Evidence session examining the London Fire Brigade's response to the Grenfell Tower fire, including operational decisions, command structure, and lessons learned.
# Transcribed with OpenAI Whisper (medium model)
# Source: Local audio transcription (no YouTube captions available)
00:00:30 I forgot to bring my notebook and pen, so could you get my room, please?
00:00:37 Yes, before the witness comes in.
00:00:40 And I must wear it in person.
00:00:43 Yes, Mr. Keir.
00:00:47 Thanks, sir. May I call Ron Dobson?
00:00:49 Yes. Good afternoon, Mr. Dobson.
00:00:51 I gather you're going to make the affirmation.
00:00:54 Right, well then, the words are on the screen. Would you read them out, please?
00:00:58 I do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
00:01:06 Thank you very much indeed. Now do sit down, make yourself comfortable.
00:01:12 Mr. Keir, I've come in without my notebook, but the usher's going to sort that out for me, so I suggest you just carry on.
00:01:17 Thanks, sir.
00:01:18 Would you please confirm your name for the record?
00:01:20 Ronald James Dobson.
00:01:22 Mr. Dobson, good afternoon. Thank you very much for coming to attend to give evidence today.
00:01:27 Before we start, there's three bits of advice I really should give at the outset.
00:01:31 My questions are intended to be short and clear. Sometimes it doesn't quite work out that way.
00:01:37 If I am unduly long or unclear or both, please say so and I'll rephrase the question.
00:01:43 Secondly, we will have break roughly halfway through the course of this afternoon's session.
00:01:50 If however you need a break at any other time, please don't hesitate to say so.
00:01:54 Finally, there's a temptation in answer to questions yes or no to nod alone.
00:02:02 Could you please say yes or no as the case may be, otherwise the transcriber will not be able to pick up your answer accurately.
00:02:08 Yes.
00:02:09 Now, am I right that you provided three witness statements to this inquiry?
00:02:14 That's correct.
00:02:15 The first is dated the 28th of January 2019, which can be found at LFB 0032157. Is that it?
00:02:25 It is.
00:02:26 The second is dated the 18th of April 2019, and that can be found at LFB 0055138. Is that it?
00:02:37 It is.
00:02:38 And finally, the third statement was dated the 30th of April 2020, and can be found at LFB 00110652. Is that your third statement?
00:02:50 It is.
00:02:51 Thank you. Have you read each of those statements recently?
00:02:53 I have.
00:02:54 Now, I understand that you'd like to make one correction to your first statement, I think it is.
00:02:59 Yes, there you go.
00:03:00 And it's paragraph 42 of your first witness statement, which is at LFB 0032157 forward slash 11.
00:03:12 And we see there the start of that paragraph refers to action 13. It should refer to action 14. Is that right?
00:03:22 That's correct.
00:03:23 Thank you. Subject to that correction, can you confirm that the contents of each of your three statements are true?
00:03:30 Yes, thank you.
00:03:31 Thank you. Are you happy for those statements to be taken as your evidence to this inquiry?
00:03:35 I am.
00:03:36 And each of those three statements has exhibited a significant number of documents. Have you read those documents in advance of today?
00:03:44 I have.
00:03:45 And have you discussed your evidence with anyone before coming today?
00:03:48 Only my legal representatives.
00:03:50 Thank you.
00:03:53 Now, Mr. Dobson, I'd like to start with your roles and responsibilities at the London Fire Brigade.
00:03:58 Now, just to give you an idea of the structure of the questions I'm going to ask you, I'm going to ask you initially some questions about the LFB and its structure,
00:04:09 including some about the temporary bodies that were established in the aftermath of the Lacknell House fire in July 2009.
00:04:17 I'll then ask you questions about fire safety activities within the LFB.
00:04:22 And before coming on to ask you questions about the actions taken by the LFB in response to recommendations and other actions following Lacknell.
00:04:32 Now, before we get to all of that, can I start with questions about your career?
00:04:38 Am I right in understanding that you joined the LFB in 1979?
00:04:42 That's correct.
00:04:43 And over the next 30 years or so, you advanced through the ranks so that you went from being an operational firefighter to being a senior officer.
00:04:52 Is that right?
00:04:53 That's correct.
00:04:54 If we could go to your first witness statement, which is LFB 0032157 forward slash two.
00:05:04 And if we look at paragraph five in the penultimate line, you explained that in 2000, you were promoted to the position of assistant chief officer,
00:05:13 in which role you were, quotes, responsible for LFB wide operational planning and policy.
00:05:20 Is that assistant chief officer role similar to the assistant commissioner role?
00:05:25 Yes, it is.
00:05:26 The name assistant chief officer was changed to assistant commissioner following a reorganisation in the early 2000s.
00:05:34 Now, in which directorate or department did you sit as the assistant chief officer?
00:05:39 I worked for the deputy commissioner and that was in the operations department.
00:05:42 Thank you.
00:05:43 Now, in 2003, you became the assistant commissioner for service delivery. Is that right?
00:05:48 That's correct.
00:05:49 And as the AC for service delivery, were you also the third officer?
00:05:54 After a while, I was, yes.
00:05:56 And was that position created for the first time for you or was it a historic role?
00:06:01 No, it's a role that had existed historically, but hadn't been used by the brigade for a number of years.
00:06:07 And it was reintroduced for me in order to provide operational cover.
00:06:11 And in relation to your role as AC for service delivery, did you report to the deputy commissioner?
00:06:16 I did.
00:06:18 Can you help us in brief? What were your responsibilities as the AC for service delivery?
00:06:24 I was responsible for the operational and fire safety performance of all fire stations in the London Fire Brigade.
00:06:32 That covers their attendance at incidents and all the community safety work they did in terms of preventing fires in people's homes.
00:06:40 I was also responsible for the London Fire Brigade's National Resilience Project,
00:06:45 which was the response to the terrorist attacks that took place in New York in 2001.
00:06:51 I was responsible for the London Fire Brigade's performance in that area too.
00:06:54 Thank you. You were appointed the commissioner of the London Fire Brigade in October 2007, is that right?
00:07:00 That's correct.
00:07:01 And you held that position until your retirement in December 2016?
00:07:05 Yes, that's correct.
00:07:06 So before 2015, is it right that the officers who directly reported to you were the deputy commissioner, Reece Dexter?
00:07:14 Yes.
00:07:15 The director of operational resilience and training, Gary Reason?
00:07:19 Yes.
00:07:20 And Sue Budden, who was the director of finance and contractual services?
00:07:24 Yes.
00:07:25 We understand that there was a restructuring of the organisation in 2015, is that right?
00:07:31 That's correct.
00:07:32 What was the reasoning for that restructure?
00:07:35 It was a restructure to reflect the changing responsibilities of the brigade.
00:07:40 These things would take place from time to time depending on how the organisation progressed,
00:07:44 what the duties and responsibilities were,
00:07:46 and in conjunction with the elected members of the fire authority, it was agreed that we would review the structure.
00:07:51 Thank you.
00:07:52 As part of that restructure, am I right in understanding that the post of deputy commissioner no longer existed?
00:07:58 That's correct.
00:07:59 Why was it discontinued?
00:08:02 Because experience has found that the role of deputy commissioner was not really needed
00:08:07 because actually most of the things that deputy commissioner deputised for me on were carried out by the directors.
00:08:13 So it wasn't always the deputy commissioner who directly deputised for me.
00:08:16 We would use the directors in their areas of responsibility to deputise,
00:08:19 and therefore the actual role of deputy commissioner was no longer needed.
00:08:23 Now following that restructure, you explained that some of the posts that had historically reported to Reeta Dexter
00:08:30 as deputy commissioner then reported to you, is that right?
00:08:33 That's correct.
00:08:34 And one of those directors who now reported to you directly was the director of operations, namely Dave Brown, is that right?
00:08:40 That's correct.
00:08:41 Thank you.
00:08:42 Now the next topic I'd like to come on to is the oversight that you exercise as commissioner
00:08:47 of the various bodies and committees that existed within the LFB.
00:08:51 Okay.
00:08:53 Now, as a general starting question, what organisational arrangements were in place to allow the three directors to report to you as commissioner?
00:09:03 The most formal arrangement was through the corporate management board,
00:09:06 a body that comprised the three directors and other heads of service as well,
00:09:12 so we could have a forum whereby we could discuss operational and managerial and strategic issues relating to London Fire Brigade.
00:09:20 We had a process called the commissioners group, which was introduced after a review of the way we communicated as an organisation internally some years before.
00:09:29 This was an informal arrangement we met once a week.
00:09:32 And the idea of this was to enable the directors to speak to me directly and without all the other heads of service there,
00:09:38 where we would just discuss concerns and worries and any other issues that we might have coming along.
00:09:43 And also I held a regular series of one to one meetings with the directors.
00:09:47 Thank you.
00:09:48 Now, if we can stay with your first witness statement and if we could go to paragraph 15 on page five,
00:09:55 and it's really to follow on what you've just said about one to ones.
00:09:59 Now, in the third line down, you refer to having, and I quote, regular one to one meetings with the directors in the context of the Lacknell House Board and the Brigade's consequential action plan.
00:10:11 Now, putting Lacknell to one side for the moment, did you have regular one to one meetings with your directors?
00:10:17 It seems if you did.
00:10:18 Yes, I did.
00:10:19 How often would those one to ones be held?
00:10:23 They vary.
00:10:24 But certainly I would see, I'd expect to see each of the directors on an almost daily basis.
00:10:29 But the formal one to ones would take place once a month.
00:10:32 And those formal monthly one to ones, can you give the panel a flavour of the range of issues that would fall to be discussed?
00:10:40 Yes, we would talk about, I would feed back to them on issues arising from my discussions with elected members and the Mayor upon issues relating to their directorates.
00:10:49 We would talk about their performance plans, their actions within the plan overall in terms of London's safety plan.
00:10:57 We'd talk about staffing matters.
00:10:59 We'd talk about any issues that were of concern to them.
00:11:02 And we'd particularly talk about issues that were due to go to the fire authority that they were producing reports and papers on.
00:11:09 And we'd talk about the progress and the content of those.
00:11:12 And those would be supplemented by daily informal discussions with your directors?
00:11:17 Yes.
00:11:18 Now you referred to in an earlier answer the commissioners' groups and other witnesses have referred to the commissioners' group meetings.
00:11:25 And as you said, they involved you and the three directors and the third officer, Dave Brown, is that right?
00:11:31 That's correct.
00:11:32 Were those meetings minuted or not?
00:11:35 No, they weren't.
00:11:36 Can you help us as to why they were not minuted?
00:11:38 Yes, they were designed to be informal meetings to improve the communications between the commissioner and directors.
00:11:45 Now this predated my appointment.
00:11:47 It was following a review of communications between the top management team that was carried out under the previous commissioner, Sir Ken Knight.
00:11:53 And one of the recommendations was, or one of the findings was, that the directors and the commissioner didn't have sufficient opportunity outside of formal meetings to actually discuss issues within the authority.
00:12:04 In your experience as commissioner, did you find them useful as an efficient and effective means of allowing directors to update you and for you to communicate your views to them?
00:12:13 Yes, I found them very efficient.
00:12:16 You referred in an earlier answer to the corporate management board, the CMB, and you would have gathered from watching proceedings that there have been a number of discussions about what was considered by the CMB.
00:12:30 Am I right in understanding that that board was attended by a broader pool of senior officers and wasn't confined to yourself and your three directors?
00:12:41 That's correct.
00:12:42 Would the membership of that board develop over time and reflect the demands of particular issues that the CMB was concerned with?
00:12:50 Yes, it did.
00:12:51 Yes, it did. We had a range of standing advisors to the board who would reflect the nature of their role, but we'd also invite other members of the heads of service and the group below those as well to talk to about specific issues or specific papers that we were considering.
00:13:06 And did you find that a useful mechanism to allow those who are close as the coal face to raise specific matters with you and the board more generally?
00:13:17 I found it invaluable.
00:13:19 Now, it appears from the minutes that the CMB reviewed various reports, important documents that would be in course submitted to the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, ELFEPA. Is that right?
00:13:32 That's correct.
00:13:33 Now, the impression from the documents, and I use those words advisedly, is that a lot of CMB's work was cyclical. Is that a fair or complete impression to take?
00:13:44 Not complete, but I would say fair.
00:13:49 In the sense of incomplete, were there ad hoc matters that would fall to be considered, but on the whole, the business was tended to be cyclical?
00:13:58 Yes, the CMB would consider matters that were going to be taken by elected members at their various committees of ELFEPA. So there was the main ELFEPA committee and there were subsidiary committees that worked for ELFEPA as well.
00:14:11 And all of those would have a programme of meetings and a requirement for papers to be updated and sent to them within their areas of responsibility.
00:14:18 CMB would be programmed in order to take those in good time for those documents to be presented properly to the authority.
00:14:26 Now, was the commissioners group the day-to-day effective means by which you exercised oversight over the activities of your three directors and their directorates?
00:14:37 Not really, no. The commissioners group was really about sharing information between the three directors and I. We would discuss issues in particular with the directorates on occasion, but it was really an information sharing process between the three directors and myself so we could talk about the day-to-day ongoing activity of the brigade.
00:14:56 So what was the forum in which you exercised day-to-day management of your directors?
00:15:02 Well, it was that. It was the corporate management board and through the individual ongoing meetings, I had them on an almost daily basis.
00:15:10 Now, the LFB had an almost military-like use of acronyms and one of the acronyms we've become familiar with is ODCB.
00:15:20 Now, that stands for the Operational Directorate's Coordination Board, whose membership consisted of directors and heads of service from the, it seems to be from the two operations-focused departments. Is that right?
00:15:33 It is.
00:15:34 Now, again, ODCB appeared to be primarily concerned with the LFB's operational performance. Again, is that a fair view to take?
00:15:43 Yes.
00:15:44 Am I right in understanding that you yourself were not a member of ODCB?
00:15:49 That's correct.
00:15:50 Why were you not a member of ODCB?
00:15:53 ODCB was established after a restructure around, I think it was around 2010. Well, we established, we had three directorates, two of which were operational, one of which was mainly administrative, director of finance and contractual services.
00:16:06 And we soon recognised there was a need for the operational directors to coordinate their work much more closely than perhaps they had been doing in order to actually reduce or to coordinate the burden on fire stations, the training, etc.
00:16:18 they needed to do. So that board was brought in to enable that function to take place.
00:16:23 It was dealing with issues of delivery rather than policy, and therefore it was a vampire that could be devolved to the Deputy Commissioner.
00:16:30 Thank you.
00:16:31 We've considered some boards and committees. Were there any other committees and boards you were a member of internal to the LFB?
00:16:39 I chaired, after the retirement of one of our officers, I chaired the contracts oversight board. I was concerned that the, I had concerns about the way we were managing our ongoing external contracts generally, where there was quite a lot of them.
00:16:57 And I was worried that we were extending too many contracts without actually retendering at the point where we should have done. So I took control of that personally.
00:17:04 Can you remember when you did that?
00:17:06 I think that was, I really can't remember exact date, but I think it was around 2012.
00:17:19 Would that have been around the same time, just kind of pinpointed, that responsibility for provision of training was outsourced to Babcock?
00:17:27 It would have been, although it wouldn't have been related to that.
00:17:30 Thank you. Now, if we could go to an exhibit that you helpfully provided, which is RJD1, which can be found at LFB, trouble 0, 32151.
00:17:47 Now we find here a role profile or job description, I think, for the role of the London Fire Commissioner.
00:17:55 And under the structural organogram, we see a second box there entitled Main Purpose of the Job.
00:18:02 That is described in the following way to provide strong, effective corporate leadership and strategic direction for the London Fire Brigade to ensure the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority achieves its vision,
00:18:15 aims and objectives. There's an element of management speak about these definitions in an escapeable reality, I think.
00:18:25 But in straightforward plain English, what was the essence of your job as Commissioner?
00:18:32 I was responsible for all aspects of the performance of London Fire Brigade, and I was responsible to the London Fire and Emergency Planning Committee and the Mayor for the performance of those duties.
00:18:43 I was also responsible as the main advisor to London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority in terms of the fulfilment of its statutory functions,
00:18:51 and also responsible as a chief advisor to the Mayor in terms of fire and rescue service in London.
00:18:57 Now, are you able to give the panel an idea of how involved you were on a day-to-day practical basis with the operations and activities of your directorates?
00:19:08 I would say very involved. I had a keen interest in the work of each of the directorates.
00:19:14 I was very keen that the work of the directorates was coordinated properly.
00:19:18 We had some very onerous responsibilities and a very high workload as well throughout most of the time that I was a Commissioner.
00:19:26 And I was really keen to understand what was going on, to understand the pressure in the directorates in order to be able to provide them with whatever support, help, assistance and resources that I could.
00:19:36 Putting the question slightly differently, how did you ensure that your directorates were working in accordance with and towards the aims that you had set for them?
00:19:48 That was carried out through the one-to-one meetings with the directors, informally through the Commissioner's group as well.
00:19:55 We'd have informal discussions where there were points of conflict or points of disagreement or points of already problems,
00:20:01 and also through the Corporate Management Board where I would study each of the papers and things that were coming to the Corporate Management Board and exercise my overview in terms of making sure that they were in line with the authority's corporate objectives and with the mayor's strategies as well.
00:20:15 Thank you. Now, Mr Dobbs, I want to move on to a slightly separate but linked topic and that's the responsibility and role of Alfeepa.
00:20:24 Now, we've got on the screen your job description and we see immediately below the box which says main purpose of the job, the heading core responsibilities.
00:20:34 And under the subheading of leadership, we see a number of bullet points.
00:20:39 Now, the second bullet point says this, to provide strategic leadership of Alfeepa, its resources, plans and activities to ensure the higher standards of governance.
00:20:52 Now, in broad terms, am I right in understanding that Alfeepa was charged with the political oversight of the London Fire Brigade?
00:20:59 Yes, Alfeepa was the fire authority for London as described in the Greater London Authority Act.
00:21:06 And Alfeepa discharged that function through various procedural mechanisms, primarily various boards and committees such as the Strategy Committee, is that right?
00:21:15 It is, but just to add some detail to that, which might help the panel, is that the authority was made up of a number of elected members.
00:21:25 Some of those, just over half came from the Greater London Authority and just over half of those came from the London boroughs nominated through London councils.
00:21:34 There was also two independent mayoral appointees who were not politicians necessarily.
00:21:40 They were appointed to the authority because of their expertise or perceived expertise in fire and rescue related matters.
00:21:46 The mayor chose and appointed the chair of the authority each year, and that would actually, exclusively actually, be a member, someone from the members of the assembly that were on the authority.
00:22:00 Thank you.
00:22:02 Although you were not a member of the authority, am I right in understanding that as commissioner you were required or expected to attend Alfeepa meetings?
00:22:11 Absolutely.
00:22:13 We see there in the second bullet point that you were required to provide quotes strategic leadership of Alfeepa.
00:22:19 Yes.
00:22:20 Again, in plain English, non-management speak terms, what did that involve?
00:22:25 The members of Alfeepa were non-fire and rescue service, didn't have fire and rescue service experience apart from, in some cases, the mayoral appointees.
00:22:35 So my job was to translate into lay person's language in many occasions the roles and responsibilities of the fire and rescue service as described by the fire and rescue service framework and by the Fire and Rescue Services Act.
00:22:49 And also to make sure that the authority achieved best practice in all of its policies, not only in relation to fire and rescue service, but also in relation to things like human resources, management, and management of its staff.
00:23:03 And is it right, therefore, that the authority relied upon you for expert guidance on matters pertaining to the exercise of fire and rescue functions and duties?
00:23:12 Yes.
00:23:14 Staying with this element of the job description, looking at the third bullet point on that page, it says this.
00:23:21 To ensure that authority policy is converted into strategy and actions through effective relations with authority members and to be accountable to the authority for its overall performance.
00:23:33 In a nutshell, that appears to be saying that you were the point man between the LFB and Alfeepa.
00:23:40 It's a crude way of putting it, but does it capture the essence?
00:23:43 I think it does, yes.
00:23:44 Thank you.
00:23:45 Having dealt with roles, responsibilities, etc., what I'd now like to turn to is an overview of the Lacknell House fire and the actions that were taken in its aftermath.
00:23:57 Now, the starting point for this is your first witness statement.
00:24:03 And if we could go to LFB-00032157-4.
00:24:14 And if we look at paragraph 11, we see there in the third line that you describe the Lacknell fire as, I might quote, a very significant incident, close quotes, for the brigade.
00:24:29 Now, could I go through the apparent reasons why it was a very significant incident for the brigade, and so that I can see whether you agree or disagree or something in between with the various factors I outlined for you?
00:24:41 Okay.
00:24:42 Now, first of all, the fire involved the rapid and widespread failure of compartmentation.
00:24:48 Yes.
00:24:49 Secondly, there was extensive fire and smoke spread.
00:24:53 Yes.
00:24:55 And in particular, there was rapid external fire spread in multiple directions?
00:24:59 No.
00:25:00 Why do you disagree with that?
00:25:02 Because the fire spread in relation to Lacknell House was not extraordinary, except that the fire spread downwards due to flaming droplets from the panels above, windows above, going into flats below.
00:25:12 But in terms of if that fire spread downwards hadn't taken place, then the fire spread, I don't believe, would have been extraordinary. It would have been something we would expect to find in buildings.
00:25:21 I think we can go to it if needs be, but in your evidence of the inquest, you said that, and I quote, I think the rate at which it spread upwards at this fire was a factor in the handling of the incident subsequently.
00:25:34 And then you later said, on no occasion before has about been experience of this phenomenon where fires start below the fire floors.
00:25:41 Yes.
00:25:42 And that was really the reason why I suggested to you, one of the reasons why the Brigade thought this was a very significant incident was because of that phenomenon of fire spread, external fire spread.
00:25:52 Well, the external fire spread, apart from the downward spread, which obviously affected operations quite significantly, that was the most significant part of the fire spread as far as I was concerned.
00:26:01 The external fire spread was not unusual because we've seen that in other instances in high-rise buildings and also in low-rise buildings where the fire comes out of the window on one floor and transfers to the window above.
00:26:12 So that was not unusual. There were factors affecting that that obviously were the subject of letters to the government subsequently.
00:26:18 Don't worry. We will come on to those.
00:26:21 I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Clear. Mr. Dobson, as you know, all your evidence is being taken down.
00:26:30 I think it would probably make life a little easier for the transcriber if you could possibly slow down a little.
00:26:35 Apologies.
00:26:36 I know it's very difficult, but if you can.
00:26:38 Apologies, sir.
00:26:40 Mr. Dobson, one of the features of the Lacknall fire, I don't think you disagree with this bearing in mind what you've just said, was that the rapid external fire spread was facilitated by, amongst other factors, external wall panels that weren't compliant or not wholly compliant with building regulations.
00:26:59 Would you agree with that?
00:27:00 Well, they were window panels, not wall panels. So there was actually panels in the lower portion of the windows rather than panels on the wall.
00:27:07 Panels that weren't compliant with the building. Indeed, indeed.
00:27:09 The number of FSG calls received was comparatively high, particularly compared to the brigade's historic experiences.
00:27:18 There were poor communications between the control room and the incident ground.
00:27:25 That came about subsequently. So it certainly was a factor that made me see Lacknall House as a significant fire, but I wasn't sure that was completely apparent to me at the point where I made the decision to implement the board.
00:27:37 And crews and incident commanders had limited knowledge about the layout of the building, and there was a degree of confusion about the location of the flats, I think.
00:27:47 Yes.
00:27:48 Seventhly, many firefighters reported issues with radio communications on the night.
00:27:53 Yes.
00:27:54 Thank you. Now we'll explore some of those factors in due course as we go through it, but I wanted to see what you identified as being the reasons for the significance of Lacknall.
00:28:03 Now, can I turn to the mechanisms which the LFB established in order to investigate Lacknall, to learn lessons and make consequential recommendations?
00:28:14 Now, the first one of those I'd like to look at is the Lacknall House board.
00:28:19 Now, in the immediate aftermath of the fire, is it right that the LFB, alongside the Metropolitan Police, were investigating the cause of the fire?
00:28:29 Mr. Keeley, could you turn to the previous question there, because there's one element that made the Lacknall House particularly significant for me, and that was the nature of the six people who died, and actually the nature of the way those deaths occurred at the fire.
00:28:45 That was something which was, I would say, outside of my experience and outside of many people's experience, it made it a very significant fire for that reason.
00:28:53 I apologise for that.
00:28:54 No, no, it's helpful to have that, and thank you.
00:28:56 Going back to the Lacknall House board, am I right in understanding that both the LFB and the Metropolitan Police were investigating the cause of that fire?
00:29:06 Yes.
00:29:08 Now, if we can stay on the page we're looking at on the screen conveniently and look at paragraph 11 of your first witness statement, you explain there in broad terms that in October 2009, so roughly three months after the fire, you set up the Lacknall House board.
00:29:29 And in the second line of that paragraph, you go on to say this.
00:29:33 I recognise that the Lacknall House fire was a very significant incident, and that it would need a clear point of focus due to the range and scope of the actions likely to be required of the LFB.
00:29:46 I also wanted to make a clear statement, both to the public and to the LFB, about how important this matter was, and that we would be devoting considerable attention, time and resources to it.
00:29:59 This was because I considered it to be essential for the London Fire Brigade to identify and address any learning points that might arise from the debriefs and investigations into the Lacknall House fire, and also from the inquests touching upon the deaths of the six people who died in the fire.
00:30:16 Now, in the next paragraph, you go on to say this.
00:30:20 On the 1st of October 2009, the board met for the first time. At this meeting, the terms of reference were first considered.
00:30:28 On the 5th of November 2009, at the second meeting of the board, the terms of reference were agreed.
00:30:35 As can be seen from the terms of reference, the board would oversee all aspects of the Lacknall investigation and related issues.
00:30:43 This was in order to better understand the LFB's response to the Lacknall House fire on the 3rd of July 2009, as well as the associated issues that emerged subsequent to the fire, and to ensure that appropriate action was taken in a timely manner to deal with those issues.
00:31:01 Now, it appears to be plain from that, at least, that the intention was that the board would identify the lessons to be learned, and then consequential amendments that were identified as being necessary would be made to the LFB's policies and procedures. In broad terms, was that the intention?
00:31:18 That was one of the intentions.
00:31:23 Well, that's a slightly tantalising answer.
00:31:27 You follow it up.
00:31:30 Can you help us with what the other intentions were that aren't immediately apparent from the content?
00:31:35 Well, the other intentions were, it became clear to me in the period between when the fire occurred on the 1st of October, that there were increasingly a significant number of interested parties in this fire and this investigation.
00:31:49 As you mentioned, Mr. Coneer, the police were carrying out an investigation. There were questions about whether or not the HSE were going to carry out their own investigation. There were significant media interest in the fire itself and what the Atlanta Fire Brigade had dealt with it.
00:32:01 I could see that there was going to be a coroner's inquest at some point in the future. So there were many, many strands to this fire that made me believe that it needed a separate board of its own, at least for a time, in order to actually consider all those things and make sure they were dealt with appropriately and in a coordinated way,
00:32:18 because otherwise they would have been dealt with piecemeal by the various departments that were responsible for the various aspects of it. And I wanted to deal with it all in one place so we were well coordinated as a brigade.
00:32:27 And the lessons that would be identified would be lessons that the LFB itself had identified and that would be addressed via various recommendations. Is that right?
00:32:38 Yes.
00:32:40 Now we've heard from other witnesses about a range of other procedures which the LFB has. DEOT, the Dynamic and Intelligent Operational Training Process, and the SAI, the Serious Accident Investigation Process.
00:32:56 Really this goes back to the answer you've just given. Why did you not use either or both of those processes, but rather set up a bespoke process under the aegis of the Lacknell House Board?
00:33:08 Well we did use those processes. It was just that they were not the only processes that needed to be used as part of the investigation and the subsequent issues arising from the Lacknell Board.
00:33:18 And the Lacknell Board was a place whereby we pulled all those things together into one place so the Brigade could then respond in a coordinated way.
00:33:27 So the SAI process was most certainly used in order to investigate the accidents. We used that process extensively. And the DOAT process was very important in terms of identifying operational matters that needed to be addressed.
00:33:38 But there was many others as well and I was very keen to get those all in one place so they could be corralled properly and dealt with in a coordinated way.
00:33:45 How did you ensure that the results of the SAI investigation were fed into the Lacknell House Board's deliberations?
00:33:55 That was part of the agendas with the various items on the agenda. I had an officer, which we may talk about in a moment, who was actually effectively my Chief of Staff in relation to the Lacknell investigation and all aspects of it, Mr Tim Cuthill.
00:34:09 And we received the results of the SAI as the SAI was progressing at the Board at its various stages.
00:34:18 Does the same answer apply to how the deliberations of the DOAT process fed into the Board's deliberations?
00:34:27 Yes, it did.
00:34:29 Now, the Lacknell House Board identified 34 action points for the organisation's improvement or development. And those actions later came to be known as the Lacknell Preactions because they were identified before the inquest. Is that right?
00:34:43 Yes, that's correct.
00:34:45 Now, the first record that we have of the 34 Preactions is in the minutes of the Lacknell House Board meeting on the 15th of September 2010. And we can find those minutes at LFB Trouble 0 84031.
00:35:05 Just briefly, we can see that you are a member of the Board and you attended this meeting. Could we go to page seven?
00:35:15 And here we have action one, headed action plan. We've gone to this document with a number of witnesses now, but essentially this is a table which identifies the 34 Preactions. That's right.
00:35:25 Yes, that's correct.
00:35:27 And it also provides the assigned officer who was responsible for implementing the consequential action.
00:35:33 Yes.
00:35:35 Now, if we could turn back to the first page of these minutes.
00:35:39 It appears that reports were presented by three departments, namely control, operations and fire safety. Is that right?
00:35:53 Yes.
00:35:55 And if we could look at paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2, for example, on this page, we see that SHJS, that's Scott Haywood and Joanne Stibbards, as well as we now know as Joe Smith, presented an overview of the draft control report analysis and post actions.
00:36:12 We see further detail provided in paragraph 5.2.
00:36:17 We then see below that paragraph an emboldened heading which reads post actions and that details some of the work that had been done by the control room. I think I'm right in saying.
00:36:28 Yes.
00:36:29 And then if we turn over the page to page two, particular paragraph 5.9, we see a quintet of proposed actions set out there, all of which came to be subsumed in the 34 Preactions. Is that right?
00:36:43 Yes.
00:36:46 I've only glossed over this, but were the three reports submitted by the individual departments, did they provide the foundation of the 34 Preactions?
00:36:57 They certainly provided this foundation, yes.
00:36:59 Thank you. Could we stay with control room for the moment? And if we look at paragraph 5.10.
00:37:09 RD, that's you.
00:37:11 Yes.
00:37:12 And various comments are recorded here.
00:37:16 Most notably you say this, you commented that there are potentially two slash three areas to consider in relation to control.
00:37:23 One, the information transfer from control to fire ground.
00:37:28 Two, the question of where LFBs stand in relation to training guidance compared to national guidance.
00:37:35 It is evident that national guidance is in need of improvement.
00:37:40 And three, to ensure that refresher training is maintained for fire survival calls and recorded on step.
00:37:48 Now, did you decide which of the proposed actions would constitute the LFBs pre-actions?
00:37:56 This was issues that arose from the paper in the presentation we received from Scott Hayward and Joanne Stibards.
00:38:03 And what is listed here is basically my summary of the issues in there.
00:38:08 But I signed off that these were actions that needed to be added to the plan, yes.
00:38:13 I suppose put differently, was this a directional summary, Mr Dobbs, in the sense that you were saying these are the matters that you shall consider?
00:38:21 Were you giving them some form of intellectual steer and guidance as to what you were expecting to see covered in the pre-actions?
00:38:28 Yes, I was trying to be very clear in terms of the actions I expect to be progressed as a result of the report that we'd received.
00:38:35 Thank you. Apologies for jumping around the documents.
00:38:38 Could we go back to your first witness statement, which can be found at LFB 0032157 forward slash five and it's paragraph 15.
00:38:48 Thank you.
00:38:51 And what you say there is this, as can be seen from the various iterations of the action plan, individuals were appointed to the role of lead officer for each action.
00:39:00 I did not have personal responsibility for the individual actions in the action plan, but I had oversight through the Lacknall House board meetings,
00:39:08 my regular one to one meetings with the directors and frequent meetings with DAC Tim Cutbill.
00:39:16 Now, you touched upon this in an earlier answer. Can you help us as to the gist of the role that DAC Cutbill performed in relation to the Lacknall House board?
00:39:26 As I said earlier, I think probably the easiest way to describe it, he was almost my chief of staff in relation to Lacknall.
00:39:33 So he was seconded to the Lacknall board effectively for a period of, I think it was two, two and a half years during the height of the investigations and the main work London Fire Brigade was doing.
00:39:45 His role was to ensure that the issues contained in the action plan were being dealt with by as a service, he would have informal relations with them about that and to keep me updated informally.
00:39:57 His role was also to act as the main point of contact with external bodies such as the Metropolitan Police Service, the HSE and to some extent the government as well
00:40:08 in relation to the ongoing investigations to make sure that LFB was presenting a appropriate, comprehensive and coordinated front.
00:40:18 Now the impression from the documents, and I should be more specific, the minutes of the board meetings, is that it was a forum in which progress could be reported rather than being a decision making forum. Is that a fair distinction to make?
00:40:36 I would describe the board as an opportunity to discuss the issues that were arising from the investigation in all of its various forms, to seek agreement in terms of the actions that needed to be taken by the various departments of the brigade,
00:40:52 to allocate those responsibilities to individual officers that had the functional responsibilities for our areas and a place where progress against those actions will be monitored.
00:41:07 So I think you agree in broad terms with the proposition I put to you then.
00:41:12 I do, I just think it's slightly broader than has explained.
00:41:16 Now to what extent did you contribute to the directorate's efforts to implement the pre-actions that have been set for them?
00:41:22 Well my role was to chair the board, to agree the actions. People were aware that their actions were going to be held accountable for their actions at the board, which I chaired.
00:41:33 I think during the period of the time the board was in existence I chaired all but two meetings of the board, so I saw it as that important that I took the occasion to give an amount of my time to that.
00:41:41 And also dealt with the, supported through my work with the directors through one-to-one meetings and through the commissioners group.
00:41:51 If there were issues of resource that were causing a problem in delivery of some of these actions, then I would seek to help the directorate with those.
00:41:59 If there were other matters that were beyond their control that I could help with, I was trying to do that.
00:42:03 Looking at the discussions that took place in your one-to-ones, would they be the forum in which it was determined that a particular pre-action had been completed, or would that be decided elsewhere?
00:42:15 No, that would be decided at the board.
00:42:17 Now I think I'm right in saying that the board sat until September 2013, so it was sitting throughout the course of the inquest, is that right?
00:42:27 That's correct.
00:42:28 That's correct.
00:42:32 Was the board finally stood down in September 2013 because a view had been taken that the pre-actions had been completed?
00:42:41 No, the board was stood down in September 2013 for a number of reasons.
00:42:48 One was that it had been agreed, I had decided and I had agreed with the fire authority that the responsibility for the oversight of the remaining actions, when there were remaining actions, would be taken over by the ODCB.
00:43:01 And the reason I decided that was that whilst I feel that my leadership and involvement in the board on a much day-to-day basis for that first period was entirely appropriate,
00:43:12 there was a time at which the work of the board needed to become much more day-to-day work of the directorates, including their normal business plans, rather than something which was specific.
00:43:22 And so ODCB took up the remaining balance of the work, is that right?
00:43:27 Yes.
00:43:28 And that's a body on which you didn't sit?
00:43:30 Yes.
00:43:31 But you would have seen the minutes?
00:43:32 Yes.
00:43:34 And so was the mechanism by which you ensured that the remaining actions were completed, was your review of the minutes, coupled with the discussion?
00:43:41 And the one-to-ones and the rest of it?
00:43:43 With the directors and also by discussions with Tim Cuthbill.
00:43:47 Did Tim Cuthbill's role remain unchanged throughout the course of this, so until the last action was completed?
00:43:56 No, Tim Cuthbill was dedicated to working on Lacknell House for the first couple of years, I think it was.
00:44:02 And sometime around 2011, 2012, he took up a normal management role as well, but maintained an oversight of the Lacknell House work.
00:44:10 Did Mr Cuthbill stay within the LFB until you retired?
00:44:14 He did.
00:44:18 Did anyone succeed him in his Lacknell role?
00:44:22 No.
00:44:25 Thank you.
00:44:26 Can we now turn to the Rule 43 recommendations and the Alfipa Working Group?
00:44:31 Yes.
00:44:33 Now, following the Lacknell House inquest, the coroner sent the LFB a Rule 43 letter which set out a number of recommendations for the prevention of future deaths that she considered were necessary and desirable.
00:44:46 Now, we can see that letter which you've helpfully exhibited to your statement, and we can find it at LFB, trouble zero, 32158.
00:44:56 Now, we can see its date at the 28th of March 2013.
00:45:01 We can also see, if it could be de-amplified, that the first page sets out the purpose of the letter, and the final paragraph on this first page reads as follows.
00:45:14 As follows, before I set out my recommendations, I acknowledge that London Fire Brigade have already undertaken extensive work to learn from their experience with the fire at Lacknell House, have introduced new policies, and have reviewed existing policies in respect of a number of matters of significance, including, and if we go over the page,
00:45:36 As she sets out on page two, a list of the bullet points, which include, amongst other matters we can see, 7-2-D visits, awareness of fire spread, communication between control and the incident ground, and the handling of FSG calls.
00:45:53 Now, can you help us? What submissions, or what other materials, put before the coroner at the inquest to allow her to identify the work that the LFB had already carried out in relation to these subject areas?
00:46:07 I can't remember exactly which documents were provided to the coroner, but certainly in relation to statements by myself, I referred to the work that London Fire Brigade had done, and it's my recollection, although I can't be absolutely sure, that the coroner was made aware of the minutes, etc. of the Lacknell Ball and the action plan that we had in place there.
00:46:29 Were those minutes simply provided to her, or were they exhibited to a statement from a witness who spoke to their contents?
00:46:36 I honestly can't remember.
00:46:40 Now, if we can go back to page two of the coroner's letter, she went on to identify five recommendations, which we can see identified in italicised subheadings, I should say.
00:46:54 First of all, public awareness of fire safety.
00:46:58 Secondly, visits made pursuant to Section 72D, Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, general familiarisation visits and home fire safety visits.
00:47:09 Thirdly, incident commanders.
00:47:12 If we turn over to page three, we see Brigade control.
00:47:18 Fifthly, communications.
00:47:22 Before concluding with a subheading entitled response, which set out the timeframe in which the coroner was inviting the LFB to respond.
00:47:30 Now, Ms Dobson will go through the detail of these recommendations in due course, but at this stage, I'd like to ask you this.
00:47:38 Is it right that you nominated Gary Reason to lead the LFB's work on implementing these recommendations?
00:47:46 Yes.
00:47:47 Can you help us? Why did you think that Mr Reason was the man for the job?
00:47:51 Well, a number of reasons. Most importantly, many of these, most of these fell within his area's responsibility, as I recall.
00:47:58 So I think that's appropriate.
00:48:00 And secondly, Gary Reason was an officer that I knew was willing and unable to undertake a significant level of detail in terms of his monitoring of the work of his reports and monitoring of the work he was responsible for.
00:48:14 Just picking up on that answer.
00:48:17 Our understanding was that Mr Reason, his directorate, were only directly concerned with matters relating to instant command and communications, whereas the balance fell within the remit of Rita Dexter, that's to say public awareness of fire safety, 7-2-D visits and control.
00:48:37 Are we wrong in that understanding?
00:48:39 No, you're correct. But Gary Reason was responsible for, mainly for the oversight and producing the reports of progress.
00:48:45 He wasn't actually responsible for those areas of work that actually sat within Rita Dexter's directorate.
00:48:50 So things like the public communication messaging, that was very set very firmly with Rita and she was responsible for that.
00:48:57 Can we get back to your first witness statement?
00:48:59 LFB Trouble 0 32157 forward slash 6.
00:49:07 If we could look at paragraph 22 at the bottom of that page, you say this.
00:49:11 On the 20th of June 2013, at a meter of the El FIPA, I presented a report in coroner's inquest following the fire at Lattnall House on 3rd of July 2009, FEP 2072.
00:49:26 You helpfully exhibit that report and the meeting minutes before going on to say this in the fourth line of that paragraph.
00:49:34 As set out within the report, it was proposed that implementation of the proposed actions in response to the Rule 43 recommendations was to be monitored by the ODCB.
00:49:44 You've probably highlighted the answer to this question.
00:49:49 Why had you identified ODCB as being the responsible monitoring body here?
00:49:54 Because it was the body that had the membership of all the main people that needed to be responsible for dealing with and progressing the actions like this one by the coroner.
00:50:04 I was anticipating that you may say that you were anticipating ODCB taking up the slack from the Lattnall House Board in due course.
00:50:14 Was that something that became a reason later on?
00:50:16 That is true and it was part of the reasoning, but mainly it was because the ODCB had all the officers on there that were responsible for the areas where the actions recommended by the coroner were made.
00:50:26 And am I again right in assuming that your previous answer applies to this question, that you monitored ODCB's progress via review of their minutes and discussions with relevant directors and personnel?
00:50:39 Yes.
00:50:41 Could we go back to your witness statement at turn over the page to page seven and look at paragraph 23.
00:50:48 That says this, as can be seen from the minutes of the meeting, in addition, it was agreed that a task group would be established consisting of three elected members of ELFIPA drawn one from each political group, excuse me, to undertake a review of the LFB's response to the fire at Lattnall House.
00:51:07 And to provide their recommendations into the strategy committee.
00:51:11 Now, take it from me that the task group is not mentioned in your report.
00:51:17 Was it instigated by ELFIPA members?
00:51:20 It was.
00:51:22 Now, as you explain in paragraph 24, which we can see on the screen, the task group became known as the Lattnall House Working Group.
00:51:31 And that working group consisted only of ELFIPA members, although you and other senior officers from the LFB attended meetings. Is that right?
00:51:39 Yes.
00:51:41 Rita Dexter explained in her evidence that one of the ELFIPA members, Valerie Shawcross, was particularly interested in the brigade's response because her seat caught Southwark. Is that right?
00:51:53 I believe her seat had caught Southwark at some time. I'm not sure it actually did at the time of the Lacknall fire.
00:51:59 Was that one of the prompts why the working group was set up?
00:52:05 Yes, it was.
00:52:07 And presumably also why Valerie Shawcross assumed the chair of the working group. Is that right?
00:52:12 Yes.
00:52:14 Mrs. Dexter also told the panel that the working group was to provide political oversight, scrutiny and accountability of the LFB and their responses to the coroner's Rule 43 recommendations. Do you agree?
00:52:28 I do agree, except that I think their work was wider than that. And if you were to examine the terms of reference for the group and also the work programme they set themselves as well as set out in their first meeting, I think it demonstrates that the work of this working group was wider than just monitoring the progress of the LFB in terms of the coroner's action points.
00:52:48 It's really flowing on from that. Arns, the working group appears to have intended to scrutinise what are described as longer term themes. Is that right?
00:52:59 It is, yes.
00:53:01 Can you give us a flavour of what those longer term themes were?
00:53:04 Well, the working group were very keen to meet with a range of different parties, obviously, and I think that, I hope the inquiry has seen the list of attendees that they invited to their meeting subsequent to them being established.
00:53:16 The things that they were particularly interested in were things like the communication that took place between the Fire and Rescue Service and residents of high-rise buildings in terms of their escape rooms and how to stay safe.
00:53:27 They were particularly interested in the responsibilities of local authority elected members in relation to housing, particularly in relation to when high-rise buildings were being refurbished or repaired and the responsibilities they held there.
00:53:42 They were also very interested in the work to support victims of fires and other emergencies and where London Fire Department could play a role in that and what arrangements already existed within local authorities.
00:53:54 And they were also very interested in the responses and the role of government in terms of the findings from the Lackawna House investigation that would identify the responsibility of government.
00:54:05 They had a lot on their plate. What was left over for the Alfipa Scrutiny Committee?
00:54:11 Well, they reported to the Scrutiny Committee. So the reason for that is because there was a lot of work on their plate, as you put it. That's why I decided it wasn't appropriate for the Scrutiny Committee to carry that work out directly.
00:54:23 And they appointed the working group, these members that had a real interest in the outcome of the fire and they were willing to commit the time to actually take on this workload.
00:54:33 Thank you. Now we know from the minutes of the Lackawna House Working Group that it met on six occasions between July 2013 and March 2014.
00:54:42 The Alfipa's strategy committee was updated on the LFB's progress in relation to Rule 43 on only two occasions.
00:54:50 First, in November 2013, when work on the actions was continuing.
00:54:56 And secondly, when the Lackawna House Working Group was finally wound up in July 2014.
00:55:03 That's what we have discerned from the minutes. Does that accord with your recollection?
00:55:07 It does.
00:55:08 Thank you. Can we turn to the minutes of an ODCB meeting from, I think, the 4th of July 2013?
00:55:14 Before we do that, Mr King, we're just probably to make a comment.
00:55:17 I know the inquirers previously have been hurt by other witnesses that the Lackawna House Working Group was an unusual thing for members to do.
00:55:24 That's not an observation of which I would concur.
00:55:27 I think, was that an observation made by Mrs Dexter?
00:55:30 I think it was also Mr Reason made, agreed with it actually.
00:55:33 But it's certainly something that will not which I would concur because I can think of other examples of where members put together working groups of this nature to assist officers in developing particular areas of strategy.
00:55:43 In other areas, though, the budget would certainly be one. The safety plan would be one and others.
00:55:49 That's useful. Thank you very much.
00:55:51 Can we turn to these ODCB minutes of the meeting on the 4th of July 2013, which can be found at LFB Trouble Zero 32729.
00:56:00 And if we could turn to page three, and we see there the substantive text there deals with item six, which is the coroner's rule 43 letters action plan.
00:56:18 And if we look at the second paragraph, it says D-O-O-R-T, which is the acronym for Director of Operations Resilience and Training, Gary Reason. Is that right?
00:56:29 That's correct. And the minutes record as follows.
00:56:33 Dort advised that the HSE would be interested in outcomes and that the commissioner had met with Vowell Shawcross to discuss the members group agreed at the last authority meeting to consider the Lacknell fire and lessons to be learned.
00:56:48 Terms of reference for this group are being discussed, and it is likely that Councillor Morris Heaster and Councillor Peter Truesdale will be members of the group.
00:56:56 It is anticipated that regular progress reports will be submitted to the strategy committee.
00:57:04 Were regular progress reports submitted to the committee?
00:57:10 The regular reports were the two reports you identified earlier.
00:57:13 And that's it?
00:57:14 Yes.
00:57:18 You say in your witness statement, and we don't need to go to it, but the references LFB 0032157 forward slash seven and paragraph 24, you said that I had overall oversight of the implementation of the coroner's recommendations.
00:57:36 Now, other than attending meetings where updates were given to our FEPA members, how did you, reviewing the minutes of ODCB, how else did you monitor progress of implementation of the work required to meet the rule 43 recommendations?
00:57:52 Certainly via my one to one meetings with the directors. We would occasionally discuss it at the commissioners group, and I would have additional ad hoc meetings with the directors in relation to the parts of the coroner's recommendation action plan that they were responsible for.
00:58:06 Did you feel that you had the requisite detail provided to you from these various sources to have an informed, effective understanding of the state of progress?
00:58:17 Yes, I did.
00:58:21 Did you feel that the sources of information that you used were giving you full, complete, and accurate information about progress?
00:58:30 I did.
00:58:31 And you never had cause to doubt that?
00:58:35 I can't recall any times when I had cause to doubt that, no, although maybe there were times when I questioned it more, the reports more than others, I would say, would be the way I would describe it.
00:58:46 We may come on to it, and you've given a general answer. Could I pin you down to something more particular? Are there any subject areas or reports in relation to which you felt the need to question more closely than in relation to others? And if so, what were they?
00:59:07 There certainly were, but I can't actually recall exactly which ones they were at the moment.
00:59:12 So nothing stood out for you as being, to be blunt, particularly agreeable?
00:59:16 Well, I think probably at certain times the issues related to control stood out to me, but other than that, I can't think of things that were particularly of concern to me from the reports I was receiving.
00:59:28 Thank you.
00:59:34 Can we turn on to a separate topic now, and that's the LFB's knowledge of poor compartmentation in buildings in London, external fire spread, and their consideration after the Lacknell fire in light of what had been learned at Lacknell.
00:59:50 Now, it's probably useful to start that examination by looking at Lacknell House fire from the perspective of fire safety. And if we could start that by examining the previous fires of which you were personally aware that involved, if I can call it generically, cladding and fire spread, external fire spread.
01:00:12 First of all, were you aware of the Nosley Heights fire in Liverpool in April 1991?
01:00:18 I was.
01:00:19 Were you also aware of the Garnock Court fire in Irvine in Ayrshire on the 11th of June 1999?
01:00:27 No.
01:00:29 Can I take it from that that you were not aware of the report prepared by the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Select Committee in 1999 on the potential risk of fire spread by external cladding systems?
01:00:43 No.
01:00:45 Were you aware of the Harrow Court fire in Stevenage on the 2nd of February 2005?
01:00:50 Yes.
01:00:52 Do you agree with Mrs Dexter that the information about these fires provided a useful learning point for the LFB?
01:00:59 Yes, I do.
01:01:02 Can you help us as to why you think that is so and why you agree with Mrs Dexter?
01:01:07 Because I think fires, significant fires of this nature are fortunately quite rare in the United Kingdom actually, let alone England.
01:01:16 So therefore when these fires do occur, we should take, the best we can, we should take any learning points from those fires as best we can.
01:01:26 Can you help us as to why those fires were not obviously taken as learning points given that answer for the LFB?
01:01:37 My recollection is that having looked at those fires, the conclusion that we came to was that whilst they were significant fires,
01:01:47 the issues we either already dealt with, the issues arising from those fire changes to our operational procedures,
01:01:53 or the items or the issues that arose for them were not necessarily relevant for London Fire Brigade in the context of our operations and the nature and size of our brigade.
01:02:04 Now you say we, the three fires we're discussing predated your appointment as Commissioner.
01:02:10 Yes.
01:02:12 Are there any officers who considered the facts of certainly the two fires you were aware of, so Harrow Court and Moseley Heights?
01:02:19 Well I didn't actually determine the officers to do that, but my understanding is that they were considered by the Operations Department and also by the Fire Safety Department.
01:02:31 Thank you.
01:02:35 Assistant Commissioner Daley gave evidence, really in the context of the Maddingley fire in 2010 that was in Kingston upon Thames,
01:02:44 that the LFB as an organisation did not always take, and I quote, every opportunity to learn as an organisation, close quote,
01:02:51 and quote, that protection wasn't always as high up the agenda as it needed to be, and so the opportunities to learn from protection haven't always been as well addressed.
01:03:02 From your vantage point, I mean being at the LFB for a considerable period of your life and ended up as Commissioner, do you agree with that observation?
01:03:10 I do.
01:03:13 Can you help us understand why the LFB did not seize every opportunity to learn from incidents and other fires?
01:03:22 It's very difficult to account for. I think my main explanation of that is that these were things that happened in other brigades and we didn't necessarily see them,
01:03:34 or the brigade at the time didn't necessarily see them as relevant, where there was potentially a culture in the London Fire Brigade that actually things that happened outside of London didn't really relate to London.
01:03:46 I wouldn't agree with that, but I think it was a culture at the time.
01:03:49 Can I stop you there? It's an interesting point. How had this London-centric perception come about and what did you do to try and cure it during your relatively long time in post as Commissioner?
01:04:02 I think it came about because London Fire Brigade had been for many, many years the largest and busiest fire and rescue service in the country,
01:04:14 largest in terms of numbers of staff, numbers of fire engines, number of fire stations, but also largest in terms of number of personnel,
01:04:22 and also because I think many disasters or large fires or other incidents for that matter had occurred in London.
01:04:31 So there was a cultural, I think, without being completely conscious about it, there was a culture of if it didn't happen in London, then it's not really relevant to us.
01:04:40 And there was nothing therefore to learn from other fires outside London?
01:04:44 To some extent. I wouldn't say that was completely the case on all occasions because there were fires from outside London that London did learn from.
01:04:50 But I think generally speaking we could have learned more from other fires outside of London had that culture not existed.
01:04:56 What did you do in your time, as I said, to try and cure that perception?
01:05:01 Well, I tried to engage with the National Fire and Rescue Service perhaps more than might have done previously.
01:05:09 So I was a member of the Chief Fire Officers Association Board for most of my tenure.
01:05:15 I instigated, we might come to talk about this later, but I instigated a process where London Fire Brigade actually funded the production of national operational guidance for the service when that sort of leadership was sorely needed.
01:05:29 And the reasons for doing that were not only because the Fire and Rescue Service in this country needed some leadership to actually progress the issues that were being debated but not resolved,
01:05:39 but it's also important that London Fire Brigade officers increasingly with the changes in the service recognised that they were employed by London Fire Brigade, but they were still part of the English Fire and Rescue Service.
01:05:51 The second element of the quote I asked you about related to AC Daly's view, and I quote, that protection wasn't always as high up the agenda as it needed to be, close quote.
01:06:03 You agreed with that. Why was protection not always or consistently given the priority it deserved?
01:06:10 When I agree with that, I do agree with that, in the context of operations. So it's my view that the Fire Regulation and Fire Safety Department were not always as closely linked to operations as they should have been or could have been.
01:06:26 I think Fire and Rescue Service was certainly high up the agenda in terms of London Fire Brigade's role in relation to their statutory duties around the Fire Precursions Act, the workplace regulations and later the Fire Safety Order.
01:06:40 So certainly very high up the agenda in relation to those, but specifically in relation to operations, I think for the same reasons as was explained earlier, there's a cultural, maybe a cultural blind spot,
01:06:52 in fact that actually Fire Safety Regulation had an important part to play in the delivery of operations.
01:06:59 Was operations the big beast? I put this really crudely, Mr. Dobson really sees out more nuanced views from you.
01:07:07 But was operations the big beast and therefore consumed the greater part of resources and focus of attention? Is that at least a crude way of looking at the problem?
01:07:19 I would agree, for many years.
01:07:21 I would say that it's crude or it's accurate.
01:07:23 It is crude, but I think it's accurate as well.
01:07:25 Now, going back slightly, you referred to there being a blind spot in relation to protection. Can you help us as to why that blind spot came about?
01:07:40 Well, I think I defer to my previous answer really. I think it was because operations was generally, the culture of the organisation was that operations was the most important part of the service.
01:07:51 That was the part of the service that the public most focused on. The public, you speak to the public in London, and we get on many occasions and ask them their views on the Fire and Rescue Service.
01:08:00 The only thing the public are really interested in is a fire engine arriving quickly, if they call the fire brigade.
01:08:05 They weren't particularly interested in the work of the Fire and Rescue Service in relation to fire prevention.
01:08:09 So I think all of that came together to lead to the development of the culture where operations was the most important thing we did.
01:08:16 Was that, had you identified this cluster of cultural issues before you started your tenure as Commissioner?
01:08:26 Or is it a perception that has developed with the benefit of retirement and further reflection?
01:08:32 No, I think I'd formed that view before I was Commissioner.
01:08:35 What did you do in order to give protection a greater priority and to give it a bigger voice compared to operations?
01:08:45 First of all, I think it was important that I demonstrated that fire protection was important.
01:08:50 And therefore, in communicating messages and things from those people to staff, I would very often, well almost exclusively, lay out the important role that fire protection plays.
01:09:01 I based that upon the need to protect the public as well as firefighters, particularly around preventing fire deaths and fire injuries and the number of fires in London, reducing those.
01:09:10 I made a very big point during my tenure that it was very important, that protection role was very important in terms of reducing the number of fires in London.
01:09:18 And therefore, the risk of injury or death to members of the public.
01:09:24 Practical things that I did were we had a very detailed suite of performance indicators for the whole of the service.
01:09:31 And we implemented a thing called a Performance Management CMB, where all the directors and all heads of service would come along and we would analyse their performance against their indicators.
01:09:41 And fire safety played a very high part in that in terms of their performance against their performance indicators.
01:09:48 A difficult question to answer, I suspect, but how successful do you think your efforts were to cure those cultural problems and to alleviate the effects of the blind spot on protection?
01:10:01 I think in terms of the outcomes we achieved in relation to the numbers of fires in London decreasing significantly during my time as Commissioner,
01:10:11 the numbers of fire deaths, the number of fire injuries also decreasing significantly during my time as Commissioner.
01:10:17 I would like to think that I was successful, but in terms of the overall culture of the brigade in relation to operations being the big beast in your hoods, I wasn't as successful as I'd like to be.
01:10:29 I think we did make some progress, but I don't think I was successful as I would hope to have been.
01:10:35 Do you remember the Atherton on Stour Fire?
01:10:38 I do.
01:10:39 Which was in 2007, in broad terms a fire in a vegetable packing warehouse I think, constructed from sandwich panels and the fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and ultimately,
01:10:50 and tragically, four firefighters from Warwickshire Fire and Rescue Service lost their lives fighting it.
01:10:56 Is that a fair summary of the essentials of the fire?
01:11:00 Yes, it is.
01:11:01 Now following that incident, a CLG Fire and Rescue Service circular was issued by the then Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor, Sir Ken Knight, who'd been your predecessor at the LFB on the 23rd of March 2009.
01:11:17 Now can we go to that circular, which is HOM, trouble 023213?
01:11:24 And we can see roughly just above halfway of the page, we can see it was addressed to you as the Commissioner of LFB amongst other recipients.
01:11:41 I can take it from your answer that you remember receiving this.
01:11:45 I do.
01:11:46 Now if we can turn to page 4 in paragraph 4.1.
01:12:12 Thank you.
01:12:13 What we have here under the emboldened heading, Knowledge of Building Construction, it says this.
01:12:21 In January 2008, the Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor, CFRA, wrote to all CFOs, that's Chief Fire Officers, to remind fire and rescue services of the need to ensure that operational risk information was available to firefighters in relation to high-risk buildings.
01:12:38 In particular, the danger when fighting fires in thermo-clad panel, sandwich panel buildings was highlighted.
01:12:45 Dear Chief Officer, letters, DECOL 396, 494, 1599, in conjunction with the Fire Research and Development Group Report, Firefighting Options for Fires Involving Sandwich Panels, describe the hazards and appropriate actions that need to be taken to maintain firefighter safety whilst fighting fires in buildings of sandwich panel construction.
01:13:10 Then if we go over the page to paragraph 4.2, the circular went on to say this.
01:13:16 Fire and rescue services are reminded that firefighters, and in particular, incident commanders, will only be able to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks of operational incidents, including being alerted to critical safety issues, if they are able to recognise building construction types and the impact that these buildings have on fire behaviour.
01:13:37 FRAs are therefore reminded of their responsibility to ensure that safety critical information is available to incident commanders and all personnel in respect of risks within their area.
01:13:51 Arrangements should also be in place to ensure personnel can recognise types of building construction.
01:13:57 Now, just to make the point, FRAs in this context is fire and rescue authorities, is that right?
01:14:03 Yes.
01:14:05 Now, upon reading and receiving this circular, what direction did you give to your senior officers as to how best the LFB could respond to the requirements it sets out?
01:14:16 My recollection was that I asked the relevant officers to consider this in relation to the training that's already provided to firefighters, to identify if there were gaps that we needed to address, and then to design methods, training to actually address those gaps.
01:14:32 Thank you.
01:14:33 Sir, it is just quarter past three, that is an appropriate place.
01:14:38 It suits you to stop there, does it?
01:14:39 Yes.
01:14:40 Right. Well, as you were told, Mr Dobson, we were going to have a break during the afternoon, and this is a good time to take it. So we'll stop now, we'll resume if we may please at half past three, and as I've said to all the other witnesses, please don't discuss your evidence or anything relating to it with anyone while you're out of the room.
01:14:59 Yes, sir.
01:15:00 All right. Thank you very much. Would you like to give the DHSH a please?
01:15:03 Yes.
01:15:12 Thank you, Mr Kinnear. Half past three, then, please.
01:15:14 Thank you.
01:15:30 Thank you.
01:16:00 Thank you.
01:16:30 Thank you.
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01:17:30 Thank you.
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01:24:30 Thank you.
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01:25:30 Thank you.
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01:26:30 Thank you.
01:27:00 Thank you.
01:27:30 Thank you.
01:28:00 Thank you.
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01:29:30 Thank you.
01:30:00 Thank you.
01:30:30 Thank you.
01:31:00 Thank you.
01:31:30 Thank you.
01:32:00 Thank you.
01:32:30 Yes, would you ask Mr Dobson to come back in, please?
01:32:49 All right, Mr Dobson.
01:32:55 All ready to carry on ahead?
01:33:00 Thank you, sir.
01:33:01 Yes.
01:33:02 Thank you very much.
01:33:03 Yes, Mr Kinnear.
01:33:04 Thank you, sir.
01:33:05 Mr Dobson, before the break, we were discussing the circular that Sir Ken sent round in March
01:33:08 2009.
01:33:09 Now, on the very same day that circular was dispatched to Chief Fire Officers, a letter
01:33:15 was sent by Steve Churek, who at that stage was one of your assistant commissioners, to
01:33:20 London boroughs and social housing landlords.
01:33:23 And can we go to that letter, which is at LFB quadruple zero one eight zero five.
01:33:30 Now, as you can see, that letter opens thus.
01:33:36 In the light of a number of recent fires and social housing blocks, I'm seeking your help
01:33:41 in bringing fire safety issues to the attention of your tenants and staff.
01:33:45 And as an enforcing authority, we thought it would be helpful to draw your attention
01:33:50 a number of significant issues relating to your responsibilities under the regulatory
01:33:57 reform fire safety order 2005.
01:33:59 Now, first of all, do you remember this letter?
01:34:03 I don't.
01:34:05 Can we turn to page two?
01:34:09 And you can see the third heading on that page is emboldened replacement windows.
01:34:14 And the letter says this.
01:34:16 We have noted cases where replacement windows, particularly U.P.V.C. window units, are of
01:34:22 a shorter depth to the original units window sets.
01:34:26 This has resulted in the gaps being covered with non-fire resisting materials, which,
01:34:30 in the event of fire, distort and allow fire into the wall cavity.
01:34:35 Although the latest amendments to the building regulations require fire stopping around the
01:34:39 window, the problem may exist in many properties with windows that were replaced before April
01:34:45 2007.
01:34:46 We've also noted the panels on the exterior of flats have been replaced with non-fire
01:34:51 resisting U.P.V.C. panels as part of replacement of window units.
01:34:56 This may have contributed to total failure of the windows during a fire and consequently
01:35:01 contributed to fire being able to pass upwards across the exterior wall to the windows of
01:35:07 flats above, causing them to fail and fire to spread to those flats.
01:35:12 And if we go to the section below that one, which is under the heading Lack of fire stopping
01:35:18 barriers and wall cavities, the letter continues thus.
01:35:23 Lack of fire stopping in wall cavities has been noted in a number of fires, particularly
01:35:27 those involving older timber frame construction.
01:35:31 Although such structures are safe, if correctly constructed, the lack of fire stopping in
01:35:36 some 1960s and 1970s structures is a cause for concern as it has allowed unrestricted
01:35:43 rapid fire spread through the building.
01:35:45 In more than one case, this has resulted in total loss of the building.
01:35:49 Although required by building regulations, the same problem has been found in some more
01:35:54 modern properties.
01:35:55 Now, can you help us?
01:35:57 What had prompted AC Churich to send this letter?
01:36:01 This would have been a result of fire investigation reports following fires at premises where
01:36:06 these circumstances had actually been noticed and also by inspections carried out, predominantly
01:36:14 by fire safety regulation officers when they liaise with local authorities and inspect
01:36:19 buildings in their care.
01:36:21 Now the introductions read, and I took you to it, in light of a number of recent fires
01:36:26 and social housing talks.
01:36:28 Can you recall now, did those fires involve non-fire resisting external panels?
01:36:33 I can't recall.
01:36:36 Thank you.
01:36:38 Can I now turn to a separate topic, which is the immediate aftermath of the Lacknell
01:36:42 House fire and the correspondence you had with DCLG.
01:36:47 Now, three months after Mr Churich's letter, on the 3rd of July 2009, a fire started in
01:36:54 a television on the 9th floor of Lacknell House in Southwark.
01:36:58 Am I right in saying that the fire spread rapidly both up and down the building through
01:37:05 false ceiling voids and via the building's composite external façade panels, which were
01:37:10 constructed I think of UPVC?
01:37:12 That's correct.
01:37:14 Now, can we go to LFB quadruple zero 1232?
01:37:25 This is a letter that you sent Mr Dobson to local authorities and social housing providers
01:37:30 on the 9th of July, so six days after the fire, and it's entitled, Social Housing,
01:37:37 Fire Safety Risk Assessment and Maintenance of Means of Escape Provisions.
01:37:42 Now, you open this letter and the first two paragraphs by making reference back to Mr
01:37:48 Churich's letter of the 23rd of March, which we looked at just now, and say that you are
01:37:53 writing following the Lacknell fire to remind recipients of their responsibilities under
01:37:58 the RRO.
01:37:59 Now, if we look at the third and fourth paragraphs of the letter, they read as follows.
01:38:06 Firstly, a requirement of the order, that's the RRO, is that a suitable and sufficient
01:38:11 fire safety risk assessment is undertaken for all premises to which the order applies.
01:38:17 In this regard, I would emphasise that any risk assessment should include, amongst other
01:38:22 things, consideration of the compartmentation within the premises, particularly where it
01:38:27 protects means of escape routes, and that there are systems in place to ensure that
01:38:32 these elements of compartmentation are maintained.
01:38:35 It is also a requirement of the order that the risk assessment should be reviewed if
01:38:40 any material change takes place within the premises.
01:38:43 This will include changes to the compartmentation arrangements, as well as potentially any refurbishment
01:38:49 work.
01:38:50 The findings of the fire risk assessment must be implemented to remove or reduce fire risks
01:38:56 and to ensure adequate general fire precautions are provided.
01:39:00 In particular, this includes an evacuation strategy that is appropriate to the circumstances
01:39:06 of the individual premises.
01:39:08 Now, at this time, bearing in mind what's set out in that letter, was it the brigade's
01:39:14 working assumption that poor compartmentation was one of the root causes or principal features
01:39:21 of the Lacknell fire?
01:39:22 I think the early indications from the fire investigation was the case, yes.
01:39:27 Was there a concern within the LFB at that time that many other buildings in London might
01:39:32 suffer from the same instance of poor compartmentation?
01:39:35 Yes, it was, and hence the letter.
01:39:38 And presumably the hope was in sending this letter that defects in compartmentation could
01:39:44 be identified by local authorities, RSLs and remedied?
01:39:49 Correct, yes.
01:39:51 Can we go back and look at the final sentence of the fourth paragraph on this first page,
01:39:57 where it says this, in particular, this includes an evacuation strategy that is appropriate
01:40:03 to the circumstances of the individual premises.
01:40:07 Was that a suggestion that the stay put strategy may not be appropriate in high-rise buildings
01:40:14 which do not have adequate compartmentation?
01:40:17 No, I don't think that was the intention of this letter, that statement there.
01:40:21 This was once again a reflection of the emerging findings from the fire investigation into
01:40:25 Lacknell House, where we knew from those initial investigations that there were escape balconies
01:40:31 on the second floor of each of the flats, but we also started to identify that the residents
01:40:38 weren't aware of the purpose of those balconies, and also that in some cases those balconies
01:40:43 had been used for inappropriate storage and things like that, making their use as an escape
01:40:49 route, undermining their use as an escape route.
01:40:52 I don't think I had anything more than that in mind at the time of this letter.
01:40:56 Can we now go to a separate piece of correspondence which has been found at LFB 00104291, and
01:41:05 this is a letter that you sent to Sir Ken Knight, so your predecessor from the LFB,
01:41:09 who is now the Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor.
01:41:12 Now, in that letter you say this, Dear Sir Ken, I'm writing to inform you that as part
01:41:18 of our investigation into the fire at Lacknell House on 3 July 2009, we have had tests carried
01:41:24 out on the exterior wall panels of the building, and that those tests have given rise to concerns
01:41:30 which may well be relevant to other high-rise premises.
01:41:34 Although our investigations are continuing and the matter has still to come before the
01:41:38 coroner, I feel that it is in the public interest to draw the issue to your attention so that
01:41:44 the matter can be discussed within the Department and any necessary advice can be given to
01:41:48 owners and landlords of high-rise buildings.
01:41:51 Now, in the paragraphs following, you summarise the functional requirement B4 of the building
01:41:58 regulations, i.e. that a building's external walls should adequately resist fire spread,
01:42:04 and you also set out the relevant provisions of approved document B.
01:42:09 Could we turn to the second page of this letter, however, and look at the third paragraph in
01:42:13 particular?
01:42:14 There you say this.
01:42:17 Based on the tests conducted by the building research establishment, it appears that there
01:42:21 are external wall panels at Lacknell House that do not have the necessary reaction to
01:42:27 fire properties required for the location in which they have been used.
01:42:32 We have also become aware that this type of panel has been supplied by more than one company.
01:42:38 In the circumstances, we believe it may be appropriate for a warning to be given to housing
01:42:43 providers that it would be advisable to check the specifications for external wall panels
01:42:48 in their high-rise housing stock and check that what has been installed meets the correct
01:42:53 specification, i.e. that fire safety requirements of the building regulations were taken into
01:42:59 account and to include this in fire risk assessments for relevant properties.
01:43:06 Now, taking the step back and looking at this letter with a cold eye, it appears that you
01:43:12 were primarily concerned that a similar fire, that's one involving external fire spread,
01:43:18 could occur at any number of buildings if similar non-compliant panels had been fitted.
01:43:23 Yes.
01:43:24 Is that a fair summary?
01:43:25 Yes, it is.
01:43:26 There's no suggestion in your letter that this was a London-specific problem.
01:43:30 Again, is that a fair reading of what you set out here?
01:43:33 Yes, it is.
01:43:35 And so presumably you were inviting Sir Ken Knight to write to all local authorities,
01:43:40 housing providers, etc. across the United Kingdom.
01:43:44 I was.
01:43:46 Mrs. Dexter told the inquiry that despite being Deputy Commissioner with responsibility
01:43:51 for the Fire Safety Department, at the time this letter was sent, she had no involvement
01:43:56 in its drafting, nor had she been made aware of the issues that are set out in this letter,
01:44:01 nor the decision to write to Sir Ken in these terms.
01:44:04 First of all, do you agree with that?
01:44:07 Could you remind me of the date of the letter, please?
01:44:09 Yes, if you go to the front page, it is 14 December 2009.
01:44:14 OK.
01:44:19 My recollection is that at that time, Mrs. Dexter wasn't a Deputy Commissioner because
01:44:23 the previous Deputy Commissioner, Roy Bishop, had retired on 30 September 2009, and Mrs.
01:44:29 Dexter wasn't actually appointed to the role of Deputy Commissioner until later in 2010.
01:44:38 Had her predecessor stood down in November 2009?
01:44:41 Her predecessor, Roy Bishop, retired on 30 September 2009.
01:44:49 The reason I'm slightly surprised by your answer here is that the information we have
01:44:54 the start date of her role as Deputy Commissioner was 10 November 2009, i.e. a month or so before
01:45:02 this letter was sent.
01:45:03 I don't believe so. I may be wrong, but my recollection was that there was an interim
01:45:12 period whereby before an appointment was made and the authority didn't actually appoint
01:45:17 Mrs. Dexter as the Deputy Commissioner until later in 2010.
01:45:22 So she would appear to be right therefore on the substance that she wasn't consulted
01:45:27 on its contents, was unaware that it was going to be sent and certainly unaware that it was
01:45:31 to be sent to Sir Ken in these terms. Is that a fair summary?
01:45:34 I think so, yes.
01:45:38 Do you know whether anyone in the Fire Safety Department was involved in the consideration
01:45:43 of the substance of this letter?
01:45:45 Yes, the letter would have been drafted on my behalf by members of the Fire Safety Regulation
01:45:49 Department, principally Assistant Commissioner Chirick.
01:45:54 I think Mr. Chirick is the principal draftsman of it, is that correct?
01:45:57 Yes it is, yes.
01:45:59 Just going back, just one point, it's probably a very minor point in the scheme of things,
01:46:05 but we have Mrs. Dexter's start date as 10 November from paragraph 4 of her witness statement
01:46:11 in which she confirmed that as her start date.
01:46:15 Your recollection is different?
01:46:16 My recollection is different, yes.
01:46:18 We have Sir Ken Knight's response to you and that can be found at HOM Trouble 0 46018.
01:46:32 We see it's dated the 22nd December 2009, so some eight days after the initial letter.
01:46:38 He refers there to having attended a meeting of the MPS, Strategic Investigation Oversight
01:46:44 Group, or the inelegantly acronym SIOG for the Lacknell House Fire.
01:46:50 If we go to the fourth paragraph on this page, Sir Ken said this, members of SIOG did recognise
01:46:58 that the information arising from the BRE report has potential implications for meeting
01:47:03 the expectations of certain aspects of approved Document B of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations
01:47:10 as amended, but it was felt that at this time there was insufficient information to warrant
01:47:16 alerting housing authorities and or property owners to the specific matters raised, not
01:47:22 least as the investigation has not yet determined if the surface spread of flame properties
01:47:28 of the panels fitted in Lacknell House were specified by the Housing Authority.
01:47:33 The investigation has not yet determined if the surface spread of flame properties of
01:47:37 the panels fitted in Lacknell House were differently specified to those subsequently
01:47:42 fitted.
01:47:43 Then if we look at the second page of this letter, Mr Dobson, in the second paragraph
01:47:48 onwards, Sir Ken said this, MPS, that's the Metropolitan Police Service, investigators
01:47:55 are actively pursuing the information required to clarify the public interest issues.
01:48:00 The above matters have been discussed with colleagues within communities and local government.
01:48:05 The clarification being sought by the investigators will in turn assist further discussion on
01:48:10 the disclosure of the relevant information.
01:48:12 In the meantime, CLG Housing Policy colleagues are including a generic statement and a letter
01:48:18 to Housing Authorities, a copy of which I look forward to keeping in touch on the above
01:48:24 issues.
01:48:25 Now, having set that out, a policy that is a very long run up, but it's probably helpful
01:48:29 to take you back through the documents, we've got a copy of the letter which seems to be
01:48:33 a generic statement that Sir Ken was referring to.
01:48:36 We can find that LFB 0041215.
01:48:46 Now you'll see from the top left, it's also dated the 22nd of December 2009, so the same
01:48:52 day as his response to you.
01:48:54 It's addressed to the CEOs, Local Housing Authorities in England, so probably it's
01:48:59 not the United Kingdom, it's England.
01:49:01 It's entitled Fire Safety and High-Rise Social Rented Housing Blocks.
01:49:05 Now on the first page, under the heading Building Regulations and Building Control, the letter
01:49:11 said this, one point of interest coming to our attention has been concerns raised regarding
01:49:17 the specification of window and cladding systems used on high-rise blocks.
01:49:23 Guidance on the appropriate specification of external walls and cladding systems to
01:49:28 satisfy the fire safety aspects of buildings regulations is given an approved document
01:49:33 B, Fire Safety, Section 12.
01:49:35 Whilst the specification of window frames would not normally be affected by this guidance,
01:49:42 infills, spandrels and over cladding could be.
01:49:46 Where any work which is subject to the building regulations is carried out, then this should
01:49:51 be checked by building control body in accordance with those regulations.
01:49:56 If there is any doubt over the application of or compliance with these regulations, then
01:50:02 advice should be sought from the relevant building control body.
01:50:07 Now taking the step back, this letter appears to put the owners squarely on housing authorities
01:50:15 who may have any doubt about compliance with the building regulations and the onus is on
01:50:21 them to report the matter to the relevant building control body.
01:50:25 Was that how you read this generic statement when you received it in December 2009?
01:50:30 It was.
01:50:33 That contrasts markedly with the contents of your letter and in your letter you were
01:50:39 suggesting writing to housing providers specifically to invite them proactively to check the specifications
01:50:47 of their high-rise external wall panels for compliance with the building regulations.
01:50:52 Again, is that a fair reading of what you were asking Sir Ken to do?
01:50:56 It is.
01:50:59 Did you have the view at the time that Sir Ken's generic letter did not satisfy the
01:51:07 request that you'd put in your letter of the 14th of December 2009?
01:51:11 I think my feeling was that it partially satisfied it but didn't go as far as I was hoping the
01:51:16 government might go.
01:51:18 Can you help us?
01:51:19 Where did it fall short in your view?
01:51:20 I think it could have been more widely circulated rather than just the building and the people
01:51:26 it is addressed to.
01:51:27 It should have been addressed to maybe owners of social housing or I can't remember the
01:51:32 exact names of all the bodies that it would be right to but certainly a wider audience
01:51:36 than just was here.
01:51:38 And I actually think it might at this point have been worthy of a note to fire and rescue
01:51:43 services as well.
01:51:45 Did you make those points to Sir Ken at the time?
01:51:48 I think my letter, not specifically verbally, but I think my letter was clear that I expected
01:51:55 probably more action than was undertaken as a result of this letter.
01:52:01 You presumably would have known him from your time together at the LFB.
01:52:06 Did you contact him to say, listen Ken, this doesn't really meet what is required?
01:52:11 No I didn't.
01:52:12 Can you help us as to why not?
01:52:15 Because at the time there was still, the police investigation was taking place into
01:52:19 Lacanau House.
01:52:20 Sir Ken on behalf of the government was involved in that and there was, whether it was real
01:52:26 or perceived, it certainly existed, there was a barrier between London Fire Brigade
01:52:31 and Sir Ken's department in relation to things relating to Lacanau House.
01:52:36 So I didn't feel in a position to be able to undertake that sort of informal approach.
01:52:41 Can we go to LFB 0089549?
01:52:52 Now we can see from the bottom half of this page that this was the email by which the
01:52:57 generic letter was sent to you.
01:53:00 If we go up the page, we can see that you forwarded it to Rita Dexter, Steve Churick
01:53:08 at DAC Cut Bill and John Badbury commenting, this is interesting.
01:53:14 First of all, can we assume from the fact that you sent it to Rita Dexter that she
01:53:20 was effectively the Deputy Commissioner by this stage or would she normally have been
01:53:23 included in circulation of this type?
01:53:27 I would normally try to circulate to as many of the directors as possible.
01:53:31 That's always a problem in terms of sending everyone everything because that was overload.
01:53:36 But because Rita Dexter had some responsibility for fire safety regulations, Steve Churick
01:53:40 in particular, it was appropriate to send it to her.
01:53:43 Why did you consider it to be, quote, interesting?
01:53:47 I think it was interesting because of the discussions we'd had previously about what
01:53:51 the government reaction might be to the letter and how much action might be taken.
01:53:55 Now mindful of the answer you gave to an earlier question, as the police investigation into
01:54:01 Lacknock progressed, as the causes became clearer as well.
01:54:07 Did you consider pressing Sir Ken again on adopting your suggestion of a more proactive
01:54:13 approach to housing providers in respect of external wall cladding?
01:54:17 I did consider it, but I decided against it for the reasons I mentioned earlier.
01:54:22 Can you remember whether you or anyone else at your behest in December 2009 or shortly
01:54:28 thereafter took any steps to warn operational crews that given the presence of exterior
01:54:35 panels they may encounter the type of rapid external fire spread that was encountered
01:54:41 at Lacknock?
01:54:42 Not that I recall, no.
01:54:44 Why not?
01:54:46 Because I think the speed at which the fire spread externally was an issue which was brought
01:54:52 about by the failure of the panel in the windows.
01:54:54 But it was my belief that actually that was not an unusual type of fire spread that firefighters
01:55:01 would not be surprised about.
01:55:03 So actually firefighters, particularly working with high-rise buildings, would not be surprised
01:55:08 to see a fire exit the window and spread the way that it did.
01:55:11 They might just be more surprised at the speed of it.
01:55:15 Mr Dobson, if I can make a plea on behalf of the transcriber.
01:55:20 It's very difficult, the moment someone suggests you to speak slowly it may not always achieve
01:55:25 that aim.
01:55:26 I'm sorry.
01:55:27 But I'd be grateful for your help there.
01:55:32 Was any consideration given to informing crews about what to do when confronted with widespread
01:55:39 compartmentation failure, which is one of the features we discussed at Lacknock?
01:55:44 No, because the issues at Lacknock, the operational issues at Lacknock, were brought about more
01:55:51 by the need to move the bridgehead down the building because the fire was spreading downwards
01:55:56 rather than in the way they were traditionally expected to be, which was upwards.
01:55:59 So in terms of actually firefighting on the floors where the fire existed, apart from
01:56:06 it being a severe fire, I didn't think there was anything particularly that was unusual
01:56:10 that fire crews needed to be notified of.
01:56:13 Can we go to LFB 0025654 forward slash 13?
01:56:26 Now this is an appendix that was included within a 2015 report that we'll come to later
01:56:34 in your evidence.
01:56:35 But the substance of the appendix is a note from 2010, you'll see 15th of April 2010,
01:56:42 prepared by Mr. Turek for you.
01:56:46 And in that note it says this under the heading Building Regulations Compliance Issues for
01:56:52 Stakeholder Meeting on the 21st of April 2010 at Union Street.
01:56:58 It said this, you are due to meet with representatives from the construction and building control
01:57:03 sectors on 21st of April to discuss our concerns about the quality of construction and checking
01:57:10 of new build and refurbished residential premises.
01:57:14 Now we can see the list of attendees, included senior individuals from the Construction Industry
01:57:21 Council, which is the CIC, the NHBC, LABC and representatives from CLG including Mr.
01:57:30 Brian Martin, is that right?
01:57:32 That's correct, yes.
01:57:33 Can we go to page 14, so over the page, and we see there the heading Background to Issues.
01:57:40 And if I could go through the six bullet points that are set out there, and apologies for
01:57:46 having to listen to me read them out.
01:57:48 A significant number of recent fires over the last two years or so have exhibited unusual
01:57:53 fire spread and or smoke spread.
01:57:57 Investigations have often found this to be due to failures to comply with the building
01:58:00 regulations either during construction or during refurbishment.
01:58:05 The fires concerned have resulted in persons becoming trapped and requiring rescue by the
01:58:10 brigade, building collapse and other unnecessary damage to buildings.
01:58:15 Firefighters being placed at unnecessary risk.
01:58:18 Second bullet point, similar failures to comply with the building regulations have been found
01:58:22 as a result of standard audits and follow up to alleged fire risks.
01:58:28 Third bullet point, around 50-50 significant cases in the London area have come to our
01:58:33 attention over the last two years or so.
01:58:36 In each case the building defects arose at the time of construction or refurbishment.
01:58:42 Most cases involve large and major construction companies.
01:58:46 Fourth bullet point, in each case the building defects appear to either have not been identified
01:58:52 by the building control body or to have been noted but not followed up on to ensure the
01:58:57 defects were remedied before the premises come into use.
01:59:02 Fifth bullet point, there is now a mass of significant concern whether the construction
01:59:07 and approval process has been enforced with sufficient vigour to reasonably ensure new
01:59:12 residential buildings in London are fit for purpose.
01:59:16 Sixth bullet point, a further issue is that the buildings involved so far can have been
01:59:22 built at any time over the last 10 or 15 years.
01:59:26 Consequently we are concerned about how many residential premises with significant building
01:59:30 regulation defects may be in use in London.
01:59:35 Now we can take it from that, and I want to see whether you agree, that certainly in April
01:59:41 2010 non-compliance with building regulations was not an abstract issue for the LFB but
01:59:49 it was a risk that had already been identified and realised in a significant number of fires
01:59:54 in the capital.
01:59:55 Is that a fair summary?
01:59:56 Yes.
01:59:57 And in particular the distinctive features of those fires had been unusual fire and or
02:00:04 smoke spread, is that right?
02:00:08 In most, but not in all, I would say the fire spread was not unusual in terms of its predictability
02:00:14 given the defects of the buildings.
02:00:15 But yes I would agree.
02:00:17 Now Mrs Dexter gave evidence that fire spread beyond the compartment of origin was not a
02:00:22 one-off at Lacknall and was in fact, the words she used were common.
02:00:28 Would you agree that is what this memorandum is alluding to?
02:00:32 Yes.
02:00:33 Do you remember the meeting on the 21st of April?
02:00:36 I remember this briefing note, but I'm trying very hard to remember the actual meeting and
02:00:40 I'm afraid I can't at the moment.
02:00:42 Now if we can turn over the page again to page 15, this sets out a list of what are
02:00:47 called key issues for discussion with stakeholders and if we could look at some of those in slightly
02:00:53 more detail, first of which is C. Now that said this, the role of other key players,
02:01:00 CIC, LABC, ACAI, can you help us with that?
02:01:06 I'm afraid not.
02:01:07 CLG, we know, and Alfeper in ensuring the construction industry complies with the building
02:01:13 regulations and that appropriate checks are made to verify compliance.
02:01:20 Helped with that reminder, does that prompt any recollection of the gist of the discussion
02:01:25 of that topic?
02:01:27 It does.
02:01:28 I remember a meeting held at Union Street where there was representatives from these
02:01:34 bodies, but I have that as a recollection of a meeting also attended by some local authorities
02:01:40 in London as well, so I'm not sure that I'm remembering exactly the right meeting, unfortunately.
02:01:45 Can you help us then with perhaps a slightly more practical question, what was Alfeper's
02:01:52 role in ensuring the construction industry complies with the building regulations and
02:01:56 that appropriate checks are made?
02:01:58 Well our role was to make the building construction industry and the government aware of defects
02:02:04 that were being identified by us, either by inspection or by fire investigation following
02:02:10 incidents that occurred within London.
02:02:12 Could we look at item E?
02:02:14 And that provides this, identifying and remedying historic hidden failures that would not be
02:02:20 identified through normal fire risk assessment.
02:02:24 What type of issues did the LFE have in mind here?
02:02:27 We had in mind there that the fire safety order required responsible persons to carry
02:02:32 out a fire risk assessment of their building, but at that point it didn't require them to
02:02:36 carry out an intrusive survey and therefore some of the defects that had caused the fire
02:02:41 spread within these buildings, i.e. failure or absence of fire stopping within cavities,
02:02:47 wouldn't necessarily be identified by the fire risk assessment carried out.
02:02:50 Can you remember whether one of the issues that the LFE had in mind there was a widespread
02:02:55 breakdown in compartmentation?
02:02:57 I don't recall that being discussed though.
02:03:02 Can you remember whether there was much discussion or the concerns the LFE had were non-compliant
02:03:07 panels as had been encountered at LATNOR?
02:03:10 Not in relation to this particular meeting, no.
02:03:13 Was there any conclusion as to how these historic hidden failures might be identified and remedied?
02:03:21 Not that I recall.
02:03:22 Can we look at item G, which asked what can be done to improve compliance with the building
02:03:30 regulations and to identify significant historic failures so that they can be rectified?
02:03:36 Can you recall what if any conclusion was reached on that point?
02:03:39 I think this was, I do remember this, I think this was an issue that all the bodies that
02:03:45 attended the meeting raised lack of resources as their main concern.
02:03:50 So I think there was some concern amongst all the bodies that attended this and also
02:03:54 whether it was this meeting or another one raised with me by local authorities that the
02:03:58 resources available to them to carry out their building control function had been
02:04:03 reduced in time, I couldn't put a timescale on that, and that was impairing their ability
02:04:07 to carry out their role in relation to what we're talking about here.
02:04:11 Bearing in mind that, did you raise with them at this stage your suggestion for more proactive
02:04:17 action to be taken in relation to writing to housing providers etc that you'd set out
02:04:22 in your 14th December letter?
02:04:24 I believe so but I can't be absolutely certain.
02:04:28 Now we took Mr Daley through the substance of this note and I think I'm right in saying
02:04:34 he was the head of fire safety at the time.
02:04:36 What, at the time of this meeting?
02:04:38 Yes, was it Mr Churek?
02:04:40 It would have been Mr Churek, yes.
02:04:42 Was he a member of the fire safety team at this stage?
02:04:45 I believe, actually I think he was a station manager at the time, I'm not entirely sure
02:04:48 but I think he was, I don't think he was in the fire safety regulation team at this time.
02:04:52 Now he's certainly there at the head of fire safety at the time of the Grenfell fire.
02:04:57 Now he agreed these issues have a direct impact on operational firefighting and the
02:05:01 appropriate operational response.
02:05:03 Bearing that in mind, was there a reason why you couldn't share the issues that you discussed
02:05:10 at this meeting with operational crews?
02:05:12 There was not a reason why we couldn't.
02:05:16 I think in terms of communication with the operational workforce generally, at the back
02:05:21 of my mind in all these issues when we're talking about making operational stations
02:05:25 aware of things, is the judgment given by the judge in the case against the four firefighters
02:05:31 from Atherton and Stour who were charged with corporate gross negligence, corporate manslaughter.
02:05:39 And I believe the inquirer has seen the outcome from that trial where the judge in there actually
02:05:44 is very, very, very clear that he believed that one of the causes of the fire, one of
02:05:48 the contributory factors to the deaths were that, was the proliferation, I think was his
02:05:54 word that he used, of guidance and information given to operational crews, much of which
02:05:59 conflicted with each other, others which duplicated each other.
02:06:02 Now in relation to this particular issue, I'm speaking slowly enough, in relation to
02:06:07 this particular issue, the fire spread within the buildings where these fires occurred was
02:06:13 unusual because of the reason it was called, because the fire stopping was absent.
02:06:18 But as an operational firefighter, wouldn't have been things that I believe operational
02:06:23 crews would not have expected to see and weren't ready to deal with.
02:06:26 Certainly, they were the types of things that I as an operational officer wouldn't have
02:06:31 been completely surprised by.
02:06:35 Could I suggest though, that notwithstanding the warning against a proliferation of advice
02:06:40 notes, policy changes and the rest of it, there was something to be said for warning
02:06:45 operational crews about the emerging, indeed significant trend of non-compliant buildings
02:06:51 and the significant number of unusual instances of fire and smoke spread.
02:06:57 There's nothing to stop that, was there?
02:06:59 No, there wasn't, no.
02:07:00 But I would suggest that they weren't as unusual and I would also suggest that they wouldn't
02:07:07 be a surprise to operational firefighters generally when attending incidents.
02:07:12 Can we turn onto a separate topic now and that's correspondence you had with central
02:07:16 in respect of the functional requirement B4 of the building regulations.
02:07:22 Now the note we've just looked at focused primarily on building regulation non-compliances
02:07:28 in a general sense.
02:07:30 Now I think what I'd like to do now is to focus on a particular aspect of the building
02:07:34 regulations which is B4 and again, that in summary is the requirement that a building's
02:07:40 external walls should be capable of resisting fire spread in broad terms.
02:07:45 Now we know that the report which we can find at LFB 0000039545 was produced for the
02:07:56 brigade by Adrian Prest, that's P-R-E-S-T, a former head of building control at East
02:08:03 Hertfordshire and we can see it is dated at the very top October 2010.
02:08:10 Now I'll come to this in a moment.
02:08:13 The report advises the LFB on the correct interpretation of functional requirement B4.
02:08:20 Now do you recall seeing this report?
02:08:22 I do.
02:08:24 Did you see this report in or about October 2010, do you remember?
02:08:28 It was probably slightly later than that but yes, it was about that time.
02:08:32 Why was Mr Prest engaged to advise the LFB on the proper understanding of functional
02:08:38 requirement B4?
02:08:41 Because it was a cause of discussion amongst fire safety officers, it was also something
02:08:46 we'd written to the government about in terms of interpretation and we were seeking an independent
02:08:51 interpretation of that regulation.
02:08:54 When you say it was a source of discussion, is that a euphemism for they couldn't agree
02:08:58 what it meant?
02:08:59 Not entirely, yes.
02:09:00 Thank you.
02:09:01 If we can turn to page five of his report.
02:09:06 We see there under the heading Question 4 and 15th of October discussions before external
02:09:12 walls fire spread.
02:09:14 We can see a question that Mr Prest was asked to answer and that question is this.
02:09:21 Do the requirements for external walls bear directly upon their ability to resist fire
02:09:27 spreading from inside a building and up the outside of the wall, i.e. when ignited other
02:09:33 than by radiation from another building?
02:09:37 Mr Prest sets out his understanding of B4 and we can see in the third paragraph of that
02:09:44 page he says ADB4 as amended March 2010 states that B4 will be met if the external walls
02:09:51 restrict the risk of ignition from an external source and the spread of fire over their surfaces.
02:09:59 And then if we go to the penultimate paragraph on that page, Mr Prest's ultimate conclusion
02:10:04 was this.
02:10:07 Although there are requirements relating to fire spread including in cavities of external
02:10:12 walls, ADB4, that's approved document B, does not clearly indicate that resistance or prevention
02:10:20 of fire spread over external walls from an internal fire is an objective in its own right.
02:10:28 Having seen that conclusion, can you remember what your response was to it?
02:10:34 Firstly, I think it's right to say that I never served in a specialist fire safety department
02:10:40 in London Fire Brigade.
02:10:41 Probably for the cultural reasons we discussed earlier Mr Kinnear.
02:10:45 You were on the upside.
02:10:46 I was on the upside unfortunately, yes.
02:10:47 I wish I hadn't been.
02:10:48 I wish I had had fire safety experience but it's certainly been helpful to me in the role
02:10:52 as a commissioner.
02:10:53 But my reading of this and I think the advice I got from colleagues in the fire safety department
02:10:59 who raised it with me was that they found this, they found it quite perverse really
02:11:05 and not intuitive that it could be read in that way.
02:11:15 I think we can put it this way that it was put politely at odds with the brigade's understanding
02:11:23 which was that the fire resistance of the external face was a requirement in its own right.
02:11:28 I think that's correct.
02:11:33 Now if we can go to LFB 0049525.
02:11:45 Thank you.
02:11:48 These are the minutes of the fire safety regulation department in the Lackmore House meeting on
02:11:53 the 18th of January 2011.
02:11:56 You didn't attend that meeting.
02:11:58 I don't think you were required to attend that meeting.
02:12:00 If we turn to page 2 and paragraph 3.8, the minutes record the following.
02:12:09 Dave Kennet advised that he and GM Paul Jenkins would be meeting Brian Martin to discuss B4
02:12:18 fire spread issues and Adrian Prest's view that the external part of the Lackmore building
02:12:24 complies with the building regulations.
02:12:27 If there's ultimately any concern over the interpretation of ADB then this would be a
02:12:32 national learning issue and it would be for the commissioner to raise with the Secretary
02:12:36 of State.
02:12:38 Were you aware of that proposed meeting with Mr Martin from CLG?
02:12:42 I knew there were a range of meetings taking place with the government department about
02:12:46 this and other issues but not this specific meeting.
02:12:49 Were you aware that they were minded to ask you to raise the matter with the Secretary
02:12:54 of State?
02:12:55 I'm not surprised, yes.
02:12:58 What did the brigade hope to achieve from the meeting with Mr Martin?
02:13:03 I think they hope to achieve a clarification into the government's precise interpretation
02:13:08 of the regulation.
02:13:13 Now Andy Jack touches on this issue in his third statement to the inquiry which we can
02:13:19 find LFB 00120308.
02:13:25 Now if we can go to page 6 of that statement and paragraph 19 Mr Jack explains that matters
02:13:42 thus.
02:13:43 The LFB sought guidance from the government as to the scope of requirement B41 and the
02:13:50 guidance and approved document B following Adrian Prest's report on the fire at Lacknell
02:13:55 House in 2010.
02:13:57 On the 14th of February 2011 the LFB wrote to Brian Martin of the DCLG quotes to ensure
02:14:05 that we have correctly understood requirement B4 of the building regulations particularly
02:14:10 with regards to vertical fire spread.
02:14:12 Mr Jack exhibited that letter which we can find at LFB 00120305.
02:14:30 And that letter addressed to Mr Martin said this, you will be aware that we are currently
02:14:35 carrying out an investigation into the fire that occurred at Lacknell Camberwell in July
02:14:40 2009.
02:14:42 As part of the investigation we need to ensure that we have correctly understood requirement
02:14:47 B4 of the building regulations particularly with regards to vertical fire spread therefore
02:14:54 we seek your assistance and would be grateful if you would answer the questions set out
02:14:58 below.
02:15:00 B41 contains two objectives.
02:15:03 Firstly to restrict the spread of fire over the external envelope of the building and
02:15:08 secondly to restrict the spread of fire from one building to another.
02:15:13 One, please confirm whether or not the first objective is an objective in its own right
02:15:19 regardless of distance from any boundary.
02:15:22 Two, please confirm whether or not the building regulations and approved document B recognises
02:15:29 that rapid fire spread over the external envelope of a building may make fire service
02:15:33 intervention more difficult and therefore the combustibility of the external envelope
02:15:38 should be controlled.
02:15:40 The question then, rather the letter then goes on to pose three more questions which
02:15:46 I won't read out for you.
02:15:49 But looking at that letter would it be fair to say that this piece of correspondence taken
02:15:56 the other evidence we've discussed this afternoon shows that certainly by February 2011 your
02:16:02 fire safety department had developed a detailed and technical understanding of external wall
02:16:08 panels and the fact that those materials were being used contrary to the building regulations.
02:16:16 I'm not sure I could go quite that far.
02:16:19 Certainly the evidence from Lackinall House in terms of the spandrel panels in those windows
02:16:23 was the thing that precipitated this and I think I don't necessarily think that the content
02:16:30 of this letter would mean that they had a general concern about it.
02:16:33 Certainly it was an issue they wanted clarified and they would have wanted it clarified for
02:16:38 a number of reasons, not least the potential prosecution of Sutherborough Council as a
02:16:43 result of the Lackinall fire.
02:16:45 How usual was it for the LFB to write to officials at CLG asking for clarification of detailed
02:16:53 questions arising under the building regulations?
02:16:58 I can't answer that question I'm afraid.
02:17:00 Did you see this letter before it was sent to Mr Martin?
02:17:03 No.
02:17:04 Were you aware that it was the intention was to send it?
02:17:08 Yes.
02:17:09 Were you aware of the gist of the contents of this letter?
02:17:13 Yes.
02:17:14 Were you aware of the specific detailed questions, the five, that it was proposed that Mr Martin
02:17:21 should answer?
02:17:23 Insofar as they were issues that have been discussed with me previously, yes.
02:17:26 Thank you.
02:17:27 Now, Mr Martin's reply was on the 23rd of February 2011 and we can find that at LFB
02:17:34 00113254.
02:17:44 And if we could look at the foot of page one, he repeats or rehearses the Brigade's first
02:17:50 question and responds in the final paragraph of that page, he says this, the two objectives
02:17:57 that form the requirements in paragraph B41 of Schedule 1 of the building regulations
02:18:03 are closely linked but are independent of each other.
02:18:07 Both need to be considered having regard to the height, use and position of the building.
02:18:13 Now, to my eye at least, he appears to have confirmed that the LFB's view was to be preferred
02:18:20 and that Mr Prest's view was not to be preferred.
02:18:25 Was that how you read Mr Martin's response back in February 2011?
02:18:30 Yes.
02:18:33 Was there a view at the LFB that Mr Prest's erroneous reading of B4 was confined to him
02:18:43 or was there a fear that it was more widespread?
02:18:45 Well, I think the reason for writing to the Government Department for clarification was
02:18:49 that we believed it was actually not just his personal view and the fact that the debate
02:18:53 had been taking place with the London Fire Brigade at all actually confirmed that it
02:18:58 might be a view that was held elsewhere.
02:19:00 Now, on the documents we have, discussions appear to have gone silent until December
02:19:08 2012, so nearly two years after this initial exchange and the resurgent activity was a
02:19:17 letter you wrote to Brandon Lewis and it dealt with this and other Lacknall related issues
02:19:23 and we confined that letter at LFB, trouble 0, 32154 and it was dated the 11th of December
02:19:30 2012.
02:19:33 Now, if you said this, dear Minister, you will be aware that the London Fire Brigade
02:19:38 has been carrying out an investigation into the fire that occurred at Lacknall-Camberwell
02:19:42 on the 3rd of July 2009. In the course of that investigation, a number of issues have
02:19:49 come to light that may warrant consideration by your department. The issues have been set
02:19:54 out below as a number of recommendations. Appendix 1, which is attached to this letter,
02:20:01 provides background information for each recommendation. Now, the letter sets out seven recommendations.
02:20:07 Can you help us as to how those recommendations were identified?
02:20:11 And they were issues that were arising from the investigations into the Lacknall House
02:20:15 Fire as I remember.
02:20:17 And why did you consider it necessary to write to the Minister at this stage about these
02:20:24 matters?
02:20:25 Because I was really keen that they were actually considered properly by government and I thought
02:20:30 the appropriate way to do that would be to write to the Minister to ensure that action
02:20:33 was taken by officials.
02:20:35 Did you have an apprehension at this time that the government wouldn't take full and
02:20:40 effective action in response to these matters?
02:20:43 I suppose it did, yes.
02:20:45 Can you help us as to why you'd formed that apprehension?
02:20:48 I think probably previous experience of engagement with the government over these issues, particularly
02:20:53 around fire safety and building control, etc. where to some extent I could understand why
02:21:00 the government seemed to be reluctant to take any what I would call decisive action
02:21:07 in terms of making some, trying to make some change or indeed making people aware of the problems.
02:21:14 When you refer to government, are you referring to the particular administration that was
02:21:18 in power in December 2012?
02:21:22 Are you talking more broadly about central government over a course of administration?
02:21:26 I think I'm talking about the letter, but in particular with relation to Department
02:21:30 of Communities and Local Government with which we were set at the time.
02:21:34 And would your concerns be directed towards Ministers or would it be concerned more with
02:21:39 the acts and omissions of relevant officials?
02:21:45 Or both?
02:21:46 Both I think.
02:21:48 On the basis that Ministers would be advised by officials?
02:21:51 Yes.
02:21:52 Can we look at three of the seven recommendations that were identified in your letter to the
02:21:59 Minister?
02:22:00 And the first of which is recommendation one, which we find set out in the text here.
02:22:05 And that said this, that government provide further guidance regarding A, which parts
02:22:10 and areas of buildings containing multiple domestic premises can be described as, quote,
02:22:16 parts used in common, close quotes, common parts.
02:22:20 And B, how the fire safety order is intended to operate in relation to these premises where
02:22:25 the responsible person does not necessarily have control over features affecting common
02:22:30 parts and or common fire precautions.
02:22:35 Now what aspect of the Lacknell House fire had prompted the LFB to identify this as an
02:22:40 issue requiring additional guidance from government?
02:22:44 The breakdown of the compartmentation in relation to the ventilation, et cetera, on
02:22:49 the corridors outside the flats and the fact that the fire has spread from the flat of
02:22:54 origin out into the corridor much more quickly than we would have expected it to.
02:22:58 That's a vital issue of compartmentation.
02:23:01 Can we next look at recommendation five, which is in the final paragraph on this first page,
02:23:06 and that said this, that government provide further guidance in relation to requirement
02:23:11 B4 of the building regulations, particularly with regards to the spread of fire over the
02:23:17 external envelope of the building.
02:23:20 Now again, was your concern at this stage, and we're now three and a half years after
02:23:25 the Lacknell fire, not just that similar non-compliant external panels were on buildings in London,
02:23:33 but that similar fires could occur and in fact had occurred, and they're the ones you
02:23:37 referred to in your 2010 note?
02:23:41 Was it your hope, looking specifically at what relief you were looking for from the
02:23:48 government, that the government would either revise approved document B or would provide
02:23:53 supplemental additional advice on the scope and meaning of functional requirement B4?
02:23:58 I was hoping for the latter, although I would have been very pleased to see the former.
02:24:04 Were you hoping for the latter in that was the more precise focus concern you had at
02:24:09 the time, and that was the priority that needed dealing with?
02:24:12 For me, the priority that needed dealing with was clarity about what the regulation actually
02:24:16 meant in relation to the circumstances we were talking about, because that would then
02:24:20 provide further guidance to building control and to fire and rescue services in terms of
02:24:26 their ability to carry out their actions as a result of the fire safety order, as a result
02:24:30 of their inspections.
02:24:32 Now, could we go to page two, which is recommendation seven.
02:24:41 It said this, that government provide guidance for the responsible person as to how they
02:24:45 might assess the risk assessor has sufficient training, experience and knowledge to carry
02:24:50 out a suitable assessment of the risk in complex and high-risk premises.
02:24:56 What was it about the Lacknall fire or the LFB's subsequent investigations that had
02:25:02 prompted this particular recommendation?
02:25:06 The Lacknall fire, as it turns out, we later found out that there wasn't a risk assessment
02:25:11 for Lacknall and that was the result of the prosecution, as I recall, in terms of Southern
02:25:14 Borough Council.
02:25:15 However, it was still our concern that the guidance in relation to the responsible person
02:25:21 was not as clear as it should be in terms of the type of people they, in terms of their
02:25:27 qualifications required for them to carry out the risk assessment or indeed the people,
02:25:35 persons which they would employ to carry out that on their behalf, because these risk assessments
02:25:40 could take various stages and they may be intrusive or not.
02:25:45 And in a high-rise building, they're much more complex than carrying them out in a low-rise
02:25:49 building. So we were concerned that people of inappropriate or insufficient qualifications
02:25:57 were being engaged to carry out these risk assessments.
02:25:59 Was there a more particular concern, namely that fire risk assessors were failing to identify
02:26:05 widespread failures in compartmentation?
02:26:08 That's part of the concern, yes.
02:26:10 Thank you.
02:26:11 So we are, I think it's 27 minutes or 26 minutes past four.
02:26:16 The next section of questions I will not finish in four minutes.
02:26:20 And so I think that in those circumstances, this may be an appropriate time to end today.
02:26:25 Yes, very well. Thank you very much.
02:26:26 Well, it sounds like that's a sensible point at which to close the day, Mr Dobson.
02:26:31 I'm afraid we're going to have to ask you to come back on Monday to answer some more questions,
02:26:36 but not unexpected.
02:26:38 No.
02:26:39 So we'll stop there.
02:26:41 We'll resume, please, at 10 o'clock next Monday.
02:26:44 And as before, I have to ask you not to discuss your evidence or anything relating to it
02:26:49 over the break.
02:26:50 Okay.
02:26:51 All right?
02:26:52 Yes, sir. Thank you.
02:26:53 Thank you very much indeed.
02:26:54 Thank you very much.
02:26:55 If you go with Yasha, we'll see you on Monday.
02:26:56 Thank you.
02:26:57 Thank you.
02:27:05 Thank you very much, Mr Kinnear.
02:27:06 Well, we'll resume on Monday morning.
02:27:10 I'd just like to say a quick word of thanks to our transcriber.
02:27:13 And at that point, we shall break for the day.
02:27:16 Thank you, sir.
02:27:17 Thank you very much.
02:27:18 10 o'clock on Monday, please.