Louise Upton from the Home Office gives evidence regarding immigration enforcement policy and its impact on Grenfell survivors.
00:00:24 oh
00:00:30 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing today we're going to continue hearing evidence from louise upton formerly of the dclg so i'll ask which option to come back in
00:00:41 so i'll ask which option to come back in please
00:00:50 good morning miss hampton good morning
00:00:54 all right all ready to carry on i hope i am thank you thank you very much yes mr come here thank you sir good morning miss upton now the first topic i'd like to discuss with you today is the stephen
00:01:05 to discuss with you today is the stephen hunt inquest now um
00:01:08 now um do you recall a report to prevent future deaths was presented to the home secretary arising from the stephen hunting quest in june 2016.
00:01:20 no i don't think i do actually if we can just go to a copy of it to see whether that prompts a memory or not hom trouble zero four double five three seven
00:01:38 does that prompt any memory at all
00:01:42 um
00:01:51 not not really i remember the name but i don't think i was
00:01:57 was i don't remember being particularly involved in this but could we go to page 11 in this document let's see if a particular aspect of it prompts a memory and
00:02:08 and we can see a series of recommendations in the top part of the page you'll see number nine which reads as follows it is suggested that the secretary of state for the home
00:02:20 that the secretary of state for the home department considers measures to ensure that fire risk assessors are adequately trained and qualified so as to be competent in the role and the responsible person has the means to verify the competence of any person
00:02:32 to verify the competence of any person holding themselves out to be a fire risk assessor does that ring any bells for you
00:02:39 um no but i imagine i would have doubt what contributed to the response if this would as this had come in if we can go
00:02:50 would as this had come in if we can go to a submission that was put up to the minister
00:02:55 minister hom trouble zero four three one eight four
00:03:04 as you'll see from the top right corner prepared by lee shears peter holland who's then i think the chief fire and rescue adviser also copied in but addressed to the men of state minister of state for policing and
00:03:16 state minister of state for policing and the fire service did you contribute to this particular submission do you remember i don't
00:03:25 i don't i don't remember but i probably would have contributed whatever we said on the competency of risk assessors on that if we go to page three and paragraph seven
00:03:41 so regarding concern nine that was the one regarding fire risk assessor competency it said this the government has taken action to ensure the competence of far risk assessors this work address both
00:03:52 risk assessors this work address both the competence and accreditation of fire risk assessors as well as how people can find a suitably accredited risk assessor can you help us as to what reasoned basis
00:04:04 reasoned basis provided
00:04:06 provided or justified the conclusion that the work had already been undertaken and it was sufficient
00:04:14 while we had worked with the um fire risk assessment competency council to establish criteria there were
00:04:26 there were a
00:04:26 a number of agreements had been reached around
00:04:32 around criteria to establish the competency and that we'd produce guidance with the sector on how to choose a risk assessor that had been
00:04:43 risk assessor that had been independently
00:04:46 or professionally assured of reaching the standard of competency and that guidance was available through fire and rescue authorities and
00:04:57 through fire and rescue authorities and others
00:04:58 others so
00:04:59 so i don't think that paragraph says everything was working fine but it reflected the work that we had done
00:05:11 that we had done in 2000 and between 2011 and 13 to bring the sector together to produce
00:05:23 registers of risk assessors okay well we'll move on from that to deal with bearing in mind what you've said to yet further concerns about fire risk assessor competency
00:05:35 risk assessor competency that were articulated in 2016. now by 2016 the order had been in place or enforced for a decade and i'm mindful of your evidence
00:05:46 and i'm mindful of your evidence yesterday that 10 years into the operation of the order might have been a useful date at which to review its effectiveness and so mindful of that decade anniversary we'll go through
00:05:57 decade anniversary we'll go through further concerns that were raised and also look at the response that the department made to those concerns now a letter was sent to theresa may then the home secretary by brian robinson of the fsf
00:06:10 robinson of the fsf on the 16th of june 2016 so just under one year before the grand fall fire
00:06:16 fall fire that letter can be found at clg travel travel035514
00:06:26 do you remember seeing this letter at the time it was received at the home office
00:06:37 no i don't i don't remember that's not to say i didn't see it i just don't remember if we can go to page three and the first paragraph
00:06:48 really the fifth line of that first paragraph mr robinson said this the fsf is also concerned that of the businesses checked for compliance in 2015 some
00:06:59 some 1932 percent were found to be unsatisfactory this raises concern about the competency of fire risk assessors in the wider industry and of fire service competency in the important area of
00:07:11 competency in the important area of inspection and audit now did you discuss that particular concern with policy colleagues at the department
00:07:21 i can't remember i'm i'm sorry i can't remember
00:07:24 remember do you remember any outcome flowing from this statistic provided by mr robinson
00:07:37 no did you go back to mr robinson to ask him about
00:07:43 him about the detail of the evidence they had gathered that justified these statistics no
00:07:50 no do you remember doing anything in response to this letter no i'm not i'm to be honest i'm not aware that i saw this letter
00:08:00 so i didn't take any action
00:08:04 on it well let's see if we can
00:08:09 help you with a further document that was dated october 2016 again produced by the fire sector federation and this was entitled uk fire competency registration scheme can be found at home
00:08:22 scheme can be found at home zero four three one nine five
00:08:31 now i think in
00:08:33 in your witness statement you are unaware of the existence of this document does that remain the case yeah i definitely don't think i've seen
00:08:44 yeah i definitely don't think i've seen this before
00:08:47 am i right in understanding that anthony moord who'd been the previous point man with the fsf had retired in july 2016.
00:08:57 he did retire around about then i did try to remember when when he retired but couldn't so i will take your word for that
00:09:06 that was anyone else sent to the fsf to uh observe their deliberations
00:09:16 no um no i did attend a meeting which i realized realised wasn't covered in my witness statement but when i saw dennis davis's evidence i think i
00:09:29 dennis davis's evidence i think i realized that i was at a meeting in
00:09:34 2017 at which fire safety competency was discussed i think it was april 2017 but i'd stand to be correct yes no i can't
00:09:46 i'd stand to be correct yes no i can't yes i've got i've got a copy of it um but i can't remember the exact date but i wasn't at this meeting as far as i recall and why was no one
00:09:57 as far as i recall and why was no one sent in mr maude's place because if someone had been sent or indeed if you yourself had attended you would have been aware presumably of the concerns that mr robinson had set
00:10:08 the concerns that mr robinson had set out in his letter to the home secretary of june 2016 and also the substance of this proposed competency registration scheme as well would you accept that yes absolutely
00:10:19 absolutely i don't i don't know why this didn't come across my desk or why it didn't register if it did come across my desk how could the department
00:10:31 across my desk how could the department remain engaged with the sector-led approach if it wasn't attending meetings of the fsf
00:10:42 i don't know whether somebody from the department did attend this meeting it just wasn't me i i just it's the basic fact you didn't know whether anyone was attending or not and didn't see fit to inquire as to whether
00:10:54 didn't see fit to inquire as to whether anyone was attending or not
00:10:59 yes probably yes
00:11:02 yes but i'm not sure i was even aware this meeting was going on but i don't know take your points yes well what were you doing to keep track
00:11:14 well what were you doing to keep track of what the sector was doing when you yourself
00:11:18 yourself were anxious to see a sector-led approach to fire safety
00:11:27 i think
00:11:30 we were kind of on standby to help if they had asked us for help i think
00:11:39 think what we talked spoke about yesterday staying engaged obviously we had
00:11:47 we had a stakeholder engagement contact we had anthony then anthony left there was obviously a gap and things fell between cracks
00:11:58 gap and things fell between cracks i i think it was just one of those unfortunate things that wasn't picked up but but
00:12:06 but but i wasn't actively engaged with the fire sector federation from the when they took over the
00:12:14 the development of the competency council of the development of the competency criteria and the development of schemes i i had other things to you know that
00:12:25 i i had other things to you know that there were other priorities for my team me
00:12:31 me well
00:12:32 well given fire you were head of the fire safety policy team given that the policy had been decided that it there ought to be a sector-led approach to fire safety and in particular the
00:12:44 to fire safety and in particular the competency of fire risk assessors it's not the most arduous drain on your resources
00:12:50 resources to ensure that someone attended their meeting or at least you had some insight into what the fire sector federation was doing is it
00:13:01 no not at all and i suppose he would have feedback you know when anthony was there and would attend the meetings he would um if anything came up we would be aware
00:13:13 um if anything came up we would be aware but i genuinely i'm not aware but once he'd gone no one yeah we didn't have a how are we going to plug this gap and what where where do we need to move people around to um plug
00:13:26 we need to move people around to um plug it or whether there was somebody who attended in anthony's place from within the team
00:13:31 the team i
00:13:32 i just genuinely don't know you ought to have known those shouldn't you
00:13:37 you yes
00:13:38 yes can we turn on to a separate topic which is lda guide and in particular vulnerable residents now
00:13:45 now it's right that you were on the project group representing the department uh when the guard was being drafted is that right yeah who else represented the department during that process
00:13:56 during that process um
00:13:58 um brian martin from building regulations and i think
00:14:05 peter wise from the chief fire and rescue advisors unit and i think occasionally i would bring in my colleagues from the community by safety bottle i take information back
00:14:17 by safety bottle i take information back to community fire safety colleagues but essentially i think it was two fire and rescue advisors unit fire safety unit and building regulation own housing of
00:14:28 and building regulation own housing of course there was also um housing policy colleagues represented on that group now we've seen mention in the documents to a reference group
00:14:39 to a reference group as well as a project group what did the reference group do if you can remember
00:14:46 yes i think the the reference group was there to identify it to make it manageable really to to agree what the guidance should cover
00:14:57 cover the handling the kind of policy and then it would present it its
00:15:04 its proposals for discussion and agreement by the much broader
00:15:10 um stakeholder group that were pulled together that expressed an interest that wanted to see this guidance developed was the department represented on the
00:15:21 was the department represented on the rep on the reference group yes
00:15:24 yes who
00:15:25 who i think probably richard longman initially
00:15:29 initially um
00:15:31 before he he left he kicked this piece of work off with the sector on behalf of the department myself
00:15:40 myself pete wise
00:15:42 pete wise and brian martin i think
00:15:46 i think we were heavily involved in in the reference group because we really saw the need for this guidance to be available
00:15:53 available to be right and so yeah we had a lot of skin in the game at the beginning but following on from that answer is it right
00:16:04 answer is it right that no one on the reference group was a disability specialist or a representative of an organization representing uh disabled people
00:16:14 with hindsight notices and he knew at the time there was no such representative is that right
00:16:24 i probably did but though but there were i think tenant and residents associations and landlords
00:16:33 who we're also on on that reference group i think
00:16:38 think i don't think it was a deliberate decision to exclude representatives i think we just i think you just didn't think about it yeah i think we just didn't think about it
00:16:51 think we just didn't think about it is it right that there was no representative of disabled people or a disability specialist on the project group either
00:17:06 um
00:17:10 no like with hindsight i would say no it wasn't right
00:17:15 right but
00:17:16 but i don't think we thought that that interest wouldn't have been covered
00:17:21 covered by the considerations of the project group i mean housing providers knew the demographic of people in in their
00:17:33 people in in their buildings
00:17:35 but did anyone raise the question whether that ought to be particular representation of the disabled as part of the deliberations
00:17:46 not as far as i'm aware but i believe the guidance covered
00:17:53 now can we look at the drafting and consultation process itself and can we look at paragraph 79.9 to 79.11 of the lga guide
00:18:01 lga guide to remind ourselves of what's in it and we can find that at home zero four five nine six four four slash one two zero
00:18:15 excuse me 79.9 says
00:18:18 79.9 says in general needs blocks of flats it can equally be expected that a resident's physical and mental ability will vary it is usually unrealistic to expect landlords and other responsible persons
00:18:29 landlords and other responsible persons to plan for this or to have in place special arrangements such as personal emergency evacuation plans such plans rely on the presence of staff or others available to assist the person
00:18:40 or others available to assist the person to escape in a fire 79.10 even in sheltered housing schemes there will be reliance ultimately on rescue by the fire and rescue service in the event that residents cannot escape
00:18:51 the event that residents cannot escape by themselves however in sheltered housing schemes it is commonplace to hold information relating to any resident with particular mobility or other issues affecting their ability to escape
00:19:03 ability to escape this can be made available to the fire and rescue service on arrival at the premises eg by keeping it in a premises information box which can only be unlocked by the fire and rescue service at the main
00:19:14 fire and rescue service at the main entrance
00:19:16 entrance excuse me details of any residents using oxygen and other medical gases are also usually kept with this information at 79.11 it is not realistic to expect such an
00:19:27 it is not realistic to expect such an approach to be adopted where there are disabled people and others requiring assistance in a general needs block any attempts to keep information of this kind must be updated regularly as
00:19:39 kind must be updated regularly as inaccurate information could potentially be more
00:19:42 be more harmful than no information first of all can we assume that you're familiar with these particular provisions is that a yes yes sorry yes given the lgi lga guide contained guidance about
00:19:55 lgi lga guide contained guidance about how to assist vulnerable and disabled persons in the event of a fire what if anything did you do and by that i mean you personally or the department to ensure that the authors of the guide sought the views of
00:20:07 the guide sought the views of organizations representing the disabled and the vulnerable
00:20:14 we didn't specifically as part of the consultation although it was a well-trailed widely i believe publicized consultation by the lg
00:20:25 lg and did you not do that because you assumed representatives of housing providers would articulate the views of the vulnerable and the disabled yes i think it was well known in the
00:20:36 yes i think it was well known in the sector that we were producing this guidance and the lgid were responsible for the consultation did this through the stakeholder groups it was publicly available
00:20:50 but no one thought to specifically address or seek the views of a disability specialist or those representing the disabled and the
00:21:01 representing the disabled and the vulnerable not as far as i'm aware in the department now the draft lga guide was put out for consultation and responses were called for by the 31st of may 2011.
00:21:15 for by the 31st of may 2011. did you review any of the consultee's responses
00:21:24 yes probably i mean i seem to remember there was a big table that we went through so yes
00:21:32 yes at that table accurately condensed the entirety of the consultee's responses is that right i don't know that i'm afraid i assume it would have now if we go to h o m treble zero
00:21:47 have now if we go to h o m treble zero one eight nine two eight forward slash one
00:21:50 one we find a report that was prepared by caroline is it boss day or boss debt um who's the lead for the project manager
00:21:59 manager now can you recall seeing this document before
00:22:09 yes but not probably but not recently i imagine i would have seen it now we understand that the substance of the document was discussed at a project
00:22:20 the document was discussed at a project group meeting on the 22nd of june 2011
00:22:24 2011 and if we look at the bottom of page one the final paragraph said this listed below are the key themes that emerge from the consultation and issues that the project group are asked to take
00:22:36 that the project group are asked to take a view on to inform the finalization of the guidance and then if we go to page two
00:22:44 we see third row down theme people with disabilities and then in the far right hand column the heading issue to resolve
00:22:55 issue to resolve and under that column in respect to the third row it says this the premise of escape route design in general needs blocks of flats is that people can escape unaided from their own
00:23:07 people can escape unaided from their own flat
00:23:08 flat clearly some people can't just as they can't in houses through age or disability while the problem is well recognized and highlighted by many respondents
00:23:19 highlighted by many respondents no solutions have been suggested how can this be further addressed in the guidance if at all was that particular issue discussed at the meeting on the 22nd of june 2011
00:23:34 i'm afraid i can't remember can you recall whether the project group formed any view as to how persons unable to escape unaided would be assisted in the event
00:23:46 unaided would be assisted in the event of a fire
00:23:57 no um
00:23:59 um obviously
00:24:02 i was trying to think how to structure my thoughts around this obviously um
00:24:09 um the guidance aimed to ensure that
00:24:14 that flats were safe for people to stay
00:24:20 stay in their flat in their own home if they didn't have the fire in their own home for
00:24:25 for as long as possible the guidance recognized i think that that may not be possible for everybody so there was it talked about premises information
00:24:36 it talked about premises information boxes
00:24:39 but
00:24:44 it it also recognized that ultimately for some people the fire and rescue service may need to rescue them evacuate them
00:24:55 if they were aware they were there during the course of an operational incident
00:25:02 incident but no it goes back i suppose to the stay put principle and being unable to move people out of their own homes simply because they were
00:25:12 they were disabled um miss upton is the answer you just given your recollection of the discussion of this particular issue on the 22nd of june
00:25:23 particular issue on the 22nd of june 2011 or is this an after event rationalization as to why there's no specific advice given
00:25:38 i can't tell anymore i'm afraid let's see we can ask something more particular given
00:25:45 given the feedback here that the problem had been well recognized and highlighted by many respondents but no solution had been
00:25:54 had been suggested was that a prompt to seek the advice from a disability specialist or from those groups representing the disabled and vulnerable
00:26:13 yes and i'm
00:26:17 and i'm just not sure that that that wouldn't have been done or although that would have been included within that there was
00:26:25 there was no simple solution to how you get somebody out of there you know disability is not necessarily a permanent thing
00:26:36 the principle of a peep which was set out in legislation was applied to workplaces and it made employers responsible and people looking after the public but in your own home
00:26:51 it it
00:26:55 it that responsibility didn't exist as far as i'm aware on landlords that statutory duty on landlords or housing providers to to do that so there
00:27:06 housing providers to to do that so there was no easy solution around making that so other than giving guidance without changing legislation to clarify
00:27:18 clarify that the idea was that buildings were safe for residents to
00:27:26 to general needs blocks were safe for everyone to be there unless they had a fire in their own home it's often that's not an answer to the question i asked sorry
00:27:38 did the fact that the problem was well recognized and highlighted by many respondents and the absence of solutions to that problem prompt at that meeting on the
00:27:50 problem prompt at that meeting on the 22nd of june 2011 consideration of the need to retain a special someone who's a disability specialist or to engage with those representing the
00:28:01 engage with those representing the interests of the disabled and vulnerable not as far as i'm aware but i'm not aware of whether there was engagement with those representatives again my next question is specific
00:28:14 again my next question is specific did the project group seek to commission any research or embark upon a further round of consultation focused on the issue of what solutions
00:28:26 focused on the issue of what solutions if any there were to help those unable to evacuate unaided not as far as i'm aware
00:28:39 could we look down further in the same document to the bottom of page two where it says in the left hand column occupancy vulnerable and in the corresponding right hand side
00:28:51 and in the corresponding right hand side it says this issue of peeps that's personal emergency evacuation plans these are not appropriate in general needs is there enough in the document to help reduce the risk through references to
00:29:04 reduce the risk through references to cfs what's that community fire safety and hfscs home fire
00:29:15 safety checks sorry and turning over the page and partnership providers again
00:29:23 again what was can you remember what was discussed about this particular issue this particular issue at the project group meeting can we just go back to the first page
00:29:35 can we just go back to the first page or to the page um
00:29:42 yeah so the guy i suppose the guidance
00:29:52 covered the knee which was you know which was put together with um fire and rescue authorities who were very engaged in home fire safety
00:30:05 very engaged in home fire safety checks and community fire safety and gave advice to residents around what to do in the event of a fire um
00:30:14 um we reflected that in the guidance and we encourage you know after lacking our house this went right up the agenda there's lots of community fire safety activity
00:30:27 community fire safety activity in purpose-built blocks of flats and
00:30:32 and they
00:30:34 they fire and rescue services were well aware of the needs of the disable of disabled people and it was a kind of a tailored bespoke approach i imagine when they visited
00:30:46 approach i imagine when they visited these people to give them advice on what to do in the event of a fire check that they had working smoke alarms they would
00:30:55 give that advice
00:30:58 advice specifically bespoke advice to the particular resident i'm sorry to interrupt miss upton my question that's not an answer to the question i asked sorry what was the
00:31:09 question i asked sorry what was the question
00:31:10 question what if anything did you discuss about the issue of peeps and vulnerable occupants at the meeting can you remember
00:31:22 no it was just i think i can remember it was just a problem that was addressed through other means because
00:31:33 through other means because there was
00:31:38 very little there was no requirement for there to be a personal evacuation plan for a resident it was a responsibility of the landlord to
00:31:49 responsibility of the landlord to understand the people in in i'm sorry they just i just think there was
00:31:58 no easy answer and i i suspect
00:32:02 that that yes let's look at it from a different perspective if we go to paragraph 78 of colin todd's witness statement which is at cta quadruple zero double zero one
00:32:14 at cta quadruple zero double zero one two forward slash seventeen
00:32:22 and we see paragraph 78 in the lower half of that page he said this as noted earlier in this statement i recollect very clearly the subject of peeps being discussed the project group in response
00:32:33 discussed the project group in response to our request for guidance any decision the consensus opinion of the project group was that it should be acknowledged in the lga guide that peeps were impracticable because of the difficulty
00:32:45 impracticable because of the difficulty of collating information and keeping it update
00:32:49 update now
00:32:50 now please listen to the question do you recall the discussion that discussion about peeps at the project group meeting in june 2011
00:33:02 not particularly can you help us as to why the considered view of the project board was that peeps were not practicable is it for the reasons given by mr todd
00:33:14 is it for the reasons given by mr todd there
00:33:18 yes i think i i think certainly those are two of the reasons why it was practical but
00:33:25 but in the con there there was no one there
00:33:31 there unlike in a i suppose i'm looking at it from my fire safety regulation rather than from a housing provision providers perspective but
00:33:43 but in most cases these premises didn't have anyone available like a caretaker or a concierge who in the event of a fire
00:33:55 concierge who in the event of a fire in somebody's flat
00:33:57 flat would be available to help them evacuate it if needed now can we look at the consultation response from the chief
00:34:08 consultation response from the chief fire officers association hom quadruple zero two double six zero
00:34:22 and if we go to page two
00:34:28 you see that the name of the organization the top box and whose name it was submitted
00:34:36 now do you recall considering the chief officers association response
00:34:45 um yes and i think there was there were more than one
00:34:52 now do you recall speaking specifically and it may well be if we can go to page seven
00:35:04 we look under the topic question of diversity question six the question asks this do you think the guidance deals adequately with vulnerable people such as people with disabilities who need assistance with
00:35:16 disabilities who need assistance with evacuation in the event of a fire and the answer in detail said this the document as stated earlier tends to avoid any reflection on the effect of
00:35:28 avoid any reflection on the effect of occupancy on the adequacy of provision over and above stating the minimum required for building regulation or benchmark compliance experience shows us that state put
00:35:39 experience shows us that state put policy is adopted in many situations to overcome difficulties with disabled evacuation with the building failing to meet the standards required for stay put many providers have taken great effort
00:35:50 many providers have taken great effort to provide access for disabled persons and fail to appreciate the difficulties in their fire situation when the measures they have provided cannot be used in a fire situation
00:36:02 used in a fire situation additionally the document states that where fire may start in common areas then occupants in these areas should make their way out of the building to ignore and eliminate advice on disabled access and evacuation
00:36:14 disabled access and evacuation is a fundamental error of the document and is recommended that it must be included
00:36:22 included were you aware of that particular comment yes it probably was were you aware in particular that sifoa was concerned that the draft lga
00:36:34 was concerned that the draft lga ignored and eliminated advice on disabled access and evacuation i was clearly aware that and andy cloak
00:36:46 from seafarer had had that view
00:36:53 wasn't that a further prompt to engage the services of a disability specialist and or to engage with those groups who represented the disabled and
00:37:04 groups who represented the disabled and the vulnerable on this crucial issue
00:37:12 yes the project group did nothing about it did they
00:37:19 i assume we talked about the comments that had been made and it was reflected in the evidence from colin todd and what was in the guidance
00:37:30 was in the guidance you talked about it but it didn't do anything about it
00:37:35 no and no um could we go to another uh piece of evidence and that's a letter from elsbeth grant sent on the 23rd of august 2011.
00:37:46 23rd of august 2011. um elsbeth grant was director of a company called triple a consult and it was sent to semeric uh cockle who is the chairman of the local government group um and it was sent
00:37:57 government group um and it was sent after the lga guide was published if we go to the letter it's a hmo trouble zero one nine eight double four
00:38:07 have you seen that letter before
00:38:14 i'm not i'm not sure i think probably and is this the type of letter that would have been sent to you once it had been received is it touched on matters concerning fire
00:38:25 is it touched on matters concerning fire safety policy yes probably to the department certainly now the first paragraph says this as a fire safety consultant who has worked with disabled people for many
00:38:37 worked with disabled people for many years i'm writing to you as chairman of the local government group to request that the guidance titled fire safety in purpose built flat blocks of flats is withdrawn and amended as the advice
00:38:48 withdrawn and amended as the advice contained within is contrary to the law then if we look at the fourth paragraph on page one it says this the advice given in these clauses is effectively stating that responsible
00:38:59 effectively stating that responsible persons do not have to be equal in their fire safety planning the personal emergency evacuation plans peeps
00:39:07 peeps are unrealistic and that responsible people are able to transfer their responsibilities to the fire and rescue services and then she cites the clauses we've
00:39:18 and then she cites the clauses we've already looked at and if we go over to page two
00:39:23 these clauses ie 79.9 through to 11 of the guide
00:39:28 the guide reflect an outdated viewpoint which is highly discriminative and not in line with uk legislation relating to equality or fire safety furthermore the wording is directly
00:39:41 furthermore the wording is directly contradictory to the legal advice given in department of communities and local governments fire risk assessment for sleeping accommodation and the supplementary guide means of escape for disabled people lake horse housing fire
00:39:54 disabled people lake horse housing fire safety guidance and bs quadruple 9 2008 then if we could turn to page four in the first paragraph on that page under the heading conclusion
00:40:05 under the heading conclusion if this guidance is not amended building managers and landlords who follow this advice will continue to discriminate in the area of fire safety against disabled
00:40:16 the area of fire safety against disabled people who represent one-fifth of the population and indeed will be open to criminal
00:40:21 criminal or civil prosecution now
00:40:28 what did you do on seeing this letter
00:40:35 i think i would have thought that the premise of the letter was wrong because the guidance she was talking about related to not people in their own home but to
00:40:47 not people in their own home but to people responsibilities for those providing
00:40:51 providing accommodation
00:40:56 that weren't people's own homes either you know it goes back to the the you know common parts the order applied in workplaces and common parts and in
00:41:09 in workplaces and common parts and in hotels this related to people paying for accommodation rather than living in a domestic premise they're at their own home
00:41:21 they're at their own home and i
00:41:24 believe the principle of it was up to the person with a disability to ask their employer or the responsible person to have a
00:41:35 or the responsible person to have a personal evacuation plan it wasn't a requirement that responsible people
00:41:43 did it unless asked
00:41:47 so i think i would have felt that the premise of the letter was wrong and it was it simply reflected the difficulty of people living in their own homes
00:42:01 people living in their own homes and what they would do in the event of a fire because it's no different if you're in if you're a disabled person in a if you have a fire in your flat to
00:42:13 in a if you have a fire in your flat to if you
00:42:14 if you are living in a you know a house or a bungalow and you have a fire [Music]
00:42:21 [Music] there's no one there necessarily miss upton if that was your response on seeing this letter um i'd suggest that it misses the point and it misses the point spectacularly
00:42:33 and it misses the point spectacularly the point that else beth grant was making here is that the weight of the advice in paragraph 79.9 to 79.11 violated
00:42:43 violated anti-discrimination laws in this country now first of all are you a lawyer no do you have any knowledge or specialism in
00:42:51 in discrimination law no
00:42:54 no did it cross your mind to seek the advice from those who did have such specialism and knowledge no
00:43:02 no sorry so i suppose it was lga guidance lga were representing the housing providers i know this sounds terrible but i'm not sure i would have
00:43:14 but i'm not sure i would have seen it as
00:43:17 solely my responsibility to do that i think the department to use your phrase had skin in the game yeah you could have raised
00:43:28 yeah you could have raised the question whether advice needed to be obtained couldn't you yes and that wasn't done no
00:43:41 now in his evidence colin todd explained that the letter was brought to the project group for discussion do you remember a meeting at which this letter was discussed
00:44:00 as part of
00:44:03 not specifically no i'm afraid you make the valid point that there are a number of people and bodies represented on the project group did anyone on that project group suggest
00:44:15 anyone on that project group suggest that specialist advice should be sought on the matters raised by elsberth grant's letter no not as far as i'm aware do you recall anyone at that meeting
00:44:26 do you recall anyone at that meeting recommending that a disability specialist ought to be engaged or there ought to be discussions with organizations representing the interests of the disabled or vulnerable on the issues raised
00:44:38 issues raised no no one raised it i don't remember anybody raising it
00:44:46 could we go to clg one treble zero four nine zero seven
00:44:53 now this is an email chain to which you are copied which attached the initial response prepared by cs todd and associates
00:45:04 cs todd and associates we can see that you're copied in there you're the first one on the list of
00:45:08 list of uh copy e's if that's a word if we can go to the draft letter clg one treble zero four nine zero six
00:45:23 do you remember seeing that particular draft
00:45:31 i'm not sure i'm afraid now if we
00:45:35 now if we stay on page one but look at the second paragraph
00:45:39 paragraph the proposed response said this we have given careful consideration to the point you have made including seeking clarification from the original drafting team as well as the project group responsible for managing
00:45:51 project group responsible for managing the development and publication of the guide
00:45:54 guide we hope that the following response will provide you with the explanation behind the recommendations given in the guide and reassure you that the particular needs of disabled and vulnerable people have been taken into account
00:46:08 have been taken into account had the authors of this letter sought clarification from the project group
00:46:16 at this stage can you remember
00:46:20 no i can't i can't tell you the dates i know
00:46:24 know if we look at the next paragraph it said this the process involved in producing the guide involved extensive public consultation which was the widely publicized in addition we held several road shows
00:46:36 in addition we held several road shows to canvas views on what should be included in the guide and on some of the proposed content while we did not receive your comments at this stage i think it means at that stage there was
00:46:47 think it means at that stage there was considerable feedback on the issue of safety of disabled and vulnerable people living in flats within a purpose-built block and the extent to which the guide should
00:46:56 should and can address this
00:47:00 did you know or can you help us whether the authors of the lga guide had in fact sought feedback from or the views of disability specialists or those representing the disabled for the
00:47:12 representing the disabled for the purposes of this letter
00:47:16 now i'm afraid i can't if we look at the bottom of page two of the letter and the second last paragraph the proposed response said this you will appreciate that in the vast
00:47:29 you will appreciate that in the vast majority of blocks of flats no one is employed to be present to provide any form of assistance to residents in the normal use of the building let alone in emergencies we therefore can see little value in preparing peeps when no one is
00:47:42 value in preparing peeps when no one is available to implement them we are sympathetic to the suggestion which you and others have made about holding information on vulnerable and disabled people that can be accessed by the fire and rescue service
00:47:54 the fire and rescue service while we are aware of organizations that have put this in place we do not consider it reasonable and practical to recommend that this is adopted by way of default in all blocks of flats
00:48:05 of flats it would place a significant burden on those managing blocks of flats to continuously update the information indeed we have emphasized that inaccurate information might be more
00:48:16 inaccurate information might be more harmful than no information can i take it from your previous answers that you agree with the views set out in that paragraph yes
00:48:29 can you remember whether before this letter was drafted any specialist legal advice was sought by the project group or the
00:48:41 by the project group or the draftsman of this letter to ensure that the lga guide in fact complied with the legislation and particularly the equality act 2010 no
00:48:51 no i can't i imagine that we would have i imagine that would have been with the lg
00:48:58 lg id to have done as the owners of the guide but you never saw any advice no now if we look at the response that was in fact sent to elizabeth grant that's
00:49:10 in fact sent to elizabeth grant that's at clg
00:49:12 at clg one treble zero four nine three two
00:49:23 the response was signed by caroline bosday the project manager of the fire safety guidance project do you remember reviewing this letter before it was sent
00:49:46 um no but that's not to say that i don't remember it today but that's not fair didn't and if we could look at the top of page two in the second line it says this
00:49:57 it says this and i can reassure you that the particular needs of people with disabilities and vulnerable people have been taken into account throughout the guidance
00:50:05 guidance there were no practical solutions offered to address the issue of evacuation of people with disabilities from purpose-built blocks of flats
00:50:15 do you think that was a satisfactory answer given the failure to seek specialist advice
00:50:24 advice in response to the absence of suggested solutions produced by the consultation exercise
00:50:38 with hindsight no obviously um
00:50:45 i'm not sure
00:50:48 whether there were practical solutions to the problem
00:50:55 but specialists may have been able to help they might and they but specialists may have been able to help and
00:51:01 help and certainly
00:51:04 i suppose it
00:51:07 it would have been open to specialists at this point having received this letter to then come back and say you know
00:51:14 know the fact we didn't at the time doesn't mean that had specialists come back and say well these are some practical things you could put into the guidance i'm just saying that might not have prompted us to look again at the
00:51:26 prompted us to look again at the guidance
00:51:27 guidance what i'm not aware of anything happening after was that any practical solutions did follow from this letter which almost seems to be an invitation
00:51:39 seems to be an invitation now
00:51:40 now you can take it from me that the this response we're looking at the moment uh didn't tell elsbeth grant that the underlying rationale for the lga guide's position on peeps was
00:51:51 guide's position on peeps was an anxiety to avoid imposing disproportionate burdens on landlords do you know why that rationale was not explained to elizabeth grant
00:52:05 no
00:52:07 would you accept it should have been in a spirited candor can we now move on to a separate topic which is an evaluation exercise that was carried out in july
00:52:18 carried out in july 2012.
00:52:19 2012. now as we touched upon yesterday afternoon there was an evaluation exercise after the lga guide had been around for one year and if we can look at the draft report
00:52:31 and if we can look at the draft report again it's a hom trouble zero two three two eight zero
00:52:42 and again if we go to page 11.
00:52:48 point five jumbo we looked at this yesterday afternoon
00:52:52 afternoon section five asked the question do you think there are any gaps in the guidance and it went on to say in the first bullet point issues around vulnerable people
00:53:01 people we find severely disabled persons living in purpose-built flats who are at risk if there is a fire and they cannot self-evacuate lack of government understanding on this
00:53:12 understanding on this and if we move down and look at the eighth bullet point it said this more guidance for personal evacuation plans for residents known to have difficulties with or be unable to escape unaided would be useful
00:53:26 unaided would be useful now the issue raised here was effectively that or covered the same ground as the issues articulated by elsmath grant's letter would you agree with that
00:53:40 yes did you or anyone else in the department take any action to address this gap that had been identified in the evaluation exercise particularly in relation to
00:53:51 exercise particularly in relation to vulnerable persons who could not self-evacuate
00:53:58 no not in respect of purpose-built flats but i think we were very mindful of the fact that there were an awful lot of
00:54:09 awful lot of um people with disabilities living in bespoke accommodation sheltered housing or um
00:54:17 or um care in in their home so i
00:54:21 i i think what this prompted was that in general needs blocks where there is a different you know risk is not as great as in specific sheltered
00:54:33 is not as great as in specific sheltered housing schemes i think we worked we recognized the concerns but that
00:54:42 but that the risk was less in general needs housing because obviously we never anticipated a grantful scenario um
00:54:50 um so and we worked with c fowar who had these concerns to produce um to encourage them because the government could have produced guidance
00:55:02 government could have produced guidance which would impose regulatory burdens particularly easily it's absolutely are you all right carry on i am sorry no no but if you'd like a break
00:55:13 break we can take one no i'll let's finish this we'll get as far as we can with this but we did take action to work with sifoa to
00:55:26 to work with sifoa to develop
00:55:28 develop a different version of fire safety guidance
00:55:32 guidance with the sector for people living in sheltered or specialized housing but for general needs blocks
00:55:44 but for general needs blocks where people with disabilities would come and go you wouldn't necessarily know who was living in your premises it
00:55:52 it it was very very difficult
00:55:58 so i've come to the end of this topic it might be possibly a useful juncture maybe to have a 10-minute break now so have the mid-morning break slightly early we could take it early and we can indeed it won't matter if we have more
00:56:10 indeed it won't matter if we have more than one so should we have a break now yes i think that would be a good thing we'll stop now we'll we'll come back at 10 past 11 and uh usual instructions don't talk to
00:56:22 and uh usual instructions don't talk to anyone about your evidence but the fact that we're taking the break early doesn't prevent us from having another break a bit later in the morning if you think that would be helpful all right
00:56:31 right all right will you go to the usher now then we'll see a bit later
00:56:43 thank you 10 faster thanks
01:12:58 all right would you ask them to come back in please
01:13:13 sorry we kept you waiting a little bit longer than i suggested i'm sorry about that
01:13:17 that are you now comfortable to carry on i think so right i apologize you don't have to apologize and we understand very well how difficult it is sometimes dealing with questions and um we're very happy
01:13:30 with questions and um we're very happy to have another break later on if that seems sensible all right all right good thank you very much yes mr miss upton the two next sections i'd like to deal with are first of all the
01:13:41 like to deal with are first of all the building regulations and see
01:13:45 see what you can assist us with on that and then find it with the drafting of gra 3.2
01:13:50 3.2 and the points that you raised in relation to the drafts that were circulating then but if i can turn to the first one which is building regulations um
01:13:59 um were there any particular matters on which uh you usually expected mr martin to update you on current issues and the rest of it um
01:14:11 no but we were very very closely we you know we were a little core fire safety team with different obviously policy responsibilities there was
01:14:22 was nobody else i could talk to like i could talk to brian so we kind of our work
01:14:31 our work certain aspects of our work um we would talk about all the time on a regular ad hoc informal basis so
01:14:40 basis so i can't think of anything specific but we were talking all the time about fire safety in its broadest possible sense would he update
01:14:51 broadest possible sense would he update you on things like changes in construction or design practice that he became aware of that you would need to know about from wearing your fire safety policy hat
01:15:04 um he would probably he almost certainly would tell me about those things but i'm not sure i would have seen with my that
01:15:15 that he would have tried but i probably wouldn't have understood as much
01:15:21 as you might think because i was a policy person not a technical person but also
01:15:28 but also the
01:15:30 the fire safety order was looking at buildings that had the extent but it was i suppose it was more for my general awareness of the fire safety environment rather than from how it touched on my
01:15:41 how it touched on my specific policy responsibilities do you remember whether he raised any specific concerns with you regarding changes in construction and design practice did do
01:15:53 construction and design practice did do any
01:15:54 any concerns particularly stay in your mind
01:16:03 no not not really i mean it was a fast moving you know the construction industry was a fast-moving thing we worked together on um in
01:16:14 on um in procedural guidance which aimed to
01:16:18 ensure building owners had awareness of the way their buildings had been constructed and that was a i suppose the closest i seem to recall it coming to um
01:16:32 i seem to recall it coming to um that kind of thing but no not not particularly how familiar were you with the detail of approved document b um not at all
01:16:43 not at all i'd say so if anyone asked you um your views on the requirements of b4
01:16:50 b4 you wouldn't have any views whatsoever because it was not something you knew about
01:16:55 about i think i know b4
01:16:59 spread of flame but um fire
01:17:03 fire on the outside of a building but um no i would say that's a building regulations issue you know i kind of going back to yesterday's discussion understood when my competence
01:17:14 discussion understood when my competence ended to talk sensibly about these things
01:17:17 things and so beyond the fact that you knew that b4 covered external fire spread you had no more detailed knowledge than that no
01:17:27 no what did you know about the risks posed by acm products with a pe core
01:17:33 pe core when used in external wall arrangements on high-rise buildings
01:17:38 that they shouldn't be be there just um and that was your knowledge that was your understanding before the fire
01:17:47 yes before grenfell yes i mean but i knew that that there were i i obviously knew there had been significant fires in
01:17:58 significant fires in other countries which had
01:18:02 gone up the side of the building you know as aware of significant fires but didn't think that that was something that would happen here we'll come up we'll come on to this okay due
01:18:13 come up we'll come on to this okay due course um what did you know about acm products uh beyond the fact that existed um
01:18:20 um that i think and
01:18:26 no that was about it was it yes and and that you know refurbishments would you know use cladding onto you know to for insulation you know
01:18:38 for insulation you know i knew why companies used it range screen to improve the look of these buildings that they were increasingly common um yeah but but no i didn't
01:18:51 yeah but but no i didn't before the fire were you aware that acm panels or the pe core were being used on the external walls of high-rise buildings no
01:19:05 were you aware even in broad terms of any discussion or debate about uh interpretation about the scope or meaning of the guidance on external fire spread in paragraphs 12.6 and 12.7 of approved
01:19:18 paragraphs 12.6 and 12.7 of approved document b
01:19:21 no no only in so far as it had been it had come up in the lacanal inquest and the need for
01:19:31 need for adb to be reviewed and it was one of the things that um was on the long list of things to be imagined reviewed as part of adb but nothing more than that
01:19:44 nothing more than that um were you aware um that brian martin had been asked by the bre in november 2013
01:19:50 2013 to think about a definition for the term filler material etc in paragraph 12.7 of approved document b no
01:20:01 um were you aware that brian martin had been informed at a meeting or at least by the minutes following a meeting of the cwct fire group on the 2nd of july 2014 that the wording in paragraph
01:20:14 july 2014 that the wording in paragraph 12.7 was not clear and in particular that it was not clear that it was intended to apply to any component other than insulation in an external wall arrangement
01:20:26 arrangement no no
01:20:28 no no were you aware that brian martin had been informed in all before july 2014 that a combustible insulation material namely kingspan's k-15 cool therm had been in widespread use in the external
01:20:40 been in widespread use in the external facades of high-rise blocks of flats for some years despite the fact that it was not a material of limited combustibility no i wasn't
01:20:51 no i wasn't were you aware that brian martin had been asked by the nhbc in june 2015 to give a definition again of the term filler material etc and it declined to do so
01:21:01 do so and i wasn't aware uh were you informed oh sorry were you aware that mr martin had been informed in february 2016 by nick jenkins of booth murray that acm panels
01:21:13 jenkins of booth murray that acm panels with a pe core had been and continued to be used on high-rise buildings across the country linking the matter directly to the ambiguity in paragraphs 12.16 and 12.17 of approved document b and asking
01:21:26 12.17 of approved document b and asking for brian martin for a less ambiguous statement to the requirements no i wasn't finally were you aware that mr martin had told members of the cwct fire group
01:21:38 had told members of the cwct fire group at their second meeting on the 17th of march 2016. that paragraph 12.7 of proof document b was quotes open to interpretation close quotes and quotes
01:21:49 interpretation close quotes and quotes misleading close quotes and that you would need to be changing it in the next revision of approved document b no i wasn't aware are those matters which you would have
01:22:00 are those matters which you would have expected mr martin to keep you abreast of
01:22:04 of no
01:22:05 no no no no not really and why
01:22:08 and why well they related specifically to building regulation
01:22:14 to the building regulations which was um
01:22:19 um brian's divisions work and
01:22:24 work and um
01:22:27 no we we had you know we we came together when we when we needed to i suppose there were lots of discussions that we had separately and didn't keep each other abreast of but
01:22:40 didn't keep each other abreast of but um
01:22:41 um the base and i assumed the reason was that
01:22:47 i might i don't know why no sorry it don't work um can we turn on to um uh some international fires um and first of all the mammals terrify and rube in
01:22:58 of all the mammals terrify and rube in may 2012. and could we go to clg trouble zero one nine one seven nine
01:23:11 and here we can see that on the 18th of may 2012 uh brian martin forwarded to you peter wise and ken knight an email that he'd received regarding a father
01:23:22 that he'd received regarding a father mama's tower in ruby france now if we scroll down we can see that the video was attached but in the main paragraph of the email we can see the words the fire is
01:23:34 we can see the words the fire is believed
01:23:35 believed to have started on the first or perhaps the second floor has been attributed to a gas cylinder carboy exploding the fire quickly spread up 18 floors firefighters first on the scene quickly
01:23:47 firefighters first on the scene quickly called for reinforcement and approximately a hundred firefighters attended the fire a number of residents were able to evacuate the building early into the fire but the fire service explained that the stairwells quickly filled with smoke
01:23:59 the stairwells quickly filled with smoke the rest of the residents were advised to stay in their flats there was one fatality an elderly woman and ten injuries including four children and a serious case of smoke inhalation 250
01:24:10 serious case of smoke inhalation 250 people were evacuated from the building a dozen flats were totally destroyed in the fire
01:24:15 the fire and we see brian martin's response in the email above at the top of the page where he says for info the video on the second link is pretty alarming this wouldn't be in accordance with the
01:24:26 wouldn't be in accordance with the building regs open brackets probably close brackets do you know why brian martin would have sent you this video for info has he termed it
01:24:41 no i think he would have thought it was important that we were aware of the detail of it and the firefighters response and um
01:24:56 do you remember watching the attached video miss upton
01:25:01 um
01:25:04 i'm not sure i've seen a number of videos of
01:25:07 videos of buyers in high-rise building i'm not sure this one i can remember it particularly
01:25:16 did you know why or did you understand the reasons for the extensive external fire spread on that particular building yeah i think it was similar to spread up the clouding as it had done in
01:25:28 spread up the clouding as it had done in places like dubai i'd seen [Music]
01:25:31 [Music] and india and places other international fires had done the same thing um
01:25:40 um and were you aware that the the fire in ruby
01:25:44 ruby involved acm panels with a pe core
01:25:55 no i'm not sure i was uh not that
01:25:59 not that level of detail or or even if i was aware i would have thought that that wouldn't have been allowed on the build you know it was a different regulatory
01:26:10 you know it was a different regulatory system potentially what did you understand brian martin to mean when he said and i quote this wouldn't be in accordance with the building regs open brackets probably close brackets
01:26:30 there was a lack of clara i think it mean you know you'll be touching on this elsewhere but i think
01:26:38 i think i i think i probably didn't register the
01:26:43 the probably um particularly i think i was more assured by this would be in accordance with the building regulations i think
01:26:55 building regulations i think and so you don't remember any subsequent conversation when you said well
01:27:01 well what is the element of doubt and what does that relate to
01:27:07 would you have gone to the text of the building regs or approved document b to look at what might be the relevant provisions here
01:27:29 it seemed clear to me with no detail that you're just reading the functional requirement that cladding shouldn't do shouldn't cladding that did that shouldn't be on buildings like
01:27:42 shouldn't be on buildings like a residential building do you know whether mr martin went back to
01:27:49 to review the building regulations or the guidance and approved document b to see how relevant provisions of those documents might control or restrict the use of materials that appear to be present in
01:28:00 materials that appear to be present in the ruby fire no i don't know do you remember any further discussions about the ruby fire and its possible consequences for fire safety policy with
01:28:11 consequences for fire safety policy with the likes of either peter wise or ken knight or anyone else
01:28:21 no i i don't i don't i think
01:28:32 if it's possibly complacent but i think we genuinely thought this wouldn't happen here no um
01:28:40 no um you've referred to in earlier answers um fires elsewhere um can i just um discuss with you which ones you were aware of at the time
01:28:52 at the time are you okay yes fine um um
01:28:56 um will you at least if i take you through some it may be easier that way yeah um were you aware of the al baker tower fire in uh uh 18 on the 18th of january 2012.
01:29:10 not sure that's not ringing a bell i'll tire tower on the 28th of april 2012 um
01:29:19 um no but i've probably grouped those into fights that happened in dubai or uae uae yeah and so the the the saeef belhasa building on the 6th of october 2012.
01:29:31 building on the 6th of october 2012. yeah
01:29:31 yeah tamweel tower november 2012 and then the al-hafiz tower fire in april uh 2013. were you aware of
01:29:42 were you aware of collectively yes that there had been a number of fires yeah were you later aware of the lacrosse turf in melbourne in australia that was in november 2014
01:29:55 no i'm not sure i was i've got family in australia so i'm not sure i was aware of that one because i might have remembered just because the family of the connection
01:30:06 because the family of the connection yeah
01:30:07 yeah um what discussion was there um in the fire safety department more generally in the department about the circumstances of the uae fires and the consequences for
01:30:19 and the consequences for domestic regulation in this country i think it was all very little with me from a fire safety policy point of view because it was
01:30:30 policy point of view because it was um
01:30:36 much more pertinent to um building regulations but by 2014 we'd obviously have given the commitments that building
01:30:47 have given the commitments that building regulations would be reviewed we'd recognize the lack of clarity that the coroner had highlighted and there was a
01:30:59 plan in place to review adb or i i think it's i think there was a plan in place to ensure that that commitment was delivered at
01:31:11 delivered at by 2016 at that point and so i this this these issues would have been picked up in respect of that recommendation from the lack of
01:31:23 that recommendation from the lack of house coroner and were you aware that uh each of the uae fires in 2012 and 2013 each involved acm pe panels
01:31:34 yes i thought i think it probably was because
01:31:37 because of the
01:31:37 of the shooting up the building yeah now can we um turn to the torch fire which is in dubai in february 2015 and if we go to an email chain which is at clg trouble zero
01:31:50 email chain which is at clg trouble zero 31073
01:32:04 and we see the third mail in the chain is an email sent from peter holland who is then the chief file rescue adviser to you brian martin neil o'connor and others at 9 33 on the 21st of february
01:32:16 others at 9 33 on the 21st of february 2015. now the title of the email is dubai high-rise fire and mr holland said this the fire last night in the badly named high-rise torch building appears to have spread rapidly
01:32:28 building appears to have spread rapidly up the outside of the building due to inadequate or non-existent fire resistance in the external elements of the structure they've had previous fires in dubai where this has been a similar problem
01:32:40 where this has been a similar problem thankfully it appears that the internal fire precautions have worked well enough to enable the circa 2000 occupants to escape safely brian martin will be able to confirm that this shouldn't be a problem in this country peter now if we
01:32:53 problem in this country peter now if we go up the chain to the next email we see brian martin's reply on the 21st of february at 1109 he wrote this as peter says they've had a few similar
01:33:04 as peter says they've had a few similar incidents in dubai there are provisions in the building regulations designed to prevent this kind of problem so this should not be a problem in the uk there are of course no guarantees
01:33:17 there are of course no guarantees did you know what provisions and the building regulations mr martin had in mind
01:33:21 mind no other than the functional requirement that
01:33:26 that shouldn't
01:33:27 shouldn't suffice spread of flame on cladding no and
01:33:31 and did you ever have cause to ask mr martin what provisions he had in mind here in more detail
01:33:39 no
01:33:42 did you understand what the problem was which was prevented by the building regulations as you understood it yes the fire shouldn't travel up cladding
01:33:54 cladding and did you establish how the provisions and the building regulations prevented quotes this kind of problem close quotes than that there was a functional
01:34:05 than that there was a functional requirement for them not to do that no and
01:34:09 and had you been briefed that this this this particular dubai fire also involved acm pe panels
01:34:20 i'm i'm not sure about i don't know i can't remember um did you establish what the internal fire precautions were which peter holland had said had worked well enough to enable
01:34:31 said had worked well enough to enable the 2000 occupants to escape safely
01:34:39 no but i would have read that as the compartmentation had been sound and
01:34:45 and in
01:34:46 in i'm not sure whether this is going too far but i think these buildings had um sprinklers installed in them um and that those would have
01:34:59 i have a very clear picture in my mind of a fire with a sprinkler in it where the whole of the outside had burnt but you could see where the sprinklers had protected
01:35:10 had protected the inside of the sprinklers had gone off and they protected the inside of the
01:35:19 block so had prevented the fire coming into the building so i'm not sure whether it was this fire or or not but certainly i think these buildings were sprinklered and they and i would have
01:35:31 sprinklered and they and i would have read internal fire precautions to have probably included sprinklers but more importantly the compartmentation fire stopping provision and those are
01:35:43 fire stopping provision and those are the um precautions that you had assumed would be in place in high-rise buildings in this country well that we had produced the guidance to
01:35:52 to identify the need for owners of those buildings to put those check that those precautions were indeed in place they would have they should have been in place at the
01:36:03 they should have been in place at the point where they had been built but maintaining them and ensuring they were still fit for purposes
01:36:12 following this exchange did you have any further discussions with mr martin about the dubai fire and its possible consequences for regulation in this country
01:36:25 other than the outstanding commitment to review adb which was obviously becoming increasingly you know pressing
01:36:37 you know pressing no
01:36:38 no did you discuss the matter for example with peter holland or neil o'connor can you remember or any other senior officials at the department
01:36:53 i i i can't remember but we probably would have because um
01:36:57 um we we probably would have but i i imagine we would have thought that this was very unlikely to you know that this wasn't a risk here
01:37:09 this wasn't a risk here i don't think i think that was we didn't
01:37:13 we didn't make the link between these fires what did you make of brian martin's words there that there were no there are of course no guarantees what do you
01:37:24 of course no guarantees what do you understand him to be saying there
01:37:28 well as with everything i suppose that there are no guarantees um
01:37:40 i suppose you could
01:37:46 i kind of saw it as a throwaway comment i didn't
01:37:49 i didn't read it with the um
01:37:53 benefit with that you have with hindsight okay but the compliance with the building regulations
01:38:04 regulations was the objective of
01:38:06 of these buildings but there was a lot of people involved in that process of ensuring compliance with the building regulations
01:38:18 are you okay would you like a no i'm fine thank you yes okay now if we can um turn to a fire at
01:38:25 at a building known as the address downtown in dubai another dubai fire which is in december 2015. this took place on new year's eve 2015 and it was a major fire at a 63-storey
01:38:37 and it was a major fire at a 63-storey hotel
01:38:38 hotel and if we go to an email chain h o m treble zero four three one zero six
01:38:46 and if we go to the very first uh email in the chambers at the bottom of page one
01:38:51 one we can see that mr bob ledson sent an email to brian martin on the fourth of january
01:38:57 january 2016 at 8 54 headed dubai hotel fire and he wrote
01:39:03 he wrote this brian anything we need to be aware of worry about for part b and we can see that mr martin replied at 9 19 copying you in and he said this might get some
01:39:15 and he said this might get some questions raised nothing new here the fire is most likely to be similar to several others that have hit dubai over the last couple of years it relates to a cladding product which is a laminate of aluminium and
01:39:27 is a laminate of aluminium and polyethylene or similar this stuff it's very rigid and makes nice shiny buildings
01:39:33 buildings sadly when it gets exposed to fire the aluminium melts away and exposes the polyethylene core whoosh requirement b41 is designed to prevent
01:39:44 requirement b41 is designed to prevent this kind of thing para 12.7 says in a building with a story of 18 meters or more above ground level any insulation product filler material not including gaskets sealants
01:39:55 material not including gaskets sealants and similar etc used in the external wall construction should be of limited combustibility the polyethylene core of defending product would be considered as a filler material so should not be used
01:40:07 a filler material so should not be used over 18 meters now we can see that brian martin sets out in this email the content of paragraph 12.7 of the approved document b
01:40:20 presumably you weren't aware beyond the object of that paragraph you weren't aware of this detail of what it required no
01:40:31 now we can see that you responded in the next email in the chain replying only to brian martin and this was sent at 9 28. we said thanks brian but
01:40:42 but from the radio 4 news reports i heard it seems there was no fire detection alarms or sprinklers fitted or working could that be right the fitted rather than working bit will pop up when you are in
01:40:55 working bit will pop up when you are in um
01:40:56 um what did you mean by the word but here in response to brian martin's email
01:41:10 can i go back could you just could you just see more of brian's email i'm not i'm not sure yes if you if the document manager could de-amplify and show the entirety mr martin's email at 9 19.
01:41:24 i'm doing is there something below this that describes the fire no what you've got is that trigger emails one i first took you to which was mr ledson's email
01:41:35 mr ledson's email so i think that's going back to kind of the regulatory fire safety order because if that had been a building in this country
01:41:42 country they would have um
01:41:46 um there would have been evacuation i think i was just trying to test
01:41:51 test how it would have applied in the context of the fire safety order
01:41:57 in terms of internal provision because it was obviously a commercial building to which the order would have applied did you have any concerns about the substance of mr martin's response hence
01:42:09 substance of mr martin's response hence your email
01:42:18 i i think i was just interested to know what the rules were or you know what the position was in dubai i mean you know how they manage
01:42:29 in dubai i mean you know how they manage build you know fire safety in buildings um
01:42:33 um and
01:42:33 and what
01:42:35 what i suppose it says you know i suppose it was just being interested um and was that the prompt for your question that was particular about fire detection alarms or sprinklers yeah were you just trying to
01:42:47 sprinklers yeah were you just trying to understand yeah because obviously if that had been a hotel in the uk the fire would have happened and they would have had to be an evacue you know people would have needed to know there
01:42:59 people would have needed to know there was a fire there would have been an evacuation plan that's not to say it would have necessarily worked but they should have certainly under the requirements of the fire safety order had a
01:43:10 safety order had a managing the building to ensure that if that
01:43:15 that yes
01:43:16 yes so if we don't worry if we can go to the final email which is at the top of this page and it was sent by you to brian martin at 9 31 on the 4th of january 2016.
01:43:28 the 4th of january 2016. sorry sent from brian martin to you and he wrote this i'm in i've heard bad things from people about the quality of maintenance in these buildings in dubai big buildings need to be looked after
01:43:39 big buildings need to be looked after properly it might be that the sprinklers were overrun if the cladding was on fire then the sprinters wouldn't be able to get at it you would then get multiple secondary fires all over the building
01:43:50 secondary fires all over the building the sprinklers can only handle one fire at
01:43:53 at the time so game over it was clear from these emails that the fire on this on this particular or these particular buildings involved acm with a pe core is that right
01:44:06 pe core is that right um could you and are you able to assist us as to how the quality of maintenance of these buildings would be relevant to a fire involving acmpe panels
01:44:17 so yes i think i just probably covered that in
01:44:20 that in you know if
01:44:28 well i suppose if you
01:44:30 if you yes are you able to assist us though with how quality of maintenance of these buildings would be relevant to a fire involving acm pe core panels
01:44:40 well in theory it should give people the time to escape a building it should ensure
01:44:48 ensure if you maintained your building properly that people could potentially escape
01:44:56 as far as reason you know
01:45:00 can you remember whether you discussed this fire in any further detail with brian martin on the day so the 4th of january 2016.
01:45:09 no i'm afraid not
01:45:18 uh do you remember whether uh what knowledge you had if any of checks being carried out about whether acmp products were being used in the uk on external wall arrangements
01:45:29 external wall arrangements following this particular fire or the series of fires in the middle east
01:45:35 no i'm not i'm not aware of that from your perspective in the fire safety policy department was there any prompt to consider carrying out or causing to be carried
01:45:46 carrying out or causing to be carried out uh checks about whether acmp products were being used in the uk and external wall arrangements on high-rise buildings
01:45:56 no would you have discussed that with brian martin or indeed any other official at the department
01:46:05 i don't think i did um so
01:46:08 um so so no
01:46:09 so no um did you from your wearing your policy uh your policy hat um advise any ministers at any time about the fact of these fires involving
01:46:20 about the fact of these fires involving acmp core panels uh and what if anything it meant for safety fire safety in this country
01:46:31 i i didn't um
01:46:34 um no no
01:46:36 no no with that why was that would you expect to be covered by brian martin from the more technical aspect of this or yes
01:46:43 yes and
01:46:46 um
01:46:48 yes i would and because um the fire safety orders applications
01:47:00 orders applications it was building regulations that governed what went on the outside of the building and um it was definitely in that policy camp rather than in
01:47:12 in that policy camp rather than in my policy camp if you are of the view as i think i was that this couldn't possibly happen here i now want to turn to a completely
01:47:24 i now want to turn to a completely different topic which was the drafting of gra 3.2
01:47:31 would you like a break nope not you sure please do chad miss clinton it's been passing through my mind that by noon or thereabouts we'll have been running for nearly an hour
01:47:42 running for nearly an hour and
01:47:43 and we shall still have another hour to run yes have in mind not only the witnesses convenience but also that as a stenographer who may
01:47:51 may feel that two hours at a run is a bit too long
01:47:55 too long so we might have a break for about say 10 minutes at some convenient point before you get too much further i was rather hoping i could
01:48:05 could to get to noon where there was a convenient point and i think it'd be new nor thereabouts that would be perfect yes all right thank you thank you now um what i'd like to discuss with you is the
01:48:16 what i'd like to discuss with you is the involvement of the department and your involvement in particular in the drafting of the revised gra 3.2 now
01:48:23 now we know that the i think the second edition was published in february 2014. and what i particularly like to discuss with you is the points and concerns you raised regarding the draft which have
01:48:34 raised regarding the draft which have been produced by others now
01:48:39 we know that uh one of the key reasons for the review of gra 3.2 at this time was the latter house fire and specifically the directions given by the coroner in her rule 43 letter to
01:48:51 the coroner in her rule 43 letter to dclg now we've gone to that letter but could we go back to it and look at it from the particular perspective of gra 3.2 we find it at home
01:49:02 3.2 we find it at home zero four five eight six five forward slash two
01:49:13 and we can see that the top sub heading is fire safety firefighting and search and rescue and the first and second paragraphs read thus evidence seduced at these inquests
01:49:24 evidence seduced at these inquests indicates that there is insufficient clarity about advice to be given to residents of high-rise residential buildings in case of fire within the building
01:49:33 building it is recommended that your department publish consolidated national guidance in relation to the stay put principle and its interaction with the get out and stay out policy including how such
01:49:44 stay out policy including how such guidance is disseminated to residents it is recommended that consideration be given to review of generic risk assessment 3.2 high-rise firefighting to provide consolidated national guidance
01:49:56 provide consolidated national guidance as to the following then we see certain bullet points set out
01:50:01 out and if we can start with the second bullet point they read as follows awareness that fire can spread downwards and laterally in a building awareness of the risk of spread of fire
01:50:13 awareness of the risk of spread of fire above and adjacent to a fire flat awareness that insecure compartmentation can permit transfer of smoke and fire between a flat or masonette and common
01:50:24 between a flat or masonette and common parts of high-rise residential buildings which has the potential to put at risk the lives of residents or others now for now i'd like to focus on your understanding of who
01:50:37 understanding of who assumed responsibility for implementing this particular aspect of the recommendation now the inquiry heard evidence from peter carrap who is a former assistant commissioner at the lfb
01:50:49 commissioner at the lfb in particular in the operational department who led the review of gra 3.2 now that review was already underway at the time of the latin link quests in january 2013.
01:51:01 january 2013. he explained that the wide review had been commissioned by the department and the cfra as the owners of the gra series and he explained the responsibility for
01:51:13 and he explained the responsibility for the management of the wider review had been allocated by the department to surrey fire and rescue services uh was that your understanding of the position
01:51:23 position i have i had i'm sorry i had absolutely um
01:51:27 um no understanding of what was going on on gra iii other than there was a commitment you know it wasn't within my sphere
01:51:34 sphere of um
01:51:36 of um awareness even um around around that review until the coroner's letter and we made the
01:51:46 the and the commitments were made to to look at the issues that came up here now peter capps said that the department retained overall control of the publication of gra 3.2
01:51:59 of the publication of gra 3.2 and remained ultimately responsible for its content was that your understanding as well
01:52:04 as well i imagine it was yes now what did dclg's ultimate responsibility look like in practice
01:52:15 in practice can you help us no
01:52:18 no no i'm i'm i'm not sure whether this was statutory
01:52:23 statutory guidance um could i look at it more practically did the department basically take the view that it had delegated
01:52:32 delegated management of the project to surrey frs and just leaving them to it as it were
01:52:39 yes i don't know i'm afraid i'm assuming this has been covered in other statements but you can't help us on that not the
01:52:49 not the process or what was involved in that responsibility for the guidance now sir ken knight explained that a
01:53:00 now sir ken knight explained that a decision had been taken to transfer responsibility for the production of operational guidance to the sector and away from government apart from certain documents including gra 3.2
01:53:13 documents including gra 3.2 um
01:53:14 um can you remember the reason why it had been decided to retain responsibility for legacy documents such as 3.2
01:53:24 no now um
01:53:28 now um can i now turn to the first time that you had
01:53:32 you had sight of the draft gra 3.2 now you referred in your second witness statement to an email chain between the 8th and i think the 14th of may 2013
01:53:43 8th and i think the 14th of may 2013 that concerned the draft response on behalf of the second of state to the coroner's rule 43 letter now we can find that email chain at clg
01:53:54 can find that email chain at clg quadruple zero one nine two one
01:54:01 and if we look at the second page of this email chain and it's the bottom email we can see that les britsman had
01:54:12 we can see that les britsman had forwarded a copy of the draft gra 3.2 to ump to holland on the 9th of may now you've confirmed in your evidence that this is likely to be the first time
01:54:23 that this is likely to be the first time you'd had sight of the draft and paraphrasing your evidence you might have given it a quick skim on receipt of mr britsman's email but it was not until a later stage that you carried out a
01:54:35 a later stage that you carried out a more uh considered read of the draft is that a fair summary of the position
01:54:41 um i think i'd have to i think i'd quite like to check my witness statement on this because i thought it had come from mel gillit the email saying
01:54:52 mel gillit the email saying well from whom it comes doesn't really matter does it is no but i'm just not not sure this was neces
01:54:59 neces the timing of it um if we go through the next few emails in this chain it may help you if we go to the top of the page two
01:55:11 two you say thanks les i've not read the draft gra but think you'll need to review it to ensure that it addresses all the issues we're saying it will in the submission right so does that help you
01:55:23 right so does that help you yes
01:55:25 yes so
01:55:26 so thank you that does help me i think that was probably the first time i'd seen it and i'd skim read it you know i'd flick through it
01:55:37 and just
01:55:41 flag back to les who hadn't been here at the time
01:55:46 time of the coroner's response just an early alert that it
01:55:55 it might need to cover more than it did on the basis of my quick skin can we go to the bottom of page one and the email of the 10th of may 2013 which was sent at 7 25 a.m
01:56:08 which was sent at 7 25 a.m from peter holland to les britsman
01:56:12 britsman said les have you cross-referenced all the coroner's comments to ensure we have responded on each one and if we look further up the chain mr britsman replied on the 13th of may at 5 15 pm
01:56:25 on the 13th of may at 5 15 pm yes i believe the submissions cover the coroner's questions and recommendations she lists in detail items for gra 3.2 we have not specifically referred to these in the response but the draft revised
01:56:37 in the response but the draft revised gra does reflect the recommendations the coroner makes now both you and mr britsman refer to the submission as well as the coroner's recommendations
01:56:48 as the coroner's recommendations for the avoidance of doubt submission here does that mean the draft submission to the secretary state that you are preparing at around this time which included the proposed letter of response
01:56:59 included the proposed letter of response to the coroner
01:57:02 yes probably does and presumably your immediate concern was to ensure that the draft gra fully reflected both the coroner's
01:57:13 reflected both the coroner's recommendations addressed to the secretary of state and everything in the secretary of state's response to the coroner regarding gra 3.2 yes
01:57:24 sir that is a convenient point oh you've got rather more quickly than i'd expected but let's keep you on your toes sir so we've got that quicker you're quite right um
01:57:34 right um i think we'll have a short break now i think ten minutes will probably be enough and we'll come back at five past twelve
01:57:41 twelve all right
01:57:42 all right please don't discuss your evidence thank you
01:57:58 thank you five fast travels
02:06:11 would you ask us upton to come back in please
02:06:14 please thank you
02:06:26 right this ups and down ready to carry on yeah thank you very much yes mr cleveland receptor can we now turn to the submission that was put up to the secretary of state on the 13th of may 2013.
02:06:38 2013. um that can be found at hom quadruple zero double four zero three
02:06:48 and we can see from the top right here the author we see its date the 13th of may we can see its address the secretary of state
02:06:57 state now in the first paragraph you set out the summary in which you explain the purpose of the submission that it included at annex b a draft reply to be sent to the coroner and at nx's
02:07:10 to be sent to the coroner and at nx's ctf consideration by individual ministers of the specific recommendations if we can look further down page one at paragraph five
02:07:22 you've set out the specific topics that are addressed in those further annexes and considered by individual ministers annex c
02:07:31 annex c is said to have been directed to brandon lewis and related to the submission on operational firefighting issues now that is the submission that
02:07:42 issues now that is the submission that was relevant for gra 3.2 is that right yes
02:07:46 yes yes it was now if we turn to page two in this principle submission and it's the bottom of the page in paragraph 10. we see that that paragraph lies under
02:07:57 we see that that paragraph lies under the subheading fire safety firefighting and search and rescue and you summarize the position in relation to gra 3.2 in the following terms the chief fire and rescue advisor
02:08:09 terms the chief fire and rescue advisor has advised that the generic risk assessment guidance on high-rise fire fighting is currently being revised and will reflect the operational issues identified by the coroner in respect of
02:08:20 identified by the coroner in respect of fires and high-rise residential buildings the revised version will cover the importance of gathering recording and making available premises information collected under section 72d
02:08:32 information collected under section 72d of the fire and rescue services act for operational planning and response purposes can you piss pause mr kenya we haven't got the next page yet
02:08:48 well just cast your eye over the remainder of the paragraph
02:08:56 if i could highlight the right following text it will also highlight considerations for instant commanders when making a decision on whether to evacuate some or all of a building in
02:09:08 evacuate some or all of a building in the event the spread of a fire suggests the stay put principle has become untenable
02:09:15 untenable now how had dclg identified that particular issue the importance to identify the relevant considerations for incident commanders to take into account when deciding
02:09:27 to take into account when deciding whether to evacuate in the event that the state put principle becomes untenable
02:09:36 i'm sorry i think that was one of the recommendations in the it had come through the um
02:09:45 the um black and or house inquest well the recommend this is the reason why i ask it is that the coroner's recommendation did not specifically state that guidance should address this
02:09:56 state that guidance should address this issue about deciding to evacuate if and when staple becomes untenable and so i was
02:10:03 was curious as to what had prompted the department to address this very particular point
02:10:15 i suppose it was a recognition of the fact that it hadn't gone according i suppose
02:10:22 that the operational response to lacanol had suggested that further guidance
02:10:34 would be helpful around evacuation can you remember whether anyone in particular at dclg had identified this particular point arising out of
02:10:45 particular point arising out of the analysis of the lack of fire and the operational response
02:10:52 no i'm afraid i can't it's kind of was it you one of the reasons the next question was going to be had you identified it because you're the author of the of the submission
02:11:03 i don't know i think i'll probably have to see the original submission that went from the chief fire the one with annex c i think okay um we haven't found
02:11:14 annex c i think okay um we haven't found a document that assists on that but um did you or had you asked for any advice from the operational firefighting site of the department on this particular point the guidance to instant commanders
02:11:30 i think it i suppose it had come up in the context obviously of the purpose built flats guidance um
02:11:40 where
02:11:42 there was recognition that in some cases you would need to a fire may be so great or the co or the quality of the building may be so poor that firefighters would need to um
02:11:55 that firefighters would need to um start to evacuate rescue residents um
02:11:59 um [Music]
02:12:02 [Music] so i'm yes i'm just not sure because i i suppose it for me it's an operational issue but it also relates to building safety i just i'm not sure where it started please
02:12:14 i'm not sure where it started please don't worry it's it's not a pointed question or a criticism it's just trying to find out it may well be if we go to annex c itself
02:12:22 itself which we can find at clg quadruple zero two zero four three
02:12:32 we can see in the top right the author is identified as les britsman from the cf ra unit it's addressed to brandon lewis then the fire minister
02:12:44 then the fire minister been cleared by peter holland who was the cfra
02:12:47 the cfra and if we could go to the recommendations section which is paragraph three on this page we can see there's a subheading stay put policy
02:12:58 policy and the
02:13:00 and the mr britsman was commending the following confirm the principle of stay put and the relationship to the advice made available to residents on what to do in the event of a fire is covered in detail
02:13:11 the event of a fire is covered in detail in the lga guidance on fire safety in purpose-built blocks of flats this has been dealt with under a separate submission by louise upton generic risk assessment 3.2 high-rise
02:13:22 generic risk assessment 3.2 high-rise firefighting is the next sub-heading and the text says this generic risk assessment 3.2 high-rise firefighting is currently under review and will be published shortly it will
02:13:33 and will be published shortly it will reflect the issues the coroner has identified below in
02:13:38 in section 7. now section 7 seems to be the internal paragraph 7 in this document if we can go to page two and start with paragraph six
02:13:53 this says under the subheading statement policy
02:13:57 policy the minister has approved the submission by louise upton that covers in detailed guidance to residents however dclg will ensure that gra also links the items in section 7 to considerations for instant
02:14:09 section 7 to considerations for instant commanders when deciding at what point the staple principle is no longer tenable
02:14:14 tenable if we look at paragraph seven which we think is the section seven referred to here it sets out the coroner's specific directions in relation to the contents of the revised gra 3.2
02:14:27 of the revised gra 3.2 now that's a long run up for which i apologize but do you think that mr britsman's reference here to your submission covering advice to residents was a resident was a reference to the individual ministerial submission that
02:14:39 individual ministerial submission that you'd provided to mr lewis on the rule 43 fire safety recommendations yes
02:14:45 yes yes i said i think that's right would it be fair to say that the while the lga guide referred frequently to stay put it did not contain any reference to the potential need for
02:14:57 reference to the potential need for instant commanders to carry out an evacuation if stay put became untenable no
02:15:03 no no because because that guidance was aimed at
02:15:08 aimed at building owners and the relevant enforcing authorities it wasn't operational guidance for firefighters which was dealt with elsewhere
02:15:20 elsewhere and as you said the imply rather um the lga guide contained a number of statistics um that
02:15:29 um that and examples are that in 2009 to 2010 over 8 000 fires and blocks of flats only 22 have prompted evacuation yeah of more than five people with the assistance of a fire and rescue service
02:15:41 assistance of a fire and rescue service do you recall the deployment of those particular statistics in the guide yes absolutely i mean you know every the evidence we had of what you know risk
02:15:52 risk was informed by the data that we collected on fires within the department and what has happened and how they've behaved
02:16:02 behaved across a whole range of premises um so yeah i do remember those statistics um do you agree with the thrust off or at least the impression given by the lga guide
02:16:13 given by the lga guide was that or was to reinforce confidence in state put by using such statistics yes
02:16:21 yes because
02:16:22 because there wasn't the evidence from real fires happening that
02:16:26 that compartmentation was significantly being breached you know
02:16:34 and was that why uh you were not minded or not persuaded to amend the lga guidance to deal with circumstances in which staple became untenable
02:16:47 no we we i think we did deal with it through the advice that was offered to residents in that guidance that you know that at some point the fire and rescue
02:16:59 point the fire and rescue service would may need to evacuate you from your you know your safe unless you're told in your premises to stay for unless or until directed by the fire service and
02:17:10 until directed by the fire service and they would manage that process of evacuating you from a building but in terms of how the fire service actually did that i think that was through the it was an operational
02:17:23 was through the it was an operational response
02:17:25 response um could we turn to the secretary of state's response to the coroner and we've touched on this in earlier evidence but i'd like to look at the particular aspect of it that dealt with gra 3.2 the letters at hom trouble
02:17:38 gra 3.2 the letters at hom trouble 0-4-7-4-3
02:17:40 0-4-7-4-3 and if we could turn to page two and the third paragraph on that page
02:17:47 thank you now that paragraph says this on your other recommendations i can confirm that my department's generic risk assessment guidance on high-rise firefighting is under review at present and will be
02:17:59 under review at present and will be informed by all of the recommendations you have made in your rule 43 recommendations it will also include advice to incident commanders to inform decisions on evacuation should it become clear during
02:18:11 evacuation should it become clear during an incident that the stay put principle is no longer tenable now
02:18:17 now that
02:18:19 that statement was based on the letter that you had drafted and included in your submission to the secretary of state is that right yes
02:18:27 yes now when peter cap gave evidence the inquiry he stated that he could not recall being given a copy of the secretary of state's response during the drafting process of durate 3.2
02:18:39 drafting process of durate 3.2 do you know who was responsible for keeping mr carrup up to date on the secretary of state's correspondence with the coroner regarding implementation of her recommendations
02:18:52 um yeah i would have thought that would have been through the chief fire and rescue
02:18:57 rescue advisors unit
02:19:01 um from your perspective did you think that the specific commitment made by the secretary of state in this letter that the new gra would include advice at two incident commanders to inform decisions on
02:19:13 commanders to inform decisions on evacuation if state became untenable was very significant given the purpose and object of gra 3.2
02:19:24 given the purpose and object of gra 3.2 yes
02:19:26 do you know if there's any express or direct discussions with anyone involved directly involved in the gra 3.2 review about the specific commitment regarding advice to instant
02:19:38 commitment regarding advice to instant commanders no
02:19:44 would that be something that would be handled by the cfra rather than yourself is that why yes
02:19:51 can i now turn to a separate topic which is a meeting that took place at ellen house which is the department's headquarters in london between peter cowep and representatives of the
02:20:03 cowep and representatives of the department and the meeting took place on the 19th of june 2013. now mr kapp said the meeting took place for the purpose of finalizing gra on the
02:20:15 for the purpose of finalizing gra on the 19th of june 2013 so after the draft gra 3.2 had been sent to you in may 2013. now peter carrap's evidence was that this meeting was attended by himself and
02:20:26 this meeting was attended by himself and philip morton for the lfb and anthony moord and peter holland for the department um do you know why mr moord attended with mr holland no was mr moored one of
02:20:38 with mr holland no was mr moored one of your officials or was he one of mr holland's officials he wasn't one of my officials he was um he was the same great as me in within the um unit that we work with but he
02:20:51 the um unit that we work with but he had um
02:20:53 had um different policy responsibilities mine were by safety and i'm afraid i can't remember
02:20:59 remember what anthony's were but i think at this point in time because
02:21:05 because my colleague melanie i think worked with him he was responsible for
02:21:12 maybe supporting the chief fire and rescue maybe supporting the work on national operational guidance i'm afraid i don't know do you know whether mr maude had any
02:21:23 do you know whether mr maude had any experience or particular experience in relation to operational firefighting matters for example or supporting operational guidance no i think that the development of operational guidance
02:21:35 operational guidance might have been a policy responsibility but he certainly was
02:21:39 was not
02:21:40 not had no as far as i'm aware operational firefighting experience because that was really the response you know that that fell within all of that expertise was within the chief fire and rescue advisors
02:21:53 chief fire and rescue advisors unit
02:21:54 unit at this time so we're talking about mid-june 2013 do you recall mr holland or anyone in his unit having any specific concerns
02:22:05 his unit having any specific concerns about the general direction of or the particular content of the draft gra 3.2
02:22:14 no no
02:22:17 no can we come on to your concerns that you had with the draft when it crossed your desk
02:22:23 desk now shortly after this meeting on the 19th of june the next draft of the gra 3.2 was circulated within the department and that happened on the 24th of june 2013.
02:22:34 2013. now if we go to clg one trouble zero five seven three zero
02:22:57 okay if we can look at the bottom email this is from melanie gillette
02:23:06 gillette and we can see from the list of recipients that peter holland les britsman brian martin and you as well as a few others are copied in can you help us as to why the giraffe gre 3.2 was sent to the likes of brian
02:23:19 gre 3.2 was sent to the likes of brian martin
02:23:21 whose responsibilities didn't obviously involve operational firefighting procedure in high-rise buildings
02:23:29 um
02:23:34 no except only in so far as it was a kind of a generic fire safety you know i suppose i suppose it was um we were all likely to have a view
02:23:45 we were all likely to have a view touched on some of our responsibilities at some point and just being aware of it um
02:23:51 um okay
02:23:52 okay in terms of i suppose ensuring that the department had a joined up consistent position
02:23:58 position now you um provided your comments in an email sent on the first of july 2013 that can be found at clg quadruple zero zero six two four
02:24:17 and you set out your views in four numbered points but your email says this thanks for the opportunity to have a look at this i have a lot of fairly detailed comments particularly in the first section where
02:24:29 particularly in the first section where hazards are identified and i'm happy to talk through these or comment later on a revised draft whatever's easiest but my four main concerns are one
02:24:41 concerns are one the extent to which this delivers the commitment in the secretary of state's response to the coroner's rule 43 report that the revised gra quotes will include advice to incident
02:24:52 quotes will include advice to incident commanders to inform decisions on evacuation should it become clear during an instant that the stay put principle is no longer tenable close quotes there's no discussion in this draft of
02:25:04 there's no discussion in this draft of what firefighters can expect residents of flats to do in the event of a fire and how they should understand when it's necessary to redirect firefighting resources to mount an evacuation
02:25:16 to mount an evacuation the guide seems to start from the premise that there will be an evacuation strategy and everyone will know what to do
02:25:23 do that might be the case in office buildings but in residential premises such an organized approach is unlikely to occur
02:25:30 to occur individuals will do whatever they feel safest doing irrespective of whatever the building evacuation strategy or safety advice is now if we put those concerns in context
02:25:43 now if we put those concerns in context look let's look at the draft version of the gre that's been circulated within the department and which you'd reviewed we find that at clg 1 treble zero five seven three one
02:25:54 seven three one and if we go to page nine
02:26:03 and if we could look at the last paragraph on that page under the subheading evacuation of buildings the text said this or the draft text said this
02:26:12 this firefighting operations can be affected by the type of evacuation being undertaken the progress of the evacuation and the number and type of people being evacuated
02:26:22 evacuated instant commanders must consider both the effect of firefighting tactics on the evacuation of occupants and conversely effective evacuation on tactics
02:26:33 tactics if for example a building's evacuation plan includes the use of lifts by occupants there may be an impact on the availability of fire lifts for use by fire and rescue personnel
02:26:44 fire and rescue personnel the need to assist with the evacuation of people can divert crew or crews away from the task or tasks they were briefed to undertake this can have an adverse effect on the
02:26:55 this can have an adverse effect on the incident commander's plan and resourcing for the incident would it be fair to say looking at that particular text that there was simply no guidance to instant commanders about the potential
02:27:07 instant commanders about the potential need to evacuate a building with a stay put strategy in place
02:27:18 yes i think it didn't is was it that concern that resonated with you when you sent the email we were looking at just before this quote yes i think
02:27:30 yes i think now if we can
02:27:34 stay in this document go to page 28
02:27:43 really what i'm going through these documents for miss upton is to look at the text which you'd highlighted as in your email of concerns so that's why we're doing this and so if we look
02:27:54 why we're doing this and so if we look at the first substantive subsection on this page headed evacuation and fire survival guidance calls the draft text said this
02:28:02 said this the incident commander should normally follow any evacuation plan devised as part of the occupiers fire risk assessment unless the fire situation dictates otherwise in residential buildings occupants should usually only
02:28:14 buildings occupants should usually only evacuate if the fire heat or smoke is adversely affecting them in their property
02:28:20 property the type of evacuation been undertaken the progress of the evacuation and the number and type of people being evacuated can adversely affect firefighting operations
02:28:31 firefighting operations now would you agree that the reference to occupants evacuating usually only a fire heat or smoke is adversely affecting them in their property is an oblique reference to statehood
02:28:43 oblique reference to statehood yes
02:28:46 but the words the phrase statement doesn't appear to be used here is am i reading it right yeah
02:28:54 that absence of the phrase stay put prompt any concerns on your part when you read the draft can you remember
02:29:10 um no i i can't i can't now actually is it a fair reading of this particular paragraph that um again
02:29:20 again it reinforces the assumption that stay put holds good rather than making clear that there may be circumstances in which the incident commander needs to consider whether to
02:29:31 commander needs to consider whether to evacuate and how to do it
02:29:35 yes
02:29:40 looking at these documents did the draft gra that you reviewed in the latter half of june 2013 and early july prompt doubts or concerns in
02:29:52 early july prompt doubts or concerns in your mind as to how effective the review of the gra 3.2 had been that being carried out by mr cap and his team
02:30:07 i'm not sure how effective i just think it it wasn't clear to me
02:30:14 that it covered the issues that i suppose with hindsight at that time i thought should have been covered in in greater detail
02:30:25 been covered in in greater detail um
02:30:26 um i'm not sure that you know it depends what the brief had been at the start um
02:30:33 um and i wasn't aware of any of you know the arrangements in place it just didn't quite
02:30:41 feel like it had done
02:30:44 what i thought it thought it should have done and if we go back to your email of the first of july it says clg
02:30:53 clg quadruple zero zero six two four
02:31:01 the thrust or the impression arising out of this is um the implication that you thought that more work needed to be done on the draft
02:31:11 draft and more substantive work is that a fair reading of your email
02:31:18 now if we can go to a further email exchange between you and mr britsman which took place on the 29th of july so nearly a month after this one and that's at clg one treble zero five eight zero
02:31:29 at clg one treble zero five eight zero seven
02:31:31 seven now just to give you some context the meeting you had with les britsman was in advance
02:31:35 advance of a meeting that was due to take place between mr britsman and mr cap on the 30th of july which we'll come on to now we can see that the subject line of this email
02:31:47 that the subject line of this email chain is lfb meeting high-rise operational firefighting guidance
02:31:53 guidance can you remember now had the email chain been initiated by mr britsman because he wanted the benefit of your further views before he met mr carrup on the 30th of
02:32:04 before he met mr carrup on the 30th of july
02:32:06 july um i i think so probably if we can go to the bottom email on page two
02:32:16 you say happy to have a look at the next draft but not minded to accept this
02:32:22 this and if we go further up to page one and the second email on that page
02:32:28 now you said this we discussed and both brian and i offered high level comments i can dig out the emails if you need them i can let you have a copy of my scribbled notes on the first draft that
02:32:39 scribbled notes on the first draft that suspect a more fundamental review going back to first principles is what's needed in the third in the first instance and if we go on to the third paragraph you said this the key point
02:32:50 paragraph you said this the key point for dclg
02:32:52 for dclg cfra
02:32:54 cfra is i think to establish is the extent to which the draft gra reflects and clearly addresses the recommendations made by the lachnal house coroner in her rule 43s to lfb
02:33:07 house coroner in her rule 43s to lfb and the dclg and the subsequent commitments made by lfb and cfra in the respective responses now we asked you in a rule 9 witness
02:33:18 now we asked you in a rule 9 witness statement request about your reference to quotes a more fundamental review being required you said that this was a reference to the secretary of state's commitment in his letter of the 20th may not been
02:33:31 in his letter of the 20th may not been reflected in the draft gra now would it be fair to say that you're also getting at when you use this phrase a more fundamental review was
02:33:41 was in your view the need to scrap the draft and start all over again is that a fair comment or not no i don't think that is a fair comment i i think
02:33:52 i i think the draft just didn't
02:33:57 it could have been i meant you know you could have amended it it wasn't a start again it was actually the fundamental principles of the timing of this
02:34:08 of this coming after everybody's responses and what had been established in the black and all inquests it seemed to be that's was was such a key element i didn't
02:34:19 was was such a key element i didn't think it needed to be scrapped definitely but it needed to focus on what the coroner wanted the lfb and the department to focus on more than it did i mean i i understand
02:34:31 more than it did i mean i i understand it was a
02:34:32 it was a much broader document um around operational firefighting in a range of premises but it
02:34:39 it seemed
02:34:40 seemed possibly slight on the um what to do in a residential building
02:34:48 building now if we go back to your email to mr britsman um which is on this page and it's the second one on this
02:34:57 this and in the fourth paragraph first sentence you say you refer to the lfb having done lots of work to review and update their own operational guidance post latino house
02:35:09 guidance post latino house and you comment that it seems odd that the revised gra didn't seem to reflect that amount of learning now again um you refer to this email in your second
02:35:20 your second statement to the inquiry where you stated that you could no longer recall in what specific respects the draft did not
02:35:27 not address the lfb's learning now could i look at it a slightly different way do you recall if you had assumed that the lfb had carried out work in relation
02:35:39 the lfb had carried out work in relation to this specific issue i.e the potential need to evacuate high-rise building yes i assume that they they would have done that
02:35:48 done that and that's what's reflected in this part of your email now mr cat was asked about your the content of your emails um and he said that the comments were absolutely not related to him at the time
02:36:01 related to him at the time would you have expected your comments have been relayed to mr cowab i would have
02:36:10 um did you ever think that it might be best that you joined the meeting no absolutely not i never thought it would be best if i joined the meeting it wasn't and why is that because it wasn't
02:36:22 wasn't and why is that because it wasn't my responsibility i didn't yeah and i didn't know anything about um operational firefighting um you know
02:36:33 you know i had
02:36:34 i had some concerns around around the draft which i could relay through colleagues and were you in the department and were you content that the full force
02:36:45 and were you content that the full force of your comments and concerns were being communicated by mr holland and mr britsman to mr cap i had no reason to think they they weren't
02:36:56 weren't now if we can turn to the meeting between mr carpen officials on the 30th of july
02:37:02 of july um if we can go to lfb double zero one zero two five nine zero
02:37:15 i'm afraid this is another email of chain
02:37:18 chain and between mr cap mr britsman arranging the meeting if we go to page two and look at the bottom email on that chain
02:37:30 now mr britsman is asking for a meeting to discuss matters before the draft is finalized you and brian martin were copied in
02:37:41 was to the best of your recollection was mr britsman arranging this meeting specifically to address the concerns you'd set out in your email of the first of july do you know
02:37:56 i don't know but i assume that the point of this email was to give confidence to me and to the chief fire and rescue adviser that the concerns
02:38:08 the concerns that i'd maybe flagged were being looked at with peter cowop um could we go to a later email chain the pos apologies for all these email chains but it's
02:38:20 all these email chains but it's one from august 2013 we find lfb double zero one zero two four eight six
02:38:36 and here we can see an email from mr britsman to peter carrap and philip morton both at the lfb that starts at the bottom part of that page you're copied into the email with
02:38:47 page you're copied into the email with others
02:38:49 others and mr britsman says in the second line this
02:38:54 this thank you for the meeting where we discussed gra 3.2 on high-rise i agreed to summarize dclg's comments for your consideration if we go over to page two
02:39:05 if we go over to page two and look at the second bullet
02:39:08 bullet point the blue text
02:39:13 that says this we would prefer greater clarification that delivers the commitment in our secretary of state's response to the coroner's rule 43 report that the
02:39:24 coroner's rule 43 report that the revised gra quotes will include advice to incident commanders to inform decisions on evacuation should it become clear during an instant that the state put principle is no
02:39:35 that the state put principle is no longer tenable again there was reference to this in the revised gra but perhaps greater emphasis would make it clearer did you agree with mr britsman that there was in fact
02:39:47 there was in fact already referenced to stay put becoming untenable in the draft array that you had reviewed
02:39:59 you didn't appear to that's the underlying point i'm asking you about
02:40:15 rather than listen to your question could you just ask the question again of course because i don't disagree with the blue text there we would prefer greater clarification it was really an element of what he said
02:40:27 it was really an element of what he said said out there did you agree with mr bretzmann that there was already reference to stay put becoming untenable in the drafty array that you had reviewed
02:40:40 yes but it should be better clearer yes okay now in the black text the next sentence which is peter cap's response to les britsman he said this as agreed
02:40:51 to les britsman he said this as agreed at the meeting we'll amend the section that deals with evacuation and fire survival guidance calls to make it clear that the initial stay put advice at residential high-rise fires should be
02:41:02 residential high-rise fires should be re-evaluated if the incident escalates i'm confident we can thereby deliver the emphasis on this point you have requested
02:41:10 requested now in his evidence to the inquiry last year mr calp said that this was the first time these points had been ever raised with him does it surprise you to hear that mr kaup said
02:41:21 kaup said that no one had raised these particular points with him before the 30th of july 2013.
02:41:28 2013. yes
02:41:34 do you know why the particular concern that you'd raised that
02:41:39 that uh putting particular emphasis on the secretary of state's commitment in relation to state becoming untenable hadn't been raised with peter cap until the end of july do you know why that would be the case
02:41:54 it appears that you are the only person making this point do you remember when you were having discussions with mr britsman about this at the time it's an obvious point to make you're the
02:42:05 it's an obvious point to make you're the only one making it do you know why it hadn't dawned on mr britsman in particular or anyone else in the the cfra's unit
02:42:16 no sorry
02:42:26 could we now turn to a separate topic which is the further draft that was sent to the department um on the 24th of september 2013. now following the meeting at the end of july the lfb did further work
02:42:38 july the lfb did further work to incorporate the points that have been raised and a further draft was circulated as i said on the 24th of september you again reviewed the draft and appears from the documents we have
02:42:49 and appears from the documents we have that your concerns persisted about this draft and if we could look at an email you sent to les britsman on the 15th of october 2013 we find that at clg quadruple zero two seven eight zero
02:43:10 we can see in the top email in this chain you said this hi les thanks for sight of this just read through again and it seems the concerns i had before appear not to have been particularly well addressed in this
02:43:22 been particularly well addressed in this version
02:43:23 version i therefore added some i think track changes is that and comments for you to consider i suspect in the context of the new text on page 28 which seemed confused and confusing you may find it helpful to
02:43:35 confusing you may find it helpful to review the evidence peter holland provided to the lachmul house coroner for a clear explanation of stay put in residential buildings
02:43:46 can you explain how concerned you were by the revised draft by this stage because you'd been making points clearly since the start of july and they didn't seem to be addressed satisfactorily
02:44:00 um
02:44:04 i just um
02:44:09 i says i don't remember having very many conversations about it i remember putting the things in right you know is it easier to comment to words on a page and
02:44:19 and have a conversation so i suspect there didn't seem to be a deadline on this piece of work so i suppose at what point
02:44:32 it would have been sorted out was unclear um they were clearly making changes
02:44:39 changes um
02:44:42 and i and i was clearly just not convinced that
02:44:48 that or they they weren't working for me at this stage in terms of the clarity so i'm not sure um
02:44:55 um did you ever have a conversation with mr britsman for example apologies i put it so colloquially but you know which bit of this don't you or the lfb understand i put out my concerns clearly why aren't they being addressed
02:45:09 no i think i'd i think i would have discussed this probably with my line manager did she give you any advice did she give you any advice on how best
02:45:21 did she give you any advice on how best to
02:45:22 to make sure your points were fully addressed
02:45:27 um
02:45:30 no but i think i was probably making track changes you know and i suppose if it wasn't working for them it was in that kind of space where if what i was
02:45:41 that kind of space where if what i was doing wasn't working for them we probably needed to sit down but this was you know and actually go through it in detail and understand i think
02:45:52 detail and understand i think should we go to some of those track changes
02:45:54 changes we can go to clg quadruple zero two seven eight one and if we go to page nine
02:46:00 nine so clg quadruple zero two seven eight one forward slash nine
02:46:07 uh here we have again at the bottom of the
02:46:10 the page the sub-section entitled evacuation of buildings and we can see that you gave a comment in the right-hand margin which said this assumes there will always be an
02:46:21 assumes there will always be an evacuation strategy and emits reference to stay put which is the principle on which residential buildings are constructed and if we look at the text of the draft
02:46:32 and if we look at the text of the draft gra 3.2 it read thus
02:46:35 thus that firefighting operations can be affected by the type of evacuation being undertaken the progress of the evacuation and the number and type of people being evacuated incident commanders must consider both the effect
02:46:47 commanders must consider both the effect of firefighting tactics on the evacuation of occupants and the effect of evacuation on tactics if for example a building's evacuation plan includes the use of lifts by occupants there may be an impact on the
02:46:59 occupants there may be an impact on the availability of firelist for use by fire and rescue personnel the need to assist with the evacuation of people can divert cruise crew or crews away from the task or tasks they were briefed to undertake
02:47:11 or tasks they were briefed to undertake this can have an adverse effect on the instant commander's plan and resourcing for the incident what was your precise concern arising out of that text
02:47:23 out of that text i think it's exactly that it wasn't front and center it was it was it assumed that all buildings had an evacuation [Music]
02:47:36 [Music] in terms of where we were
02:47:39 we were post slack and all it seemed to be very clear that for operational firefighters they needed to have this understanding that that wasn't always the case in all sorts of buildings and something
02:47:51 buildings and something much more
02:47:54 obvious would have been helpful i suppose that you've hidden there on the head there the most the section and sort of entirely misses the point doesn't it um because
02:48:05 the point doesn't it um because um there's no reference to stay put at all no
02:48:09 all no let alone evacuation in a building with a stay put strategy those specific matters
02:48:14 matters yes
02:48:22 now there's one other comment on this draft that we i'd be grateful for your views on and that's at page 19.
02:48:33 and we can see just above the sort of midway point the text says this training for high-rise instance must include those various matters set out if we can turn over the page to page 20
02:48:46 turn over the page to page 20 the third bullet point reads evacuation and casualty removal tactics in relation to that particular bullet point you've commented thus add in
02:48:57 add in understanding when a full or partial evacuation strategy becomes necessary in residential buildings built and maintained on the principle that staying put unless directly affected by smoke heat or fire is appropriate
02:49:10 heat or fire is appropriate at that stage did you know whether incident commanders were being trained to understand when and how to carry out a full or partial evacuation of buildings with a stay put strategy in
02:49:21 buildings with a stay put strategy in place
02:49:23 place no i did i didn't know whether that was happening which is why i think i thought it was important to be
02:49:30 to be in the guidance
02:49:33 did you discuss the matter of instant commander
02:49:37 commander training and specifically on the question of evacuation with les britsman anyone in the cfr a unit or indeed anyone else
02:49:51 do you remember if anyone said i'm sorry sorry no i didn't i think your point here is actually a rather more important one which is not about how to evacuate but
02:50:02 which is not about how to evacuate but whether to evacuate isn't it in other words training yes whether and when yes recognize the need yes yeah yes
02:50:14 do you remember if anyone ever reported to you anyone from the cfra unit or anyone else that it wasn't standard practice for fire and rescue services to train their personnel to carry out
02:50:25 train their personnel to carry out emergency evacuations in buildings with a stay put strategy no definitely don't remember that um
02:50:33 um could i now turn on to further email correspondence within the department in late october 2013. now following your comments on the draft which we've been looking at now there
02:50:44 which we've been looking at now there were further internal email exchanges about how best to progress matters in the light of those continuing concerns could we go to first of all to clg
02:50:56 could we go to first of all to clg triple zero one eight nine one five forward slash five
02:51:08 and we see roughly halfway down that page an email from les britsman sent on the 22nd of october 2013 timed at 4 52 pm to peter holland and dawn eastmead
02:51:20 pm to peter holland and dawn eastmead and you and certain others are copied into the exchange now the email is fairly lengthy so i won't ask you to read it all but to summarize the principal point that mr
02:51:31 summarize the principal point that mr britsman was making here was that within the department there was a sense that the draft was not a useful document
02:51:39 document and if we look at the fourth paragraph of the email and particularly the first sentence he says this the new gra has gone from a 26-page document to approximately 84
02:51:50 26-page document to approximately 84 pages and has lost its purpose as a document
02:51:54 document if we go on to the sixth paragraph he says this the view is that the document is neither a gra or a or ops guidance in its present form and the concern from myself
02:52:06 present form and the concern from myself and dclg colleagues is that this does not clearly meet our commitments to the coroner in our response the rule 43 letter
02:52:16 letter now did mr britsman's comments reflect your own concerns about the draft at that time
02:52:22 that time yes i imagine they did yeah did you feel the draft ura had in effect lost its purpose
02:52:34 i'm not sure i had that that bigger view i think i was very narrowly focused on it doing the things that i thought it should have done and where it touched on areas where i had an interest it was
02:52:47 areas where i had an interest it was simply to make sure that those were
02:52:51 adequately explained correct or not there if not relevant
02:52:58 did you agree with mr britsman's observation that it didn't obviously or clearly address the recommendations that the coroner had made and indeed the secretary of state's response to those
02:53:09 secretary of state's response to those recommendations
02:53:14 there was so many drafts at this point but i suspect at this point i did still think that there was more work to be done on it to do that effectively now looking at the
02:53:25 now looking at the bottom of page five we can see that mr britsman starts to set out certain options
02:53:31 options uh option a was in summary sending the text out as is with an explanatory cover letter or option b which is set at the page top of page six
02:53:43 of page six which is holding off publication and again i summarize incorporating the key lessons into different forms of operational guidance to be produced in due course
02:53:55 to be produced in due course did you have a considered view on the on which option was to be preferred
02:54:02 no i don't i think i probably would have left that to the recipients of the email and
02:54:08 and seen what the you know what their advice had been the rest of the email correspondence isn't directly relevant for us but could i go to a related exchange which can be
02:54:20 i go to a related exchange which can be found at clg quadruple 0-1949
02:54:32 if we could look first at dawn eastmead's email on the 24th of october so it's roughly in the middle of that page
02:54:41 page and she says this copying you and brian martin brian not sure if you'll want to attend two at this stage louise will have details at the exact time it appears that rather than looking at
02:54:53 it appears that rather than looking at the gra we had and saying i wonder how this needs to be improved in light of the coroner's rule 43 on lagnal we just gave it to london fb fire brigade to start from scratch or rather allowed
02:55:05 start from scratch or rather allowed london to pour all their work angst and trade union relationships from 2009 onwards into the document i don't have the technical skills to be able to properly judge but if the
02:55:16 able to properly judge but if the decision were mine i'd scrap this version
02:55:19 version anyway the meeting on the 31st is to discuss what to do i've told les that whatever happens we need swift resolution he was talking about more important to get it right than do it
02:55:30 important to get it right than do it quickly which i agree with as long as it's done quickly too now had you had any discussions with dorney smith or indeed anyone else at the department about scrapping the draft
02:55:42 totally no not that not that i remember as i said i think i just wanted you know whatever it was wasn't for me to say what what this document should look like
02:55:53 what what this document should look like i just wanted it
02:55:56 to reflect certain things now if we can look at brian martin's um response to dornis mead which is at the top of page one
02:56:05 one he said this i think you've summarized the situation perfectly
02:56:09 perfectly it reminds me of the first attempt to produce the guidance for the fso this too was a document put together by a bunch of fire service guys without proper supervision or terms of reference
02:56:20 proper supervision or terms of reference not entirely their fault the result then was a document that was way too long and next to useless my only interest in the gra is how it relates to the design strategy for buildings so
02:56:31 the design strategy for buildings so long as that doesn't change then i'm happy
02:56:34 happy i'm not an expert in firefighting procedures although i've picked up a lot over the years getting a bit gray now i'll attend the meeting if you and louise want me to otherwise i'll watch with interest in speech marks
02:56:49 did you share mr martin's view that the problems regarding the draft had arisen because of the absence of proper supervision or effective terms of reference
02:57:05 i'm not sure i had a view on on any of that it was um
02:57:12 i don't think i knew enough about the purpose or the guidance or you know how it was targeted at operational firefighters so
02:57:27 i suspect i agreed with the fact that it kind of lost its way
02:57:33 but yeah but nothing more than that no i was just something that was coming across my desk every now and again and i was
02:57:42 was having a look at quickly and saying no it wasn't something i was giving a massive amount of attention to and you've made your comments and that was sufficient
02:57:54 and that was sufficient yeah and would obviously comment the next time i saw it thank you
02:58:02 so the next section will take longer than
02:58:07 than the two minutes or depending which block you're looking at um might i suggest that this is an appropriate point yes very well um thank you wellness upton it looks as
02:58:18 thank you wellness upton it looks as though this is a good time to stop for lunch so we'll break now we'll resume please at two o'clock and as before please don't talk to anyone about your evidence all right thank you thank you very much
02:58:40 thank you very much mr can hear two o'clock
02:59:37 you