London Fire Brigade Evidence - Monday 1st November 2021 (2/2)

Full transcript

00:00:31 you ask mr carp to come back in please thank you

00:00:47 all right mr ready to carry on indeed thank you thank you very much yes mr killer thanks sir good afternoon mr carrot now before the break we were about to examine the start

00:00:58 break we were about to examine the start of the first regional round of consultation excuse me so that's the process i'd like to discuss with you now excuse me now you explain at paragraph 79 of your third witness statement and

00:01:09 79 of your third witness statement and if we go to lfb double zero double one nine eight four nine forward slash three six

00:01:22 and if we look at the third sentence you say there that the first round of regional consultation involved the circulation of the draft gra by derrick

00:01:33 circulation of the draft gra by derrick clough to all gra committee members for them to consult with their respective cfo regions and then if you go on further to paragraph 82 at page 37

00:01:46 you say that although the draft gra 3.2 was ready for circulation by december 2011 derek clough delayed its circulation until march 2012. can you help us why was that delay

00:01:59 can you help us why was that delay affected by mr clough i can't remember with 100

00:02:05 with 100 complete certainty but i think if you you referred earlier to the

00:02:10 the gra program and i think there'd been delays

00:02:14 delays with some of the other documents and it was a question of measuring into the process so that there wasn't too many documents out for consultation at one time so it's

00:02:25 out for consultation at one time so it's for pacing purposes for internal program pacing purposes that's a really good way to summarise it and so the practical consequence was before it got going in a substantive way

00:02:36 before it got going in a substantive way the gra process was already behind schedule

00:02:39 schedule yes

00:02:41 yes now we can see an email that derek clough sent to the gra committee on the 11th of march 2012 requesting responses by the 30th of march

00:02:50 march 2012 that email can be found at lfb 0010235

00:03:01 and if we can look at the second paragraph of that email

00:03:06 derek clough refers there to the quote risk matrix for the highrise gra close quotes the risk matrix was a separate document is that correct

00:03:17 is that correct now it was an additional section to

00:03:21 to to the main text so if you look at gra 3.2 version 2 all you'll see is the main text description of the hazards and the control measures

00:03:33 control measures there was a decision taken

00:03:36 taken somewhere along the line to then provide the same information in a matrix format and and the objective for that

00:03:47 and and the objective for that was to assist local fire services in carrying out their local risk assessment so we were doing a lot of the work for them

00:03:55 them by identifying the hazards and setting out the control measures in a matrix format

00:04:01 format and to that end you set out and table form all the risks identified in gra 3.2 and the relevant control measures correct and the risk assessment document as you say was eventually all

00:04:12 as you say was eventually all incorporated into the body of gra 3.2 and ultimately became section 2 of gra 3.2 that's correct and if we can look um simply for illustrative purposes at the final

00:04:23 illustrative purposes at the final version of gra 3.2 as published in february 2014 which is lfb quadruple zero one two double five

00:04:36 and then if we can look at page 37 onwards

00:04:42 we see set out there a table identifying the list of lists of activities associated hazards and risks identifying persons at risk and the relevant control measures

00:04:53 relevant control measures that's what the risk matrix transmogrified into isn't it absolutely and is it correct that the content of this table is very much lifted from the content of the gra document itself i.e

00:05:04 content of the gra document itself i.e there's nothing in here which isn't in gra i'd like to think so we certainly checked it a few times but that's exactly what should be the case now the consultation responses that you

00:05:15 now the consultation responses that you received were collated into a spreadsheet which was considered in due course by you and philip morton is that right

00:05:24 right i think it's right for this round it's definitely right for the national round i i'm not 100 certain whether we put all of the regional consultation responses

00:05:36 of the regional consultation responses into a spreadsheet we certainly considered them as they were on the on the individual documents but i'm not so sure that we put them into a spreadsheet now um

00:05:47 put them into a spreadsheet now um it's right to say that you amended the draft on the basis of the feedback and then sent an updated draft to derek clough on the 9th of may 2012 as the precursor to the second round of consultation at the national level is

00:05:59 consultation at the national level is that right that's correct now if we can go to your third witness statement again which is lfb double zero double one nine eight four nine forward slash three eight

00:06:12 eight and paragraph a hundred and two

00:06:17 two i don't think maybe that's not quite right well let's

00:06:26 leave that for the moment oh yes i think it has set out there the correct bit there so you set out uh wahoo's consulting all the rest of it now if we can go on to the second round of consultation

00:06:37 consultation which

00:06:38 which look at page 46 in this statement

00:06:43 and if we look at paragraph

00:06:46 104 and the first two sentences there you

00:06:51 there you say that the national consultation was itself delayed until july 2012 and that you understood that the reason for this was that derek clough wanted to await the publication of the shirley towers

00:07:03 the publication of the shirley towers inquest report is that right yes were you content with that delay uh

00:07:10 uh it made sense we'd spoken to hampshire fire rescue as part of our research and preparation for for this work

00:07:21 work but it would always make sense to make sure you've covered off what is in the formal inquest findings and and therefore yeah it was a sensible decision

00:07:32 now the gra 3.2 is eventually circulated on the 29th of july 2012. you deal with this at paragraph 105 below on there on the screen now you then go on to explain

00:07:43 the screen now you then go on to explain at paragraph 106 from the bottom of page 46 onwards that the national consultees included included the chief fire officers of fire and rescue authorities throughout

00:07:54 and rescue authorities throughout england as well as the cfos for scotland north wales south wales and northern ireland is that right that's correct and the replies from the national consultees were then collated into a table

00:08:06 were then collated into a table if we look at paragraph 108

00:08:11 108 you confirm that there yes now if we turn to the table that's referred to in paragraph 108 that can be found at lfb001024443

00:08:25 again apologies that's something that will need to be downloaded

00:08:34 and if we could

00:08:37 look at line 155 i think the identification of the line is at the bottom of the box

00:08:46 we see here a response received from a gary brandwick from north wales and i particularly like you to look at the the text at

00:08:57 the the text at 1 5 9 which relates to the section of 3.2 that was entitled evacuation of buildings

00:09:08 and we can see the gray text that mr brandwick is commenting upon so it's set out immediately before his uh comment in um in column e and under the heading in capitals of

00:09:19 and under the heading in capitals of evacuation of buildings it says this firefighting operations can be affected by the type of evacuation being undertaken the progress of the evacuation and the number and type of

00:09:31 evacuation and the number and type of people being evacuated instant commanders must consider both the effect of firefighting tactics on the evacuation of occupants and conversely the effect of evacuation on tactics

00:09:42 the effect of evacuation on tactics if for example a building's evacuation plan includes the use of lifts by occupants there may be an impact on the availability of fire lifts for use by fire and rescue service personnel

00:09:54 fire and rescue service personnel the need to assist with the evacuation of persons can divert crews away from the tasks they were briefed to undertake this can have an adverse effect on the instant commander's plan and resourcing

00:10:06 instant commander's plan and resourcing for the incident now mr brandwick's comment appears immediately underneath that quote in bold and he said this

00:10:16 this is a very topical discussion point at the moment and this paragraph in a national grade document does not do the necessity

00:10:24 necessity for getting the evacuation strategy correct justice having researched this dilemma in some depth with our legislative fire safety department the conclusion we have come

00:10:35 department the conclusion we have come to the present time is that the oic so officer in command in charge of the first attendance is in the best position to dictate the evacuee evacuation

00:10:46 to dictate the evacuee evacuation tactics

00:10:47 tactics but this does not help control room staff who may be receiving multiple calls and are unsure of the advice to give

00:10:55 give if a building was fitted throughout with a sprinkler system then a stay put policy would generally be warranted but without such a system how can we be sure that any built-in or engineered

00:11:06 that any built-in or engineered solutions have not been compromised and how often would we need to inspect these buildings to be confident the prescribed evacuation policy was still valid

00:11:17 evacuation policy was still valid and we see in column f uh that

00:11:20 uh that mr brunwick's views were rejected do you remember considering mr brandwick's feedback as part of the consultation process i do what was your assessment of the merits

00:11:33 what was your assessment of the merits and disadvantages of what mr brandwick was suggesting

00:11:38 first thing i would say is that he's put that comment against page seven of the document which is merely a statement of hazards

00:11:49 hazards not a statement of control measures and actions that might be taken at the scene so that's the first point and that's more of a drafting issue if you like and that's

00:12:00 drafting issue if you like and that's the point that's made in column g i think is that right yes however i can see i can see where you're going with with this in terms of the substantive

00:12:11 substantive point the document does of course say that the incident commander should

00:12:17 should change the evacuation strategy if their perception of the fire or the incident requires that and in terms of fire survival guidance

00:12:32 that it also says that the

00:12:35 that the incident commander should liaise with brigade control and make sure that the two sets of advice are in accordance with each other so that if if it is

00:12:46 with each other so that if if it is changed on the at the incident then control would be informed and they would need to give different advice to callers

00:12:54 callers looking at what mr brandwick says here certainly um on one reading he's concerned that an evacuation strategy including state put depended

00:13:05 strategy including state put depended essentially on uh buildings fire engineered solutions operating as intended in circumstances where those fire engineered solutions did not always operate as intended and

00:13:17 did not always operate as intended and could not necessarily be relied upon to do so

00:13:20 do so first of all was that how you read his comment when you initially considered it back in 2012 it was

00:13:27 it was and and on reflection i think we should have given him more of a

00:13:33 more of a detailed response i think the point he's making in his second paragraph is very much a regulatory fire safety issue as to whether

00:13:44 as to whether staple is acceptable in a building whether it's got sprinklers or some other form of fire safety engineering that's not an issue that the gra

00:13:55 that's not an issue that the gra was able to address because the gra is about providing

00:13:59 providing operational guidance to operational crews that i saw that at the time and i still do

00:14:05 still do see it as a regulatory fire safety issue i completely accept that in our comments we would have been better to to ask

00:14:16 to to ask gary brendrick to take that up through his fire safety department with clg the part of clg that deals with fire safety policy cutting through that um mr

00:14:28 safety policy cutting through that um mr carrup looking at the first paragraph there what he's basically saying is you can't safely assume that a building will perform as intended now that's a sound legitimate point of view isn't

00:14:39 a sound legitimate point of view isn't it did you agree with him i do agree yes and

00:14:43 and i think you also agree with me that the observations he puts in his first paragraph

00:14:48 paragraph um deserved a greater more reasoned response than a simple rejection didn't they

00:14:56 i would accept that and and i would accept that in our response we could have been

00:15:01 have been clearer

00:15:02 clearer than we were and it's also poverty is cutting across you mr but what the problem he identifies here i you can't assume that a building will perform as intended

00:15:14 perform as intended was a risk that was realized at lachnal wasn't it yes

00:15:21 yes and one of the purposes of gra 3.2 was to deal with the lessons learned from lachnal and yet the rejection does not appear to engage

00:15:33 the rejection does not appear to engage with a learning point that did arise from lachna as phrased here by mr brandwick i i do take a slightly different view on that

00:15:43 that what is that view so my my view is that gra 3.2 version 3 did address the issues identified from lacanal

00:15:54 the issues identified from lacanal i'm quite confident about that with regards to this particular point which i think is more about liaison between the

00:16:04 the incident commander at the scene and brigade control i accept that we that we perhaps should have made it even clearer than we did

00:16:15 made it even clearer than we did that there needs to be very close and ongoing liaison because i think that's the the main point that he's making i accept he's making a point about failing buildings but

00:16:26 buildings but i think the nub of what he's saying there is that there needs to be close liaison between the incident commander and brigade control and i fully accept that the other item of feedback that i'd like

00:16:38 the other item of feedback that i'd like to discuss with you today is that received during the national consultation and it really dealt with the discrete issue of the the function of gra 3.2 now it's not recorded on this

00:16:49 now it's not recorded on this spreadsheet but you do in fairness refer to it in the pc6 report and could we go to that which is a lfb0032783

00:17:00 forward slash nine

00:17:12 and if we look at paragraph

00:17:16 2.4.10 uh you say this one of the common and most prominent themes that emerged from the consultation was that the section of gra that described control measures had become too procedural in quotes

00:17:29 become too procedural in quotes it was certainly true that version 3 presented the actions necessary for safe and effective fire service operations in a logical order but in this respect the

00:17:40 a logical order but in this respect the changes that were made were only expanding on the approach that had already been taken in version two of dura 3.2

00:17:48 dura 3.2 now when you refer to the section of grade that described control measures are you referring there to the risk matrix we've just been considering no the main text meant it

00:17:59 the main text meant it well both i mean the control measures are described in both but they're described

00:18:03 described in the in the sense that's procedural they're described in section one and what was your understanding of the criticism that uh the section had was quotes two procedural close quotes

00:18:19 the criticism was made by a number of people the deputy chief fire officer in hertfordshire was probably the person leading this particular criticism and he felt it was too close

00:18:32 criticism and he felt it was too close to a service policy and he felt it should be it should have less detail and less information

00:18:41 myself and and many others on the committee took a a different view and as i said earlier for me this was about helping local fire services to create an

00:18:54 local fire services to create an effective policy so the idea of putting the information in a chronological order would greatly assist most fire services that would adopt that approach for their procedure if you read

00:19:08 approach for their procedure if you read version two the information jumps around from topic to topic and from different points in the incident to different points so it goes from the beginning of

00:19:19 points so it goes from the beginning of the incident to the middle then back to the beginning and then covers things that might happen later on so from my from my perspective it was better

00:19:30 from my perspective it was better to present the information chronologically and also

00:19:35 and also because we've gathered a lot of information and some of it was quite complex that meant our take on that procedure was really quite involved and some

00:19:47 was really quite involved and some people felt it was too involved for a generic risk assessment now can we now turn to the final version of gra 3.2 which was produced on the 8th of november 2012 and following the close of

00:19:59 november 2012 and following the close of the national consultation on the 14th of september of that year now if we can go back to your third witness statement lfb0019849

00:20:11 forward slash 51

00:20:15 apologies i i don't think it's fair to describe that as a final version well it was in the finals in inverted commas well please don't worry mister i can't do it matters um

00:20:27 um dealing things first of all with the period of consultation you'll see dealt with a paragraph one one five um you confirm the consultation period formally closed on the 14th of september 2012 and between october and

00:20:39 september 2012 and between october and december 2012 you reviewed the responses to the national consultation but that no further drafts were produced during that time again does that remain a fair summary yes

00:20:50 summary yes you also explain if you go over the page there we go a paragraph 116 that was decided to postpone the production of further drafts of the gra pending both the shirley towers and the lachnal house findings is that right yes

00:21:03 house findings is that right yes and the latino house inquest hearing started in january 2013. i believe so yes so by this time so september 2012 when

00:21:14 so by this time so september 2012 when the national consultation closed is it right that the lfb had completed its own internal investigation into the latino house fire and was preparing for the inquest yes

00:21:25 the inquest yes by that stage the lfb would have had presumably a clear appreciation of the learning points arising out of that fire i believe so did you think therefore it was necessary

00:21:36 did you think therefore it was necessary to await the outcome of the inco inquest before making further progress with the draft gra

00:21:43 draft gra as i explained earlier i think i think it's always prudent to wait for the formal findings of a formal inquiry we anticipated what we thought were going to be the recommendations and the

00:21:54 going to be the recommendations and the issues but i think it's prudent to wait for that to be confirmed in writing now if we can just clarify will matter if we go to paragraph 120 of this statement which is the page 53

00:22:14 you say that that you circulated on the 8th of november what you consider to be at the time to be the final draft that's what i was referring to earlier on ready for publication and you sent it to

00:22:26 ready for publication and you sent it to derek clough and paul is at walston homes of the fbu correct now we can have a look at that email which is lfb trouble zero nine zero seven one six

00:22:42 and we find your email is the excuse me is the second email in that thread

00:22:49 thread it's sent at 1608 and you say this please find attached final versions of the high-rise gra which is now ready for publication from lfb's perspective

00:23:00 lfb's perspective we have provided two copies the first version of which shows in track changes the amendments which have been made as a result of feedback received from the second open brackets cfo close brackets round

00:23:13 open brackets cfo close brackets round of consultation and the second of which is a clean version which is easier to read

00:23:18 read as already advised the consultation process generated a high volume of feedback and a wide variety of views hence the time necessary to consider all of these carefully in order to produce

00:23:29 of these carefully in order to produce the final draft although some people will possibly still disagree with the content i am satisfied that we have struck a bad reasonable balance of all the views we have received and

00:23:41 received and more importantly that the document encompasses all the key risks issues and associated control measures that have been identified as a result of incidents such as shirley towers and lachnal

00:23:54 such as shirley towers and lachnal now that email uh 10 suggests that you'd

00:23:58 you'd you were confident that the draft dra that stage properly reflected the relevant learning from lachnal is that a fair observation yes

00:24:09 now we can see from the first email in this thread just going well

00:24:15 well sorry subject to the

00:24:18 to the formal

00:24:20 formal inquest findings being a variation to what we understood at that time now you forwarded this email to i think professor your line manager so ac knighton and gary dobson gary reason

00:24:33 knighton and gary dobson gary reason gary reason sorry yes and you say in the middle of that email this the production of this document has been a very significant piece of work but i am very pleased with the outcome

00:24:44 but i am very pleased with the outcome and i'm satisfied it will lead to safer high-rise operations both in lfb and the uk fire service provided no more changes are made as a result of any further response from the

00:24:55 result of any further response from the fbu

00:24:56 fbu we will shortly start work on revising lfb's operational procedure to bring it in line bring it line with the gra now

00:25:06 now there is no mention there of a possible or potential contribution review from the dclg is that right no there isn't so is it fair to say that you weren't

00:25:17 so is it fair to say that you weren't expecting any further substantive comment from them before publication not at that stage because my understanding as i explained earlier was that derrick clough as their

00:25:29 that derrick clough as their representative was reviewing the document presumably sharing it with colleagues as appropriate and therefore i felt he was i mean i knew he was happy with it at

00:25:40 i mean i knew he was happy with it at that time and so absent any shouting from him

00:25:44 from him absence of any feedback from him or anyone else uh i felt we were in a reasonable place yes can we look at the uh draft that you attach this email which can be found at lfb

00:25:56 lfb 003 double eight six

00:26:02 and if we turn to page 25

00:26:11 now here we have the section evacuation and fire survival guidance calls a section which we looked at in its earlier life now two changes have been made to this section

00:26:22 section since the end of the consultation period the first change is the insertion of the word numerous in the first line the second change

00:26:34 the second change is the additional sentence at the end of the second paragraph which reads the type of evacuation being undertaken the progress of the evacuation and the number and type of people being

00:26:45 number and type of people being evacuated can adversely affect firefighting operations now

00:26:53 now can you help us first of all what was the thinking behind the first change so the inclusion of the word numerous in the first sentence i think that would have i can't precisely remember

00:27:04 i can't precisely remember my thinking but i think it would have reflected the fact that far survival calls are fairly rare but when we get them they they tend to be multiple

00:27:16 they they tend to be multiple so

00:27:18 so i think i would have just been emphasizing particularly to fire services who may not have experienced that kind of incident that they should expect the challenge of dealing with

00:27:30 the challenge of dealing with multiple calls looking at uh this the first paragraph bearing in mind your experiences that you recount i think you've counted an incident where there were 36 you obviously have the

00:27:42 there were 36 you obviously have the benefit of lachnal looking at how that first paragraph is drafted would you accept that it doesn't fully convey the rarity of multiple fsg

00:27:53 fully convey the rarity of multiple fsg calls and the consequential difficulties and challenges that poses to control i would accept that was that something

00:28:04 was that something hindsight's a wonderful thing at the time did it cross your mind that do we need to be conveying the rarity and in more detail the problems that

00:28:15 and in more detail the problems that flow from multiple fsgs

00:28:20 i think there's a partial counter to that if if we'd have expressed the rarity of it is there not a risk that we would have downgraded its

00:28:33 a risk that we would have downgraded its importance in people's minds and and i

00:28:37 and and i we were quite strong at wanting people as i said earlier we were the only service to my knowledge that had a procedure on the ground for managing these and i was very keen

00:28:50 for managing these and i was very keen through the national working group to share that information and indeed we shared

00:28:56 shared lfp's policy as it was at the time with numerous brigades because none of them had anything equivalent so i think what we wanted to highlight to them because

00:29:08 them because if you get one call there may well be serious challenges but it's probably not too difficult to manage but the fact is they do tend to happen in in a multiple context and then

00:29:20 happen in in a multiple context and then the risk of confusion the risk because the way in which the information is passed from a control room to the incident ground and then of course information fed back if you're

00:29:31 course information fed back if you're doing that with multiple calls i would never underestimate the challenge of doing that accurately and doing it well so i think we wanted to emphasize that you've got to be ready

00:29:43 to emphasize that you've got to be ready for multiple calls you've got to be ready for

00:29:45 ready for numerous

00:29:47 numerous multiple calls that are happening at the same time

00:29:50 same time and and you would possibly need to prioritize the action and that was your thought process at the time

00:29:58 time it was

00:29:59 it was and so

00:30:00 and so does it flow from that was there a discussion between you and mr morton or anyone else on your team about how to draft this particular sentence to convey how you dealt with the rarity

00:30:12 how you dealt with the rarity and secondly the seriousness and significance of the consequential issues that flow from multiple fsg equals beyond beyond what i've just said i i mean i don't think we spent a lot of time thinking about the rarity aspect of

00:30:25 time thinking about the rarity aspect of it perhaps we should have done but i think what we were trying to do was share

00:30:32 was share our

00:30:33 our knowledge and experience of what wasn't just lacking all but with several other incidents as well with brigades that i knew from having spoken to them it was even rarer in in their services

00:30:45 it was even rarer in in their services so

00:30:46 so it was how do we help them to benefit from what we've experienced and so the team coalesced around this drafting fairly speedily from what you say absolutely i don't remember a

00:30:58 absolutely i don't remember a particularly long or detailed discussion around it can we look at the second change

00:31:03 change which is the addition of the sentence at the end of the second paragraph again

00:31:09 again what did you have in mind when you use the phrase the type of evacuation you may well have covered this in earlier evidence i just want to ask you directly looking at this

00:31:20 well as we've already established this morning obviously there are different strategies for different buildings so some buildings

00:31:31 some buildings carry out a phased evacuation that can be just the fire floor or the fire floor on the floor above some buildings go straight for a full evacuation some do a zonal evacuation

00:31:42 evacuation some do a zonal evacuation there are many different variations so understanding what kind of evacuation you're dealing with if one is in progress when you

00:31:53 with if one is in progress when you arrive is obviously very important thank you there is one express reference to stay put advice in the draft they've been added since the conclusion of the consultation can we go to page 15

00:32:11 now just to give you some context mr carpenter we can go back to if you need to this is the part of the document that deals with key control measures a section which started on page 11 and it forms part of the guidance on

00:32:22 and it forms part of the guidance on planning that fire and rescue services are advised to carry out in relation to high-rise buildings now if we can look at the fourth paragraph from the bottom

00:32:33 at the fourth paragraph from the bottom of this page this is the one that contains the reference to stay put and the management of fsg calls and what it says is this frses should also have effective

00:32:44 frses should also have effective arrangements in place to handle fire survival calls from the public where they believe they are unable to leave their premises due to age disability mobility illness or the

00:32:56 disability mobility illness or the effects of fire frses should consider both generic techniques for persons told to stay put as well as bespoke arrangements for specific

00:33:07 bespoke arrangements for specific buildings where this is appropriate these arrangements should include how calls will be passed and recorded at the incident their impact on resources and mobilizing and how information will be exchanged

00:33:19 and how information will be exchanged between callers control and managers at the incident and vice versa now the first question is this did you consult with anyone at lfb control about

00:33:31 consult with anyone at lfb control about the content of this section

00:33:35 by this point this document had been consulted on internally through heads of service and control would have been part of that process correct yeah

00:33:46 process correct yeah and can you remember now whether you received any responses or feedback from control on this particular passage i can't but as i said earlier what i can

00:33:58 i can't but as i said earlier what i can remember is that we work closely with control

00:34:02 control in establishing the fsg guidance generally

00:34:08 generally and

00:34:09 and in my mind we were only reflecting that back here

00:34:14 back here so

00:34:15 so i i wouldn't have envisaged control would have an issue with what we've written here we should be reflecting your discussions yes and previous consultation with them on that specific policy thank you what

00:34:27 on that specific policy thank you what did you mean by generic techniques for persons told to stay put

00:34:35 i don't think they're my words i i think these were brought into this document at this stage as a result of a comment so i i can't actually explain that for you unpack it you you don't remember having to apply

00:34:47 you you don't remember having to apply your mind to understanding what it meant well i think what they mean i think they mean techniques for people generally and then

00:34:56 and then as it goes on to say if you've got a high risk uh buildings such as the ones we mentioned this morning you may have a bespoke contingency plan

00:35:07 you may have a bespoke contingency plan for that building and that may include for example the provision of refuges or the other provisions that may be relevant to how you manage fire survival guidance

00:35:19 fire survival guidance now looking at this passage what it doesn't address is the issue of how and in what circumstances to change state advice would you accept that i would but i wouldn't expect it

00:35:30 i would but i wouldn't expect it that to be covered in the planning section because we are talking about pre-incident and equally in this section um there's no guidance on how in what circumstances to tell residents to

00:35:42 circumstances to tell residents to attempt to leave their property in a building where normally a state put advice

00:35:48 advice no but the same rationale applies we are in a

00:35:51 in a this is the planning phase so we're not at the incident yet and you don't think that's a circumstance that ought properly to be considered in the context of planning

00:36:04 sorry could you repeat the prospect of evacuation and how in what circumstances that stay put should be withdrawn in particular you don't consider that an appropriate factor to

00:36:15 consider that an appropriate factor to be considered in the context of planning i think it is an appropriate factor but i think elsewhere in this section we do refer people

00:36:27 we do refer people sorry refer fire services to the need to consider the evacuation strategy as part of their planning so it's it's not in this particular paragraph but i believe it is in the section

00:36:39 believe it is in the section now the second item text that i'd like to ask you about is on page 14 of this draft so the page before the present one

00:36:48 and we can see that in the bottom half of the page there's express reference there to the need for contingency plans and again that's part of the planning section

00:36:58 section now what the middle paragraph says is this

00:37:01 this contingency plan should include a range of events

00:37:05 of events which are foreseeable for the particular premises

00:37:08 premises including

00:37:09 including fire spread beyond the compartment of origin

00:37:12 origin and the potential for multiple rescues now that same passage was found in the 2008 uh version of gerald 3.2 we've already seen it was a passage that was identified in november 2009 by kevin

00:37:25 was identified in november 2009 by kevin hughes

00:37:27 hughes his gap analysis in which he observed that the gra was more detailed than the lfb's policy on contingency plans and the lfe policy should be or could be enhanced with the inclusion of further

00:37:38 enhanced with the inclusion of further information on and development of operational contingency plans now when you transferred the guidance on contingency plans for fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and the consequential potential for

00:37:50 and the consequential potential for multiple rescues from the 2008 version to this one did it cause you to think about whether the lfb's own internal policies and procedures equipped personnel

00:38:01 procedures equipped personnel to compile prepare contingency plans for fire spread beyond the compartment of origin

00:38:11 at the time i would have undertaken that work

00:38:14 work the

00:38:15 the work to progress lfb's policy was obviously in the future so it would certainly have been in my mind

00:38:23 mind that this was going to be an issue in fact you know the whole gra was going to be something we needed to transpose into lfp policy was i specifically thinking about this

00:38:35 was i specifically thinking about this at the time that you refer to i think the answer is probably no thank you what's specific guidance on how to develop

00:38:43 develop an operational contingency plan rotten general guidance was that a matter for local policy rather than the gra in your view

00:38:51 view yes because the systems and processes do vary significantly from service to service i'm bearing in mind that did you take any steps at this time

00:39:03 any steps at this time to ensure that any deficiency in lfb's policy 633 was addressed or at least on someone's radar to be addressed

00:39:13 no because at this point i still hoped that the gra would be published within a reasonably quick time and therefore i i think my view was let's wait for the

00:39:24 i i think my view was let's wait for the final version of gra 3.2 revise 633 on the basis of it and publish it the danger of doing it more piecemeal

00:39:35 piecemeal would be

00:39:37 would be issuing multiple versions of the same document

00:39:40 document and getting people on fire stations to read multiple versions my experience of working with people on fire stations is that wouldn't engender confidence or support

00:39:52 confidence or support quite apart from the fact their capacity to keep reading iterations of the same thing so i think it was wise and i still think it would be wise to wait until you've

00:40:03 it would be wise to wait until you've got all your ducks in a row so to speak and you're clear about all your changes and make them all at once thank you finally i'd like to look at the express reference to cladding that's

00:40:14 the express reference to cladding that's in the draft and that was dealt with in the 2008 version of gra 3.2 which for context let us look at briefly

00:40:25 context let us look at briefly and if we can go to h o m

00:40:29 h o m quadruple zero two one two eight four slash eleven [Music]

00:40:45 now we can see that the first paragraph here refers to arrangements for some 2d visits

00:40:52 visits and lists the information that should be gathered as part of that process now that included if we turn over to page 12

00:41:00 page 12 and the fourth bullet point

00:41:05 building fourth bullet point from the top i should say building construction features which may promote abnormal or rapid fire spread such as sandwich panels cladding systems voids etc

00:41:17 panels cladding systems voids etc now in your post consultation version of 3.2 the reference to cladding remains but in an altered form and if we could look at that draft lfb trouble zero double three double eight

00:41:30 trouble zero double three double eight six forward slash thirteen

00:41:40 if we look at the pre-planning section and we can see the bottom paragraph immediately before the bullet points it reads information to be gathered

00:41:51 reads information to be gathered in relation to high-rise incidents should include again we go over the page page 14

00:42:00 and we look at the fifth bullet point from the top and it says this building construction features such as the presence and location of masonette style construction sandwich panels

00:42:12 sandwich panels timber framing cladding systems surface-mounted trunking ducting and voids in addition to features which present a specific hazard such as asbestos

00:42:23 asbestos now what appears to have been removed is the reference to construction features which promote abnormal or rapid fire spread

00:42:32 spread first of all do you accept that i do accept that can you help us what was the rationale for the removal of those words i actually don't think there was a rationale i think it was an omission

00:42:47 now you have stated in your pc6 report which we can find at lfb treble zero three two seven eight three four slash two two

00:43:00 if we look at paragraph three point seven point five at the bottom of the page

00:43:06 page it says this it is also pertinent to note that whilst various building construction features had been highlighted as playing a significant part in the development of

00:43:17 significant part in the development of recent major high-rise fires in the united kingdom the gra authors were not aware of any evidence at the time of the gra review process

00:43:27 process that cladding as a material and building system posed a significant fire hazard now

00:43:36 now bearing in mind what you say there would you accept that the 2008 version of gra 3.2 referred explicitly to cladding systems as potentially promoting abnormal or rapid fire spread

00:43:51 my understanding of the 2008 version and i think it's firstly i'd like to say i understand cladding is a very sensitive issue particularly to the families

00:44:03 particularly to the families and and i recognize that but what i'm about to say is

00:44:08 is a true representation of my understanding at the time so the way that i understood cladding was not

00:44:16 was not as a hazardous material in its own right because i believed that it would have as an external item of construction it would have been non-combustible

00:44:27 it would have been non-combustible because that was my understanding of the regulations my understanding of the risk that cladding posed was that it had the potential to create a void

00:44:38 potential to create a void and it was the void rather than the cladding which created the risk of fire spread so i completely accept your point that in

00:44:49 accept your point that in moving from version two to version three we we we lost that connection and i regret that however

00:44:57 however what i'm really clear about and i think this is the most important point is that at no point did anyone indicate that cladding as a material in and of itself

00:45:09 as a material in and of itself was a hazardous material and

00:45:13 and when you consider the extent of consultation [Music]

00:45:18 [Music] across the british fire service through clg

00:45:21 clg if it had been understood i would have expected someone to point it out could i put a point directly to you could we go back to the 2008 version of 3.2

00:45:33 the 2008 version of 3.2 which is hom quadruple zero two one two eight four slash twelve

00:45:40 and if we look at the bullet point from the fourth bullet point from the top it says building construction features which may promote abnormal or rapid fire spread such as

00:45:51 spread such as cladding systems none of the qualifications which you've set out there are set out here are they i accept that that what i've given you is my

00:46:04 that what i've given you is my understanding of of why cladding was there in version two and

00:46:12 and an explanation as far as i'm able to offer it for how it was then treated in version three and i think the main point that i would want to emphasize again is that that was

00:46:23 again is that that was on the basis of not understanding it as a hazard

00:46:27 a hazard other than the fact that when it was put on a building

00:46:31 building it had the potential to create a void which had the potential to create abnormal and rapid fire spread mr cap in answer to an earlier question you said that the words promoting abnormal rapid

00:46:43 that the words promoting abnormal rapid fire spread were dropped from the later version of 3.2 due to an omission

00:46:50 omission now are you saying that the omission was a conscious decision by you to drop those words or is it simply in the realm of oversight oversight

00:47:02 so they were dropped by the authors of gra 3.2 without any consideration in detail

00:47:09 detail of the precise nature of the risks posed by cladding in relation to promoting rapid fire spread for example

00:47:23 if it's an oversight it's got to follow hasn't it

00:47:26 hasn't it it has and i can understand what you're saying

00:47:34 we did not understand the hazard of cladding

00:47:38 cladding i think that is the fundamental point i think to compound that we we dropped this

00:47:46 this connection with abnormal and rapid fire spread so that that is an oversight on my part

00:47:53 my part did anyone raise with you as part any member of your team or anyone else for that matter why those words promoting abnormal

00:48:03 abnormal or rapid fire spread had been dropped from the

00:48:06 from the later 3.2 not to my knowledge

00:48:12 can we now turn to latino inquests and the further delay in the publication of 3.2 and the final internal responses from the lfb now shortly after you sent what you

00:48:23 now shortly after you sent what you consider to be the final version of 3.2 in november 2012 the latino house inquest opened in january 2013. now you didn't give evidence of those inquests i think i'm right in saying

00:48:35 inquests i think i'm right in saying correct

00:48:37 correct now you emailed gary reason jim knighton and others on the 5th of february 2013 in which you refer to the latino inquests and the publication of the gra now can we look to that email which is a

00:48:49 now can we look to that email which is a lfb0093003

00:48:58 can we look at the second email on that page which you sent at 1803 and you say this dear all

00:49:06 dear all for your interest and information please see correspondence below between fbu national health and safety official paul wolson homes lee brinton open brackets surrey frs gra program

00:49:19 open brackets surrey frs gra program manager and myself regarding the highrise gra please note that due to the fact the lateral inquest may affect the content of this gra i've agreed with lee that it

00:49:30 of this gra i've agreed with lee that it would be prudent to defer its publication until we know the inquest outcome and whether that will require any changes to this document obviously if it becomes apparent that

00:49:41 obviously if it becomes apparent that the outcome is going to be significantly delayed that decision can be revisited now had lee brinton succeeded derek clough as project manager of the gra

00:49:52 clough as project manager of the gra review program by this stage no

00:49:55 no and i apologize for the fact i think that's an erroneous reference her role was always administrative but in a more managerial sense i think when

00:50:08 in a more managerial sense i think when derrick clough retired

00:50:11 retired i think surrey appointed another uniformed officer to take his place however

00:50:18 however i think it was very much emotional replacement because most of the gras by then were finished this was one of the few that was still outstanding and in practical terms lee

00:50:31 outstanding and in practical terms lee brinton was the person doing the work and the person we spoke to thank you now four days earlier on the 1st of february 2013 you had recirculated the final draft gra 3.2 to a number of

00:50:45 final draft gra 3.2 to a number of individuals within the lfb for what you referred to as a sense check for consistency and to identify any formatting errors now that particular email is a lfb treble02835

00:51:06 excuse me

00:51:15 thank you again can i apologize mr carrot for reading it out but it's probably the easier way of recording on the transcript dear colleagues i'm writing to seek your assistance in

00:51:27 i'm writing to seek your assistance in finalizing the attached document which is the new and extensively revised national high-rise generic risk assessment qra this document has been authored by lfb on behalf of cfra

00:51:40 on behalf of cfra as part of the review of the entire current gra series and as such has taken almost two years to complete the document has been subject to several rounds of very extensive and detailed

00:51:52 rounds of very extensive and detailed national consultation and despite the fact this subject is one about which many have strong and diverse opinions i am pleased to say the content is now agreed

00:52:03 is now agreed i'm sure you will recognize the importance of getting this document as right as possible given the risk critical nature of this instant type to both firefighters and the public alike the version attached has now been

00:52:15 the version attached has now been typeset ready for publication by the stationary office and i have requested an opportunity to finally proofread the document before it goes for printing

00:52:26 it goes for printing and to be placed on the clg website this is where you come in as people who i think have an eye for detail and or sufficient interest in the topic to give this final draft version the close

00:52:38 this final draft version the close scrutiny i consider it deserves you're also people who have not been previously involved in the formal consultation process so i hope you can bring a useful degree of objectivity to

00:52:49 bring a useful degree of objectivity to this process on the basis of your reading of the text won't be influenced by any past involvement in making this request please note that

00:53:00 in making this request please note that i am asking you to sense check a document

00:53:03 document for consistency and in order to ensure the typesetting process has not introduced any formatting errors or otherwise corrupted the content it will not generally be possible to

00:53:14 it will not generally be possible to amend the content at this stage unless there is a very good reason for doing so so please confine your review of this document to a proofread this is therefore not consultation

00:53:26 therefore not consultation as a result of the fact we have decided to postpone publication until after the lactal inquest is complete i'm sure you'll understand why there is no immediate rush for your response and i would ask you provide any

00:53:39 response and i would ask you provide any comments format changes ideally using track changes to michelle is at kunika on or before 4th of march 2013. in the unlikely event that you consider

00:53:50 in the unlikely event that you consider there is a very good reason to change the content please highlight any such changes in yellow and also refer to them by page number in your response email now can you explain if this group of

00:54:01 now can you explain if this group of individuals had as you say in the fourth paragraph sufficient interest in the topic etc why there's substantive feedback

00:54:09 feedback had not already been sought as part of the various preceding consultation rounds

00:54:14 rounds could we just scroll up so i can see exactly who they are of course

00:54:25 so so they were from reading across from the top they were from

00:54:31 from health and safety operational resilience

00:54:37 my own department spencer alden smith he hadn't he was out as a borough commander i believe at this time nick coombe was regulatory fire safety steve dudeny was someone who had a particular interest in high rise

00:54:51 particular interest in high rise dave eaglin was somebody on a fire station i thought might have a view and pat tony was someone who led on breathing operators policy so these were people that

00:55:03 policy so these were people that knew a lot about policy but hadn't been involved the the consultation within lfb was via heads of service so i wasn't cited on exactly which individuals they

00:55:16 cited on exactly which individuals they shared it with it could be to be fair it could be that some of these people had seen it as a result of that but these were people that i knew had an eye for detail and and i was at

00:55:27 had an eye for detail and and i was at this point this document had been subject to so many changes and that as the person that was very close to it i wasn't entirely sure that i could see

00:55:38 i wasn't entirely sure that i could see the wood for the trees so i wanted someone who wasn't so close to it to just read it you know hopefully for the first time but it it wouldn't have mattered if they had been in the consultation and and as

00:55:51 had been in the consultation and and as i said there to give it that sense check that i think it needed to have because it had been sub it had been pulled so many different ways by

00:56:02 ways by so many of the different consultation responses that i was getting a little bit concerned about whether we'd lost the overall sense of what we were trying to say so that was my rationale

00:56:14 to say so that was my rationale were you also keen by this time given how long the process had been going on for that subject to then not been a significant delay uh concerning the lack of inquest to get the guidance published

00:56:28 yes i mean after two years i felt and the consultation rounds and the responses and all the work we'd done with the fiverr coach union you know i thought the the priority was to get this

00:56:40 thought the the priority was to get this document out we were some years after lacking

00:56:44 lacking we needed to move on was there any noise in the sector about the delay in the new gra 3.2 that was relevant or were people just awaiting publication in his own course

00:56:57 publication in his own course i wasn't aware of anyone else in the fire sector expressing particular concerns

00:57:03 concerns but

00:57:05 but certainly within lfb i think we felt that it was time to get the document out now there was one substantive response to your email i think that came from stephen dudeny is that right that's

00:57:16 stephen dudeny is that right that's correct and um you helpfully reviewed this in your pc6 report and if we go back to that which is lfb uh trouble zero three two seven eight three four

00:57:27 zero three two seven eight three four slash eleven

00:57:30 and if we look at paragraphs two point six point three through to two point six point five at the top of the page and you describe the the response you received from mr dude thus although it was made clear that this was

00:57:42 although it was made clear that this was not a consultation regarding the documents content one respondee did offer substantive feedback regarding changes that could be made with respect to building construction which has the

00:57:53 to building construction which has the potential to be taken as relevant in the context of the grenfell tower fire the comment related to large panel system lps which are pre-fabricated sections of

00:58:05 which are pre-fabricated sections of concrete that had commonly been used in residential high-rise buildings that were constructed in 1960s lps should not be confused with more

00:58:16 lps should not be confused with more modern cladding systems and the hazard identified was that if it is poorly installed lps can create gaps and allow fire smoke and heat to pass from one building compartment to another

00:58:28 building compartment to another as this comment had been received after the document content had already been agreed and its impact had was already explained within gra 3.2 the jury author

00:58:39 explained within gra 3.2 the jury author decided against making the requested change

00:58:43 change now can we look at stephen dudeny's response

00:58:46 response which was set out in his email to you on the 6th of february 2013 which can be found at lfb double zero one zero two double four

00:58:57 double zero one zero two double four zero

00:58:59 and it's the second email in the chain

00:59:05 you see the email's timed at 12.02 hours and it's his first point that contains his comments about panel systems he says this i've given this a slow and

00:59:16 he says this i've given this a slow and detailed look over and think i've highlighted any minor errors this amounts the removal of a double comma and a double full stop as well as deleting a line about vandalism

00:59:27 deleting a line about vandalism i think it is a very comprehensive document which covers all of the issues that have been ongoing and unchallenged for many decades it goes evolving to take account of the issues which modern firefighters

00:59:39 issues which modern firefighters are facing in high-rise fires such as cable entanglement now just stopping there cable entanglement was a significant issue at shelly towers is that right absolutely

00:59:50 absolutely and the email goes on to say this however in recognition of what you said i appreciate changes are unlikely there are two glaring emissions that i feel i needed to get down on paper that will

01:00:01 needed to get down on paper that will leave for you to decide the weight of their significance number one construction technique one of the big issues related to construction that i have referenced previously is that of large panel system

01:00:14 previously is that of large panel system lps construction often referred to as quotes system built close quotes this is where prefabricated sections of building are put together like a lego set to enable the majority of

01:00:25 set to enable the majority of construction to take place off-site and to facilitate quicker assembly on-site there are still many system-built high-rises in london and one assumes across the uk as the contracts were

01:00:37 across the uk as the contracts were widely awarded in the 1960s to well-known national building companies the issues with these buildings are down to poor fits of the panels which on a day-to-day basis may cause draughts

01:00:48 day-to-day basis may cause draughts within the building but little else and this is the bit i'd like to emphasize significantly though they have been known to personal experience included allow flames smoke and heat to travel

01:00:59 allow flames smoke and heat to travel through parts of the compartments that may otherwise have been deemed fire resistant

01:01:05 resistant this includes unseen spread from one flat to another horizontally or vertically and smoke seepage into protected areas incidentally the building i experienced this in was ronan point on plaistow's

01:01:18 this in was ronan point on plaistow's ground in the early 90s this of course was the building that suffered extensive collapse in 1968 when a gas explosion caused catastrophic failure of the lps construction

01:01:29 construction now

01:01:30 now taking a step back from this correspondence your point here is that lps panels are made of concrete and so they can't be safely or reasonably compared

01:01:41 safely or reasonably compared to the properties of materials used in modding modern cladding panels is that a fair summary yes

01:01:50 wasn't stephen dudeny highlighting another mindful of that distinction wasn't he highlighting another point which is another means by which compartmentation in a high-rise fire may

01:02:02 compartmentation in a high-rise fire may not be

01:02:04 not be necessarily or safely relied upon to subsist

01:02:08 subsist i would i would accept that and i think if if this comment had came sooner

01:02:14 sooner there would have been no good reason to not include it as another example

01:02:21 example but what i would say is that in a more generic sense gra 3.2 was very clear about the fact that firefighters should expect

01:02:32 expect compartmentation to sometimes fail should expect that poor workmanship or deteriorating materials can result in the products of combustion spreading so

01:02:45 the products of combustion spreading so in the material sense of what what what that would have added to the document at that stage and i was

01:02:54 and i was mindful that we were as i understood it at that time very close to publication i didn't feel it was sufficient

01:03:05 sufficient to to include did it prompt you though to look back at the draft to see whether it had given sufficient prominence and guidance on the issue of

01:03:16 prominence and guidance on the issue of compartmentation failure and its consequences for operational firefighting no

01:03:21 no [Music]

01:03:24 [Music] was the reason why it didn't prompt that because by this stage the greater concern was to get the document published rather than rewrite or finesse the text

01:03:36 rewrite or finesse the text [Music]

01:03:37 [Music] i think when you're producing a document of this

01:03:40 of this size and complexity there's always a balance between bringing the thing to conclusion and publication and

01:03:49 and continually revising it did i get the balance right on this occasion i i'm not 100 sure but i didn't feel that what steve had said

01:04:02 i didn't feel that what steve had said was of sufficient it would make sufficient difference to what we'd already covered in the document albeit more

01:04:13 document albeit more generally than he had you know he gave a very clear and positive example and as i say if that comment had been received sooner

01:04:22 sooner i'm

01:04:23 i'm fairly confident it would have found its way into the document as another exemplar of what people should look for but in the circumstances i didn't feel it was

01:04:34 it was sufficiently uh

01:04:37 uh of sufficient risk to to warrant changing the document at that time bearing in mind what you say would you accept though that mr dudeny's comment is an echo of the comment that

01:04:49 comment is an echo of the comment that was made by mr brandwick from north wales

01:04:52 wales namely that you ought not readily or safely to assume that compartmentation will subsist mr brandwick's comment didn't make it into gra 3.2 either

01:05:04 didn't make it into gra 3.2 either at the time i certainly didn't make any connection at all between the two comments well there they are now you've drawn now you've drawn that comparison i can see

01:05:16 comparison i can see how with hindsight that might appear to be the case your reply to mr dudeny you replied on the same day and uh if we go to the top email in this thread

01:05:30 your email is sent at 13 26 so an hour and a bit 20 minutes after the trigger email um steve thanks for your feedback

01:05:41 thanks for your feedback the consultation has closed and adding new content was not the objective at this time

01:05:46 this time but i understand the points you raised below

01:05:49 below we're going to wait for the outcome of lachnal before publishing this document and if this requires changes additions and or amendment we can consider these issues at that time who knows they may

01:06:01 issues at that time who knows they may even emerge as issues from that sort now when you identified wait sorry when you referred to the outcome of lachna and stated the issues identified by mr dudeny may even emerge as issues from

01:06:14 dudeny may even emerge as issues from that source does that mean that you're anticipating the issue of compartmentation failure was going to quote emerge close quotes as an issue following the outcome of the inquest

01:06:27 i was certainly aware that the failure of compartmentation was a key

01:06:31 key lesson identified from lacanal yes and you're aware of that from when i say you i mean the lfb yes were well aware of that very soon after the latter fire itself back in july 2009 indeed

01:06:48 the impression arising from this email is that you are not willing to address in more details the consequences of compartmentation failure unless they were addressed by the lachnal coroner

01:07:01 were addressed by the lachnal coroner would you accept that point [Music]

01:07:07 i i wouldn't accept that point in the sense of

01:07:12 sense of my recollection of this response was was i i was not seeking to do that i can see now with hindsight how you could interpret it in that way so so yes i

01:07:25 interpret it in that way so so yes i accept it

01:07:26 accept it based on the way you've conjoined things but that certainly wasn't what was in my mind when i replied to steve judy now the following month while the lachnal inquests were

01:07:39 while the lachnal inquests were continuing you received another view on the final draft of gra 3.2 and this time from michael curran right and he emailed you and philip morton on the 18th of march 2013

01:07:51 morton on the 18th of march 2013 and his email can be found at lfb treble zero nine zero seven five four

01:08:04 um first of all before we go to the text what was michael curran's role at the nfb

01:08:10 nfb he was an operational officer i think at this i mean he had previously been in my team i think at this time as it says on his sign off he was part of the health and

01:08:21 sign off he was part of the health and safety team i believe he was part of the he was detached into the

01:08:27 the lack and all review team can you give us an idea how senior we'll see in the hierarchy well as it says on his sign-off he's a group manager so senior management

01:08:39 senior management now as the email says i've discussed as discussed i've gone through the draft gra up to page 31 and made a few observations for discussion i'll send out a meeting wizard to enable a

01:08:50 out a meeting wizard to enable a roundtable discussion as you suggested now can you help us why was he responding to the final draft at this stage so mid-march and he was not

01:09:01 and he was not we can go back to it but he wasn't one of the recipients of your email of the 1st of february 2013. can we see the documents that precede this when you say documents the procedure well sorry the email this is a train i

01:09:13 well sorry the email this is a train i presume

01:09:14 presume or is a single email this is a single email

01:09:18 email in that case i can't really answer

01:09:21 he may have he may have had sight i think i would have sent

01:09:28 have sent as you say the word final was used quite a few times in this context i would have sent various final versions to tim cuthbill

01:09:36 cuthbill who he was working for so quite possibly he obtained the copy through that route now the annotated draft that mr curran provided um attached this email can be found at lfb

01:09:48 attached this email can be found at lfb 0089264

01:09:56 now one of the suggestions he made in this document was in relation to the only express mention of stay put that we've looked at and it's the one we looked at in the pre-planning section

01:10:07 looked at in the pre-planning section and for this purpose can we go to page 16 in this draft

01:10:14 and if that could be expanded slightly so the writing's clearer thank you

01:10:22 now the paragraph on arrangements for fsg calls as we can see is at the top of page 16. and mr curran added track text to the end of the initial paragraph

01:10:34 initial paragraph and i'll read out the entire paragraph just so it's clear from the record um frses should also have effective arrangements in place to handle fire survival calls from the public where they believe they are unable to leave

01:10:46 they believe they are unable to leave their premises due to age disability ability illness or the effects of fire forces may consider both generic techniques for persons told to stay put as well as bespoke arrangements for

01:10:58 as well as bespoke arrangements for specific buildings where this is appropriate and the new text says this a re-evaluation process should be included to ensure the balance of risk to the occupier is considered as

01:11:10 to the occupier is considered as circumstances change this reevaluation process may influence a change in the advice previously given and then it goes on so these arrangements may include how calls would

01:11:23 arrangements may include how calls would be passed and recorded the incident their impact on resources and mobilizing and how information will be exchanged between callers control and managers at the incident

01:11:34 and managers at the incident now wasn't that the first time there'd been a reference to changing state put advice in the draft gra

01:11:44 i don't believe so because i believe in the evacuation section

01:11:50 section we spoke

01:11:52 we spoke from early drafts onwards about the need for the

01:11:55 for the incident commander to change the strategy if

01:11:59 if uh the fire escalated so i don't believe express reference to stay put

01:12:06 stay put i

01:12:08 i yeah i accept not not expressly in relation to stay put but as i've said all the way along at this point because the document was intended for

01:12:19 because the document was intended for all high-rise buildings and not just residential buildings we had not specifically mentioned stapa in the context of evacuation i fully accept

01:12:31 fully accept with hindsight and on reflection that that was a mistake and i've accepted that would you accept this is the first time that there'd been any express emboldened underlined reference to

01:12:43 emboldened underlined reference to needing to keep advice to callers under review

01:12:46 review i i think that requirement is covered by what i've just said but i i again i accept that this phrases it more explicitly and better

01:12:58 phrases it more explicitly and better all i would say at this point is

01:13:02 is one of the criticisms that we'd had of the gra at this point and i'm and i was probably very mindful of this is that it was too long too complicated and too detailed

01:13:15 too complicated and too detailed and and that whilst that doesn't excuse what i can now see in the context of of the grenfell tower fire was you know looks really quite negative

01:13:27 really quite negative at the time i was very mindful that if we continued to change it and add detail the people who'd been criticizing me and others for many months would i'd be adding fuel

01:13:39 for many months would i'd be adding fuel to the fire and also i was going to be changing it at a point when i'd already said it was the final draft so

01:13:48 so on reflection i think that would have added value without a doubt but at the time i had a rationale for not accepting it

01:13:59 i had a rationale for not accepting it did you have a blanket rationale for not accepting further changes at this stage simply to get the thing published i think

01:14:09 i think the first thing i would say is that we weren't generally seeking further changes at this stage so i can't remember the mechanism by which michael curran

01:14:20 michael curran got involved but it wasn't at my behest i'm pretty sure

01:14:26 and yes i think there was a priority you you mentioned yourself about the delay in in the effort in the gra starting the review process

01:14:37 gra starting the review process i felt after two years we'd reached a point where we needed to publish so the answer is yes to my question yeah i'm trying to explain why but yes

01:14:48 yeah i'm trying to explain why but yes the answer is yes [Music]

01:14:54 did you ever discuss the substance of these points with mr curran i thought you might ask me that and i'll be honest i can't re i mean i used to see

01:15:04 see mike curran quite a lot so we may have discussed it informally i can't remember having a formal meeting to discuss his feedback

01:15:14 feedback now

01:15:15 now apologies for this it's difficult remembering that the cut and thrust of email communications and meeting requests and the rest of it we've been provided with an electronic meeting request that you sent to michael

01:15:26 meeting request that you sent to michael curran and philip morton to review mc amendments so it must be mike curran yeah to high-rise gra plus consider any available outcome from lachnal inquest on the 17th of april

01:15:38 lachnal inquest on the 17th of april 2013 so roughly a month after his email we can find that lfb travel08653

01:16:00 this cup i more than appreciate that

01:16:05 eight years after the event nearly nine years it's difficult to remember these things can you remember whether the meeting ever took place i can't but in any event it didn't result in any amendment to the text no

01:16:19 now if we can go back to mr curran's suggested amendments uh lfb trouble zero eight nine two six four forward slash

01:16:30 [Music] g5 two five

01:16:36 thank you now we've looked at this section are we going to be looking at a series of these amendments uh

01:16:44 uh we will be looking at a few more i've probably got 10 more minutes on this sir but i don't i don't think it caused great interruption to the flow of matters if we had a break now well i

01:16:55 matters if we had a break now well i mean i

01:16:56 mean i just wanted to see if you think you can finish a topic in 10 well that's a challenge we can go on uh otherwise we can stop no i think we can so i'll plow on sir

01:17:09 so i'll plow on sir um

01:17:12 slightly thrown what i was going to ask then

01:17:14 then looking at the second set of changes that is set out there at the bottom of the page

01:17:22 the page we see emboldened in red after the black text which says fire survival calls can be numerous during a high-rise incident the ic will need to prioritize these by taking any action necessary to either rescue reassure

01:17:34 necessary to either rescue reassure building occupants mr current suggested including the following in red text a clear record of fire survival calls and relevant information on their location and circumstances may be

01:17:45 location and circumstances may be necessary at the mobilizing center and the instant ground this may assist confirmation of priorities and subsequent reassessment of those priorities should information change as

01:17:56 priorities should information change as the incident develops

01:17:58 develops now had the need to keep a clear record of fsg calls on the instant ground as well as in the control room um occurred to you before mr curran's suggested amendment

01:18:09 suggested amendment absolutely and for me that was very well covered in fire survival guidance policy so

01:18:19 so there's again there's always a question of how much repetition we include within operational policy and

01:18:29 and we you know accept this was the national guidance but as i've already said we'd shared london's

01:18:36 london's fsg

01:18:37 fsg uh policy with with other services so i i very much what mike has said there is is obviously very true

01:18:46 very true and very relevant but where does it sit does that sit in a high-rise policy or does that sit in a fire survival guidance call policy which although high rise is the

01:18:58 which although high rise is the predominant source of those calls they can in fact come from any incident so my judgment was that that comment whilst perfectly valid

01:19:10 that that comment whilst perfectly valid would sit better in

01:19:13 in fsg policy rather than high-rise policy so it didn't it was rejected a result of a considered decision as opposed to being rejected on the basis of your uh blanket ban on

01:19:25 on the basis of your uh blanket ban on further changes at this stage i don't think i had a blanket ban did you make any changes at this stage of the document we certainly did after after or prompted

01:19:36 we certainly did after after or prompted by dclg then prompted by dclg but i i don't recall i cannot recall exactly but as i say i've got no problem with the comment i'm sure i wouldn't have had any problem

01:19:48 sure i wouldn't have had any problem with it at all at the time it's just where do you put that information and i've given my rationale for where i thought it best sat but fsg policy was

01:19:59 thought it best sat but fsg policy was obviously a local policy rather than national guidance wasn't it it was but we'd shared it nationally with in fact you know fire survival guidance

01:20:10 guidance wasn't mentioned at all in version two of

01:20:14 of gra so alongside sharing

01:20:18 sharing the gra we had certainly at the committee meetings we'd made it clear that

01:20:25 that lfb had a policy and other brigades should consider adopting the policy and i remember sharing it with with quite a few of the committee members that asked to see it

01:20:36 committee members that asked to see it thank you we can move to the next paragraph uh in the text which reads the ic should normally follow any evacuation plan devised as part of the occupiers fire risk assessment unless the fire

01:20:47 fire risk assessment unless the fire situation dictates otherwise in residential buildings occupants should usually only evacuate if the fire heat

01:20:54 heat or smoke adversely affect them in their property so the words inserted there in red text are to make it consistent it would appear with the fsg policy the type evacuation being undertaken

01:21:06 the type evacuation being undertaken progress evacuation the number and type of people being evacuated can adversely affect firefighting observations

01:21:16 uh you nodded which i encourage you to nod for which apologies um but those insertions if you can just expressly confirm for the record brought the text into line with lfb's fsg policy is that

01:21:28 into line with lfb's fsg policy is that right indeed

01:21:32 did you discuss that with michael curran do you remember i i can't remember in detail because i can't remember whether we discussed any of these points

01:21:43 whether we discussed any of these points for sure

01:21:44 for sure so

01:21:45 so uh in under 10 minutes um i've reached the end of that topic and this would be a convenient time for a break very well well that seems a good idea doesn't it mr carp we'll have a break now please

01:21:56 mr carp we'll have a break now please we'll come back at 20 to 4 and uh while you're out of the room please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything to do with it thank you thank you

01:22:15 thank you very much twenty to four people

01:41:13 would you ask mr carp to come back in please thank you

01:41:23 thank you

01:41:28 all right mr carp ready to carry on indeed thank you very much yes mr canoe when you're ready thanks sir um mr carp could we now turn to the latino house uh coroner's rule 43 letters that were

01:41:40 coroner's rule 43 letters that were addressed to the lfb and also clg as was now shortly after michael curran's proposed amendments the lfb received a copy of the coroner's rule 43

01:41:51 copy of the coroner's rule 43 recommendations addressed the brigade and arising out of the evidence that she heard during the inquests did you see that letter when it was received by the lfb uh yes

01:42:02 received by the lfb uh yes now if we can turn to look at it it's dated the 28th of march 2013 and can be found at lfb zero three two one five eight

01:42:17 and if we can look at the bottom of the first page of the letter and the paragraph which starts with the words before i set

01:42:27 and out coroner said this before i set out my recommendations i acknowledge that the london fire brigade had have already undertaken extensive work to learn from their experience

01:42:38 learn from their experience with the fire at lachnal house have introduced new policies and reviewed existing policies in respect of a number of matters of significance including then if we turn over the page

01:42:50 then if we turn over the page the coroner sets out the list of learning points in respect of which she considered that the lfb had already undertaken work now the fourth bullet point reads thus

01:43:01 now the fourth bullet point reads thus and i quote awareness that fire can spread downwards and laterally in a building and the burning debris might fall through open windows or onto balconies and the fifth bullet point says this awareness of the

01:43:13 bullet point says this awareness of the risk of spread of fire above and adjacent to a fire flat now the latter point fire spread above and adjacent to a fire flat that appears to be a failure of con

01:43:26 flat that appears to be a failure of con of compartmentation that's referred to there was that your reading of that phrase

01:43:31 phrase uh

01:43:31 uh [Music]

01:43:36 probably uh sounds very bad doesn't it i

01:43:41 i i think it probably mainly refers to external spread but i'm very conscious that in the case of lachenal there was also significant internal

01:43:52 there was also significant internal spread

01:43:53 spread and was it did you read it as dealing with external spread at the time do you remember

01:43:59 i don't know if i necessarily differentiated between the two i i just think i would have understood it probably mainly in the context of external spread because it

01:44:10 because it refers specifically to above but the adjacent on the same floor would more likely be internal thank you now the coronet goes on to state at the end of this list of

01:44:22 on to state at the end of this list of bullet points i therefore do not make any recommendation in relation to such matters

01:44:27 matters are you able to say what work the coroner was referring to as having been carried out by the nfb in the period between the lack of fire and the inquests specifically in relation to those

01:44:38 those fourth and fifth bullet points i.e awareness of the risk of fire spread downwards and laterally and awareness of the risk of fire spread above and adjacent to the fire flat

01:44:49 adjacent to the fire flat yes i mean substantially that was covered in the revision of policy note 633 so

01:44:58 so as you know and then subsequently brought into gra 3.2

01:45:05 3.2 so

01:45:06 so for the first time we specifically mentioned the fact a fire can spread downwards principally through falling debris and we made

01:45:17 and we made very clear that it can spread laterally as well uh mainly through failures in compartmentation

01:45:25 apologies i didn't want to cut you cut you off no sorry now the letter goes on to set out the recommendations uh of the coroner and if we could look at those recommendations

01:45:36 recommendations that concern instant commanders which appear at the bottom of page two onwards there we go under the subheading instant commanders it says this during the lachnal house fire there were

01:45:48 during the lachnal house fire there were six changes of instant commander with some serving as ic for brief periods it is recommended that the brigade review its policy and procedures concerning incident command and regard

01:45:59 concerning incident command and regard to whether it is effective for the choice of incident commander to be tied closely to the number of type of appliances attending an instant and the effectiveness of a policy policy which

01:46:10 effectiveness of a policy policy which is going on to page three may result in rapid or frequent changes of ic it is also recommended that consideration be given to training of ics and potential ics to enhance their

01:46:22 ics and potential ics to enhance their performance in relation to the following the third bullet point then read this to anticipate that a fire might behave in a manner inconsistent with the compartmentation principle

01:46:34 compartmentation principle now did you give specific consideration when you read this letter to whether your revised 3.2 adequately addressed the need to ensure that incident commanders were able to

01:46:45 incident commanders were able to anticipate that a fire may not behave in a manner consistent with the compartmentation principle yes and i think 3.2

01:46:56 3.2 covers that adequately it's it's in there as a hazard under the fire development and behavior section

01:47:05 now the draft 3.2 that you had prepared had adopted the same text from the 2008 edition about contingency plans for fire spread beyond the compartment of origin did that reference the fire spread

01:47:17 did that reference the fire spread beyond the compartment of origin in the coroner's letter give you reason to consider whether the matter required greater prominence in the draft 3.2

01:47:31 it feels in that question like we're conflating fire spread and contingency planning on perhaps you could rephrase what you're what you're seeking for me

01:47:42 what you're what you're seeking for me to clarify well it's more straightforward than that um in the draft 3.2 that you'd prepared you basically lifted the same text from the tooth the predecessor edition okay

01:47:56 the tooth the predecessor edition okay about contingency plans for fire spread beyond the compartment of origin so you kept the same text in your revision

01:48:05 revision did the coroner's reference in her rule 43 letter to

01:48:11 to the potential for spread beyond the compartment of origin prompt you to consider whether you had given sufficient thought given sufficient advice in the revised

01:48:22 given sufficient advice in the revised 3.2

01:48:25 to the prospect of spread beyond the compartment of origin i i felt that 3.2 and the draft that was available at this time did cover that in

01:48:38 this time did cover that in quite considerable detail and it had it as a particular hazard and that

01:48:45 that if you look at the hazard that relates to fire spread it particularly spells out the uh breach of compartments and did you so i was pressing on this mr cab did you

01:48:56 so i was pressing on this mr cab did you read this letter see what the coroner had said about fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and then go back to your draft and ask yourself the question have i addressed this in enough detail

01:49:09 this in enough detail we certainly read this letter and certainly satisfied ourselves that all the issues raised by the coroner had been addressed yet how did you satisfy yourself did you go through a line-by-line review of your draft 3.2

01:49:21 line-by-line review of your draft 3.2 how did you do it well we did we did go through the letter and make sure that all the issues raised were covered in the document yes and you specifically looked at the text of your draft 3.2 as part of

01:49:34 at the text of your draft 3.2 as part of that exercise did you or did you just go through the letter going dealt with that dealt with that dealt with that i believe that i produced the document to show a kind of a matrix document

01:49:45 to show a kind of a matrix document which i think has been disclosed that covered this very issue so i specifically created a document to show that we'd addressed the lack of findings

01:49:57 the lack of findings in the gra 3.2 and for what purpose did you draft that document was it for internal audit purposes or was it for the purposes of assuring the commissioner for example

01:50:08 assuring the commissioner for example that

01:50:09 that you had actively considered the coroner's recommendations uh when drafting 3.2 well both but primarily to assure the commissioner that we'd covered all of the issues raised here in in the

01:50:22 all of the issues raised here in in the document now can we look at the rule 43 letter that was sent by the coroner too sorry can you just help me with this um the way the coroner's letter is structured with the bullet points at the

01:50:34 structured with the bullet points at the end of the paragraph we've just looked at

01:50:37 at tend to take one's eye off the beginning of that paragraph which is to do with something completely different which is choice of incident commander yes was any was that addressed as well

01:50:49 as well i can't really answer that sir because that the whole issue of incident command policy sat with somebody else right so i believe it was

01:50:57 was i believe changes were made to the thresholds at which people would take over but i'm not the best person to answer that yeah all right thank you very much

01:51:08 thank you very much yeah i'm sorry mr thank you sir um could we go to look at the letter that the coroner sent to the secretary of state for communities and local government and that can that was also dated the 28th of march 2013

01:51:21 was also dated the 28th of march 2013 and can be found at h-o-m quadruple 0-0-1-8

01:51:31 did you see that letter at the time yes [Music]

01:51:36 [Music] now the letter contains the coroner's recommendations for the review of gra 3.2 which appear in the second paragraph on the second page and it sets out there

01:51:47 and it sets out there in that paragraph this it is recommended that consideration be given to review of the generic risk assessment 3.2 high-rise firefighting to provide consolidated national guidance as to the

01:51:59 consolidated national guidance as to the following

01:52:00 following and then looking at the second bullet point awareness that fire can spread downwards and laterally in a building awareness of the risk of spread of fire above and adjacent to a fire flat

01:52:12 above and adjacent to a fire flat awareness that insecure compartmentation can permit transfer of smoke and fire between a flat or maisonet and common parts of high-rise residential buildings

01:52:23 parts of high-rise residential buildings which has the potential to put at risk the lives of residents or others did you

01:52:31 did you go through the exercise of putting the coroner's letter on one side and seeing whether your draft 3.2 satisfied those recommendations

01:52:42 recommendations yes in the same way that we did for the letter that was addressed to lfb and regarding those four points i i would

01:52:51 would contend that gra 3.2 covers them all and for that exercise did you also prepare a schedule which set out uh the conclusions of that comparative

01:53:02 uh the conclusions of that comparative analysis

01:53:04 analysis is that the matrix i was re i think that's the most i don't know what you're referring to mr kell you have the advantage of me

01:53:11 i can remember doing providing a document

01:53:14 document which specifically addressed the rule 43 letters and to provide an assurance that the gra met the requirements of those

01:53:25 the gra met the requirements of those letters yes and that assurance was addressed just the commissioner was it addressed the commissioner and the secretary of state i certainly didn't send it to the secretary of state i wasn't in the habit of

01:53:36 of writing to ministers derek clough i think had sight of it

01:53:46 but it was probably more likely he had a mainly internal audience to be fair internal internal to the lfb for the avoidance of doubt

01:53:54 doubt yes within lfb now on the 4th of april 2013 so a week just under a week after these letters were sent you emailed gary reason copying in jim knighton philip morton

01:54:07 copying in jim knighton philip morton danny cotton and tim cut bill with the subject heading changes to high-rise gra arising from lachnal inquest and the email can be found at lfb treble zero

01:54:18 email can be found at lfb treble zero eight quadruple six

01:54:26 now i can go to page two in a particular the middle of that page

01:54:31 this is the originating email dear gary

01:54:36 dear gary further to our earlier conversation i am pleased to confirm that the current open bracket speech marks final played speech marks closed brackets draft of the national high-rise generic risk

01:54:47 the national high-rise generic risk assessment gra 3.2 already provides national guidance on all of the issues which have been identified for review by the coroner in her letter to the secretary of state for communities and

01:54:58 secretary of state for communities and local government dated 28th march 2013. one of the advantages arising from the decision that lfb should lead on the review and rewriting of this gra was

01:55:09 review and rewriting of this gra was that sm so station manager morton and myself as document authors have been able to maintain close liaison with the investigation and inquest teams and thereby identify and anticipate issues

01:55:22 thereby identify and anticipate issues arising at an early stage all these points were therefore brought into the draft at a relatively early stage alongside learning point from colleagues in other fire rescue services

01:55:33 colleagues in other fire rescue services relating to incidents such as harrow court and shirley towers as a result of this close liaison with the lachnal team it has become apparent that there are several areas which

01:55:44 that there are several areas which mainly relate to planning and the risk that fire and smoke can spread more rapidly and unpredictably beyond the compartment of origin in fires and high-rise buildings where it would be beneficial to open speech marks amplify

01:55:58 beneficial to open speech marks amplify close speech marks certain points which already form part of the final version of this gra none of these amplifications constitute new issues or considerations but it

01:56:10 new issues or considerations but it clearly makes sense to take this opportunity to ensure that the outcome of the latino inquest is fully reflected in the revised high-rise gra i envisage this work being completed

01:56:21 i envisage this work being completed within the next 14 days after which i will provide a revised final draft version document to you for your agreement after that the proposal is to produce an

01:56:33 after that the proposal is to produce an abstract of the high-rise gra which only includes the amplifications clarifications made as a result of lachnal for circulation via lee brinton who is program manager responsible for

01:56:45 who is program manager responsible for publication of the revised gra series to the gra working group this group includes representatives from all see foe regions staff side and the hse

01:56:58 staff side and the hse this will enable all relevant stakeholders to see the additional changes which have been made as an outcome of the latino inquest but at the same time avoid the risk of reopening a full-blown consultation of what is

01:57:10 full-blown consultation of what is otherwise an agreed document given the fact that we will only be adding further detailed information to the already agreed text i anticipate and trust that this final review process can be

01:57:21 this final review process can be completed quickly thus allowing the revised gra to be published without delay

01:57:27 delay now on one reading there appears to be attention in this letter which i'd like to discuss with you on the one hand you say in the first paragraph of the current final draft of the gra already provides national

01:57:39 the gra already provides national guidance on all issues identified by the coroner

01:57:42 coroner but on the other hand

01:57:46 you go on to say the result of close liaison

01:57:50 liaison certain areas would require certain amplification is that a

01:57:55 is that a fair description or fair identification of attention between the two points made in that email

01:58:02 email yes i would accept that it clearly i'm saying and i'd forgotten about this email so it kind of contradicts what i said just now it does kind of and i accept that so i apologize

01:58:14 kind of and i accept that so i apologize to the inquiry that that was just my memory

01:58:17 memory so clearly when we looked at the letters as you suggested you know we would do we did spot but in certain respects and artists we in particular talk about

01:58:28 artists we in particular talk about compartmentation and spread of fire and smoke we obviously spotted that the gra needed to be [Music]

01:58:37 [Music] enhanced in those in those areas i say enhanced because i think the the basic hazard was there but it wasn't perhaps described as fully as uh as it was appropriate to do so and

01:58:49 as uh as it was appropriate to do so and and that really vindicated the reason to wait for the coroner's inquest findings now the implication is these well as you say more explicitly there

01:59:00 well as you say more explicitly there that the issues were already being addressed in the draft 3.2 and it might take further tweaks for want of a better phrase to address the coroner's recommendations in other words

01:59:11 coroner's recommendations in other words no further significant work was needed is that a fair reading of your attitude at this time of what more was needed i think it's fair to say that i didn't i didn't

01:59:21 i didn't see anything in those letters that required a substantial rewrite

01:59:27 rewrite but clearly and this email captures it i think fairly well in the body of it that there were aspects

01:59:36 aspects of the description that could be improved

01:59:40 improved and in particular with the areas that i highlighted in paragraph three

01:59:47 three when you said that these matters required quotes amplification close quotes uh isn't that just an euphemistic underplaying of the fact that the draft offered no practical advice or guidance

01:59:58 offered no practical advice or guidance to incident commanders about what they should be trained to do when faced with unexpected fire behavior

02:00:05 [Music] no

02:00:08 no i don't i

02:00:09 i don't i i don't accept that because i don't accept that the basic draft was

02:00:16 draft was flawed in this respect it just it just didn't contain the the detail and the emphasis on it that clearly came out of the

02:00:27 out of the final inquest findings so it was important to reflect that but i think the document did cover those issues and and what the changes we made at this

02:00:38 and and what the changes we made at this point only enhance that now

02:00:44 now could we go back to page one of the email chain we're looking at at the moment

02:00:50 and it's really the the second email on that page sent on the 5th of april 2013 at 1544 hours and it's an email from lee brinton

02:01:01 from lee brinton to anthony maude at clg and it says in the second paragraph this this makes clear the next steps and provides an idea of time scales for completion

02:01:12 completion on speaking with peter yesterday and considering those who would need to have sight of the additions i would hope publication can be the end of may now presumably the discussion with peter is

02:01:23 presumably the discussion with peter is a discussion with you yes

02:01:27 yes do you remember any discussion with lee brinton at this stage about the the nature of the intended changes and how long they take to carry out i don't recall them in detail

02:01:38 i don't recall them in detail did you discuss with her who would need to see your intended editions

02:01:44 uh i think based on on her email i think i must have done because what i was conscious of we had a document that we'd finally agreed

02:01:55 document that we'd finally agreed with the fire brigade union that had taken an awful long time and i was very conscious that if we made extensive changes they they would be quite rightly unhappy

02:02:08 they they would be quite rightly unhappy that that we hadn't kept you know the integrity of the document in terms of the one they they uh

02:02:16 they uh had agreed to however given what i'd said elsewhere about the additions i and and the fact i saw them as enhancements of points that were already there

02:02:27 points that were already there i think i was probably talking about a smaller group than than the full body of of national consultation because that would have introduced yet more delay

02:02:38 delay for no particular benefit in my view and

02:02:43 and who

02:02:43 who formed part of this small group that you're intending to discuss the new actions with well certainly the people within lfb that have been

02:02:54 the people within lfb that have been directly involved uh lee brinton derek i'm not sure if derek clough may have retired by then whoever was working with lee

02:03:06 working with lee and

02:03:07 and i think at this stage it was also about making sure that clg were happy with it because i think by this stage it had gone to them for typesetting and

02:03:18 and their quality assurance so clearly they had to be happy with the amendments that were going to be made

02:03:26 made by this stage uh if derek clough had retired i think you're right in assuming he had i tied by this stage i think he i think he retired in january but i'm not certain how was the voice of clg being

02:03:38 certain how was the voice of clg being articulated in sort of the first part of the first quarter of 2013 can you remember

02:03:45 he was involved in the discussions with the fire brigade union so he didn't retire immediately in january because i believe they were in january

02:03:55 january 13.

02:03:57 13. i think by february we'd sent the final version to the fbu and had not heard back that in a positive sense that they were happy with it but took their silence to

02:04:10 happy with it but took their silence to mean consent consent and if i'm honest there would have been a lull

02:04:16 a lull then

02:04:17 then until the rule 43 letters had come out so there probably wasn't a lot going on and to and that's a long-winded way of answering your question i don't think i had a lot of interaction with clg during that

02:04:29 interaction with clg during that particular period thank you now i would now like to look at the um response from the secretary of state uh who's then mr eric pickles and it's dated the 20th of may 2013 can be found

02:04:41 dated the 20th of may 2013 can be found at home zero four double seven four three

02:04:49 [Music]

02:04:53 and if we can go to the part which deals with gra 3.2 which is on the second page in the third paragraph it says this on your other recommendations i can confirm that my department generic risk

02:05:06 confirm that my department generic risk assessment guidance on high-rise firefighting is under review at present and will be informed by all of the recommendations you have made in your rule 43 recommendations

02:05:17 rule 43 recommendations it will also include advice to incident commanders to inform decisions on evacuation should it become clear during an instant that the stay put principle is no longer tenable

02:05:28 is no longer tenable did you see that letter before it was sent

02:05:32 sent before no no not before it was sent you saw it afterwards i

02:05:37 i i believe i would have seen it some time afterwards i can't say for sure when

02:05:45 now can i turn to sorry could i just see when it was dated of course it's the it's may 2013 so it's um 20th of may 2013.

02:05:55 okay i'm i'm really i have seen it before and now i'm now trying to think have i seen it as part of my preparation

02:06:06 of my preparation for this inquiry or if i or did i see it at the time did you see it in draft i certainly didn't see it in draft um presumably you wouldn't have seen it

02:06:19 presumably you wouldn't have seen it unless it was forwarded to you by someone at clg after it was sent correct

02:06:24 correct and at the time who was the most likely contact

02:06:29 contact that you had to be fair i think it would have come to lfb

02:06:34 lfb via the lack and all review team because i think they still and possibly by the commissioner himself because obviously there were like various lines of communication to clg so it's quite possible that it came into

02:06:46 it's quite possible that it came into lfp

02:06:47 lfp through that route so you can't remember say for example it came via les britsman for example i don't recall les britsman sharing this with me either as a finished document or

02:06:59 with me either as a finished document or or as a draft certainly not as a draft but he may have sent it to me but i can't recall that

02:07:12 um can i now turn to a separate topic which is dclg's involvement in progressing the draft gra 3.2 now at this stage there was

02:07:23 now at this stage there was the start of considerable and sustained involvement from officials at the department with draft gra 3.2 and then your third witness statement which can be found at lfb00119849478

02:07:42 you say paragraph 171 that and i quote it was during this stage of the review referring to the period july to november 2013 during which you state that there were various discussions with dclg that

02:07:54 were various discussions with dclg that much of the content relating to the explicit reference to stay put as a named concept and design principle was added to 3.2 does that remain your evidence

02:08:03 evidence yes

02:08:05 yes now

02:08:06 now if we can just go through uh chronologically clg's involvement and your communications with them about 3.2 now we know that clg had been provided

02:08:18 now we know that clg had been provided with a copy of the final draft are you final inverted commas for these purposes of gra 3.2 in or around june 2013 and if we could please look at an email

02:08:30 and if we could please look at an email exchange between you and peter holland who by that stage was the chief fire and rescue advisor on the 19th of june 2013 and which you then forwarded to gary reason you can find that exchange at lfb

02:08:42 reason you can find that exchange at lfb trouble zero 9893

02:08:51 and if we go to page three

02:08:57 we see there an email from peter holland to you timed 1725 hours

02:09:03 hours he says peter good to meet you today thanks very much for the offer to visit the shard

02:09:09 the shard i'm free on the morning of the 1st of july from 9 until 11 30 so it can be fitted in at that time please

02:09:16 please if we go to page two and it's the bottom email from you to ron dobson and gary reason

02:09:24 uh sent on the 19th of june

02:09:30 the same day timed at 1946 hours and you state this sirs

02:09:35 sirs please see note below from the chief fire rescue service advisor this request arose from a meeting sm phil morton myself attended earlier today at clg ellen house to finalize the

02:09:47 today at clg ellen house to finalize the formatting and layout of the high-rise gra

02:09:50 gra the cfra

02:09:52 the cfra and anthony maude attended part of the meeting and showed considerable interest in the gra and the work we have done to complete it he asked a number of questions and i believe i was able to reassure him that

02:10:04 believe i was able to reassure him that we have fully addressed all the recommendations issues arising from the lachnal and shirley towers instance first of all do you remember the meeting between you philip morton philip holland

02:10:15 between you philip morton philip holland and anthony maude on the 19th of june i certainly can remember the meeting taking place but the detail of what we discussed now

02:10:26 discussed now now you refer in that email to reassuring officials that the recommendations and the issues arising from lachnal had been fully addressed in the draft gra was that reassurance necessary because

02:10:38 was that reassurance necessary because mr holland and mr maude had doubts about whether they had in fact been adequately addressed

02:10:44 addressed i certainly don't remember them approaching the meeting from that perspective i think i was interested in what we'd done

02:10:53 done we spoke about the consultation process if i remember we spoke particularly about

02:10:58 about the challenges we'd had securing

02:11:02 securing fire brigade union agreement to the document which as you know was was through extensive discussion uh

02:11:12 uh and then i think we got into at some point we did get into this discussion about the shard and and

02:11:20 and i was

02:11:22 i was keen to show them or talk about the systems at that particular building which being very modern and very cutting-edge and developed to provide information for operational crews

02:11:33 crews can you remember how granular the discussion was about gra 3.2 so for example did mr holland or mr maude have a copy of the draft in front of them and saying mr cap you haven't addressed x y or z i

02:11:46 mr cap you haven't addressed x y or z i can't

02:11:47 can't i certainly don't remember them

02:11:52 raising any concerns i'm i'm fairly confident about that whether they had a copy of the draft in front of them whether we spoke about any particular aspect of it i i honestly can't recall

02:12:05 can't recall so i've come to the end of a particular topic the next one will i think take longer than 15 minutes to address yes we are however doing well

02:12:17 address yes we are however doing well for time

02:12:19 for time and so i since it's been a long day for mr cowep

02:12:23 mr cowep this would be subject to your approval a convenient place to end for the day with no harm to completing mr cab's evidence in time yes well i don't suppose mr carp will

02:12:34 well i don't suppose mr carp will complain if we stop a little earlier than usual um

02:12:39 um you're getting on quite well are you yes um

02:12:43 um mr carp is down to give evidence for quite a long time but uh anyway we can afford to we can afford to rise a little bit early i i think we can and mr cow you know has given detailed

02:12:55 and mr cow you know has given detailed answers today for which we're grateful yes of course well mr carp we normally go on little longer than this but tonight is convenient to stop at this point i say you probably don't mind anyway thank you sir

02:13:05 sir so we'll stop there for the day we'll resume please at 10 o'clock tomorrow and as before please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything to do with it over the break understood

02:13:16 to do with it over the break understood we'll see you tomorrow morning thank you thank you sir

02:13:28 thank you very much mr can hear 10 o'clock tomorrow thank you