Brian Martin, former government building regulations official, gives evidence about his role in fire safety policy, the Lakanal House fire investigation, and the department's response to external fire spread concerns.
00:00:28 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing
00:00:31 hearing today we're going to continue hearing evidence from mr brown martin so i'll ask mr martin to come into the room please
00:00:49 good morning mr martin monitor we're ready to carry on i hope yes sir thank you very much yes mr miller thank you mr chairman good morning to you good morning members of the panel mr martin good morning good morning um i just want to revisit for a few minutes if we can
00:01:01 to revisit for a few minutes if we can please some of the evidence uh from yesterday on the question of the lga guide and stay put um now um onto the question of stay put
00:01:13 um now um onto the question of stay put you said yesterday uh that you've had conversations with firefighters about
00:01:19 about an understanding that where fire was spreading beyond the compartment of origin
00:01:24 origin and then evacuation was something that the incident commander at the incident would consider um and and you mentioned that a couple of times um what conversations
00:01:37 what conversations can you recall which particular incidents can you recall
00:01:45 it's certainly something i'd discussed with sir ken knight at various points over the years
00:01:52 some of the firefighters that worked um with the chief fire and rescue advisors team um
00:02:00 team um i remember an incident when i was working for bre um
00:02:07 um there was a fire a block of flats in york i think it was um and the firefighters there and i'm trying to remember why the fire spread i think the fire got caught in a
00:02:19 spread i think the fire got caught in a roof um and and
00:02:26 so it's probably more detailed than you might know but that but the memory is there
00:02:32 the roof of this particular building was um
00:02:37 um a form of construction i hadn't seen before um
00:02:40 before um where the the top surface was um a stainless steel sheet um
00:02:47 um it looked like the sort of lead roof that you often see in london but it was in fact stainless steel and so
00:02:53 and so was
00:02:54 was and the problem the firefighters had is that as they were putting water onto this roof it was it was quite a tool block but low enough that with a high reach appliance they could get water onto the roof
00:03:05 get water onto the roof um the roof therefore stayed intact and they couldn't get water to where the fire was so the fire they were unable to control the fire um and the commander there decided it was
00:03:16 and the commander there decided it was time to evacuate the building because they weren't and the adjacent blocks quite at some point during the incident um he decided to evacuate the block um
00:03:28 um he decided to evacuate the block um and
00:03:29 and so firefighters were sent to um ensure that the the building had been evacuated so andy jack did you mention the word maybe i
00:03:40 did you mention the word maybe i misheard you you said andy jack uh i don't think i did all right
00:03:51 at various points over the years um i first met him when he was the um official that was leading on the introduction of the fire safety order yes indeed that's why i thought you'd mentioned his name um to what extent can
00:04:02 mentioned his name um to what extent can you remember any reference to carrying out a full building evacuation uh as opposed to a partial evacuation in circumstances where stay put had no longer become tenable
00:04:21 i'd certainly discussed as say it's it's a subject that came up i think when
00:04:26 when base double triple nine one which um provides design guidance on blocks of flats and when that was being revised it was something we discussed with a number of firefighters there as well so the
00:04:37 of firefighters there as well so the represent i can't remember who was the the rep on the committee from from the would have been the chief fire officers association then i think right so it was an understanding that that's part of the
00:04:49 an understanding that that's part of the the process um was something which i'd come across from several firefighters from several different brigades i i don't think i could name all the names because these
00:05:00 could name all the names because these are various conversations i'd had the incident you remember roughly when was that you said you were working for the bre at the time can you remember a date or even a year um
00:05:10 um i could probably find out um but it as i say it would have been when i was working at bre perhaps in the latter part of my time there right um now you you refer to bs
00:05:21 there right um now you you refer to bs triple nine one we're going to come to that in just a moment before i do can i ask you this um
00:05:29 before colin todd as the designated agency for the purpose started work on drafting the lga guide and particularly 79 9 to 11
00:05:42 lga guide and particularly 79 9 to 11 that we studied together yesterday do you remember whether there was any guidance
00:05:47 guidance in existence whether statutory or government approved guidance or any other sector got guidance which said that peeps or any other kind of emergency escape planning
00:05:59 of emergency escape planning was not required for vulnerable persons because stay put would suffice
00:06:10 i don't think it was ever written down anywhere i think it's one of these things which which which had emerged possibly
00:06:19 uh um whole question of peeps was i emerged i'm trying to think when that first became common
00:06:26 common practice um
00:06:32 it probably became more more entrenched in in sort of fire safety language um probably around the time the fire safety order was implemented fire safety language used by
00:06:43 safety language used by whom by fire rescue services building owners
00:06:47 owners [Music]
00:06:49 [Music] i i guess i'm thinking of the sector in general so people that worked in fire safety and and firefighters right
00:06:57 and was there any guidance anywhere of that kind
00:07:01 that kind which said that for vulnerable people it was unrealistic or impracticable to expect any more in general needs housing no i think that was i mean as i said
00:07:12 no i think that was i mean as i said yesterday that was one of the reasons why it was decided to commission the lga guide because um
00:07:22 again i'm sorry so i have to go back in history trying to make this make sense
00:07:27 before the fire safety order there was almost no legislation that covered fire safety in blocks of flats certainly in terms of its management the fire precautions act
00:07:38 the fire precautions act which essentially was the predecessor to the fire safety order um
00:07:45 didn't apply to blocks of flats um except in so far as the fire and rescue service had a power to
00:07:53 to require a block of flats to be um closed for one of a better term um if they felt it was unsafe but there were no provisions for um fire
00:08:04 but there were no provisions for um fire certificates and all and all the other rules that and came about so the fire safety order essentially was the first time that
00:08:14 there was certainly national legislation that set out
00:08:19 out any requirements for that kind of thing and even in blocks of flats it was quite limited in its scope because of this question of um
00:08:29 um parts using common so
00:08:33 so that's probably why there was no guidance on that issue prior to that time because there was there was no legislation that addressed it right
00:08:41 it right so the answer is no i think
00:08:44 i think i think yeah yeah sorry but yes that yes no is the correct answer is the answer yeah let's turn to bs triple nine one then um can we please have that up it's bsi six zeros five nine
00:08:58 now the panel may remember uh that the inquiry examined this document was quite closely with uh colin todd at the end of july last year when he came here to give his
00:09:09 year when he came here to give his assistance and uh
00:09:13 and uh so it should be familiar to many but um first is it correct just looking at the top right hand corner and the date 2015 that this document post dates the completion
00:09:24 completion and publication of the lga guide
00:09:30 um this particular edition does yes
00:09:35 does yes yes and um is it right also that it's a it's a standard um applicable specific fire safety in the design management and use of residential buildings as it says
00:09:47 use of residential buildings as it says yes yes
00:09:49 yes yes did you or the department have any role in formulating this standard um so i was a member of the um
00:10:00 committee responsible for this and a number of other similar standards um i think at the time this edition was being drafted um
00:10:12 um i think i i was busy on something else i'm trying to think what it would have been um when was it being drafted it may help you i i guess it would have looking at the date it probably would
00:10:24 looking at the date it probably would have been the two or three years preceding 2015. um right so that's probably the housing standards reviewers probably but i i remember i missed a lot of the meetings because i i was double booked
00:10:35 because i i was double booked essentially
00:10:39 um now um
00:10:41 now um let's look at some principles in it um can we please go to page 15.
00:10:52 and if we look on page 15 of paragraph 0.2.1 general principles
00:10:58 this is about means of escape and a set of provisions based on some assumptions set out there a to d and the second one is no reliance on external rescue
00:11:09 rescue uh and c
00:11:11 uh and c in the last part of that paragraph in most fires simultaneous evacuation of the building is unlikely to be necessary now
00:11:20 now and then if you go on below that underneath the note it says whilst a simultaneous evacuation is normally unnecessary see a1 regarding state put strategy there will be some occasions where
00:11:32 there will be some occasions where operational conditions are such that the fire and rescue service decide to evacuate the building in these situations the occupants of the building will need to use the common stair sometimes whilst firefighting is in progress as such the measures in this
00:11:44 progress as such the measures in this british standard for the protection of common stairs are designed to ensure that they remain available for use over an extended period now um
00:11:53 now um [Music]
00:11:54 [Music] it
00:11:55 it was that principle there of the that articulation of it knew in 2015 in this standard
00:12:01 standard um i remember discussing this but and to some extent i think it was um
00:12:11 following the lack of a house fire there'd be quite a lot of discussion about everybody's understanding of the stay put principle um and
00:12:20 and it was felt that
00:12:24 everybody seemed to know but it wasn't written down anywhere um and um it was felt that we ought to that the standard ought to explain itself um and
00:12:36 itself um and i think there were various iterations of this i i remember discussing it i can't remember
00:12:41 remember the first time i look at this text for quite some time but it it rings bells with me i remember us talking about it and saying um
00:12:50 um it it was important to try and explain that whilst you design once you design the building on the basis of the stay put principle
00:13:02 basis of the stay put principle um
00:13:04 um then
00:13:05 then there were definitely situations where evacuation might become necessary um and that's why as this paragraph is trying to explain that's why this standard and and for
00:13:16 that's why this standard and and for that matter approved document b has
00:13:21 has additional measures in it to protect the stairway because in most other buildings you'd be using the stairway quite quickly after a fire is discovered whereas it was recognized that the stairway would need to be used for a
00:13:32 stairway would need to be used for a longer period of time so that's why there are smoke control systems and so on in that type of building just on the relationship then between approved document b and this british standard
00:13:43 standard looking at the date of publication which is in fact i think 2016 but the date is the standard is 2015 and the work would have been done in the years leading up to that as you've just told us
00:13:55 us was any thought given during the process of
00:13:58 of considering the revisions to adb after the lachenal coroner's recommendation to that effect
00:14:07 to bring adb into line with this british standard in any way
00:14:17 um in terms of explaining itself in this respect do you mean i mean making it consistent and
00:14:25 and making it consistent so that the building regulations and the associated guidance particularly approved document b
00:14:36 would produce a building that would be consistent with and facilitate the principles on this page
00:14:47 i think we thought they thought it already did you thought it already did was any exercise done to put the two pieces of paper together adb and bs 9991 actually go through the exercise
00:14:59 actually go through the exercise critically and ask yourself what does adb facilitate simultaneous evacuation where it becomes necessary
00:15:11 no the exercise wasn't carried out why is that um i don't think we consider that to be to be necessary at the time
00:15:22 essentially this standard was saying the same things as a proof document b but with more detail um and
00:15:34 with more and probably more options is perhaps the the way to describe it the the
00:15:44 these standards again so i have to go it's difficult to go back into history with these things is prior to um certainly prior to 1985 um
00:15:58 certainly prior to 1985 um it was most guidance certainly on means of escape
00:16:01 of escape in the design of buildings had evolved through the development of british standards so there wasn't a government document that told people what to do it was a
00:16:11 was a a standard that comes from the from the british standards institution and
00:16:18 and when
00:16:19 when these issues were picked up by national building regulations and found their way into the approved documents um we ended up with a situation where there
00:16:30 we ended up with a situation where there was a you had the approved document um but the british standards were still there um and they often provided more depth of information
00:16:41 provided more depth of information certainly when i first started as a building control officer if you weren't quite sure about something you would read the two documents
00:16:51 documents and say well this is the issue that approved document b is telling me to think about this standard is actually giving me some background and explaining itself and that's helped me understand what this provision is about and now i
00:17:03 what this provision is about and now i can apply it more effectively to the project i'm looking at so
00:17:10 so they tended to operate in parallel and that
00:17:15 that but were revised at different times so so that's why you you would get differences between the documents well one can well understand that there are operative standards which are woven into the fabric of approved
00:17:26 are woven into the fabric of approved document b for example the s8414
00:17:30 the s8414 given the principles articulated here in 9991 why wasn't atv or why wasn't any thought given to in to weaving into adb in its revised form as promised to the
00:17:41 in its revised form as promised to the lack of house coroner uh revisions which would take account of and facilitate the principles on this page
00:17:51 um i think if if we had carried out those revisions as promised then then
00:17:58 then then we definitely would have looked at the the text that had been generated for this standard and and where we thought it was useful or um better than what was in the approved document we would have adopted
00:18:09 approved document we would have adopted it now i may be wrong about this mr martin but we've not seen a scrap of evidence in any of the preparatory documents between may 2013 and the date of the grenfell tower fire generated by
00:18:20 of the grenfell tower fire generated by government in response to uh or in in perpetuation of the secretary of state's promise to the latin house coroner the 9991 would be examined and adb would be revised to take account of
00:18:32 adb would be revised to take account of it
00:18:33 it why is that um
00:18:40 i guess there was no point writing it down it would only been me that read it um so
00:18:45 um so uh
00:18:47 uh right that doesn't mean the same we weren't going to do it's just that we didn't
00:18:51 didn't i didn't see the need to to produce a document
00:18:55 document that only i would have read at the time because there wasn't anybody else working on the subject certainly in in the department um
00:19:01 um but definitely um
00:19:05 um that would have been something we would have done um that's one of the it's one of the advantages of being involved in the development of the standards where where i was able to do it um because you could talk through
00:19:16 it um because you could talk through these issues um with um the other experts that were that were on the committees um
00:19:24 um so that's perspective retrospectively was any thought given once this document was published
00:19:33 to revising the lga guide to take account of the principles we see here
00:19:43 i think they're in line with the lga i'm i i must be missing something all right let's let's to go to page 20.
00:19:56 uh now um page 20 is uh a rather a long chunk of text which sits under 0.8 management of fire safety on the previous page page 19. halfway
00:20:07 on the previous page page 19. halfway down page 20 towards the bottom of your screen it says effective management of fire safety can contribute to the protection of the building occupants in many ways and then if you look at d
00:20:19 d by being aware of the types of people in the building such as disabled people elderly people children pregnant women etc and any special risks or needs
00:20:32 was any thought given to revising the lga guide
00:20:35 lga guide to take account of that principle or requirement um i i i
00:20:44 um i i i to some extent is that with the area that i that i was specifically responsible for um but um i don't think this was in conflict with the lga guide and the i mean there's a difference between requiring
00:20:56 there's a difference between requiring or saying that there should be a peep prepared for each individual and and um
00:21:04 being generally aware of of the the challenges associated with um with people with um disabilities well where in the lga guide is there the
00:21:17 well where in the lga guide is there the express
00:21:18 express allusion to or awareness of the types of people in the building of the categories listed um
00:21:23 listed um i don't know the oj guide off by heart i'm afraid no but um you do not know it sufficiently well to be able to at least identify in principle what i'd be surprised if it doesn't mention the issue somewhere um i i i think that's
00:21:40 for as a high level observation yes you should
00:21:42 should if you're in managing a building you want to
00:21:46 want to consider the the nature of your residence especially if you've got a building where they are predominantly a particular group but for most general needs blocks
00:21:57 needs blocks you've got a cross-section of society in there
00:22:00 there and that's you know a universal thing um can we please go to page 33
00:22:10 inclusive design
00:22:14 and that
00:22:17 that says
00:22:18 says uh in the second paragraph special management procedures might be required where it is reasonably foreseeable that the proportion of disabled persons in a building will be relatively high recommendations for building management
00:22:29 recommendations for building management are given in section nine and then there's note attention is drawn to the equality act 2010 which places a duty on all employers and service providers not to discriminate against disabled people
00:22:40 to discriminate against disabled people it is vital to ensure that when making plans for the fire safety and management of buildings the requirements of disabled people are properly taken into account at all times it is important to note that the
00:22:52 it is important to note that the recommendations given in this british standards are for escape not access etc
00:22:59 etc and
00:23:02 it goes on about it goes on in relation to other standards as well which cover similar topics and was any thought given to amending the lga guide to reflect the the attention drawn to the
00:23:15 reflect the the attention drawn to the equality act here
00:23:18 not that not that i'm aware of um i think
00:23:23 i think the paragraph immediately above it is is is the point that i was just making is that um what they're saying here is um if you've got a block which is say it's a retirement block or something so the
00:23:34 a retirement block or something so the majority of the population are elderly then it's reasonable to assume that they'll have um you'll have more people with restricted mobility than you might expect in a general needs block and that's something
00:23:45 general needs block and that's something that you'll to consider the problem with this kind of text is or well a good saying you should consider something but it's not much help unless you give them some clue about what what they ought to be considering well
00:23:57 what they ought to be considering well mr martin let me try this way of looking at things on on you um we heard yesterday that uh after the lga guide was published a member of the public representing
00:24:08 member of the public representing disabled persons wrote to you asking oh well challenging the legality of 79.9 to 11 and we've had your evidence about that when bs 9991 was being considered
00:24:21 that when bs 9991 was being considered and then published was no thought given back to that legislation back to that letter and the legislation and
00:24:31 and uh consideration given to
00:24:34 to taking legal advice on the equality act and
00:24:38 and examining the duty placed on employers and service providers not to discriminate i think i think that would have been out with my job sorry that's that's that's that that's not an area that i would
00:24:49 that that's not an area that i would have been directly responsible for um but i think and and
00:24:55 and and the way british standards are drafted is they're drafted by um committees um with the intention of setting out what they consider to be um best practice which might be more than
00:25:07 best practice which might be more than what the law requires and this this note is alerting people to um
00:25:15 um statutory provisions but it's not really setting out exactly what they should do um
00:25:20 um and i'll say that the challenge you have um
00:25:23 um in practice with real blocks of flats is if you've got somebody in a flat with um limited mobility um
00:25:34 if they're unable to leave the flat of their own volition and there are no uh and
00:25:40 and there are no there's no one there to help them then the only people that are left to the fire and rescue service um in practice um
00:25:48 um the way
00:25:49 the way that's addressed um and i'm kind of stepping outside my area of responsibility but i think it's an important point if i can explain it i think it
00:25:57 think it it is important um
00:26:00 um is
00:26:01 is um
00:26:02 um you need to it's recognizing that a particular individual has a higher risk of not being able to um self-rescue for one of a better term
00:26:14 self-rescue for one of a better term so
00:26:16 so trying to help them live in a way where they're less likely to have a fire becomes the best available option and that's something the fire and rescue services and
00:26:27 services and the social care sector um work together on to try and help people and do that and i know that the fire policy team which by then may well have been in the
00:26:38 which by then may well have been in the home office i can't remember and did a lot of work on um sort of information requirements so that the social sector could share information with the fire and rescue
00:26:49 information with the fire and rescue service on people they'd identified as being vulnerable um so that was that was what that team had done to try and help um
00:26:59 um the fire service know where vulnerable people were so they could help them um avoid the sorts of fires that would put them at risk um
00:27:10 put them at risk um the idea that you can um you know have a requirement that someone's gonna a procedure in the building that's going to get them out of the building relies on someone being there
00:27:22 on someone being there and i think some practitioners have argued that a peep could reference um
00:27:29 um you know an arrangement with a neighbor or a family member that lives nearby most people in the sector don't think that's a viable option um and thinks
00:27:40 that's a viable option um and thinks there's a risk of that's just a lip service
00:27:42 service response to the provision of a peep
00:27:46 a peep and i think that's that's the challenge with this area it's very difficult
00:27:52 can you in that last answer you refer to work on information requirements so the social sector could share information rescue services on people that identified as being vulnerable what was the work what was the product of that
00:28:04 the work what was the product of that work
00:28:05 work um
00:28:07 um it was something that louise upton did a lot of um
00:28:10 lot of um work on um and was a result yes there was yes that there was a there was a um
00:28:17 was a um i can't remember the exact detail of it because it wasn't something i was working on specifically but i remember her team working on that um it it was either a protocol it might even have been a change to secondary legislation i can't remember
00:28:30 legislation i can't remember i can probably find out if the inquiry is interested now can i then uh take you further on into this document
00:28:40 uh first para 54 at page 145
00:28:50 evacuation of disabled occupants or occupants that require assistance to escape
00:28:56 escape and then note one it is the responsibility of the premises management to assess the needs of all people to make a safe evacuation when formulating evacuation plans an evacuation should not rely on the
00:29:07 an evacuation should not rely on the assistance of the fire and rescue service
00:29:11 service this is an important factor that should be taken into account in the building design now again when that was published was any thought given to looking back at 79.9
00:29:22 79.9 to 11
00:29:23 to 11 and asking whether that was consistent with this provision i think i remember this being quite contentious at the time because it was um as i say the standard in of itself has no
00:29:35 the standard in of itself has no statutory status it's a
00:29:39 what the committee at the time considered to be best practice um
00:29:44 and
00:29:48 i think it probably go again this is probably to some extent outside my area area of responsibility at the time um well on that i mean what was your area of responsibility so far as
00:30:00 of responsibility so far as and this guide was concerned this standard was concerned
00:30:08 well essentially it's a code of good practice so it has no status but because it was
00:30:14 a document which was often used in the sector sometimes as an alternative approach to compliance with approved document b i guess my main
00:30:26 focus was ensuring that it didn't set out standards that were lower
00:30:32 lower than would have been imposed through compliance following the approved document
00:30:38 document um but also where i was able to just contributing to the the discussions um to assist in the in the production of the code um and learning from the
00:30:49 the code um and learning from the conversations
00:30:52 and finally can we please look at page 175
00:30:56 175 of this document which is annex e within nxe
00:31:01 nxe management of additional needs and disabilities and this is informative as it says there and in the second paragraph it says uh information for
00:31:12 paragraph it says uh information for disabled people needs to be noted in fire action notices and in the fire management plan assumptions cannot be made about the willingness of individuals to remain in their flats even where a stateful strategy is in place
00:31:23 place it is also possible that some residents will not be inside their own dwelling at the time of fire occurs they may might for example be in the process of using lifts or stairs to reach their home visiting a neighbor or in a common area
00:31:34 visiting a neighbor or in a common area such as a terrace or communal garden in which case returning to their flat might not be appropriate or possible and then in the final two paragraphs the uk has an aging society with increasing
00:31:46 uk has an aging society with increasing levels of independence into later years and there are therefore many people living in standard residential accommodation who have a range of impairments which could affect their ability to evacuate or follow procedures
00:31:58 ability to evacuate or follow procedures fire safety management needs to take into account the full range of people who might use the premises paying particular attention to the needs of disabled people with permanent or temporary impairment and then under e2
00:32:10 temporary impairment and then under e2 it says this people with mobility impairments assumptions cannot be made about the abilities of wheelchair users it could be helpful to produce a personal emergency evacuation plan peep to
00:32:22 emergency evacuation plan peep to explore the level of need and what they are to do in the event of a fire in their own home or one nearby if direct escape to a place of ultimate safety is not possible horizontal escape to another fire compartment can be explored
00:32:34 another fire compartment can be explored now again same question i'm afraid mr martin when that was published or considered for publication was any thought given so looking back at the lg side 79 9 to 11 and revising it to make
00:32:45 side 79 9 to 11 and revising it to make it consistent um not that i'm aware of as i say that wouldn't have been something that i would have directly been involved in this is um an informative on what was
00:32:57 this is um an informative on what was considered to be best practice i think quite a few local authorities try and take this approach um
00:33:04 um in this case here i mean this is perhaps a more pragmatic piece of um a recommendation here in the standard in that it's recognizing that
00:33:15 that it's recognizing that um
00:33:16 um what a
00:33:18 what a building manager can do is talk to its residents and where they identify somebody that is vulnerable in some way that they understand the fire
00:33:30 that they understand the fire precautions in the building and what would be the best option available to them it's a bit like the the general advice and the fire kills campaign um
00:33:42 and the fire kills campaign um pursues which is to say to all of us in our homes um to think about what you would do in the event of a fire um and consider your own home whether you live in a um you know a single family dwelling house or a block of
00:33:54 family dwelling house or a block of flats or whatever um
00:33:56 um ask yourself what plan you've got if a fire affects your home and what would you do with yourself and your family
00:34:03 family and
00:34:04 and that's good practice for a good landlord um
00:34:08 um it
00:34:10 it probably depends on the circumstances about whether you could reasonably argue that that's a a requirement that should be applied to all blocks um and i think that's something that's being considered at the moment
00:34:22 being considered at the moment now you told us yesterday that um it was a universally understood problem
00:34:28 problem uh or the prevailing view to expressions you used
00:34:32 you used um that peeps were impracticable that that was i think if i got that right the thrust of your ever a peep which relies on the landlord
00:34:42 landlord for one of the building manager um to provide
00:34:47 provide a
00:34:50 assistance for somebody that might need it in the event of a fire i think is the thing that people considered to be an unreasonable provision right you've also got the challenge is that for most of these blocks
00:35:02 these blocks extremely difficult possibly impossible to know
00:35:08 the details of all of your residents people come and go in these blocks and and people's level of vulnerability can change
00:35:19 level of vulnerability can change and so i think that's one of the problems that landlords face but i i'm probably stepping this this is more about fire safety management than it is about
00:35:28 about building design and i'm i'm probably less qualified to respond to that than probably somebody like mr todd who's spent most of his life working in that area well he can speak and has indeed done so
00:35:39 has indeed done so for himself my question to you was what was the empirical the evidential basis for the prevailing view or the universal view which you told us about yesterday i think the process they went through um
00:35:50 think the process they went through um to to to speak to um quite a wide range of people including um a large number of fine rescue services who would be on the enforcement side of this
00:36:02 but not i think is this right any groups representing vulnerable persons so i understand which i'm surprised about um but
00:36:10 but um i
00:36:12 um i that was probably an oversight i guess an oversight um what the government well i'm i'm guessing so i mean i had nothing to do with it i i think i'm probably answering questions that i'm not really fit to answer well you didn't have nothing to
00:36:23 answer well you didn't have nothing to do with it mr martin as we know we've seen some documents okay so that's not right is it let's turn to a different topic lachenal
00:36:35 let's turn to a different topic lachenal now i don't need to tell you that that was a fire which happened on the 3rd of july 2009 in which six people lost their lives
00:36:42 lives at that time i think it's right isn't it that you had left the bre the previous year and you were now full-time in post as the fire safety policy lead within the building regulations division in the
00:36:53 the building regulations division in the department um that was my responsibility amongst other things in the department yes yes and is it right that it was decided within your division at a fairly early stage that the bre should be asked to investigate the fire
00:37:06 should be asked to investigate the fire under the auspices under the umbrella of the investigation of real fast projects and was the basis for that decision in very simple terms that um this was a
00:37:17 very simple terms that um this was a fire of special interest a fosse if you like
00:37:20 like yes yes and let's look at dr david crowder's witness statement number two please bre 30 is 43716 page 2
00:37:30 page 2 paragraph 5a
00:37:34 and if you uh look at the top of the screen there mr martin you can see what he says
00:37:40 he says uh after reference to um the report uh of the 10th of august 2009 which was the final version what he says is this uh
00:37:51 final version what he says is this uh five lines down the purpose of my work at this time in relation to lack of house was to establish whether the fire had resulted from one a failure of the building regulations and the technical guidance
00:38:02 regulations and the technical guidance in approved document b i.e the fire spread in the way it did and claimed six lives in spite of the building or aspects of the building being compliant with the guidance and approved document b or the subject of a properly justified
00:38:13 b or the subject of a properly justified fire engineered alternative solution and whether there were therefore any aspects of the building regulations and or technical guidance for which recommendations might be made or two of failure to comply with the
00:38:25 two of failure to comply with the regulations and the technical guidance and approved document b in which case the matter would be for the relevant enforcing authority to consider is that an accurate description of the department's purpose in instructing bre
00:38:37 department's purpose in instructing bre to investigate the latino fire um i think it's a reasonable summary of it yes right and what would need to be established or learned in order for the department to form a view about which of those two
00:38:48 form a view about which of those two categories the fire fell into um
00:39:05 foreign
00:39:16 i guess you'd need to understand what building work had been
00:39:22 if there'd been building work for which the building regulations were relevant um
00:39:27 um and
00:39:29 and whether or not they met the guidance or
00:39:34 or there was some kind of deviation from that
00:39:37 that right
00:39:39 right now
00:39:40 now you say the building regulations uh in relation to the approved documents applicable
00:39:49 the bre would have to choose wouldn't they between
00:39:53 between the
00:39:54 the current or the then current 2006 edition or the previous edition the 2000 edition with the 2002 amendments if i got that right yes i suppose the principal objective as far as
00:40:10 my role would be is there something here that we need to take account and take into account as we develop
00:40:19 develop our building regulations guidance right okay uh but which building regulations were you focusing on to the 2000 with 2002 amendments or the
00:40:31 to the 2000 with 2002 amendments or the 2006 edition probably all of them but at the time i mean it would be what do i need to change in the one that's extent right um but in answering the questions posed there by
00:40:43 posed there by uh dr crowder would you not need to know which the applicable building regulations were which applied to the refurbishment uh at that would definitely be be part of that i mean the building was
00:40:55 be part of that i mean the building was built before national building regulations exist it existed i think but the refurbishment was done um after that i think i think there were more there was more than one refurbishment i think yes but the
00:41:06 refurbishment i think yes but the refurbishment that was being examined for the purposes of identifying the cause
00:41:11 cause of the fire uh and whether there were any defects in compliance well we wouldn't have known that at this stage that was that would have been part of the investigation yes
00:41:21 yes forgive me um let me try it differently um did you or the bre
00:41:29 bre or anybody establish which of the two versions was the version which applied to the most recent refurbishment
00:41:42 it became known as as as the investigations progressed i'm not sure at which point um as i've mentioned before the challenge for the department and for the bre is
00:41:55 for the department and for the bre is that there are no powers of investigation um
00:41:58 um so
00:41:59 so you're working on the goodwill of the of the um
00:42:03 the um the fire rescue service the police the building owners and anybody else that's involved
00:42:08 involved right
00:42:09 right when
00:42:10 when did you
00:42:12 did you discover
00:42:13 discover which
00:42:14 which set of building regulations and approve document b specifically was the relevant one for your purposes i'm not sure i can answer that in confidence uh confidently
00:42:26 confidence uh confidently well do your best at some stage as as the investigation progressed i'm not sure i can answer that right was it before the inquest
00:42:40 i think it probably was yes but i i i can't say for certain right
00:42:47 and which version was it
00:42:55 it definitely wasn't the 2006 edition so the the one that preceded it i think now um in his oral evidence dr crowder told us that he thought the mata the question which a version of adb applied
00:43:07 question which a version of adb applied was established between you and martin ship at an early stage in the investigation he said that at day 229 page 227 lines 21-25 is he right about that i've got no
00:43:19 is he right about that i've got no reason to doubt him right how is it done how is identification of the relevant building regulations and approved document ascertained
00:43:33 i honestly can't remember i imagine it would have been a discussion between bre the metropolitan police and london fire brigade possibly the building owners right
00:43:45 so just to be just to be clear at some stage
00:43:48 stage uh probably at an early stage uh the version of approved document b relevant to the refurbishment which had taken place at la canal was the 2002 edition not the 2006 edition
00:44:02 edition not the 2006 edition i believe so yes right now once the bre had been instructed to investigate the fire who at the department was in contact with the bre's investigation team it would have been me right
00:44:14 and at the bre who who would it have been
00:44:20 um i think in this period that i think martin ship was the the lead contact at bre um
00:44:31 the lead contact at bre um yes but it was after this i think that that dr crowder took over that role and in the days and weeks immediately after the fire
00:44:38 the fire can you tell us a little bit about what work the bre did so far as you were aware at the time
00:44:44 what did they do
00:44:52 um
00:44:59 i'm struggling to separate what i think they would have done from from what i know they did but
00:45:07 but they visited the site on several occasions um
00:45:14 they would have spoken to the police and london fire brigade and to try and learn um about
00:45:23 um about their experiences and what they knew about the incident insofar as that they were willing to share that information and by whom were you kept informed or updated by the bre during that period which is essentially june july
00:45:34 which is essentially june july like july and august i think in terms of the main work on the investigation i think dr crowder did most of the the work so i think i spoke to him and was this telephonic because
00:45:46 to him and was this telephonic because we haven't seen emails yeah it would have been by telephone i see how regularly did he speak to him do you think
00:45:54 every every other day perhaps for for a matter of a couple of weeks i imagine and how detailed were his updates
00:46:02 um
00:46:09 i don't think i can answer that question confidently um from memory um
00:46:16 i don't remember having a problem with the level of detail that he was giving me but i i i can't say exactly how detailed they were all right now what aspects of his investigation specifically do you remember you were asked to be updated on or were updated
00:46:29 asked to be updated on or were updated on
00:46:37 i think it was a general view about what they'd found i know they'd had some difficulties when they first visited the um scene i think they arrived on the scene
00:46:48 scene i think they arrived on the scene um and
00:46:50 um and um i think there was some tension with london fire again again because they have no we have no powers of investigation um
00:46:58 um it's only
00:47:00 it's only by the acceptance of the the authorities um
00:47:05 on seeing whether they can have access to the site and i think shortly after they'd arrived initially because they they were well known to the london fire brigade fire investigation
00:47:17 london fire brigade fire investigation team
00:47:18 team and i think they worked together in the past
00:47:21 past but i think someone more senior in the london fire brigade decided that was unhappy with the number of people that were on the scene and so they um asked bre and possibly some other
00:47:33 asked bre and possibly some other organizations to leave until a proper protocol could be put in place did you during those communications give dr crowder specific instructions in any way about what aspects of the
00:47:44 in any way about what aspects of the fire
00:47:45 fire or the building itself that he was to focus on
00:47:52 i doubt it i think we would have just discussed what he was seeing and what he'd found out um i might well have said that's an important point um see if you can find out more um
00:48:03 see if you can find out more um i wouldn't have told him not to look at a particular issue dr crowder tells us in his evidence that he
00:48:10 he recalls
00:48:12 recalls to be more accurate he thinks he would have had a lengthy conversation with you on the 9th of july so that's six days after the fire following a particular site visit giving you an overview of the investigation at
00:48:24 you an overview of the investigation at that stage that was day two two nine page two three two twenty five onwards do you remember that
00:48:30 that um i don't but i have no reason to doubt it it sounds likely right do you remember anything of what you were told
00:48:40 one of the things that i do remember kate
00:48:43 kate arose quite at some stage in the investigation was there's quite an unusual um
00:48:52 feature in this block they were
00:48:56 they were two-story flats and the staircase that joined the two stories of the flat which was a wave that was within the confines of the flat
00:49:07 the flat and it
00:49:08 and it it spanned over the top of the communal corridor for the building which would be the principal escape route and the way that was constructed meant
00:49:19 and the way that was constructed meant that there was a weakness where fire could get from the flats into that corridor where the staircase met the corner of the corridor
00:49:30 the corridor um
00:49:32 um and i know that was something we were quite concerned about the time could be repeated on um
00:49:37 um on similar blocks with a similar design and it was decided to alert other social landlords to see if there was a similar form of similar arrangement in other blocks did you visit the site
00:49:49 visit the site um
00:49:51 yes i think i went once yes once and do you remember when that was how long after the fire probably within a week right and for what purpose um
00:50:02 um to gain and it's quite a complicated building in terms of its geometry um and so it was to get an understanding of of the nature of the building and
00:50:13 the building and what happened right and what did you learn
00:50:16 learn apart from what you told us about the scissor block the scissor configuration of the staircase
00:50:27 i think my over overriding finding was that it was a complicated incident at the visit did you have any discussion with any investigator on site about what they had found
00:50:38 they had found initially in terms of the purpose of the investigative work we've looked at in other words whether the fire had resulted from a failure of the relevant regulations or guidance or from
00:50:49 regulations or guidance or from non-compliance
00:50:53 i don't think i've concluded anything from that my my recollection is that i was on i went to the scene i think sir ken knight was with me and i think we met the then um commissioner of
00:51:04 think we met the then um commissioner of london fire brigade um which i think was ron dobson then dobson yes um so it was it was quite a it was more of a familiarization um
00:51:15 um exercise than anything else um i'd like to show you or look together with you at the fosse reports you received from the bre on this fire and well there are three versions um
00:51:27 um uh
00:51:28 uh one of the 7th of july 2009 which was a draft
00:51:32 draft that clg-401693
00:51:38 and i'll just put that up on the screen for you so you can see it that's the first version and the date of that as you can see about a third of the way down your screen is about 7th july
00:51:49 july the second one is
00:51:52 is 16th of july at bre 3036261
00:51:59 36261 and you can see there the date of that
00:52:07 is the 16th of july 2009 and then the third one the final version is the 10th of august 2009 at bre 4078 sorry 5878 at page 195.
00:52:29 but now there it is appendix a and it forms part of the um real fires project for the period and it's dated the 16th the 10th of august 2009. now dr crowder told us in
00:52:42 august 2009. now dr crowder told us in his evidence uh
00:52:44 uh in his third witness statement of paragraph 91 that he submitted an initial fosi report fires a special interest report to you on the 16th of july 2009. that's the
00:52:56 on the 16th of july 2009. that's the second one we've just looked at and then a final version which is this version on the 10th of august does that accord with your recollection um
00:53:06 um that's what i would have expected him to have done i i don't remember the date you don't remember now um we'll come back to this in a moment but before we do can we look at clg one triple zero three nine one five please
00:53:17 please this is an email run between you and glenn houghton now glenn horton at the time was a director of um an entity called lock carey who
00:53:28 who are fire safety or were a fire safety consultancy and this email exchange is on the 13th and the 14th of july 2009. now um glenn horton um was he a friend or at least a
00:53:39 horton um was he a friend or at least a professional contact of yours um i met mr halton a number of times i was quite involved in standards and drafting um and um
00:53:49 um and um i think he's an ex firefighter so it's quite useful somebody that was um working as a fire engineer with firefighting experience quite kind of useful person to talk to right how long have you known him
00:54:01 have you known him um
00:54:02 um i didn't know i would have met him from time to time at various committees with probably over um what year is this this is 2009. might have been eight to ten years i suppose i don't
00:54:14 eight to ten years i suppose i don't know but i wouldn't have liked spoken to him every day no now just paraphrasing the email that you received from him which you can see uh in the middle of your screen there on monday the 13th of july i'm just going to paraphrase it he
00:54:27 july i'm just going to paraphrase it he he offers assistance to the department in relation to the fire at latin house and if we look at your response at the top of the next day 14th july you say this hi glenn
00:54:42 next day 14th july you say this hi glenn it's been a bit lively here i even worked last sunday thanks for the offer of help bre have been on scene and we are waiting to see what they found based on the snippets of info i've had so far
00:54:54 on the snippets of info i've had so far i don't think there's any need for changes to adb although people may be a bit more thorough when doing risk assessments if there is an inquiry they may be looking for independent experts i'd be
00:55:05 looking for independent experts i'd be happy to put your name forward in the light of the fact that you you tell us that um well glenn horton or sorry in the light of the fact that you tell glenn horton that you were
00:55:17 you tell glenn horton that you were waiting to see what the bre had found are you able to tell us how you come to the view only 11 days after this fire that is that so far you didn't think that there would be any need for any
00:55:28 that there would be any need for any changes to adb
00:55:33 um well i think as i say in the email i'm talking about the snippets of information i've seen so far so i'm not saying categorically there wouldn't be a need for changes to adb but
00:55:44 need for changes to adb but um
00:55:45 um what i'd seen didn't imply that there would need to be and what had you seen that led you to that
00:55:52 that preliminary view
00:55:55 i think that preliminary view showed me that these this was mostly an issue with the um the original construction of the building i think that was a view i probably had at that time
00:56:10 and what aspects of adb had you considered on the basis of what you knew at that point uh
00:56:17 point uh might require change following this fire um i i i think i'm not sure i can answer that question this this was i i i'm essentially putting
00:56:28 i'm essentially putting mr halton down like politely um saying um thanks for your help i will bear you in mind um i
00:56:36 i i wouldn't read more into it than that now from whom at the bre had you received these snippets of info um probably dr crowder and what was this what was the content
00:56:47 and what was this what was the content of the snippets up to that oh i haven't got a clue um i i can't remember what i knew at a particular point in time was there any discussion between you and
00:56:59 was there any discussion between you and dr crowder about external fire spread
00:57:07 well there would have been at some point but i can't remember when that was might have been at this point or can't you recall
00:57:16 you're asking me to pinpoint what i knew at a particular point in time that i don't think i can do that reliably
00:57:23 you say here although people may be a bit more thorough when doing risk assessments what did that mean
00:57:31 um
00:57:39 i'm guessing but i think at various points during during the investigation i think the
00:57:44 think the the level of fire safety management and the quality of risk assessments that have been carried out on this building i think were quite heavily criticized so i think that's all i'm
00:57:55 i'm pointing out i see was that a reference to um the outcome namely that the fra for latino was inadequate and there needed to be some
00:58:06 to be some regulation of fire risk assessments or fire risk assessors um
00:58:12 um i i can't say what was going through my mind at that point when i drafted this email but i know that those were issues that
00:58:19 that that arose from this incident now before you saw any of these reports can you recall what information the department had received about the possible causes of the fire
00:58:42 um no i think that the only reliable the only information i would have had with any
00:58:46 any reliability would have been whatever i got in the fuzzy reports from bre right was there any discussion between you and dr crowder about external fire spread
00:58:55 spread do you remember um that would have been because the fire spread externally
00:59:01 right certainly part of the i say it was a very complex incident um and there was some fire spread um between flaws externally as i recall
00:59:12 between flaws externally as i recall right and
00:59:13 right and those conversations did they prompt you to have a look at adb and consider whether or not the external fastbreak and what you knew of it from those conversations might uh
00:59:23 uh have an effect on those those were the thought those were things that we were talking about um i i can't
00:59:30 can't reliably tell you exactly what was said at various points during this process or what i was thinking is it right that you had no information at that stage so mid july 20 2009 about
00:59:42 at that stage so mid july 20 2009 about the composition of the external panels at lachnal
00:59:49 um i know eventually we had an idea about what they were constructed of i can't say what i knew at that time no testing i think had been had been undertaken at this stage had it on the samples of the
01:00:00 this stage had it on the samples of the window panels uh whether under 476 part six or seven or any other standard i think that's correct yes can we then look at um the second draft i showed you the 16th july
01:00:13 second draft i showed you the 16th july draft the bre 3036261
01:00:19 and we go to page that's page 1 and there's the date 16th july 2009
01:00:25 july 2009 it's the second of the drafts but maybe the first you saw if we go please well first of all can i just ask you did you see this report at the time
01:00:34 the time i would have done and if we go to page three let's look at the fourth bullet point down on that page it says fire spread through
01:00:45 fire spread through interior of masonettes initially flame spread up window facade initially burning droplets down window facade source of droplets under consideration
01:00:56 source of droplets under consideration you see that yes and then if you go down the page to the section headed potential implications for building regulations uh you can see these are ticked off means of escape yes compartmentation yes
01:01:09 means of escape yes compartmentation yes cavity barriers yes and then
01:01:12 and then external fire spread yes see that
01:01:16 see that fire initially spreading up externally from flat of origin fire spreading down due to burning material falling possibly lodged in anti-pigeon wires also wind may have
01:01:27 anti-pigeon wires also wind may have been a significant in blowing fire through corridor sea figure eight
01:01:34 and if we go to figure one on page four you can see the title
01:01:42 the title reads
01:01:45 reads west face of lacknell house arrow indicates room of origin on ninth floor fire spread to floors below believed by lfb to be caused by drop down of flaming material from window frames did you read
01:01:58 material from window frames did you read that at the time i would have done yes now take it from me that there is no other reference within this document to the panels on the external face of the building window or
01:02:09 external face of the building window or balcony still less to any observations or or findings about the composition or the compliance or otherwise of the infill panels with regulations and the guidance take that from me
01:02:21 guidance take that from me now um dr crowder said in his evidence that even the later final version of the fosse report dated the 10th of august 2009
01:02:32 august 2009 um was presented to the department as no more than an incomplete investigation and he went on to say that it could be nothing more given that by that date he
01:02:43 nothing more given that by that date he had he'd not even as he said gotten to the stage of stopping and doing if you like a review and comparison of approved document b versus the findings from the investigation he also told us and this is day 230 page
01:02:56 he also told us and this is day 230 page 12
01:02:57 12 he said it's just focused predominantly just focused on trying to get the facts down in terms of
01:03:04 of you know the way the building was put together and the sequence of events so far could be ascertained at this time that was his evidence now
01:03:12 now that's quite a lot for you to keep in your head and we can look at the transcript if you like but is it right that by this date 16th july 2009 no assessment had been carried out
01:03:24 no assessment had been carried out of either the nature or the composition of the external panels
01:03:32 i think that's correct i say i can't remember the timeline is what happened when
01:03:36 when now
01:03:37 now um
01:03:39 if we can go back to page two
01:03:50 i'm sorry page three page three and look at the end of the fourth bullet point there
01:04:11 where it says burning droplets down window facade source of droplets under consideration when you read that did you obser did you consider that that observation was a significant one
01:04:33 i think i would have done but i can't remember what i was thinking at the time did you consider the the downward
01:04:40 downward spread of fire to be unusual
01:04:45 um
01:04:56 i i'm struggling to place um different conversations in in the timeline i i remember
01:05:04 discussions about the potential the issue of fire spreading downwards um um i'm pretty sure sir ken knight took the view that it wasn't that
01:05:15 took the view that it wasn't that unusual for falling debris to result in secondary fires um
01:05:27 although as you might mention that in in general flames go upwards um but falling debris
01:05:34 debris causing secondary fires wasn't that unusual a
01:05:37 unusual a situation
01:05:40 situation when was that conversation i i can't remember ken knight you don't remember
01:05:46 remember was down with fire spread and the falling burning droplets something you discussed with david crowder i remember some discussion about it and i certainly remember some discussion
01:05:57 i certainly remember some discussion about the the um sort of anti-pigeon provisions that were on the building right
01:06:06 that's a a specific recollection can we take it therefore that you you did have a discussion with the bre david crowder about
01:06:14 about falling burning droplets um i i would have thought so yes a doctor croucher told us when he gave evidence that that was a a matter he specifically flagged for your attention as unusual
01:06:25 flagged for your attention as unusual even before he'd submitted uh his report or draft report yes um i i've seen this evidence that effect as i say um
01:06:36 i think that was his view i think sir ken knight took it didn't think it was as unusual as perhaps had been suggested did these matters the fact of the falling debris and burning droplets observed in this fire as we can see from
01:06:48 observed in this fire as we can see from this report lead to any concerns on your part
01:07:07 i can't remember being overly focused on it i know it was one of the issues that that that got raised in this incident but i i
01:07:14 but i i would you say not overly focused i mean does that mean yes or does that mean no
01:07:21 i guess it means yes we could talk about it but i i can't remember exactly where we got to with it all did you take any action or did you make a note even a mental note to
01:07:32 a note even a mental note to do something about what you'd observed about
01:07:35 about external downward fire spread i think at this stage um it was still quite early in terms of understanding the detail of what happened
01:07:46 happened and it was clear because of the nature of the
01:07:50 of the incident
01:07:52 incident both the fire and rescue service and the metropolitan police were going to carry out um a much more extensive review than we had the resources to do um within the investigation of real fires contract
01:08:03 investigation of real fires contract it's um
01:08:05 it's um um
01:08:07 um it's one of the frustrations with that contract is is that it you can you can get a small team to have a
01:08:15 to have a look at an incident and discuss
01:08:18 discuss some of the issues with the the firefighters if they're available um what it doesn't provide is an in-depth analysis of of um every
01:08:29 in-depth analysis of of um every incident that they look at um just because i think that would be very resource intensive right but presumably would this be right you were looking at this draft report with an eye to seeing
01:08:43 this draft report with an eye to seeing whether or not or not adb was sufficiently robust to prevent the fire spread that we are reading about here i guess oh yes yes
01:08:55 i guess oh yes yes did you ask yourself therefore whether adb ought to regulate materials and products which might produce burning droplets and cause downward external fire spread
01:09:09 i know it's an issue that we've looked at various points in the past um
01:09:16 where was that um
01:09:23 so some of the european classification tests um attempt to measure um the production of burning droplets something which is associated with thermoplastics in particular
01:09:35 thermoplastics in particular was that the d designation uh yes
01:09:40 uh yes and i think there was a piece of research that the department looked at to look at both the um the smoke designation and the droplets
01:09:51 the smoke designation and the droplets designation um and i think the department at the time decided not to take that forward and adopt that no and indeed i'm if you're talking about
01:10:02 about class b s3 d2 within diagram 40 that was of course an option but it was an alternative to class naught which did not measure
01:10:14 class naught which did not measure either smoke production or droplets yeah and it's right isn't it that also that falling burning debris or droplets was not a matter addressed by the 2003
01:10:27 not a matter addressed by the 2003 second edition of br135 which bore your name
01:10:32 um it would have been picked up in the mechanical um performance criteria but it's not a pass valve criteria no indeed and as we've seen you and dr colwell had taken a decision way back in 2003 that
01:10:43 taken a decision way back in 2003 that there would be no failure criteria based on that mechanical performance um i don't recall that being my decision uh there was that was a decision i'm not sure how that decision got made well it was certainly uh the outcome
01:10:55 was certainly uh the outcome yes
01:10:56 yes to which in a publication to which you put your name yes yes you nodded did the falling burning debris at lachnal lead you to consider whether or
01:11:07 lachnal lead you to consider whether or not that decision whether or not it was yours primarily should be revisited so that the next edition of br135
01:11:17 of br135 would actually contain mechanical failure criteria so as to address burning droplets down window facades
01:11:28 i think by then the 2006 edition of the approved document had
01:11:37 in our view at the time um addressed combustibility of the facade we thought more effectively than the previous edition
01:11:49 previous edition and
01:11:49 and you can only get burnley burning droplets if you've got something on the wall that's burning well
01:11:55 well uh
01:11:57 uh is that filler again
01:12:00 again when you say um well i think
01:12:04 that and and more important i think for for this particular incident um the insulation
01:12:11 um although i think it was a thermosetting insulation from memory so it wouldn't have produced a droplet but you you would get debris you also get debris from
01:12:23 you also get debris from um things that might be stored on balconies or things that are blown out of windows and i think ultimately it was never established
01:12:34 established what the material was that was the debris that would that caused the secondary fires it could have been could have been part of the building it could have been part of the contents of the building i don't think that was ever categorically established right
01:12:47 categorically established right two things i think flows from that answer first i think you would accept that with the exception of the removal of the qualification for ventilated cavities in 12th grade in what became 12.7 in 2006
01:12:59 12.7 in 2006 the requirement that insulation should be a material of limited combustibility did not change from to the 2002 version amended into
01:13:09 the 2000 version amended in 2002 to the 2006 version did it
01:13:15 yeah well the key point is the ventilation question this isn't the ventilated system is it exactly so this for the 2006 edition that would have
01:13:26 for the 2006 edition that would have said don't use combustible insulation in the external wall exactly so regardless of whether it's a ventilated cavity or not so if the problem was caused by droplets falling from combusting
01:13:37 droplets falling from combusting insulation the amendments made by the 2006 edition of adb made no difference
01:13:46 no that's not right well how how did it made a difference because if if the if they if this work had been done in accordance with the 2006 edition then the combustible insulation wouldn't have been there
01:13:57 been there but if it had been done in 2000 the combustible insulation wouldn't it wouldn't have been there either would it because the 2000 edition of
01:14:08 because the 2000 edition of the equivalent of 12.7 required insulation to be of limiting but only in ventilated cavities so but i thought you would agree there wasn't a ventilated cavity system here
01:14:20 ventilated cavity system here so it wouldn't and therefore it wouldn't have required non-combust material limited combustibility insulation whereas in 2006 it would have done is that the other thing that follows from your evidence is it just now is
01:14:32 from your evidence is it just now is this is there anything in adb which actually specifically adb 2006 which specifically addressed downward fast spread or burning droplets
01:14:44 and no
01:14:48 no let's go to the final fossie report the 10th of august 2009 that's at bre 40 is 5878
01:15:00 page 195
01:15:05 and we can see that the report starts here
01:15:09 here and um again i think can we tell you that you read this at the time i must have done and if we go to page 196 please first paragraph fifth line down
01:15:21 uh it says this on odd floors the external wall to each bay consists of a full height painted aluminium window frame assembly with a layered polymeric panel four panels forming the lower
01:15:32 panel four panels forming the lower halves of these sets figure a1 and figure a5
01:15:35 figure a5 on even floors a block work half wall with door and window set leaves room for a narrow balcony on each side of the building figure a6 providing additional means of escape to the main stairwell
01:15:47 means of escape to the main stairwell this is described in more detail later balconies have steel guard rails and polymeric panels fitted to them now take it from me we don't need to get back to it that this information had not
01:15:58 back to it that this information had not been included in the earlier fosley report of the 16th of july looking at the last line there and the reference to polymeric panels what did
01:16:10 reference to polymeric panels what did you understand those to be um polymeric is a term to describe some sort of plastic which so it's
01:16:18 so it's they've used that term because they probably don't know specifically what the material is so
01:16:22 so polymeric would be a generally a combustible material yes you'd expect so yes yes so is this right by the 10th of august 2009 the bre had been able to identify polymeric and therefore
01:16:35 identify polymeric and therefore combustible materials in the external wall of latin house yes
01:16:40 yes and therefore the combustible products had been used in the external wall refurbishment yes yes yes what did you make of
01:16:47 make of that news
01:17:02 it was clearly an issue that needed to be
01:17:05 be looked at um i can't remember what i was thinking at different stages during the timeline so but it's obviously a factor that needed to be considered mr chairman is that a convenient moment
01:17:16 mr chairman is that a convenient moment i'm afraid we're right in the middle of this topic there's no more less convenient moment than now so the clock tells us that it is convenient have you finished with this document uh no
01:17:26 no but you've got some way to go yes yes right well i'll be guided by you on that kid
01:17:31 kid um well mr martin we'll have a morning break at this point we'll resume please at uh 25 to 12. and as i've asked you before please don't talk to anyone about your evidence
01:17:42 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room yes sir all right thank you very much would you like to go with the usher please
01:17:57 thank you very much 25 to 12 please
01:36:19 would you ask mr martin to come back in please
01:36:22 please [Music]
01:36:32 all right mr martin ready to carry on yes sir thank you very much yes yes mr chairman mr martin back into the same report please bre uh four zeros five eight seven eight uh let's go in that please to page 202
01:36:45 uh let's go in that please to page 202 third paragraph down let's read it together falling burning debris from flat 79 and 65 most probably from both the window facade assemblies
01:36:57 both the window facade assemblies and the contents of flat 79 ignited materials in flats 37 and 53 located on the fifth and seventh floors respectively it has not been possible to determine which source of falling debris was
01:37:08 which source of falling debris was responsible for each flat that was ignited footage from channel 4 confirmed reports that these two flats happened to have windows open these windows appeared to be open in such a way that would enable them to collect falling debris
01:37:20 enable them to collect falling debris into the flat flat 37 appeared to become involved shortly before approximately two minutes flat 53
01:37:28 flat 53 now on page 203 if we turn to that please halfway down the page first heading in bold potential implications for building regulations we read as follows the following issues are of note with respect to building regulations
01:37:40 with respect to building regulations that approve document b and then if you look at the third paragraph from the bottom if you scroll down you can just see it there towards the bottom of your screen external fire spread yes
01:37:51 yes fire initially spread up externally from flat of origin fire spread down due to burning material falling wind may also have been significant in blowing the fire through the corridor
01:38:02 fire through the corridor now that's a copy of the same section of the earlier report we saw of the 16th of july 2009 which is at bre 3036261 page 3 we saw
01:38:13 we saw other than that after the words fire spread down to burning material falling the words possibly lodged in anti-pigeon wires in the 16th july report have been removed did you notice that at the time
01:38:25 removed did you notice that at the time i don't remember noticing it right as far as
01:38:29 as far as you understood it had some finding or conclusion been arrived at that the burning material which was falling had not become lodged in the anti-pigeon wires
01:38:37 wires and not that i'm aware of right what did you understand by the heading the following issues are of note with respect to the building regulations and approved document b
01:38:52 um that's so that's the um
01:38:56 um the place where we ask the
01:39:00 ask the um
01:39:02 um bre team to um
01:39:07 um set up
01:39:08 set up where they think there might be issues right so in other words you the department were to note in other words to consider the matters listed including external fire spread yeah i mean the nature of these things is it's often to
01:39:19 nature of these things is it's often to some degree conjecture on their part because it's the limited amount of information that they're able to gather did you actually give consideration to the information recorded there about external fire
01:39:30 recorded there about external fire spread
01:39:36 i guess i must i i can't remember exactly what happened at which time but we that's something we would have been looking at and thinking about yes right but in any in any case i think you and i can agree that here we see recorded both
01:39:48 can agree that here we see recorded both upward and downward external fast spread yes yes but there's no further commentary here in this report on the possible reasons for the observed external fire spread either up or down that's right isn't it that's correct and
01:40:00 that's right isn't it that's correct and no further information is given on the specific makeup of the external wall products is there no no equally i think you would accept no information given about the compliance or otherwise of the materials
01:40:12 compliance or otherwise of the materials used in the external wall with the building regulations all the guidance control
01:40:17 control contained in approved document b
01:40:21 yeah that's correct yes can we then turn to bre 3043742
01:40:31 what i'm showing you here is an email dated the 28th of july 2009 from you to martin ship with david crowder copied in subject camberwell martin for the purposes of the fire investigation
01:40:43 purposes of the fire investigation contract you have with the department i'm satisfied that there will be no need for you to revisit latino house any further visits will be needed to be funded by a third party i've raised this with colleagues in frd and they are
01:40:56 with colleagues in frd and they are happy for you to step away now clearly if the police or london fire brigade want to commission you to carry out further work then we would have no objections now
01:41:06 now that
01:41:08 that in a word is the shutdown isn't it on your authority not just of physical visits to the latino site but also the bre's further investigation of the incident
01:41:19 incident yes
01:41:28 essentially yes i mean it says you won't need to revisit la canal house i mean if they if they gathered other information they hadn't reported to us they could have shared that but um i think at that stage
01:41:40 that but um i think at that stage um
01:41:43 um the
01:41:44 the metropolitan police and the london fire brigade um were progressing their investigations um and
01:41:53 and the conclusion that we'd come to in the department is it was better to let those authority given the nature of the incident and the seriousness of it it was better to let those authorities
01:42:05 let those authorities carry out
01:42:07 carry out their investigations but you were also weren't you by doing this calling a halt to any further investigations into whether or not this was a fire stemming from non-compliance with the
01:42:19 stemming from non-compliance with the regulations uh and adb or whether there were matters within the regulations and guidance which needed to be considered for amendment i think we took the view that's
01:42:31 i think we took the view that's something that london fire brigade and the metropolitan police were looking into um
01:42:35 into um they would um
01:42:39 um they were
01:42:41 they were we understood i can't remember the the detail of the conversations but we understood that they were um planning to um investigate this incident um
01:42:53 investigate this incident um quite thoroughly there'd been some tension between london fire brigade and certainly the chief fire rescue advisors team
01:43:06 because as i said we have no statutory locus to investigate and
01:43:12 and [Music]
01:43:14 [Music] i think there was there was a concern that
01:43:18 that the department's intervention into what might be at that time a criminal investigation was something we needed to be very cautious about um
01:43:29 as a government department you don't want to undermine a potential prosecution by getting in the way of what the police and the fire and rescue service are doing so having discussed it um
01:43:41 doing so having discussed it um internally and certainly as it says in the email with the fine resilience director i think both sir ken and shona dunno would have been the director of fine resilience then i think um
01:43:53 then i think um were content that was the right thing to do given what uh the metropolitan police and london fire gave today this decision was taken almost two weeks before the department could have and indeed did receive the
01:44:04 could have and indeed did receive the final report on the 10th of august yes um i
01:44:09 um i i'll take your word for it i don't know what the timeline was right did you have information on the basis of which you were satisfied that there was no need for the bre to investigate any further
01:44:22 investigate any further on behalf of the department um i think
01:44:27 the chief fire and rescue advisors team and fire and resilience were in close communication with um the metropolitan police and london fire brigade um so they had a good idea
01:44:40 fire brigade um so they had a good idea about what those two authorities were planning to do and that's why we felt that it was um appropriate for
01:44:52 we felt that it was um appropriate for um
01:44:53 um the department to step back and let those authorities do what is their statutory role so that's that's the approach we took i
01:45:04 so that's that's the approach we took i think i was also conscious that um
01:45:09 given that there was a lot of work being done by those authorities and the amount of funding available to this research that the investigation real fires contract is quite limited um
01:45:22 fires contract is quite limited um i didn't want
01:45:24 this one incident to use up all the available resources when there might be other incidents which wouldn't be investigated in that much detail where bre would be more use
01:45:35 detail where bre would be more use at the moment when you or the department decided to pull bre off the investigation here at the end of july before they'd finally reported
01:45:46 reported did you have in place with
01:45:49 with the cf with the cfra or the police or the lfb an arrangement whereby they would provide to you the
01:45:59 the results of their investigation
01:46:03 or other information which would enable you to decide whether or not this was a simple case of non-compliance or whether there was a defect in the regulations or approved document b
01:46:14 approved document b not a specific arrangement um i don't think that's something that you you couldn't
01:46:19 couldn't i i think there was
01:46:24 as i say the chief rescue advisor and and um and the fire resilience director had quite good lines of communication communication with um the police and
01:46:36 communication with um the police and london fire brigade so um they would inform us of what they were finding um where they thought that was appropriate given the the constraints of what could
01:46:49 given the the constraints of what could have been a um
01:46:52 a potential prosecution did you take or did anybody in your department take any steps to put in place an arrangement which on the one hand of course would have safeguarded
01:47:03 have safeguarded any prosecution or other criminal proceedings flowing from the incident on the one hand but nonetheless gave you sufficient information sufficient data
01:47:14 sufficient data to decide whether or not the lack of house fire was a simple case of non-compliance or had revealed defects in the building regulations and the proof document b um essentially that was the arrangement
01:47:26 essentially that was the arrangement that had been established between the chief fire and rescue advisors office and and
01:47:30 and and the two authorities um i'm not sure if that was in writing or i'm not sure the detail of the i'm not sure if it was a a formal procedure it was more of a an
01:47:41 a formal procedure it was more of a an agreement to work together where possible right but why not i mean you're the official in the department to whom the bre was reporting why did you let them go without ensuring you had a sufficiently robust substitute in place
01:47:54 sufficiently robust substitute in place as a conduit for the information you needed to make the decision i i think i was satisfied that's the uh having spoken with them with the chief fire and rescue adviser and the director of fine resilience but it
01:48:05 the director of fine resilience but it was left informal not in writing in a matter of
01:48:08 matter of um i can't say that for certain they might have written something down and i i i can't remember um at any event do you accept i think that at this stage 28 july 2009
01:48:18 july 2009 no findings have been communicated to you no final findings about the specific composition of the external panels at lachnal
01:48:26 lachnal um i think that's correct and no assessments have been carried out of the performance in fire of those external panels
01:48:32 panels had it
01:48:34 had it i think that's correct too now we know that it was established by the bre at a later stage through testing various samples of the panels to bs 476 part 7 surface spread of flame that the panels couldn't achieve
01:48:46 that the panels couldn't achieve national class naught and in fact were national class three take that from from me but are you aware of that fact yes yes well that was many months after the 28th
01:48:57 well that was many months after the 28th of july 2009 wasn't it yeah november and december of that year now that means that by 28th of july 2009 when you pulled bre off the of the job there'd been no testing at all of those
01:49:09 there'd been no testing at all of those panels to establish their performance in fire that would follow wouldn't it that's correct but as i say that was something that i think we would have expected to find out in the fullness of time so what did you know at that date
01:49:20 time so what did you know at that date about the cause of the burning material falling and the downward fire spread
01:49:31 um that it was as a result of debris falling from from the flats weather of fire to in through windows on other floors why flats
01:49:40 flats why not also possibly the panels themselves i'm sorry i mean i'm including that generically it was it was i i don't think it ever was established what material
01:49:50 material right and it was very possibly a mixture of the two i see so at this date to the best of your recollection you were aware that there was a cause of burning
01:49:59 burning falling material and at least in part that was contributed to by the burning panels
01:50:05 panels um
01:50:06 um yes
01:50:07 yes yes who within the department had final say on
01:50:13 say on um the cessation of bre's investigation
01:50:28 well i guess if i i would as i say i definitely discussed it with the chief fire and rescue advisor and and um director in fire and resilience
01:50:39 fire and resilience and i would have discussed it with the deputy director which i think was bob ledson then
01:50:46 so if they'd have disagreed with the proposal then they could have said no keep them there for longer right frd is is is what i think it's the i
01:50:57 frd is is is what i think it's the i think it was called the fire and resilience directorate so they were the
01:51:02 the the department was responsible for the fire and rescue service at the time right but you say also you think bob led some too yes um
01:51:11 um i must have done and this wasn't a decision was it you took on your own um no
01:51:17 no was it a decision you made and then sought approval for or was it something you were told should happen
01:51:26 uh probably a mixture of the two i imagine that it was something we were discussing at the time what what's what's the appropriate thing to do as i say i know that there was some um
01:51:36 um tension
01:51:37 tension between um in particular london fire brigade and the chief fire rescue advisors unit it was a relatively new role the chief fire and rescue adviser and
01:51:51 i think there was some difficulty trying to establish where the chief fire rescue advisers role should start and finish in relation to looking at a particular incident um
01:52:03 to looking at a particular incident um and whereas london fire brigade had a clear statutory function to investigate now let's look at david crowder's second witness statement please bre 30 43716
01:52:16 page twenty eight uh paragraph eighty eight h at the foot of the page you say following he says following this period i believe i had very little contact with brian martin regarding latino house until the time of
01:52:27 regarding latino house until the time of the inquest my general impression was that the view of dclg at this time prior to the inquest was simply that latino had occurred as a result of non-compliance with the previous edition of approved document b the 2000 edition
01:52:39 of approved document b the 2000 edition consolidated with 2000 and 2002 amendments whereas the current edition was the 2006 edition amended 2007. matters concerning the adequacy of guidance for
01:52:50 the adequacy of guidance for firefighting were not within brian martin's remit and i predominantly dealt with peter wise in this regard and then at the next sub-paragraph i he says note that i was in regular contact with brian martin throughout the above
01:53:01 with brian martin throughout the above period regarding the investigation of real fires project generally but not in respect of lachnal house in particular my general impression as previously stated was that lachlan house was not a particular concern to dclg in terms of
01:53:13 particular concern to dclg in terms of potential updates to approve document b given the volume of non-compliances with approved document b that had led to its tragic outcome now
01:53:23 now i'll go into that in a moment but just for completeness um when he gave oral evidence to the inquiry dr crowder confirmed that the general impression that he's describing in those two paragraphs i've just read to you had
01:53:35 paragraphs i've just read to you had come from you specifically and he picked up that impression from you during the summer of 2009 that's day 2 30 um at page 87 line 17 to 19 and 25 and he was
01:53:48 page 87 line 17 to 19 and 25 and he was also said he was disappointed to receive the email shutting down the investigation that's day 230 page 17 lines one to four question having given you that to digest had you formed the view by the 28th of
01:54:00 had you formed the view by the 28th of july 2009
01:54:02 july 2009 that the latin house incident was simply a matter of non-compliance with the proof document be
01:54:13 it as i said it's a very complex incident
01:54:17 incident and
01:54:24 i i can't remember exactly at what point i thought what but i think that was the general conclusion we'd come to in respect of that incident is for them
01:54:35 respect of that incident is for them for the most part if not entirely it was an issue of um
01:54:41 um non-compliance rather than um certainly non-compliance with the current edition of the approved document
01:54:48 document but how could you have come to any conclusion given that you knew that the vre investigation was incomplete had been stopped by the department and
01:55:02 had given you no final
01:55:04 no final set of facts on which to base your decision
01:55:07 decision um
01:55:09 probably from whatever other information we were we were finding out from london fire brigade at the time
01:55:18 well what was that i i can't i'm sorry it's really difficult to place in time what i knew at different points in time but
01:55:26 but um
01:55:27 um we i guess we gradually um gleaned more information and eventually the inquest itself provided more information can we go to bre three zeros four three
01:55:39 can we go to bre three zeros four three seven four four
01:55:42 um this is some emails between you and david crowder in november 2009 and um if we go to page one second email down on page one um you can see that david crowder writes
01:55:53 um you can see that david crowder writes to you and the topic is lacking house and he says brian would you mind giving me a call as soon as is convenient and your response at the top of the screen
01:56:03 screen there a few minutes later is i'm out and about i'll call in the morning now at that stage this is mid-november 2009
01:56:12 2009 i think it's right isn't it uh that uh he suddenly says so that he was acting on behalf of the metropolitan police service and the lfb in the latino investigation
01:56:23 in the latino investigation um that sounds right yes it's his statement at paragraph 5b in his second statement bre 30 is 43716 page 2. um question for you did you call him
01:56:35 um question for you did you call him back the next morning i haven't got a clue right
01:56:40 right do you know why he had wanted you to call him
01:56:43 call him no
01:56:45 no do you remember what you discussed no now we know from the evidence of dr crowd that he had been commissioned by the lfb and the date matters on the 17th of
01:56:56 and the date matters on the 17th of november 2009 so the day before his email of the 18th to carry out standard tests on sample panels taken from latino house
01:57:07 from latino house we get that from his second statement to paragraph 5c
01:57:12 does that help you with why he was calling or what you've discussed if you discussed anything
01:57:21 i i i can't be sure i i'm i remember becoming aware of some of the tests that lfb had commissioned um
01:57:33 um i don't think mr crowder would have dr craig would have shared that information with me until he had an authority from london fire brigade so this seems too early for that but i could be wrong
01:57:45 can we go to his second statement again please bre three zeros four three seven one six this time page 22 paragraph 78
01:57:54 78 and uh there on 78 you can see what he says in the first line he says um i believe the fosie report was emailed to dclg on the 10th of august 2009. i
01:58:05 to dclg on the 10th of august 2009. i also contacted brian martin via email the subject of which was lateral house on 18th of november 2009 requesting a telephone call which he exhibits this was around the time when bs 476 part 7 tests were being carried out i
01:58:18 part 7 tests were being carried out i did not recall the specific nature of the phone call but i do recall it being made clear to me at some point that the issue with the panels was one of non-compliance not that the panels were somehow compliant and
01:58:29 somehow compliant and and had produced burning debris in spite of being compliant in addition it remained the case that it was not possible to confirm whether the panels were in fact responsible for the burning debris which had ignited flats 37 and 53 or whether it was simply the
01:58:43 37 and 53 or whether it was simply the contents of the flats that had produced the burning debris now were you aware in november 2009 that it had by that stage still not been possible to establish what was
01:58:54 possible to establish what was responsible for the falling burning debris igniting the secondary fires in flats 37 and 53 below i think i would have been away right
01:59:06 right in fact it was never established at any later time either was it no i mean that's the the challenge of fire investigation is very often the materials that you're most interested in are destroyed by the fire so it's not always possible to know for sure what
01:59:19 always possible to know for sure what did or didn't happen did you tell dr crowder during your call in november 2009 that the the issue with the panels was one of non-compliance as he says
01:59:31 was one of non-compliance as he says i'm not sure if i would have told him i think we would have discussed it
01:59:37 right
01:59:39 did you discuss the issue and at least give him the impression that so far as you were concerned there was no com there was an issue
01:59:51 there was no com there was an issue of non-compliance with the panels not that there was some problem with adb
01:59:57 adb um i can't remember that conversation but
02:00:00 but that's the sort of thing we would have talked about right
02:00:04 and when had you reached the conclusion that the issue with the panels was one of
02:00:10 non-compliance well i don't know for sure that i did but as i say that would be the sort of thing that i would that we would talk about um and and i'd be interested in his opinion
02:00:21 interested in his opinion well you see he his recollection is that it was made clear to him by you that the issue with the panels was one of non-compliance
02:00:33 of non-compliance now do you recall either saying that to him or using words to that effect um
02:00:40 um no
02:00:44 now i think you were aware at some stage that the tests under part 7 of bs476 were undertaken as you've told us now just to be clear for your benefit um
02:00:55 for your benefit um those tests were carried out on three types of panels um they were foam cored one with a pale yellow core one with a pink foam core and one with an orange core do you remember that
02:01:06 do you remember that fact i've been reminded of it in preparation for for uh giving evidence i i can't recall if i knew that at the time i probably would have done did you ever see any report showing the results of those
02:01:20 tests i was aware of the results i don't know if i saw the actual test report do you remember when the results of those tests were first communicated to you i'm sorry i couldn't give you a date
02:01:32 you i'm sorry i couldn't give you a date why did you not want to see the reports
02:01:38 if you didn't see them why didn't you ask them
02:01:45 i'm not sure why i would have needed to see them um as i say i i was definitely aware of the results um in in some form um
02:01:57 which were quite straightforward i think you see you had called off the investigation by the bre on the basis that there were continuing investigations by the police and by the lfb
02:02:07 lfb as part of that investigation you're given information by mr by dr crowder about the results of these tests
02:02:16 why didn't you want to know the results of those tests so as to be able to answer the critical question was lachnal compliant or not uh
02:02:26 uh and if it was [Music]
02:02:30 [Music] how come well i didn't know the results that's what i've just said i just didn't see the test reports
02:02:40 were you made aware at any stage that the panels had burnt in those tests with such ferocity that the bre had been reluctant to go on to test under part 6 because they feared
02:02:51 to test under part 6 because they feared damaging the testing equipment
02:02:57 i think that's more of a foible of the nature of that particular test rather than the ferocity of the the fire well were you aware of what i've just put to you mr martin i don't remember that no let's look at
02:03:09 i don't remember that no let's look at one of the test reports on one of the sample panels bre four zeros five eight seven eight page two four two
02:03:24 uh and uh this has a title at the top as you can see surface spread of flame test to bs 476
02:03:30 476 part
02:03:31 part 7 1997
02:03:34 7 1997 and
02:03:36 and the the actual test result start the actual report starts at page 238
02:03:43 238 dated the 11th of december 2009 uh prepared for global by somebody called potter approved by debbie smith dr debbie smith and if we go
02:03:54 dr debbie smith and if we go please to page 242 as we can see uh
02:03:59 uh and you've got this you've got the statistics and the observations and under observations of paragraph 4.2 you can see line 1 all incandescent
02:04:10 you can see line 1 all incandescent spalling was visible throughout all test runs
02:04:14 runs just
02:04:15 just would you tell us for everyone's benefit what the word spalling means um
02:04:22 um bits of material coming off of the surface yeah and then all um popping sounds of widely varying volume audible throughout all test runs and then all line three specimens were
02:04:35 and then all line three specimens were flaming strongly at the end of all test runs
02:04:38 runs and then line four
02:04:42 flaming debris was observed burning on the floor for a maximum of five seconds each
02:04:47 each and then two a piece of flaming debris was ejected at 601 minutes seconds which continued to burn on the floor for 20 seconds
02:04:56 seconds and then flaming visible above the reference line and then finally flaming visible above the reference line also 200 and 620 millimeters uh
02:05:07 uh does this
02:05:09 does this trigger a recollection did you ever see this report do you think
02:05:13 think i'm not sure i don't recognize it no
02:05:16 no and i mean do you agree that that identifying whether the panels any of the panels tested at national atlanta were national class naught or class iii
02:05:27 class iii wasn't going to tell anybody about the fire performance of those panels as a whole
02:05:39 it's only part of the story i accept that yeah
02:05:43 do you remember when you first learned that the foam core of the window panels was considered by the bre to be a pir or a pur foam i'm not sure when when i um i found that
02:05:55 i'm not sure when when i um i found that out but i as as i said earlier i i was under the impression that it was a thermosetting plastic which is what they are
02:06:01 are and indeed um the pot the red there's a reference as we saw in the uh 16th of august 2009 report to polymeric foam we saw that yes yes did you give any consideration
02:06:14 yes yes did you give any consideration at this stage and this is before the inquest so either in december 2011 uh nine and or later um that to the fact that the insulation
02:06:25 um that to the fact that the insulation was combustible pir or pur foam
02:06:35 i don't think i can honestly answer that i can't remember what i was thinking at the time um but certainly
02:06:42 certainly to say the changes that we've made to approve document b in 2006 had removed the reference to ventilated cavities which meant that um
02:06:51 um the guidance would be specifically telling you not to use um
02:06:56 um foamed plastics in those locations i mean the specific composition of the materials making up the phone calls of these panels was never identified at any stage was it yeah that's a common problem um
02:07:08 yeah that's a common problem um it's
02:07:10 it's quite difficult to identify with certainty the specific nature of a
02:07:18 material without going quite a lot of effort and so you first need to ask yourself is what would you do with that information
02:07:26 and
02:07:31 it probably wouldn't have made a lot of difference whether you've known which particular beyond knowing that it's a thermosetting foam
02:07:40 there'd be no there wouldn't be much benefit in knowing specifically which one
02:07:45 one is it not important to know whether it's pir or pur or phenolic within the family of thermosetting insulins
02:07:56 no i don't think it would have been particularly useful information right
02:08:00 right can we take it that you didn't give any further consideration to investigating uh further or asking the bre to investigate the precise nature of these foam insulins
02:08:11 insulins no i think i mean it's it's clear that it was a thermosetting foam at the way that they burned as was something which the fire science community had quite a lot
02:08:22 fire science community had quite a lot of information on the reason i asked the question is because although they may be treated as a family as combustible they may
02:08:30 they may melt or drip in different ways and with a thermoset so they don't melt or drip they they tend to char and and and spoil sometimes
02:08:41 and spoil sometimes right
02:08:42 right dripping is what you get from a thermoplastic yes all right but um burning falling debris the creation of burning falling debris it's it's quite a different
02:08:53 debris it's it's quite a different behavior um but you would need to that's the point isn't it you'd need to know whether it was pir or pur or phenolic to to know or to assess the fire and safety
02:09:05 or to assess the fire and safety implications of the panels as a whole particularly having regard to doubt the downward fast spread as observed at la canal no you don't agree with that no well so
02:09:16 you don't agree with that no well so they all behave the same today near enough yes for the for in terms of what you needed to know if it there's there's a big difference between thermoplastics and thermosets in terms of the way they behave in fire um
02:09:27 behave in fire um in terms of the the differences between different forms of thermosetting plastic the differences are
02:09:35 are certainly for this purpose it will be pretty much academic i think i think you would agree with me uh that the results of the part seven tests here and the observations we've just looked at
02:09:45 at demonstrated that whatever it was on lacanal house was a dangerous combination of materials
02:09:58 well it confirms that it's a combustible insulation material um definitely not material a limited combustibility and the way it's behaving sounds like a thermosetting phone right whether it's dangerous or not depends on what you do with it right now um okay that takes us
02:10:11 with it right now um okay that takes us to the question of long compliance d did lachnal signal to you in any way that there might be a legacy of high-rise buildings where the building control certificate had been issued before your 2006 guidance came in and which
02:10:24 your 2006 guidance came in and which might contain combustible insulation or panels with a combustible core
02:10:33 i think that is a fair question i think we were focused on um what changes we might or might not need to make to building regulations so we were looking at what do the building regulations say here
02:10:44 here and
02:10:45 and and the guidance had been changed such that this type of insulation shouldn't be used in the external walls of tall buildings i don't think we
02:10:57 i don't think we i
02:10:58 i i don't remember us considering um
02:11:02 um the fact that there would potentially be a legacy
02:11:09 that's um that would be consistent though with your approach um throughout the entire period to the grenfell tower fire wouldn't it which is that while you may be interested in making
02:11:21 while you may be interested in making changes prospectively to adb you were never interested in doing a doing a survey of what was out there to make sure that the buildings people were living in weren't dangerous i think that's a fair criticism
02:11:32 that's a fair criticism why is that um
02:11:35 um it's the nature of the work we did we were focused on um trying to improve building standards or set appropriate building standards um
02:11:45 um that wasn't our we didn't see that as our function and
02:11:52 and in general that's the way building regulations worked over time is that um you would change building standards um in the light of
02:12:04 in the light of lessons learned um but a retrospective application of those regular certainly retrospective abdication those regulations isn't something you would do
02:12:15 something you would do um
02:12:18 and it would have to be a more severe issue
02:12:21 issue um
02:12:22 um to
02:12:23 to justify
02:12:25 justify um something retrospective and i think that's probably a mindset that we that we adopted probably inappropriately sometimes
02:12:37 and a more severe issue would be something like the fire at grenfell tower
02:12:46 that's an extreme example but yes well it's the
02:12:50 it's the precise example because it is only after that incident that the british government decided to do something retrospective
02:13:01 to do something retrospective isn't it yes i i i think i think that's a fair point um and
02:13:10 i i get if if we'd have thought this was
02:13:15 a very severe situation then we may have taken suggested more steps that wasn't the way our team typically functioned our job was to develop policy for building regulations
02:13:26 develop policy for building regulations as we saw it um and i guess that's a a weakness in the system
02:13:39 and does it explain why so far as we know and tell me if this is wrong you never thought to alert anthony bird to conduct some sort of survey
02:13:49 of survey or alert louise upton to alert building owners in turn so that they could beef up their fire protection and prevention measures
02:13:56 measures under the rro in blocks containing these kinds of panels whether or not they were compliant um well i mean i i certainly didn't raise that um the
02:14:07 raise that um the i mean at that time the chief fire and rescue advisors unit did have some expertise in the subject area and they were aware of these results too and that i guess that would have fallen to them
02:14:18 and
02:14:21 none of us looked upon this as being something where retrospective action was necessary even though six people had lost their lives in the fire at latino um i think it
02:14:32 i think it it would be very wrong to look at the lack of house fire and consider that the um
02:14:39 um the external wall construction was the cause of those deaths um
02:14:44 um and i know that's that was the conclusion that dr crowder came to and and i think he's right um it was a much more complex incident than that
02:14:56 and the issues that were probably more significant and related to the failure of the internal fire protection and compartmentation
02:15:07 fire protection and compartmentation such as the issue with the staircases that i mentioned earlier on now um let's go to dr crowder's final report to the metropolitan police into the latin house fire um it's dated the 11th of may 2012 and we find it at
02:15:19 11th of may 2012 and we find it at bre405881
02:15:21 bre405881 [Music]
02:15:29 and if we go to page one we can see the date at the bottom right hand corner uh
02:15:35 uh it's called an expert witness report uh and um if you
02:15:40 you um go please to page two you can see that it's prepared by dr crowder and reviewed by martin ship on the 11th of may
02:15:48 may 2012.
02:15:50 2012. now did you receive this report or read it at any time um i can't say right well let me just see if i can pick up a document hom 401108
02:16:04 this is an email of the 12th of september 2012. so five months later
02:16:14 that's hom four zero is one one zero eight
02:16:30 i'll come back to it later if i need to let's go to page 97 of this document
02:16:37 uh and you can see here
02:16:41 let's see if this triggers a recollection um at um this section uh he is he um dr crowder is commenting on what nick
02:16:52 um dr crowder is commenting on what nick coop the symphony windows manager uh has said in his witness statement to the inquest
02:16:58 inquest now nick coop or symphony windows had supplied the window panels for the refurbishment at lachnall uh and if we go on with in this section to page 99 paragraph 552
02:17:11 to page 99 paragraph 552 nick coop says this in his witness statement
02:17:15 statement um paragraph three with reference to the infill panels it would be unusual for us to deviate from the sandwich panels but we may if for example a backup panel was required on the inside the insulation in the panel
02:17:27 the inside the insulation in the panel is in a high density polyurethane board which is commonly used in the industry and i'm not aware of any alternatives for this type of insular installation although i believe polystyrene is still used in some installations but it is not
02:17:39 used in some installations but it is not a product we would consider it is my understanding that polyurethane insulation meets recognized standards of fire safety were you aware of that evidence
02:17:50 were you aware of that evidence at any time
02:17:57 i don't recognize it right
02:18:01 right how is it that you were not aware of that evidence
02:18:06 was that not ever brought to your attention i can't say um it may have been and i've forgotten it but i i don't recognize this text right
02:18:15 right did you have any evidence at any time to suggest that the type of board nick cooper is referring to here was not commonly used in the industry at the time
02:18:25 time um i guess i wouldn't have known one way or the other um but i think
02:18:31 it was something that we later raised with the um the registration schemes for window installers to try and
02:18:39 get them to address compliance issues let's go then
02:18:46 to hom40106
02:18:53 this is a note uh
02:18:58 of a meeting on the 18th of january 2011
02:19:02 2011 at eland house attended by you and by david kennett paul jenkins and stuart reeves of the lfb uh and damian walsh of the met
02:19:15 uh and damian walsh of the met do you remember that meeting um i do have some recollection of it yes right do you remember how it had come about
02:19:20 about um i think and so london fire brigade had uh employed um an advisor i think that's who adrian prest is um on building regulations um
02:19:31 prest is um on building regulations um and he
02:19:32 and he suggested that requirement b4 didn't address external fire spread to them which they that was not their understanding of the building regulations and and they were asking
02:19:44 for some advice on that point advice from you um yeah
02:19:49 um yeah right
02:19:51 right is this
02:19:53 is this formal or informal advice
02:19:59 and they asked to come ask to speak to me about an issue and um it was an important issue so i said i'd help where i could um i guess it's formal at some on some level right
02:20:10 it's formal at some on some level right how did that fit with the instruction that you told us about over the course of your evidence previously that as an official you were not you were required not to provide an advice or an opinion oh i see what
02:20:21 advice or an opinion oh i see what you're saying um
02:20:29 i think that that so that general policy would have meant that i would have been discouraged from saying this material does or doesn't comply but i think what lfb were looking for
02:20:41 lfb were looking for was
02:20:42 was an understanding of the actual functional requirement itself um
02:20:48 um and also
02:20:49 and also this is a
02:20:50 this is a an investigation into a serious incident so
02:20:53 so um if it was possible to assist them then i would do what i could to do so so
02:20:58 so [Music]
02:21:00 [Music] do i understand that answer to mean that you were free to give advice an opinion or steer on your of the meaning or underlying intent behind a building
02:21:12 underlying intent behind a building regulation but not the guidance um yeah we need to be cautious about how we
02:21:20 we how we responded to that sort of query where did that distinction come from did somebody tell you that you are free to advise on the building regulations um but not on the approved documents
02:21:34 um but not on the approved documents um not in those terms um as i said
02:21:39 as i said the general advice we've been given as officials was not to um directly um if you like make a decision that should be made by a building
02:21:50 that should be made by a building control body um
02:21:52 um or in this case ultimately it could be a call that would decide whether or not um somebody had or hadn't contributing contravened the law um
02:22:02 um but what lfb were looking for here was to
02:22:06 to check their understanding of the building regulations um
02:22:10 um and clearly that be something we'd try to help with is it fair to summarize the purpose of this meeting as advice from you to the lfb
02:22:20 lfb on various aspects of the building regulations and the approved documents proof document b uh
02:22:26 uh where it was related to their continuing investigation into the latino house fire i think that's a fair description of it yes now i want to ask you about some sections of these notes but before we do can we go to a later email at hom
02:22:37 can we go to a later email at hom 3046917
02:22:43 now um
02:22:45 uh
02:22:48 let's wait for it to come up on the screen but it's an email sent
02:22:57 right
02:23:06 it's hom three zero is four six nine one seven
02:23:12 well we may have to come back to that uh
02:23:16 uh at a later stage going back to this note then where you asked specific questions of this meeting i i can't remember that much detail right
02:23:25 right um looking at the first paragraph the note says this brian martin broadly expressed the view that adrian press was wrong in his assertion that b4 does not include external fire spread he stated that br 135 revised addresses the issue
02:23:37 that br 135 revised addresses the issue but concludes that it predominantly refers to rapid vertical fire spread makes reference to a case in scotland involving rapid rapid vertical fire spread caused by external panels made of grp as opposed to jumping from floor to
02:23:49 grp as opposed to jumping from floor to floor which would be virtually impossible to prevent because of open windows etc and mentions that downward spread could even be caused by falling curtains etc makes reference to a case where falling aluminium window frames
02:24:01 where falling aluminium window frames ignited a car below now in summary among other things adrian prest you remember had expressed the view that adb did not clearly indicate
02:24:10 indicate that resistance or prevention of fire spread
02:24:13 spread over external walls from an internal fire was an objective in its own right
02:24:20 yes i think that is what he said yes and we can look at adrian press letter of the 18th of october 2010 which the inquiry has already seen for our purposes it's at lfb triple zero three nine five eight eight
02:24:32 three nine five eight eight or lfb triple zero three nine five four five put to dan daley um on day one eight three but um your answer is yes and at that stage had adrian prest's views on the functional
02:24:44 adrian prest's views on the functional requirements on b4 caused you any concern
02:24:48 concern in relation to a possible lack of clarity
02:24:50 clarity about the way in which those requirements were expressed um i i i remember being surprised at that conclusion probably because we had just
02:25:00 just um
02:25:01 um done all of the work on br 135 which was specifically about that issue um in support of requirement b4 so i i couldn't see and i i think i remember looking at the
02:25:12 i i think i remember looking at the functional requirement and the guidance and
02:25:15 and and not seeing how you could come to that conclusion if you read it can we go to lfb triple zero five two one three five and within that email run
02:25:28 and within that email run page four
02:25:31 nfb triple zero five two one three five and you can see that uh on page four is an email from dave kennett to
02:25:43 to andy jack
02:25:50 uh it's it's it's the very you don't need to go back to the bottom of page three it just says david kenneth but you can see the signatory um a quarter of the way down your screen and he says this
02:26:01 he says this uh and it's sent to andy jack and um
02:26:05 um a group of other people within the lfb whose names will be familiar um at least to the panel i think and he says this only to add that in 2010 we engaged adrian press to advise
02:26:16 2010 we engaged adrian press to advise us on interpretation of b4 adrian had been head of bc for several local authorities as i recall his advice was that the fire resistance of the external face of a building was only relevant with regards
02:26:28 building was only relevant with regards to distances from boundaries and unprotected areas we including paul jenkins took the view that the fr of the external face was a requirement in its own right
02:26:39 in its own right hence the letter to brian martin who confirmed this to be the case brian was also horrified that such an experienced bca should be should misinterpret b4 in this way i wondered at the time bearing
02:26:50 this way i wondered at the time bearing in mind that lack of guidance on this issue
02:26:53 issue whether his view was commonly held indeed adrian adrian had checked his view with another senior colleague before providing us with written advice is that right that you were horrified by adrian prest's misinterpretation as
02:27:04 adrian prest's misinterpretation as david kenneth puts it um i think it probably was yes i mean i i i
02:27:10 i i found it difficult to reconcile that opinion with what the guidance said i thought
02:27:17 thought the objective is clear did you at any time carry out any inquiries even in formal inquiries to to to find out whether others in the building control industry or industry more widely held the views
02:27:30 or industry more widely held the views which aligned with adrian prests and which were therefore horrifyingly wrong
02:27:45 i think i may have done i can't remember for sure um it's a sort of thing i might well have discussed with some building control officers um
02:27:55 right and what was the upshot um i don't think any of us understood how you could come to that conclusion well yes and adrian pressed as you can see had been head was head of building
02:28:07 see had been head was head of building control for a number of local authorities so
02:28:10 so it was not inexperienced i i would suppose yes
02:28:16 i i assume so it might have been that he'd
02:28:19 he'd been in a managerial role for a long time and perhaps was out of out of line with um the regs i'm not sure well the regs have been around apart from the word adequately which came and went
02:28:31 came and went um since 19 well since 1985. yes so
02:28:37 so that doesn't really offer much of an explanation and we can also see that
02:28:41 that he had checked his view with another senior colleague my question is this in the light of what of what you knew about about adrian prest and the fact that he checked his view with another senior colleague did you not think it's
02:28:52 colleague did you not think it's sensible
02:28:53 sensible um to find out how he'd come to that view or or critically work out whether or not this was a common view a common error i think it was something i bore in mind
02:29:04 i think it was something i bore in mind when in conversations i had with other um building control officers and when i was um
02:29:11 was um building control related events i didn't carry out a formal exercise as such right
02:29:19 now at the going back to the first paragraph of the note if we can please hom four zero is one one oh six
02:29:28 um when you said there in the second and third lines that um the br135 predominantly referred to rapid vertical fire spread as opposed to jumping from
02:29:39 fire spread as opposed to jumping from floor to floor what did you mean by that um
02:29:44 um so that that that that's there's a there's a diagram at the front of br135 which explains that the issue that um
02:29:52 um if you've got a fully developed fire on one floor the flames coming from the windows are likely to be
02:30:02 to be so long as to attack the windows of the floor above and that's something which you can't
02:30:12 reasonably prevent with the construction of the building and so what the object what we're trying to achieve with
02:30:22 with the guidance in the approved document and br135
02:30:27 and br135 is to ensure that
02:30:30 there isn't further fire spread which is supported by the external wall construction so the difference between what i might call fire spreading up was through
02:30:40 through the elongated flame envelope and the coanda effect perhaps on the one hand and a cladding system on fire on the other
02:30:48 other um yes yes and the case in scotland was garnered wasn't it um yes yes
02:30:55 did it occur to you um that the the uh as you gave the explanation in january 2011 that one option for pro for at least attempting to prevent that
02:31:06 for at least attempting to prevent that type of fire spread would be for the regulations and guidance to require the use of
02:31:11 use of non-combustible materials in the external arrangements external wall arrangements of high-rise buildings as a linear route to compliance harking back to the recommendations from december 1999 from
02:31:23 recommendations from december 1999 from the select committee i think at that time i thought that the changes we'd made in 2006 um removing the reference to
02:31:35 ventilated cavities and and the fact that bl-135 had been produced which provided um
02:31:44 background information um
02:31:48 um had done that how was it had achieved the objective um you know that's that's what we genuinely thought is that the guidance that we'd changed in 2006
02:32:00 in 2006 addressed that risk adequately um
02:32:04 um and and br 135
02:32:08 supported that but of course as we know class naught still remained in diagram 40 and the alternative option of class b i had a d2
02:32:20 i had a d2 requirement which was essentially a a a
02:32:24 a a a standard which did not prevent burning droplets yes that's correct yes yes
02:32:33 so it hadn't arrived at the position whereby non-combustible materials that would be used in the external wall arrangements over 18 meters not wholly non-combustible no that's as as we've
02:32:44 non-combustible no that's as as we've discussed that's something which um we'd looked at as part of the 2006 review yes but you know we can see in the paragraph i've just read to you that it refers to falling curtains as potentially responsible for the falling debris why
02:32:57 responsible for the falling debris why did you say that
02:33:02 i can't remember exactly what i was thinking at the time it's meeting but it's a fact that material from um
02:33:10 um fires
02:33:11 fires sometimes falls out of windows yes indeed but why did you not also discuss the possibility that the falling burning debris could have come from the combustible external window panels themselves as we saw
02:33:21 as we saw recorded
02:33:23 recorded in the
02:33:25 in the 16th of august 2009 bre report the light i imagine we would have talked about that otherwise we wouldn't have talked about the curtains um i think it's just um
02:33:38 the curtains um i think it's just um this note may not have picked that up looking at the second paragraph it says this states that insulation above 18 meters should be of limited combustibility and the original specified aluminium panels would have
02:33:49 specified aluminium panels would have been class naught on the surface but the insulation may not have been also notes that aluminium has not always proved reliable during intense heat um
02:33:59 um what did it mean when you when it says there that the original specified aluminium panels would have been class naught on the surface but the insulation may not have been may not have been what
02:34:16 i i i can't reading that sentence i think it means that the the insulation may not have been class o or or a material limited combustibility
02:34:27 a material limited combustibility why the insulation be class naught why would it be tested to class naught you wouldn't expect it to be um i i can't remember the detail of this conversation right and it's a
02:34:39 conversation right and it's a it's a it's a note that someone's made after a meeting i i don't know whether i saw it or not at the time right and as as i say it goes on to say that aluminium has not always proved reliable during intense heat to
02:34:50 proved reliable during intense heat to what experiences or observations were you referring there aluminium's got a melting point at 600 degrees c so it tends to melt in contact with flames and you'd seen that you knew that from
02:35:02 and you'd seen that you knew that from experience had you it's a yes it's a thing that most engineers would know yeah you're not an engineer there so i think we established early on in your evidence i'm a child building engineer
02:35:14 evidence i'm a child building engineer so it's a different sort of engineer right
02:35:16 right right indeed now i mean did you have in mind the test carried out in july 2001 under cc 1924
02:35:26 no because i as as i've said repeatedly i didn't see all the detail of those and i i don't think that would have been particularly relevant here anyway okay now you go it goes on to say notes the difference between non-combustible and
02:35:37 difference between non-combustible and fire resistance non-combustible material should not ignite the combustible material can offer fire resistance if it burns at a slow rate what did you what did you mean when you said that combustible material can offer
02:35:49 said that combustible material can offer fire resistance if it burns at a slow rate
02:35:52 rate um i i think we're talking about the difference between fire resistance and reaction to fire um
02:35:58 um which
02:35:58 which um
02:36:01 it's important to be clear about which of those
02:36:04 of those most construction products when you're looking at their fire performance you're over thinking about their reaction to fire properties which is how easily they ignite and and the the energy they release and the way that they burn
02:36:15 they burn fire resistance is about their ability to
02:36:19 to stay intact or
02:36:22 or or contain a fire um so for instance a fire resisting door um they're often made of wood which is a com you know known as a combustible material um
02:36:35 known as a combustible material um but the way that they're constructed and the thickness of the door means that it resists fire spreading from one side of the door opening to the other when the door is closed so there's a difference between fire
02:36:46 so there's a difference between fire resistance and reaction to fire
02:36:55 and was that a difference that you considered mr press understood or not
02:37:04 oh i'd be really surprised if a building control officer didn't know that um i i think i don't think this is a this note is entirely about the discussions relating to mr prest's um evidence i think this is a
02:37:15 think this is a a general discussion with the london fire brigade team that were working on um
02:37:22 um the lack of investigation what was the relevance of the distinction you were seeking to draw in that paragraph
02:37:32 i can't be certain this is what we were talking about at that time um this was a meeting that's quite some time ago but certainly
02:37:40 certainly one of the issues that was discussed and was considered at the inquest um was um
02:37:48 um that these panels burnt through um
02:37:54 um and
02:37:55 and that was to some extent um
02:37:58 um an issue that had been um looked at
02:38:03 looked at um and so the panel's burning through is a question of fire resistance whereas the panels being on fire is a question of reaction to fire now let's go to the bottom of page i'm
02:38:14 now let's go to the bottom of page i'm so sorry let's go to lfb three zeros four nine five two eight
02:38:21 uh and um this is uh the minute of an lfepa meeting of the 1st of february 2011.
02:38:30 2011. now you weren't there but we could see from the list of attendees that dave kennett was as was
02:38:39 as was ac steve turek and andy jack and if we scroll to the bottom of page one
02:38:48 so this is about two weeks after the meeting you'd had with dave kenneth at eland house and if we go to the bottom of page one under the heading uh enforcement it says this dave kennett reported that he andy jack gm paul jenkins and police
02:39:00 gm paul jenkins and police representatives had met with brian martin to discuss with the issues raised by adrian prest brian martin did not concur with adrian prest's views on external fire spread and the building regulations and suggested that lfb right
02:39:11 regulations and suggested that lfb right to him rather than the secretary of state with a series of questions to get a formal view dave kenneth has produced the questions that have been agreed by all relevant parties and he will now draft a letter for ac dacfsr
02:39:24 will now draft a letter for ac dacfsr approval
02:39:27 did you suggest to the lfb that their letter should come from you rather than the secretary of state
02:39:37 i think i might have done um i think it was just um i think it may have been to speed the process up i think i was concerned if they wrote to the secretary of state there would have been delays in the
02:39:49 delays in the and the letter getting to me it was i'd having had the discussion with lfb about this problem um
02:39:58 i was conscious that this was a an important investigation and um i was trying to help um so i suggested to them
02:40:10 i suggested to them write to us and and um i'll see if i can get you a an official response from the department which would resolve the issue when you say i'd get you an official
02:40:21 when you say i'd get you an official response
02:40:22 response that mean it would come from you um
02:40:25 um i wouldn't have been allowed to do that in isolation um i distinctly remember talking to the department's lawyers about how we should approach this and
02:40:35 this and given that was doing that i probably spoke to more senior officials as well i imagine i spoke to mr ledom about this as a minimum well maybe you imagine it i mean do you remember doing it i remember speaking to the lawyers and the lawyers wouldn't have spoken to me without me speaking to mr ledson first but i
02:40:47 speaking to mr ledson first but i remember the conversation with lawyers but not the one with mr ledson yes
02:40:52 yes um can we go to clg one triple zero four six five zero please this is an email from dave kennett of lfb to you dated 15th of february
02:41:09 2011 so two weeks or so after the meeting the minutes of which we've just seen and he says brian attached as a copy of the formal letter would you like me also to send
02:41:21 letter would you like me also to send you a hard copy and if we go to the attachment we can see this it's clg one triple zero four six five one it's dated the 14th of february 2011
02:41:34 it's dated the 14th of february 2011 addressed to you at the department and
02:41:38 and uh
02:41:39 uh it's written by steve turek as you can see from the bottom of your screen and we don't need to go through it all because we'll come back to the questions when we look at your response we know that you sent your response to this letter by email to dave kennett on
02:41:51 this letter by email to dave kennett on the 23rd of february 2011. we have that email if you want to see it mr martin at clg one triple zero four six eight three and we know also that you discussed the
02:42:03 and we know also that you discussed the draft with your colleagues steve kelly and anthony bird before the letter was finalized
02:42:08 finalized do you remember that um i i remember that the letter is something we put quite a lot of time into it yes all right and i will look at that in a in a moment before
02:42:19 before uh the letter was sent did you see clearance from any official more senior and
02:42:24 and to anthony bird
02:42:31 i can't actually remember i know i know that we um we we cleared it with the department's legal team which suggests to me that we probably did go higher up the the ladder but i can't remember you remember seeking ministerial approval
02:42:43 remember seeking ministerial approval for it
02:42:46 i don't think so uh now can we get into the letter clg one triple zero four six eight four
02:42:59 uh it's dated the 23rd of february to 2011 and responds to the questions set out in steve turek's letter of the 14th of february 2011. if we look first
02:43:10 of february 2011. if we look first please at the second paragraph on page one you say this you will appreciate that i cannot give a definitive determination of the law as this is a matter of the courts however i hope the following responses to your questions are of assistance i've
02:43:22 questions are of assistance i've answered your questions in relation to approved document b volume 2 buildings other than dwelling houses based on the current 2006 edition which took effect in april 2007 you may need to check that
02:43:33 in april 2007 you may need to check that this edition is relevant to any building work that may have taken place i would also remind you you go on that the approved documents do not provide the only way to comply with the requirements of the building regulations
02:43:46 requirements of the building regulations the legal status of the approved documents is set out in section 7 of the building act 1984 and my comments in relation to the approved document should be considered in this context
02:43:59 why did you base your answers to these questions that you've you've been asked on the 2006 edition of the approved document
02:44:07 document as i remember it we discussed this with london fire brigade or i discussed this with london fire brigade and
02:44:17 they asked us to refer to the 2006 edition
02:44:20 edition why i can't remember now um why did you agree to
02:44:29 well i agreed to do it because we were trying to help them and having discussed it with them i i i just think remember having a conversation with um someone from lfb about the you know
02:44:40 um someone from lfb about the you know how do you want us to approach the question of different approved documents applied applying to different aspects of the work that had been done to the building
02:44:50 and
02:44:53 it might have been that at that stage there was still some uncertainty about which element of work was dealt with at which time i'm not sure the detail now but i remember we discussed it with lfb and said
02:45:04 and said ask them how they wanted us to approach this and they said that for the purposes of what they were looking for reference to the 2006 edition would serve their purpose so that's what we did well there's no take it from me that
02:45:16 did well there's no take it from me that that instruction does not appear in the steve turek letter of instruction of the 14th of
02:45:21 14th of february that we've just looked at and i'm very happy to go back and say that i don't doubt it but that's the conversation we had who did you have the conversation with um
02:45:35 i think it was ever was leading on the investment i think it was um is it mr kenneth there was no i can't remember the exact
02:45:41 the exact name now um but i definitely remembered speaking to the the person at lfb that was leading on that investigation did they give you a reason why you
02:45:52 did they give you a reason why you should use the 2006 edition i think they did but i can't remember what it was in detail now i mean can we take it as you've told us earlier this morning that you knew in 2009
02:46:04 morning that you knew in 2009 um that the addition of adb applicable to the refurbishment at latino was the 2000 edition with the 2002 amendments i think that was my understanding i suppose knowing is is a different question but i i was
02:46:16 question but i i was confident it wasn't the 2006 edition but as i say that's the approach i'm sure we agreed it with lfb and i can't remember the reason why
02:46:32 right
02:46:39 had you somehow concluded that there were no wider implications for
02:46:46 for the
02:46:47 the 2002 version of approved document b
02:46:56 i don't think that's what i was thinking about at the time i think i was just trying to help lfb out with this specific problem that they had um and having discussed it with them we'd agreed to refer to the 2006 edition right did you
02:47:09 refer to the 2006 edition right did you tell them that so far as you were aware it wasn't the 2006 edition that applied to the relevant refurbishment at la canal but the earlier version i think they were well aware of that they were there they spent quite a lot of time
02:47:20 there they spent quite a lot of time investigating this incident so what i know you can't recall you say but
02:47:28 what is the explanation for your going along with what you say is the instruction from the lfb to use an irrelevant edition
02:47:41 i'm sorry i can remember the conversation i can't remember the detail of it but
02:47:47 that's what we agreed the the key point was that we made it very clear in the letter that that was that was what we'd done and and that served that helped them address the issue that they had at the time right now let's go
02:47:58 they had at the time right now let's go to page two of this letter please and lfb's question two and we can see the questions are set out here for convenience so we don't need to go back to the 14th of february letter
02:48:09 go back to the 14th of february letter from steve turek the question reads as follows please confirm whether or not the building regulations had approved document b recognizes that rapid fire spread over the external envelope of a
02:48:20 spread over the external envelope of a building may make fire service intervention more difficult and therefore the combustibility of the external envelope should be controlled now your response below that is this the guidance set out in diagram 40 is
02:48:32 the guidance set out in diagram 40 is more onerous for walls above 18 meters in height whilst there is no reference to fire service intervention in this part of the guidance the 18 meter dimension is widely regarded as the maximum height at which the fire service
02:48:44 maximum height at which the fire service can attack a fire externally this principle is discussed in paragraph 17.1 onwards
02:48:51 onwards now first of all if you look at the question question two which i've read to you
02:48:56 you the question you're asked is about control of combustibility on the external envelope of the building isn't it
02:49:04 isn't it [Music]
02:49:10 i see your point yet well you may see that well the point will come in a moment maybe you do see it but i think you understood the letter at the time that this was addressing combustibility of the external envelope
02:49:22 combustibility of the external envelope so the question is why are you referring the lfb to diagram 40 to answer a question about combustibility
02:49:40 think we use i think this is something which we've discussed before is
02:49:46 and it is probably an issue with terminology um is that combustibility certainly in my mind still now is a is a is a another term for
02:49:57 is a another term for the reaction to perform performance of a of a material so it's not just is it or isn't it combustible um it's
02:50:06 um it's how combustible is it i think that's something that we've discussed before over the last week or so it is and i think you would agree uh
02:50:15 agree uh and if you don't please tell me but diagram 40 doesn't control or make any stipulations in terms of combustibility does it
02:50:22 does it and that's the point i made which you've just ignored again um is is that um in in my view the reaction to par for fire the reaction to fire performance of the
02:50:34 reaction to fire performance of the external walls which is set out at the surface of external walls that's set out in diagram 40 relates to its combustibility in terms of how
02:50:46 how you know the sliding scale of combustibility rather than the black and white is it or isn't it combustible i know that's something that the inquiry seems to be focused on um and and that's that's not how i read the
02:50:59 and and that's that's not how i read the word combustibility in that sense forgive me mr martin for appearing to ignore your evidence i certainly don't mean to do that i just seek to understand it
02:51:10 seek to understand it and i'm trying to understand the distinction or lack of distinction in your mind at the time between the word combustible or
02:51:22 between the word combustible or combustibility on the one hand and the technical requirements of diagram 40 on the other and my question i'll ask it one more time and i'm sorry to labor the point
02:51:33 time and i'm sorry to labor the point forgive me but it's right isn't it that diagram 40 does not control or make any stipulations in terms of combustibility as for example clause 12.7 does
02:51:46 as for example clause 12.7 does does it
02:51:50 well i think it does i think it sets out um it it sets out a minimum reaction to fire performance of the external surface of the wall are you quite sure in your own mind mr martin that at this point february 2011
02:52:02 martin that at this point february 2011 you had a full and clear understanding of the concept of combustibility and the difference between combustibility and classification to national class north
02:52:23 in my view at the time and i think my view now is that when i'm talking about combustibility in its general sense i would include um a classification such as class o
02:52:37 of course but it doesn't tell you whether it's combustible or not in terms of the definition of
02:52:45 non-combustible there isn't a definition of combustible there's a definition of non-combustible so you presume that anything
02:52:52 in the same way that material limited combustibility is referring to combustibility but it's not referring to a non-combustible material
02:53:02 let's go to question three please confirm whether or not a proof document b recommends that in a building with a story greater than 18 meters in height any insulation used in the construction of external walls should be
02:53:14 construction of external walls should be of limited combustibility and this should be the case regardless of distance from any boundary that's the question and the answer follows paragraph 12.7
02:53:26 and the answer follows paragraph 12.7 does indicate that insulation materials used in wall constructions over 18 meters in height should be of limited combustibility however paragraph 12.5 offers an alternative approach by using
02:53:38 offers an alternative approach by using a full-scale test from british standard eight four one four five performance of external cladding systems as such there will be cladding systems that do contain combustible insulation materials but still demonstrate an acceptable
02:53:50 still demonstrate an acceptable performance through this test now
02:53:53 now do you agree with me that the the question posed by the lfb there specifically asks about whether any insulation used in those circumstances should be of limited combustibility yes
02:54:09 i think it's pretty it that's yes it's clear i think we can agree that yes from the first line now you give your answer based on 12.7 paragraph 12.7 of the 2006
02:54:20 based on 12.7 paragraph 12.7 of the 2006 edition of approved document b yes yes were you aware when you wrote that that in the 2000 edition
02:54:31 that in the 2000 edition of approved document b with 2002 amendments which were in force when the relevant refurbishment took place uh it wasn't the case that any insulation used over 18 meters was
02:54:43 insulation used over 18 meters was required to be of limited combustibility was it
02:54:48 was it that's definitely the case did i fully understand that at the time
02:54:54 i think so but i can't be certain indeed i think as we've been through in some detail in the history over the last few days
02:55:01 days the the section at the time which was section 13.7 did not require insulation to be of limited combustibility in an external facade of a building over 18
02:55:12 external facade of a building over 18 meters unless it was used in ventilated cavities that's right a point i think you've
02:55:17 you've reminded me of this morning and therefore you would have been well aware at the time having yourself removed the words in ventilated cavities when drafting the amendments to the 2006
02:55:29 when drafting the amendments to the 2006 edition
02:55:30 edition yes
02:55:31 yes yes and as we know lachlan house did not have a ventilated cavity system did it that's correct
02:55:39 and therefore that tells us doesn't it and you'd have known at the time that pur or pir insulation
02:55:49 was perfectly compliant for use over 18 meters on lachel house under the 2000 edition of the guidance i think it's correct yes yes did you
02:56:00 i think it's correct yes yes did you explain that at any time to the lfb or the metropolitan police
02:56:09 i know that we discussed the the fact that there were different editions of the approved document i can't remember the detail of the conversation i mean that and
02:56:18 and they weren't ignorant of the the provisions of of the approved document um quite the contrary and this was a quite an experienced team of um
02:56:29 an experienced team of um fire safety officers working for lfb um we were trying to give them um
02:56:39 reinforce the points that they concluded themselves um in a format that they thought would be useful for their purposes
02:56:48 purposes why did you think it would be useful for their purposes to base your answers on the 2006 edition uh with which the latino panels would not have been compliant in circumstances where
02:56:58 where they were compliant with the addition enforced at the time of the refurbishment because i recall it that's what they asked me to do but you can't remember the rationale i i i
02:57:08 i not with any confidence now
02:57:15 but would it not have been of crucial importance whatever the expertise of the lfb's fire safety department for them to know from government what government's position was in relation to compliance or
02:57:27 was in relation to compliance or non-compliance with the governing approved document at the time
02:57:35 um yes and so that's something we discussed with them um
02:57:39 um and
02:57:42 their view was is that what they wanted from us was um advice based on the 2006 edition and i say i can't remember why that's what they asked us to do we were
02:57:53 that's what they asked us to do we were trying to help them do their job and and that's what we did the lack of any fire performance requirement in the relevant edition of approved document b
02:58:04 edition of approved document b for the foam insulation that lachenal was also not something you mentioned i think at any time during during your evidence at the inquest into the six deaths
02:58:17 into the six deaths in march 2013.
02:58:20 that's right isn't it i think you're right yes yeah why is that um
02:58:25 um as i recall it the i was asked to answer some very specific questions by the um by the uh inquest um
02:58:37 um which i'd received in writing in advance of attending and and and so that's what i did right
02:58:46 right did you consider the fact that the
02:58:52 insulation used in the external wall arrangement of latin house was in fact compliant with the provisions of approved document b
02:59:04 in terms of its combustibility it exposed an obvious flaw in the 2002 edition of the approved document
02:59:16 we definitely concluded that in the process of drafting the 2006 edition um
02:59:24 yes so why not mention that to the coroner
02:59:30 as i say i think i've been asked to answer some quite specific questions um and and
02:59:37 and and not to stray into other areas did it occur to you that had that matter been made clear to the coroner there may have been other questions for
02:59:44 for the department to answer
02:59:49 it didn't occur to me at the time no
02:59:53 didn't occur to you at the time that the fact that the insulation complied with
03:00:00 with the approved document at the time but was nonetheless implicated in these six fatalities was something relevant for the coroner to know
03:00:09 i wasn't giving general advice to the coroner i was answering a specific question the coroner had other um experts that it was that um were being consulted i was being asked
03:00:20 asked to address a specific question that had arisen
03:00:25 in through the process of the inquest
03:00:36 now we don't have a record of this matter or fact being
03:00:41 being mentioned at any time to the lfb or the metropolitan police or the coroner by david crowder do you know why that is
03:00:53 no
03:01:01 mr chairman can i just finish off on this letter and i'm looking at the time but i'm mid letter and i've got about five minutes well it's not going to take you too long is it no i don't think so it's all right if it does i'll stop
03:01:12 it's all right if it does i'll stop um
03:01:13 um going back to the letter please and the questions we've looked at at questions two and three there's nothing in there is there it either answers to two or answer to three
03:01:24 three or anywhere else in the letter about filler material is that
03:01:32 no i don't think it was relevant because
03:01:37 the insulation material used in those panels was insulation it was being used for its
03:01:43 for its design study for its thermal performance um so the question of filler and and those other issues didn't arise
03:01:52 well is that right um
03:01:55 um there's nothing in here is there that would tell the lfb that 12.7 of approved document b was intended to restrict the combustibility of the core of a composite panel
03:02:07 of a composite panel as well as insulation material is there
03:02:13 no because that's not what they were asking us
03:02:19 nor is there anything in there to say that any part of a panel as opposed to insulation
03:02:27 was restricted by 12.7 in the 2006. same answer i was trying we were trying to answer some specific questions that they had that they felt would be useful
03:02:39 they had that they felt would be useful for them in addressing the issues that they'd come across in the investigation we were trying to be helpful
03:02:45 helpful um
03:02:46 um i drafted this letter with the assistance of my colleagues and and it was reviewed by a legal team do you agree that there's certainly no indication in this letter that there's any kind of catch-all
03:02:58 any kind of catch-all in 12.7
03:03:02 or any word that's intended to be open-ended to be filled in by discussion to the effect that all elements or key elements of an external wall arrangement be restricted to materials of limited combustibility
03:03:13 combustibility yeah we don't address that because the question didn't arise no you say the question didn't arise why didn't it arise
03:03:24 because they the nature of the construction was such that it was there was a surface and there was insulation and there wasn't much else
03:03:35 mr chairman is that a convenient moment yes i'm not entirely sure i have quite finished with this document but it's it's it's it's likely to be yes all right thank you very much well mr martin we'll stop at that point
03:03:46 well mr martin we'll stop at that point so we can all get some lunch we'll resume please at five past two and again please don't talk to anyone about your evidence yes sir thank you very much
03:04:08 thank you five past two please