set out about your understanding of 59 and you told us that it was in your discussions with Peter Field and Sarah
01:49:46 discussions with Peter Field and Sarah Cowwell and my question is what was your involvement in those discussions? What was the nature of your involvement in those discussions? Um it would have just been um feedback in terms of background
01:49:59 been um feedback in terms of background to what was going to be done next because this was obviously a response to the um environment subcommittee
01:50:10 the um environment subcommittee um the parl parliamentary inquiry and whilst they put references in there and made reference to the first edition of BR135
01:50:23 BR135 um it was not really definitive guidance. There were no pass fail criteria or anything like that in BR135. It was guidance and I think there was a
01:50:34 It was guidance and I think there was a recognition that that needed updating to reflect the types of systems and so on that that were now in the market as opposed to what was available in 1988
01:50:46 opposed to what was available in 1988 or pre988. In fact, I I I'm just puzzled by the chronology. Was
01:50:54 Was far 9 developed, as you've just told us, as a response to the environment subcommittee, the parliamentary inquiry, or did it predate that? Um, it predated that. It was published
01:51:05 Um, it predated that. It was published before that, wasn't it? Yes. So, how could it have been a response then to the No, no, I was talking about the paragraph above where the reference to it was put into the approved document.
01:51:16 it was put into the approved document. I see. Now looking at um paragraph 27 of your statement there. Mhm.
01:51:22 Mhm. Um
01:51:24 Um was fire note 9 mainly developed because of the recognition your word that reliance on smallcale test data was not possible
01:51:33 possible uh as you've explained or mainly because of developments in the products used or a bit of both. Um
01:51:42 Um I suspect a bit of both. It's my belief that it it it was a bit of both.
01:51:50 of both. Principally, what was the principal driver though? Was it the inadequacy of small test data, small scale test data? Um, yes. The the the fact that you still
01:52:01 Um, yes. The the the fact that you still needed um a standardized approach for testing at large scale. Now, I don't think we need to go to it, but Dr. Connelly says in his statement and I summarize that at the time of his
01:52:13 and I summarize that at the time of his experimental work in 1994 uh the idea was to move away from class N and adopt compliance with the full scale test. That's that's from his statement of paragraph 25c on page 15 of
01:52:25 statement of paragraph 25c on page 15 of BR30 47667. Assuming that that is correct, do you know why there was so little movement in that direction in the years between 1994
01:52:36 that direction in the years between 1994 the date of his tests and 1999 the date of fire note 9 and the DETR parliamentary select committee inquiry? No, I don't. You don't.
01:52:47 You don't. Do you know why there was so little movement even in the wake of the select committee's recommendation on full-scale testing in December 1999? I can well from what I can recollect I
01:52:58 I can well from what I can recollect I mean the decision was taken that the standard the finite nine needed to be taken and turned into a British standard and
01:53:08 and you could not actually put the reference to that BS standard in until it had been published. No.
01:53:16 No. And sorry, you know, so it's um chicken and egg, isn't it? And work was done as quickly as it could be to progress that.
01:53:27 as it could be to progress that. But the egg hatched at some stage, didn't it? In the sense that BS8414 went in.
01:53:34 went in. Yes.
01:53:35 Yes. But diagram 40 and class were retained. Yes.
01:53:40 Yes. question is why? I can't explain that other than what I said earlier about um you know the decisions
01:53:51 decisions as to what to leave in and what to take out were not taken by BRE. they are taken by other um authorities
01:54:02 um authorities based on consultation and um input from B and um other constraints that the government departments may well be
01:54:13 government departments may well be under.
01:54:15 under. Did you see a draft of the 2000 edition of the of approved of the next edition of the approved document before it was published? Um,
01:54:26 published? Um, I don't recall seeing one. No. Now, it was published in July 2000, but were you aware at some time before that that Fire Note 9
01:54:40 that Fire Note 9 was not going to replace testing to BS8, BS 476 parts six and seven and diagram 40, but there would be just a passing mention of it in the text of the guidance as a possible alternative
01:54:52 guidance as a possible alternative option. No, I don't think I would have been aware of that. Right.
01:54:57 Right. Do are you able to tell us why that came about?
01:55:03 about? Why it was only given a passing mention? No, I don't know why. Did you ask anybody at the department when you saw the 2000 edition why it was that class N had been retained and there
01:55:14 that class N had been retained and there was only a passing reference to what had been not?
01:55:18 been not? No, I mean that was not an area that I was working in at that time. So other colleagues would have had such discussions with the department. Do you know which colleagues had those
01:55:29 Do you know which colleagues had those discussions with the department? Um people such as Tony Morris and a colleague of his that used to work um very closely with the department in
01:55:41 very closely with the department in terms of um understanding and interpreting the research um for them was um Richard Reid. Did did you ever talk about this subject
01:55:52 Did did you ever talk about this subject with any of those individuals? Um, no. I don't believe I did. Do you know who made the decision that the full-scale test that the BR had developed
01:56:02 developed to the extent of note 9 would not replace diagram 40 as the select committee recommended, but would sit alongside it? No, I don't know. I think you told us earlier that that at
01:56:15 I think you told us earlier that that at the time the full-scale test might replace diagram 40 at some point in the future.
01:56:21 future. Yes.
01:56:22 Yes. Was that something that you had discussions about with anybody at the department? Um
01:56:28 Um I mean it must have been something that I don't know whether it was discussed with the department or whether it was um my belief based on discussions that I'd had with B colleagues such as Peter
01:56:40 had with B colleagues such as Peter Field and um and Sarah Cowwell. Can we then go back to the department's response to the committee's recommendations 6th of April? It's a document you told us you hadn't seen, but let's let's
01:56:51 but let's let's I don't recall seeing it. Yeah, that you don't recall seeing it. All right, let's CLG. Let's go to it. CLG1 14347
01:57:00 page 3 paragraph 9
01:57:08 and it says the 1992 addition of the approved document to part B which was in force at the time I give evidence to the committee last year set out the recommended provisions for the fire protection of external surfaces of walls in diagrammatic form. However, in the
01:57:21 in diagrammatic form. However, in the new 2000 edition of the approved document to part B, the test method mentioned in your recommendation, currently BR fire note 9 is now quoted as an alternative to meeting these provisions for the external surfaces of
01:57:33 provisions for the external surfaces of walls.
01:57:37 Uh now, um if we then go on to paragraph 11, it says this. When the technical when the technical amendments to the document have been completed and it's been
01:57:48 have been completed and it's been adopted as a British standard, the department will amend the reference in the approved document to BRE509 to reflect its status as a British standard. We will also review whether the reference to this method of
01:57:59 the reference to this method of demonstrating compliance should be strengthened. It is unlikely that any such changes will be made immediately. The status of the test method is changed such as such minor amendments to the
01:58:10 such as such minor amendments to the approved documents are difficult to promulgate to ensure that all users of the document are made aware of the change. However, supplements to the approved document are planned to give guidance on the new harmonized European methods of test and the amendment would
01:58:21 methods of test and the amendment would be included in this. Now, um I know you say you don't recall seeing this document at the time, but were you aware that this was the department's response? the two
01:58:32 department's response? the two paragraphs I've just read to you, nine and 11.
01:58:35 and 11. No, I don't recall being aware of that. Does it follow that you weren't aware in 2000 that the department's position was that following the adoption of the BR's
01:58:47 that following the adoption of the BR's full-scale test as a British standard, it would review whether the reference to this method of demonstrating compliance should be strengthened. Yeah. No, I I wasn't aware of that. I
01:58:58 Yeah. No, I I wasn't aware of that. I don't recall being aware of that. Do you recall any discussion about the possibility of substituting BR's then fire note 9 as a test method
01:59:10 BR's then fire note 9 as a test method uh for the existing requirements of diagram 40 or at least going some way towards doing that? No.
01:59:15 No. No.
01:59:24 In fact, it's right, isn't it, that no such amendment to quote strengthen the reference to 59 or indeed PSA414 part one as it became was included in the
01:59:35 one as it became was included in the supplement to the approved document on the harmonization of European test methods in 2002? Um, probably I mean don't recall without
01:59:46 Um, probably I mean don't recall without going back and checking. I mean that that would be take it from me that it wasn't. Can you help us why that is the case? Um, no I can't.
01:59:56 can't. Do you remember any discussion with the BR about that? About not strengthening the reference to include the reference to British standard 8414? No, not with me anyway.
02:00:08 No, not with me anyway. And in fact, it's right, isn't it, that when the reference to BS8414 uh came into the approved documents as it did in the 2006 edition published in
02:00:19 it did in the 2006 edition published in April 2007. There was still no amendment to quote strengthen the reference, was there?
02:00:26 there? Um,
02:00:27 Um, no. The the reference would have just been changed to Yeah.
02:00:31 Yeah. the BS8414. Yeah, exactly. Right. Standard.
02:00:35 Standard. And indeed, that's the case, isn't it? as far as you know throughout all the amendments subsequently to the approved document.
02:00:41 document. Yes, correct. Uh so it's right to think that throughout these documents PS8414 was provided as an alternative and only as
02:00:52 provided as an alternative and only as an alternative route to compliance alternative to meeting the provisions of 12.6 six and and diagram 40 so far as external so so far as external walls were concerned over 18 mters
02:01:03 were concerned over 18 mters correct
02:01:04 correct and only in December 2018 that the government did away with class N in relation to external walls uh yes
02:01:12 uh yes yeah
02:01:15 yeah can you just tell us at what stage over those years 2000 to 2018 did you realize that the select committee's recommendation
02:01:26 recommendation of replacing class N with what became BS8414
02:01:32 BS8414 was not going to be followed and that class N was here to stay.
02:01:41 I I don't recall at what point that um that would have been um foremost in in my mind.
02:01:51 my mind. I couldn't give you a date. There's no point at which you asked yourself given what you knew about and felt about class N and knew about the recommendations from the select
02:02:03 recommendations from the select committee. I wonder why class N is still there in approved document B. Yes. I mean what I would say is that of course you know when they undertook the review in 2006
02:02:16 review in 2006 then the department went out to full consultation on the changes and also asked for um you know industry's views on those um changes etc.
02:02:30 on those um changes etc. and
02:02:32 and Brack again would have been heavily involved in preparing all of that material and those documents and
02:02:42 it's really um it's really for those bodies well and and say BR has no um authority in that we can only express an
02:02:56 authority in that we can only express an opinion and it is no more valid than anybody else's opinion. Well, it may or may not be more valid, but it would certainly be more influential, wouldn't it, given the
02:03:07 influential, wouldn't it, given the historic relationship between B and government even after practice? Well, not necessarily. No, not your experience. No.
02:03:14 No. You say that industry's views on the changes were sought
02:03:20 sought as part of the consultation in 2006. Do do you know whether industry was asked the question, should we retain class not? I don't know without going back and looking. I mean
02:03:33 without going back and looking. I mean that there certainly was a lot of debate and a lot of um consideration given to the retention of the national classes not just class north but the national
02:03:44 not just class north but the national classes in general in the approved document.
02:03:47 document. G given the indicated direction of travel in 2000 did there never come a point when you even in a casual moment with with your contacts in the department you being the points person
02:03:58 department you being the points person at the BR ever say to them what's happened to BS8414 taking over from class N as the select committee recommended back in 1999
02:04:09 recommended back in 1999 I don't recall having that direct conversation on that one particular issue with them given
02:04:15 given I mean the the approved document obviously covers a big broad range of of matters um in relation to the different classes.
02:04:25 classes. Um,
02:04:26 Um, given the BR's interests in what became BS8414 and the expansion of the testing that you would be able to achieve and
02:04:38 you would be able to achieve and therefore the conccommatant increase in your in your income, why didn't you press government on getting rid of class N as recommended and adopting BS8414 as
02:04:50 N as recommended and adopting BS8414 as the standard? Well, that's not the motivation for um for BRE. It's it wasn't about us increasing the income into that income
02:05:02 increasing the income into that income stream. I mean, the whole point of um producing Fire Note 9 as a British standard was to make it more available to other laboratories etc. so that they
02:05:13 to other laboratories etc. so that they could indeed um invest and and begin to carry out testing in those areas as well.
02:05:19 well. um it was to make it you know a a proper standard that others could also test to. What I'm really suggesting to you is that you had two motives um for pushing what the select committee
02:05:33 um for pushing what the select committee had recommended namely substitution of class N with the full scale full system test. The one was financial and the other was was fire safety in the public interest. Would you accept that? Um,
02:05:46 interest. Would you accept that? Um, yes, fire safety in the public interest. That said, I say, you know, there are other authorities that are looking at these things and and BR's voice was one
02:05:57 these things and and BR's voice was one of many and, you know, did not necessarily carry any greater weight than anybody else's. I wonder if that's really really right.
02:06:08 I wonder if that's really really right. It's right, isn't it, that in fact the BRE was contracted in by government to do lots of things, including advising on the amendments to the approved documents, prove document B in 2006.
02:06:21 documents, prove document B in 2006. Well, we could produce the technical evidence base and provide them with the information, but we were not the decision makers. No, I'm not suggesting that you were the decision makers. What I'm asking you
02:06:33 decision makers. What I'm asking you what insights you had in into the rationale for those who were making the decision. Yes. I I don't recall that conversation happening. Um so I I I really can't um offer any
02:06:46 so I I I really can't um offer any further
02:06:48 further information around that point. Let's then turn to 2001 uh and uh CC1924 which was the review of fire performance
02:06:59 which was the review of fire performance of external cladding systems and also the revision of BR135. Um
02:07:08 Um first you'll recall I think that there was a project uh which um BRE bid for in late 1999 after Garnuk and after the select committee which was the review of
02:07:19 select committee which was the review of fire performance of external cladding systems and the revision of BR135. Um yes
02:07:25 Um yes yes uh and that was under a contract called CC1924. Um, probably. Yes. Yeah. Take it from me. It's got a label and that that's what we refer to. Were
02:07:36 and that that's what we refer to. Were you involved in that project, Dr. Smith? Um, not directly. No, not directly. Um, during the project, I think your position within the BRE was head of the reaction to fire team as
02:07:47 head of the reaction to fire team as we've already seen. Correct.
02:07:48 Correct. Um, did you become involved in the bid for the 19 CC 1924 project? Um,
02:07:55 Um, I think the bid would have been prepared by um, Dr. KOA. Um, I may have seen it and made some comments on it. I don't recall.
02:08:08 comments on it. I don't recall. Um, and I don't know who signed the bid off. It may well have been at that time um, Peter Field. Let's go to B3041836, please.
02:08:21 This is the first page of the bid document.
02:08:23 document. Okay. as you can see and it bears the date 23rd of December 1999. The BR project manager is Mrs. S. Cowwell.
02:08:33 Cowwell. Uh and uh you can see the title to it. Uh if um there are a number of versions of this document uh but if you um to stick with that I think at that time
02:08:45 stick with that I think at that time still you were Sarah Cowwell's line manager weren't. I was. Yes. Yeah. Uh and if we go please to page 11 under the scope of work
02:08:56 under the scope of work you can see a second paragraph there uh which says in the second line the quality in terms of the technical detail of the work and the outputs and the timeliness of delivery will be
02:09:07 timeliness of delivery will be supervised and monitored throughout the project by Dr. DA Smith as director of the center for reaction to fire and Mr. Pfield director of FRS operations. Yes. And then if you go to the sixth
02:09:18 Yes. And then if you go to the sixth paragraph down under the heading project organization and staffing um that reads in the second line the project will be led by Mrs. S. Cowwell
02:09:29 project will be led by Mrs. S. Cowwell uh senior consultant center for reaction to fire under the supervision of Dr. GA Smith as director for center for reaction to fire. The quality and timeliness of the outputs is monitored by Mr. Pfield director of FRS
02:09:41 by Mr. Pfield director of FRS operations. Yes.
02:09:45 Yes. Uh and then if you go uh to page 12 please in the middle of the page um you can see that on page 12 it says
02:09:57 um you can see that on page 12 it says just after the two bullet points under project responsibilities all activity on the project shall be subject to the supervision and quality control of Dr. DA Smith. Mhm.
02:10:08 DA Smith. Mhm. How
02:10:09 How now can we take it from that that that is an accurate record of your your relationship to this project and your responsibilities on it? Um as laid down in this um
02:10:23 Um as laid down in this um yes that Sarah would have um consulted me as and when she needed to. Yes.
02:10:30 Yes. Can you tell us how did you provide the supervision and quality control for this project?
02:10:35 project? I don't recall all of the details of that.
02:10:39 that. In what way did you supervise Dr. Cowwell's work? Um
02:10:44 Um I mean obviously um she would have designed the program because it was a test program. She would have designed that. I'm sure we would
02:10:55 have designed that. I'm sure we would have sat down and reviewed the test program that she was proposing to do and would have discussed um
02:11:04 um potentially why she had chosen to do one thing as opposed to something else. Um you know I might have during that discussion said have you thought about
02:11:15 discussion said have you thought about X? Um
02:11:18 X? Um you know it's that kind of discussion. I mean it doesn't mean that you are stood in the laboratory looking over somebody's shoulder all the time.
02:11:29 all the time. That's not what that means in this context.
02:11:33 context. Can we go to page three this document
02:11:38 and we can see the objectives the project objectives there and there are three bullet points. um to review the guidance contained within the approved documents that serve the building
02:11:49 documents that serve the building regulations with regard to external cladding systems on multi-story buildings. In particular, fire stopping between floors and surface spread of flame to update and maintain the building regulations and associated guidance based on a series of
02:12:00 guidance based on a series of experimental studies on new and existing cladding systems to support the process of regulation and harmonization with Europe. And then under those specific under those general objectives, you can
02:12:12 under those general objectives, you can see that there are some specific objectives of the DETR set out there. Uh and we can see that we carry out a a survey of the existing multi-story building stock in Great Britain in order to determine the composition and design
02:12:25 to determine the composition and design of systems and the changing nature of materials currently in use within 3 months of the start date. to produce a simple database of the results of the survey including cladding type application and the respective market
02:12:36 application and the respective market share within three months of the start date
02:12:40 date to review and update the existing guidance given in BR E report BR135 etc and then over the page
02:12:51 etc and then over the page uh if you go over the page um to complete an experimental program etc to utilize large scale scenario-based tests to determine the most approp appropriate method for specifying the fire
02:13:02 method for specifying the fire performance requirements of cladding systems and then other things as well as you can see. Um just on that last bullet point I'm want to focus but did all of those particular objectives listed in the bid
02:13:13 particular objectives listed in the bid document remain as objectives and unchanged through the life of the project?
02:13:19 project? I don't recall. Now as part of the project do you recall that an IG an industry advisory group was established by the B? Um yes that would not be unusual.
02:13:31 would not be unusual. And what was its purpose? Um
02:13:35 Um the industry advisory groups or stakeholder groups or steering groups as they they can be called any one of those things is for them to basically um understand what's going to be done in
02:13:47 um understand what's going to be done in the project. for them to provide input to the project to they have generally real world experience that the research
02:13:58 real world experience that the research teams at BR at the time um did not have. Um and they're able to um also advise on
02:14:09 Um and they're able to um also advise on choices and selections of um different materials
02:14:14 materials um and and so on. Um so that they are they're usually sent documents as well to review um reports and so on to
02:14:26 to review um reports and so on to comment on um during the course of the project. So if you produce a draft output, they will typically get a copy of the draft output and we'll have the opportunity to look at that and provide feedback. Um uh and yeah, I think that
02:14:41 feedback. Um uh and yeah, I think that probably just about covers it. Thank you. Can we go to BRE 401392?
02:14:48 This is the first page of uh the annual progress report 1st of April 2000 to 30th of April 2001 under CC 1924. Mhm.
02:15:01 Uh and uh
02:15:06 um you can see from page two that that is well sorry page one 27th of April 2001 is the date. who just shot past it, but that's what it said. If we go to page five, we can look under
02:15:17 If we go to page five, we can look under the heading formation of the IAG.
02:15:25 And I'm sorry, I'm rushing ahead a little bit too fast. Can Can we go please to page two? We can see on page two you your name there. Yes. As the approver. As the approver prepared for Anthony
02:15:37 As the approver prepared for Anthony Bird. Yes. Yes. By Sarah Cowwell. Yes. Now let's go then to page five and look at the heading formation of the IG. 30 groups were invited as you can see to
02:15:49 30 groups were invited as you can see to join the industry advisory group for this project and they included representatives from manufacturers, raincreen systems, rendered systems and builtup systems, specifiers and building owners and users. Mhm. Now under that
02:16:02 owners and users. Mhm. Now under that list we can see that it's reported as you can see below the 27 representatives uh of the 30 accepted the invitation to join and the members of the IG group are
02:16:13 join and the members of the IG group are then listed on page nine. If we go to that, you could see table one there, page nine, members of the IG. And there they are.
02:16:25 are. And of the 27, the list includes um five members of BR staff as well as Dr. Jackman from the Loss Prevention Council. We we've got three government
02:16:36 Council. We we've got three government employees including Anthony Bird. Um and we've got um people from the BBA, CWCT. You see that? Mhm. Uh and various manufacturers and
02:16:47 Uh and various manufacturers and industry associations. Yes. Mhm.
02:16:50 Mhm. Yes.
02:16:50 Yes. Yes.
02:16:51 Yes. Do do you know who had decided which manufacturers, specifiers, and building owners and users would be invited to join the IG? Um usually the way that works is um
02:17:06 usually the way that works is um a list is drafted up and then it's uh discussed and circulated with the department and they typically have you
02:17:18 department and they typically have you know the final say in agreeing that that is an appropriate and balanced group of people that will add value to the project. Right.
02:17:29 Right. So the department had final say even this even though this was your project typically
02:17:34 typically right?
02:17:35 right? Yes.
02:17:35 Yes. I see.
02:17:38 I see. Was it advised that all aspects of the work on the project would be shared with the I a group have a particular role? Um
02:17:48 Um it's not normal for you to not share the project. If you you know when you have a meeting then the work that's been done would be presented back to the I a
02:18:01 would be presented back to the I a might be given hard copy format but it also might be in the form of you know just a verbal update as to what's happened
02:18:08 happened um you know problems will be discussed with them if we've run into problems with the project for any any reason um it's usually a very sort of open
02:18:21 it's usually a very sort of open dialogue. They are there to assist the project and if you don't share with some degree of openness what you are doing and how you're doing it then you're not going to get the best
02:18:34 then you're not going to get the best um feedback from them. Yes.
02:18:38 Yes. Um now to meet the objectives of of this uh project I think several reports were produced weren't they? One of which was a literature review probably. Yes. I mean that the outputs
02:18:50 probably. Yes. I mean that the outputs would be listed in the proposal usually. Can we go to B41353
02:19:00 please?
02:19:03 Uh this is a letter of the 30th of March 2000 to Mr. Payne who is Mick Payne I think at AEA technology. Correct.
02:19:11 Correct. And uh and it comes from Sarah Cowwell copied Anthony Bird and Mr. Troutton. Mhm.
02:19:19 Mhm. Uh sending the literature review to him. Yes.
02:19:24 Yes. Uh if we go please to page four, we can see the actual report itself, which is where it starts. And you'll see that the report is prepared by Sarah Cowwell J. Foster B. Martin, Center for
02:19:36 Cowwell J. Foster B. Martin, Center for Reaction to Fire. And the date is the 30th of March 2000. And it's signed by you. Yes. As approving it as the center head. Yes. Who is Jay Foster? Um
02:19:48 head. Yes. Who is Jay Foster? Um Jason Foster was a somebody that joined us as a graduate. Um I mean I don't know how long he'd been at BR by that time. Um and
02:19:59 been at BR by that time. Um and obviously Brian you know I mean Brian was not part of the reaction to fire center but um that what was the basic purpose of this review?
02:20:09 review? Um well I presume if you go through it it it will explain in the introduction. Well what was your understanding? I I can't recall at the time without
02:20:20 I I can't recall at the time without looking at you know having my memory joged scope of uh what what was being undertaken uh and um we know what your relationship was hierarchically with Sarah Cole at
02:20:32 was hierarchically with Sarah Cole at the time. Um did Brian what was Brian Martin's role at this point March 2000? uh March 2000, Brian sat in. So we had um
02:20:44 um two centers within the fire research activities. Um Sarah and the reaction to fire center were in my center and I had a colleague
02:20:57 were in my center and I had a colleague called Nigel Smiies who was the center head for the other um area of activity and Brian Martin sat within Nigel's
02:21:09 and Brian Martin sat within Nigel's um center. And what was that center? Um can't remember what it was called. I'd have to go back and look. I mean what did it do? Um it basically had a um
02:21:21 what did it do? Um it basically had a um group of activities that sat within it. Um included fire investigation at that time sat within that center. Um the
02:21:32 time sat within that center. Um the all of the support work that Brian was doing um in relation to the approved document and the se technical secretariat work and so on sat within that center.
02:21:44 that center. Um there was also a group looking at fire suppression research into fire suppression technologies. There was a group um looking at smoke control
02:21:57 group um looking at smoke control and um and fire detection.
02:22:04 What was your role as the person signing it off?
02:22:08 it off? Um, so as the approver of this, basically you're looking at the report when it comes to you. You're looking for sort of obvious typographical mistakes
02:22:19 sort of obvious typographical mistakes and so on. You're looking to check that the right templates being used because they were all agreed and it was quite strict with the contractual side of
02:22:30 strict with the contractual side of things that you had to present the reports in a specific way on specific templates. Um, and then just a a pair of eyes looking at it that had
02:22:41 a a pair of eyes looking at it that had not been involved in the day-to-day work and actually doing the work, but to see if there was anything in there that basically doesn't make sense, didn't
02:22:52 basically doesn't make sense, didn't read correctly, um, and so on. But it's not the job of the approver to go back and repeat the work. You're you're reviewing the work that other people have done. So, you
02:23:03 that other people have done. So, you know, a review of a document like this would typically take, you know, half a day maximum. What was Sarah Cowwell's role in this review?
02:23:12 review? Um, well, Sarah would have led the project team in carrying out the work. I don't know exactly what parts she would have done personally. Um,
02:23:24 have done personally. Um, was it not your role as as approver to find out?
02:23:27 find out? Well, I can't remember now. I mean, I I we would have known at the time, I'm sure, but I did not know. I can't tell you now.
02:23:36 you now. What was Brian Martin's role in this report? Do you know? Um, I can't remember the the the contents. Have we got the contents? Yes. Let's go to page six. You'll see the executive summary.
02:23:51 If we can have that expanded, please. So you can see that it it it says that the the paper identifies and summarizes three bullet points. Types of
02:24:03 summarizes three bullet points. Types of external planning systems currently in use. Current requirements and guidance given approved document B2000 revision and research previously undertaken on external fire spread in buildings.
02:24:15 external fire spread in buildings. Mhm.
02:24:16 Mhm. Yeah.
02:24:17 Yeah. And then there are findings. Yes.
02:24:19 Yes. That that's what it was about. Yes. Does that help? Um
02:24:22 Um what was Brian My question is what coming back to it. What was the Brian Martin?
02:24:25 Martin? So Brian Martin would certainly have been um
02:24:29 been um leading on the second bullet point, the current requirements and guidance as given in the approved document and its revision.
02:24:37 revision. Um Sarah I would say would have led on the research previously undertaken on external fire spread on buildings um and types of external cladding systems currently in use. I mean that
02:24:50 systems currently in use. I mean that could have been I I don't know whether that was done jointly between the two of them or whether one or the other would have taken the primary lead on that. Now at the time I think it's right that
02:25:01 Now at the time I think it's right that isn't it that the revisions to approve document B 2000 revision was still in draft because I think they weren't published until the July of that year and this document is dated March.
02:25:14 and this document is dated March. Um that that may well be true. I don't I don't know the exact timelines. Um
02:25:22 Um so is it right that Brian Martin would be leading on the when then it says the current requirements and guidance the draft current guidance? Um probably in that case
02:25:34 Um probably in that case and and why would you do you say Brian Martin would have led on point two? Was his role focused on ADB back in 2000? It was.
02:25:42 was. Yes. So Brian was a a building control professional by background, right?
02:25:48 right? And um so he had real world experience of the approved documents and how to apply them and so on which obviously was not true of
02:26:00 on which obviously was not true of people that had come from research background. Was anybody other than Brian Martin in the uh at the Bari at the time uh as experienced or expert that's the
02:26:11 uh as experienced or expert that's the right word on the approved documents as Brian Martin? Yes. So um and I can't remember when he retired but Brian in effect took over
02:26:22 retired but Brian in effect took over and was recruited to for a period of time anyway to work alongside somebody called Richard Reid. You mentioned him before. Yeah. who again was a building control professional by background
02:26:35 professional by background um and you know had practiced and and worked and had real real world experience. Do you know whether this this report was reviewed by the department before it was
02:26:47 reviewed by the department before it was finalized? Um that was the typical process. So I'd be surprised if it wasn't. I mean they they typically you would submit a report
02:26:58 they typically you would submit a report and then they would come back with any comments or questions or queries or clarifications that they needed and um yeah Mr. Chairman we are a long way from
02:27:11 yeah Mr. Chairman we are a long way from finishing the topic before 4:30. It's it's simply not possible looking at my notes. Um but we are in a natural subb breakak. So I'm going to ask you I think
02:27:22 breakak. So I'm going to ask you I think to call an end for the day now and we can come back to this very document I think but tomorrow morning. Yeah. Sorry to break in the middle of a document but don't think it'll be tomorrow then Mr. No, it won't. Monday the next available.
02:27:33 the next available. Well, we don't usually finish even a few minutes early, but there's obviously a good reason to do so today. We reached a natural point. So we'll break there. Um we'll resume. I mean I know you were
02:27:44 we'll resume. I mean I know you were expecting to come back next week anyway, weren't you? Yes, indeed. That wasn't a surprise. So, we'll resume, please, on Monday morning at 10:00. Okay.
02:27:52 Okay. We look forward to seeing you then. And uh please take care over the weekend not to discuss your evidence or anything relating to it with anyone else. Thank you. All right. Thank you. So, if you'd like
02:28:03 All right. Thank you. So, if you'd like to go with the usher, that's it for the day.
02:28:04 day. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you.
02:28:19 Thank you very much for 10:00 on Monday. Monday. Thank you.