Professor Jose Torero's expert evidence on fire safety testing regimes, building regulations, and the need to abandon stay-put strategies
00:00:24 would you ask professor torreira to come back in please thank you
00:00:36 good all right professor ready to carry on yes thank you very much yes mrs grange yes professor torreira i'm now in in the final section of my questions for you and um in the final part of your
00:00:47 you and um in the final part of your report you address defining an adequate testing regime and you set out certain conclusions now you're going to be making recommendations to the inquiry formally in due course
00:00:58 in due course but you've made some observations and conclusions about how to define an adequate test regime in your report and can you confirm this you've concluded that the current fire related performance assessment of materials and
00:01:10 performance assessment of materials and systems associated with the design and build of the building envelope in this country is flawed i can confirm that and you've also concluded that the way in which building regulations deliver
00:01:21 in which building regulations deliver fire safety is also flawed yes
00:01:24 yes sorry can we just look at what you say on page 177 of your report that's jtor706177
00:01:34 and i want to look at what you say at 1502
00:01:38 1502 and following you say the conclusions also indicate that the manner in which the building regulations presumed to deliver fire safety is also flawed building regulations established that interpretation of test data by a
00:01:49 interpretation of test data by a competent professional is the mechanism by which assurance is provided that the fire safety strategy will be enabled and supported by the building envelope
00:02:00 supported by the building envelope and then you go on you say nevertheless the conclusions also indicate that the understanding of the fundamental physical phenomena governing the attainment of the failure condition for modern building envelopes is insufficient and by consequence it is
00:02:12 insufficient and by consequence it is not clear what the required competency is for a professional to be able to establish the fire performance of a building envelope building envelopes are therefore currently designed in a manner that does not allow fitness for purpose to be
00:02:23 not allow fitness for purpose to be established with any certainty existing testing practices have little capacity to deliver the necessary data for an adequate performance assessment as a consequence existing testing practices place an unrealistic
00:02:35 practices place an unrealistic expectation on professionals because they do not deliver appropriate and sufficient data for the required assessment and then you go on below that to say that the expectation of competitive competency as a guarantee to fire safety
00:02:48 competency as a guarantee to fire safety is wholly unjustified
00:02:52 now help us with this why isn't i mean i think it follows from some of your answers but i still want you to answer this question why isn't simply banning combustible cladding and answer to the
00:03:04 combustible cladding and answer to the problem
00:03:06 problem first of all because combustibility is not the only problem of the building envelope as we have discussed broadly mechanical deformation thermal mechanical performance is also on
00:03:19 mechanical performance is also on on on another problem but but i think i think fundamentally because um the the
00:03:28 the the the problem with banning is is a very very simple approach that unfortunately when contrasted with a fairly complicated problem is always going to create the situation
00:03:39 is always going to create the situation of partial bands so i'll give you a very very simple example i can design a timber building with a timber slab okay and and i can argue
00:03:51 okay and and i can argue that the building envelope has to be non-combustible by means of a ban now the only thing that i need to do is to guarantee that the timber slab doesn't
00:04:02 doesn't go through the building envelope that's the only thing that i need to guarantee nevertheless if the timber slab went through the building envelope it would be a much much safer approach
00:04:13 be a much much safer approach because as we discussed when i give my presentation fire resistance guarantees the compartmentation so i can have a continuous system that goes
00:04:24 have a continuous system that goes through the building envelope that timber system if it's deemed to have the appropriate fire resistance will be an appropriate way of containing the fire in in that space
00:04:35 the fire in in that space nevertheless what i have created now is a combustible on this side i have created a system that the only property that it has on the other side is to be non-combustible and a point that
00:04:47 non-combustible and a point that connects the two of them which all of a sudden creates all sorts of potential problems that can result in the timber slab burning that can destroy the the building envelope and i'm landing in a
00:04:58 building envelope and i'm landing in a situation where i'm meeting this over simplistic ban condition by actually creating a hazard when in reality if i allow the timber slab to go through
00:05:10 slab to go through i would have basically end up in a much much much better situation now when you think about this type of counter example what you realize very rapidly is that
00:05:21 what you realize very rapidly is that there is no absolute ban because the building is the building and if i say i don't want combustible materials
00:05:29 materials in the perimeter of the building that doesn't necessarily mean i don't have them elsewhere and so if i don't think more in terms of a holistic fire safety strategy and the purpose of a holistic fire safety
00:05:41 purpose of a holistic fire safety strategy all i'm going to be creating is partial bands and partial bands in reality unfortunately do not solve the problem if you really wanted to implement the perfect ban
00:05:52 perfect ban everything would have to be non-combustible and uh and and of course we know that that is not possible yeah and and is it also potentially unhelpful
00:06:03 and and is it also potentially unhelpful to just have a banning approach because then
00:06:06 then the research the development that's necessary to get to a better system
00:06:12 system is simply
00:06:13 is simply not needed because you've banned something
00:06:16 something well i mean i think i think this is what ends up
00:06:19 ends up does the collateral damage so what you end up doing by putting a ban you've created an over simplistic false sense of safety and the moment that you create a false
00:06:30 and the moment that you create a false sense of safety there's a perception that no further work is needed now the reality is that even then what is going to happen is that technologies will be developed and a number of other
00:06:42 will be developed and a number of other products are going to be pushed into the market and eventually we will have to backpedal
00:06:46 backpedal and try to redefine ban and we're going to create again once again the same type of mess that we've already created that we try to correct and correct and correct and correct and correct instead of actually starting with something that
00:06:58 of actually starting with something that relies on a solid basis which is competency yeah okay um let's go to the next page page 178 within your conclusions and i want to look at what you say at 15.0.7
00:07:11 look at what you say at 15.0.7 and you say this you say the true solution will require a complete reassessment of the manner in which fire safety is perceived by the construction industry it is clear that these types of changes will take significant time
00:07:23 changes will take significant time therefore it's essential that short-term improvements are implemented before longer-term ones can follow or longer term ones can take effect now
00:07:33 now before we get to the specifics of what you talk about there in the short term versus the long term um just help us with this in your assessment in your opinion how far away
00:07:45 assessment in your opinion how far away is our testing regime from where it ought to be if it's to deliver the kind of data and information which competent professionals can use to make appropriate assessments about these external wall systems
00:07:57 external wall systems i mean
00:07:59 i mean from a fundamental perspective is extremely far away because when i was talking about you know patching a broken system um it is effectively where we are and where we have been for a very long
00:08:10 and where we have been for a very long period of time what if you think about it what we have is a functional requirement system that effectively is constructed around the premise of a prescriptive structure
00:08:21 the premise of a prescriptive structure so
00:08:22 so we have
00:08:23 we have mix-matched this uh these two approaches in a way such that we have created a very complex complex misunderstanding you know of what a functional
00:08:34 you know of what a functional requirement system is and uh and we keep trying to supplement it by creating rules or prescriptive uh requirements now the problem with our testing regime
00:08:45 now the problem with our testing regime and the reason why so far is not necessarily because of the tools and the way that you know because of the tools that we have it is because we are using those tools
00:08:56 it is because we are using those tools as if they were part of a prescriptive system and by using those tools as part of a prescriptive system we try to oversimplify things into classifications categories and so forth we ignore the
00:09:07 categories and so forth we ignore the need for gaining information which is what we really need and uh and we ignore the need for a competent interpretation so while we maintain this idea that our tests our compliance
00:09:21 this idea that our tests our compliance tests that conform with the concept of a prescriptive regulation then they will never they will be really really far away from meeting the requirements of functional uh rules so
00:09:33 functional uh rules so functional requirements so so in essence if we were to think properly and make once and for all the decision that we are going to go in the direction
00:09:45 that we are going to go in the direction of functional requirements and we create the framework that supports that then we could actually work with the tests that we have modify them you know use them in a way such that they could provide
00:09:56 a way such that they could provide meaningful information because at the end tests are tests and they're just a source of information thank you and how would you describe current levels of competence in this country amongst fire safety engineering
00:10:07 amongst fire safety engineering professional professionals when making assessments of external wall performance um it's it i i think in general i would say it's extremely poor and i think but
00:10:18 say it's extremely poor and i think but i rather describe it as we have an enormous confusion of competency i think uh we've got to the point where we really cannot assess in a credible way who's competent and who's not
00:10:30 who's competent and who's not yeah
00:10:31 yeah and and is it because of the gap between where you would like this country to be and where it is that you're proposing that we maybe need to think of this problem
00:10:42 problem um in the short term and in the longer term yes i mean i think i think creating a competent practice is eventually the one and only solution that we can put in place but obviously
00:10:54 that we can put in place but obviously that takes a long time the moment that you create a competent practice that competent practice is capable of continuously improving the way in which we do things the moment that you lose
00:11:05 we do things the moment that you lose control over your competency this is where you go in this spiral down that dame judith hackett was was talking about i think uh the every attempt that we have to improve things ends up in a
00:11:16 we have to improve things ends up in a worse position because it's not being handled you know by individuals who truly understand uh the complexity of the problem so that change in culture is is a long-term uh process
00:11:29 is a long-term uh process and uh and in the meantime there is an element of management that has to be put in place because we're obviously still building buildings and we're still refurbishing buildings and so forth and we need to be able to guarantee the
00:11:41 we need to be able to guarantee the safety of the people who occupy them yes now thinking about the short term then and just looking down this page i just want to read what you say below that you say as described throughout this report
00:11:52 say as described throughout this report the condition that dismantles the fire safety strategy in the case of a stay-put approach to egress is the heating length being greater than naught this condition corresponds to a physical
00:12:03 this condition corresponds to a physical bifurcation that leads to extinction bifurcations are very complex to characterize and are extremely sensitive to any of the governing parameters thus the transition from
00:12:15 the transition from heating length equals naught to heating length
00:12:18 length is greater than naught will always be extremely difficult to predict with certainty and then you go on current testing practices and the prevailing professional competence competency do
00:12:29 professional competence competency do not enable us to make this characterization with confidence thus the abandonment of the stay put strategy for high-rise residential buildings is essential and you obviously
00:12:40 buildings is essential and you obviously touched on all of those things in your presentation as well now
00:12:44 now just just
00:12:45 just just thinking about this in more detail does your recommendation apply to all high-rise residential buildings or just high-rise residential buildings in certain categories uh from my perspective that will apply
00:12:56 uh from my perspective that will apply to all high-res residential buildings so whether or not they are above 18 meters above 11 meters does the height matter
00:13:07 does the height matter uh no the height doesn't matter because uh as as as we've discussed uh significantly the moment that you lose compartmentation uh and you start involving uh
00:13:20 uh and you start involving uh other units uh height becomes irrelevant i mean obviously as the building becomes taller it becomes more complicated and the risks keep accumulating but but the concept in itself gets breached
00:13:32 but the concept in itself gets breached the moment that you lose compartmentation so the height will be irrelevant okay
00:13:39 okay and um
00:13:42 and um what about legacy buildings that are obviously constructed of materials which are non-combustible so think of grenfell before it had the overcladding it was constructed of just of concrete
00:13:54 constructed of just of concrete are you saying that for buildings like that we ought to be uh reverting from stay put to something else well i mean i think i think there there's there's a number of things that need to be uh assessed i think i think
00:14:05 need to be uh assessed i think i think the the the first one is the the
00:14:10 ev every building in many ways will have to be assessed we have heard a lot about these arguments that it is uh almost impossible to prevent
00:14:22 impossible to prevent a fire from re-entering in in a building that doesn't have very specific provisions even if it's built out of fully non-combustible materials the fire can penetrate through the window and uh and so forth i mean we've
00:14:34 window and uh and so forth i mean we've heard all these things and uh and we have discussed them uh extensively so in many ways
00:14:41 many ways every building does have an element of risk and uh and therefore the the reason why uh stay put strategy is not viable it is because not
00:14:57 not because the state put strategy necessarily represents an insurmountable level of risk but it is more because we don't have a plan b i think i think what i'm advocating when
00:15:09 i think i think what i'm advocating when i say that that we have to abandon the state-wide strategy is is the concept of this absolute idea that uh that people will stay in their
00:15:20 that uh that people will stay in their place and without a way to get out of that because at every stage you say well but people can make that decision we know perfectly well that we cannot put that
00:15:33 perfectly well that we cannot put that responsibility on people and we know what happens when we do that so nobody can argue to me that that
00:15:41 that that the expectation that the occupants are to make that informed decision is a plan b that is not a plan b then we say well then the firefighters can help them but as we can see you know
00:15:54 can help them but as we can see you know the firefighters do not really understand what the limits of their capacity are so what are we talking about are we talking about two units are we talking about three units before you
00:16:07 we talking about three units before you start evacuating how are we going to do it what methods are we going to be using to actually do that where is the plan b and we will not get an answer of what is the plan b to
00:16:18 get an answer of what is the plan b to try to enable the firefighters to actually beat that backup condition so that we can take out and on top of that then you know we put all the uncertainties in our capacity to
00:16:30 all the uncertainties in our capacity to try to control the fire within one unit so if you put all these three things together and you recognize that you don't have a plan b
00:16:42 don't have a plan b what i advocate is the fact that either we have an explicit clear and very well demonstrated plan b that we know is effective
00:16:54 plan b that we know is effective otherwise
00:16:55 otherwise we cannot pretend that we can sustain a state put strategy so
00:17:01 so so in many ways i think i i i think my my
00:17:05 my my point is not that a staple strategy is not viable a staple strategy is possible but so long you have the provisions that accompany the staple strategy given the fact that we will
00:17:17 strategy given the fact that we will never be able to guarantee that the fire doesn't penetrate uh other units and and for all the reasons that we have discussed you know through through the day yes
00:17:28 through the day yes and and just in practical terms if that happened in the short term um
00:17:34 um i don't think you're suggesting that you just switch overnight and say like this building that had stayed put tomorrow it's going to have a phased evacuation strategy there would have to be an assessment process there would have
00:17:45 an assessment process there would have to be facilities provided for to it to allow a plan b to operate is that what you're saying yes and and i think the reality is that i think that we we failed to recognize
00:17:57 i think that we we failed to recognize that most of those things are already in place
00:18:00 place so you know people will argue that there is a hazard you know from evacuation and and potentially there is but in many ways i would like to really understand how we
00:18:11 would like to really understand how we have quantified that hazard and to what extent that hazard is actually real and it is not just simply a perception that evacuating a building is a hazard because we know that all over the world
00:18:22 because we know that all over the world we evacuate buildings now people will argue that having uh detection on alarm systems is going to numb the population and they're not going to be responsive well you know i would like to see you
00:18:34 well you know i would like to see you know what evidence is behind that and the reality is that we do that everywhere in the world so we i don't really understand why the british population were particularly sensitive you know to that that type of
00:18:45 sensitive you know to that that type of a problem so all these arguments against moving in the direction of of of uh you know of a state evacuation strategy are something that are
00:18:57 are something that are difficult for me to understand because they don't seem to have a technical basis now people will argue that the stairs don't have sufficient dimensions anybody who argues that doesn't understand how stairs work
00:19:08 understand how stairs work you know you heard from dr stoyanov about pipes and hydraulics the stairs work as hydraulics so in principle people come in and come out so accumulation of people in stairs so the
00:19:19 accumulation of people in stairs so the dimensions of the stairs are only to allow the flow of people and people don't accumulate in stairs and if you stage your equation you have only a few people coming in so almost everything is there the only thing that is missing is
00:19:32 there the only thing that is missing is a way to tell people it's time to get out
00:19:36 out and i don't believe that that is such a complicated thing we have all the technologies available and they're used all over the world so in many ways i'm more than happy to listen to people's
00:19:47 more than happy to listen to people's arguments
00:19:48 arguments and the the demonstrating knowledge that shows me that a stay put strategy can is absolutely necessary and a stage evacuation strategy cannot be
00:19:59 evacuation strategy cannot be implemented but my sense is that those arguments actually don't exist yes
00:20:05 yes now you say in in your report that if we moved away from a stay put strategy or only a stay put strategy with no plan b um that could mean that you can move to
00:20:16 um that could mean that you can move to this controlled full evacuation or controlled or full evacuation strategy whereby the relevant parameter becomes the flame spread velocity as opposed to heating length being
00:20:29 heating length being the same as nord that's correct that's what you say now is it possible given existing knowledge of fire science to calculate flame spread velocity at least conservatively
00:20:40 conservatively yes absolutely i mean i think if you think of the most trivial way of calculating flame spread velocity you take all the data that i collected on my phase one report and uh establish all the flame spread
00:20:51 and uh establish all the flame spread velocities in every external facade fire and you take the worst and add 50 so you can do a conservative assessment based on known data
00:21:02 based on known data of what that time period would look like exactly yeah so you don't have to do a building specific assessment you could do a conservative analysis based on published information exactly and and
00:21:13 published information exactly and and the reality is that if we if you do it at that level of conservatism probably most systems will not uh work so so so you will have to put all sorts of other restrictions and and you're going to have to refine it but
00:21:25 you're going to have to refine it but all of a sudden you enter a completely different mindset in which you start with an analysis that actually is valid and you're moving in the direction of refining it to enable
00:21:36 refining it to enable more uh more approaches or more products or more types of fire safety strategies to work yeah now if we could go uh down this page um and look at paragraph 15.0.14
00:21:51 you say this you say changing the focus to establishing the fast fed velocity as a means to assess performance will require the appropri appropriate modification to existing test procedures
00:22:02 modification to existing test procedures the modifications will have to focus on understanding and quantifying the parameters controlling the flame spread velocity
00:22:09 velocity and when over the page
00:22:13 at the top it then says the inclusion and quantification of parameters that govern thermo-mechanical behavior the inclusion of all measurements deemed necessary to quantify with sufficient certainty and robustness the different
00:22:25 certainty and robustness the different forms of fire spread and you say in the next paragraph while it is my belief that this can be done quite rapidly months it will require a significant effort to deliver the appropriate testing approach
00:22:37 deliver the appropriate testing approach government should enable these developments to proceed as a matter of priority
00:22:42 priority now can you just give us an example of the practical changes that would have to take place to to the existing testing approach if you were going to go to this model yeah so so for for for example if
00:22:53 model yeah so so for for for example if you just simply take the example of bs8414 um
00:22:57 bs8414 um you will have to uh for example uh try to understand a bit better instead of just a single with a single solicitation try to understand a bit better the impact that our different
00:23:09 bit better the impact that our different sources of fire will have and characterize them appropriately with the appropriate measurements you know you will have to instrument the facility in a much more extensive way so you can adequately establish the spread rate and
00:23:21 adequately establish the spread rate and um and and and effectively that in itself will give you already a much much more effective set of information but it's your genuine belief that that
00:23:33 but it's your genuine belief that that could be done in a matter of months not years yes
00:23:37 years yes and what effort would be needed in parallel to address the competency of those professionals working in this area to be able to deliver those analyses well i mean i think that that that is in
00:23:48 well i mean i think that that that is in many ways the more complicated manner matter and uh and and i think there will have to be a concerted effort to try to disseminate this information in in a
00:23:59 disseminate this information in in a clear and effective way and in many ways it's no different to the model that queensland was trying to implement they were not trying to solve all the problems and address this in its full complexity all that they were trying to
00:24:10 complexity all that they were trying to do was come up with a an approach that enabled them to in a conservative way educate people so that they could start the process you know as we created the need for more
00:24:22 you know as we created the need for more competent professionals and uh and we in you know there was a an approach towards accreditation and so forth that was appropriate so that in the long term you will end up where you
00:24:34 the long term you will end up where you want to be but in the initial stages what you were doing is just simply bringing people to a level where they could actually operate in a conservative but safe manner right yes now you address the potential role of
00:24:46 now you address the potential role of sprinklers within any such approach on page 179 of your report now it's a is it a fair summary of your views to say that sprinkler performance is inherently related to fire size and
00:24:59 is inherently related to fire size and the rate of fire growth and sprinkler systems can be much more effective in support of fire strategies which are focused more on fire spread velocity and controlled evacuation
00:25:11 velocity and controlled evacuation yes i mean if you think if you think of what a sprinkler does a sprinkler in principle is a system that is designed to control the fire so that it remains at a certain level that is acceptable so
00:25:23 at a certain level that is acceptable so by doing so you are delaying the whole process of failure of the facade system which in principle are is going to help you reduce significantly the flame spread
00:25:33 spread okay now
00:25:35 okay now the sprinkler can potentially eliminate the problem and uh and and extinguish the fire completely but that is not necessarily the the case the problem is that if we
00:25:47 the the case the problem is that if we think of the current framework that we have in regards to the staple strategy and and and so forth sprinklers can fail and they do have a probability of failure and uh and
00:25:59 probability of failure and uh and therefore the problem is that if the sprinklers then fails and we still have no plan b we have immediately detonated the whole sequence again and so so in a way
00:26:11 sequence again and so so in a way sprinklers as a mechanism to fix the problem that we have now are not appropriate but sprinklers as a mechanism to help us come up with a better system
00:26:22 come up with a better system could potentially if people invest in the appropriate research and so forth could potentially be a mechanism of making things better yes and can you give an example of how in practice you would deploy sprinklers to support
00:26:35 would deploy sprinklers to support a controlled evacuation approach well the sprinkler is a system that activates itself and the moment that it activates itself is an automatic suppression system so the moment that
00:26:46 suppression system so the moment that you deploy the system you would expect that a certain level of fire growth the speaker the sprinkler will activate and it will control um the
00:26:55 um the the the rate of growth of the fire now sprinklers activate at temperatures of about 60 degrees so that for example gives you the opportunity to start thinking
00:27:04 thinking that you might maintain those temperatures around that number which eventually what ends up providing you is with a delay in the in in in in the
00:27:15 with a delay in the in in in in the spread rate so in many ways i think they are robustness to the system and uh and when it comes to a variable like flame spread
00:27:26 like flame spread effectively what they do is delay the whole process so even if at the end they don't control the fire and they fail even then they would have created a significant delay
00:27:37 would have created a significant delay because you're throwing water into the fire and that delay enables your egress strategy to proceed in a much more effective way right yeah let's go to the longer term and if we
00:27:49 let's go to the longer term and if we look at page 180 of your report
00:27:54 at paragraph 15.0.21 you say this you say currently there's a conflict between attempts to promote a culture of competency and professional responsibility
00:28:05 responsibility as embraced by technically quantified functional requirements as per the building regulations and guidelines that still rely on compliance testing compliance testing
00:28:16 compliance testing compliance testing aims at delivering simple high throughput and cheap measures of compliance that require little to no interpretation this promotes a culture of ignorance and deflection of responsibility towards the
00:28:28 deflection of responsibility towards the tests and those who perform them now
00:28:34 now what is required of fire safety engineers with regards to presenting fire safety strategies to address the issues of deflection and responsibility
00:28:45 any in any professional that uh conducts a design
00:28:49 a design that has an objective has the duty to demonstrate that they have met that objective in an explicit and clear way and and that should be put up for
00:29:01 and and that should be put up for scrutiny and it should be deemed appropriate so to me that is a cultural responsibility where the designer assumes responsibility over the design
00:29:12 assumes responsibility over the design that they have conducted and uh and if you compare that to the s9414
00:29:18 s9414 you see completely the opposite which is a situation by which you take a test you take the result of a test and a table
00:29:27 table tells you whether it's okay or not so who takes responsibility over the outcome
00:29:33 outcome i mean that to me is is the difference between
00:29:38 between somebody taking responsibility putting their signature their name their registration on a document that promises an outcome with respect to the opposite which is
00:29:49 with respect to the opposite which is basically
00:29:50 basically bs 9414 told me that that's the way it's supposed to be because it's a rule
00:29:58 now you go on within this section to explain something we've actually covered in some detail already today which is about the role of manufacturers and product development and in essence what you say is that
00:30:12 fire safety should be a functional performance requirement in product development so that the manufacturers have a responsibility of delivering quality data on fire safety to those who
00:30:24 quality data on fire safety to those who are using their products that you can then rely upon and we've discussed and you had an exchange with the chairman about the the ways to to do that um
00:30:36 do you also advocate something like the cladding materials library as per the queensland approach being developed alongside that so as well as putting a burden onto manufacturers to provide
00:30:48 burden onto manufacturers to provide better
00:30:49 better information would you also advocate the development of a body of knowledge within the fire safety profession about materials and systems yeah i mean if you accept the fact that
00:31:01 yeah i mean if you accept the fact that fire safety is a social responsibility i think we
00:31:06 think we will always favor an advocate of a cooperative approach you know between government industry academia to try to put
00:31:17 put all the information that is possible so that people can do their job appropriately so i i don't see any conflict between government supporting this type of development as it happened in queensland
00:31:30 development as it happened in queensland and uh but that doesn't release industry from the responsibility in the same way that the fact that industry doesn't do it doesn't release government for responsibility so given that safety is a social function i i think i think it
00:31:42 social function i i think i think it should be a cooperative approach yes
00:31:47 yes and
00:31:49 and one of the things you haven't addressed in this short term long term section of your report is what would happen to our current guidance in say the approved documents
00:32:00 guidance in say the approved documents as you've said before we've got this perhaps mixture of systems here we've got functional performance requirements but then we've got some guidance that looks very prescriptive in approved document b that you can follow and
00:32:11 document b that you can follow and people do see that as the rules to follow
00:32:16 follow what what
00:32:17 what what what's your view about what should happen to that kind of prescriptive guidance assuming that functional requirements are kept as the the ultimate goal so if if you think of an ideal evolution of a functional
00:32:28 ideal evolution of a functional requirement system starting from where we are right now there are two clear points that that need to be corrected and uh and the first one is that
00:32:39 first one is that whatever way that's um that's decided there has to be a clear definition of what the objective is and and that right now is absent
00:32:50 and and that right now is absent so what is a fire safe building and what is societal's expectation of what the objective of the building regulations are in matters of fire safety until we make that very clear we have no target
00:33:02 make that very clear we have no target so that really needs to be established from the beginning then the second one there has to be a much more clear requirement for an appropriate fire
00:33:13 requirement for an appropriate fire safety strategy with a series of very clear statements of what is necessary for a fire safety strategy to actually be appropriate and uh in my presentation
00:33:25 be appropriate and uh in my presentation i discussed the concepts of the dependencies and the conflicts all these things that today you will never see in a fire safety strategy all these things need to be clearly specified so that guidance exists on what should be in a
00:33:37 guidance exists on what should be in a fire safety strategy i think that in itself will change the culture now i think that if those things are established and they're very clear and explicit
00:33:48 explicit the natural course of the guidance will be that it will move into the space of guidance
00:33:54 guidance that people will recognize that is not the answer to your questions but information that helps you in case you want to design a fire safety strategy and not only it will progressively move
00:34:07 and not only it will progressively move into the space where it belongs which is guidance but it also be improved because now you have a competent body of professionals that understands what they need to deliver and therefore they will be seeking to improve those documents in
00:34:19 be seeking to improve those documents in such a way that they give them the information that they need so that they can make their job more agile and more effective so in a way you're creating a natural path for progress
00:34:30 natural path for progress well in reality what we have right now when we have this sort of imposition of guidance almost as a set of prescriptive rules you know what you have is an excuse not to learn an excuse of not to
00:34:41 excuse not to learn an excuse of not to do not anything so so i think i think by stating your objectives clearly and making sure that people really understand what a fire safety strategy is and what is expected from them i
00:34:52 is and what is expected from them i think you will have a natural progression of the guidance towards a space where it's more appropriate yes and where you've got that that kind of guidance being given as opposed to what we've got at the moment um
00:35:05 we've got at the moment um it sounds like it's going to be quite important that the stakeholders using that guidance having some involvement in terms of keeping it up to date and that's a natural course you know in in a true professional environment
00:35:17 in a true professional environment though it is you know it it it it is the law profession that defines in many ways the way in which the law is written and uh so so
00:35:28 and uh so so in in in in in in many ways i guess all i'm advocating is a professional approach
00:35:34 approach yeah
00:35:35 yeah okay thank you very much um professor torreira those are all my questions for now
00:35:40 now um mr kinnear has some questions for you on water which he's going to do now and then what we'll do is then have a final break to sweep up any final questions uh on either topic okay thank you
00:35:52 uh on either topic okay thank you right thank you very much for strange now
00:35:55 now mr you've got some questions i have some very brief questions sir right thank you good afternoon professor um can we turn to questions of water supply on the night of the fire now in particular the need for technical
00:36:07 now in particular the need for technical knowledge in the context of the water supply on the night and you've dealt with that issue in your second phase two report um which we can find at j20 quadruple zero trouble zero five
00:36:19 quadruple zero trouble zero five uh slash three if we look at lines 65 to 68.
00:36:27 there at the bottom of the page you say this
00:36:29 this the lfb did not show sufficient understanding of the technical aspects underpinning the correct operation of the water supply systems used in fire suppression tactics during the grenfell tower fire the
00:36:41 during the grenfell tower fire the incident commanders were not capable of defining the problems of the water supply systems and if we turn over the page as a consequence the actions taken did not make best use of the available
00:36:52 did not make best use of the available water supplies and if we turn over the page the one we're on at page four and look at line 71 through to 72 you say this
00:37:03 you say this lfb instant commanders were not capable of adequately communicating with thames water utilities limited and then at line 74 on that same page you say that the technical knowledge
00:37:15 you say that the technical knowledge required to understand fire suppression hydraulics is simple now when you refer to fire suppression hydraulics does this mean that the water supply required to respond to a fire
00:37:26 supply required to respond to a fire incident
00:37:28 incident um
00:37:29 um yes
00:37:30 yes and when you say that the technical knowledge required to understand fire fire suppression hydraulics is simple does it follow that it was within the capacity of the commanders on the night
00:37:41 capacity of the commanders on the night of the fire correctly to identify the problems uh experience in relation to water and take steps to remedy those problems that's my belief and the essential problem therefore was
00:37:53 and the essential problem therefore was one of training they hadn't been trained on how best to respond to that particular type of problem yes and i think i think training um has two aspects of it uh the first part
00:38:05 has two aspects of it uh the first part of the training is to understand what is your domain of operation so what is what your are your responsibilities so in principle you have uh the the fire
00:38:18 so in principle you have uh the the fire truck and the fire truck has a reservoir that has to be filled with water and you have a pump and that pump is delivering a pressure and that pressure is the one that goes you know there's losses and then it goes to your to your nozzle and
00:38:30 then it goes to your to your nozzle and then that nozzle is the one that is going to deliver the jet so that is your domain and you should receive appropriate training to be able to understand that domain and when something is not working you need to
00:38:42 something is not working you need to understand where the boundaries are because of course hydraulics can get really very complicated once you're talking about networks and mathematical models and all these things and that doesn't necessarily pertain
00:38:53 doesn't necessarily pertain the london fire brigade nevertheless it does pertain the london fire brigade to be able to communicate their needs effectively to those who in principle are there to supply uh the the the water
00:39:06 are there to supply uh the the the water that they need thank you now there are two particular failures uh that you identify on the part of the lfb on on the night in relation to the management of water supplies
00:39:16 supplies first you say that the lfb failed to recognize that it was necessary to change the strategy towards securing sufficient water flow now we heard from dr stoner last week
00:39:27 now we heard from dr stoner last week and you also note in your own report that the hydrants used on the 14th of june did not deliver sufficient flow rate to the lfb appliances to operate firefighting equipment to its full capacity and you say
00:39:39 capacity and you say lines
00:39:40 lines 887 at the very bottom of page 27 of your report we don't need to go to it but a basic understanding of the simple models that govern hydraulic flow would have enabled lfb with advice from thames
00:39:53 have enabled lfb with advice from thames water to change strategy and secure adequate water flow can you help us what you mean there by the phrase change strategy well um if
00:40:04 the phrase change strategy well um if you think just take me uh i'll go to one of the examples of this so you have a tank that is emptying itself
00:40:13 itself very rapidly and therefore you have to go through a process of stopping and restarting again so your problem there is a problem that you need more water
00:40:25 you need more water uh because you need to refill uh that tank uh in in at a faster rate so
00:40:32 so if what you need is more water uh you have options and the options is multiple sources that can supply that that water or an increase in pressure
00:40:43 that water or an increase in pressure that will result in that single pipe that they have delivering uh more water now
00:40:51 now understanding of those options can enable you and potentially in consultation with thames water can enable you to make a decision of what is the most effective way to fill your tank
00:41:02 the most effective way to fill your tank and and that's exactly what what i mean in making informed decisions that are based on understanding of what your options are and how these options work we know that the flow rate has a
00:41:13 we know that the flow rate has a constant of proportionality which is the the orifice or the the the flow coefficient and the square root of the pressure so we know that if we want to double the flow you know we have to
00:41:25 double the flow you know we have to increase the pressure by four you know and we know that if we um we want to double the flow we can actually put two entry points coming from two different sources so all this
00:41:36 from two different sources so all this is is that understanding that enables you to make decisions in an informed way and it brings you to probably the most effective decisions thank you now we don't need to go to it again but on page 27 of your report
00:41:49 again but on page 27 of your report you refer there to the description by dr stonehoff of i quote a multiplicity of other potential strategies that would have delivered the necessary flow rate and the alternative strategy is that dr
00:42:01 and the alternative strategy is that dr stonov identified we don't need to go into those but it's the use of multiple hydrants to supply a single pump appliance the use of pump relays to minimize pressure losses between hydrants and appliances and avoiding the
00:42:13 hydrants and appliances and avoiding the use of washout hydrants as well now when you say that a basic understanding would have enabled the lfp to change strategy can i clarify what you're referring
00:42:25 can i clarify what you're referring there to is changing to the strategies identified by dr stonehoff is that right yes that's correct now the second failure you identified was the quality of the communications between the lfb and thames water
00:42:37 between the lfb and thames water and if we can go to page 28 in your report and particularly lines 916-918
00:42:45 uh you say there that the lfb and also thames water failed to deploy personnel with adequate competency to be able to assess the problems and to communicate in a manner
00:42:56 problems and to communicate in a manner that information being transferred across the boundary of the two organizations was appropriate now i suppose this picks up on your earlier answer but in relation to lfb personnel what would be
00:43:08 relation to lfb personnel what would be the level of competent competency or knowledge that you'd expect on the part of say an ordinary firefighter to be able to assess the issue and to communicate appropriately
00:43:20 communicate appropriately with his counterpart at thames water uh i mean my expectation is that um and and i guess you're prefacing it with an ordinary firefighter i think the the
00:43:32 an ordinary firefighter i think the the the way i think about this is that um water is the primary tool that a firefighter has to fight the fire and therefore there has to be somebody within
00:43:43 within uh the response unit that actually understands uh what they need and uh and and therefore can engage in a communication in which they are capable
00:43:55 communication in which they are capable knowing what they need and knowing how the system works they are capable of discussing with thames water how
00:44:04 how the network can deliver what they need
00:44:11 i suppose one of the things that dr sohanov picked up in his report was the fact that lfb personnel of whatever rank tended to use non-specific and non-technical vocabulary when communicating with
00:44:22 vocabulary when communicating with thames water for example referring to pressure or volume to describe flow rate was that one of the problems that you too had identified when you were reviewing the evidence well yes i mean i
00:44:33 reviewing the evidence well yes i mean i think i think these are the kinds of things that i think are symptomatic that are that the the the level of understanding of the system is not sufficient to be able to have an
00:44:44 is not sufficient to be able to have an appropriate communication and what was your assessment of the level of understanding on the part of thames operatives thinking about the network technicians that they'll be dealt with about their understanding of
00:44:56 dealt with about their understanding of the operation of the thames water supply system yeah again again you enter into the space of there is the the technicians that are that that were
00:45:07 the technicians that are that that were uh supporting uh the the intervention and um but the reality is that if they could not answer the questions appropriately they
00:45:18 answer the questions appropriately they should be aware of the limits of their knowledge and there should be a backup that provides them with the information that they need because at the end if you think about it this is an emergency and as such appropriate answers at the
00:45:31 and as such appropriate answers at the appropriate rate need to be delivered so either you're going to send the people with the competency or you're going to create a means by which this can be escalated as necessary thank you now
00:45:42 escalated as necessary thank you now again still on page 27 of your report and that line eight eight one
00:45:49 just let that come on the screen on line eight eight to one now you say this an important issue to point out is that the flow coefficients of all the fire hydrants were much lower
00:46:00 of all the fire hydrants were much lower than those required and prescribed by the manufacturers now where you refer here to the hydrogen's flow coefficients being lowered than prescribed presumably you're referring to dr
00:46:11 presumably you're referring to dr soyonov's conclusion that the flow coefficients fell below the figure stipulated in british standard 750. is that a fair assumption to make yeah that's a fair assumption this is clearly
00:46:22 that's a fair assumption this is clearly based on the information that dr soyanov put forward now dr stone off confirmed in his evidence uh last week that this conclusion uh that the hydrants didn't comply with bridge standard 750 depends
00:46:35 comply with bridge standard 750 depends on which of the two alternative the competing interpretations of british standard 750 that you adopt now dr stoner told us that if 750 refers to an installed
00:46:46 that if 750 refers to an installed hydrant the interpretation he prefers then it's right to say that the hydrants fell well short of the requirements of the standard however he accepted that if british standard 750 is taken to refer
00:46:58 british standard 750 is taken to refer to a standalone hydrant which accepts is also a reasonable interpretation then he is unable to conclude
00:47:06 conclude whether or not the hydrant complied with the 750 now that's a run-up to a long run up to a short question but is it right that your conclusion that we've looked at here at line 881
00:47:17 that we've looked at here at line 881 should be understood to be subject to the same caveat that dr stonoff applied to it it depends upon which interpretation is preferred uh
00:47:25 uh yes but i need to add that uh while i i did um
00:47:31 did um heard dr sternov's evidence and and i do understand the possibility of both interpretations the way i look at it is much more basic i'm looking at it from the side of the
00:47:43 i'm looking at it from the side of the fire service so from the side of the fire service i need to know how much water is going to come out from the hydrant that's what i need to know so whether you know it's a compounded coefficient or it is the the coefficient
00:47:55 coefficient or it is the the coefficient that is stated by the manufacturer to me if i want to make sure that i'm supporting my intervention i would like to know how much water is
00:48:06 would like to know how much water is going to come out of the hydra professor thank you those are all the water-related questions that i have for you thank you thank you very much mr canoe well at this stage professor guerrero as you
00:48:17 this stage professor guerrero as you know we'll need to have a short break so we can review the questions and give other people a chance to suggest questions that uh perhaps we ought to be asking you okay so we'll break there
00:48:29 asking you okay so we'll break there until ten past three that be long enough and then we'll come back then and see whether any more questions for you all right thank you thank you very much
00:48:45 thank you very much ten past three
01:10:22 would you ask professor torreira to come back in please kim
01:10:35 right professor well let's see if there's any more questions for you shall we thank you yes we're strange yes mr chairman just one question so um just before we broke off um i was asking you about levels of competency
01:10:46 about levels of competency in external wall assessments and i asked you how would you describe current levels of competence in this country amongst fire safety engineering professionals when making assessments of external wall performance and you say
01:10:58 external wall performance and you say you said it's i think in general i would say it's extremely poor but then you said but i'd rather describe it that we have an enormous confusion of competency now can you just help us what's the
01:11:10 now can you just help us what's the evidential basis that you're relying on when you say that in general you would say such competency and that's specifically about external wall assessments is extremely poor uh i have been involved in the review of
01:11:23 uh i have been involved in the review of many projects particularly in the last few years and and i have not only witnessed the analysis that was originally done by
01:11:35 analysis that was originally done by engineers who designed the systems and tried to establish compliance but also i have seen
01:11:45 seen many people argue assessments of performance even
01:11:51 even now after grenfell and and the level in the majority of the cases has been extremely poor the arguments have been very weak most of the times purely just an opinion
01:12:02 most of the times purely just an opinion without any technical backing or calculation or support and and when i say many i'm i'm i'm i mean in the hundreds
01:12:11 hundreds okay that's very helpful thank you and those are all of our questions we'd just like to thank you very much for all the assistance that you have provided the inquiry in providing these reports and in assisting professor bisbee with
01:12:23 and in assisting professor bisbee with his experiments thank you very much thank you well professor herrera you've done an enormous amount of work with the inquiry
01:12:29 inquiry you've given us a lot of reports a lot of advice and a lot of your time and we are enormously grateful to you for putting your expertise and your knowledge at our disposal in that way um
01:12:41 um we i need hardly say how grateful we are and um
01:12:45 and um thank you very much indeed well thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to work with yourselves well we've benefited enormously from your assistance thank you very much thank you and now of course you're free to go
01:12:56 and now of course you're free to go thank you very much
01:13:08 yes it's grange well that's it that's it for today is it yes and the module 7 evidence now and so we have module 6 closings starting on monday right well in that case we'll
01:13:20 monday right well in that case we'll break there for the afternoon we'll resume on monday morning at ten o'clock when we shall begin hearing closing statements relating to module six thank you very much
01:14:20 you