London Fire Brigade Evidence - Thursday 23rd September 2021 (1/2)

Full transcript

00:21:51 so [Music]

00:22:00 [Music] good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing

00:22:03 hearing today we're going to continue hearing evidence from mrs dexter formerly deputy commissioner of the london fire brigade so could i ask which decks to come in please

00:22:15 decks to come in please [Music]

00:22:30 thank you good morning mr dexter morning all ready to carry on yes thank you yes mr miller mr chairman good morning good morning to the members of the panel uh ms dexter good morning to you

00:22:41 ms dexter good morning to you last night when we finished for the day we were discussing the lfb's response to the investigation of tall and timber-framed buildings by the gla's planning and housing committee can we

00:22:54 planning and housing committee can we turn please to the lfb's submission to that committee at lfb double zero one zero eight one four four

00:23:07 uh there it is it's dated the 5th of march 2010 i'd like to explore some of the contents with you if i may can we turn please to page seven

00:23:18 and on page seven uh which follows on from questions about the use of timber this question asks what risks do other materials and

00:23:29 what risks do other materials and construction methods pose in comparison and the lfb's response because should we just get page seven up um

00:23:40 right yes mr chairman thank you i'm sorry my

00:23:43 sorry my one version of mine is slightly ahead of the the general i'll ask the question or put it again you can see it written down what risks do other materials and construction methods pose in comparison and paragraph

00:23:55 methods pose in comparison and paragraph 28 says in order to meet the challenging requirements of the modern built environment many new innovative construction products and techniques icpt

00:24:05 icpt are being developed as with all construction methods it's necessary to ensure that innovation does not have a detrimental impact on safety whilst there is the potential for icpt

00:24:17 whilst there is the potential for icpt to be used in all buildings they are probably most prevalent in the residential sector if we go on to paragraph 29 miss dexter just below that it says this the main forms of icpt used residential buildings

00:24:30 forms of icpt used residential buildings include and then you can see four bullet points light steel frame steel frame timber frame and then this structural insulated panel systems s-i-p-s

00:24:42 insulated panel systems s-i-p-s and then paragraph 30 whilst the list is not exhaustive there are some primary concerns from a firefighting and fire safety aspect and then if you look at the first bullet

00:24:53 and then if you look at the first bullet point it says uh whilst the it says innovative structural forms sometimes mimic traditional construction and the brigade may not be aware of the nature of the building and the key structural

00:25:05 of the building and the key structural elements

00:25:06 elements and the second bullet points is this the increasing use of polymeric materials in building construction the reduced fire performance of some polymeric materials can provide a route

00:25:17 polymeric materials can provide a route for fire to spread by bypassing cavity barriers or fire stopping measures this issue is relevant to external walls cladding systems

00:25:28 cladding systems internal walls and cavities between floors now just pausing there would i be writing thinking that from reading that as of early march 2010

00:25:40 reading that as of early march 2010 your fire safety department and indeed other senior officers in the lfb were aware of the fire risks associated with insulated panel systems and cladding systems in the modern built

00:25:52 cladding systems in the modern built environment that's a reasonable inference based on uh that text yes well it was it so as a fact i can't speak to that mr miller i i

00:26:03 i can't speak to that mr miller i i don't think um i was very involved in uh in this i

00:26:10 in this i i think i i was uh i probably reviewed it and i probably commented on it um um but i i don't recall uh an intense

00:26:22 um but i i don't recall uh an intense involvement in this and it was in the early days of my appointment um so i i just i i i don't think i can offer you anything on that right

00:26:34 right uh

00:26:36 uh would you also accept that as at that time early march 2010 uh that your fire safety part department and other senior officers at the lfb were aware that there was a risk not only of potential fire spread but also

00:26:48 only of potential fire spread but also of the brigade being unaware of that when attending an incident

00:26:56 uh yes yes

00:26:59 yes yes was that risk the the building risk and the ignorance risk

00:27:04 risk ever communicated to operational crews

00:27:10 i i'm not aware that it was communicated in in in terms such as that uh no but

00:27:17 but i have to say i can't speak to [Music]

00:27:24 [Music] the extent of the risk that was known amongst the fire safety team and or some senior operational or senior senior

00:27:35 senior operational or senior senior officers so i i genuinely don't know whether this was something that they had begun to see emerge or where they had a substantial body of evidence as it

00:27:46 a substantial body of evidence as it were

00:27:47 were i don't think it was the latter because i think i would have known more about that would know more about that um but

00:27:54 um but but i can't be certain on those points just looking at the first part the first sentence of your answer you said i'm not aware that it was communicated in terms such as that no

00:28:05 communicated in terms such as that no are you telling us that you knew that it wasn't

00:28:08 wasn't uh or are you telling us that you don't know one way or the other whether it was or whether it wasn't uh the latter rather than the former why didn't you know one way or the other um

00:28:21 because i don't feel like i can be absolutely certain that um the next document that you present to me won't be you know an email to all operational staff dated october 2010 saying please

00:28:34 staff dated october 2010 saying please be aware of this i'm just not certain on that point i don't believe it is the case um but i'm uh i'm simply and only saying i'm not certain i think it's unlikely i think i

00:28:47 certain i think it's unlikely i think i either would be likely to recall it or would have been likely to have discovered it during the process of preparation and nothing comes to mind that fits that bill um mr dexter i wonder whether

00:29:00 bill um mr dexter i wonder whether you've quite understood what this process is about i'm asking you questions to elicit what you knew looking back on it at the time to the best of your recollection um it would be i think more helpful to us if you didn't

00:29:11 i think more helpful to us if you didn't try and anticipate documents i might or might not put to you or documents you might or might not have read in the course of your preparation is that do you see what i'm do you see what i'm driving at i do but

00:29:23 driving at i do but but i'm slightly worried about saying i definitely you know this thing didn't exist um when i can't be 100 certain about whether something existed or no no that's the only point i was trying to

00:29:34 that's the only point i was trying to make right all right you might feel that

00:29:39 the response could be as far as i remember yes okay and then if if it subsequently transpires that your recollection here and now uh is not accurate we shouldn't hold that again i'm sorry i thought that's

00:29:51 that again i'm sorry i thought that's what i was doing but i've obviously haven't done it very well no no it's right here it's very difficult i do understand that we're asking you about things that happened quite a long time ago and no one expects you to have a total recall now so i was only hoping to convey

00:30:05 now so i was only hoping to convey uncertainty yes or the absence of certainty if that's right same things thank you to the best of your recollection having seen this document and as you told us reviewed and

00:30:16 and as you told us reviewed and commented on it did it occur to you at the time

00:30:20 the time that question seven and the parts under question seven that i've read to you were important matters to be communicated directly or indirectly but efficiently at least to frontline firefighters

00:30:32 at least to frontline firefighters no

00:30:33 no can you explain why that is um

00:30:50 uh so this followed this inquiry by the assembly followed

00:30:58 followed a number of notable fires uh i only specifically recall collindale at the moment but

00:31:07 but my recollection is that you know over

00:31:11 over a time frame of 12 or 18 months there were two or three significant fires generated by timber-framed buildings either either complete or in construction

00:31:23 either complete or in construction um

00:31:26 and so because there had been these notable incidents there will have been a level of knowledge

00:31:40 at some but maybe not all fire stations based upon the fact of those events so

00:31:48 so you know the collindale fire i think involved

00:31:52 involved many stations in attendance um

00:31:56 um and and it was a notable fire which uh which will have been considered through the kinds of processes we discussed yesterday a pro prc

00:32:08 discussed yesterday a pro prc um uh

00:32:10 um uh those mechanisms so it will have it will have received formal consideration in those terms but uh

00:32:17 uh i think it's likely that it was the subject of more informal discussion um um so there will have been some knowledge based on the knowledge of incidents within the

00:32:29 the knowledge of incidents within the brigade

00:32:30 brigade um

00:32:31 um but

00:32:37 in preparation for today i've reflected hard on you know at what point did we have a body of knowledge that you could rely upon in relation to

00:32:50 in relation to numerous matters but including the question of for example cladding you know just when did we have enough knowledge or information or insight into for example the risks of cladding to as it were turn it into something that we

00:33:02 it were turn it into something that we needed to reflect back and reflect back and it's possible that we simply hadn't reached that stage here in 2010

00:33:12 in 2010 my recollection is that is that um although although you know i'm not sure the words here are going to support um what i'm going to say next my recollection is that this

00:33:23 say next my recollection is that this was very much focused on timber-framed buildings at the time

00:33:28 the time and the risks for example from structural insulated panel systems didn't receive the same level of prominence or consideration but that's only my recollection that is only how i

00:33:39 only my recollection that is only how i remember it right

00:33:44 let's look at when i come back to that answer into course miss dexter but let's just look on uh noting if we can at paragraph 30 as i read you

00:33:53 read you that there these were described as primary concerns from a firefighting and fire safety aspect looking at page eight if we can please uh question 10 reads as follows

00:34:07 how have building regulations fire safety codes and risk assessments developed over time in relation to both tall and timber-framed residential buildings

00:34:16 buildings and then if we go over the page to page nine

00:34:21 nine please as part of the answer given by the brigade you can see what is said at paragraph

00:34:29 39 as a reference to risk assessments under the rro and uh

00:34:36 and uh note the exclusion there of single private dwellings or individual flats and then at 41

00:34:44 41 questions have also risen more recently regarding

00:34:48 regarding first bullet what constitutes a suitable and sufficient fire risk assessment as as suitable and sufficient is not defined as not a defined term in the fire safety order how competency to carry out a fire risk assessment can be

00:35:00 carry out a fire risk assessment can be determined by a responsible person who's seeking to appoint a third party to carry out fire risk assessments for them and

00:35:06 and third bullet what constitutes a simple or complex building and so determines whether the responsible person may be able to carry out a fire risk assessment themselves in-house or will need to appoint an expert

00:35:17 appoint an expert can you explain do you know why those questions had arisen

00:35:23 arisen the questions identified at paragraph 41

00:35:29 um

00:35:35 uh those questions were still in circulation five years later ten years later

00:35:46 ten years later but what

00:35:47 but what and i think in both cases what prompted them uh

00:35:53 uh was

00:35:54 was a discussion outside london fire brigade at for example fire conferences there used to be there probably still is an annual fire conference and um i have a distinct recollection

00:36:05 and um i have a distinct recollection that for example the fire protection association were very much

00:36:11 very much concerned with these questions and raising them and

00:36:16 and these questions arose out of the brigade's experience of carrying out its fire safety regulation

00:36:27 carrying out its fire safety regulation function so as inspecting officers were visiting

00:36:32 visiting premises in london as part of their audits

00:36:36 audits they

00:36:39 they certainly came across examples of fire risk assessments which in their view were not suitable and sufficient just be clear um when you say uh the fire regulate safety regulation

00:36:50 uh the fire regulate safety regulation function and audits do you mean the enforcement function uh on the lfb in london as the enforcing body under the rro or the fire safety order as it's sometimes called uh i think we

00:37:02 as it's sometimes called uh i think we made this the same thing but but i'm not certain so the activities undertaken by fire safety inspecting officers which some which sometimes then led to enforcement action very well now what

00:37:13 enforcement action very well now what are the london fire brigade done as at this point in time early march 2010 to address

00:37:19 address those questions set out at paragraph 41. steve turek would be able to give a much more comprehensive answer to that question so

00:37:31 comprehensive answer to that question so he was

00:37:32 he was the assistant commissioner fire safety and i'm confident that steve um

00:37:38 um would be able to talk to you about you know work that he and his team did with the fire industry in in in the broadest terms so they were engaged with a number of

00:37:51 so they were engaged with a number of bodies professional associations um i can't i can't bring to mind um the names of them but but i recall that some of them are named in in

00:38:03 some of them are named in in some of the uh exhibits to my own witness statement um

00:38:08 um from your knowledge yes from my knowledge i in some of the reports that i produced i repeated information about what the fire safety regulation department had been doing in terms of engagement with outside bodies um so

00:38:20 engagement with outside bodies um so um

00:38:22 um uh

00:38:23 uh that they will have been uh advising um uh

00:38:29 uh responsible persons that their fire risk assessments were not suitable or sufficient for example and in some cases will have been issuing notices of deficiency or enforcement

00:38:40 notices of deficiency or enforcement notices or progressing to prosecution activity

00:38:44 activity so where it was appropriate they were working with responsible persons um they were sometimes progressing that to more formal action and they were engaged with a series of

00:38:55 engaged with a series of outside professional bodies and interests in order to try and make progress with these issues now

00:39:01 now i want to focus on that from the from the point of view of the local fire safety teams carrying out um

00:39:07 um information gathering under their statutory obligations under 72d were local fire safety teams doing that exercise aware of these questions

00:39:21 do you know i think 72d visits were undertaken by fire station staff

00:39:30 staff in order to inform their pre-planning and

00:39:35 and the work undertaken by fire safety inspecting officers as it were in auditing what was happening in premises was a separate stream indeed it was and that's why i asked the

00:39:47 indeed it was and that's why i asked the question

00:39:48 question let me try it slightly differently where using your expression fire station staff

00:39:55 conducting 72d visits and other information gathering aware of these three questions set out of paragraph 41 of this document i think it's much less likely that fire

00:40:06 i think it's much less likely that fire station staff were aware of these issues but but but i would i um but i wouldn't have expected them to i would ins i would have expected the

00:40:17 i would ins i would have expected the fire safety inspecting officers to be aware of them as part of their visits to premises so they were they were they were focused differently and on different interests does that tell us

00:40:28 different interests does that tell us let me just follow that up a little bit does that tell us that structurally within the lafb there was a separation between the nfb's enforcement function under the rro as you call it an audit function

00:40:41 you call it an audit function for the purposes of ensuring that a responsible person carried out their obligations on the one hand and on the other uh a a separate body namely local fire stations carrying out

00:40:54 namely local fire stations carrying out information gathering uh under section 72d of the um of the 2004 act well in in structure they were certainly separate yes but there were there were arrangements

00:41:07 but there were there were arrangements for them to exchange information in a in a in a systematic way so there were a process

00:41:15 process there were systems in place for fire safety inspecting officers to make notifications to fire stations if they'd come across something in the course of their duties

00:41:26 their duties which they felt might be a risk to firefighters and firefighting and they would provide a notification to the local station uh to that effect and

00:41:37 the local station uh to that effect and vice versa so there was a process of exchange

00:41:41 exchange and that process of exchange was the subject of a formal report which i think came to my directorate management board so the number of notifications in one direction to the other and vice

00:41:53 in one direction to the other and vice versa

00:41:54 versa was noted

00:41:56 was noted together with um some commentary as to the action taken as a consequence

00:42:05 within this two questions followed from that within the structure as we understand it during your time we know that fire safety regulation and enforcement sat within your directorate where did 72ds if i can use a shorthand

00:42:17 where did 72ds if i can use a shorthand sit was it was that also within your directorate or was that in the doort directorate no in my directorate so right the carrying out of 72d visits

00:42:28 right the carrying out of 72d visits was by firefighters based at fire stations and in that respect it was part of the

00:42:34 of the um uh department controlled by dave brown so operations prevention and response opr yes right so that was that a separate department from fire safety regulation and who second question who

00:42:45 regulation and who second question who oversaw

00:42:46 oversaw the

00:42:47 the efficient flow of information between those two departments vis-a-vis what enforcing officers found in a building on the one hand and what 72d station

00:42:57 station staff found on the other who oversaw that process uh

00:43:03 uh it probably involved more oversight than was visible to me but as i've said i required a report to my board which provided information about that exchange right and i know that

00:43:14 right and i know that definitely dave brown had arrangements in place

00:43:17 in place where he would go to the tier below him so the the deputy assistant commissioners who were responsible for fire stations so there were there were four deputy assistant commissioners who each had as it were a portion of london

00:43:29 each had as it were a portion of london and he would take that as it were down the line management chain within his department um in order to continue to monitor and inspire progress and were

00:43:41 monitor and inspire progress and were you always satisfied that that system that um two-way flow of information between the rro people and the 72d people if i can put it that way always operated efficiently

00:44:03 yes

00:44:07 so nobody ever brought to your attention is this right any defects is that information any lapses in reporting of important matters one way or the other uh

00:44:16 uh no

00:44:17 no uh no no they didn't but you know but but at the same time i acknowledge that um for example 72d visits

00:44:28 72d visits you know the feedback i received was that 72d visits for example were better undertaken in some places than others you know some crews were

00:44:42 there wasn't i can't say there was a single standard for the performance of 72d visits and

00:44:49 and the same is likely to be true for fire safety audits

00:44:56 audits but i know that both managers had arrangements in place in each of their departments to

00:45:04 to to make those things better so they were concerned that they should be as comprehensive um and effective as they could be and as we wanted them to be in compliance with policy

00:45:16 be in compliance with policy but it was something that they were always working at just just remind me who was it if anybody who sat above those two departments overseeing them and monitoring the flow

00:45:27 overseeing them and monitoring the flow of information so it says to make sure that it worked one way and the other who was it well i sat above the department said i don't know whether you're so was it you

00:45:38 don't know whether you're so was it you yes i think so i was monitoring i was rece you know i was receiving a report at my board which said you know this number of notifications went in that direction this number of notifications went in the

00:45:50 this number of notifications went in the other direction and as i say with some commentary about what happened as a consequence um

00:45:58 um first of all which board are you talking about is that cnb no i i had a directorate management board so my my heads of service would meet as a board

00:46:08 board i see and the same was true in the and the other two directorates yes and

00:46:13 and can you just help us with what report that was what was it called um

00:46:20 i can't mr millet um i know that i've been provided with a copy of one of the reports as part of the disclosure process

00:46:29 a year ago i you know i had forgotten that that this process existed you know it's come back to me in the last year that it did exist and i uh and certainly as part of the

00:46:40 uh and certainly as part of the disclosure process i have been provided with a copy of at least one of those reports but i i can't tell you what it what specifically it was called making allowances for your recollection

00:46:51 making allowances for your recollection how frequently did those reports come to you

00:46:57 annual no no more than annual more than annual um more than annual but um i i don't want to commit myself to quarterly you can't remember no right now um

00:47:07 now um let's look at the planning and housing committee's final report of december 2010 which i think we looked at yesterday that's inq3014711

00:47:21 and here you can see the title fire safety in london fire risks in london's tall and timber frame buildings december 2010 and uh if we go please to the recommendations about fire risk

00:47:33 recommendations about fire risk assessments on page 35 we can see recommendation seven just below heart uh it says uh by 2012 dclg in association with

00:47:44 by 2012 dclg in association with relevant bodies such as the local authorities coordinators of regulatory services lacours and chief fire officers association should draw up national guidance to ensure mandatory minimum

00:47:55 guidance to ensure mandatory minimum standards of competence for training and accrediting fire risk assessors were you aware of that recommendation uh i

00:48:04 uh i i can't say i was aware that recommendation seven in this report from december 2010 existed but i was aware that a number of bodies were

00:48:15 i was aware that a number of bodies were uh promoting this idea right i i should have asked you did you read this report when it came i'm assuming you did i think we covered that yesterday i can't swear to it but it's highly likely right and therefore it's likely

00:48:27 likely right and therefore it's likely would you accept that uh you were aware of this recommendation yes yes do you remember whether the lfb endorsed it i think so i i i believe that this was

00:48:38 i think so i i i believe that this was followed up i know that this was followed up with a report to the then community safety committee of the authority so steve tirica's ac fire

00:48:49 authority so steve tirica's ac fire safety

00:48:50 safety produced a report which said this piece of work has happened at the london assembly these are the recommendations and

00:48:57 and this is what we the london fire brigade officers believe in response to them right now in the recommendation it says that the dclg in association with relevant bodies and some examples are given though there

00:49:09 and some examples are given though there um do you know which the relevant bodies were other than the lakers and the cfoa i no i can't speak to that did you consider that that a mandatory minimum standard of

00:49:21 that a mandatory minimum standard of competence and accreditation of fire risk assessors was by this time required from what you could see of enforcement activity

00:49:32 at this time i don't think i had seen enough about enforcement activity to have a view i don't believe i had a strong view about it at that time oh because this is december 2010 indeed and i thought you were getting

00:49:43 i thought you were getting more than annual reports about uh what um the enforcement bodies within the lfb the fire safety department were finding uh in their buildings so was that

00:49:54 uh in their buildings so was that exercise which you were overseeing not informative about standards of competence of fire risk assessors um no it wasn't it wasn't that kind of report mr miller i'm sorry if i've

00:50:06 report mr miller i'm sorry if i've created the wrong impression so um the report to which i've referred was

00:50:15 you know as an as an example a fire safety inspecting officer might undertake an audit in a high-rise residential tower block

00:50:27 a high-rise residential tower block and uh discover that the hydrant had been vandalized and that is an example of something where we'd want the local station to be aware of it if they weren't already and

00:50:38 aware of it if they weren't already and that would be notified to the local fire station

00:50:41 station conversely uh fire station uh staff doing a 72d visit they might they might visit the same block on a different day and find that the

00:50:53 different day and find that the corridors were cluttered or

00:51:03 maybe maybe they came across examples of self-closers that either didn't work or weren't in place they might have found holes in fire doors and they in turn would be expected

00:51:14 doors and they in turn would be expected to notify that to the fire safety inspection team so that they could make a visit if necessary to form a view about in that in the case of those examples

00:51:25 examples um the fire safety management for example of uh the building and so that was at that level rather than at this kind of different policy level

00:51:36 at this kind of different policy level right so you in short you never detected from what you saw that there were any lapses and standards uh of fire risk assessments being carried out um i think i did subsequently so um uh when i'd been

00:51:48 subsequently so um uh when i'd been imposed maybe for a couple of years i became concerned about how long it took some prosecution activity to come to fruition

00:52:00 activity to come to fruition i can't remember what drew it to my attention but it came to my attention so i might say to ac fire safety you know maybe i was aware of a particular case and i knew that we were

00:52:12 particular case and i knew that we were intending to take prosecution action i might say to to ac fire safety you know how's that going why is it taking so long and then there'd be a bit of well it's with the legal team and then when i have

00:52:23 with the legal team and then when i have i'm sorry

00:52:24 i'm sorry that's all very well but i was asking about the quality of the fire risk assessments being carried out by responsible persons not the speed of enforcement so we're not what was well well sorry it was because i was

00:52:35 well sorry it was because i was concerned in some cases about the speed of enforcement um that i came to set up a regular process where i met with the fire safety team a senior team and the legal team

00:52:47 legal team to review every prosecution case that we had in progress and as part of that i would be able to see whether for example concerns about

00:52:59 see whether for example concerns about the quality of the fire risk assessment was one of the motivating factors in that intended prosecution so it's from that process which i established that i gained that i personally gained more insight into for example the question of

00:53:12 insight into for example the question of the competency of some of the fire risk assessments i see can we then turn the page to page 36 please and look at recommendation number eight

00:53:21 eight it says this by 2012 dclg should require all social landlords to publish a full register of fire risk assessments for the residential properties that they're responsible for this will enable all residents to be informed of the findings

00:53:33 residents to be informed of the findings of the relevant risk assessments and whatever remedial action plans are in place this register should be available online but also available to residents in their buildings for inspection and to tenant and residence representatives

00:53:46 tenant and residence representatives um

00:53:47 um having read this report i'm going to assume you were aware of this recommendation again did the lfb endorse it

00:53:56 um from memory ac turret reported to the community safety committee that it was a decent idea um but it but it had its limitations and problems were you aware that this recommendation uh was never carried into

00:54:08 recommendation uh was never carried into effect

00:54:10 effect yes

00:54:11 yes do you know why it wasn't carried into effect

00:54:15 after the london assemblies report was published in december 2010 did the lfb have any further involvement in implementing the reports recommendations a number of the recommendations

00:54:27 a number of the recommendations were

00:54:28 were consistent with policy activities or

00:54:34 implementation activities that we were already undertaking so those which would those which were directly relevant to our organization were taken forward as it were as part of

00:54:46 were taken forward as it were as part of business as normal i don't from memory think there were any recommendations with which we fundamentally disagreed so the burden of our response to the recommendations which were relevant to our organization

00:54:58 which were relevant to our organization were incorporated in uh as it were business at business as normal now i want to turn next to the latino house fire as we know that fire took place on the

00:55:10 as we know that fire took place on the 3rd of july 2009 which was before your appointment as deputy commissioner and therefore of course before you had assumed responsibility for the fire safety department um but presumably as one of

00:55:22 um but presumably as one of um the lfb's directors you were aware of the incident when it happened it was yes yes um now blackened house as we know is a high-rise residential block in camberwell in south london

00:55:35 in camberwell in south london do you agree with that it was a significant incident for the lfb because in part because of the building's compartmentation failures and the rapid fire spread yes

00:55:46 yes let's go to lfb four zeros one two three two

00:55:52 this is a letter dated 9th of july 2009 to the london borough housing departments from ron dobson the then commissioner

00:56:03 from ron dobson the then commissioner uh

00:56:04 uh and also to other housing associations and other social housing providers it as i as i say it's dated the 9th of july 2009 so six days after the fire

00:56:15 july 2009 so six days after the fire and

00:56:16 and if we look at the second paragraph you can see he says this following the tragic fire in camberwell on third july 2009 i consider it appropriate to

00:56:28 2009 i consider it appropriate to personally write to you to remind you of certain matters which you are either responsible under the regulatory reform fire safety order 2005 the order or which you have a role in enforcing

00:56:39 and if you look then at the third and fourth paragraphs he says this firstly a requirement of the order is that a suitable and sufficient fire safety risk assessment is undertaken for all premises to which the order applies in

00:56:51 premises to which the order applies in this regard i'd emphasize that any risk assessment should include amongst other things consideration of the compartmentation within the premises particularly where it protects means of escape routes and that there are systems in place to ensure that these elements

00:57:02 in place to ensure that these elements of compartmentation are maintained it is also a requirement of the order that the risk assessment should be reviewed if any material change takes place within the premises this will include changes

00:57:13 the premises this will include changes to the compartmentation arrangements as well as potentially any refurbishment work

00:57:17 work then the next paragraph says the findings of the fire risk assessment must be implemented to remove or reduce fire risks and to ensure adequate general fire precautions are provided in particular this includes an evacuation

00:57:30 particular this includes an evacuation strategy that is appropriate to the circumstances of the individual premises

00:57:35 now um it was written by ron dobson the then commissioner can i assume that you were aware of this letter when it went out i don't know that i was aware of it when it went out i've certainly subsequently

00:57:47 it went out i've certainly subsequently become aware of it but i i can't say i was at that time right uh uh now at this time july 2009 do you know whether it was the lfb's

00:57:58 do you know whether it was the lfb's working assumption that the cause or a cause a root cause of the latino house fire was the building's poor compartmentation at the time of this letter uh

00:58:09 at the time of this letter uh no i couldn't say that no do you know whether there was a concern within the lfb at that time that there were many other buildings in london which might suffer from similar instances of poor compartmentation

00:58:24 uh

00:58:27 poor com poor compartmentation is a really wide term that's not the criticism

00:58:33 criticism of the of the use of it um but um

00:58:37 but um [Music]

00:58:39 [Music] and the brigade routinely collects information about fires where

00:58:47 problems with compartmentation has been an issue so it's part of the national data recording system and it's possible for us to extract data about that

00:58:59 the experience of poor com poor compartmentation i don't think that was a very unusual occurrence in the context of fires

00:59:10 occurrence in the context of fires but the extent of it and the reasons for it

00:59:14 it were highly variable is it right that in sending this letter and

00:59:19 and you didn't see it at the time so perhaps um

00:59:23 um perhaps

00:59:24 perhaps um we take that into account but in sending this letter the lfb hoped that any

00:59:29 any defects in compartmentation or maintaining compartmentation could be identified and rectified so that another incident like lacking house would uh would not happen

00:59:40 would not happen yes yes was there a view within the nfb at the time do you know that a stay put policy in place for any given high-rise housing block social or otherwise should not be a

00:59:52 social or otherwise should not be a given but should be assessed by the responsible person on a case-by-case basis

00:59:58 basis taking into account all the fire hazards in the building and their active and passive prevention and protection measures

01:00:04 measures no

01:00:05 no it wasn't

01:00:06 it wasn't sorry i hope i've understood your question correctly but i think the answer to this is a long question let me try it slightly more briefly was was there a view within the lfb at the time that a stay put policy in place for a

01:00:18 that a stay put policy in place for a given high-rise block should not be a given but needed to be assessed by the responsible person when carrying out their obligations under the rro um

01:00:30 well two things at that point in time i may not have known um so i was still director of corporate services and so that you know there were a range of

01:00:41 that you know there were a range of meetings and information which at that time was not available to me so

01:00:49 me so it could have been the case uh

01:00:52 uh i feel that um the fires the fire safety regulation people

01:00:59 people uh would say that that was a requirement um that there is something in the you know there are provisions in the legislation that require responsible persons to take a view about

01:01:10 responsible persons to take a view about whether stay put is right for their building based on the characteristics of that building um but you would have a much better discussion about this with the assistant

01:01:22 about this with the assistant commissioner fire safety regulation right

01:01:24 right would it be fair to say that in short your answer is i don't know it amounts to that doesn't it yes yes i guess i'm sorry um it

01:01:35 it did just uh help me with this if you look at the second page of this letter

01:01:41 letter please page two you can see that in the last sentence it draws attention uh

01:01:47 uh to steve turek head of fire safety regulation as the person to

01:01:51 to assist with clarifications do you know whether assistant commissioner steve turek drafted this letter or had him put into it i think that's very likely yes now going back to the first paragraph

01:02:02 now going back to the first paragraph of the letter if we can please at page one uh

01:02:05 one uh the introduction to the letter says this uh you may recall the letter dated 23rd of march 2009 from assistant commissioner steve turek in which he highlighted a number of significant fire safety issues relating

01:02:17 significant fire safety issues relating to social housing

01:02:21 and that letter obviously predates

01:02:25 predates lachenal

01:02:27 lachenal and indeed your appointment as deputy commissioner but can we go to a later letter which post dates your appointment at lfb double zero one zero four two nine one

01:02:40 double zero one zero four two nine one please

01:02:47 this is a letter dated the 14th of december 2009 to sir ken knight the chief fire and rescue adviser to the communities and local government

01:02:58 to the communities and local government department of central government and uh

01:03:04 and uh yeah it's uh it starts dear sir ken it's written by ron dobson uh and it says this dear ken i'm writing to inform you that as part of our investigation into the fire at latino

01:03:16 investigation into the fire at latino house go gardens southwark on third july 2009 we've had tests carried out on the exterior wall panels of the building and that those tests have given rise to concerns which may well be relevant to other high-rise

01:03:27 may well be relevant to other high-rise premises although our investigations are continuing and the matter has still to come before the coroner i feel that it is in the public interest to draw the issue to your attention so that the matter can be discussed within the department and any necessary advice can

01:03:39 department and any necessary advice can be given to owners and landlords of high-rise buildings and then if you cast your eye down the paragraphs below the letter goes on to summarize functional requirement b4 of the

01:03:50 functional requirement b4 of the building regulations uh that the building's external walls should adequately resist the spread of fire as well as the relevant provisions of approved document b

01:04:01 of approved document b and if we go to the second page of this letter

01:04:05 letter picking it up at the third paragraph down

01:04:09 uh mr dobson says based on the tests conducted by the building research establishment it appears that there are external wall panels at lachen house that do not have the necessary reaction

01:04:21 that do not have the necessary reaction to fire properties required for the location in which they have been used we've also become aware that this type of panel has been supplied by more than one company in the circumstances we believe it may be appropriate for a

01:04:33 believe it may be appropriate for a warning to be given to housing providers that it would be advisable to check the specification for external wall panels in their high-rise housing stock and check that what has been installed meets the correct specification i.e the fire

01:04:46 the correct specification i.e the fire safety requirements of the building regulations were taken into account and to include this in fire risk assessments for relevant properties um now i've shown you quite a bit of that letter because it's an important

01:04:57 that letter because it's an important letter as

01:04:58 letter as you can see was it do you remember drafted by the fire safety department and then signed by the commissioner i don't know did you see it at the time but before it

01:05:09 did you see it at the time but before it went i don't believe so right now you had assumed as we know the position of deputy commissioner the previous month november

01:05:16 november 2009. so you were now in charge of the fire safety regulation department weren't you yes yes um

01:05:24 um but you you're telling us i think you had no involvement in the letters drafting or the decision to send it is that right i believe that to be the case yes right nonetheless were you alive to the issues that the

01:05:35 alive to the issues that the commissioner was raising with sir ken knight

01:05:38 knight no you weren't right

01:05:44 are you are you able to explain why that is

01:05:47 is no

01:05:49 no strange isn't it yes

01:05:52 yes now we've got sir ken knight's response to the commission of the 22nd of december 2009 at home triple zero four six

01:05:58 six zero one eight

01:06:05 here it is it is dated the 22nd of december as i say uh dear ron latino house investigation and just picking it up in the fourth paragraph down

01:06:15 down members of seog did recognize uh and seog i should tell you is this is the strategic and investigation oversight group for latino house

01:06:26 oversight group for latino house uh which involved the metropolitan police as well um picking it up again members of seog did recognize that the information arising from the bre report has potential implications for meeting the expectations of certain aspects of

01:06:38 the expectations of certain aspects of approved document b of schedule 1 to the building regulations 2000 as amended but it was felt that at this time there was there is insufficient information to warrant alerting housing authorities and

01:06:49 warrant alerting housing authorities and or property owners to the specific matters raised not least as one the investigation has not yet determined if the surface spread of flame properties of the panels fitted in latin house were specified by the housing authority

01:07:01 specified by the housing authority two the investigation has not yet determined if the surface but of flame properties of the panel fitted in lacking house were differently specified to those subsequently fitted now

01:07:12 now if you go on to the second page of this letter

01:07:17 letter uh

01:07:18 uh and look at the second paragraph and on uh it says in order to determine the evidence relating to one and two above the mps investigators are actively pursuing the information required to

01:07:30 pursuing the information required to clarify the public interest issues the above matters have been discussed with colleagues within communities and local government the clarification being sought by the investigators will in turn assist further discussion on the disclosure of relevant information in

01:07:41 disclosure of relevant information in the meantime clg housing policy colleagues are including a generic statement in a letter to housing authorities a copy of which i will forward to you i look forward to keeping

01:07:52 forward to you i look forward to keeping in touch on the above issues now

01:07:55 now uh we have a copy of clg's letter to housing authorities which contained that generic statement ms dexter and i'll show you that lfb3041215

01:08:09 and you can see

01:08:12 can see from the letter now on the screen that it is also dated the 22nd of december 2009 the very same day sir ken knight's letter to commissioner dobson

01:08:23 knight's letter to commissioner dobson uh and it's addressed to the chief executives of local housing authorities in england and it's entitled fire safety and high-rise social rented housing blocks

01:08:35 and if you look at the first page under the heading building regulations and building control it says this one point of interest coming to our attention has been concerns raised regarding the specification of window and cladding

01:08:47 specification of window and cladding systems used on high-rise blocks guidance on the appropriate specification of external walls and cladding systems to satisfy the fire at safety aspects of building regulations

01:08:58 safety aspects of building regulations is given in approved document b fire safety section 12. then as a footnote which takes you to it whilst the specification of window frames would not normally be affected by

01:09:09 frames would not normally be affected by this guidance infills spanned rules and overcladding could be where any work which is subject to the building regulations is carried out then this should be checked by a building

01:09:20 this should be checked by a building control body bcb in accordance with those regulations if there's any doubt over the application of or compliance with these regulations then advice should be sought from the relevant bcb

01:09:32 should be sought from the relevant bcb now there are some questions which are coming i just want to show you one more document lfb3089549

01:09:46 this is an uh email uh if we go to the bottom half of the page

01:09:54 uh you can see uh the there's an email by which this letter the uh the generic letter from the dclg uh was sent to uh commissioner dobson

01:10:06 uh was sent to uh commissioner dobson uh you can see kelly fairman at the at clg

01:10:11 clg on behalf of ken knight sends it on the 23rd of december you see that and there's some text below it if we go up the page we can see that ron dobson

01:10:24 we can see that ron dobson sends it on to you steve turek tim cut bill and john bradbury with the remark this is interesting

01:10:36 do you remember what did you understand the commissioner to mean by this is interesting i'm sorry would you mind going further down the page again just so i can try and answer that question

01:10:47 try and answer that question yes of course

01:11:01 i don't think i can shed any light on the this is interesting comment did you have a view at the time yourself of the clg's letter the generic letter i've just just looked at with you i can't recall having one no

01:11:13 recall having one no do you remember whether you considered it an adequate response to the concerns raised by the bragrades letter commissioner dobson's letter i'm not certain i saw commissioner dobson's letter

01:11:24 dobson's letter as i as i said a few minutes ago um

01:11:30 so uh i i i'm not certain i saw that letter and during preparation for today i have seen it uh and i have asked for a review to see whether i was ever

01:11:41 a review to see whether i was ever copied in to it and i haven't had any confirmation that i that i was um so i i absolutely don't recall the letter

01:11:51 letter um

01:11:52 um right

01:11:52 right i mean can you think of a reason why ron dobson

01:11:55 dobson uh

01:11:56 uh would have sent that letter without without copying you in on it or at least telling you about it yes i can think of a reason um uh which is um that he was

01:12:09 is um that he was uh he worked very closely with the fire investigation team our fire investigation team that investigated the lack of house fire um

01:12:20 um and uh as i'm sure you know he he'd established the lacchanal house board um

01:12:27 um i.e the officer group um which i joined in february i think at the same time as dave brown now i i don't know why i wasn't there

01:12:38 now i i don't know why i wasn't there for the first three or four meetings i don't know even that i knew that they were happening um so i did only join the lucknow house board in february i think february 2010. um but i think

01:12:53 you asked me a question about the reason and my my view of that is because he was working closely with the fire investigation team and they were feeding back to him print of new results but

01:13:04 back to him print of new results but my recollection is that the final report of the fire investigation team in terms of the uh lack of house fire didn't finally emerge for for you know a considerable period after it

01:13:15 you know a considerable period after it may have been it may have been more than a year for example i'm i'm i'm not certain um but my

01:13:23 my my guess would be that it was a preliminary finding which he was aware of based on his close work with the fire investigation team just just will you remind me you may have told me already and i apologize if

01:13:34 have told me already and i apologize if i've asked this question before but where did the fire investigation team fit in the structure of the lfb at the time in the fire safety regulation department sat in the fire safety regulation department and therefore at

01:13:46 regulation department and therefore at this time it was one of the departments sitting within your directorate it was it was and i i i understand the no uh

01:13:56 no uh it was i i would simply add that um as commissioner ron dobson took a very intense interest in the lack of house fire in particular um so he was

01:14:08 um so he was you know he was very involved in that incident which actually in a way that i think probably was unusual for a chief fire officer or for our chief fire officer um because he

01:14:19 for our chief fire officer um because he thought it was important if if i reflect back on the bethnal green fire for example in 2004 the way the lessons from that were taking forward and that was a very significant fire for london fire brigade

01:14:31 significant fire for london fire brigade um involved a degree of delegation but in relation to the lack of house fire ron was always very hands-on in how it was taken forward and many of the key decisions yes um but you had come into

01:14:44 decisions yes um but you had come into position of yes well let me just ask the question

01:14:47 question as we've established you'd come into the position of deputy commissioner the previous month uh

01:14:52 uh is it fair to say that um the latino house fire and mr dobson's involvement is something that he would have wanted you to be closely involved with as his immediate deputy and as the director in

01:15:03 immediate deputy and as the director in charge of the fire safety regulation department uh

01:15:08 uh yes and i think that happens subsequently so you you know for example that he recommended to the authority um that um the operational directorate's coordination board should oversee the

01:15:21 coordination board should oversee the continuing implementation of the rule 43 action plan and that was until 2013 but odcb had already started before that recommendation to the authority so i i i

01:15:35 recommendation to the authority so i i i don't doubt his intention to involve me but it it didn't start immediately right

01:15:41 right um

01:15:42 um did you do you remember discuss this letter the generic letter with steve turek i don't remember doing so any other fire safety colleagues no i don't think so what about team cup bill

01:15:53 think so what about team cup bill uh definitely not no i don't i don't think so uh it was a long time ago 2009 i i don't think so did you order your knowledge anybody else consider pressing this issue further uh with the clg or

01:16:04 this issue further uh with the clg or with sir ken i i don't know am i right in thinking that the dclg had not taken up the lfb's suggestion of writing to housing providers

01:16:15 writing to housing providers to request specifically that they proactively check the specification of their high-rise external wall panels for compliance with the building regulations uh mr miller i only know what i've read

01:16:26 uh mr miller i only know what i've read there and it doesn't appear so right um does it follow that it remained the case and the lfb knew that it remained the case that any number of high-rise buildings in london

01:16:37 number of high-rise buildings in london could well have non-compliant panels that promoted fire spread

01:16:44 yes yes

01:16:47 yes and therefore it would it remained the case that a fire like latino house could occur in any number of high-rise buildings in london at any time

01:17:02 uh

01:17:05 all these all these fire in my experience uh all these fires had different characteristics if i if i made a list of ten things that you

01:17:16 if i made a list of ten things that you know might have been features of the luckiness house fire and i

01:17:20 and i you know and i worked through other high-rise fires in london either that had happened or could happen you know

01:17:28 you know i might take four of those items i might take nine of those items or all fires are different um and so the potential is there but you know especially after grenfell there are

01:17:40 know especially after grenfell there are a few potentialities that we exclude as being possible these days but i i don't think

01:17:48 think i don't i i don't think it would be right to say um based on this fire the same fire could happen in the mirror block for example it certainly could

01:18:00 certainly could but but it would be it would be speculative rather than us saying you know based upon what we know about the fire safety features of that building

01:18:10 building it's inevitable um

01:18:14 but in light of your earlier answers do you remember a time whether you uh or anybody in the fire safety department uh

01:18:25 uh considered telling station staff that this risk existed and that therefore they needed to check with the building owner

01:18:37 with the building owner whether the external wall complied with the building regulations given that this risk was one which had been identified with government but not taken up by way of communication to housing providers

01:18:49 of communication to housing providers uh

01:18:52 uh no i think it's more complicated than that question and my answer but the answer to your question is no and can you give us a reason why the answer is no

01:19:01 no uh

01:19:05 i'm sorry mr miller would you ask the question again yes um

01:19:10 um did anybody to your knowledge in the fire safety department consider telling station staff that there was a risk that cladding systems did not comply with the building regulations and that is and that was something they should verify

01:19:22 that was something they should verify with the building owners on their 72d visits or indeed as part of rra enforcement okay

01:19:28 okay um so the answer is still no to my

01:19:32 no to my to the best of my knowledge um

01:19:40 we would have had to have given uh sorry this isn't intended as an excuse but you've asked me why the answer is no i'm not i'm not sure about the extent of our knowledge about cladding at that

01:19:51 our knowledge about cladding at that point in time and it's not my understanding then or now that all cladding is bad and inevitably a risk uh presumably there are buildings that

01:20:02 uh presumably there are buildings that are clad where the cladding does what it's supposed to do and doesn't do what it's not supposed to do but you know the cladding might be good but its combination with something else might be bad and that makes it a risk or its

01:20:14 bad and that makes it a risk or its nature of fixing might be um and so

01:20:19 um and so i don't

01:20:21 i don't maybe

01:20:23 maybe so it's it's more complicated sorry my answer is no we didn't but i i think i'm not sure about the depth of the information we had and i think the whole topic of cladding

01:20:35 topic of cladding is more complicated than cladding is bad and is a risk that may be so but reducing it to its minimum you accept because we see it from

01:20:48 you accept because we see it from the commissioner's letter that

01:20:52 that a warning should be given to housing providers because of a risk that the specifications for the external wall panels that they had used on their high-rise blocks might be non-compliant

01:21:03 high-rise blocks might be non-compliant yes i i accept that that's that's a very fair point and i also accept mr millet that um fire safety regulation and operations

01:21:15 fire safety regulation and operations may not have been closely integrated in fire brigades in the way they should have been over a long period you know

01:21:23 you know they were in i think in all brigades structurally separate one from the other and i i think that over time

01:21:32 over time the extent to which the knowledge and experience of the fire safety people as it were for our investigators for our engineers that that has spread into operations um

01:21:44 um has improved its change and improved and i i would i would say that was my experience based on my london experience and i i don't know what you know you have an expert on

01:21:55 have an expert on fire brigades and you know i'd be interested to know what he thinks about that whether you know maybe they have been separate universes for a long time but i think that is less much less so

01:22:06 that is less much less so um

01:22:07 um these days um now let's turn to your involvement on the latino house board we touched on that body earlier on um and if we go to your witness

01:22:18 um and if we go to your witness statement please lfb3032363 at page three paragraph eight um underneath the heading latin house board it says this the lack of house

01:22:29 board it says this the lack of house board the board began meeting on first october 2009 the board was directed and usually chaired by the commissioner ron dobson i became a member of the fifth meeting on

01:22:40 became a member of the fifth meeting on 22nd of february 2010 which i chaired in the absence of the commissioner um

01:22:46 um and that's something i think you've already told us um

01:22:51 um it's right isn't it that before the inquests

01:22:54 inquests uh or rather before the inquest hearings which which ran from january to march 2013

01:23:01 2013 the latin house board identified a number of lessons learned and organizational action points from the fire yes yes

01:23:09 yes yes now i think we first see those actions in the minutes of the latino house board meeting for for the 15th of september 2010

01:23:17 2010 let's go to that it's at lfb 3055192

01:23:25 and we can see from the first page uh

01:23:28 uh who the what the membership is other than the commissioner you are one of the members there you see that yes uh

01:23:38 uh as the deputy commissioner um you can see the attendees at the meeting yes and you it appears from that we're absent

01:23:45 absent i think that's right isn't it because you sent apologies yes yeah now um nonetheless can we take it that you would have read yes this meeting note or minute after after the meeting

01:23:58 minute after after the meeting yes it would have been sent to you yes um can we go to page seven please

01:24:05 and on page seven uh you uh can see appendix one action plan uh and there is a list of actions which goes over the page um for two more pages

01:24:17 goes over the page um for two more pages can you just confirm that these actions came to be known as the the lack of pre-actions by virtue of the having preceded the lachenal inquest

01:24:28 lachenal inquest they were never referred to in those terms that i think i think this uh are there 34 items in this list uh it became known as the lack of house action plan yes i see right uh and

01:24:41 action plan yes i see right uh and indeed

01:24:42 indeed as you've correctly pointed out there are 34 actions in total do you know how the board the lack of house board went about identifying each of those action points

01:24:58 uh

01:25:00 how did it go about it

01:25:10 uh well

01:25:14 well following the fire there will have been

01:25:21 debriefs as it were uh

01:25:25 about

01:25:28 different aspects of the fire so i i'm you know it was before before my time as it were but um with a fire of this seriousness the

01:25:41 um with a fire of this seriousness the commissioner would have and did and did bring together all of those senior officers whom he thought

01:25:51 thought had something significant to say at an early stage about aspects of the incident so that might be the operational response it might be

01:26:02 the operational response it might be control performance it might be a fire investigation um and over and above that um he appointed you've already referred to

01:26:13 appointed you've already referred to somebody called tim cuttwell he appointed tim cupvill

01:26:18 cupvill to

01:26:19 to lead

01:26:20 lead i can't remember what the team was called but a team was established to work specifically on the lack of house fire and the follow-up in the same way as i'm sure the inquiry have seen in relation to grenfell so the

01:26:33 have seen in relation to grenfell so the grenfell process i think it has been modeled very much on what happened after after lucknow so

01:26:41 so a senior officer was appointed to lead a team of people who worked with heads of service either in meetings with the commissioner and or

01:26:52 in meetings with the commissioner and or others or outside those meetings to identify what at that time on the face of it seemed to be the priority issues for the brigade to address

01:27:04 address that's the structural answer to the question

01:27:07 question do you know what the methodological answer to the question is in other words what tools did that team use to go about identifying uh the action points do you know i i i don't think

01:27:20 points do you know i i i don't think there were any tools as such um but uh i i can see looking even at what's on the screen now so if i look at item three complete and operational

01:27:31 three complete and operational sequential time event plot you know that that will be the same type of activity or the same nature of activity as was undertaken after for example 7-7 so after 7-7 which

01:27:44 after for example 7-7 so after 7-7 which was a very significant incident there were

01:27:47 were processes for uh

01:27:50 uh as it were plotting as said here um the response of the brigade you know what time were recalls recalls received what response was made what was mobilized when did they get there what equipment did they use and so some of

01:28:02 equipment did they use and so some of these actions will be based on the experience of analysis

01:28:07 analysis and

01:28:09 and investigation of previous very significant incidents in london right now a number of the actions were attributed to departments within your directorate when they they were for example if we scroll

01:28:20 they they were for example if we scroll down to page eight we can see uh item 20 review of high rise fires where fire spread beyond the compartment yes yep

01:28:31 yes yep ac fsr

01:28:33 ac fsr by safety regulation is it right that the fire safety regulation department was also heavily involved in the ongoing police investigation into the cause of latino the national house fire

01:28:45 the national house fire uh

01:28:49 the fire safety investigation did you say

01:28:53 say no the um the police the fire safety department

01:28:57 yes but but also um the team to which i've referred that was headed by tim cutler indeed so who were part of the fire safety department right so both the latino is this right that as a result both the lack of house

01:29:09 that as a result both the lack of house board and the fire safety regulation department under your stewardship were involved in and and very familiar with the lfb's response to the lack of house fire

01:29:20 fire yes

01:29:21 yes yes yes but not response you know operations prevention and response were also intimately involved in the response to the fire so dave brown was

01:29:32 to the fire so dave brown was responsible for control for example mobilizing and control and so you know he had as it were in an equivalent interest to uh the fire investigation team's

01:29:45 uh the fire investigation team's interest in cause and origin yes but that department operations prevention and response also sat within your directory yes now um i just want to look at some correspondence with the

01:29:56 look at some correspondence with the dclg

01:29:57 dclg about

01:29:58 about requirement b4 it's a slightly different topic but chronologically it's pre-inquest mr chairman that's a good time to take the break well i did wonder whether it might be so

01:30:09 might be so good

01:30:10 good um

01:30:11 um miss dexter we're going to have a break now we'll resume please at half past 11 and as before please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while they're out of the world thank you

01:30:31 thank you how fast 11 minutes

01:48:09 would you ask mr dexter to come back in please okay

01:48:28 all right mr dexter carry on yes mr minutes chairman thank you um uh ms dexter we're now going to look as i say at correspondence with the dclg over the question of requirement b4

01:48:40 dclg over the question of requirement b4 of the building regulations which is external fire spread can we start please with lfb

01:48:55 now this is a minute of 15th of october 2010 of

01:49:04 of the a meeting of the latino investigation team and you can see from the list of those present

01:49:11 present that you were not there but lfb representatives were there and we can see peter mancy andy jack tim cut bill

01:49:22 bill nick carey and david kennett and there were others there from the metropolitan police service and the hse and the bre as you can see dave crowder

01:49:34 and the bre as you can see dave crowder and richard chitty um

01:49:37 um looking at the individuals from the lfb did any of those work within your directorate i think we know that andy jack did uh what about um peter mancy uh

01:49:48 jack did uh what about um peter mancy uh and uh nick carey yes they did yeah and tim cutler you told us did no no he didn't he didn't no no he

01:49:56 no he um

01:49:58 um for the purposes of lucknow he was uh a a team was created which he headed and um in sephara's it was

01:50:10 and um in sephara's it was in a directorate it would have been in gary's rather than mine right but he i think i see so he i think he worked in operational resilience at the time okay yes but i think he was probably seconded

01:50:22 yes but i think he was probably seconded out yes i follow yeah um i follow now if you look at the second page of this document um

01:50:28 um three paragraphs from the bottom of the page you'll see and the following exchange

01:50:33 exchange uh rm

01:50:36 uh rm and that's i think d.i rick murphy um initiates extensive discussion about areas requiring clarification regarding the contract between lbs and apollo which also leads to discussions about building regs and

01:50:48 to discussions about building regs and building control approval dk that's david kennett comments that adrian prest may be able to provide expert guidance on matters relating to building regs and building control aj

01:50:59 aj as andy jack refers to brian martin and the document that specifies the responsibility for building works rests with the builder action and then if we can go over the page

01:51:10 and then if we can go over the page rm

01:51:11 rm that's rick murphy again of the metropolitan police suggests a meeting with adrian prest and the contract lawyer in order to clarify areas relating to the contract building control and building regs

01:51:23 control and building regs and were you aware of david kenneth's suggestion to seek adrian prest's expert guidance on the building regulations no you weren't

01:51:33 now can we then go to lfb3082587

01:51:38 let's follow this through and see how much you can help us with it uh if you um go to this email run it's in october 2010 as you can see from what's on the page and if you go to the

01:51:50 what's on the page and if you go to the email at the foot of the page from adrian prest to mark fiskin 18th of october 2010 subject l fifa questions mark fiskin i think we've established

01:52:01 mark fiskin i think we've established was in lfb's legal department is that is that right uh now you've said that yes i remember that yes and i think fell within your directorate isn't it yes um now this is three days after the investigation team

01:52:14 three days after the investigation team meeting that we've just the minutes for which we've just looked at and he says further to friday's telephone conversation with your fire officer colleagues for clarification the points discussed are summarized in the attached

01:52:25 discussed are summarized in the attached document which perhaps you could forward onto them

01:52:29 onto them and if we look at the attachment it's at lfb three zeros three nine five four five

01:52:44 and it's entitled el fiber questions october 2010 rebuilding regulations and refurbishment works

01:52:52 works you see that yes um just looking at this document i can show you more if you like um

01:52:58 um do you think you saw this at the time i don't think so no you don't think so and were you informed of the contents at the time do you think i don't think so right um can we go to page five then and see

01:53:09 um can we go to page five then and see how see how we get on um page five has questions four and five and fifteen october discussions uh i think that means fourth and fifteenth of october discussions b4

01:53:21 fifteenth of october discussions b4 external walls fire spread i'll just go through this with you see how much you can help us with it uh the question do the requirements for external walls bear directly upon their ability to resist fast spreading from

01:53:33 ability to resist fast spreading from inside a building and up the outside of the wall i.e when ignited other than by radiation from another building see that yes uh and then mr press goes on in to summarize his understanding of

01:53:45 on in to summarize his understanding of regulation b4 for example in the third paragraph on this page he says uh adb4 it's approved document b for as amended in march 2010

01:53:57 amended in march 2010 performance states that b4 will be met if the external walls restrict the risk of ignition from an external source and the spread of fire over their surfaces so as to limit the risk of a fire spreading from the building to a

01:54:09 spreading from the building to a building beyond the boundary this indicates that the concern is in relation to the transmission of fire to other buildings rather than the spread of fire along the walls to other parts of the existing

01:54:20 walls to other parts of the existing fire affected building and then if you look at the penultimate paragraph on that page under conclusions uh adrian prest's ultimate conclusion was and i'll read it he says although there are requirements relating to fire

01:54:32 there are requirements relating to fire spread including in cavities of external walls

01:54:35 walls adb does not clearly indicate that resistance or prevention of fire spread over external walls from an internal fire is an objective in its own right

01:54:46 fire is an objective in its own right that was his advice and he signs it off as you can see just below that uh then if we go back to the covering email at lfb four zeroes sorry three zeros eight two five eight seven please

01:55:00 zeros eight two five eight seven please we can see what happens to the advice

01:55:04 uh it it if you look at the second email down mark fiskin sends it to david kenneth also on the 18th of october 2010 fyi

01:55:13 fyi and then uh that then gets forwarded on

01:55:19 on uh

01:55:19 uh to andy i'm sorry he sends it to david kenneth and andy jack and then at the email at the top of the page 21st of october david kenneth sends it to paul jenkins

01:55:29 jenkins uh copy to andy jack and mark fiskin and he says

01:55:34 he says paul

01:55:35 paul don't know if andy has talked to you about our advice from adrian press but can you have a look at the attached document

01:55:40 document adrian's understanding of b4 is at odds with r and somewhat cuts across all the discussions we've had over the last year regarding vertical fire spread it may be that we need to ask adrian to come down to us for a meeting to discuss further

01:55:52 to us for a meeting to discuss further catch up with you next week now um first um paul jenkins as far as we are concerned we he worked as a group manager in fire engineering

01:56:03 as a group manager in fire engineering is that right or can you help who was he um

01:56:08 um i i can't swear to it being fire engineering but certainly he was a group manager within the fire safety regulation department thank you is it right to say um from your knowledge at the time that

01:56:19 um from your knowledge at the time that adrian prest's understanding of b4 was indeed at odds with the lfb's interpretation

01:56:28 i don't believe i had any understanding of these issues at the time i've read about them subsequently i i i don't quite understand how mr prest adrian prest fits into the

01:56:39 mr prest adrian prest fits into the equation but my knowledge about these issues is is more contemporary uh it certainly doesn't date to 2010 i see right so

01:56:48 right so when um

01:56:50 when um david kennett refers to all the discussions we've had over the last year regarding vertical fast spread would it follow you're not able to help us with what those discussions were or how they originated no you're not uh let's

01:57:02 uh let's see how this goes further if you go to lfb 30s 49525 we find a minute of a meeting uh in uh

01:57:13 uh in uh january 2011 18th of january 2011 entitled

01:57:17 entitled lachen house notes of meeting held on 18th january 2011 and you can see who was present andy jack paul jenkins and dave kennett with john bradbury in the chair

01:57:28 with john bradbury in the chair apologies from steve turek as you can see at the start and then if we go to page two the minutes record this

01:57:39 it's paragraph 3.7 but the paragraph numbers become adrift and the paragraph starts dave kenneth advised can you see that yes just below it dave kenneth advised that he and

01:57:50 it dave kenneth advised that he and group manager paul jenkins would be meeting brian martin to discuss b4 fire spread issues and adrian prest's view that the external part of the latino building complies with the building regulations

01:58:01 regulations if there is any ultimately any concern over the interpretation of adb then this would be a national learning issue and it would be for the commissioner to raise with the secretary of state first can you help us what was the lfb's

01:58:13 first can you help us what was the lfb's connection with brian martin uh

01:58:18 uh brian martin i i don't believe i ever personally met or correspondent with brian martin but i believe he was the dclg responsible dclg official

01:58:29 dclg responsible dclg official responsible for building control yes and what do you know what the nature of the relationship was if any or connection was between the lfb and brian martin

01:58:44 in the course of normal business in local government including in local in in london fire brigade officials of an authority would from time to time have discussions with

01:58:55 discussions with the

01:58:57 the sponsoring department official

01:59:00 official who had policy responsibility for the thing they were interested in now obviously you were not at the meeting did you see this note i don't believe so no right i see so you weren't involved in these discussions at all not at all right

01:59:12 discussions at all not at all right i see

01:59:15 i see can we look at lfb three zeros four nine five two eight which is the minute of the subsequent meeting on the uh first of february 2011. as we can see uh steve turett was was there the same

01:59:27 uh steve turett was was there the same uh the other individuals with the same other than paul jenkins and if we go to page one at the bottom to scroll down to look at three enforcement

01:59:38 enforcement uh 3.1 dave kennedy reported that he and jack jim paul jenkins and police representatives had met with brian martin to discuss the issues raised by adrian prest brian martin did not concur with adrian prest's views on external

01:59:49 with adrian prest's views on external fire spread in the building regulations and suggested that lfb write to him rather than the secretary of state with a series of questions to get a formal view dave kenneth has produced the questions that have been agreed by all relevant parties he will now draft the

02:00:00 relevant parties he will now draft the letter a c d a c f s r approval um at that stage early february 2011 were you aware at all of fire safety's intention to write to the government

02:00:11 intention to write to the government brian martin no we and i'm assuming therefore you were not involved in the letter signing it off i don't believe so right do you know whether that would have been something that the commissioner dobson

02:00:22 that the commissioner dobson was involved in um

02:00:28 i don't know whether he was or he wasn't but

02:00:30 but uh

02:00:31 uh assistant commissioner turek had sufficient authority to be pursuing this important fine detail um with brian martin without as it were

02:00:44 um with brian martin without as it were without having to check it with either me or with with ron dobson let's then take this as quickly as we can given your

02:00:53 your lack of involvement uh

02:00:57 can we go well as a fact i'll just give a reference um andy jack did write to brian martin and um if we look at lfb two zeros one

02:01:10 and um if we look at lfb two zeros one two zero three zero five i say andy jack wrote uh uh

02:01:17 uh uh he was involved in the decision to write let me just show you the letter here it is it's dated the 14th of february 2011 and it's signed by steve chirek to brian martin who's the principal construction

02:01:29 martin who's the principal construction professional sustainable buildings division at the dclg and i'll just show you um what it says he says

02:01:39 he says dear mr martin you'll be aware that we're currently carrying out an investigation into the fire that occurred at lachnal uh as part of the investigation we need to ensure that we have correctly understood requirement b4 of the

02:01:50 understood requirement b4 of the building regulations particularly with regards to vertical fire spread therefore we seek your assistance and would be grateful if you would answer the question set out below requirement b4 1 contains two objectives

02:02:01 requirement b4 1 contains two objectives firstly to restrict the fire spread of fire over the external envelope of the building and secondly to restrict the spread of fire from one building to another and in question one please confirm whether or not the first

02:02:12 confirm whether or not the first objective is an objective in its own right regardless of distance from any boundary

02:02:17 boundary two please confirm whether or not building regulations an approved document b recognizes that rapid fire spread over the external envelope of a building may make fire service intervention more difficult and therefore the combustibility of the

02:02:29 therefore the combustibility of the external envelope should be controlled and the other three questions are also important but perhaps not for you and they're about the provisions of approved document be in relation to

02:02:41 approved document be in relation to buildings over 18 meters

02:02:45 18 meters including the reference to class naught in question four now this letter on its face would suggest that as of february 2011 the lfb's fire safety department had

02:02:58 the lfb's fire safety department had developed a very detailed technical and nuanced understanding of external wall panels insulation the combustibility of those materials and the risk present in the built environment but would you agree with that

02:03:09 but would you agree with that proposition yes yes uh they would also they had also well grasped the difference between reaction to fire and resistance to fire

02:03:26 can you answer that or perhaps all right um right yeah no just just pausing there this is a letter which asks five questions of

02:03:37 letter which asks five questions of government um was the fact that those questions were asked of government something that the latino board was kept abreast of

02:03:51 uh i don't know um you don't know one way or the other or

02:03:58 or i mean

02:03:59 i mean i i simply don't recall right uh i i think it's likely that at the lack of board

02:04:04 board steve turek report or and or tim cutwell reported that there were discussions with dclg but um because i think in the natural course of events that's the kind of thing they would have reported but i'm

02:04:15 thing they would have reported but i'm but i'm not certain right uh now we look let's look at brian martin's reply to the letter um 23rd of february 2011. it's only a week or so later lfb double zero one one

02:04:26 or so later lfb double zero one one three two five four uh and if we look at the final three paragraphs on uh that page um

02:04:35 um he

02:04:36 he responds uh and says in the last paragraph the two objectives that form the requirements in paragraph b for one of schedule one of the building regulations are closely linked but are independent of each other

02:04:47 linked but are independent of each other both need to be considered having regard to the height use and position of the building

02:04:52 building so we

02:04:53 so we in short it looks as if he confirmed the lfb's view the andy jack dave kenneth view um and that adrian pressed interpretation of requirement b4 was wrong

02:05:04 wrong we can get that from the documents my question for you is do you know whether the lfb was satisfied with that response i don't know so you don't know whether there was any follow-up no now given

02:05:16 there was any follow-up no now given that the lfbs as it appears go to authority

02:05:19 authority on the fr on fire and rescue services adrian prest was was revealed it appears to have misunderstood the meaning and effect of functional requirement b4 do you know whether the lfb

02:05:31 you know whether the lfb um or the fire safety department or anybody within the nfb took steps to warn operational crews of the consequent risk to them or their operations

02:05:42 operations of

02:05:44 of fire spread over the surface of the external wall

02:05:54 the answer is i don't know i don't know if i i also don't know whether if i reviewed uh

02:06:04 uh operational news

02:06:08 i would discover that such references exist which may may not be a product of this specifically or lacking specifically so the answer to your question is i don't know but it doesn't mean it's it's definitely not there

02:06:20 mean it's it's definitely not there right

02:06:21 right i'm sorry i don't know who adrian preston is i've i've read this and you describe him as our hour there go to authority i'm i'm just not quite sure about that no well i

02:06:32 not quite sure about that no well i understand that yeah okay but because of your inability to help us i haven't haven't if i explain why i i put that to you but but you can't help on that either would it also follow that nobody in the

02:06:43 would it also follow that nobody in the lfb

02:06:44 lfb took steps to tell station staff that on their information gathering or in their information gathering under section 72d they needed to be looking closely

02:06:57 they needed to be looking closely at the risks inherent in fire spread over the surface of the external wall

02:07:07 uh i think that's that's uh that's true at this point in time

02:07:15 time i simply can't bring to mind what happens subsequently in terms of guidance for 72d visits but i'm not sure that that would have fallen within the

02:07:26 that that would have fallen within the scope of a 72d visit but you ought to talk to dave brown on that topic right uh

02:07:33 uh can i ask you why you're not sure that that would fall within the scope of a 72d visit as you call it um

02:07:45 again i think i think david brown will be

02:07:49 be a much better authority than i can be on this but

02:07:55 this but um

02:07:55 um [Music]

02:07:57 [Music] i think 72d visits were more focused on the characteristics of a building broadly broadly determined rather than

02:08:09 rather than i mean

02:08:12 the point about understanding or knowing what the characteristics of the building were was to inform pre-planning and firefighting so i'm not saying it's completely separate thing but

02:08:23 thing but um

02:08:26 i'm not sure i'm not sure what claims could reliably may be made about whether 72d visits were intended and did

02:08:40 consider for example fire development so

02:08:46 so if they said if they discovered as part of a 72d visit that a building was clad that that that's the thing that would be recorded

02:08:56 recorded um that's something that would appear then on the mdt and

02:09:03 in the circumstances of the incident that would obviously be something to which they'd have regard but but it was a consequence of the 72d rather than the feature of 72d i feel uh

02:09:15 rather than the feature of 72d i feel uh based on my understanding of 72d visits but david brown will be a much better authority just from your perspective at the time did you have any understanding or views

02:09:27 understanding or views about whether station staff gathering information under section 72d should

02:09:35 should on should be looking or needn't look at the external wall of a high-rise building and the risks posed by it no i didn't right now um can i then look with you at

02:09:48 now um can i then look with you at um

02:09:49 um commissioner dobson's witness statement to the inquiry this is at lfb3032157

02:09:55 because the history goes on and i just want to show this to you and see if you can help if we go to page five of that uh witness statement paragraph 16 he says this

02:10:06 he says this during the time of the latino house board on the 11th of december 2012 i wrote to brandon lewis mp parliamentary under secretary of state for communities and local government responsible for fire

02:10:18 responsible for fire a copy of this letter is produced at exhibit rjd4 the letter accurately reflects those issues arising from the lack of house fire that the lfb considered to be beyond the control of lfb and therefore warranted

02:10:29 lfb and therefore warranted consideration by the government he goes on to say i received a response from ms upton from the dclg on the 6th of february 2013. and we'll come to that now the letter that he's exhibiting

02:10:42 now the letter that he's exhibiting of 11th of december 2012 is at nfb 3032154

02:10:48 3032154 can we please turn that up

02:10:52 now the date's important as you can see 11th december 2012 this is um very shortly before the opening of the inquests for latino house in

02:11:03 in the next month

02:11:06 and some time after the establishment of the national house board just putting it in its chronological context

02:11:15 context and he says this uh dear minister you'll be aware that the london fire brigade has been carrying out an investigation into the fire that occurred at la canal camberwell on the 3rd of july 2009

02:11:26 camberwell on the 3rd of july 2009 in the course of that investigation a number of issues have come to light that may warrant consideration by your department the issues have been set up below as a number of recommendations appendix 1 which is attached to this

02:11:37 appendix 1 which is attached to this letter provides background information for each recommendation now just pausing there

02:11:45 there do you know who drafted that letter

02:11:49 uh i i don't know no uh i i could speculate that it was tim cuppel because he was still leading the team

02:12:00 right

02:12:03 we know that andy jack contributed to it because he's told us that in one of his statements but you can't help us with the drafting um did you see the letter before it went to

02:12:14 to mr lewis i can't remember you can't remember moving down the page you can see that there's a set of recommendations recommendation one uh reads as follows

02:12:26 recommendation one uh reads as follows that government provide further guidance regarding a which parts and areas of buildings containing multiple domestic premises can be described as parts used in common common parts and b how the

02:12:38 in common common parts and b how the fire safety order is intended to operate in relation to these premises where the responsible person does not necessarily have control over features affecting common parts and or common fire precautions

02:12:49 precautions do you know what aspect of the latino house fire and the lfb's subsequent investigation into the cause of that fire

02:12:55 fire prompted the lfb to identify that as an issue regarding requiring additional guidance in government action

02:13:16 i feel it's uh doors and or door frames but i'm not certain right

02:13:25 you feel it's that is that something from your recollection at the time or is that just from reading preparation to give evidence i think uh i'm reaching back to my recollection and

02:13:36 i'm reaching back to my recollection and and and that's what i think i recall but i'm certainly not certain let's look at recommendation number five at the foot of the page that government provide further guidance in relation to requirement b4 of the building regulation

02:13:48 building regulation regulations particularly with regards to the spread of fire over the external envelope of the building

02:13:55 now there's further background to that recommendation in the in the annex or appendix to the letter we find that lfb3032154

02:14:08 uh now there's quite a lot in this which i should show you but again you may not be able to help and let's see if you can if we look at the text of recommendation five

02:14:20 this is on page six of this document

02:14:26 uh there's the recommendation in bold you can see part b of schedule one of the building regulations set out uh and then it says regulation b4 seeks to control two aspects of building works

02:14:38 to control two aspects of building works with regard to fast where the regulation is complied with this should ensure that fire cannot easily spread from one building to another and the rate of fire spread over the external face of the building is controlled uh the building regulations recognizes

02:14:50 uh the building regulations recognizes that

02:14:51 that if that's a fire spreading over the external envelope of a building is undesirable for two reasons and should be controlled firstly the fire may spread so rapidly that it is a risk to the health and safety of occupants

02:15:02 the health and safety of occupants secondly such a fire particularly in tall buildings has the potential to affect multiple stories simultaneously thus making firefighting more difficult the regulations except that fire spread from one floor to another via the

02:15:13 from one floor to another via the external windows cannot be eliminated but the rate of fire spread should not be at a speed that prevents occupants from the building escaping or makes fire service intervention unusually difficult

02:15:24 service intervention unusually difficult to address this matter approved document b makes recommendations regarding the combustibility of materials that are used on the exterior face of the building the guidance is more onerous for buildings that are over 18 metres in height

02:15:35 height the investigation is highlighted that the intentions of the building regulations with regards to restricting the spread of fire over the external face of the building may not be fully understood we do not think that a proof document b

02:15:46 we do not think that a proof document b is particularly clear on this matter additionally there are a number of recognized publications that provide guidance and commentary on the building regulations namely guide to part b of the building regulations 2006

02:15:59 the building regulations 2006 edition by fire safety engineering consultants limited guide to the building regulations 2011 edition by hugh evans and the building regulations explained and illustrated 12th edition other than repeating the

02:16:10 12th edition other than repeating the recommendations that are contained within approved document b they do not explain or comment on the requirement to restrict the f spread of fire over the external envelope of the building our view that the requirement to

02:16:22 our view that the requirement to restrict the spread of fire over the external envelope of the building is an objective in its own right regardless of the distance from any boundary has been confirmed by department of communities and local government

02:16:33 and local government now um did you uh

02:16:37 uh i've read a lot of that to you um did you have any understanding or or view of what i've just read to you there at the time

02:16:47 time uh yes i'll have sat at my desk and read it more slowly than you've just read it too yes but you would have understood would you at the time that the

02:16:57 that the concerns the issues the problems identified in what i've just read to you were problems or issues faced by the lfb in london

02:17:08 faced by the lfb in london from the built environment that they were problems manifest certainly in this incident i wouldn't i i simply wouldn't have known the extent to which they were wider spread

02:17:20 extent to which they were wider spread than that but do you know whether the lfb had taken any steps or undertaken any work on this issue between receiving the response from brian martin on the 23rd of february

02:17:32 brian martin on the 23rd of february 2011 and the date of this letter in

02:17:37 in december

02:17:39 december 2012. i'm i'm sorry ask me ask me this again well this is december 2012. indeed do you know whether the lfb had undertaken any work or further investigation into the problems that we

02:17:50 investigation into the problems that we now see set out in this letter between the date of brian martin's letter on the 23rd of february 2011 and the date of this letter in december 2012 almost two years

02:18:04 i think you want to talk to gary reason and or peter cowep about this

02:18:14 because i'm not certain that

02:18:19 that this clarification about the building regulations

02:18:29 required a a new or discrete response i am not certain because i'm not a firefighter um that you will not

02:18:41 um that you will not uh i'm not certain that um

02:18:43 um [Music]

02:18:44 [Music] that

02:18:45 that because you don't see it in a linear relationship with this correspondence that the issue was not covered um so

02:18:54 um so it's it's certainly possible that existing policies of the london fire brigade for example uh the high-rise firefighting policy or

02:19:05 uh the high-rise firefighting policy or the dynamic risk the decision making model dynamic risk assessment it's certainly at least possible if not likely that those policies

02:19:16 likely that those policies were intended already to be responsive to these issues about uh

02:19:21 uh the potential for fire spread so this is this is addressing you know a a clearly very important point about understanding of the building regulations

02:19:32 building regulations um

02:19:33 um but

02:19:35 but i'm not sure that that translated into a requirement for a very specific intervention that was uh not already as it were dealt with in existing brigade

02:19:46 it were dealt with in existing brigade policies um so that if if i was to ask a question about that that is the question that i would have put to gary reason and or peter carrap to what extent is this risk already covered off by

02:19:59 risk already covered off by um

02:20:00 um what we already have in place did you ask that question i don't think i did mr millet no why is that um

02:20:07 um it it clearly didn't occur to me to ask that question um but it but you can't take from that that others in london fire brigade had not taken a view on it and

02:20:19 had not taken a view on it and uh but but i didn't right so but i think my question was what had happened between february 11 and december 12 to develop the thinking on this and i don't think you can help well can you

02:20:32 think you can help well can you i can only i can only say i can only repeat that uh uh

02:20:39 uh that i can't speak for peter cowep or gary reason and it and and it is possible that with their specific responsibilities they had given consideration to whether

02:20:50 whether uh

02:20:51 uh a new piece of work as it were or a new intervention was required in order for this to be um more

02:20:58 um more prominent within the operational workforce but this letter was something going to government yes uh i i i would have just assumed as a

02:21:09 i i i would have just assumed as a member of

02:21:10 member of the latino house board and as a senior person within the nfb you would at least would have seen this letter i bet i i think it's likely that i do yeah

02:21:19 yeah and therefore it wouldn't have come to you out of the blue after 22 months of silence so my question is um what happened between february 2011 when the government answered

02:21:32 2011 when the government answered commissioner dobson's questions first time around and december 2012 to develop the thinking

02:21:40 sorry what happened between february between february 2011 23rd of february 2011 when the dclg brian martin responded to commissioner dobson's questions and

02:21:51 to commissioner dobson's questions and the 11th of december 2012 when these recommendations were set out i just i just want to know what happened in that 20-month

02:21:58 20-month or 22-month period can you help so

02:22:04 sorry my recollection is that brian martin was in discussion with the fire safety regulation team rather than with ron dobson in

02:22:12 dobson in 2011 i hope i've not i hope i've not confused that um

02:22:19 um and i can't i can't help you with i personally can't help you with it but i'm but i wouldn't take it for granted that others couldn't no i wasn't asking you indeed otherwise you can't help us you can't help us can you help us with

02:22:30 you can't help us can you help us with this do you know what the lfb was hoping for in making recommendation number five

02:22:37 may i see it again please of course i'm so sorry could we go back to page one foot of page one

02:22:50 further guidance uh they were hoping to achieve further clarity uh we were hoping to achieve further clarity

02:22:58 clarity well click click clearly but but uh

02:23:03 uh was it simply clarity that b4 had two discrete parts or was it further than that

02:23:13 i don't know right um if we go to page two

02:23:18 two we look at recommendation seven and that says uh the government provide guidance for the responsible person as to how they might assess the risk assessor has sufficient training experience and

02:23:29 sufficient training experience and knowledge to carry out a suitable assessment of the risk in complex and high risk premises and again we have further background to that in appendix one at page seven

02:23:42 we can go to page seven there's the recommendation again in bold at the foot of the page note this issue was identified early on in the investigation since then the fire risk assessment competency council has been

02:23:53 assessment competency council has been established although the council is in its infancy it seems likely that it will address the issues raised in recommendation 7th however recommendation 7 has been included for completeness do you know what it was about the

02:24:05 do you know what it was about the lachenal fire or the lfb subsequent investigations that gave rise to this concern and the recommendation

02:24:20 uh do i know

02:24:30 uh i know some things about the topic of uh

02:24:35 uh the fire risk assessments that southwark had undertaken in their stock prior to la canal and the brigade's involvement in that but

02:24:46 in that but i don't know how close that gets to

02:24:51 your question did the nfb have any involvement in the council's work risk assessment competency councils work i don't know right can we go to lfb 303

02:25:02 i don't know right can we go to lfb 303 153

02:25:03 153 32153

02:25:05 32153 um we see here the dclg's reply to commissioner dobson's letter it's dated the 6th of february 2013 uh and it's from uh louise upton of the

02:25:18 uh and it's from uh louise upton of the dclg

02:25:20 dclg uh now

02:25:23 uh now just for your information her letter contained no response to recommendation seven which we've just looked at but she did address recommendation one and that's on the third paragraph of this page

02:25:34 page and she says this in terms of recommendation one and two we've considered previously the extent to which the regulatory reform fire safety order 2005 which gives effect to

02:25:45 safety order 2005 which gives effect to a number of european council directives designed to improve safety in the health safety and health of workers at work was intended to apply to premises or parts of premises other than those which could be viewed as workplaces or places to which the public have access as you know

02:25:57 which the public have access as you know the order specifically does not apply to domestic premises except to the extent mentioned in article 31 10.

02:26:05 10. and then looking ahead to page three if we just do that and come back to page one in a moment um we can see louise upton's response on recommendation five namely the need for further guidance in

02:26:16 namely the need for further guidance in relation to functional requirement b4 and she says uh on recommendation five requirement b4 of the building regulations and its supporting guidance explicitly state that external walls should adequately resist the spread of

02:26:28 should adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and underlined from one building to another further guidance is given in the bre publication bre 135 far performance of external thermal insulation for walls of multi-story

02:26:40 insulation for walls of multi-story buildings which explains the objectives for controlling fire spread on the external envelope of tall buildings in detail

02:26:47 detail now i've shown you a little bit of the letter d do you remember seeing it at the time i think so yes um

02:26:55 do you remember how you yourself reacted to seeing that letter at least so far as i've i've shown it to you did you agree with it or disagree with it i think it felt not very satisfactory in

02:27:07 i think it felt not very satisfactory in what way

02:27:09 what way uh that it wasn't a sufficient response to the concerns raised by the commissioner now given the trail of correspondence we've looked at

02:27:20 looked at am i would i be right in thinking that the lfb did not agree that requirement b4 and supporting guidance explicitly stated using her words that external walls should adequately

02:27:31 that external walls should adequately resist the spread of fire in their own right

02:27:35 right well from the correspondence that you've already shown me sorry i i read the sentence and i was surprised at how emphatic it was which didn't feel

02:27:46 emphatic it was which didn't feel congruent with what we've already looked at yes thank you

02:27:53 um now if we look at the email chain we'll come back to this letter in due course on the subject of the external wall

02:28:01 wall and the rra but if we look at the email chain

02:28:05 chain which surrounds this um can we go to lfb20121100 [Music]

02:28:16 you can see from the bottom half of the page it needs to be blown up it's a bit small but you can see that sue marshall uh who i think is the way he's said to

02:28:27 uh who i think is the way he's said to be the pa to the commissioner um

02:28:30 um sends you an email as well as gary reason and dave brown and steve cherick and and others uh on the 8th of february 2013. dear all the commissioner has asked me to forward

02:28:41 the commissioner has asked me to forward you the attached for your information and

02:28:46 and you then i think reply to a number of senior officers if you go to the top of the email on the 18th of february and you say i wouldn't mind receiving some authoritative advice about what this reply amounts to i've read it but i

02:28:59 this reply amounts to i've read it but i am left unusually short of a view about what it all means for other reasons i thought david atkinson might appreciate the statement of the letter quotes unfortunately legal definitions of common words can often result in more

02:29:11 common words can often result in more problems than they solve and we clg would therefore be reluctant to do this

02:29:18 when you say i wouldn't mind receiving some authoritative advice about what this reply amounts to what did you what did you mean

02:29:28 before you displayed this i uh i said that my recollection was that i didn't find the response from louise upton very satisfactory and this is a longer-winded version that's

02:29:39 this is a longer-winded version that's it okay did anybody give you the authoritative advice that you wanted um i don't i don't remember whether i received emails in response to it no right did you follow up

02:29:51 right did you follow up well the letter was from from memory the letter was subsequently followed up so i think subsequently we put the correspondence between before members

02:30:02 and members took the view that it wasn't very satisfactory and there was a further round of correspondence with dclg i hope i've remembered that correctly but that i think that's what happened i see um did you discuss the letter with

02:30:14 um did you discuss the letter with commissioner dobson i can't remember now this is february 2013. do you know whether any consideration was given to going back to louise up to

02:30:25 was given to going back to louise up to north of brandon lewis to ask for a response that properly engaged with the brigade's concerns

02:30:34 well uh we

02:30:37 we i think it's likely at the luck and all house board there was a discussion about whether at that time to make a response that must have been we must now have been very close to

02:30:49 close to the inquest well it was halfway through the inquiry halfway through um

02:30:58 look you know i don't think it was our position at the time that we thought we were pushing an open door with clg on much of this um so uh concerns about the competency

02:31:09 um so uh concerns about the competency of fire risk assessors i mean

02:31:13 i mean you you've demonstrated today that in the industry as it were the fire industry people have been talking about that since shortly after the introduction of the rro but nothing substantive followed from it

02:31:25 substantive followed from it um it you know we were influenced by our assessment that

02:31:32 that government were

02:31:37 not interested in more layers of regulation or more layers of rules which is not to say that we gave up on it you know

02:31:46 you know you can see a subsequent activity to which my statement refers which demonstrates that we didn't give up give up on it but but but but

02:31:58 but but but um

02:31:59 um [Music]

02:32:01 [Music] you know i i've said i don't remember seeing ron dobson's letter to ken knight in december 2009 but the response to that you know

02:32:12 was less than we probably hoped for and you know this was obviously less than we hoped for um and there were probably other letters on other topics at the

02:32:24 other letters on other topics at the same time between us and dclg where we'll be getting less than we hoped for is that a

02:32:30 is that a long and perhaps delicate way of saying that dealing with government on this issue and trying to get your recommendations sensibly addresses like trying to get blood out of a stone i'll stick with mine not pushing an open

02:32:42 i'll stick with mine not pushing an open door right now um let's turn to a slightly different topic subtopic which is lacking all pre-action uh

02:32:52 uh your own work on fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and we start i think with the email chain at lfb40 sorry three zeros nine six six four seven

02:33:13 now the first email in the chain starts at the bottom of page one uh from uh you on the 14th of january 2013 so we're only a month or so no three

02:33:24 so we're only a month or so no three weeks or so before the letter we've just seen from louise upton

02:33:29 upton uh and about a week or so after the start of the inquest hearings at la canal

02:33:35 canal so just that is the time point uh and it's to david wyatt and clive eustis and it says post lachenal fs is that fire safety yes we're asked to

02:33:46 is that fire safety yes we're asked to quote review of high-rise fires where fire spreads beyond the compartment close quotes apparently no such incidents could be identified would you please just double check ims records for

02:33:57 please just double check ims records for me

02:33:58 me would i be writing thinking that ims stands for information management system yes right

02:34:04 yes right now the request that fire safety review high-rise fires where fire spreads beyond the compartment of origin was as we saw earlier i think um item 20 of the thirty-four latino

02:34:16 item 20 of the thirty-four latino pre-actions as i've called them yes yes i i can't remember if it was twenty but i believe so yes yes yes uh and had been identified by the latino board and we've looked at that before

02:34:27 board and we've looked at that before just just for reference purposes for those who want to go back to it it's lfb3055192

02:34:34 page eight minutes of the 15th of september 2010 meeting

02:34:39 meeting now

02:34:39 now why was that identified as an internal action following the latter house fire we've touched on this before but but clearly you've picked it up now in early 13.

02:34:50 13. do you know why it was identified as an internal action after the fire because uh because the

02:35:01 uh uh because of the knowledge of the fire spread in the building and based on emerging findings as reported by the fire investigation team do you know what

02:35:13 fire investigation team do you know what had prompted you to send this email on the 14th of january 2013. it's the kind of thing i did on the one hand i get you know an action

02:35:24 on the one hand i get you know an action plan which says the answer to this question is is this and sometimes i

02:35:32 i took took it away and uh and probed a bit harder now we know that david wyatt from the email above it was head of information and management and performance that was his role what was clive

02:35:43 that was his role what was clive eustace's role clive worked works for david so they were both uh they were both very involved in the creation and maintenance of

02:35:54 creation and maintenance of information management systems and clive was useful because he was a former operational firefighter i see um

02:36:04 just going back to my previous question you um

02:36:09 you um i asked you why why was this identified or what rather what prompted you to send this email and you say it's the kind of thing i did i mean it's a very specific

02:36:20 thing i did i mean it's a very specific issue spread of fire beyond the compartment of origin can you remember what it was what was happening at the time which prompted you to ask this question

02:36:31 uh

02:36:34 it would in answering you it would be helpful for me to know what was recorded in the action plan as the action taken i have a recollection that

02:36:47 that that steve went as it were international in his reply but i'm i'm not certain you you'll have the action plan with the response in the action plan that steve

02:36:59 response in the action plan that steve offered

02:37:00 offered um

02:37:04 i i must have known at that point because i was responsible for the information management division amongst other reasons that

02:37:14 that uh there was a data field about uh fire fire where fire spreads beyond the compartment and so i would have known that i could ask the information people

02:37:27 that i could ask the information people to extract some data from those data fields yes and just just following on from that was it was there a view within the lfb at that time so early 2013

02:37:39 at that time so early 2013 that this type of fire spread beyond the compartment of origin was a historical problem in london which had not been grasped

02:37:52 i think i said earlier mr miller i think

02:37:57 i think this problem of uh spread beyond the compartment is is complicated so

02:38:05 so it might have spread beyond the compartment because there was a hole in the door

02:38:09 the door or because there was uh because pipes had been uh fitted and the fire stopping around them were

02:38:17 were was inadequate or it might be because um

02:38:21 um a a more fundamental systemic problem with the building as a whole so there was a huge spectrum of reasons why fire spread beyond the compartment and quite often in our records it was about

02:38:34 often in our records it was about um buildings uh which were the subject of works so they were big culprits for fires in which uh fire spread beyond the compartment so

02:38:45 compartment so um

02:38:46 um i think if if if one asks for the data from the team uh tell me something about fire spread beyond the compartment you get five from memory you get five or six different lines of different aspects

02:38:57 six different lines of different aspects of the data and you you'd need to do some work with the data to make sure that if you wanted to take it forward and understand better you were doing so on the basis of an intelligent understanding of what the

02:39:08 an intelligent understanding of what the headline was so

02:39:11 so my question was really a headline question leaving aside the nuances of different kinds of compartments and different kinds of fire spread different kinds of buildings your question is nfl fs were asked to review high-rise

02:39:23 nfl fs were asked to review high-rise fires where fire spreads beyond the compartment and my question is given the way you ask the question was there a view within the lfb at the time that fire spread beyond the compartment of origin

02:39:35 the compartment of origin whatever the cause whatever the nuances was a historical problem which had not been grasped no no that's that's that actually now you've asked that question in the context of this email i can see that what one might think that's what

02:39:46 that what one might think that's what was happening but no it was a more innocent question about you know tell me what you can see from the data yes and that's why i asked you why you asked the question why were you concerned

02:39:58 why were you concerned because i knew the data existed because

02:40:02 because i knew the data was there and i you know i went to the information management division

02:40:08 division daily literally daily and said you know tell me more about this tell me more about that look up the data tell me more it was not it was not an unusual thing for me to do

02:40:19 it was not an unusual thing for me to do quite the reverse what were you after after

02:40:23 after you know you were after data but what did you want to know what did you want to learn from the data uh what did i want to learn from the day i wanted to see some numbers

02:40:34 wanted to see some numbers um so

02:40:36 um so i i'm i'm fur from this

02:40:39 this i mean i haven't haven't shown me the action plan with whatever was recorded as the action taken um

02:40:46 um but um

02:40:49 but um i've already said you know i i was reading all the fire investigation reports by this time and i and i could see there were instances of breach of com compartmentation or spread

02:41:00 breach of com compartmentation or spread beyond the compartment identified in fire investigation reports so it probably struck me that

02:41:08 no such incidents could be identified um was unlikely but it but to give steve terrick he's due it could be that he in one sense he he answered a more intelligent question than the simple one

02:41:20 intelligent question than the simple one you know how many how many fires spread beyond the compartment so i was kind of going back to basics i suppose whereas you know it's possible that steve approached the question in a more

02:41:31 approached the question in a more sophisticated way than that well what did you want to learn from the numbers you were after uh i wanted to get some feel for the extent to which it was a regular

02:41:42 a regular uh phenomenon and and was that prompted by a view within the lfb uh that

02:41:49 uh that fire spread beyond the compartment of origin was not a one-off at lachnal but very likely to be far more common

02:41:58 it it was far more common but for a really wide range of reasons now can we go to lfb 3033943

02:42:09 which is a report entitled review i'll just wait till it comes up there it is it's review of the latino action plan 4th of january 2013. first do you recall seeing that report

02:42:21 first do you recall seeing that report at the time

02:42:24 i don't recall it at the time but i've certainly seen it as part of the disclosure process for today

02:42:31 today i i don't remember back in january 2013. right can you confirm for us and we we've got there from the documents that this report was drafted by group manager david lindbridge who was seconded to

02:42:44 david lindbridge who was seconded to operational assurance and this is in effect a summary of the brigade's work on the 34 latino actions at that point

02:42:55 i believe this was a draft on on the 4th of january i believe it was it was a draft i believe it was sent to me by gary reason who said here's the latest draft we will be discussing it and i followed it up

02:43:08 discussing it and i followed it up uh right was it this report that prompted your follow-up email to clive eustis and david wyatt about fire spread beyond the compartment of origin do you think

02:43:17 think uh

02:43:18 uh the timing is suggestive that that's likely

02:43:22 likely right i mean i can't be certain you can't be saying all right now let's look at page 15 please where we can see a box headed

02:43:31 headed action reference 20. now you'll remember from the annex to the 15th of september 20

02:43:38 20 um 10 um

02:43:40 um 10 um latino board minutes the item 20 was compartment fires or spread of fire beyond the compartment of origin we looked at that before here we have action reference 20 responsible department officer fire

02:43:51 responsible department officer fire safety regulation ac turret and dac lee phil potts entry on action log you can see review of high rise fires where fire spreads beyond the

02:44:02 where fire spreads beyond the compartment expected outcome identify recorded fires which could have produced a learning opportunity prior to third july 2009 review process findings a senior officer

02:44:13 review process findings a senior officer with a health and safety specialism conducted a document search of funds within lfb and other uk frses an experienced fire investigator sent a request to an international fire safety organization with a similar intention

02:44:25 organization with a similar intention both searches identified no such incidents this outcome has been included in the fi report uh now um

02:44:35 uh now um we've seen no documents recording the lfb's research or or the study uh and none appear in the brigade's fire investigation report take take that from from me do you know whether a report uh

02:44:48 from me do you know whether a report uh or review note was drafted as a result of this work no going back to the email we were looking at earlier if we can lfb3096647

02:44:59 which you sent to david wyatt and clive eustis just moving up the email chain um your request as we've seen was to double check the records the ims records

02:45:10 double check the records the ims records you see that at the foot of the page yes

02:45:15 yes yes you laughed does it trigger a recollection

02:45:22 uh no no

02:45:25 no no sorry it confirms i i hope what i was trying to explain which is that you know i did

02:45:35 steve did something um appropriate and intelligent with his team um but it but it didn't fully satisfy me i wanted us to

02:45:43 to dig into our data yes in asking will you please just double check ims records for me was that because you had doubts about the research that had been undertaken oh no by the science safety department no no

02:45:55 by the science safety department no no but if somebody had asked me uh if you went back to action 20 if somebody had asked me to do that i would have done the thing that i did but i probably wouldn't have done the thing that steve did you know steve did

02:46:07 thing that steve did you know steve did a a thing that looked higher level than the thing that i did or was interested in doing he tackled the question in a different way i just wanted a different perspective on it

02:46:18 perspective on it based on

02:46:19 based on um some you know very high level data that we had in our information management systems well when you said in the email apparently no such incidents could be identified was that a reference to what we've seen in action 20 attached

02:46:30 to what we've seen in action 20 attached at page 15 to the i think so yes thank you that's helpful now can we just then go on up the page in the email directly above david wyatt responds to you and he says uh we are able to do this based on

02:46:42 uh we are able to do this based on property type and fire spread in ims and we'll produce some data yeah and in the next email up above that clive eustis writes to you a little bit later the same day

02:46:53 a little bit later the same day in fact seven minutes later who told you there were none straight the criteria could not be identified please seems like a very lazy response to me i asked ian and he will give rihanna the criteria and we'll have any

02:47:04 rihanna the criteria and we'll have any such incidents in a report by the end of today i expect now we've seen no emails between you mr wyatt and mr eustis nor

02:47:15 between you mr wyatt and mr eustis nor the promised report do you know what the outcome of that investigation was

02:47:22 was that investigation of the ims they they will have provided data without a doubt um so i think it would be fair to say i always had a rolls-royce service from the information management team

02:47:34 the information management team they will have sent me some data and

02:47:39 i've seen data more recently as part of this process and i don't

02:47:47 i don't know whether that was a copy of what i had in 2013 or um

02:47:54 um it may be that i asked for data myself more recently in what form do you remember that data came to you it would have been a table so ims generally

02:48:05 would have been a table so ims generally generated tables uh lines of data so it will give me it'll give me an annual figure for a number of years maybe four or five i don't remember

02:48:17 maybe four or five i don't remember and it will have um so it's based on property type um so it'll told me whether it was a dwelling

02:48:26 it would have used the property type categories that were in ims which were always a bit frustrating to my mind but

02:48:36 but so by property type probably gave me data for a five year period and it will have given me the breakdown that was in ims about you know whether it was building in

02:48:48 you know whether it was building in construction for example so there have been four or there are four or five lines of data there's probably a drop down menu um so if if if fire investigation tick um

02:48:59 um breach of compartmentation as part of their investigation when they're filling in the form they'll then get i think a drop down menu saying you know tell me a bit more based on these um based on specified categories and how

02:49:11 um based on specified categories and how would that information have come to you would it come by email i think

02:49:15 i think yeah probably probably so we've not been able to find any any further emails on this subject between you and mr eustace or mr wyatt um

02:49:26 um but

02:49:27 but from the best of your recollection is this right that you got further emails um with that information attached to it that you had asked for yes and do you remember whether it was long after lunchtime on

02:49:39 whether it was long after lunchtime on the 14th of january 2013. did you have to wait a few days for it remember it's not very likely it will have taken them minutes to generate a report from the system so just to help us with what we're looking for in your

02:49:51 us with what we're looking for in your disclosure or the lfps disclosure we're looking for an email on the 14th or around the 14th of january 2013 which has an attachment from the ims which came to you yes right

02:50:02 which came to you yes right now

02:50:07 do you know whether uh as well as interrogating the ims system as you'd asked inquiries were made by the investigation team of any other fire

02:50:18 the investigation team of any other fire and rescue services as to their own experience of fire spread beyond the compartment of origin

02:50:25 uh mr miller

02:50:28 you showed us what they said and i and i simply can't remember whether that included that well we can go back to 20 let's do that

02:50:39 well we can go back to 20 let's do that uh so i only know what i only know what they did based upon what was contained in that draft action plan i don't know anything beyond or outside that

02:50:50 beyond or outside that right

02:50:51 right now um

02:50:52 now um there were a number of fires in the uk before lachnal which had involved far spread

02:50:58 spread uh external fire spread and i just want to ask you about a few of those first

02:51:03 first were you aware during your uh time as deputy commissioner of the fire at garner court in irvine in scotland in june 1999. i was aware of it

02:51:15 scotland in june 1999. i was aware of it yes were you aware of the fire at nosley heights in liverpool in april 1991 i'd certainly heard of it yes yes and what about the fire at harrow court in stevenage in february 2005. yes i'd

02:51:26 stevenage in february 2005. yes i'd heard of that

02:51:29 and do you agree that the information about those particular fires should have been identified as learning points for the lfb either at the time they happened but in any event after the latino house

02:51:42 but in any event after the latino house fire in july 2009 i'd like to think so yes yes can you explain why they were not i don't i don't know that they were not

02:51:53 i don't i don't know that they were not um so i don't know whether

02:51:57 whether peter camp in operational procedures we'll have looked at uh

02:52:03 uh uh i've forgotten which the third one was mr millet but steve arrow court um uh

02:52:11 um uh i don't know that peter cowart will not have reviewed

02:52:17 information about harrow court and incorporated it into what he was doing i feel certain that gary reason will know i'm clear that i recall gary reason talking about

02:52:29 gary reason talking about harrow court you answered the question you don't know that they were not and it is a fair point that my question implied that they were not let me ask it differently from your

02:52:40 differently from your experience on the lack of house board so before the inquests in early 2013. do you remember any discussion uh or investigation

02:52:51 uh or investigation of those fires which might inform how the lfb might respond uh to the latino house fire no now do you remember that

02:53:02 now do you remember that before latino there were also international high-rise fires involving fire spread beyond the compartment of origin

02:53:09 origin no you don't so you can i take it therefore that you were not aware of the torrey windsor fire in madrid february 2005.

02:53:16 2005. uh

02:53:18 uh i wouldn't have remembered it but i've seen in disclosure documents which just did in 2005 i was aware of it yes but i'm asking for what you knew during your time

02:53:27 time as deputy commissioner no right what about the water club tower fire in atlantic city jersey in the usa in september 2007 no no television cultural

02:53:39 september 2007 no no television cultural center fire in beijing february 2009 no all before my time still as deputy commissioner again can we take it that so far as your recollection is

02:53:51 that so far as your recollection is concerned there was no discussion of those fires and any learning points to be derived from them when addressing the problems that have been that had arisen at national house you can right

02:54:03 at national house you can right do you remember whether the fire safety department or the odcb for that matter ever considered conducting research into international fires or to seek to learn from

02:54:14 fires or to seek to learn from overseas incidents uh no we didn't um in 2014

02:54:21 in 2014 when danny cotton became assistant commissioner operational assurance

02:54:27 assurance i

02:54:28 i i asked her to do a piece of work to consider whether we were

02:54:35 we were having regard to the best available range of information or whether there were more more things that we could be taking into account and learning from but that work hadn't come to fruition by the time i

02:54:47 hadn't come to fruition by the time i left

02:54:48 left did you ask her specifically to consider the history of domestic clouding fires in the uk and overseas why is that

02:55:01 to be fair to her i gave her a very uh uh

02:55:06 uh outline brief in one sense i was i was wanting her to come to me with some proposals so you know i didn't start out knowing what i wanted i wanted somebody to

02:55:17 i wanted i wanted somebody to provide me with some advice about you know things i i might not have thought of or didn't know right um let's then look at uh the latino rule 43 letter

02:55:27 43 letter and move this on in time um the lack of housing quest hearings as i say took place between january and march 2013

02:55:38 2013 um

02:55:39 um and as we now know were ongoing at the time of your discussions on pre-action number 20 and the correspondence with louise upton at the dclg

02:55:51 at the dclg the inquest hearings finished in march 2013 and at the conclusion on the 28th of march 2013 the coroner sent what are known as rule 43 letters which contained recommendations

02:56:03 letters which contained recommendations uh that the coroner considered would eliminate or reduce the risk of deaths and those were sent to a number of organizations including the lfb and the dclg and i've given you a little potted history um is there anything i've just

02:56:14 history um is there anything i've just said with which you disagree yeah right now the coroner's letter to the brigade we find at lfb through uh three zeroes three two one five eight

02:56:30 and if you go to the first page you can see that it's dated the 28th of march 2013 sent to the commissioner dear mr dobson lachlan house fire third of july 2009

02:56:42 of july 2009 and as a reference to the narrative verdicts on the first page and if you go to page two halfway down you can see i'm sorry mr miller can you just remind me of the date of the letter 28th of march 2013. i didn't get there

02:56:54 28th of march 2013. i didn't get there quickly enough okay and if you um look halfway down page two you can see where she makes the recommendations she says i make the following

02:57:05 she says i make the following recommendations that's after the long list of bullet points uh which i it's not on your screen the first one is public awareness of fire safety you see that yes

02:57:13 that yes uh

02:57:14 uh and then if we um look down and scroll down you can see the second one is visits made pursuant to section 72d

02:57:22 72d general familiarization visits home for our safety visits and then incident commanders you see in italics under that yes yes and then if we move over the page

02:57:33 page uh brigade control yes and then communications yes yes yes so those are the topics uh and the recommendation relating to

02:57:44 uh and the recommendation relating to incident command training starts at the top of page three and if we go to the top of page three she says this it is also recommended that

02:57:55 it is also recommended that consideration be given to training of ics and potential ics to enhance their performance in relation to the following and then there are seven uh bullet points set out

02:58:06 points set out and they're important so i'll read them out to you the first is use of the dynamic risk management model and other management tools to enable ics to analyze the situation and to recognize and react quickly to changing

02:58:17 and react quickly to changing circumstances second bullet to recognize when to escalate attendance by more experienced ics

02:58:24 ics third bullet to anticipate that a fire might behave in a manner inconsistent with the compartmentation principle fourth bullet to be aware of the risks to those above and adjacent to the fire flat

02:58:37 and adjacent to the fire flat fifth bullet handover from one i see to the next a defective deployment of outgoing ics sixth bullet the collection of information from all possible sources

02:58:48 possible sources seventh and final bullet use of methodical search patterns now um let's before we move on with this document go to ron dobson's witness statement

02:59:01 to ron dobson's witness statement at lfb 3032157

02:59:05 and there are one or two things in there i want to show you before asking you some questions at page six please paragraph 22 under the

02:59:15 under the heading rule 43 recommendations he says this

02:59:19 this on 20th of june 2013 uh at a meeting of the el fipa i presented a report coroner's inquest following the fire at national house on third july 2009 a copy of the relevant

02:59:30 third july 2009 a copy of the relevant excerpt of the meeting minutes are produced as exhibit rjd8 a copy of the report is produced at rjd9 as set out within the report it was proposed that implementation of the

02:59:41 proposed that implementation of the proposed actions in response to the rule 43 recommendations was to be monitored by the odcb

02:59:48 and and then he goes on in the next paragraph 23 if we can turn the page please to say this as can be seen from the minutes of the meeting in addition it was agreed that a task group would be established consisting of

03:00:00 group would be established consisting of three elected members of el phipa one drawn from each political group to undertake a review of the lfb's response to the fire at national house and to provide their recommendations into the strategy committee

03:00:12 strategy committee now um take it from me that this task group is not mentioned in the report that was presented to the old fifa but do you know whether it was instigated by the el fifa members it was

03:00:24 instigated by the el fifa members it was it was

03:00:26 it was do you know why it was deemed necessary for the el fipa members to undertake a review of the lfb's response to the latino house fire uh because they took such a serious view

03:00:37 uh because they took such a serious view of the fire and what had occurred right

03:00:41 right and was it intended that the new latin house working group would provide political oversight scrutiny and accountability of the lfb's responses to the to the lack of housing

03:00:54 responses to the to the lack of housing quest coroner's rule 43 recommendations yes yes

03:00:59 yes yes why did the strategy committee have oversight of the lfb's rule 43 actions

03:01:05 actions in in addition to the battle house working group and the odcb

03:01:13 uh

03:01:17 because the strategy committee was a committee of the authority and the lack and all house working group was not so it was in although it was mem although it was a

03:01:28 although it was mem although it was a member body attended by officers it wasn't part of the formal structure of elfipa

03:01:35 of elfipa and so

03:01:38 and so i think the members who proposed the working group just wanted to make sure that the work was

03:01:49 the work was integrated into the

03:01:52 the formal political management structures of

03:01:55 of the authority and in one sense the odcb was completely separate to that that was the officer mechanism

03:02:10 right so just help me with this um

03:02:18 there was the latin house working group there was the strategy committee yes yes

03:02:26 and

03:02:29 there was the odcb yes yes was there another like an house board or at that finish by then no well that that um was discontinued there may have been an element of overlap in timing terms but

03:02:40 element of overlap in timing terms but it was discontinued and the work of the board as it were segued into the nh um wg um

03:02:48 um my question was is was there a duplication of work as between the national house working group and the strategy committee

03:02:59 as an officer i'd say there was yes and you know and it it was it was difficult and a bit frustrating at the time but sometimes these things happen in local authorities i'm sorry i probably i

03:03:10 authorities i'm sorry i probably i probably ought to have added one more thing to

03:03:13 thing to i think you asked me you know why did they create the lack of normal house working group or you asked me a question that was as it were on that topic um so one of the three members was valerie shawcross who i think was the leader of

03:03:24 shawcross who i think was the leader of the authority at that time she also had a constituency interest so her

03:03:32 so her seat as a member of the london assembly included southwark and she in particular felt very passionately about what had happened at la canal house and she herself wanted to

03:03:44 la canal house and she herself wanted to be involved in a substantial piece of work

03:03:48 work to oversee um

03:03:50 um the brigade's response so she she had a very significant personal political motivation for wanting to as a as it as it was chair

03:04:01 wanting to as a as it as it was chair the lack of house working group right um i just want to understand the structure a little bit better um the lack of house working group comprised is this right three elected members of el fifa yes yes

03:04:14 members of el fifa yes yes the strategy committee also comprised or contained elected members yes yes uh the odcb was a purely lfb entity officer thing yeah yes

03:04:26 entity officer thing yeah yes um but

03:04:27 um but is it right that both the strategy sorry both the latino house working group and the odcb fed into the strategy committee

03:04:37 committee or did the odc be not feed into the strategy committee uh

03:04:43 no the odcb didn't feed into the strategy committee but you're right to identify there was some awkwardness in terms of the joins between the lucknow house working group and the strategy

03:04:54 house working group and the strategy committee

03:04:55 committee but

03:04:57 but for officers it amounted to an element of duplication and i i don't it wasn't my view then or now that it exposed or left the potential for any gaps

03:05:09 potential for any gaps um

03:05:10 um right yeah what did the strategy committee do that the um national house working group did not uh

03:05:22 it it took over some of the longer term themes that um [Music]

03:05:31 sorry when the lucknow house working group ceased to meet it took over some of the longer term themes

03:05:37 themes so from memory there was an exchange of correspondence between valerie shaw cross as chair of the lucknow house working group and

03:05:47 and sarah

03:05:49 sarah the then chair of the strategy committee they had an exchange of correspondence where valerie shaw cross said the lucknow house working group has done this this this and this

03:06:00 this this this and this but there's still more work to be done and that ought to be taken forward by the strategy committee right can we just look at your witness statement please your first witness david paragraph 22 page seven

03:06:15 um and you say in that paragraph under the heading latin house working group

03:06:23 group uh that it was established by the authority at his meeting on the 20th of june 2013 as the commissioner has said and you say this this is an unusual action for members to initiate and they mark the importance they attach to the

03:06:34 mark the importance they attach to the events at and after the latin house fire the working group met on six occasions its membership comprised three elected members of the authority one from each of the main political groups and the meeting was chaired by one of the

03:06:45 meeting was chaired by one of the members

03:06:46 members officers would attempt to provide advice to the working group principally through presentations and reports and then you go on to explain who that was and then on to the terms of

03:06:57 who that was and then on to the terms of reference

03:06:59 reference um but it wouldn't be right that the the three elected members of the authority would actually have no um firefighting or operational or training experience of their own

03:07:11 training experience of their own they were just politicians i don't say just options but they were not they were not fire

03:07:18 not fire uh well uh valerie shaw cross became chair of the authority in

03:07:27 [Music] 2000 when the authority was created so she you know she accumulated

03:07:36 a lot of political management experience of

03:07:39 of the work of the brigade and i think the same is true about maurice easter and they were both uh peter truesdale hadn't been on the authority very long but the three of them were highly

03:07:50 highly competent and well established local authority members you know they they each had 20 30 years of experience of being counselors um and so

03:08:02 um and so you know they had a very well developed understanding of the political management responsibilities [Music]

03:08:10 [Music] of members in relation to the work of their local authority in this case right the london fire brigade but would it be right to say that each of them individually and

03:08:22 say that each of them individually and as a group were entirely dependent upon the advice and presentations and reports given to them by those within the lfb

03:08:40 uh

03:08:46 no i don't think it would be right to say that

03:08:48 say that valerie shaw cross in particular was never entirely dependent on on officers you know she was a clever fierce woman who you know had lots of ability and maurice histor had

03:09:00 lots of ability and maurice histor had years and years of experience as a senior once worth counsellor i think peter truesdell did in his authority too so um

03:09:09 um you know they were they were a ferocious group to work for no i wouldn't say they were entirely dependent upon what we serve them ferocious and experienced is one thing yes what i'm really asking for is that when it comes to

03:09:22 is that when it comes to when it came to formulating the recommend the responses to the recommendations the rule 43 recommendations when it came to formulating them and

03:09:33 when it came to formulating them and identifying what in practice could and should happen they were entirely dependent upon what they were told by the lfb and for example what training was happening in response what was being

03:09:45 happening in response what was being developed they wouldn't know that themselves they'd have to be told that indeed but that's how that's how it works indeed um now let's look at the first

03:09:57 now let's look at the first minute the first meeting sorry the minutes of the first meeting of the latin house working group 24th of july 2013 at lfb 3050526

03:10:10 now uh you can see the date you can see the notes you can see the time

03:10:16 time you can see the members um maurice heaster valerie shawcross and peter truesdale the names you've just given us

03:10:24 given us uh and the officers who were present ron dobson gary reason steve churyck tim cut bill

03:10:30 bill and some others uh you're not there um

03:10:36 um do you know why you weren't there i i don't mr millet no um was steve turek effectively deputizing for you uh

03:10:46 uh no

03:10:47 no no i didn't i didn't have a as it were system of deputies so he was there because fire safety regulation was so central to lucknow house right uh now the working groups terms of reference are set out under item two as

03:11:00 reference are set out under item two as you can see or you can't quite see can we please scroll down and we'll have them in full terms of reference noted as agreed by the authority at its meeting on 20th of june to undertake a review of the brigade's response to the fire at

03:11:11 the brigade's response to the fire at national house and to feed recommendations back to the strategy committee so the strategy committee had already been set up by this time presumably yes that's the standing committee yes that's the standing committee

03:11:21 committee right and

03:11:23 right and under item 4 we can see a list of possible items for the work programme you can see their

03:11:31 their first bullet point ongoing updates on rule 43 action plan also to be reported regularly to the strategy committee victim support fire safety regulatory reform order is one of the bullets

03:11:43 reform order is one of the bullets incident command capture and use of premises based information fire safety info for residents in high-rise blocks

03:11:53 do you know why the working group was interested in undertaking work on the rro third bullet point down do you know why that was part of the work programme uh

03:12:18 uh

03:12:21 because by this time

03:12:28 we had begun to form a view that for some of the reasons that we've already discussed and some that we haven't yet discussed or may never discuss

03:12:39 discussed or may never discuss that the rro [Music]

03:12:43 [Music] had deficiencies um

03:12:47 um i want to say some of those were important in the context of vladimir but i'm anxious that then you'll ask me which ones and i won't immediately bring them to mind but we thought the rro was problematic and we wanted to explore that further

03:12:59 and we wanted to explore that further with members right was that linked specifically to the recommendations i asked because it's not apparent from the letter that it was uh the recommendations from the coroner yes um

03:13:15 no i think you're you're you're right to make you're right to make that point i think that that's correct so so the latino house working group was actually

03:13:24 actually looking at slightly wider connected i oh yes

03:13:27 yes slightly wider issues than simply the rule 43 response and its quality yes yes so the rule 43 response for example didn't deal with victim support but valerie shawcross was really

03:13:38 but valerie shawcross was really interested to deal with victim support indeed do you know who put fire safety regulatory reform order on the list

03:13:45 the list uh

03:13:49 we certainly agreed between the officers you know it'll be somewhere between steve turek and and die in all probability right and i know you went at the meeting but was the list of bullet points for the work program that we've

03:14:00 points for the work program that we've just looked at something that you discussed before the meeting even though you went to the meeting oh we the officers certainly did yes right

03:14:08 we will have prepared the report which proposed a work program right

03:14:13 right now uh

03:14:15 now uh mr chairman uh uncharacteristically um this might be a moment to take the break i'm going to turn to a different document which i will certainly not finish by one o'clock and it's right

03:14:27 finish by one o'clock and it's right now rather than in the middle of a line of questions exactly thank you all right well we'll take a break at this stage uh mr dexter um we'll resume please at two o'clock and again please don't speak

03:14:39 two o'clock and again please don't speak to anyone about your evidence or anything relating to it when you're out of the world all right thank you very much

03:14:57 thank you very much two o'clock please

03:15:08 you