Professor Luke Bisby gives expert evidence on fire testing regimes. He explains BS 8414 as a 'technological proof test' that was misused 'as if' it were a model test, criticizes the mismatch between BR135 fire re-entry scenarios and the windowless 8414 test rig, and states the system's controls over who makes critical decisions are 'effectively no controls'.
00:00:22 would you ask professor bisbee to come back in please
00:00:32 [Music]
00:00:39 all right professor bisway yesterday um oh my god then thank you very much yes thank you mr chairman professor uh we were talking about class naught earlier as an external wall classification given its uh internal room or corridor
00:00:53 its uh internal room or corridor reference scenario before the break and afterwards or later we will come on to the differences between the national and the european classification systems and the underlying tests that pin them
00:01:04 and the underlying tests that pin them that underpin them but on this particular point uh you have a you have an observation can we go please to page 174 in your report
00:01:14 page 174 paragraph 957 at the top of your screen and you say this
00:01:19 this however the modernization brought by the new european classification system having been developed based on a reference scenario that was only loosely applicable to external fire spread hazards was inadequate to address these
00:01:31 hazards was inadequate to address these more fundamental concerns the reason for this emerges from messerschmitt's 2008 analysis of the european system that the european methods for classifying products were almost entirely based on an assessment of the
00:01:43 entirely based on an assessment of the likelihood of a fire's growth to flash over inside a compartment and then you have 958 which i read to you before now what do you mean by loosely applicable in paragraph 957 there
00:01:56 applicable in paragraph 957 there uh
00:01:58 uh i mean that you know the products are installed uh on a surface and there's a fire involved you know it it is it is a test that does assess the way the products react to a
00:02:10 assess the way the products react to a fire and the extent to which they'll burn
00:02:13 burn so it is
00:02:14 so it is it's not entirely remote if you like uh the products are being subjected to a fire it's that i mean that simple really right i mean that's no more than saying that it's a far test absolutely right let's see
00:02:26 absolutely right let's see now can i then turn to technological proof tests which is the third category of tests that you've described in your report
00:02:31 report um and i think you would include in that um the bsa414 series would you uh yes yes um and is it right that the test apparatus and the method
00:02:42 apparatus and the method are designed to imitate as closely as practicable a real world youth scenario that's my understanding yep yes and you characterize those tests if we go to page 44 please paragraph 216.
00:02:55 um you and i'm summarizing here really but you you characterize them as used when there's little scientific understanding of how various materials or products might behave on a real building yes that's right yeah
00:03:07 building yes that's right yeah is it right that we should understand that in the absence of such an understanding the closeness of the resemblance of the test rig to a real-life building is important in allowing designers to make judgments
00:03:19 allowing designers to make judgments about how a particular system would behave in the event of a real fire in that building in my view yes yes um are there any other factors in play uh with respect to what with respect to
00:03:31 uh with respect to what with respect to the resemblance of the between the test rig and the real life building in other words not just subjective judgments but other things too uh i'm not sure i follow the question
00:03:42 uh i'm not sure i follow the question all right well let's let's let's see how we go with the next paragraph can we go to page 222 of your report sorry paragraph yes sorry page 45
00:03:53 sorry page 45 my fault start again paragraph 222 on page 45 and you say there technological proof tests are different they rely almost entirely on similarity judgments made by
00:04:04 entirely on similarity judgments made by the end users about each specific system the implicit and in the case of br 135 explicit onus of responsibility falls almost entirely on the end user to make a judgment about whether any particular
00:04:16 a judgment about whether any particular testing outcome is applicable to any particular real-world situation can you expand on that and in particular in relation to ps8414 and in particular
00:04:27 and in particular why do they place reliance on the end user in the way you've described uh
00:04:33 uh because the outcome of a technological proof test uh or the observations that would arise if you conduct a technological proof test are going to be
00:04:44 are going to be the reason you're doing the technological proof test is because of the complexity of the system yes that's in play and that complexity also means that small changes uh in the system uh could
00:04:57 small changes uh in the system uh could lead to differing outcomes and and so if you if you perform a technological proof test and you observe an outcome uh the extent to which the same outcome
00:05:08 uh the extent to which the same outcome would be observed if that external wall arrangement to use you know sort of the terminology of the inquiry uh would would manifest on a building in the case of an actual fire is something
00:05:20 the case of an actual fire is something that you have to think very hard about and that's you know i think that's why um
00:05:26 um there are some statements in br135 that kind of draw that out and they warn users quite specifically that you know this test is only applicable to what you've tested and if you're gonna if you're gonna take this result and you're going to apply it on an actual building
00:05:39 going to apply it on an actual building out there in the world you need you need to make some assessment make some judgment as to whether or not the the result that you get in the br 135 assessment is going to lead to what you consider to
00:05:50 is going to lead to what you consider to be adequate fire safety outcomes in the real world
00:05:56 and we'll come back to that very topic later
00:06:00 later uh
00:06:01 uh if we go to paragraph 226 at the foot of page 45 you say this the technological proof test ie bsa414 was invoked within approved document b
00:06:12 was invoked within approved document b and br 135 in accordance with the logic identified above it was made explicit that the onus was on the user to ensure that a test result was applicable to any particular situation
00:06:24 particular situation however as has been demonstrated in the evidence to the inquiry the manner in which it was actually used in practice was more as a non-representative or model test where little thought appears to have been given
00:06:35 to have been given about the extent to which the tested system was genuinely relevant to the end use situation now is it right in other words that
00:06:46 in your view approved document beyond and br 135 made it clear that the user of the test had to ensure that a particular test result was applicable to a particular building situation
00:06:58 a particular building situation certainly br135 yes and i think approved document b kind of in a in an overarching way you know given its its legal status as guidance rather than the law
00:07:09 law well that's the next question how in your opinion did adb itself do so even implicitly um
00:07:19 um you know adb uh you know there are statements both within the building regulations and within uh adb that you know there's no there's no requirement for a user to um
00:07:30 for a user to um to to to meet the requirements of uh or to meet the the recommendations to adhere to the recommendations of approved document b and designers can do things whatever the way they want uh the building act itself
00:07:43 uh the building act itself uh
00:07:44 uh basically uh says that if if one and prior editions of of adb
00:07:50 of of adb basically have said that you know if if one wants to do that that is fine but in the event that something goes wrong and you're found not to have followed the rules
00:08:00 rules um then you you know you're you're on your own if you have followed the rules then there is a attending to negative liability associated with those actions so there is there's some kind of comfort in following the rules in of adb but it is
00:08:13 following the rules in of adb but it is not
00:08:14 not uh an absolute defense of behavior if you like or of of design decisions if that makes sense so so
00:08:23 so so you know
00:08:24 you know the the the approved documents don't require you to do um anything and and like by virtue of that
00:08:35 that uh
00:08:36 uh i don't see that they can be used as a bulletproof defense of actions you know you might follow the the recommendations of the approved document and still end up with a system that does not adhere or does not um
00:08:47 that does not adhere or does not um adequately resist the spread of fire on the outside of a building now it's conceivable that that could happen in that last answer you used the words rules at least twice
00:08:58 twice i probably misspoke then well i was going to see if i can understand why you misspoke sure
00:09:06 sure why did you refer to them as rules uh you'd have to show me the transcript to see where i did it in order for me i can read it back to you um just i'm just interested in what lies underneath this um you you say the prior editions of adb
00:09:19 um you you say the prior editions of adb basically you know if one wants to do that it's fine but in the event something goes wrong and you're found not to have followed the rules then you're on your then you know you're on your own if you have followed the rules there's a there's attending to negative
00:09:30 there's a there's attending to negative liability associated with those actions yeah and i just wonder whether when you use the word rules even you professor might be indicating some kind of underlying tacit understanding of how adb was
00:09:43 tacit understanding of how adb was supposed to work
00:09:47 i mean it's possible um i'm not in the position of ever having used
00:09:53 used adb in my practice so i can't tell you how i would have thought about approved document b prior to the grenfell tower fire um
00:10:06 but but i have but i have always known or at least to the extent that i've ever thought about it um that
00:10:13 that the building regulation system in the united kingdom was functionally based and that the consequence of the building act was that designers are free to do
00:10:24 act was that designers are free to do whatever they want uh if you like provided they can meet the requirements that are stated in the building regulations and that
00:10:34 and that like i suppose in in practice provided that one can get the necessary approvals for what one sets out as a designer one can one can do those things
00:10:45 designer one can one can do those things the
00:10:48 if if if something goes wrong down the road how one would defend oneself um i think is is sort of relevant to that that status of the approved documents but i mean
00:10:59 but i mean yeah it's easy to slip into using the word rules um because
00:11:04 because whilst they are not i guess formally i'm not a lawyer of course but whilst they're not formal legal rules it is not prescriptive deemed to satisfy uh uh guidance
00:11:16 uh uh guidance they are as if you like they are effectively written as rules so yeah yeah
00:11:21 yeah i think i mean i think that's a that's a misuse of language for sure
00:11:29 on my part but a helpful explanation nonetheless thank you can i um
00:11:38 uh take you then to uh page um
00:11:42 page um paragraph 226 which starts at the foot of the previous page page 45. and you say there
00:11:55 is really halfway through the paragraph um
00:11:57 um the
00:11:58 the the
00:11:59 the so long
00:12:01 so long a third of the way through the paragraph thus so long as the literal rules of the test standards and approved document b were quotes followed on quotes in practice the regulatory system appears to have placed no onus whatsoever on the
00:12:12 to have placed no onus whatsoever on the user to ensure that the particular testing framework applied to any specific situation was suitable for that product or for its application on a building the regulatory influence of this category of tests was much more
00:12:24 this category of tests was much more significant as regards the application of combustible cladding products in particular the classifications of british national class north and european class b s3d2 both of which are
00:12:35 european class b s3d2 both of which are based entirely on model tests appear to be profoundly relevant to what occurred at grenfell tower and to many other uk buildings with problematic cladding now constituting the uk's cladding crisis
00:12:48 constituting the uk's cladding crisis now i'm interested in what you say there when you say uh that
00:12:54 uh that uh
00:12:56 uh sorry then you go on to say um as we've seen already um
00:13:01 um that the manner in which 8414 was actually used in practice was more as a non-representative or model test now taking those two paragraphs together
00:13:11 are you able to tell us what you really mean by 8414 being used more as a model test um
00:13:22 uh being used in a way uh
00:13:27 uh in a way such that if one is able to not that this language is used but quote pass an 8414 test you know achieve a classification under br135 for an 8414 test
00:13:40 br135 for an 8414 test that it is viewed as a result that can be relied upon to give a great deal of confidence that when applied to a building
00:13:51 that when applied to a building uh the the outcome in the event of a fire would also be positive if you see and therefore it's it's treated but mistreated is this your view as a model really rather than a representative test
00:14:02 really rather than a representative test which is what it was designed for uh
00:14:05 uh yes
00:14:06 yes yes that's right yeah it's it's treated as uh
00:14:09 as uh it's you know a non-representative test a pass fail result is something that i'm willing to call a pass fail result a technological proof test is something where i'm i'm not happy to call it a pass fail result
00:14:20 not happy to call it a pass fail result a model test is somewhere in the middle where there's this discretion so it's a it's a question of the level of discretion the onus of responsibility and discretion on the end user with an increasing level of bonus responsibility
00:14:33 increasing level of bonus responsibility on the end user the user of the test as you go from non-representative through to model through to technological proof tests so the technological technological proof test requires a great deal of
00:14:45 test requires a great deal of responsibility and awareness from the user
00:14:48 user and that was not in my as far as i can tell that
00:14:52 tell that was not
00:14:53 was not uh deployed out there in the industry it seems to me
00:14:59 i'm going to examine 8414 in a little bit more detail shortly but before we do can i just ask you arising out of the last series of answers
00:15:08 answers this um
00:15:10 this um our class naught and the um
00:15:14 um the euro the european classes that give rise to class b both of which are placed within diagram 40. are those model tests or are they technological proof tests their model tests their model tests yes
00:15:29 um so moving on to the next stage then we find those don't we um identified in approved document b at paragraph 12.5 which says you can um
00:15:43 paragraph 12.5 which says you can um either follow the linear what is called the linear route 12.6 to 12.9 or um
00:15:50 um satisfy the performance criteria derived from tests under bsa414 yes that's right um
00:15:57 um is it your opinion that an expressing uh
00:16:02 uh satisfaction of the guidance in in that way
00:16:06 way that the the person using approved document b is being presented with two alternatives that are not strictly alternatives one is a model test but its alternative
00:16:17 one is a model test but its alternative is not also a model test it is a technological proof test yeah that's a very good insight yes i think that's true and i think i think that i think that that
00:16:28 that i think that that i think that that type of language uh could create the false impression within the user community of adb that
00:16:39 that there is an equivalence of let's say approach in terms of how one uses those those two routes let's call them um i think that's probably a fair yeah
00:16:51 i think that's probably a fair yeah i've not thought of it that way it's a good insight yeah let's move on to bsa414 then uh and a later stage we'll look at the performance criteria can we go to page
00:17:02 performance criteria can we go to page 42 of your report please and paragraph 210 to 11.
00:17:14 uh and you say there what emerges from the specific framing of the technological proof test is a realization that to criticize the bsa414 test for being unrealistic is to reveal
00:17:25 test for being unrealistic is to reveal the critic's fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of testing it should be obvious that bs 8414 tests can never be faithful reproductions of anything other than bs8414 tests in other words the test is
00:17:38 bs8414 tests in other words the test is the test it is what competent professionals do with the test results that is most deserving of scrutiny now for completeness at the end of paragraph five of your report on page two if we if we skip back
00:17:50 report on page two if we if we skip back to that please page two paragraph five it's the same point um
00:17:55 um you say there at the end of paragraph five
00:18:01 uh fundamentally i aim to demonstrate that it is usually unfair to criticize a test for being too small too unrealistic too variable a test is just a test it is what people choose to do with the results from a test that matters
00:18:15 results from a test that matters uh now
00:18:16 uh now in in that description in both those paragraphs when you call when you refer to people
00:18:21 to people um are you referral who are you referring to i'm referring to the people who are making design decisions and what about the people who are creating the regulatory regime in the first place do we include them as well
00:18:33 first place do we include them as well uh those yeah those and i've discussed this uh somewhere in the report i can't remember where exactly um those people do have a responsibility uh in terms of
00:18:44 in terms of both articulating clearly for the users uh all of these embedded assumptions and intents that sit behind the test methods um uh and in
00:18:57 um uh and in setting
00:18:58 setting the
00:18:59 the uh let's say the past criteria or setting the bars that need to be met in a in a way that uh that is is credible given what the test
00:19:10 that is is credible given what the test is doing for you right so so and i said this out in the report so the unrepresentative tests um
00:19:19 um uh
00:19:20 uh they
00:19:21 they so if you if you were to if you were to say
00:19:24 say uh i'm only going to allow a2 products and i'm going to do bomb calorimeter tests which are non-representative tests and i'm going to pick a very very low heat of combustion
00:19:35 heat of combustion as my criteria that i can use well then i'm i'm pretty confident that the user of that result doesn't really need to know how a bomb calorimeter works doesn't really need to know much about what bomb calorimetry is
00:19:46 know much about what bomb calorimetry is but but needs to understand a little bit about heat of combustion but if they adhere to the less than two megajoules per kilogram or whatever it is then probably your outcomes are going to be
00:19:57 outcomes are going to be uh not so bad right uh because it's quite a conservative test and is not representative but at the other end of the spectrum when you have bs8414 test um
00:20:09 um i mean
00:20:10 i mean understanding exactly how adequacy is defined in those tests is a bit of a challenge as i'm sure we'll come to but
00:20:17 but but you you could have much less confidence uh that the outcome of that test will lead to a satisfactory outcome because it is less conservative and more
00:20:28 because it is less conservative and more complex and and more fraught with with challenges and and and more difficult to take from the lab out there into the real world um so that's kind of what i'm alluding to here but yes no you're right there there there are there are
00:20:40 there there are there are responsibilities and expectations that we must place both on those people who use the tests and on those people who set those tests out for use by others i think absolutely yeah i think maybe that that latter point probably doesn't come
00:20:52 that latter point probably doesn't come through
00:20:53 through as strongly as it ought to reading this back now yeah now building on that can we then go to page 13 please paragraph 54
00:21:04 and this covers the point we've seen already
00:21:07 already but you explain here that the key issue is not whether a test is realistic but whether it's sufficiently representative you go on to quote from downer and i've read that to you already this is footnote seven sorry footnote eight in
00:21:18 footnote seven sorry footnote eight in paragraph 54. i'll read it again halfway through the paragraph since even the most realistic tests will always differ in some respects from the real thing engineers must determine
00:21:29 thing engineers must determine which differences are significant and which are trivial if they are to know that a test is relevant or representative now looking at the engineer who is to make this determination that you describe
00:21:40 describe what is
00:21:41 what is who is this person what is their minimum level of academic qualification that they need to have reliably to be able to consider the design of a test which you would expect
00:21:53 design of a test which you would expect to be adequate when testing a clatting system are you asking me who it is in practice in england or are you asking me who i think it is who do
00:22:04 you asking me who i think it is who do you think it ought to be well the latter um
00:22:11 i mean it's not for me not for me to say i don't think i'm just you know i'm just an academic engineer who works at the university of edinburgh who has opinions about um
00:22:23 who has opinions about um the levels of competence that people ought to have
00:22:29 there ought to be some in my view there ought to be some mechanism by which society all of us can have some
00:22:41 society all of us can have some confidence that the people who we're gonna who we are going to charge with making those assessments and decisions as we move from the lab to the real world know what they're doing have some
00:22:53 know what they're doing have some fundamental technical understanding have some
00:22:57 some uh you know moral and ethical standards that they're operating with have some uncertainty about the things that they know and are willing to be um
00:23:06 um thoughtful about that uncertainty you know to demonstrate competence and an awareness of of their own incompetencies and and and how one how one i mean this is to me this is
00:23:17 is to me this is in a way the issue uh of everything i've done with respect to this inquiry how do we as a society ensure that the people that we charge in making these decisions
00:23:29 charge in making these decisions have the relevant competencies how do we define them how do we assess them how do we police them um and what do we do when
00:23:41 when people don't display them or have them you know what what measures do we put in place to make sure that that we what measures do we put in place to make sure that society can have that confidence if we're going
00:23:52 can have that confidence if we're going to have a functionally based building regulation system that permits anyone to do anything uh
00:23:58 uh what do we do to make sure that that doesn't go horribly wrong and that is a very fundamental question but i i mean i can't sit here and tell you
00:24:06 you the only people who should be doing this should be people that have this degree in this subject area this uh you know they've passed these examinations they they undergo this amount of annual cpd training as
00:24:19 amount of annual cpd training as recorded by some regulatory authority but the idea that we should we should regulate and register the people who are making these decisions is very fundamental to my views
00:24:31 i'm now sure if that's a long-winded and slightly peripheral answer to your question
00:24:35 question it's it's certainly an answer to the question as interpreted as i put to you the latter but try the former um who are the people now looking at the body of available expertise out there as june 2017
00:24:48 expertise out there as june 2017 as of june 2017 uh were those qualifications defined or assessed or policed in a way which you would you in your opinion consider satisfactory feel
00:25:01 opinion consider satisfactory feel satisfactorily safe no
00:25:04 no i mean i mean they're they're uh i mean
00:25:08 uh i mean uh i'm what what what controls are there um there are effectively no controls uh over who
00:25:18 who who can
00:25:20 who can claim to make that assessment the only control is the is the the only control that seems to exist in practice is the tolerance of the approving authority whoever they are
00:25:33 approving authority whoever they are um
00:25:35 um and therefore the competence also of the approving authority which is also not very well controlled as far as i can tell when you say approving authority do i take it you mean building control
00:25:46 i take it you mean building control offices
00:25:47 offices uh yeah i mean typically building could i mean if
00:25:50 i mean if if we're talking about doing something to a building building a building or doing something to it to the extent that what's being done requires building control approval then yes
00:26:06 now let's go to page 41 of your report please paragraph 203
00:26:13 uh you say uh there
00:26:17 uh there and you've covered you've covered mock-ups uh and and represented the representative nature of the 8414 test itself
00:26:24 itself you say paragraph 203 more challenging however are the relatively inflexible parameters that are defined within the testing standard itself although bs8414 has intentionally been made to be more
00:26:36 has intentionally been made to be more quotes representative some compromises to reproducibility appear to have been necessary in its design for example the bs8414 testing apparatus does not include any windows it could of course
00:26:47 include any windows it could of course but the window openings in a real building might be situated differently to those in any bs8414 test arrangement would it be necessary to re-test for every possible window size tape type and shape or every possible window frame
00:26:59 shape or every possible window frame material what if the windows in the rail building are open at the time of the fire how open are they what if they are open in tilt versus turn mode the list of potentially influencing parameters has literally no end
00:27:12 has literally no end now
00:27:13 now in the in light of that litany of variables do you consider that the bs8414 test rig as required
00:27:22 required and the and the example test rig shown at a1 of the third edition of br135 which we can look at if we need to um
00:27:30 um should have been designed as it was in other words emitting all windows or apertures
00:27:39 uh do i consider that it should have been designed that way yes was it an appropriate design given that it is a rig which has no apertures or windows at all
00:27:51 apertures or windows at all depends what you want to do with the result i mean yes sure yeah i i i mean i can't
00:27:57 can't i can't criticize bsa414 for all of the reasons that i've that i've mentioned there uh
00:28:04 uh and as you know as i've said before the test is the test we can criticize it for being unrealistic and we can say well you know we could say well i want to use the result of an 8414 test in a building that has windows and those windows are
00:28:16 that has windows and those windows are this size and shape and they're directly one above each other and this is the story height and i build a rig and i test it but if you go down that path quite quickly you realize that every time you want to build a building you have to build it and burn it down
00:28:29 have to build it and burn it down and that's not going to work out there in the world and so
00:28:33 and so we have to make compromises but but when we make those compromises we have to be clear about what those compromises are and we have to be clear about the extent to which we're going to demand that the people who take the
00:28:44 demand that the people who take the result then understand those compromises and account for them when they go off into the real world
00:28:51 world so i i think no i mean to take the window example as a as an example so let's say i i decide well okay that's unrealistic and i want to have windows
00:29:02 to have windows in my test rig uh and i so i put some windows in my test rig well you know what what kind of what kind of glass do i put in do i put single glazing do i put double glazing do i put toughened
00:29:13 put double glazing do i put toughened glass
00:29:14 glass do i put
00:29:16 do i put as is common in buildings now do i put reflective films on the outside of the glazing to help me with building energy performance that might impact on the radiative properties of the glass um
00:29:27 um you know all of these questions and and and in and in it's important to recognize it if i'm interested in evaluating the fire performance of let's say a a cladding system that might incorporate
00:29:38 system that might incorporate combustible products either insulation or rain screen and i displace some of those products by inserting windows into my rig maybe i've actually made it more likely
00:29:51 maybe i've actually made it more likely that i'll pass by inserting windows and not less because i've displaced fuel fuel that would otherwise be there and burn
00:29:57 burn and so you know if as soon as you start tinkering
00:30:01 tinkering uh with a test like this the
00:30:06 the potential for tinkering in a direction that is not what you hoped or you know more worryingly the potential for tinkering by people who might seek to tinker to their advantage uh
00:30:17 uh is is immense and so bs8414 whilst being unrealistic uh in many respects and as i said it can
00:30:28 uh in many respects and as i said it can only be
00:30:29 only be truly representative of a bs8414 test so unless my building is literally an 8414 test rig
00:30:35 test rig then i have to ask the question how might my building how might this system this overall build up of products
00:30:45 on my building given that the joints are going to be in different places the windows are going to be in different places the cavity barriers are going to be in different places the fixings might be different maybe i have a wing wall maybe i don't
00:30:57 a wing wall maybe i don't uh all of those questions you have you have to and this is why i say you can't just take a br-135 135 classification point at it and say everything's fine you have to think about how this is
00:31:08 you have to think about how this is going to be applied to your building and that i think br 135 is very clear about that
00:31:13 that it says this is this is the classification based on a bs8414 rig not on a building and if you're going to put it on a building you better think about it now granted it doesn't give you a huge amount of help
00:31:24 huge amount of help in terms of how one would do that but that's why the people who are doing this type of work need to be competent if we're to have any faith in the outcomes
00:31:35 any faith in the outcomes can we just look at br135 then please bre
00:31:39 bre four zeroes five five five five and i i'd like well let's have a look at the first page um please first of all [Music]
00:31:52 and the second page is the one which tells you that this is the third edition and if we go in it please to page 26
00:32:05 we can see the rig design there and you can see in it under test method that's an example of a test facility and the principle of the test
00:32:16 the principle of the test and then if you gave please to page 28
00:32:22 there is the warning um
00:32:25 um but page 28 please
00:32:29 please yes
00:32:29 yes uh under the three bullet points uh it says the classification applies only to the system as tested and detailed in the classification report the classification report can only cover
00:32:41 the classification report can only cover the details of the system as tested it cannot state what is not covered when specifying or checking a system it is important to check that the classification documents cover the end use application now
00:32:52 now is that what you're referring to when you say you're in your last uh answer
00:32:57 answer um that you you you need to think about it
00:33:01 it yeah
00:33:04 in fact uh when it says it cannot state what is what is not covered it it would it be right for a an engineer reading that to understand that actually what is covered is pretty limited given all the
00:33:16 covered is pretty limited given all the other variables you've referred to the geometry the fixing joints the apertures the windows matters of that nature so that actually the test rig has tested and covered by
00:33:27 the test rig has tested and covered by the classification report is some way away from the from the end use application even if the materials and
00:33:34 and the geometry of the use of the materials in relation to each other is the same yes i mean that's that's certainly how i read it and i've always read it
00:33:45 read it and i've always read it to the extent that i've looked at it uh i mean i've i've had to accept that my reading of things appears kind of atypical in this community um but that's certainly how i've always
00:33:56 um but that's certainly how i've always read it yes so what's the forgive forget the simplicity of this question or perhaps the um
00:34:06 um with the bluntness of this question but but what's the point of bs8414 as a test as a system test if in it is
00:34:15 it is uh unrepresentative of the end use building to such a degree what what help does it it's a test as a test but what does it actually tell you
00:34:27 it can tell you
00:34:31 what is it can tell you what would be a really bad idea
00:34:36 bad idea is what it can tell you right and it
00:34:40 and it can't tell you much more than that right
00:34:43 right sorry before we go on can i just check with you this paragraph here that you've just been asked to look at is the only paragraph that you are aware of is it which tells the
00:34:55 which tells the end user or the user of the test that he's actually got to think about the results he's got from the test and how they apply to his building not just to accept the past of the past
00:35:06 not just to accept the past of the past in a
00:35:07 in a uh
00:35:08 uh as if it were a model uh i think it i want to check the rest of the document before saying definitively but i think yes i think this is
00:35:19 yes i think this is probably the only place where it would be stated explicitly that there or and it's not even that explicit here if we're being honest with ourselves uh is that it is that it's stated here certainly intimated i think i i as i say
00:35:31 certainly intimated i think i i as i say i have always read it that way but i have had to realize i'm a bit unusual
00:35:36 unusual um
00:35:37 um i i do think that as i've said i think that if one understands one's role as a designer within the regular within the broader regulatory system and one considers the
00:35:49 regulatory system and one considers the building regulations the building act that one
00:35:53 that one should recognize one's professional responsibility regardless of what vr135 says even if br135 was completely and utterly absent there would still in my view
00:36:04 there would still in my view any competent professional should understand that they just cannot blindly follow rules or recommendations and hope
00:36:14 and hope that that's them dispensing reasonable skill and care i mean we cannot we just cannot accept that from the engineering community and that you know i just i i i would refuse to accept a view that
00:36:26 would refuse to accept a view that that competent professionals practicing engineering in safety critical areas should be permitted to say oh well the document never told me so
00:36:35 me so i just can't i can't accept that it sounds to me from what you've just been saying that you would
00:36:41 would feel more comfortable if the warning which i think you're saying it really is intended to contain were much more explicit
00:36:51 explicit it would certainly be helpful if it were much more explicit and it may well have prevented
00:36:56 prevented um
00:36:57 um some of the sort of the misconception around the use of this document or the application of this document i think would it also follow in your view that uh it may or may not be appropriate for
00:37:09 uh it may or may not be appropriate for adb to advise people that
00:37:14 that they can satisfy the building regulations by getting a
00:37:19 getting a pass under br135
00:37:23 br135 uh
00:37:26 if yeah i mean if if that's how one reads adb yes yeah yeah all right yes thank you very much it would have been helpful if clause 12.5 said
00:37:37 helpful if clause 12.5 said um
00:37:39 um uh although you know i think as i said before the break i'm not sure adb is obliged to say this but given what we have observed about being just the behavior of people within the industry
00:37:50 the industry uh perhaps it would have been helpful for adb to say in a number of places just just to remind you everyone uh
00:37:58 uh even if you follow the rules in this document
00:38:01 document that's still not you home free so to speak you you know you still have to think about not rules apologies mr miller recommendations of grief document be you know even if you follow these rules that are set up these recommendations that
00:38:12 are set up these recommendations that are set out in proof document b um it's still on you as the competent professional that's the designer uh and and i think that the more people in out there in the world can be reminded of that and to the
00:38:23 world can be reminded of that and to the greater extent that people out there in the real world can be held responsible for design decisions that they've made all the better so do i take it from that
00:38:34 so do i take it from that series of answers to the chairman that actually the putative competent fire safety engineer or a competent fire strategy relying on this document
00:38:45 strategy relying on this document would not need to have this spelt out to him even if it is a spelling out they would know it intrinsically my view is that they ought to yes they ought to
00:38:54 ought to um
00:38:56 um did you were you aware that this was this paragraph was added to appendix a at the same time as appendix b was introduced in this third edition in 2013 and had been absent from the second edition
00:39:07 been absent from the second edition which only contained annex a in very much similar form in 2003 did you know that possibly i mean as you're telling me i'm thinking oh that's interesting i'd want to go back and look okay
00:39:19 back and look okay um let's just move on then with the question of windows uh
00:39:23 uh are you first of all are you able to offer us a view in simple terms which will tell you more about the potential for external fire spread a rig with with window gaps or a rig without
00:39:35 i mean it would tell you it might tell you different things right yeah let's go to um uh figure two please page 11 of this document which is bre-135
00:39:47 which is bre-135 third edition uh here's a photograph under figure two have gone at court irvine and you can see the fire damage from the windows directly in line of the vertical fire spread
00:39:57 spread yes and if we go down to page 13 figure 3
00:40:01 3 is the graphic representation of a fire scenario with fire climbing the building and re-entering the building via windows you see and um
00:40:12 and um under mechanisms of fire spread it says the key stages associated with fire spread on the outside of the building envelope are and then they're in order initiation of the fire event fire breakout
00:40:25 the fire event fire breakout interaction with external envelope and then across the column fire re-entry fire service intervention these stages are discussed below and illustrated schematically in figure three
00:40:37 figure three and you can see the you can see the process there the secondary fires entering through the windows on each floor also through apertures at least on each floor um
00:40:46 um now that that's dealing then isn't it with with
00:40:50 with with re-entry of fire into the building through windows yes that's the assumption here as it travels vertically now given that br135 is overtly directed at the hazard posed by
00:41:02 overtly directed at the hazard posed by cladding fires and re-entry um is it right to say that some compromises to reproducibility appear to have been necessary in its design my question is is this not a pretty major
00:41:14 question is is this not a pretty major compromise where the rig itself doesn't have any windows
00:41:18 windows to let fire back in
00:41:25 okay my understanding of what
00:41:31 of what uh
00:41:32 uh bs8414 and br135 testing
00:41:37 testing uh it's trying to tell you tell you us uh them whoever's using it um
00:41:45 um is
00:41:46 is whether or not or perhaps the extent to which a combination of clotting products on the outside of a building is likely to contribute to the upward
00:41:59 is likely to contribute to the upward progression of fire it's not
00:42:03 it's not a test that is trying to tell you necessarily whether or not that contribution to the upward progression of fire
00:42:11 of fire is going to go in a window i think the assumption is that if the clouding system contributes to the upward progression of fire that is going to make it more likely
00:42:22 that is going to make it more likely that more windows will become compromised right that makes sense yes it does i see in what way does the 8414 test series actually test for the risk actually depicted here in figure three
00:42:34 depicted here in figure three given those five key mechanisms uh stages
00:42:39 uh stages only in so far as uh one assumes that if you have a fire spreading up the outside of a building and it finds a window then it's likely to enter that window
00:42:50 to enter that window right
00:42:58 so is it right that in your understanding br135 appears to consider a specific risk which the associated test the s8414 doesn't in fact seek to
00:43:09 the s8414 doesn't in fact seek to address namely fire reentry i mean yeah it doesn't it doesn't address it explicitly uh in that it doesn't reproduce that but
00:43:20 uh in that it doesn't reproduce that but in order i mean the problem is that in order to address it explicitly you would end up with a litany of further questions about the particular characteristics of the windows
00:43:30 windows uh which would become an impossibility uh
00:43:34 uh you know even if you said okay we're not even gonna have glass there we're just gonna have a big void then
00:43:40 then you know
00:43:41 you know what are you going to put inside the void to check whether ignition occurs do you have curtains and if you have curtains what are they made of and do you have a sofa and you know it just goes on and on
00:43:53 it just goes on and on so
00:43:56 i guess i just i guess i just i mean i'm i'm perfectly happy to uh i'm perfectly happy to sort to sort of be critical of the bs8414 test in terms
00:44:07 be critical of the bs8414 test in terms of how it's used and you know various other aspects of it but but to criticize it for not having windows i just don't think makes any sense
00:44:17 and you've given the reasons for for that
00:44:20 that my question is slightly different though i mean is there not a mismatch between the mechanisms of fire spread addressed in br135 on the one hand which does address fire re-entry or at least the key stages of fire spread externally
00:44:33 the key stages of fire spread externally involving fire reentry on the one hand but the bsa414 test not doing so i i mean i see i take the point i think that
00:44:42 that if i were if i were to try to argue on behalf of br135 not quite sure why i'm doing that but if i were to try to argue on behalf of br135 i would probably say that that if you know if
00:44:53 you know if if the cladding system is is seen to result in upward progression of the fire uh you know five meters above the hearth then that is giving you an indication
00:45:05 then that is giving you an indication that
00:45:06 that there's a larger potential that you're going to get break into of a fire of a window above the fire of origin if you like yeah so it's it's it's it's indirectly addressing the
00:45:18 it's it's it's indirectly addressing the question in a way does i see i mean i don't want to put words in your mouth but does it come to to this that the
00:45:27 the um the mechanisms for fire spread addressed by br135 which is not just a list of criteria it has some background to it as well which includes fire re-entry
00:45:38 well which includes fire re-entry through windows uh
00:45:44 include but not um exclusively include uh the the um mechanism for interaction with external envelope
00:45:58 sorry you'll have to ask me that yeah let me try that one again um is it in fact is the right way of reading these two tests these two elements together bs8414 the test and br135 the criteria document on the other
00:46:11 br135 the criteria document on the other um the criteria document um goes further than the test because bs8414 tells you only about interaction with the external envelope it doesn't tell you anything about fire
00:46:22 it doesn't tell you anything about fire reentry
00:46:26 um i i think that the classification of a system to br 135 after having performed a test on that system to be safe for one for
00:46:39 system to be safe for one for uh
00:46:39 uh equally doesn't doesn't go any further than what the 8414 test
00:46:45 8414 test is telling you i'm not sure i'm answering i'm not trying to either understand nor i'm answering the question mr miller let me try the other way around if you met the performance criteria um
00:46:57 um on the basis of test data derived from bs8414 parts one and two would that eliminate the risk of fire reentry
00:47:06 if you were to if you were to meet the criteria
00:47:08 criteria yes uh no
00:47:11 yes uh no no i wouldn't why not
00:47:15 why not because your real building has windows probably
00:47:20 yes and what is there in either the bsa414 rig design uh or br135 to tell the designer that
00:47:35 explicitly nothing it's just from memory nothing
00:47:42 let's talk about 1919 uh and the path to grenfell and i want to pick up from part two of your report um you've given us a detailed overview
00:47:53 um you've given us a detailed overview of the evolution of the building rig and ra and testing landscape and the regulatory regimes in place from 1919 onwards um we land i think in the mid 1980s
00:48:05 um we land i think in the mid 1980s at page 90 if we can pick that up and the page 90 paragraph 442
00:48:17 you tell us oops
00:48:22 ah
00:48:27 that is not the right report i don't think
00:48:37 okay um we need i think to go please to your
00:48:42 to your uh
00:48:43 uh path to grenfell report which is l b y p 2
00:48:52 7 0 1
00:48:55 and in that document we need page 19. thank you paragraph 442 and you say this there had been therefore there had
00:49:06 there had been therefore there had therefore been a fundamental shift in the way designers could practice in principle there were no prescribed constraints on how the adequacy of the proposed design could be demonstrated against the requirements of the building regulations 1985.
00:49:18 regulations 1985. there had not however been any fundamental changes in the testing standards which underpin the approved documents indeed to maintain continuity with the past it was logical to retain the majority of the existing testing
00:49:29 the majority of the existing testing methods and performance standards even if these were no longer mandatory or if the new test methods or classifications were available to supersede pre-existing ones
00:49:40 now and you then go on at 443 the idea of linking a performance standard and a test method had been enshrined in law since the 1950s it was necessary to continually review
00:49:51 it was necessary to continually review the tests and the performance standards to ensure that they were fit for purpose to check that they had not been invalidated by a new material product or system this had been the fundamental objection of raba and the frs to
00:50:03 objection of raba and the frs to mandatory performance standards in 1958 that such mandatory standards constrained innovation breaking this link was expected to allow unconstrained quotes flexibility
00:50:14 quotes flexibility now um
00:50:16 now um that's the background to what i now want to show you which is 444 and you say this
00:50:20 this since the performance standards and tests were no longer seen as constraints the need to continually review and update became less urgent if a new and innovative product failed to meet the stated
00:50:31 product failed to meet the stated performance standard then the product manufacturer could simply find alternative means quotes on quotes by which to quote demonstrate safety close quotes in this new functionally based model of building regulations devising
00:50:43 model of building regulations devising ways to circumvent the prescribed guidance of the approved documents was not finding loopholes it was the intent of the regulatory system now i just want to focus on the last part of that paragraph there
00:50:55 part of that paragraph there when you why do you say that finding ways to circumvent the statutory guidance was the intent of the system
00:51:05 because the point of a functionally based regulatory system
00:51:10 system is to
00:51:12 is to promote innovation and flexibility one of the points is to promote innovation and flexibility and so provided you can
00:51:23 provided you can demonstrate in quotes uh that your product or system
00:51:30 or system meets the functional requirement then you don't need to follow any uh particular performance standard or test method uh you know it's up to you to meet the
00:51:42 you know it's up to you to meet the requirement the functional standard in whatever way you choose so so and that that um removal of deemed to satisfy
00:51:51 satisfy uh
00:51:52 uh uh
00:51:54 uh roots let's say to compliance with the building regulations uh was was you know quite explicitly the point of um of these changes to the regulatory
00:52:05 of these changes to the regulatory procedures you know to remove these constraints that were quite you know it's quite difficult to update a test standard and change things as a consequence of new products and things so if you want to promote
00:52:16 so if you want to promote um innovation and flexibility in the interests of industry then it does make sense to to allow people to do what they like
00:52:28 do what they like so are you saying that instead of having a prescribed system where people would look
00:52:32 look for loopholes with which to circumvent uh you created a new open textured flexible system where you no longer needed to do that yeah i mean you could argue that the system was
00:52:43 you could argue that the system was created specifically to enable people to circumvent the rules and how could they demonstrate safety other than by reference to adherence to a classification system based firmly on
00:52:54 a classification system based firmly on reliable tests and reliably applicable outcomes
00:52:59 outcomes uh in practice new practice uh
00:53:02 uh they would make some justification they would write that up as their design and they would seek the approval of the approving authority uh and if the approving authority said that they were satisfied then i guess
00:53:14 that they were satisfied then i guess you would build it and at what point would you know within a reasonable to a reasonable degree of certainty whether or not you had met the functional requirement
00:53:26 in practical terms with respect to fire safety yes if you had a big fire and everything went horribly wrong right so while that happened you'd be taken to have complied until it happened
00:53:37 taken to have complied until it happened when you suddenly realized that you hadn't
00:53:42 now at term page 91 we have melhotra you start the quotation in the previous paragraph uh
00:53:53 uh in fact let me show you what um malhotra says at paragraph 446 actually i've jumped a little bit ahead too far um
00:54:01 um melhaltra then a long time veteran of the fire research station summed up the significance of these fundamental changes as follows historically over the last three centuries we've moved from strict constructional specifications to
00:54:13 constructional specifications to functional semi-functional requirements with the performance orientated objectives as and when feasible rigid controls are being replaced progressively by a more flexible system which permits alternative solutions to be considered the burden of
00:54:25 be considered the burden of responsibility is being shifted from the central or local authorities to the individual or corporate designer stroke contractor for the adequacy of this system or his system
00:54:37 this system or his system and that's a quotation from malhotra in 1986.
00:54:41 1986. then you say this it's 447 malhotra concludes 448 it will perhaps it will be perhaps another two or three decades before the consequence of this approach
00:54:52 before the consequence of this approach can be seen now
00:54:55 now we can see that malhotra was only a year or so out in his prediction yes what was it then do you know or do you think that mulhotra saw which people did not see in the
00:55:06 which people did not see in the intervening 30 years
00:55:12 i don't know again because i wasn't i wasn't around and i never met malhotra unfortunately um
00:55:20 um but
00:55:21 but to me this quote expresses concern it expresses a concern that uh uh you know that that this this um
00:55:32 uh you know that that this this um shifting
00:55:34 shifting uh to
00:55:36 uh to individual corporate designer contractors for adequacy uh without some appropriate level of oversight has the potential to cause significant
00:55:47 has the potential to cause significant problems but that because we are working in fire safety and because severe fires are thankfully rare
00:55:54 rare it might take a long time in order for the chinks in the armor if you like to manifest
00:56:01 manifest um yeah i mean when i when i found this quote i thought wow
00:56:09 yeah spot on
00:56:15 let's move on to some of the missed opportunities that you identify to address key problems relating to the regulation of and industry practices prevailing in testing design and
00:56:27 prevailing in testing design and construction of external wall systems um we start i think with noslee in 1991 fifth of april liverpool about which we have heard some evidence
00:56:38 about which we have heard some evidence in the course of module six and let's go please to page 95 of your report here paragraph 470
00:56:47 and you say there in the early hours of the fifth of april 1991 a fire occurred at nasally heights on arrival the fire brigade reported that it was the most frightening thing any of us had ever seen as firefighters
00:56:58 any of us had ever seen as firefighters and the flames were coming from every landing window between the ground floor and the roof that's a quotation from shenan 1991 there were no fatalities and the fire
00:57:09 there were no fatalities and the fire brigade were eventually able to bring the fire under control and if we go to
00:57:16 paragraph 465 you
00:57:19 you confirm there page 94
00:57:25 that the rain screen was used at nasally was a glass fibre reinforced polymer grp sheeting product with an aggregate finish on its outside face products marketing literature suggested
00:57:36 products marketing literature suggested that the polymer used as a polyester polymer resin the grp grain screen was a product called cape stenny sheeting and was presented as being a class naught product
00:57:49 now i think you've reviewed the bre's 1992 investigation report into that fire written by penny morgan and others yes yes for reference purposes that's at bre 3035385
00:57:59 3035385 i think you've also looked at her witness statement yes yes and that's a bre 30th 43866 um and at your report at page 95 at paragraph 472 foot of the page you say this the
00:58:11 foot of the page you say this the investigations concluded that the primary reason for the rapid and widespread progression of the fire had been the complete absence of cavity barriers between the rain screen cladding and the mineral fiber insulation as a result the first major
00:58:23 insulation as a result the first major revision of approved document b which was already underway at the time of the fire increased the degree to which cavity barriers were recommended within rain screen clouding systems now
00:58:34 now if you go then page 98 and paragraph 486
00:58:42 um you say there from my perspective what is most notable about the report of the bre investigation into the into the nasally heights fire is the striking absence of any explicit discussion regarding the degree to which the grp
00:58:54 regarding the degree to which the grp rainscreen product may have contributed fuel to the fire i find this particularly notable since noseley represented a highly significant project in the development of rain screen clouding systems i have found no
00:59:05 clouding systems i have found no documentary evidence to suggest that anyone openly ask the question what was burning within the cladding at the top of the building it appears that the cell focus regarding the fuel for the fire was on the refuse
00:59:16 the fuel for the fire was on the refuse judged to have initiated the fire at the building's base i find it surprising and alarming that nobody appears to have taken an explicit and active interest in the combustibility of the class naught quotes on quotes
00:59:27 of the class naught quotes on quotes class naught grp range screen product at the time of writing i've seen no such interest evidence of the documents made available to me and now um why is your reaction one of surprise and
00:59:39 why is your reaction one of surprise and alarm
00:59:46 there have been two there's been two moments in this inquiry when i've when i've thought when i've been speechless uh
00:59:53 uh and and one was when i read that it was jrp clouding at nosley heights and the reason that i was speechless was because i was aware of noslee heights had been for many years and i've read you know br 135 and various other
01:00:05 you know br 135 and various other reports and things over the years and the problem at nosley was the absence of cavity barriers right that's that's what i believed that's what i was told
01:00:15 told uh because that's the problem that's that's the narrative of nosley the narrative of noseley is that there were unobstructed cavities all the way up the building and that's why there was a big fire
01:00:25 fire uh now my professional background i come from a structural engineering background and the way i got into fire was because i was interested in using grp materials and structural engineering
01:00:36 grp materials and structural engineering applications and they burn quite nicely so my route into this profession was through understanding the way grp burns so when i
01:00:45 so when i for the inquiry thought you know when i was asked to look at the regulatory regime and the testing i thought well right where do we start we start at nosley so let's go back and look at noseley and i looked at noslee
01:00:56 look at noseley and i looked at noslee and as soon as i started reading the document's been provided to me about nosley and i realized that had been grp i thought to myself
01:01:06 with the question here what was burning 10 stories above the refuse
01:01:10 refuse if this was a non-combustible cladding system and it had no cavity barriers can i really get flame extension 10 stories up an unobstructed cavity to fuel only being at the base and i immediately went
01:01:21 being at the base and i immediately went and spoke to my colleagues and said you know guys am i crazy but does it seem pretty unrealistic that you get fire coming off the top of a building due to refuse burning in its space even if you have an unobstructed cavity and they agreed with me so so you know that
01:01:36 the fact that and then i started to look for mentions of the combustibility of the cladding over
01:01:43 over decades and i found none
01:01:46 none um
01:01:48 um and then i and then i looked at all of the work that came after nosley and i looked to
01:01:52 looked to you know trying to understand how classo kind of perpetuates within the system trying to understand the the sort of slightly odd um british focus on cavity barriers in these
01:02:03 focus on cavity barriers in these systems that doesn't exist in many other jurisdictions around the world
01:02:07 world and it all goes back to noseley and it all goes back to noseley in the absence of any significant discussion about the grp cladding so i can't remember now what the question is but but
01:02:18 but to me that was really you know a sit-up straight moment and i've tried quite hard to understand why
01:02:28 like why why was it not mentioned
01:02:32 mentioned and have you found an answer no now um if we go to page 99 paragraph 496
01:02:43 you say on the basis of the above summary it is apparent to me that the bre investigation into nasally heights failed to fully address the degree to which the presence of a combustible rain screen may have contributed to the
01:02:54 screen may have contributed to the spread and magnitude of the fire even with the considerable benefit of hindsight i struggle to understand how this factor could have been overlooked during these investigations
01:03:05 during these investigations this is particularly the case given that the rain screen product used at nasally heights was a glass reinforced polyester composite which will almost certainly have had some and perhaps significant potential to contribute fuel to an
01:03:18 potential to contribute fuel to an escalating external fire are you able professor to offer any possible
01:03:23 possible or plausible scientific basis which could justify or explain the omission of any discussion of the combustibility of the grp cladding from bre's work
01:03:36 only that those who investigated the fire
01:03:40 fire on behalf of bre may have not understood themselves that something that is class not isn't necessarily non-combustible
01:03:52 isn't necessarily non-combustible right so
01:03:54 right so those who investigated the fire on behalf of the bre may have been operating under the misapprehension that glass naught means won't burn and if they were then you can kind of understand they wouldn't have considered
01:04:05 understand they wouldn't have considered that the rain screen could possibly have contributed if they thought it was non-combustible now they would have been wrong to think that but nonetheless they may have thought that
01:04:17 so you know penny morgan for instance may not have realized that class naught and non-combustible are not the same thing
01:04:23 thing well let's look at her witness statement which is i think one of those things that you read bre three zeros four three eight six six
01:04:36 uh and if we go please to page 21 paragraph 115
01:04:43 she says and this answer actually answers a question at the foot of page one page 20 which we need to look at paragraph 114 we could just pick that up i'm sorry and the question at the foot of 20 is did
01:04:55 the question at the foot of 20 is did you understand the fact that the grp rain screen cladding applied to the external walls of the nasally building had achieved class naught to relate to the combustibility or otherwise of the product please explain your answer
01:05:06 product please explain your answer and at the top of page 115 she says this to the best of my recollection i understood that grp rain screen clouding had achieved class nord which did relate to the combustibility
01:05:17 which did relate to the combustibility of the product and then if you go to page 22 i'll show you two things page 22 paragraph one two five
01:05:28 uh she says well while i cannot recall due to the passage of time i assume that i did consider the cause of the vertical fire spread to be a matter of significance as a ground-based fire had spread over what
01:05:40 a ground-based fire had spread over what was purported to be non-combustible cladding
01:05:46 now what do you make of that evidence uh
01:05:51 uh it would appear that um she doesn't understand the distinction between class naught and non-combustible do these passages that i've read you
01:06:02 do these passages that i've read you from her statement thrown in light on the state of knowledge assuming how to be representative for the moment a state of knowledge in fire engineering circles in the early 1990s about the limitations of class naught
01:06:13 about the limitations of class naught and the risks of external fire spread presented by products like grp well i'm i wasn't there so i i can't really speak to whether or not this view
01:06:24 really speak to whether or not this view would have been typical uh it does seem to me that over the years there has been quite a lot of confounding of these two concepts yes the the two
01:06:35 of these two concepts yes the the two concepts being class not and non-combustible and when you say confounding you mean conflating sorry conflating yes it's the same thing because people understand better than confound yeah
01:06:48 understand better than confound yeah can we then go to page 99 paragraph 491 of your report please
01:06:53 please back to your report your paths to grenfell report page 99 paragraph 491
01:07:03 and
01:07:06 you've quoted from the passage i've just read to you and
01:07:11 and then you also quote from 490 from a later bre report which says this i'll just read this to you the most significant of the historic
01:07:22 you the most significant of the historic external fires of that of the 99 is that of the 1991 fire and nasally heights a residential block of flats which had been refurbished with the addition of a thermal insulation to the external walls of the block the fire started externally
01:07:34 of the block the fire started externally to the block and ignited the combustible cladding system resulting in extensive fire spread across the face of the building mostly upwards
01:07:43 upwards and then you say at 491 i agree that the nasally heights fire was the most significant of the historic external fires which is why the apparent failure to properly interrogate the key issues or make the necessary changes to the
01:07:55 or make the necessary changes to the relevant guidance is so tragic with hindsight the above quote also suggests an unarticulated knowledge of this issue within bre going back for decades
01:08:06 for what reasons do you consider that this fire was the most significant of the historic external fires in the in the years between 1991 and 2017
01:08:18 years between 1991 and 2017 [Music]
01:08:20 [Music] because of what it ought because it would because of what it ought to have caused people to think about but didn't apparently and what interrogation do you think should have been carried out
01:08:32 should have been carried out into what you describe as the key issues those who are investigating these this fire
01:08:39 fire ought to have tried to understand the extent to which the escalation of the fire vertically was a consequence of the continuous cavity
01:08:51 continuous cavity or
01:08:52 or a consequence of the combustibility of the rain screen rather than focusing as far as i can tell uniquely on the continuous cavity and you know i mean noslee heights
01:09:04 and you know i mean noslee heights is why as far as i can tell is you know is why we have such a strong focus on the use of cavity barriers um
01:09:15 if if if after noseley someone had had stood up and said well actually a significant proportion of the adverse outcome at nosley
01:09:27 outcome at nosley was because we had a class not combustible range screen
01:09:33 then maybe we wouldn't have had uh well many other fires including grenfell tower you know it's it's
01:09:40 it's i think it's i think it's impossible to overstate the importance of of what was missed here and in para 491 where you say
01:09:51 and in para 491 where you say failure to make the necessary changes to the relevant guidance what are you referring to what are the necessary changes that should have been made reconsideration of class not right
01:10:02 class not right presumably the grp panels and mostly were
01:10:06 were removed and examined were they uh
01:10:10 uh the uh they were well uh i don't i don't know i mean i mean noseley was re-clad as far as i'm aware
01:10:18 aware uh
01:10:19 uh i certainly don't think and hope that the those panels are not on noseley heights still although i have to say given what we've observed it wouldn't surprise me if they were i mean i asked the question because
01:10:32 were i mean i asked the question because if they were removed and examined fire damage to the internal faces would have been apparent wouldn't it uh yeah i mean there are photos in the fire investigation report um
01:10:45 fire investigation report um bre's investigation report that clearly show
01:10:48 show um
01:10:49 um what
01:10:50 what someone who understands the way grp burns would expect you see so grp is glass reinforced polymer glass fibers that are that are placed inside a polymer matrix i think
01:11:01 placed inside a polymer matrix i think polyester probably would be typical for this era
01:11:07 and when they burn the polyester burns off and the glass fibers remain and you end up with
01:11:16 up with stringy glass fibers you end up with a mess of a tangle of glass fibers that is what was pre-existing inside the resin before the polymer burned off and in the photos after um noseley you see it you
01:11:28 photos after um noseley you see it you see glass fibers hanging all over the place you see partially burned rain screen clouding panels it's it's it's it's abundantly clear what has happened the the
01:11:39 the the polyester resin assuming it was polyester the polymer resin has burned away and has left the fibers and there's ample evidence of exactly what occurred so the the green screen panels at nosley heights did burn
01:11:51 heights did burn there's no question people didn't really pick it up that's what it appears yeah as i say for me when i realized they were grp panels and i went back and
01:12:03 were grp panels and i went back and looked at the photos and realized what i was looking at um
01:12:07 um you know having had in my having had in my head
01:12:10 my head all these years that that that the problem that mostly had a non-combustible rain screen and the problem was the absence of cavity barriers
01:12:19 barriers uh
01:12:20 uh i again it was one of those moments where i just thought i said what like this cannot be this cannot be the truth um yeah it's it's absolutely clear to me that the the fact that the rain screen
01:12:31 that the the fact that the rain screen at nosley heights was grp uh
01:12:34 uh it was was one of
01:12:38 one of if not the reason why that fire spread mr one more question before the break okay
01:12:44 okay um
01:12:46 um in your experience and knowledge of grp uh
01:12:50 grp uh does it or did it routinely achieve a class not classification i i i couldn't say one of the things that's interesting about uh
01:13:01 uh and i couldn't say because it depends on you know the type of polymer what what um
01:13:06 um fillers or fire retardants you might have in the polymer the the ratio between fibers and polymer there's all sorts of reasons why it's quite difficult to say whether something would or would not what's interesting about the noseley panels is that they they
01:13:19 the noseley panels is that they they were grp panels but they had an aggregate outer surface as is mentioned um in the recording um and that so they had little little stones that were kind of i guess pressed in or formed into the outer surface to
01:13:31 in or formed into the outer surface to make it look like it was a render or a you know
01:13:35 you know a rough cast kind of finish to the outside of the building
01:13:41 [Applause] and and i can imagine that if if the rainscreen products at noseley were tested in bs 476 part 6 and part 7 that the presence of that rough cast
01:13:53 that the presence of that rough cast stone finish would assist the product to achieve potentially class naught
01:13:59 naught what's interesting is that after noseley one of the changes that was made quietly to the guidance was that rain screen panels need to achieve class knot on both the outside
01:14:11 achieve class knot on both the outside and inside faces and so i believe that it's plausible that the reason that change was made is because somebody realized but did not say
01:14:22 but did not say that the rain screen panels at nosley were not class naught inside the cavity and that's one of the reasons why the fire spread so quickly but that's
01:14:33 but that's conjecture on my part yes all right thank you such a good point yes mr chairman thank you good we'll have the afternoon break at this point and uh professor bisbee we'll come back at 25 to 4 please and usual rules
01:14:44 back at 25 to 4 please and usual rules apply thank you thank you very much from it 25 to 4
01:14:56 thank you very much from it 25 to 4 please
01:32:02 would you ask professor bisbee to come back in please
01:32:13 [Music] very good right ready to carry on yes thank you thank you very much yes yes thank you very much mr chairman professor
01:32:22 professor in the exchanges before the break you said that there were two moments in your work for the inquiry which left you speechless and you explained what one of them was i'm afraid that during the break the press of curiosity has become
01:32:33 break the press of curiosity has become too much for us what was the other uh
01:32:36 uh the other was when i discovered uh what had been tested in the cc 1924 project in the early 2000s right
01:32:47 right somebody behind me has just won a bet ah okay congratulations uh now um in relation to uh noseley we go please to page 100 paragraph 500. um you say
01:32:59 to page 100 paragraph 500. um you say that that nasally heights was a pilot scheme for the estates action program wherein government investment was intended to support local improvements it was a pilot scheme for new over-cladding technologies that have been the subject of bre review it was a
01:33:11 been the subject of bre review it was a pilot scheme for the fire safety of such systems as informed by bre's earlier large-scale fire testing program it was also to some extent a pilot scheme for it the new building regulatory system whereby new
01:33:22 regulatory system whereby new technologies could be deployed without meeting specific performance standards via alternative routes rather than by strict compliance with the proof document b
01:33:32 are you able to tell us from your review of the history and the documents relating to it whether there may have been some other reason uh for um
01:33:41 uh for um the investigation into the classification of grp not being picked up as a feature of the nosely investigation investigation um
01:33:53 i mean i've i've tried quite hard to think of an alternative reason other than
01:34:00 than what we might call the potential for embarrassment uh or the self-interest of the parties involved in that scheme in one way or another i've not been able to come up with
01:34:10 with one that i consider plausible uh it you know
01:34:14 know it may be the case that penny morgan uh who
01:34:20 who you know my understanding of her background is that she you know she didn't necessarily come from uh
01:34:26 uh fire science or even a physics or engineering background that she may not have understood uh
01:34:34 uh what she was looking at but
01:34:38 but i mean
01:34:39 i mean the people who were other people who were within the organization bre at that stage these were the top fire scientists in the country uh if any of these people looked at this evidence i i can't see how they would not see
01:34:51 i i can't see how they would not see what i saw the moment i looked at it so i i i i'm at a bit of a loss to explain it other than um uh uh i mean the statements i've made here and there there's also
01:35:03 here and there there's also um obviously we
01:35:06 we graham spinardi who works in my team went to the archives at q and started looking at some of the files at queue and and uncovered um you know this memo that the inquiry has
01:35:17 you know this memo that the inquiry has seen yeah uh that alludes to certainly the potential for some embarrassment in my view around the fire at nosley heights was some grp whether cape stenny or otherwise in wide
01:35:29 cape stenny or otherwise in wide use at the time the late 1980s early 1990s
01:35:33 1990s that will have been a period when grp was um
01:35:39 uh i mean certainly in that in that period people were using grp on buildings for uh you know it's a modern material a space age material and people were using it for for cladding panels
01:35:50 were using it for for cladding panels and various other things at that time yes certainly there were a number of buildings in london that were clouded with grp that didn't age particularly well over the years and moving on then too a little bit later in the decade 1994 raymond
01:36:02 later in the decade 1994 raymond connolly can we go please to page 109 of your report
01:36:07 and a paragraph 6 five six eight you address the full scale fire test research which was carried out uh and as a result of the fire at nosley
01:36:18 uh and as a result of the fire at nosley by the bre through mr raymond or dr raymond connolly which led i think to a report from him in 1994 about which the panel has heard some evidence that's right during the course of this module
01:36:29 right during the course of this module now is it right that you consider that the primary focus of that research work which included 10 full-scale tests was on cavity barriers uh it appeared to be interested primarily in cavity barriers
01:36:41 interested primarily in cavity barriers yes on reading it and the power 569 you observe and i'm summarizing that one of the tests namely test two carried out on the system incorporating class naught grp rain screen cladding appear to be an
01:36:54 grp rain screen cladding appear to be an almost exact reconstruction of the cladding system used at nosley certainly very similar yep yes what observations recorded from that particular test do you consider to be significant
01:37:05 significant from the test two from test two yes uh from from memory i mean that that test two uh escalated quite rapidly and went off the top of the rig uh you know it behaved in much the same
01:37:16 uh you know it behaved in much the same way that one would have expected given what had occurred at nosley and you go on to say at 572 that this is colin connolly the reaction to fire properties of the shooting materials i.e that the rain screen
01:37:28 materials i.e that the rain screen shooting was class naught on both faces do not give a true indication of the potential fire hazard yes
01:37:36 yes that's connolly being quite clear yep yes and then at 350 there's a footnote you conclude and i'll read it aloud thus by at least as early as 1994 bre and the construction sponsorship directorate of
01:37:48 construction sponsorship directorate of the then department of the environment doe should have been aware that class not did not give a true indication of the potential fire hazard of a rain screen product and that this fact could contribute to a planning system experiencing unlimited vertical fire
01:38:01 experiencing unlimited vertical fire spread of fire over the full height of a cladding system that's right yeah
01:38:08 and
01:38:13 are you aware of anything done within government at the time from your reading of all the material about that no i mean other than
01:38:24 no i mean other than potentially you know the requirements on cavity barriers being enhanced uh you know it's it's
01:38:33 it's it's conceivable that those involved felt that
01:38:38 felt that implementing a greater requirement for cavity barriers would address the problems uh i don't know what basis they would have had for that belief but it's possible that they held it focusing on dr connolly's conclusions of paragraph
01:38:50 dr connolly's conclusions of paragraph 572 which i've just read to you how significant was that conclusion i mean i think it's a i think it's a hugely significant conclusion yeah and
01:39:01 hugely significant conclusion yeah and you go on to say that dr connolly concluded that it was necessary to consider the system as a whole and that there was still a need for full-scale testing to determine appropriate cavity protection i'm
01:39:12 appropriate cavity protection i'm summarizing your paragraph 576-577 is it fair to say professor that the the focus on cavity barriers and protection reflects the report as a whole dr connelly's work as a whole
01:39:24 dr connelly's work as a whole uh that that he was focused on cavity barriers
01:39:27 barriers uh yeah i mean the the the kind of what i'm left with when i look at
01:39:34 look at that work in the context of noseley heights and some of the reputational issues around it
01:39:41 it uh is is this idea that um [Music]
01:39:47 [Music] that the cavity barriers could be a way to address either wholly or impart
01:39:52 or impart the the poor performance that had been that had been observed yes
01:39:59 and the focus was on cavity barriers and protection rather than the risks presented by using what appeared to be class naught rain screen material yes what is what is
01:40:11 rain screen material yes what is what is surprising uh is that it doesn't appear that anybody said um
01:40:18 um you know what we'll hang on maybe we just should not use combustible rain screens maybe we should find some other way to restrict the reaction to fire behavior of rain screen products um
01:40:31 screen products um you know maybe in addition to class not we should have some other requirement or maybe we should develop a bespoke requirement that is is applicable to rain screen systems and how they might behave in a fire scenario but it doesn't appear that anyone did that other than
01:40:42 appear that anyone did that other than to
01:40:43 to argue that um a bs8414 test what would eventually become the bsa414 test that a large scale test was needed so it doesn't appear that anybody thought
01:40:53 thought uh well let's uh let's think about restricting the combustibility of rain screens let's instead think about ways we can satisfy ourselves by other means or other
01:41:05 ourselves by other means or other assessment techniques that we can still use these products in ways that would would be adequate as far as we're concerned and you know and there is a there is a
01:41:17 and you know and there is a there is a kind of a narrative that that flows through this from the from from noseley heights all the way through to the parliamentary inquiry and subsequent um that the way
01:41:28 that the way uh that what is that what is needed is a large-scale test rather than what is needed is some further restriction on the combustibility uh or the extent to which rain screen products might contribute to a fire
01:41:41 products might contribute to a fire yeah
01:41:42 yeah there were you know there were there were two paths or two lines of thought that could have been followed and the one that was followed you know uniquely was the large-scale testing path
01:41:52 path yes let's see if i can just tease out a little bit more on that can we go please to page 111 of your report and look at paragraphs 580-581 you say in 580 and colony's approach appears to
01:42:04 in 580 and colony's approach appears to have been as follows given that adb allows class naught rain screens and given that class naught does not fully address the fire hazards associated with class
01:42:13 class yet combustible rain screens what mitigations could stroke should be introduced in order to reduce the hazards to acceptable levels the question of whether a class naught range screen was stroke is appropriate
01:42:25 range screen was stroke is appropriate does not appear to have been asked or if it was asked this was not articulated or investigated i consider the nasally heights fire its investigation and connolly's subsequent research to represent significant missed
01:42:36 represent significant missed opportunities to explicitly address the potential hazards associated with combustible class naught rain screen products
01:42:45 products now
01:42:47 now do you consider the fact that whether a class naught rain screen was or is appropriate should have been asked or investigated at that point yes
01:42:56 notwithstanding that that was not the focus of the colony report is it your opinion professor that the experiments identified significant potential hazards associated with the use of a class naught product yes
01:43:09 naught product yes and
01:43:10 and had connolly been asked to consider the question do you consider that he would have been justified in concluding based on his tests that class naught was not a suitable
01:43:19 suitable measure for assessing the hazard posed by
01:43:22 by an external cladding system with a view to satisfying um functional requirement b4 yeah i mean i think he says as much in his report yes is is there a scientific justification
01:43:35 is is there a scientific justification for not asking dr connolly to investigate that question
01:43:45 um
01:43:52 i mean i would have asked the question is all i can say
01:43:56 can say uh
01:43:58 uh i and i would have expected anyone in the room so to speak to have a discussion about that question maybe they did i don't know maybe they did have that discussion
01:44:09 maybe they did have that discussion maybe they talked it over and they decided well no instead what we're going to do um because we can't come up with an alternative
01:44:21 approach here that's based on small scale or medium scale tests and we don't want to restrict
01:44:32 the industry we don't want all of a sudden there to be this problem of of all these rain screen products that are being used to reclad uh high-rise tower blocks uh we don't want to create a problem so we're going to we're going to really push hard for a
01:44:45 to we're going to really push hard for a full-scale test as an alternative and we're going to and we're going to get rid of class naught we're going to do it with a large scale test and it you know it seems that is what was being argued
01:44:56 it seems that is what was being argued for in in those years between this and the parliamentary inquiry the 1999 inquiry that that the the the the goal was to supplant
01:45:07 was to supplant or replace glass naught with a large-scale fire test that would be used for all products and systems uh now obviously that's not what happened as it as it happens but i think
01:45:20 i see your question i i would have i would have wanted to ask that question about class naught quite carefully because the thing that's important to recognize about class naught that seems to get a
01:45:31 about class naught that seems to get a bit lost in the conversation is that
01:45:35 is that class naught covers all manner of products
01:45:40 products uh with all manner of particular hazards associated with them you know whether they are composite products
01:45:49 products what types of metal faces they have how thick those faces are whether the cores are foamed or solid polymers or metallic honeycombs with adhesives or whatever you know
01:46:00 whatever you know whether the faces are metallic or cementitious come to that so so the
01:46:06 the the problem with class naught is that it just simply cannot address the responses of the full range of products that it was being applied to um and a view may have been taken that a large scale test could do that and
01:46:17 large scale test could do that and therefore switch to a large scale test may be appropriate now let's uh let's look to see how dr connolly describes the approach can we go please to his statement at bre
01:46:28 we go please to his statement at bre 3047667
01:46:34 there's his first page and if we go to page 12 please and i'm afraid there aren't
01:46:38 aren't paragraph numbers on this page but let's pick it up at the top he says at f as outlined previously test number two confirmed that the guidance had approved document b relying on class naught as a
01:46:49 document b relying on class naught as a sufficient measure of fire performance was inadequate unless also associated with the guidance requiring provision of cavity barriers which were problematic for reasons of dampness control rather than raising a concern test number two
01:47:01 than raising a concern test number two validated the need for a full-scale fire test to allow for an examination of an integrated external wall system rather than an individual component by component-based specification as an alternative outcome had had class naught
01:47:13 alternative outcome had had class naught rated materials exhibited sufficiently robust fire performance at full scale then the need for cavity barriers and or full-scale testing would not have been necessary in this context i would respectfully suggest that the bre
01:47:24 respectfully suggest that the bre research program was significant with the benefit of hindsight it is recognized that a component-by-component specification would have been an alternative and valid approach to have adopted subject to that specification
01:47:37 adopted subject to that specification being entirely one of non-combustible materials such an option was never thought of by me at the time as being necessary and i never heard any other person involved in the research suggesting at the time that such an
01:47:48 suggesting at the time that such an approach was potentially necessary
01:47:52 now it looks from that that dr connolly considered that the tests confirmed the need for a full-scale test and the small-scale component testing would only have been a valid alternative approach if comprised of entirely non-combustible
01:48:05 if comprised of entirely non-combustible materials or products do you agree with that
01:48:09 that no
01:48:09 no no i don't i mean another way of reading the result of test number two is that test number two is telling you don't use these rain screens
01:48:21 and it's telling you that pretty forcefully actually
01:48:27 and what does that tell you about what test well it means you don't necessarily need it i mean there's this weird yeah i mean there's a strange kind of um
01:48:38 sort of one-way set of blinders that people appeared to have on in this period
01:48:43 period uh
01:48:45 uh where when something went badly what it was showing was the need for a full-scale test um as opposed to it was showing that you shouldn't use that product um so there there there was there's a
01:48:57 um so there there there was there's a in all of the narrative throughout this period there's this strange kind of single-mindedness pushing towards this idea that the way to solve this problem is with a large-scale large-scale fire test
01:49:10 you'll have to remind me i don't escapes me at the moment but was there a test number two that was performed but with cavity barriers i can't remember off the top of my head
01:49:23 uh i don't believe so okay but from that but from memory there were a number of tests that involved cavity barriers and many of those were deemed inadequate as well
01:49:34 deemed inadequate as well in this uh in this study so you know
01:49:38 what what dr connolly seems to be saying here is that test number two confirms that we need a large-scale fire test and if we do a large-scale fire test but it incorporates cavity barriers then there seems to be this presumption that
01:49:50 seems to be this presumption that everything would be fine but having not performed that test i don't think i'm not sure on what basis he's arguing that that's the case would this this would wouldn't it treat small-scale
01:50:01 would wouldn't it treat small-scale tests and large-scale tests as functional equivalents um
01:50:07 um in what respect i'm not sure i follow well uh in this in the sense that they would both um arrive at the same point namely that you could use this
01:50:18 point namely that you could use this particular product or material um if you passed or didn't fail yeah if you're going to stick with class naught yes yes yeah yeah if you're going to but i mean my argument is that
01:50:29 i mean my argument is that they shouldn't have stuck with class not should have done something different or at least thought very hard about doing something different now he says it's with the benefit of hindsight that a component by component specification with non-combustible
01:50:40 specification with non-combustible materials would have been an alternative and valid approach but what was it that the scientists like dr colony did not know in 1994 that they came to know later so as to be able to invoke the
01:50:51 later so as to be able to invoke the wisdom of hindsight as he does i i you know i would disagree with that statement i don't think you need the benefit of hindsight to make that statement and is it fair to say that in fact as
01:51:02 fact as no hindsight was needed given what the nasally heights flash demonstrated about what class naught panels could do in the event of a an external fire presuming that dr connolly had been
01:51:13 fire presuming that dr connolly had been briefed on what had occurred at mostly yes i would agree with that when we get back to your report then at page 40 please paragraphs 195 to 197 and you say there
01:51:29 in 197 one approach would have been to revisit the reference scenario and redevelop new model tests and just pausing that is that a reference to class nought
01:51:40 reference to class nought a new more appropriate reference scenario could have been defined and the possibly voluminous and costly underpinning research conducted to determine if it was possible to link the results of a new small scale and hopefully reproducible product test to
01:51:52 hopefully reproducible product test to the results in a larger reference scenario indeed it may have been possible with seeing it with sufficient underpinning research to more credibly link the existing model test to reference scenarios involving external fire spread this is not the course of
01:52:05 fire spread this is not the course of action that was taken the alternative approach was to prioritize representativeness over reproducibility and to create a more realistic test the second route was one suggested by connolly who was apparently
01:52:17 suggested by connolly who was apparently keen possibly for both technical and commercial reasons to create a test that included cavity protection insulation and external rain screens connolly therefore proposed the creation of an external fire spread system test
01:52:29 external fire spread system test was that the work of revisiting the reference scenario and uh developing new model tests ever carried out not that i'm aware of no was it your view that it ought to have been carried
01:52:40 view that it ought to have been carried out uh
01:52:42 out uh it ought to have been very seriously considered and i i would have expected that consideration to have been you know written down and documented somewhere and given what happened what is your
01:52:53 and given what happened what is your opinion of the appropriateness of continuing to use class naught developed as it was for an internal reference scenario in the context of assessing the safety of external cladding systems uh it should not have been it should
01:53:05 uh it should not have been it should have been reconsidered i mean it should have been reconsidered immediately after the noseley fire and if we go to paragraph uh page 253 paragraph 1578 to 1580. i won't read it
01:53:17 paragraph 1578 to 1580. i won't read it all out to you just remind you what you said there under the summary 1578 1579
01:53:24 1578 1579 and 1580
01:53:26 and 1580 uh you you summarize your views there just on the basis of what you say there is it your view that the continued use of class naught in the context of the safety of external clouding systems represented a hazard to life safety yes
01:53:40 represented a hazard to life safety yes do you consider that the focus on mitigation obscured the extent to which the continued use of class naught was a hazard
01:53:48 hazard yes
01:53:49 yes and what ought to have changed after nasally and connolly given what they've showed
01:53:54 showed uh
01:53:56 uh what ought to have changed um the
01:54:00 the the the i mean the machine of government regulation you know bre the relevant government government departments
01:54:10 should have removed class naught as the means by which cladding products could be assessed and accepted for use on the outside of buildings they should have thought about
01:54:22 buildings they should have thought about the products that were being used across the industry how those products react when exposed to heating and what that means for the performance with respect to external fire spread
01:54:36 they might claim that that's what the bs8414 test was trying to do and that had the bsa414 test been implemented as an alternative to
01:54:48 been implemented as an alternative to class not rather than as a parallel stream or parallel approach to class naught that it would have addressed those issues um and maybe it would have it's hard to say with hindsight
01:55:00 it's hard to say with hindsight you know if you if you if you test uh mpe on an 8414 test uh notwithstanding all my comments about complexity and differences in behavior uh i defy you to pass that test
01:55:15 let's turn to garnet court 1999 11th of june in that year 14-story block of flats in irvine in scotland overclouded as part of a refurbishment again grp yes
01:55:26 again grp yes yes
01:55:28 yes and if we go to page 123 of your report paragraphs six three four and six three five
01:55:35 five under the heading garlic 1999 you say you well you describe the fire in paragraph 634 and then in 635 you say as had been the case at
01:55:46 635 you say as had been the case at nosley heights garnet court had been reclaimed us using a grp cladding product however in this case the grp was installed over a more localized portion of the building essentially as pre-formed spandrel panels installed
01:55:58 pre-formed spandrel panels installed below the living room windows along isolated vertical lines up the sides of the building figure 15 at garnet court however the refurbishment grp cladding was not a ventilated rain screen and the cladding
01:56:09 ventilated rain screen and the cladding system
01:56:11 system therefore also did not and did not need to incorporate cavity barriers now it's right i think that as with the fire at nasally heights the garlic court fire was investigated by the bre on behalf of central
01:56:23 by the bre on behalf of central government yes this time the department of the environment transport and the regions as i think it had become yes yes and it was reported as part of the august 2000
01:56:34 reported as part of the august 2000 investigation of real fast report done by the bre under contract with the government yes yep and also the subject of reports prepared by the bre for the procurator fiscal's office
01:56:45 bre for the procurator fiscal's office and for irving council both in scotland yes it's my understanding yep yeah uh and you've read those reports yes i have um if you go please to six three seven um
01:56:56 just in the middle of your screen you say the fire investigation report issued by bre to detr in august 2000 described nosley heights refurbishment grp cladding in considerable detail
01:57:07 cladding in considerable detail as follows and then you settle that out and then you say a couple of paragraphs on at 6 3 9 the only substantive technical commentary on the role of the cladding in the fire spread at garnet court is
01:57:18 in the fire spread at garnet court is contained in the following passage and then you say this at 6 40. the video from tesco's security camera shows full involvement 15 minutes after the call to the brigade and for the next seven minutes the video shows even burning up
01:57:30 minutes the video shows even burning up this
01:57:31 this external surface of the grp with the production of flames and dense black smoke this indicates the involvement of the grp alone rather than the contents of the flats as the burning pattern
01:57:43 of the flats as the burning pattern would vary according to the materials burning
01:57:47 burning is it fair to say that the report into the garlic court fur con contains less detail as to the nature of the grp cladding than the noseley heights report uh contains less detail i would say it
01:57:59 uh contains less detail i would say it contains probably a bit more a bit more detail yeah and
01:58:04 and it at least makes it clear what we're dealing with right you say it 641 it's clear from the above descriptions that the presence of the combustible grp spandrel panels was the primary contributor to the rate and
01:58:15 the primary contributor to the rate and extent of external vertical fire spread at garnet court the video has unfortunately not been made available to me
01:58:22 me and are you able to tell us how you reached that conclusion that the grp spangled panels were the primary contributor to the rate and extent of the external fire spread at garnok
01:58:32 garnok i mean largely largely based on the information that's given in the bre's report the geo you know the only thing on the outside of the building that's there that's combustible is these grp panels
01:58:42 panels these are
01:58:44 these are you know preformed grp spandrel panels essentially uh i imagine they're quite polymer rich at their surface and i can imagine that they would burn
01:58:55 and i can imagine that they would burn pretty enthusiastically based on my knowledge of grp and you go on to say paragraphs 2 4 two and six four three um the foot of page one two four and over to page one two five
01:59:07 over to page one two five and i'm summarizing that no further testing on the spanish panels and no explicit comment was made by the in the detr report as to whether the panels were class naught or whether there were any implications for the
01:59:19 there were any implications for the building regulations in england you say you consider that surprising have you seen any evidence in the form of a document or a witness statement that would provide
01:59:31 witness statement that would provide what you might consider to be a tenable explanation for those emissions now
01:59:37 now if we go to page 133 then paragraph 701 you observe that testing on the spandrel panels was carried out between august 1999 and may 2000 under confidential
01:59:50 1999 and may 2000 under confidential contract norway should council yes
01:59:53 yes so some testing was done later later yeah and but not by central government only under contract to the local council uh that's right i believe that work was
02:00:04 uh that's right i believe that work was done on behalf of the local council in in some way in association with the procurator fiscal yeah can we go to the next page page page 134 paragraph 703 and you say there as part of my work
02:00:18 and you say there as part of my work uh for the grenfell tower inquiry i've performed a side by side comparison of the reports prepared by bre for north asia council and the report prepared by bre for department of energy transport in the regions the reports for
02:00:29 transport in the regions the reports for north ayrshire council dated august 1999 and april 2000 were prepared by penny morgan brian martin and tony morris the report for detr was submitted to anthony bird as part of the
02:00:40 submitted to anthony bird as part of the august 2000 investigation of real fires report and was prepared by penny morgan i've noted what i consider to be some potentially significant differences and you've done that
02:00:53 now you then go on to set 705 in the in the last line or last sentence the removal of mentions of class naught from the reports to detr
02:01:04 of class naught from the reports to detr appears to have been performed intentionally now your opinion that the removal of mention or the omission of a mention of class not was intentional to be clear are you offering no more than a lay view of the evidence as opposed to your
02:01:16 of the evidence as opposed to your expert opinion um
02:01:21 if you if you i mean if you if you perform i mean i suppose so if you if you perform a side-by-side comparison of the two reports what's striking is that they are
02:01:31 they are in the relevant sections verbatim uh or almost verbatim and yet you know the sentence that deals with class naught or the specific set of words that deals with class law has been removed from
02:01:42 removed from the reporting to government but is present in the north ayrshire reporting uh i mean i suppose that's a lay assessment what what is interesting to me
02:01:51 me or what i what i what i'm puzzled by is is why
02:01:55 is is why that information is considered uh sufficiently uninteresting to government that it should be explicitly removed from text which is otherwise verbatim what is the significance
02:02:07 what is the significance of the omission of the mention of class naught in the in the report that went to government uh that it that it that it that it by its omission does not
02:02:19 that it that it by its omission does not flag
02:02:20 flag uh the issue of class naught that it that you know that that that um that
02:02:27 that it it appears to it appears to not want to draw attention to class naught um
02:02:38 yeah i mean that's all that's all i can really say about it i i have you know i've i've watched obviously much of the testimony that's been given in module six
02:02:49 six uh and i recognize a number of witnesses were kind of questioned about about this discrepancy and none of the witnesses were able to give a very suitable rationale for why that discrepancy
02:03:00 discrepancy uh existed which i think is also a bit puzzling
02:03:05 puzzling uh the only explanation that i have been able to come up with is that in the reporting to government which i think occurred um sorry the reporting to north north
02:03:17 sorry the reporting to north north north ayrshire council that was
02:03:20 that was i believe temporarily earlier than the reporting to government where those relevant sections of text are included and it may be that in the intervening time period certain decisions had been taken and certain um
02:03:32 decisions had been taken and certain um replacement products have been installed that meant that the mention of class law was not necessary anymore but it is it is striking by its absence from any of the reporting to government in my view
02:03:43 in my view now um
02:03:44 now um we come on then to the select committee recommendations and the government's response
02:03:49 response there's another missed opportunity in your list i think i'm not going to ask you any questions about the evidence given or whether you agree or disagree with the recommendations um but uh if we look at the
02:04:00 um but uh if we look at the recommendations themselves you summarize those on page one through one three three if we can go back to that please at paragraph six nine seven
02:04:11 and we can see that there
02:04:15 in the middle of the paragraph you recall as follows thus they suggested that the new bre test i either test described in far note 9 which would later become bsa414 should be reissued
02:04:26 later become bsa414 should be reissued as a british standard and be substituted in the proof document b to replace previous recommendations relating to the fire safety of external cladding systems i.e the class naught should no longer be used in this context
02:04:38 used in this context i think we can agree that that recommendation was not subsequently acted upon as as a fact um but you then go on 720 uh on paragraph in paragraph 720 on page
02:04:51 uh on paragraph in paragraph 720 on page 137 if we go to that please
02:04:56 to note that class naught wasn't even mentioned
02:04:59 mentioned within the government's response to the first report of the 1999 select committee inquiry is that the nick rainsford response of the 6th of april i believe i believe so
02:05:10 the 6th of april i believe i believe so i'd have to check the reference somewhere on that page yeah i see that right i think so yes yes
02:05:17 in your view uh
02:05:20 uh was the failure to implement the select well let me let me put it neutrally perhaps um what was the how would you characterize the failure uh by government to implement the select committee's recommendations
02:05:34 committee's recommendations uh how would i characterize it um
02:05:40 foolish irresponsible
02:05:46 a missed opportunity a missed opportunity for sure and i want then to ask you finally on garnet what what we should have learned from it
02:05:54 from it and can we start with that question with page 138 the following page paragraph 726
02:06:00 726 and you say this given that garnet court's grp overclocking fell significantly short of meeting the recommendations for class naught and this did not even comply with the recommendations of approved document b at the time of garnet courts
02:06:12 b at the time of garnet courts overclouding refurbishment the key issue at garnet court was actually one of inadequate adherence to the existing guidance rather than the existing guidance necessarily being inadequate it is not clear what steps were
02:06:23 is not clear what steps were subsequently taken by government if any to enhance oversight of adherence to building regulations guidance or to verify that similar oversight had not occurred on other buildings across britain
02:06:35 britain does it follow that in your view there was nothing about the circumstances of the garnet court fire that suggested that a large scale test was required
02:06:46 uh the garnet court fire itself that's right yeah i would agree with that statement the garnet court the garnet court fire showed that someone put something on the outside of a building that you should not put on the outside of a building and then everyone knew you shouldn't put on the outside of a building right so it was the lesson from
02:06:58 building right so it was the lesson from ghana not that there was something wrong with class naught per se but there was something wrong with the with adherence and enforcement of the regulatory system as it stood and or the competence of those people
02:07:10 and or the competence of those people who were doing that type of work yes right
02:07:16 when you say it paragraph 727 rather than eliminating the use of class nor for external clouding products or alternatively more tightly restricting his application to products where the testing methods underpinning a class
02:07:28 testing methods underpinning a class classification were more technically credible the government chose to simply add a new and potentially lucrative to the recently privatized bre alternative route to demonstrating compliance with
02:07:39 route to demonstrating compliance with the recommendations of the approved document b i.e large-scale fire testing to bs8414
02:07:45 to bs8414 now standing back and on a full and fair view of what transparent garment caught namely as you say inadequate adherence to the guidance rather than inadequate guidance itself was elimination of class
02:07:59 guidance itself was elimination of class not justified not on the basis of garnet court but on the basis of evidence that was heard during the select committee inquiry i think certainly some some for some pretty deep thought
02:08:12 some some for some pretty deep thought about reconsidering class naught would have been appropriate you know the the evidence given by by dr bob moore for instance a number of comments made by various people who gave evidence in that inquiry
02:08:23 that inquiry who were highlighting concerns around class naught concerns around the use of small-scale tests uh for a variety of reasons uh and i you know that that's the basis upon which i think
02:08:34 that that's the basis upon which i think there was a missed opportunity it's not it's not that garnet court what's interesting about garnet court is that a fire that would happen for quite a straightforward and obvious reason
02:08:45 straightforward and obvious reason precipitated a select committee inquiry that then ended up asking uh the really important questions that were unrelated to the fire that had initiated initiated the inquiry but
02:08:56 initiated initiated the inquiry but nonetheless were questions that had been asked and demanded some response in my view
02:09:02 view yes thank you and is it your view that introducing large-scale fire testing as an alternative a choice an alternative way of
02:09:10 way of demonstrating compliance uh
02:09:12 uh with the regula with the um functional requirement was not an appropriate response
02:09:19 response yeah i think that's true i think it actually made matters worse why was because it introduced you know another way uh another way that people who
02:09:31 uh another way that people who who couldn't get through the class not route might be able to to get through it you know
02:09:35 you know it opened up opportunities for people to attempt to game the regulatory system
02:09:42 which otherwise wouldn't have existed you know
02:09:44 you know if all you have is class naught to try to to game uh then certain products would just never be able to do it but if you have large scale testing as well then other products might be able to
02:09:56 products might be able to get through the alternative route and we'll see that shortly perhaps with the
02:10:02 with the introduction of the euro-class regime and the work done around that let's go to that then we you've explained a little bit about the european sbi single burning item test we know that in 2000 a decision of
02:10:14 test we know that in 2000 a decision of the european commission led to the adoption across europe of the european reaction to fire system en 13501 part one
02:10:22 one to harmonize methods of classification you and you've covered that in your report at paragraph 600. am i right in thinking that en 13501 is a composite classification system
02:10:33 classification system that's correct yeah it depends on a number of tests it's a number of tests and the single burning item test which is en13823 is one of a number of tests used to classify products or materials under the euro class system that's right
02:10:45 euro class system that's right and you tell us in your report that although the british standard test methods used to establish national class nords which is 476 parts six and seven and the sbi tests are very different tests they are nonetheless strongly
02:10:57 tests they are nonetheless strongly allied or aligned perhaps conceptually yeah is that correct um
02:11:04 um yes they're i mean they were both they are both um model tests and they're both uh part six and seven separate tests and sbi as a single test uh
02:11:15 uh notionally based around a reference scenario of a fire growing in the corner of a room as we discussed earlier yes and in terms of the alignment you refer to
02:11:24 refer to um both sets are focused as you say i think
02:11:27 think on a fire in an internal reference scenario can you describe what the differences between the tests are
02:11:35 other than by explaining what the tests are um not really i mean if if you look at the uh
02:11:44 uh vs476 part six test
02:11:49 test um you know you have a little little plate of material in a little box and you you heat it and you measure how much heat comes off it essentially um in the uh in the part 7 test you have
02:12:00 um in the uh in the part 7 test you have the lateral flame spread so you've just got a flat sample and you have a heat flux exposure that decreases as you move along the sample and you ignite a fire at one end and you see how far the fire goes i'm quite straightforward the sbi
02:12:11 goes i'm quite straightforward the sbi test is is a more complex test is is is a model that looks more like if you like the model that it's intending to um to simulate and captures and kind of mixes
02:12:25 and captures and kind of mixes a lot of the physics that would be more separately interrogated in part six and seven so you know part six is about how much heat is coming off or out of a product part seven is about flame spread
02:12:36 product part seven is about flame spread across a product sbi is is doing both of those things and others in a single test method
02:12:45 and what is the significance of the differences
02:12:50 uh this this well the significance of the differences between four seven six part six seven versus sbi yes
02:12:57 sbi yes uh i mean they're very they're very different um they're very different test methods they're measuring uh similar things in different ways i mean one good example would be that the sbi test uses oxygen consumption
02:13:09 the sbi test uses oxygen consumption calorimetry to measure heat release rates to calculate the various limits that define the class limits in the euro class system the part six test measures temperatures
02:13:20 the part six test measures temperatures and uses the measurement of temperature as a proxy for energy release rather than measuring energy release directly so you know there's a whole host of of differences um
02:13:31 of differences um that again are relevant to how one uses the outcomes or thinks about using the outcomes in a real-world application
02:13:39 dr smith debbie smith of the bre told us that there were completely different tests like comparing an apple with an orange
02:13:45 orange both items of fruit but they are different that's what you told us at day 235 page 185 lines 7 to 13. would you agree with that characterization i could go along with that yes both fruit but different fruits
02:13:57 that yes both fruit but different fruits sure right yep let's then turn to composite panels with combustible cores um is this right that there were concerns
02:14:06 concerns uh in 2000 when harmonization was being considered about the adequacy of the sbi test adequately to reflect the fire hazards presented by metal-faced polymer-filled
02:14:17 presented by metal-faced polymer-filled core panels
02:14:20 there were cons i wouldn't be able to date the concerns i don't think but there certainly were concerns
02:14:27 concerns uh during the development of the sbi and subsequently that
02:14:33 that that the sbi did not do a good job of predicting the outcomes of the scenario tests uh upon which it was calibrated so
02:14:45 uh upon which it was calibrated so the sbi did not do a very good job of assessing the fire hazards associated with metal face foam core panels for instance sandwich panels yes right let's look at page 116 and see if we can pin
02:14:57 look at page 116 and see if we can pin this down
02:14:58 this down um on page 116 there is paragraph 606 607 and 608
02:15:06 and uh at 607
02:15:10 at 607 you say this as already noted in part one despite the sbi's implementation via the european directive of 2000 there was disquiet in some quarters because it could not easily classify some products
02:15:22 could not easily classify some products the en 13501 part one classification of quits exotic on quotes composite panels with combustible calls and external metal skins was felt by some to be dangerously misleading
02:15:33 dangerously misleading and you have footnote 386 there which is a reference to messerschmitt 2008.
02:15:41 uh uh now is that a quotation of what
02:15:45 of what uh berget messerschmitt said in 2008 uh use of the word exotic is is a quotation yes and i mean that's probably a paraphrase of what she will have said yep
02:15:55 yep right so that the 2008 reference is to a an event that was actually held in edinburgh
02:16:01 edinburgh uh shortly after i shortly after i moved to the university of edinburgh and mr schmidt gave a talk uh at a conference that had been organized by the university of edinburgh um and she set out her concerns as
02:16:12 um and she set out her concerns as someone who had been involved in the process of developing the sbi test right the proceeding decades i mean can you recall whether her views were well respected and shared commonly or was she regarded as perhaps something of a
02:16:24 regarded as perhaps something of a cassandra
02:16:26 cassandra no um
02:16:28 no um i
02:16:29 i i mean i certainly respected her and i think everybody in the room respected her whether that's representative sample of the community is hard to say um
02:16:37 um the only caveat uh
02:16:40 uh that is probably worth mentioning is that at the time brigitte messerschmitt was working for rockwell who are a mineral fiber manufacturer and the products that the sbi did not
02:16:52 and the products that the sbi did not well predict were polymer foam core products so products that will likely have been manufactured by her competitors but i think she would have been totally open about that i don't think she was trying to hide that that fact from anyone
02:17:03 fact from anyone are you able to shed any light on first weather the
02:17:09 the bird get messerschmitt views if i can put it that way as you described it here
02:17:16 were part of any part of the british mainstream in
02:17:20 in the early naughties and beyond
02:17:25 i think there was a recognition in some parts of the community that
02:17:32 that metal-faced sandwich panels in particular had the potential to cause significant problems in real fires but from a regulatory perspective were able to achieve uh classifications that were perhaps
02:17:44 uh classifications that were perhaps more positive than they might deserve when faced with the reality of fires if that's a diplomatic way of putting it it's diplomatic to the point perhaps of inviting a further question
02:17:55 of inviting a further question which parts of which community well so for instance um colleagues at edinburgh in the years after 2008 were involved in a research project where
02:18:06 involved in a research project where metal-faced foam core panels were tested in in room corner tests so tests with boxes made of room-sized boxes made of
02:18:18 made of room-sized boxes made of metal face sandwich panels those sandwich panels were very slightly damaged you know with a with a small hole or a or something in the metal skin uh and the outcomes of those tests were
02:18:29 uh and the outcomes of those tests were were
02:18:31 were not good
02:18:32 not good so it didn't take much of a in the armor of the metal face sandwich panel to demonstrate very poor fire behavior and you know one can argue as was argued
02:18:44 and you know one can argue as was argued by the manufacturers of those products at the time that um
02:18:52 that that was not a fair thing to do because the regulatory tests that were giving them their very nice uh ratings said that they were okay and these tests seem to indicate that they weren't
02:19:04 seem to indicate that they weren't um so and this is the problem it's the fundamental problem when you set up um
02:19:11 set up um an unthinking uh incompetent regulatory system uh is that people will make those arguments and they will succeed
02:19:21 they will hide behind the test that allows them to do something that everyone knows they shouldn't
02:19:30 mr chairman yes
02:19:33 yes i've come to the end of uh part of this topic but i'm reluctant to start on the next one which is the final element of the harmonization regime which is quite long and we will not finish before 4 30. and would it be
02:19:44 not finish before 4 30. and would it be better to finish that it would be better to finish there i'm i'm confident that we will finish professor bisby's evidence at some stage during the morning of wednesday right even though we're not sitting tomorrow
02:19:56 sitting tomorrow thank you well professor bisbee it's a little earlier than usual but it sounds like it would be a sensible point at which to stop and i think you were already arranging to come back on wednesday were you not yes so it sounds from what mr millett is
02:20:09 yes so it sounds from what mr millett is saying that you will be away should we say by lunchtime or can hope to be away by lunchtime you never quite be sure of these things yeah all right so we'll break there and we'll look forward to seeing you again on wednesday we're not
02:20:21 seeing you again on wednesday we're not sitting tomorrow as you know and um i think it's probably right that i should remind you not to talk to anyone about your evidence or anything relating to it over the break since it's certainly a long one sure all right and
02:20:33 certainly a long one sure all right and we'll look forward to seeing again on wednesday 10 o'clock wednesday morning thank you thank you very much
02:20:47 well thank you mr millet as i indicated a moment ago we shall not be sitting tomorrow in recognition of the fact that tomorrow is the fifth anniversary of the fire so we shall resume our
02:20:59 so we shall resume our hearings on wednesday morning at 10 o'clock and when professor bisbee will be back to answer some more questions mr chairman thank you very much thank you thank you very much 10 o'clock on wednesday please