Firefighting Expert Evidence - Tuesday 19th October 2021 (2/2)

Full transcript

00:21:00 [Music]

00:21:03 would you ask mr mcgoat to come back in please

00:21:18 right mr mcguck all ready to carry on i hope yes sir very good thank you yes mr canoe thanks sir um miss mcgirt can we now turn to the question of positive pressure ventilation

00:21:29 pressure ventilation now um you address this piece of equipment at paragraph 198 page 72 onwards of your report so that's a smc quadruple zero double zero four six

00:21:41 smc quadruple zero double zero four six forward slash seven two is it correct that the purpose of pp vans is to remove smoke from a particular space and or to prevent further smoke entering that space

00:21:52 further smoke entering that space yes it is and that the tactic is used to improve access by the fire brigade to the seat of the fire is that right yes again i talk in very broad terms and if i've lost the nuance please shout

00:22:04 i've lost the nuance please shout pp vans ppv fans operate by essentially pushing the smoke and any other combustion products out of one space and into another and then introducing

00:22:15 into another and then introducing sufficient volumes of fresh air into that first base so to create a slight pressure hence the title yes essentially and that pressure then prevents more smoke from entering the space yes thank

00:22:28 smoke from entering the space yes thank you

00:22:29 you now you explained that uh ppv fans are commonly used in multi-story buildings in particular essentially to keep the stairwell free of smoke is that a fair summary it is and you then go on to say

00:22:40 summary it is and you then go on to say that there are a number of different factors that can determine how a fan will affect the behavior of the smoke and fire including and if i can go through them the potential to increase

00:22:51 through them the potential to increase the fire by introducing fresh air correct

00:22:54 correct the potential to push the smoke and combustion products out of one area and into another where they pose a similar risk to occupants or firefighters yes

00:23:04 yes and you say that there's also the potential to increase the risk of backdraft and flashover is that correct that's correct thank you now you state that it's necessary to have specialist training to be able to use a fan effectively can you help us

00:23:17 use a fan effectively can you help us understand why

00:23:20 the um i mean your your um summary was very helpful mr kinnear but the there are an awful lot more tactics because they the right balance of

00:23:33 because they the right balance of um

00:23:33 um sufficient inlets within which air can come in balanced with sufficient outlets through which smoke and other combustion products can escape

00:23:43 escape and where those outlets are located which may well be to further feed the fire as i as you just highlighted there requires

00:23:52 requires um

00:23:53 um quite a lot of consideration and modeling and there are some sort of teaching tools that people can use it's almost sort of desktop where you can blow smoke in and open doors and shut windows and you can actually start to

00:24:06 windows and you can actually start to see how you can control the movement of smoke and combustion products simply by a combination of fans and opening and shutting various vents and

00:24:17 opening and shutting various vents and outlets um within a either a building or a compartment or a multi-storey building as well so there's quite a lot of sophistication in terms of making sure that you're not going to worsen the

00:24:28 sure that you're not going to worsen the situation by the use of the positive pressure fans bearing in mind bad answer would it be within the competency of the average operational firefighter to understand whether a fan may assist at a

00:24:40 understand whether a fan may assist at a particular incident yes many fire rescue services have these things on all front line appliances so it's not a situation where only specialists with particular training can safely operate or deploy this

00:24:52 can safely operate or deploy this equipment not far from it they're they're well within the capability of all firefighters now you explained that in your view the use of a fan at grenfell would have been unlikely uh to uh clear the smoke inside

00:25:03 unlikely uh to uh clear the smoke inside the building in broad terms is that a fair summary of your view it is yes and if we can look at the reasons for that um opinion um primarily that there was nowhere for the smoke logged and stairwell to escape to is that

00:25:15 stairwell to escape to is that the essential point there was nowhere for the smoke to escape to and in terms of blowing as it were air into the structure there was a fundamental

00:25:26 the structure there was a fundamental barrier across the staircase which was at the mezzanine floor level the second floor level so there was no there was no way to create as a throughput of air from top to bottom of the building which is what

00:25:38 to bottom of the building which is what would have been necessary to keep the staircase free and so with that that space having initially been cleared of smoke um your view is that the effect of that pressure that would be used by

00:25:49 pressure that would be used by operational flow from the operation of the fan would be to draw in smoke and debris from elsewhere in essence is that your indeed it would yes now you also refer to the rapture well sorry can you just explain where you

00:26:00 sorry can you just explain where you envisage the fan

00:26:03 fan would be placed so there's a there was a diagram in the report sir that might help explain that will you

00:26:10 will you turn to that if we can uh turn over the page i think to uh 73 [Music]

00:26:19 [Music] maybe slightly further i'm afraid my memory of precise pages of the report isn't what it ought to be there we go there we go so the top diagram excuse me figure six

00:26:30 figure six is is illustrative of the kind of high-rise building for which this type of procedure would be really useful so you can

00:26:40 pressurize the staircase create a higher pressure and that would have the effect of doing two things one it would push the smoke and combustion products out of the opening at the top and to maintain

00:26:51 the opening at the top and to maintain the staircase at a slightly higher pressure than the rest of the building so in the event that the door is opened then the likelihood would be that the smoke would be held in

00:27:02 smoke would be held in that floor level i think the diagram before

00:27:05 before the diagram below illustrates that that phenomenon a little bit better so the diagram on the right shows that by keeping a pressure in the staircase

00:27:16 by keeping a pressure in the staircase the combustion products remain in the room whereas a diagram on the left without a fan shows that the combustion products are just free to move into the staircase enclosure and will just come further and further down effectively but

00:27:27 further and further down effectively but in both cases it's contemplates that the fan will be set up outside the building in data so if we go to the next diagram if we could mr can hear yes

00:27:39 so figure eight there would you like that expanded mr please thank you

00:27:45 thank you so

00:27:46 so um where the fan is pointing was actually the door into the main door into grenfell tower and effectively that um

00:27:55 um sort of south east corner of the tower was

00:27:59 was a mezzanine floor effectively and there was a door it isn't shown on this diagram but there was a door between the um bottom of the staircase and the mezzanine floor itself and so

00:28:10 mezzanine floor itself and so you really you've only got two options you could either put the fan where i've kind of pointed it there in which case all that would happen is you would pressurize that bottom south

00:28:21 you would pressurize that bottom south east corner because the door into the second floor would prevent you doing anything else or you could try to move it up onto the actual staircase itself but congestion and all that would do

00:28:32 but congestion and all that would do would bear to the further congestion but in terms of where the fan would then get its air from you'd simply be drawing air from from the building already effectively you'd be bringing in further smoke so wherever you try to put that

00:28:43 smoke so wherever you try to put that fan because the particular circumstances of grenfell tower you were going to do struggle to do anything other than drawing more smoke and presumably if you place the fan in the ground just inside

00:28:55 place the fan in the ground just inside the ground floor where's the smoke going to go there isn't an exodus there's no exit for it exactly so right yeah thank you that's helpful

00:29:03 helpful um now you also refer to the rapid development of the fire grenville over multiple floors can you explain the significance of those features in terms of the potential effectiveness of the ppv

00:29:15 ppv but differently is it the case that the fire was simply developing too quickly for the ppv to have any real substantive long-lasting effect in a nutshell yes it's essentially it's a sequential process you would need to pressurize one

00:29:27 process you would need to pressurize one area to create a greater pressure to then move to another area to create a greater pressure and then so it is a sequential process if you will a pressurization when you've got multiple

00:29:38 pressurization when you've got multiple floors simultaneously involved it's virtually impossible if not impossible to follow a sequence thank you can i now turn to a separate and distinct piece of equipment and that's the lightweight

00:29:49 equipment and that's the lightweight portable pump and if i describe that as an lpp

00:29:53 an lpp now you deal with this particular item of equipment at paragraph 206 of your report which is at page 76 onwards so just over the page please now there you explained that lpp is a as

00:30:06 now there you explained that lpp is a as the title suggests a portable pump that enables water to be pumped from open-air sources such as rivers and lakes is that a fair summary it is now put simply the essential

00:30:17 now put simply the essential disadvantage of lpps is that they cannot provide as much water as a standard pumping appliance is that right that's it

00:30:25 it by contrast their principal advantage is that they can be used in areas that a standard pumping appliance may not be able to access exactly they could be physically manhandled into really quite small spaces if necessary

00:30:36 small spaces if necessary they're petrol driven so they can only be used for a finite period before they require reshaping is that also right and of course they also give off exhaust gases as well and that's the next point i was going to ask yes and

00:30:47 and which is why to bring clarity to the point they're not designed to be used uh indoors they're designed to be used in the open air exactly thank you now there is some evidence i think i'm writing saying that an lpp was taken

00:30:59 writing saying that an lpp was taken inside the tower during the later stages of the incident is that as a broad proposition is that your understanding of the evidence as well it is certainly i've seen pictures of the entrance to the tower um and

00:31:11 the tower um and um

00:31:13 um witness statements that suggest that it was in inside the tower so it was somewhere in and around the ground floor of the tower either just outside or just inside or or both at some point in time

00:31:24 inside or or both at some point in time during the incident an lpp inside the tower would still have needed to draw on the water supply to the rising main is that the operating assumption you're making exactly and essentially the problem you know i think

00:31:35 essentially the problem you know i think i have no criticism of the attempt to improvise and try to do something um almost out of an act of desperation to get a better water supply but the the water blacks but i'm so so i'm sure we'll speak to themselves but

00:31:46 we'll speak to themselves but essentially the problem wasn't so much the capacity of the main inside the tower it was the supply to the general area and the risk of overdrawing the supplies that were available in that vicinity so there was a really need to

00:31:57 vicinity so there was a really need to go further afield to broaden the sources of supply rather than i suppose increase the pumping capacity at the scene itself and viewed also practically the lpp would

00:32:09 also practically the lpp would put it bluntly struggled to have provided a significant volume of water given that it only had one outlet it's a the volume of water and b the the height that to which it would be able to pump

00:32:20 that to which it would be able to pump would be very difficult as well so if it's a much smaller motor it can only it they can only pump to a much a lesser height as it were and so again because of fictional loss and gravity

00:32:32 of fictional loss and gravity it's probably my fault but um where is it drawing from so again you've got to feed it from somewhere so essentially the supply to the light portable pump will have come

00:32:43 the light portable pump will have come from the same sources of supply that was feeding the other pumps so effectively you know crudely you are robbing peter to pay paul i think the one the one caveat i'd put to that is i think some of the evidence talks

00:32:55 is i think some of the evidence talks about

00:32:56 about um that they were using the lack portable pump because the falling debris had cut through the existing holes so in one sense it's possible that you you were not as it were stealing the

00:33:08 you were not as it were stealing the supply from something else or um

00:33:11 um yeah taking taking the supply from something else rather than you were replacing

00:33:17 replacing something that had already been lost during the incident but but i think so your essential point is the same the water is coming from the same place so it's it's really half a dozen one and six or the other what you do with it following on from that given that it

00:33:29 following on from that given that it operated with limited pressure would that have decreased the higher up it went in the tower assuming of course it did go higher yeah i make reference to a simple fire ground formula it's roughly 0.1 of a bar per per head

00:33:41 roughly 0.1 of a bar per per head so yeah effectively you're losing basically a bar's pressure every 10 meters it works and that as it was petrol fueled wherever it was used it would have emitted fumes which wouldn't

00:33:52 would have emitted fumes which wouldn't have helped put mildly smoke logging in that particular area exactly and so for all those reasons is it your opinion

00:34:00 opinion that you consider that it it wouldn't have made it wouldn't have made any material difference had lpps been deployed or deployed sooner on the night of the fire no

00:34:12 now can i turn to a separate and new topic and it very briefly and that's the use of a helicopter um are you able to assist the panel on the practicability of using a helicopter

00:34:24 the practicability of using a helicopter to rescue people from the roof of the tower during the course of the night beyond the findings that were made in the phase one report no i have no expertise in helicopters there's no helicopter capability in the

00:34:35 there's no helicopter capability in the uk from a fire rescue point of view so i have no expertise in that area at all thank you

00:34:39 thank you um can i now turn to a separate matter which is alternative firefighting strategies which is the excuse me the final topic i'd like to address with you and you consider this from paragraph 211

00:34:51 and you consider this from paragraph 211 onwards of your report which starts at page 78 so two pages forward

00:34:58 now if we can look at paragraph 212 you make

00:35:05 what you consider to be an important point which is this that due to the speed and scale of the fire spread on the 14th of june 2017 there came a point at an early stage in the incident when there was no real possibility of

00:35:17 there was no real possibility of firefighters getting above the fire to stop the spread is that

00:35:22 is that have i drawn out the importance of the point you want to make yeah would it also be correct say that because of that factor the lfb were primarily facing a rescue operation while trying to limit

00:35:34 rescue operation while trying to limit fire spread as much as was possible that'll be my view yes and did that mean essentially that the lfb were never going to be able to extinguish the fire in your view not realistically no

00:35:45 realistically no consequently did they need to prioritize their resources on rescue as well as limiting the extent of the fire spread that would be my view yes now as we've already dealt with earlier

00:35:56 now as we've already dealt with earlier in the evidence you agree with the chairman's findings in the inquiry phase one report that evacuation ought to have been attempted on the night as the only realistic means of minimizing life but you also put into context and you agree

00:36:08 you also put into context and you agree with the caveats and that the chairman noted

00:36:12 noted and

00:36:13 and essentially you come to the view that that was still preferable to telling occupants to remain in their flats in essence is that your view it is

00:36:22 it is now we know that the lfb did not have an evacuation policy or procedure at the time the grenfell fire and did not train instant commanders on when and how to carry out an emergency evacuation

00:36:33 carry out an emergency evacuation now you provide an important point of context in your report at paragraph 216 if we can go to that on page 79 and really look at the penultimate sentence which starts with the word

00:36:45 sentence which starts with the word essentially

00:36:51 we see it's i think five lines from the bottom of that paragraph you say this essentially there is no practical guidance in the uk as to how evacuation should be carried out now to be clear

00:37:03 now to be clear what you are saying here is that in your knowledge before the grenfell fire there was no practical guidance national or otherwise

00:37:10 otherwise to fire and rescue services on how an emergency evacuation of a residential high-rise premises could or should be achieved is that a fair summary of your position it is

00:37:22 fair summary of your position it is and you are also not aware of any such training or policy being adopted by any other fire and rescue service before the grenfell fire is that too a correct summary of your assessment of the evidence it is

00:37:35 evidence it is now

00:37:36 now from the evidence you've given earlier on it's clear that you watched dr grimwood's evidence and in particular heard his evidence on the rice procedure now one possible exception

00:37:47 now one possible exception to the the views you've set there is his uh rice the command decision making tool that you considered in your report and from paragraph 218 onwards and that starts at page 80.

00:38:01 good look at that thank you now

00:38:06 now if i could take you through some questions about kent's approach and the evidence that dr grimwood gave now we've heard from him that the rice concept which stands for rescue

00:38:18 concept which stands for rescue intervention containment and evacuation is a command tool that is designed to assist instant commanders responding to a fire in a high-rise building specifically the rice model is intended

00:38:30 specifically the rice model is intended to remind commanders of the four distinct strategic options rescue intervention containment and evacuation those are the four options that a commander must consider when planning the operational response to an incident

00:38:42 the operational response to an incident at a headline approach is that consistent with your understanding of the rice model it is now if we could look at the rice model that you hopefully provide in your

00:38:53 that you hopefully provide in your report on page 82.

00:38:57 now as that diagram shows and as dr grimwood explained in detail the r i c and e or rather the r i and c parts of the model relate to steps that

00:39:08 parts of the model relate to steps that should be taken in relation to the seat of the fire is that correct yes now the principal aspect of the model when considering its potential relevance to grenfell is evacuation the rice decision tool directs

00:39:20 the rice decision tool directs commanders to consider whether evacuation is or may become necessary as one of the four options that forms part of the operational response again is that consistent with your understanding of this model it is

00:39:32 understanding of this model it is and as we can see from the diagram and the green evacuation box evacuation may be of primary or secondary risk zones i.e the areas in the immediate vicinity of the fire or

00:39:43 the immediate vicinity of the fire or areas further away from the fire again is that consistent with your understanding it is yes

00:39:51 now if we can look at page 83 of your report

00:39:56 and the top bullet point

00:40:01 you make the point that there is no order of priority to those four strategic options so the fact that e occurs at the end of the mnemonic does not mean that it is the final stage in the process is that is that correct it

00:40:13 the process is that is that correct it is i think i i elsewhere i refer to the triggers you may be going on to that we will do and if i don't please remind me thank you and you then point out that commanders in kent are trained that the circumstances of an

00:40:25 trained that the circumstances of an incident may dictate that evacuation needs to be considered first or indeed evacuation may need to be considered in conjunction with some of the other strategic options again does that reflect your understanding of the process it does yes would it also be

00:40:38 process it does yes would it also be correct to say that evacuation needs to be considered by reference to the way that a high-rise building is performing in the early stage of the fire yes that's crucial and it may be a question that goes to the

00:40:50 it may be a question that goes to the obvious why is that crucial um

00:40:54 um [Music]

00:40:57 [Music] fundamentally the it's a question of compartmentation i think as the rice as the 20 questions i think this is from the ken's 20 questions documents i think

00:41:08 the ken's 20 questions documents i think isn't it essentially fundamentally where compartmentation has broken down then you've really got little option but to move swiftly to evacuation i think in

00:41:19 to move swiftly to evacuation i think in summer the kind of rice model hazardous core that principle i suppose put slightly differently if the fire is performing in an unusual or unexpected unexpected way that should also prompt

00:41:31 unexpected way that should also prompt consideration of evacuation is that fair indeed yet as i said there were four triggers and so when when there's been a breakdown in some of the facilities firefighting facilities of the building and i think those those four triggers i

00:41:43 and i think those those four triggers i think dr greenwood was um was correct in his um summation that a useful and the mnemonic is really useful because of its simplicity and i think the four triggers are a useful prompt for an officer in

00:41:55 are a useful prompt for an officer in charge to consider uh when they should reverse stay stay put on a motor evacuation and underlying all of this the rice model um proceeds on the basis that compartmentation cannot necessarily be

00:42:08 compartmentation cannot necessarily be assumed to continue or to subsist no i think he explained that the the the kind of genesis of the policy um or the model um was fires in kent a number of years ago

00:42:20 fires in kent a number of years ago where similarly compartmentation had broken down alongside uh dr greenwood's experience in other parts of the world and it follows that for example evacuation of flats on the same floor as the fire flat may need to take place as

00:42:32 the fire flat may need to take place as a priority even before the initial attack crew entered the fire flat is that fair it is now in terms of the viability of evacuation one crucial component of this is the maintenance of a smoke-free

00:42:44 is the maintenance of a smoke-free stairwell that can be used by occupants exiting or being helped to leave the building is that right it is and that is provided for in kent's high-rise standard operating procedure

00:42:55 high-rise standard operating procedure which you've also considered is that right yes

00:42:58 right yes now we don't necessarily have to go to the standard operating procedure unless you want to but in your view does the kent approach present an effective means of reducing the possibility for smoke spread within

00:43:10 the possibility for smoke spread within the stairwell thereby preserving a viable escape i think it prevents a strong possibility i think even even dr grimwood um conceded that they their working

00:43:21 conceded that they their working assumption in kent is that smoke is likely to still be in the stairwell and um the experience for all kinds of reasons of housekeeping and so on is it there remains a possibility even

00:43:32 is it there remains a possibility even with stairwell protection teams that fire and combustion products could make it into the stairwell but as a principle as a working principle that that stable protection teams stand of extremely good

00:43:43 protection teams stand of extremely good chance and an important vehicle important opportunity for maintaining stairwells as free as smoke free from smoke as possible to the best of your knowledge how widespread is application of the

00:43:56 how widespread is application of the rice model or at least the principles which underpin the rice model um before grenfell not very widespread i mean in truth i'd only uh i may retire to chief artist in 2015.

00:44:09 uh i may retire to chief artist in 2015. um it was just about on my radar but i would be it would be misleading as i was familiar with the approach in 2015. i'm aware that subsequently a number of fire rescue services have adopted the rice

00:44:21 rescue services have adopted the rice approach in whole or in part and

00:44:25 and is the

00:44:27 is the absence of widespread application due to lack of awareness of its existence or were there more reasoned principled reasons for not seeking to apply it i think in truth prior to grenfell

00:44:40 i think in truth prior to grenfell the

00:44:41 the the problem perceived by fire and rescue services with high-rise firefighting was more associated with risks to firefighters there's been a series of

00:44:52 firefighters there's been a series of firefighter fatalities over the years which the inquiries already heard about and near misses as well as firefighter fatalities and

00:45:01 and that had very much driven changes to operational procedures and practices um lacannell was probably the exception to that

00:45:09 to that that was there had been fire fatalities in high-rise buildings but in many respects

00:45:16 respects it would be in a lounge or a kitchen the phenomenon happened to be in a high-rise building it was not did not register as a consequence of the high-rise risk it

00:45:27 a consequence of the high-rise risk it was the risk that people face from fire luck and lsa was exception to that but even in and around lakenhold the proximity of the shirley towers incident

00:45:38 proximity of the shirley towers incident i think still very much um

00:45:41 um pointed fire and rescue services towards seeing high-rise fires as primarily are risks to firefighters and therefore i need to put in safe systems at work as

00:45:52 need to put in safe systems at work as they were a risk to the public and i think for that reason and there wasn't a great deal of energy expended in sort of seeking out alternative approaches to firefighting

00:46:04 alternative approaches to firefighting because

00:46:05 because at that stage it was not foreseen that the existing approaches were problematic thank you

00:46:12 thank you now you've stated that in your view the kent approach which incorporated rice that requires consideration of evacuation as a priority and the standard operating procedure that provided for protection of the

00:46:23 that provided for protection of the stairwell

00:46:25 stairwell in order to assist evacuation could have materially improved the effectiveness of the operational response at grenfell is that a fair summary of the general elements of your conclusion it is very much for the general point yes um you

00:46:37 much for the general point yes um you are um you make a number of significant caveats though to that view and if i could go through those caveats with you please

00:46:44 please first of all you're careful to qualify that general view by saying that the implementation of the kent approach would not necessarily have prevented fatalities at grenfell but you consider that it's possible that it may have

00:46:57 that it's possible that it may have saved lives is that a fair summary of your opinion yes it is

00:47:02 yes it is however it would also be correct say that any attempt to apply the rice model at grenfell would have faced the particularly challenging circumstances of that instant including and if i can go through certain factors the absence

00:47:13 go through certain factors the absence of a system allowing communications with residents yes secondly the rapidity of the fire spread yes

00:47:20 yes thirdly multiple failures of compartmentation correct fourthly the fact that conditions in the stairway were after the initial stages of the incident increasingly compromised correct and fifthly the fact that there

00:47:32 correct and fifthly the fact that there were residents with mobility issues who would have required more assistance to leave the building correct thank you can i now turn to a separate topic which is smoke hoods and smoke curtains

00:47:45 is smoke hoods and smoke curtains first of all you deal with smoke hoods from paragraph 228 of your report onwards which can be found at page 84 so just overleaf

00:47:58 and if we can go over the page

00:48:03 i'm sorry i thought it would be there anyway you provide an image which is in fact taken from ken frs website uh where they now use smoke codes and perhaps you can go to inq trouble zero one three

00:48:14 can go to inq trouble zero one three nine five three [Music]

00:48:21 that's a smokehood displayed on the right hand side is that right it is yes now those hoods are intended primarily to be used by members of the public who are the subject of rescue is that right that's correct and they provide a

00:48:33 that's correct and they provide a certain period of protection from noxus noxious fumes and smoke is that right i think it's about 15 minutes yes

00:48:41 and can you explain briefly how the hoods are used so

00:48:45 so um they were not in wise produce when i was in the fire service so i didn't know personal experience of them um but

00:48:51 but i'm aware that a crew would take small cuts in with them and in particular i think to high-rise buildings although they can be used elsewhere of course but

00:49:02 they can be used elsewhere of course but they enable crews to then lead people to safety

00:49:06 safety and

00:49:07 and give them some protection from smoke and the effects of combustion um for 15 minutes to enable the crews to reassure the people concerning and get them out of the building thank you now

00:49:19 them out of the building thank you now excuse me you've noted that paragraph 299 of your report which is a smc quadruple zero double zero four six four slash eight five

00:49:29 five that smokehoods are now also used by the lfb as well as a number of other fire and rescue services first of all do you know how many other fire and rescue services are now using smoke hoods i i i

00:49:41 services are now using smoke hoods i i i know there's an increasing number a lot of fire rescue services as i i believe on the feedback from kent and the lfb they've had a good kind of write-up in the various fire journals and so on and

00:49:54 the various fire journals and so on and so um there's a definite increase in different fire rescue services procuring them but what i would say i think i made the point i i couldn't really offer an explanation about why they'd not been

00:50:06 explanation about why they'd not been prevalent before that's what i was going to ask you next were they commonly used before grenfell no no no i i couldn't really at the time of writing the report i've been giving this some thought i couldn't really think of a good reason why um but i

00:50:18 think of a good reason why um but i suppose on reflection i think i suggest it will be a combination of two or three things firstly

00:50:25 firstly fire deaths and injuries had been falling dramatically over an extended period of time particularly from fires in the home and the nature of the way

00:50:36 in the home and the nature of the way a modern fire develops and by by modern i mean in the last 20 years would be

00:50:42 would be that people have very very little time to survive in a domestic fire hence the reason why we fit smoke alarms now because that time that gestation period of the fire has got so much shorter

00:50:53 of the fire has got so much shorter so there would be it would be a very rare occurrence indeed where we would be leading somebody to safety from a house fire very rare indeed so logically

00:51:04 fire very rare indeed so logically they what their place probably is more suited to high-rise buildings where the time is the factor and you need the time to get people in time to set up your your operations and therefore time to

00:51:16 your operations and therefore time to lead people to safety and what smoke cods do is buy you that time and again until la canal there really hadn't been a significant incident where there was a

00:51:28 a significant incident where there was a major loss of life or a mass evacuation required on the scale that would come to the attention of different fire rescue services so i think a combination of those two factors potentially explains

00:51:40 those two factors potentially explains that thank you what's your assessment of the effectiveness of smokehoods in protecting occupants from the effects of smoke and allowing and assisting their evacuation they look excellent

00:51:53 i do i do wonder why we didn't do it years ago frankly now um

00:51:57 now um another

00:51:59 another possible tool is smoking curtains you refer to these at paragraph 232 of your report we see it there on page 85. now you explained and dr grimm would dealt with this as well and his evidence

00:52:10 dealt with this as well and his evidence that smoke can smoke curtains are made of material that withstands heat and that the material is fixed onto a frame that can be adjusted so it fits into a doorway

00:52:19 doorway providing a barrier to smoke and fire now in your view would smoke curtains prove an effective way of minimizing the risk of smoke spread into the stairwell if they were placed in the doorway of

00:52:30 if they were placed in the doorway of the fire floor lobby they they are not infallible but they can be extremely effective and i'd do as a footnote put a link to a youtube video clip by west sussex it's a

00:52:42 youtube video clip by west sussex it's a very helpful portrayal of how to use these things because i'm conscious that they're very difficult to picture and visualize but it's a very helpful youtube clip to see that thank you um could they be used in conjunction with

00:52:53 could they be used in conjunction with the kent procedure in your view yeah i think the the latest iteration of kent would use them as a matter of course almost as a precautionary measure because you you know you whilst kent you

00:53:04 because you you know you whilst kent you know has a positive shutting doors and self-closing devices you know are part of the approach often self-closing devices are not working so even where they've got a fire

00:53:15 working so even where they've got a fire door i would i suspect kent will still use smoke curtains almost as a kind of backup procedure what is your view of the practicability of the use of smoke curtains at grenfell had they been

00:53:26 curtains at grenfell had they been available

00:53:28 available it's difficult to say i come back to the point of multiple failures so quickly effectively simultaneously on multiple levels

00:53:38 levels um

00:53:40 um i think they would have enabled um

00:53:45 um some protection in terms of keeping the staircase

00:53:48 staircase more free of smoke but i think if some of the witness accounts about the ferocity of the fire on various levels and certainly some of the lights were melted i think between floors 12 and 14

00:53:59 melted i think between floors 12 and 14 even some of the bulk headlights in the staircase enclosure were melted so in in in parts of grenfell i think it unlikely that even a smoke curtain would have been effective so i think there was a

00:54:11 been effective so i think there was a possibility that there was a would have been partial success in the application of smoke curtains but it would have needed a

00:54:17 needed a big commitment of resources to install them effectively all the way up the tower as far as they could um are there any other ways in which smoke curtains could have been used or could be used

00:54:28 could be used during the course of a high rise fire beyond acting as a barrier no they're they are effectively to recognize notwithstanding the kent policy

00:54:38 policy my point earlier about the the implication of those firefighter fatalities over the years i think mr greenwood made the point has moved pushed fire rescue service operations into the staircase enclosure when

00:54:50 into the staircase enclosure when originally that was not where they were intended to be um

00:54:55 um and so what small curtains provide is certainly a halfway house to protecting that staircase as far as possible and still enabling firefighters to go in and out of door doors that are held open for one reason

00:55:07 doors that are held open for one reason another hose or of self-closing devices being broken or whatever thank you now um in your report we don't need to go to it but a paragraph 235 you say that you're now aware that smoke curtains are used by

00:55:20 aware that smoke curtains are used by kent greater manchester cambridgeshire and west sussex is that correct it is do you know how common the use of smoke curtains was before the 14th of june 2017.

00:55:31 2017. not at all coming i think there were probably only two or three fire services if that looking at these are small curtains and kent would probably have been one of those i think west sussex were also looking at them at the time do you know why their use wasn't widespread

00:55:44 you know why their use wasn't widespread again it's fair it's fair to say i think dr coin hatton described the the lfb as conservative i think fire services generally

00:55:55 generally are

00:55:56 are slow to embrace change in technology

00:56:00 um i think people want to ensure there's a good evidence and any new procedures and any new approaches are properly tried and tested before adoption by all fire rescue services and

00:56:13 adoption by all fire rescue services and i think the second dimension of that is the coordinating body that would undertake the necessary research and develop those kind of standard operating procedures and test

00:56:24 procedures and test uh new equipment and new technologies i think since the demise of patient firing inspector in the mid 2000s that there hasn't really been the necessary

00:56:35 hasn't really been the necessary resources to properly coordinate the research and development and implementation of this kind of technology added to the fact that the fire service generally would be slow to take up new

00:56:47 generally would be slow to take up new technologies for the reasons i've outlined as well thank you can i now turn to a separate topic which is that of alarm systems and there's an additional point you've raised to paragraph 214 of your report which can

00:56:58 paragraph 214 of your report which can be found at page 79 [Music]

00:57:06 [Music] and it's really in relation to the practical challenges of evacuation of a residential high-rise building which is that of communication with occupants and specifically how to inform occupants that they should leave their flats when

00:57:17 that they should leave their flats when that decision is taken now you say in the report that this could be much more easily achieved with the incorporation of a building-wide alarm system in high-rise premises which should be capable of being selectively

00:57:29 should be capable of being selectively activated either manually or by automatic detection again is that the first summary of your view it is now to be clear are you envisaging a an alarm that could be activated by the fire brigade once they have arrived on

00:57:41 fire brigade once they have arrived on the scene if and when a decision is taken to withdraw or stay put for example i am those kind of systems are already available so there was zone premises so you could activate

00:57:53 was zone premises so you could activate an evacuate a zone a pre-recorded message etc you know these systems are now quite tried and tested um certainly abroad as well as in this country and i think they've got a

00:58:05 this country and i think they've got a real part to play in evacuation for the future how effective do you consider such a system would be in assisting an evacuation extremely effective um

00:58:16 extremely effective um i mean it could be built into seven two procedures to make sure that the relevant crews are aware of its existence and how to operate it and i'm i'm part

00:58:25 i'm part of the fire drills i mean you'll elsewhere other experts will be looking at the tmos responsibilities and fire drills and how people need to evacuate and so on but it will still be the case that most of these premises are

00:58:37 the case that most of these premises are tenanted and there will be a requirement to do regular fire drills and people could become really well practiced in evacuating different zones at different times um and i think that as i say i

00:58:48 times um and i think that as i say i think a big part of play thank you mike now turned to questions in relation to radio communications and

00:58:56 and really

00:58:57 really focusing on the evidence given by professor johnson yesterday now the first sub-topic is the practicability of fire-ground risk assessments regarding a change of radio communications and i'll explain further

00:59:08 communications and i'll explain further what i mean by that

00:59:12 it's really the practicability of requiring senior operational personnel to carry out risk assessments on the fire ground in relation to the type of radio communications equipment to be used and

00:59:23 communications equipment to be used and if we could look at the practical example of the lfb policy and lfb's policy 458 we don't need to go to it unless you want to that was current at the time of the fire required a senior officer to carry out a risk

00:59:35 a senior officer to carry out a risk assessment in order for ba teams to be permitted to use their handheld radios for watts rather than their inbuilt battery radios one watt the

00:59:46 inbuilt battery radios one watt the purpose of that risk assessment would be to take into account the potential safety implications of using a higher wattage

00:59:52 wattage handheld radio is that consistent with your understanding of the requirements of that policy are you aware of whether that requirement for a risk assessment before

01:00:03 requirement for a risk assessment before changing the mode of communications is a practice adopted by other fire and rescue services so if i could probably a slightly extended answer if that's okay

01:00:15 extended answer if that's okay right so intrinsic safety which is the essential point at issue here um

01:00:21 um and i think professor johnson explained essentially um what it is which is that the the tiny spark that's produced from the equipment making its electrical connections

01:00:32 making its electrical connections needs to be so small as to not ignite a flammable atmosphere essentially that's what intrinsic safety means and it's been a contested issue in fire and rescue services for quite a long

01:00:44 and rescue services for quite a long time

01:00:45 time with professor johnson's point being it seems

01:00:49 it seems at odds with a very fixed view about intrinsic safety and therefore low wattage radio sets in so-called flammable atmospheres when

01:01:01 in so-called flammable atmospheres when uh crews are probably already in a fumble atmosphere i.e fire anyway any even more difficult to reconcile when things like

01:01:12 difficult to reconcile when things like repeaters are not intrinsically safe and other procedures don't confirm so for example without operational procedures that ensure for

01:01:23 operational procedures that ensure for example a firefighter hasn't got um a mobile telephone in the pocket so unless it's a complete ban and some check and balance to make sure that there's not a single firefighter with a radio in their

01:01:35 single firefighter with a radio in their pocket underneath their tunic or indeed even having a stone stuck in the tread of a boot which may well you know create a tiny spark when going along concrete the point about it is

01:01:47 the point about it is to

01:01:48 to properly secure a risk-free zone such that intrinsically safe radios are justified requires more than just the handset

01:01:59 handset itself

01:02:00 itself and so

01:02:01 and so i think you made the point that some fire rescue services have moved away from the requirement for intrinsic safety in the general radios including breathing apparatus radios as well

01:02:12 breathing apparatus radios as well and so therefore they've moved the risk assessment requirement back to the procurement and the operational procedures of the radios themselves rather than place and gets a burden on on an offspring charge in the middle of an incident

01:02:23 an incident and um

01:02:25 and um i would subscribe to that view certainly that was the view that i've taken over the years in the organizations i've worked with so can you help us when did the transfer of the risk assessment start to take

01:02:36 of the risk assessment start to take place that started to take so i i would say late 2000s early between 2010 and 2014 in greater manchester we replaced our mob

01:02:47 greater manchester we replaced our mob uh fire ground radial systems i think between 2012 and 2014 and we moved to digital radios

01:02:57 radios and i'm fairly sure that we moved away from intrinsic safety as a default standard we still had intrinsically safe radials for use in proper if you will

01:03:08 radials for use in proper if you will true flammable atmospheres for example we had a petrol chemical risk in the area and we would use gas tight suits and intrinsic intrinsically

01:03:19 tight suits and intrinsic intrinsically safe radials in that setting because it was a true flammable atmosphere or indeed if we were doing mines working or underground where it was absolutely clear that the risk assessment showed

01:03:30 clear that the risk assessment showed this was a flammable atmosphere but where was the generality of just intrinsically safe radials as a default state because combustion products are flammable we'd

01:03:42 combustion products are flammable we'd moved away from that and as i say that would be

01:03:45 would be the late 2000s to the early 2010 to 2015 during that first first half of this decade and so was manchester in the lead or were you in the majority

01:03:56 or were you in the majority difficulty the majority was we were certainly not the only one there were those radios were manufactured and not other fire rescue services were used not i'm fairly sure cheshire i'm pretty sure we did it in cheshire if we didn't cheshire certainly did it and other fire

01:04:08 cheshire certainly did it and other fire rescue services around the the northwest i think similarly we're moving away from intrinsically safe radios thank you now professor sorry i'm gonna have to ask you again mr mcgowan to go a little bit more slowly because i think

01:04:20 bit more slowly because i think uh transcribers find it quite difficult to keep up with you i do very difficult to apologize the speed of which one speaks because one does it naturally but if you can um it would be appreciated i'm sure

01:04:33 um it would be appreciated i'm sure thanks thank you um professor johnson has pointed out that uh during the fire the grenfell fire some lfb ba crews did use their handhold radios without that having been approved of or

01:04:46 having been approved of or by a senior officer's risk assessment or indeed reported to the senior officer does that tally with your reading of the evidence

01:04:55 evidence it does as i suppose the tricky element is i'm not quite sure what that risk assessment would entail um

01:05:07 um it's a fire you know the building's already oh i think professor often was making the point the building is already on fire isn't it so trying to evaluate where the flammable atmosphere now is in order to undertake

01:05:19 atmosphere now is in order to undertake a risk assessment becomes extremely problematic thank you that's sort of the answer to my next question um how usual in practice would it be for a risk assessment to be carried out because it seems that serve no useful

01:05:30 because it seems that serve no useful purpose on in these particular circumstances yeah i mean there's um as doctor coined out and said yeah

01:05:37 yeah um dynamic risk assessment on the fire ground is an ongoing base it's an ongoing um process and an ongoing approach and continually to develop build and

01:05:49 continually to develop build and maintain situational awareness is part of the function of being an incident commander so in the general terms that dynamics assessment is an ongoing process what i think we're talking about

01:06:00 process what i think we're talking about here is a specific risk assessment associated with the use of non-intrinsically safe radios and

01:06:09 and um

01:06:11 um it not being a policy i've kind of used myself i would have to assume that the lfb officers were trained at what point in time they would undertake that risk assessment and indeed how they would record that

01:06:22 and indeed how they would record that risk assessment and where they would record it i think that flows on because professor johnson observed that the prospect of senior officers carry out risk assessments in order to permit use of handheld radios i think the euphemism he used was problematic

01:06:34 he used was problematic uh in the sense that there would be no way of communicating the decision or there'd be obstacles in the way of communicating the decision to ba crews who'd already been committed in the building presumably you would agree with

01:06:45 building presumably you would agree with uh professor johnson's view on that exactly it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy doesn't it yeah in your opinion at what stage of an incident would such a risk assessment need to take place for communications to be effective

01:06:57 be effective i.e the risk assessment of a change to handheld radios so i think the decision to

01:07:05 to of which channels to use or how to use how to establish a command communications infrastructure is part of the tactical plan formed by the incident commander as

01:07:16 commander as command is handed over at various stages of the incident part of the handover of the officer being handed over to would be to establish what it what what is the

01:07:28 establish what it what what is the existing communications infrastructure that's in place for that incident command and or make a determination whether there's a need to change that at that point of command takeover or need

01:07:39 that point of command takeover or need whether to change it subsequently as his or her situational awareness develops so i i think at the start of the incident at the point of handover and an ongoing basis as part of situational awareness

01:07:51 basis as part of situational awareness thank you if i could just pick up that point which is the use of multiple channels one of the points you made there and professor johnson observed that in addition to the radio channels that were in fact used at grenfell there were an additional three channels to

01:08:03 were an additional three channels to which the lfp had access but did not use so it's channels four seven and eight professor johnson considered that those channels presented an opportunity to quote

01:08:13 quote to increase the capacity and resilience of fire ground communications close quote and my first question is this do you agree that using additional radio channels may be of

01:08:24 additional radio channels may be of benefit on the instagram yes i do it requires careful orchestration in terms of how you move from the existing channel infrastructure you've got to a

01:08:37 channel infrastructure you've got to a new channel infrastructure if i can stop you how do you how does the instant commander secure the benefits that flow from the use of additional channels can you explain to the panel how we'd go about doing that so

01:08:49 so when it is clear that there's congestion and confusion and more radio channels would be helpful that's a command decision normally you would have the command unit

01:09:01 normally you would have the command unit that's got the technological infrastructure to facilitate and enable this with repeaters antenna etc you would then anticipate that the command unit crew

01:09:13 command unit crew and if they needed supplementary resources they would commandable the firefighters to form part of the command unit crew

01:09:19 unit crew would then actively and quite assertively manage the transition from one channel to another and physically use runners to do that so they would be clear what the sectorization is so if the

01:09:32 what the sectorization is so if the water sector is going to use this channel they would simply make sure physically send a runner to the water sector and say you now change to whatever channel check

01:09:43 you now change to whatever channel check it out while they're there that the command unit has got somebody on that channel and to make sure that they've established that communications link and then they would say to the set commander you now need to make sure that all your

01:09:55 you now need to make sure that all your personnel are involved in in this work here are all on the channel that we've now allocated to you and you would do that sequentially moving around the fire ground with a combination of runners and

01:10:06 ground with a combination of runners and testing it to make sure that you've got the comms locked down now the lfb's position and i hope i put this fairly so i've got just so of course

01:10:17 course and this is why we talked to earlier about training and exercises

01:10:23 exercises that takes some doing it it doesn't just drop in

01:10:27 drop in it's not like a kind of wi-fi signal going down and you kind of just go and press the button and it reboots you know bear in mind at one in the same time this is a major instance we're talking about otherwise you wouldn't need to

01:10:38 about otherwise you wouldn't need to reallocate the channels and there's a huge amount going on and it's therefore vitally important that this is exercised in as close to life conditions as possible because it really takes some

01:10:51 possible because it really takes some grip if i can use that expression to do it now the lfb's position as i say i hope i put this fairly is that the use of additional rail radio channels is too risky and in response to the recommendation of the latino

01:11:03 recommendation of the latino coroner that the lfb consider using additional radio channels the lfbs explained that this would create a need to re-transmit any risk critical information that needed to be transmitted to cruise over

01:11:16 needed to be transmitted to cruise over those additional channels to ensure that that information was received by everyone rather than being able to communicate with all crews at the same time on the same channel now my first question is this in your view

01:11:28 question is this in your view is it correct that the use of additional radio channels poses the risk to crews that

01:11:34 that appear to be concerning the nfb there providing the transition is well managed i've that's not been my experience i mean the the risk information that

01:11:45 mean the the risk information that personnel are aware of they're already aware of it it's already being transmitted and they're now managing this incident on an ongoing basis

01:11:54 basis simply changing the radial channel is just simply the means of communicating thereafter so you would only have a doubt about the awareness of risk information

01:12:07 awareness of risk information because there's a problem with risk information not necessarily because of the problem with the radios you see what i mean it's already they've already got this information i i'm struggling to see how the tran to transfer from one channel to another

01:12:19 transfer from one channel to another further compounds that problem thank you now can i turn on to a separate point which is the possibility of more extensive use of airwave radios and professor johnson

01:12:30 and professor johnson has considered that possibility on the instant ground given their strongest signal strength rather than reserving airwave radios for the sole use of senior officers for communicating with control

01:12:41 control now particularly john in particular professor johnson has referred to a proposal that the lfb appear to have considered as part of the lacquer lachnal inquest to make use of instant

01:12:52 lachnal inquest to make use of instant command talk groups on airwave radios by those in the chain of command now do you have any view on the general feasibility of making greater use of airwave radios on the instant

01:13:05 use of airwave radios on the instant ground

01:13:06 ground um

01:13:08 um only in the sense that they give you the advantages i think project johnson identified you've got the digital radio you've got better coverage um

01:13:17 um therefore greater reliability and so on so there's a real opportunity to use them for torque groups on the fire grain they're quite a complicated handset to use they're not there's quite a lot of

01:13:28 use they're not there's quite a lot of channel changing because they're kind of multifunctional um in my experience in the financial services we because we muted digital radios anyway we we were able to take

01:13:40 radios anyway we we were able to take advantage of that top group type facility without necessarily resorting to the airwave arrangement and the reason for that is airwaves has had a limited life i know that's been extended the project's been

01:13:52 that's been extended the project's been delayed but it was uncertain at the point in time that we were looking at changing out radials how long the airwave system was going to still be in existence from from the current national fire perspective so we went in a

01:14:04 fire perspective so we went in a slightly different direction using digital radios but essentially i think the point the general point remains the same that the advantage of the airwave torque groups on digital radios being able to do that i would agree with thank

01:14:16 able to do that i would agree with thank you

01:14:17 you um

01:14:18 um sir mr mcgurk i've reached the end of my prepared questions right um sir may i ask you for until quarter past three so they can review matters see if there's anything

01:14:29 review matters see if there's anything else like auto of us which i haven't done and to give others an opportunity to suggest other questions well since it's as early as it is i think we can allow you that indulgence thank you yes well mr goku you probably know that um when council gets to the end of his

01:14:41 when council gets to the end of his questions or things he has we always have a break to give him time just to check that he hasn't overlooked something and also to allow others who are not here to suggest questions that perhaps we should put to you so we're

01:14:54 perhaps we should put to you so we're going to have a break now we'll come back

01:14:56 back as you head at quarter past three please and we'll then see if there any more questions we want to ask you all right and please again don't talk to anyone about your evidence over the break thank you thank you very much

01:15:14 [Music] all right mr clear quarter past three then thank you

01:44:38 would you ask mr mcgowan to come back in please

01:44:50 all right mr goku i'm sorry we kept you waiting longer than i indicated but we are ready to go on now so we'll see if there are any more questions for you thank you

01:44:59 thank you yes mr thank you sir a few um mr gut you said that whilst porus marked a shift in what was required under section 72d um you weren't sure whether it marked a

01:45:10 you weren't sure whether it marked a shift in the understanding of fire and rescue services and it was left individual services to adopt the guidances they saw fit would understanding have been improved and more widespread if there'd been a

01:45:21 and more widespread if there'd been a national structure for dissemination of such uh change and learning so i think the short answer is probably yes i would qualify if i could a tiny bit just so just to be clear because

01:45:34 bit just so just to be clear because poor is consolidated if you will different

01:45:38 different um

01:45:39 um avenues of risk information collection each of those separate avenues were already very familiar to fire and rescue services it was it was an act of consolidation um so it's not not in a sense that it

01:45:51 um so it's not not in a sense that it was kind of radically new and a surprise in that respect in any one of the individual if you like strands of information collection notwithstanding that familiarity and

01:46:02 notwithstanding that familiarity and awareness i think would still be the case that whether we've been to a nationally orchestrated and managed communications campaign i think understanding would have been better

01:46:13 understanding would have been better across the board thank you now in terms of the more efficient use of training resources the

01:46:22 the and looking particular the greater use of computer computer-based training would you agree that live and practical training cannot be replaced entirely or in part by computer-based training

01:46:34 in part by computer-based training i would agree entirely and that's because of the the primacy of real life experience which you adverted to in your earlier well i think dr cohen hatton also mentioned a report i think her research is not just kind of my my take on it or

01:46:47 is not just kind of my my take on it or an opinion i think the research of dr cohen happened as part of a doctorate established that as well that it's

01:46:53 it's very difficult if not impossible to recreate the what we call human factors in other words the stresses under which an instant commander is placed at an incident like grenfell i

01:47:04 placed at an incident like grenfell i think watch manager dowden used two words one although he was overwhelmed and he used another expression of sensory overload and i think they very graphically captured what it felt like and i'm not suggesting

01:47:16 what it felt like and i'm not suggesting that you will but put people in that position as a matter of course during training but you do need to take people to that edge as close as possible in order that when they've confront that

01:47:27 order that when they've confront that situation in reality they're at least if it's not the first time that they do that the first time you confront something like that is really not on the actual instant itself if you can possibly avoid that and the

01:47:38 if you can possibly avoid that and the only way of doing that is is at least in part practical training with real people putting you under real pressure in a real scenario thank you

01:47:49 real scenario thank you there's evidence of phase one that various bits of equipment did not work or work effectively in the command unit matters were referred to such as a remote a remote sticker camera toughbook

01:48:01 remote a remote sticker camera toughbook laptop a mesh node the css most importantly and various web mail services

01:48:09 services do you agree or do you consider that the failure of any or all of the equipment on the command unit impacted adversely on the lfb's

01:48:17 lfb's response to the fire

01:48:21 [Music] yes i do actually i think that the ability to as it would coordinate and perhaps even

01:48:32 as it would coordinate and perhaps even orchestrate a command and control infrastructure that would have enabled or facilitated better decision-making or a better structure to the instant ground can only

01:48:44 structure to the instant ground can only have been assistance i wouldn't go so far as to suggest had all of the technical capability of the command unit be in working order that that would have resolved the problems experienced at

01:48:55 resolved the problems experienced at grenfell

01:48:56 grenfell thank you um mr mcgurk i have no further questions for you and that concludes uh your examination today finally i want to say uh thank you very much indeed for attending to give evidence today we're

01:49:08 attending to give evidence today we're very grateful indeed thank you and mr gurkha i'd like to add my thanks on behalf of all three members of the panel to you for all the effort you put into writing your report which is i'm sure substantial

01:49:20 report which is i'm sure substantial it's a very interesting and useful report and we're very grateful to have had it and of course it's been very helpful to see you here today and hear what you have to tell us so thank you very much indeed for giving us your time today

01:49:31 today and for assisting the inquiry generally thank you very much and now you're free to go thank you

01:49:47 well now mr kunia um no more witnesses today i think is that right that's right sir and that concludes uh subject to dr steinov coming back in module seven and that

01:49:58 coming back in module seven and that concludes um the evidence for today subject to the expert evidence subject to professor torreira attending on thursday yes he's not able to be here tomorrow unfortunately not due to pre-existing

01:50:09 unfortunately not due to pre-existing commitments exactly so we shall not sit tomorrow but we shall resume on thursday morning at 10 o'clock when we look forward to seeing professor tarrero thanks so much thank you very much

01:50:20 thanks so much thank you very much thursday at 10 o'clock bill thank you [Music]

01:50:27 you