Dr Sabrina Cohen-Hatton gives evidence on her research into incident command decision-making and the Development of the Decision Control Process, including LFB's resistance to adopting it.
00:21:41 thank you [Music]
00:21:53 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing today we're going to continue hearing evidence from Dr Cohen Hutton so I need to ask Dr cohenhattan to come back in please
00:22:12 good morning Dr conehead yes please sit down good morning foreign
00:22:21 thank you very much yes yes Mr chairman good morning good morning morning members of the panel and good morning to you Dr Karen Hatton now yesterday we were just about to go to what was or what is the decision Control process and
00:22:34 what is the decision Control process and I'd like to go to that now can we please start with your witness statement please lfb double zero double one zero six six zero page seven paragraph 28.
00:22:48 foreign and you will see there it says this and I'll just read this to you the DCP decision Control process was developed to recognize both the analytical and
00:23:00 to recognize both the analytical and intuitive processes of the human brain decision controls were developed for incident commanders to enable them to focus responses on operational goals to encourage them to push their situational
00:23:11 encourage them to push their situational awareness up to the highest level and consciously consider the potential consequences of these actions and to explicitly ensure that the benefit of a decision outweighed the risk these techniques are designed to
00:23:23 these techniques are designed to minimize the potential for unexpected consequences that might occur when decisions are made intuitively furthermore our research showed the decision Control process didn't slow
00:23:34 decision Control process didn't slow down decision making it recognized and supported intuitive decisions in a way that protected against decision traps where previous decision models had failed to do so this isn't this is also an important consideration to assist
00:23:46 an important consideration to assist with learning when scrutinizing a decision post incident as the different decision types analytical and intuitive lead to different decision-making considerations and behaviors
00:23:58 considerations and behaviors now I I just want to break that up a little bit but see see if um see where we go the decision am I right the decision Control process is the process that was developed specifically as a
00:24:10 that was developed specifically as a result of the findings of your research on incident command decision making that's correct yeah in in the test that we saw that's correct right and first is it right that in summary as I
00:24:23 first is it right that in summary as I understand it is is this correct the decision Control process became a fundamental part of the national operational guidance on incident command which was under development at the time you were doing your research yes that's
00:24:35 you were doing your research yes that's correct right and it became so via the cfoa document the future of incident command August 2015 we saw yesterday no it became so through the publication of
00:24:46 it became so through the publication of the national operational guidance for incident command itself the previous month yes right now you've also set out in the passage I've just read out for everybody's benefit that the advantage
00:24:57 everybody's benefit that the advantage of the decision Control process or DCP is that it accurately reflects part of how decisions are made in practice on the incident ground is that right yes that's correct and it seeks to
00:25:08 that's correct and it seeks to strengthen that process by guarding against the dangers of what you call decision traps yes and we looked at certain kinds of decision trap yesterday yes
00:25:18 yes um so would it be would it be right to say that the decision Control process seeks to provide a solution to your findings
00:25:28 findings in your tests that commanders are typically not thinking through in a logical order the possible consequences of their chosen course of action yes it was designed to the tool to support that
00:25:39 was designed to the tool to support that yes
00:25:41 yes to support not to provide a solution but to support the process of making them think through in a logical order yes that's correct I worry that it would be an oversimplification to say that it would be the solution to the solution
00:25:53 would be the solution to the solution would suggest that it was uh it was a Panacea that would be able to um in a sense ensure that every decision was made in a in an optimal way I think decision making can be slightly more
00:26:05 decision making can be slightly more complicated than that the intention of the decision Control process was to be a tool that incident commanders could use with those techniques specifically being the decision controls that could help to
00:26:16 the decision controls that could help to guard against some of those decision traps
00:26:19 traps let's look at the 2015 edition of the national guidance programs document foundation for incident command it's at SMC 6045
00:26:38 [Music] now am I right in thinking that this is one of the parts of the national operation guidance to which you yourself contributed yes that's correct it relates to the NOG document the
00:26:50 it relates to the NOG document the future of incident command of August 2015 we looked at yesterday the interconnected documents so the national operational guidance document itself was intended to uh to be aimed at the policy
00:27:02 intended to uh to be aimed at the policy makers to assist a fire and rescue service in developing a policy for incident command the foundation for incident command provided additional evidence that expanded on some of the
00:27:13 evidence that expanded on some of the points that would be necessary to develop policy to help to help a wider audience such as trainers and incident commanders themselves
00:27:23 so it was a supporting document they were interconnected right I see uh
00:27:29 uh and this document on my right summarizes the decision Control process it does as does the national operational guidance document at the time yes
00:27:40 guidance document at the time yes I'm sorry sorry it was reflected in both it was reflected in both yes let's look at page 12 of this document
00:27:47 and let's look at the left hand column where you'll see if we can have those expanded a bit um to red bullet points under the big heading decision Control process DCP and it says in the italics in the third
00:28:01 and it says in the italics in the third paragraph there the decision Control process consists of four stages and then you have four bullet points um the first situation consists of incident resource and risk information gathering
00:28:15 resource and risk information gathering and would it be right to say that that reflects the situational awareness or sa yes that's correct situation assessment so that corresponds with
00:28:26 so that corresponds with the essay stage in the uh the DMM then you've got the second bullet point plan this comprises identifying the objectives and tactical priorities and
00:28:38 objectives and tactical priorities and developing a tactical plan does that correspond with the PF stage of the DMM the plan formulation stage it does although it was expanded slightly in the decision Control process and could you
00:28:49 decision Control process and could you just explain how certainly in the Control process itself if you move across you'll note the diagram that might be helpful for me to illustrate uh yes I'm going to come to the diagram we'll look at that sure but
00:29:02 we'll look at that sure but um in answering the question please please use it to to illustrate what you want to tell them so in essence in the decision Control process it breaks down the plan formulation stage to the objectives the
00:29:15 formulation stage to the objectives the Tactical priorities and the operational tactics to help The Incident Commander to consider the steps that might be taken when they're formulating a plan whereas in the decision-making model itself it was it was more broad it was
00:29:27 itself it was it was more broad it was just objectives um can we just have that on the screen more squarely the it's the right-hand side of the page that's the um the diagram yes could you
00:29:39 that's the um the diagram yes could you just uh point out on in the diagram where you say or how you say the plan formulation stage is expanded under the DCP certainly it's the bottom right hand
00:29:51 DCP certainly it's the bottom right hand corner that lozenge right so plan which comprises objectives tactical priorities and operational tactics yes that's correct I see so there's a correspondence with the plan
00:30:02 there's a correspondence with the plan formulation stage is this right but it's broken out into sort of sub-compartments yes right then decision controls if we go back to the left hand column in the document
00:30:12 document on page 12 third bullet point decision controls applied by applied by asking yourself why am I taking this action what are my expectations of these actions do the benefits justify the
00:30:24 actions do the benefits justify the risks
00:30:26 risks now
00:30:28 now that that involves a new element I think isn't it that's introduced by the decision Control process yes um and would it be wrong to summarize
00:30:41 um and would it be wrong to summarize that or in this way stopping and thinking before deciding uh you may have made the decision but it's stopping and thinking before you act which might change the decision
00:30:54 to review yes before you knew yes right and looking back at the diagram on the right hand side of the page please if we can again
00:31:07 um we see do we do we see that in the orange triangle yes that's correct so does it work this way did you make your plan but before you act you go into
00:31:22 your plan but before you act you go into a stage of decision control which is in the orange or ocher box and then into the okra and blue triangle where you've got to work through why why am I doing this expectations what do I expect to
00:31:34 this expectations what do I expect to get out of this benefits against risk um balancing the two uh that is one way the other way that you might come to a decision as we discussed yesterday would be through a more reflexive or intuitive
00:31:45 be through a more reflexive or intuitive process in these boxes you may go from situation assessment directly to action which essentially was plan formulation so the decision controls are intended to
00:31:57 so the decision controls are intended to be that opportunity to pause and run through that very rapid mental checklist once you've made a decision whether analytically by going situation assessment plan formulation plan execution or whether you've made that
00:32:10 execution or whether you've made that more intuitively by situation assessments directly to plan for plan execution essentially so it recognizes is both Pathways and offers an intervention at the point before you were to execute the decision related
00:32:22 were to execute the decision related with either of those Pathways right and just I'd like to come back to that in just a second but before I do the is it right that the action box well let's go back to the bullet points it's because there's some text there right left hand
00:32:34 there's some text there right left hand side action implementing the plan by communicating and controlling actions and if we look at the diagram on the right now again bottom left hand purple box communication and control does that
00:32:47 box communication and control does that correspond to the PE stage in the DMM it does yeah the plan execution stage now can I then come back to what you said a moment ago about this two lines active
00:32:58 moment ago about this two lines active monitoring monitoring on both sides of the triangle does this tell us that um you might be a linear thinker you might be a more intuitive
00:33:10 might be a more intuitive thinker or actor either way before you act whether you've come to it through a plan or straight from situation assessment you have to control the decision that you have made
00:33:22 control the decision that you have made by running through the three Ike questions why expectations benefits against risk that's correct the same decision maker may be likely to use different patterns of decision making depending on the position that they
00:33:34 depending on the position that they might be in the incident so you may use either an analytical or a intuitive Pathway to come to a decision at various points in that in that incident the
00:33:45 points in that in that incident the active monitoring lines denote the fact that you could use either pathway but they also denote the fact that you should actively be monitoring the situation whereas in the decision-making model you'll recall that there is an
00:33:57 model you'll recall that there is an evaluation triangle that waited until the end of the process and then took you back to the beginning this is intended to reflect the point that incident commanders in particular should
00:34:08 commanders in particular should constantly be seeking information that would inform their situational assessment rather than encourage charging incident commands to wait until the end and then seeing how it went yes rather than it being a loop rather than it being a loop now
00:34:20 it being a loop now the text of this document May describe better
00:34:23 better than than I can and by way of a question what it what it does can we go to the um the bottom two paragraphs on the same page on the left hand side of this document
00:34:36 uh there's some text and what it says is this under some circumstances decision makers will respond rapidly and directly to an element of the situation moving
00:34:47 to an element of the situation moving from situation assessment to action this may be particularly likely where a q or Q's prompts an intuitive decision the decision Control process takes account of the way people naturally make rapid
00:34:58 of the way people naturally make rapid decisions it presents some safeguards against potential decision traps see decision traps it also accounts for the slower and more reflective analytical type decision processes where plans are
00:35:09 type decision processes where plans are explicitly formulated the way an individual will make a decision may not consciously may not be consciously selected it depends on the number of factors related to the incident time pressures perceived at actual and the
00:35:21 pressures perceived at actual and the command Road adopted for instance a senior Commander planning the resolution of a large-scale incident may be more likely to reach a decision using an analytical process a commander who is first in attendance at a house fire
00:35:33 first in attendance at a house fire my people need urgent rescue is less likely to use this type of process and more likely to use intuitive decision making I'd like to come before I come back to the the to the
00:35:44 before I come back to the the to the questions about that text can I just ask you this um is as a result of your research did you find that
00:35:55 you find that um as a result of the lfb hierarchy uh the line of promotions a watch manager will be mostly experienced in the physical engagement at an incident
00:36:06 the physical engagement at an incident putting out the fire rescuing people or assisting with evacuation whereas senior commanders may have left that experience behind uh longer ago and
00:36:19 experience behind uh longer ago and therefore there'd be a tendency in small senior commanders to proceed along along the linear route but a greater tendency among Junior incident commanders to proceed from sa to PE
00:36:31 proceed from sa to PE and very much depend on the situation and the role that you're doing at the time that particular incident there would be more calls for a watch manager that is dealing with the very early
00:36:42 that is dealing with the very early stages of an incident particularly an incident that's very Dynamic like a fire for example to use more of those intuitive processes yes there might be incidents that are slower moving for
00:36:54 incidents that are slower moving for example a road traffic collision where it's not going to get any worse it's as bad as it's going to get so you don't have the same time pressures that you might do at an escalating incident so the reason I said is I don't want to
00:37:06 the reason I said is I don't want to make it overly simplistic it is very nuanced and will depend on the situation and both will use both processes but if your question is would a watch manager
00:37:17 your question is would a watch manager be more likely to be using intuitive processes than the kind of situation a more senior Commander might find themselves in with more time then yes that would be correct yes thank you
00:37:28 that would be correct yes thank you that's that's interesting now we've seen the expanded entry diagram on the right hand side of the page and you've explained that it would be right to say that decision
00:37:39 it would be right to say that decision controls really act as a safeguard against the fact that a decision maker may not have reflected fully on the potential consequences of a chosen course of action yeah
00:37:51 course of action yeah yeah yes
00:37:53 yeah yes so this inserts a new conscious active thinking reflective stage before the taking of the action the final taking of the action based on the decision yes that's correct right can we
00:38:05 decision yes that's correct right can we look at the more detailed guidance on this stage of the process on page 13 of this document right hand column Under The Heading decision controls
00:38:16 and that says um
00:38:22 decision controls are designed to guard against decision traps that might occur as a result of the type of decision process people naturally adopt in a situation before moving to the action phase decision makers should use
00:38:33 phase decision makers should use decision controls they can do this as fast as a fast mental check or use them as part of a briefing now the decision control checks are then listed in in bullet and sub bullets and
00:38:44 listed in in bullet and sub bullets and we saw this in the Triangle why am I doing this goals and objectives what do I think will happen is the benefit proportional to the risk uh and it goes on to say in the
00:38:55 uh and it goes on to say in the paragraph immediately below the bullet points decision makers should make good fast use of decision controls at incidents where risks are high and time is short
00:39:03 is short this means they need to practice using decision controls until they are second nature the best way to practice is for decision makers to use decision controls at all types of incident repeated use
00:39:14 at all types of incident repeated use will make them more effective now just looking at those two last sentences am I right that that suggests that decision controls should become maybe this is the wrong word but intuitive through repeated use of them
00:39:26 intuitive through repeated use of them uh in a manner of speaking yes it should be second nature to use the decision controls but of course the process that you would be doing wouldn't be intuitive it would be more thoughtful right uh
00:39:38 right uh I'm just trying to understand the difference between intuitive and second nature sorry perhaps it was an unuseful uh it wasn't a useful analogy I think what I'm trying to say is using them should become second nature to you it
00:39:50 should become second nature to you it should be you should be primed and ready to use them that using the decision controls themselves would be conscious you'd be consciously asking yourself for that particular situation what am I
00:40:03 that particular situation what am I trying to achieve and how does the action I'm about to take lead me to that you should be consciously asking yourself how that incident is likely to escalate what do I anticipate is going to happen so those prompts that you're
00:40:15 to happen so those prompts that you're using whilst using the prompt should be something that you would do a almost automatically if you've used it repeatedly you're going through a thought process that is conscious in uh
00:40:28 thought process that is conscious in uh in comparison to when we were talking yesterday about intuitive decisions and things that might be triggered by a queue the process that you would go through for that might not include plan
00:40:40 through for that might not include plan formulation because it's an association between a cue and an outcome right I think what I'm having difficulty with is the difference between intuitive and second nature to the point of automatic
00:40:52 second nature to the point of automatic if something is automatic because it's been drummed into you why is that not intuitive
00:41:04 an intuitive thing to use the decision controls because it's become second nature but the process that you would be going through by using the decision controls is thoughtful I see so it would
00:41:16 controls is thoughtful I see so it would become intuitive to become conscious of the decision controls you're about to use essentially yes right I think yeah so does that mean that it's in it's essential to include them
00:41:28 it's in it's essential to include them as part of incident command training uh training and policy and I would also suggest that it would be useful to embed decision controls in other aspects of the organization as well so for example
00:41:39 the organization as well so for example when you're debriefing an incident it would be useful to use the decision controls to explore that decision making it would be useful as part of an operational Assurance process for
00:41:50 operational Assurance process for officers to use the decision controls when discussing the incident with those incident commanders at the time so they become something that's not just incumbent on the instant Commander to think about at that point in time
00:42:02 think about at that point in time they're more embedded which helps them become more of a uh it essentially helps them to be more second nature because you're used to describing what you're doing through those decision controls I
00:42:15 doing through those decision controls I see I see what you mean so when you're being interviewed for example as part of a pro or PRC you would be able to articulate more
00:42:26 you would be able to articulate more precisely the conscious processes of control of the decision you'd made before acting to assist those evaluating your performance yes precisely one of the issues when
00:42:39 yes precisely one of the issues when you're using an intuitive process whether recognition primed or more associative is you can't very often describe your rationale for that decision at the time because it wasn't consciously planned and so by using the
00:42:52 consciously planned and so by using the decision controls before you've made that decision you're essentially pushing yourself back to that plan formulation piece so that you are conscious about the rationale for the decision that you're about to action before you've
00:43:04 you're about to action before you've taken it yes I see now where there's a monitoring officer present which I think at the time of the Grenville Tower fire was at a four pumps plus fire
00:43:16 was at a four pumps plus fire um with the monitoring officer's role also to be to ensure that
00:43:23 that where the national operation guidance was applied of course um the the decision Control process was actually used by The Incident Commander uh
00:43:33 uh the national operational
00:43:39 got all fire and Rescue Services have monitoring offices but it would be reasonable where a monitoring officer does exist to suggest that part of their role would be to ensure that the guidance is being used appropriately how
00:43:50 guidance is being used appropriately how would they do that um they would do that by essentially speaking to the instant Commander about the decisions they're making they would be observing briefings that The Incident Commander might be giving it might be giving so they would be able to see
00:44:03 giving so they would be able to see whether they're using those decision controls because they would be articulating them and they may challenge the incident Commander's decisions through the use of the decision control so it might be a conversation such as
00:44:15 so it might be a conversation such as the monitoring officer may may see a decision that the instant Commander is about to make and they would ask them so why are you doing that where is that linking in terms of your plan in terms of your objectives what do you think is
00:44:26 of your objectives what do you think is going to happen let's talk through the implications of that and tell me how the benefit is proportional to the risk that would be a slower time use but one way in which an observer in some capacity
00:44:38 in which an observer in some capacity might be able to use the decision controls to be able to assure themselves that they're being applied appropriately to a decision that's about to be taken in reality would that happen
00:44:51 in reality would that happen whether or not the monitoring officer was challenging the incident Commander's decision and proposed course of action or would it happen all in any event in terms of the monitoring officer
00:45:02 terms of the monitoring officer themselves or The Incident Commander in terms of the monitoring officer themselves another question a bit slightly differently please with the the discussion that you just identified happen only where the monitoring officer
00:45:13 happen only where the monitoring officer thought that the acting on the decision was not appropriate or would it happen in any event um should happen in any event can I ask you about handovers certainly
00:45:25 can I ask you about handovers certainly because would I be writing thinking that at an incident command Handover and I know there's policy which covers this the incoming Incident Commander
00:45:36 the incoming Incident Commander uh is this right would go through the decisions which have been acted on by The Incident Commander who is handing over control and and run through each process
00:45:49 and and run through each process London the process would be to use the decision-making model as a briefing tool so at the Handover point they would run through the incident information the resource information relevant to the
00:46:01 resource information relevant to the incident at that point in time and also any hazards or risks that might still be present then they would attempt to articulate their plan for the overarching incident
00:46:12 overarching incident um and then in terms of communication and control communication they would normally run through process so the use of radio channels for example there is less discussion around control but they
00:46:24 less discussion around control but they would also then talk about the incident structure themselves so it would be through using the decision making model itself
00:46:33 itself they would only run through individual decisions if it was uh particularly Salient or particularly relevant rather than running back through a history of
00:46:45 than running back through a history of all of the decisions that have been made that's that's in London but but in the way in which this policy was intended to operate
00:46:55 operate my question is at Handover was it intended that at Handover the incoming Incident Commander should run through the decision-making decision control processes which have been used by the
00:47:06 processes which have been used by the outgoing Incident Commander the national operational guidance is silent on the use of briefing tools we did we weren't prescriptive to Fire and Rescue Services and a specific briefing tool that they
00:47:17 and a specific briefing tool that they should use however the decision Control process is one tool that they could use to articulate the irrelevant information during a Handover but it doesn't explicitly say that why was that because
00:47:29 explicitly say that why was that because there are a number of briefing tools that fire rescue services use as well there are a number of mnemonics that essentially set out some criteria for Fire Rescue Services to use and the
00:47:40 Fire Rescue Services to use and the intention wasn't necessarily to be prescriptive on that although some work has been done subsequently through National working groups to look at whether there could be a more prototype example of a of a briefing tool that
00:47:53 example of a of a briefing tool that could be used I'm just trying to work out the thinking in policy terms of not you say prescribing but not at least suggesting that the DCP should be used at Handover and leaving it to the to the
00:48:04 at Handover and leaving it to the to the DMM in London it was discussed um when we were developing the guidance but I think because a number of Fire and Rescue Services we're using uh other tools in a variety of tools then it
00:48:15 tools in a variety of tools then it wasn't something that the group had decided to prescribe in policy at that point in time was that a gap do you think
00:48:23 think um
00:48:23 um potentially it is something that we'd worked on since um there were the assistant command guidance was the first piece of national operational guidance that was developed so there was a lot of discussion on what
00:48:35 so there was a lot of discussion on what should be policy and what should be prescribed and what wouldn't count as policy The Briefing tool arguably was more of a gray area but as I said it is something that some work has been done
00:48:46 something that some work has been done with since now I wanted to ask I want to ask you next about the research that you did during your secondment to the uh the cfoa the Chief Fire Officers Association
00:48:57 cfoa the Chief Fire Officers Association uh after he was seconded you told us that you'd carried out a second piece of research on the topic we've been discussing uh and you describe that in paragraph 29 of your witness statement as and I'll quote it to you National
00:49:09 as and I'll quote it to you National decision trials exploring the effectiveness of the DCP compared with the DMM
00:49:14 the DMM it's paragraph 29 for those who want to look at it would it be right to summarize the purpose of that second piece of work as being to establish the effectiveness of training that was
00:49:25 effectiveness of training that was specifically based on the DCP the decision Control process rather than the normative decision-making model the DMM in essence yes we wanted to look at how effective the decision Control process
00:49:36 effective the decision Control process was itself primarily because it was important to us that it was going to be practical for incident commanders to use so it the the the point of the research
00:49:48 so it the the the point of the research was to test the efficacy of the decision Control process itself right and did that include the question whether the training it did in fact is
00:49:59 whether the training it did in fact is successfully encourage explicit plan formulation inserting the decision control stage rather than the tendency that you'd observe to move directly from situation awareness to plan execution
00:50:10 situation awareness to plan execution yes it did right and is it right that the findings of that research were again published
00:50:14 published this time in the Journal of experimental psychology in November 2015. uh yes now um let's have that let's have that on the screen just to remind ourselves
00:50:26 on the screen just to remind ourselves of it it's at lfb double zero double one zero six seven four
00:50:36 and um
00:50:39 uh you are the co-author uh with uh is it Mr honey uh Professor honey uh and uh you uh
00:50:51 and uh you uh I wonder if we can summarize the research that you carried out um in this way and tell me if this you disagree with anything here you used I think a a three-fold set of scenarios so
00:51:04 think a a three-fold set of scenarios so a house fire a road traffic collision and a fire and a Skip and then replicated those three scenarios across across three different forms of training uh yes the
00:51:15 uh yes the small complicated than just a skip in as much as it spread to a nearby residential building and a shop as well but yes in essence yeah uh yes I can see why a fire container
00:51:26 uh yes I can see why a fire container skit wouldn't wouldn't tell on that um experiment one am I right experiment one used a visual virtual reality environment yes experiment two used simulated incidents on the fire ground
00:51:38 simulated incidents on the fire ground yes using the fast service College I think yeah and experiment number three a house fire recreated as what I think you've called a live burn yes that's correct
00:51:50 correct um and am I right that you used 84 experienced incident commanders for each one of those experiments 84 incident commanders in total each undertook the
00:52:01 commanders in total each undertook the three scenarios but only one of the instant commanders would have so each Incident Commander would have only done one phase of the experiment so we had a separate group that did the virtual
00:52:12 separate group that did the virtual reality element we had a separate group that then did the uh the training ground section and then a separate group of instant commanders that did the live Burns
00:52:22 Burns right so three groups totaling 84. correct right were they distributed randomly uh yes they were the entire experiment was counterbalanced completely right I see
00:52:34 completely right I see uh
00:52:36 uh uh now is it right also that shortly before each experiment the commanders were split into two groups a a standard group and a decision group yes so this is it right that the Standard Group
00:52:47 is it right that the Standard Group would be a control yes they were using the decision-making model as in extant guidance at the time and then each group I think received an hour's training that that either
00:52:58 hour's training that that either mirrored the DMM the standard guidance about how decisions are made so the normative approach or or else mirrored the DCP yes that's correct and that I think was called goal orientated in this
00:53:10 think was called goal orientated in this article that's correct um a a standard training would that be the um the lfb's standard training on the decision-making model uh it wasn't based
00:53:23 decision-making model uh it wasn't based on the training given by any particular fire and rescue service if I could illustrate the content of the training that might be helpful to think yes please do um for example in the decision-making model
00:53:35 for example in the decision-making model group they had initially some input on the decision-making model itself to remind them about the components of the decision-making model and how it's used and then for the decision control group
00:53:48 and then for the decision control group they would have had similarly input on the decision Control process and its components and how it's used and then each group would have gone on to watch
00:53:59 each group would have gone on to watch a video of an incident broken down in particular sections and it would pause at a point and for the Standard Group they would be asked what they would do next they would be using the decision
00:54:11 next they would be using the decision making model as their tool whereas with the decision control group the decision group they would be prompted to use the decision controls to say what they were going to do next why what they expected
00:54:23 going to do next why what they expected to happen and how the benefit outweighed the risk so they were prompted to use the decision controls in practice can I
00:54:33 can I just see if I can understand one aspect of your answer you say in the decision-making model group they had initially some input on the decision-making model itself to remind them about the components of
00:54:45 to remind them about the components of the decision-making model and how it's used does that does that mean that they were taught that rather than giving the input in other words they received the input yes I see can you explain why why do it that way rather than simply taking
00:54:59 do it that way rather than simply taking your Your Standard Group and giving them a standard training that a fire and rescue service would give them
00:55:09 them lfb being a prime example where we know there are but there is incident command training which involves training on the decision-making model it was important that that group was operating as a
00:55:21 that that group was operating as a control group so whatever input that we were providing the control group it was important that it mirrored the training that we were going to give in the experimental group which in this case was the decision group so one of the
00:55:33 was the decision group so one of the things that was very important to us was that both would receive input if you were to have a training session on the decision-making model um in a in a fire and rescue service it
00:55:44 um in a in a fire and rescue service it might be a component of a broader lecture they might look at it as part of pre-course learning so it would be difficult to standardize an approach to that and also do it in a way that was
00:55:56 that and also do it in a way that was going to effectively mirror what you were going to do in the control group so that if it was important to ascertain that the effects that you were seeing were as a result of the thing that you
00:56:07 were as a result of the thing that you were trying to manipulate not something erroneous as a difference that might have been in the training delivered I understand that was there a countervailing risk though that by
00:56:20 a countervailing risk though that by designing
00:56:22 designing specific
00:56:24 specific decision-making model training for the Standard Group by reference to perhaps the training for the decision Control process
00:56:36 decision Control process there was a risk that unconscious bias might creep into the DMM training not necessarily necessarily because the control group itself would have already
00:56:48 control group itself would have already been established on the use of the decision-making model they would be used to using it anyway as a piece of extant Guidance the decision that the decision group itself was given something
00:57:00 group itself was given something different
00:57:01 different um
00:57:04 sorry I'm not sure I followed your question actually well by designing by designing specific training for the Standard Group on this on the decision-making model for specific use
00:57:16 decision-making model for specific use as part of this experiment rather than simply using or packaging up the training done in real life as it were in London for example wasn't there was there a risk
00:57:27 example wasn't there was there a risk that it would contain some kind of unconscious biases to to lead the Standard Group away from uh having full faith in the DMM oh I see forgive me uh no I don't think so because we were
00:57:39 no I don't think so because we were essentially just providing um an articulation of the decision-making model which was um directly lifted from policy right from the extent policy so there was nothing that they were uh experiencing
00:57:51 nothing that they were uh experiencing in that training that would have been new as it were so they should have be they were presented with the same information that you might be presented with on a training course I think the point I'm trying to make is if you were
00:58:02 point I'm trying to make is if you were experiencing training it might be a broader package that would be linked to other pieces as well I see and you then I think followed the same process as you had in your first piece of research namely that you recorded the commanders
00:58:13 namely that you recorded the commanders during the experiments and then coded the footage either as situational awareness plan formulation or plan execution yes that's correct yes and and on the subject of your findings is it
00:58:24 on the subject of your findings is it right that in all three experiments incident commanders who received the standard training demonstrated the same pattern that you'd observed in your earlier research and maybe that they would move directly from situation situational awareness to plan execution
00:58:35 situational awareness to plan execution rather than plan formulation yes that's correct it was a very similar pattern yes and and the incident commanders who received the decision group or the goal-orientated training were more
00:58:47 goal-orientated training were more likely as you found it to demonstrate plan formulation rather than plan execution yes after situational awareness yes that's correct uh and am I am I right also that the incident commanders who receive that
00:59:00 incident commanders who receive that training the goal-orientated training and showed a greater tendency towards plan formulation didn't spend any more time in making those decisions than the standard group yes that's correct we measured the latency uh between the uh
00:59:13 measured the latency uh between the uh some injects that represented unexpected events such as uh water unexpectedly failing
00:59:20 failing um we measured the latency between the time that the inject was given so and the time in which a an action was taken and there was no significant difference between the groups that were using the decision Control process and the groups
00:59:33 decision Control process and the groups that were using the decision-making model right what is latency uh the time between okay time lag the timeline yes right and does
00:59:44 time lag the timeline yes right and does that support well did you find that it did support your conclusion that that following the decision Control process does not reduce a Commander's ability to respond quickly on the fire ground to
00:59:56 respond quickly on the fire ground to events yes that was the summation of the evidence that we found yes so
01:00:01 so could you summarize for us in Practical terms what your concerns would be as a result of this work about relying on the same standard command training that was used in this research that would reflect the the traditional normative model yes
01:00:14 the the traditional normative model yes um in essence what we found when people were using the normal uh or the old decision-making model as it was they were more likely to use intuitive
01:00:26 they were more likely to use intuitive decision making in this particular piece of research I recall it was around uh 70 of the time in total as opposed to the 80 of the time that we found at real life incidents but it was similar
01:00:39 life incidents but it was similar um they were more likely to rely on intuitive decision making without something that would stop them and help them to make sure that the particular individual decisions that they were making were related to the overarching
01:00:52 making were related to the overarching goal of the incident we also found when they were using the decision-making model that they were making decisions that were based pretty much on the here and now it was a lower level of
01:01:03 and now it was a lower level of situational awareness when we saw commanders using the decision Control process what we saw was an increased use of goal-directed behavior so they were
01:01:16 of goal-directed behavior so they were more likely to link the decision that they were making to the overarching goal of the incident what they were trying to achieve
01:01:23 achieve um the reason that is important I articulated in my evidence yesterday that when you are just responding intuitively you're responding to a piece of the incident one part of it and when
01:01:36 of the incident one part of it and when you're responding intuitively it feels very much like a like instinct like a gut a gut feeling that this is the right thing to do that might absolutely be the right thing to do based on that single cue but when
01:01:48 to do based on that single cue but when you put that cue back into the bigger picture of the overarching incident that's when you may have unintended consequences so by using the decision controls what we found what incident
01:01:59 controls what we found what incident commanders considering the uh the cue that they might be experiencing within that broader context of the incident and we also saw a greater degree of anticipation it was a higher level of
01:02:12 anticipation it was a higher level of situational awareness that we were seeing from those incident commanders so they weren't just thinking about what they needed to do at that moment they were thinking about the impact of that and the ramifications of that within the
01:02:24 and the ramifications of that within the incident so my concern with continuing the use of the decision-making model is that we weren't able to provide a tool within the decision-making model that was going to assist those incident
01:02:35 was going to assist those incident commanders with those safeguards if you like to support them and while I accept it would not mean that every decision would be a planful decision and not
01:02:46 would be a planful decision and not every decision would be a goal directed decision we certainly saw an increase in that there are some decisions that are helpful to be uh very reflexive and intuitive but what we wanted to look at
01:02:57 intuitive but what we wanted to look at was how we could address that balance to get incident commanders to be more planful more considered and critically more goal directed with a greater level of situational awareness
01:03:09 of situational awareness could you give us a practical example of how command training might be modified to incorporate the decision Control process yes the there would be a change in the input so it would be a different
01:03:20 in the input so it would be a different description of the the decision Control process first and foremost because it would replace the content that was associated with the decision-making model descriptives aside in a practical sense one of the uh one of the
01:03:33 sense one of the uh one of the techniques that were that was very um uh impactful during the training that we did in the um in the experiment itself was to coach an Incident Commander in
01:03:44 was to coach an Incident Commander in using those decision controls so to give a scenario pause at particular points in time and run through those decision controls to Prime that decision makers thinking in terms of those decision
01:03:56 thinking in terms of those decision controls so you may stop you may have a scenario that an Incident Commander would be running through and you would freeze the frame you'd pause at that point in time and you would ask what are
01:04:07 point in time and you would ask what are you going to do next and then you would ask why are you going to do that what are you expecting to happen and articulate to me how the benefits of that action are going to outweigh the risk taking one of those three
01:04:19 risk taking one of those three experiments the live burn house fire can you give us an example of at what stage in that incident you would have paused and asked those
01:04:31 you would have paused and asked those questions
01:04:34 yes it's a training scenario so one of when an inject came in so the example that I gave was uh uh water unexpectedly failing pause at that point
01:04:45 unexpectedly failing pause at that point and say what are you going to do why are you going to do it how does the benefit outweigh the risks and what are you expecting to happen as a result so you would pause it at that point that a decision is required but before it's
01:04:58 decision is required but before it's necessarily implemented to coach that decision maker through those points to help them to understand in practice how they might be applied and the range of scenarios they might apply but the range
01:05:10 scenarios they might apply but the range of decisions that they might apply them at right from a Layman's perspective uh one may not know the answer to the question you've just paid but would that be filled by policy or training so when
01:05:21 be filled by policy or training so when water fails you do X
01:05:27 there are elements of policy that you will be referring to in your training but in essence the description that I gave was more based in training because it's how you would help someone to learn
01:05:38 it's how you would help someone to learn how to do something as opposed to just the technical knowledge of what you should do according to a policy in that scenario
01:05:46 scenario right
01:05:48 right um can I then turn to another topic which is the lfb's response to the incident command National operational guidance and the decision Control process
01:05:58 process um if we go to your witness statement please uh we'll just have it up but I don't need to read it out to you page eight paragraph 33 you refer there to
01:06:09 eight paragraph 33 you refer there to uh
01:06:10 uh group manager Butler Phil Butler's literature review that you did that he did in par in 2014 and we saw that reflected I think in the August 2015 future of incident command document
01:06:22 future of incident command document yesterday do you remember who asked him to form to perform that review yes that would have been as part of a work package for the national operational guidance program itself and if we turn
01:06:34 guidance program itself and if we turn the page to page 34 paragraph 9 you referred there to a briefing paper prepared by group manager Butler for uh uh for AC cotton and DAC Ellis about the
01:06:49 uh for AC cotton and DAC Ellis about the draft text to be used to direct Babcock to include or exclude aspects of incident command now that's before I think you joined the lfb and you explain in paragraph 35
01:07:01 lfb and you explain in paragraph 35 that you uh had had no formal involvement in the production of the note is it right that you were nonetheless working with group manager Butler at this time on your own research into command decision making uh I was
01:07:13 into command decision making uh I was yes but I wasn't involved in his role in London fire brigade at the time no but did group manager Butler discuss the briefing paper with you on an informal basis uh
01:07:23 basis uh only in as much as there were elements that he thought needed to be introduced into London
01:07:33 and what did he think should be introduced into London uh certainly the command skills was a gap
01:07:40 including the decision Control process
01:07:45 what was do you know what his view was based on
01:07:49 based on the research that we did and also the national operational guidance which made explicit that the expectation was that fire and Rescue Services should adopt the national operational Guidance the
01:08:01 the national operational Guidance the national operational guidance didn't come until 2015 and the review was in 2014. no but it was imminent it had been drafted the publication process was somewhat lengthy so although it wasn't
01:08:13 somewhat lengthy so although it wasn't published I think off memory until about June or July 2015 the draft was already in an advanced stage did you have
01:08:25 did you have uh or were you aware at this time that he was having discussions with graham Ellis and Danny cotton about about incident the incident command National operational guidance not directly
01:08:36 operational guidance not directly right
01:08:38 right so
01:08:39 so indirectly no I wasn't doing directly I wasn't privy to the content of the discussions but I knew that as part of his role he would likely be having those discussions because those were the people that they would he would be
01:08:50 people that they would he would be reporting to can we then go to lfb double zero double one zero six six eight
01:08:58 this is group manager Butler's paper dated the 15th of December 2014. its subject as incident command review and it's a brief as we can see for AC Danny
01:09:10 it's a brief as we can see for AC Danny cotton and DAC Graeme Ellis and its purpose as you can see is to outline a number of issues concerning the incident command review and where necessary to provide a number of recommendations to resolve them that
01:09:22 recommendations to resolve them that require action or to recommend the acceptance of a process associated with future development of incident command training
01:09:30 training do you know if the incident command review referred to by group manager Butler there is the same as the three yearly incident command training course uh review the incident command review
01:09:42 uh review the incident command review Course Review that Babcock undertook following the start of their contract in 2012. yes that's my understanding group manager Butler was seconded across to
01:09:53 manager Butler was seconded across to Babcock I believe at that time yes and you I think sat on the incident command project board from 2015 after you joined the lfb lately yes lately and the
01:10:04 the lfb lately yes lately and the purpose of that was am I right to oversee the review of The Incident Command training specifically uh it was to uh to assist with as opposed to having direct responsibility for
01:10:15 having direct responsibility for assist with uh
01:10:19 uh now even though you weren't yet at the nfb as of December 2014 were you aware at that time from group manager Butler that the lfb were undergoing a review of their incident command training I
01:10:31 their incident command training I understood that one was imminent but I didn't know the content of it uh at this point 15th of December I would have been told that I was to be appointed to
01:10:42 told that I was to be appointed to London fire brigade I believe um but I wasn't I didn't start until the February I had a notice period to work out
01:10:52 out yes as you told us in February is when you started February 15. now this briefing paper sets out a number of recommendations relating to incident command training and if we go to page
01:11:03 command training and if we go to page two we can see subparagraph B uh which um says this I recommend that in future Babcock's training reviews that they are directed to a horizon scan
01:11:14 that they are directed to a horizon scan for training Solutions adopted by other frses and other Industries as a fundamental part of their review this will assist to ensure future training is modern and up to date I also recommend that where a policy does not exist for
01:11:26 that where a policy does not exist for an aspect that is critical for incident command you direct babcocks to include it for them to develop appropriate training these critical aspects are and then he sets out five headings human
01:11:40 then he sets out five headings human factors the decision control method for inclusion in the NOG operational discretion changes to Tactical modes to be included in the nag and jesip and the joint decision model
01:11:54 and jesip and the joint decision model now can we just look at little Raymond one
01:11:59 human factors of incident command or the command skills to be included in nog for incident command item two decision making as opposed to the DMM
01:12:10 making as opposed to the DMM and then at little Roman 2 the decision control method as it is to be included in nog for incident command now
01:12:21 now following that briefing paper you refer I think to an email in paragraph 38 of your statement um sent by group manager Butler to James dalglish and Dave Brown copied to AC
01:12:34 dalglish and Dave Brown copied to AC cotton and DAC Graeme Ellis on the 1st of April 2015. and let's go to that it's at nfb double zero double one zero six six four
01:12:52 and there's the email and I'll just show it to you it's as I say from Phil Butler to James dark leash and you can see the copy ease all please
01:13:04 and you can see the copy ease all please find below a revised draft text to be used to direct babcocks to include or exclude those aspects of incident command discussed at our meeting on the 2nd of February the lfb recognizes that a president is awaiting the production of national
01:13:15 awaiting the production of national guidance before it develops any policies that relate to a number of key features of incident command that will form part of the national operational guidance for incident command at present the guidance will not be
01:13:26 at present the guidance will not be published before the end of the incident command review in recognition of this and the importance of the anticipated changes within the national guidance it is necessary that the incident command training review ought to include the
01:13:38 training review ought to include the following and then you can see the first bullet point command skills I.E human factors of incident command and the second sub-bullet point there is
01:13:49 and the second sub-bullet point there is decision making see that and then the second bullet point down the decision decision Control process I.E the revised decision-making
01:14:00 process I.E the revised decision-making model which includes the addition of decision controls and reflects the decision-making methods used by incident Commanders um I've shown you that now this is April
01:14:11 um I've shown you that now this is April 2015.
01:14:13 2015. um so I think during your um
01:14:17 um I don't be right to call it the probationary period but during your initial phase of your um of your time at the lfb were you aware that group manager Butler had proposed giving this direction to
01:14:28 proposed giving this direction to Babcock relating to the need to incorporate that the revised decision Control process into the review of incident command I understood that to be the case yes now I want to show you what DAC Ellis
01:14:40 now I want to show you what DAC Ellis says about this in his witness statement uh if we go please to lfb double zero double one eight two three zero
01:14:50 let's go to page three
01:14:56 this is a statement from May 2020 and at page three you can see paragraph 19 at the bottom of the screen I recall discussing the briefing note with GM Phil Butler AC cotton and other
01:15:07 Phil Butler AC cotton and other colleagues in December 2014 it was clear that the fundamental changes proposed by if we could just go to the IC nog incident command National operational guidance would have far-reaching
01:15:19 guidance would have far-reaching consequences for the selection training and assessment of future incident commanders within lfb it was agreed the consideration of these fundamental changes would require strategic oversight and Direction within lfb and
01:15:31 oversight and Direction within lfb and full engagement from directors stroke corporate board now just uh looking closely on the proposed change from the DMM to the DCP specifically do you or Pat did you agree
01:15:44 specifically do you or Pat did you agree with DAC Alice's assessment that this was a fundamental change that would have far-reaching consequences for the selection training and assessment of future incident commanders within the Brigade it was certainly a fundamental
01:15:56 Brigade it was certainly a fundamental change within the guidance and it would have implications I think my issues I don't know the extent to which he's referring to far-reaching consequences so yes it would have consequences but I
01:16:10 so yes it would have consequences but I would have difficulty in understanding how he was trying to consequence how he was trying to uh uh quantify that with that statement right so consequences but not necessarily
01:16:21 so consequences but not necessarily far-reaching consequences it would certainly involve change in
01:16:27 change in fire brigade yes can you explain why or do you know why Mr Ellis considered that it was a fundamental change with far-reaching consequences why did he use
01:16:38 consequences why did he use do you know why his view was that the changes and the consequences would be so great uh no that would be a question for Mr Ellis I think the lfb then I think produced a report in July
01:16:51 then I think produced a report in July 2015 shortly after the energy was published and I'd like to show you that it's lfp double zero double one zero six seven three please and it's dated 16th of July 2015
01:17:04 and it's dated 16th of July 2015 and his type is entitled National operational guidance incident command provisional impact review and if we go please to page three
01:17:15 under organizational impact as the heading I'll just redo the first two paragraphs for the context the foundation for incident command document predominantly details the qualities and
01:17:26 predominantly details the qualities and skill requirements for incident commanders and strategic Arrangements that need to be implemented regarding selection development and assessment in order to achieve command competence the contents of this document will need to
01:17:37 contents of this document will need to be considered as part of the lfb review of command competence as the author of much of the content and lead for the lfb review this will be dealt with by DAC Cohen Hatton Learning and Development
01:17:48 Cohen Hatton Learning and Development appendix one item one uh and then if we go please to the top of page four
01:17:59 if you look at the first paragraph um it reads as follows CFO Simon piling okay should be pilling um I think he was at West Yorkshire fire
01:18:10 um I think he was at West Yorkshire fire and rescue service he was yeah um CFO Simon pilling made it very clear at the incident command conference that the decision Control process does not replicate place the decision-making
01:18:22 replicate place the decision-making model DMM which will significantly reduce the potential impact of the guidance on lfb as it is mentioned in and the foundation of many policies the decision Control process is an
01:18:33 decision Control process is an illustration of how incident commanders think and will therefore be a useful tool for selection and development but should not lead to wholesale changes in the DMM or other policies however the
01:18:44 the DMM or other policies however the decision controls why expectations and benefits will be incorporated into the Gathering and thinking deciding area of the DMM policy appendix one item seven
01:18:57 the DMM policy appendix one item seven now Simon pilling chaired the national operational guidance team's review of incident command guidance didn't he he did
01:19:05 did and do you know what he's he said at the incident command conference about the DCP model yes I do he the point that he was trying to make is that the decision Control process was an evolution of the
01:19:17 Control process was an evolution of the decision-making model itself so it is a fundamental piece of the national operational guidance but the point that he was trying to make was that it was an evolution that incorporated some aspects
01:19:29 evolution that incorporated some aspects of the decision-making model and more helpfully would illustrate how people think as well what he wasn't suggesting was that it was simply an illustration or or a picture as the paragraph
01:19:41 or or a picture as the paragraph latterly refers to this was a paragraph that I challenged when this report was circulated
01:19:50 um going back to the conference were you at the conference I was did you challenge him at the conference on this uh no because what he was saying was right it's an evolution of it was an
01:20:01 right it's an evolution of it was an evolution of the decision-making model I see so
01:20:06 see so uh it's it's this text that you object to yeah sorry yes now let's just trace this through historically can we go to your statement please lfb double one double zero
01:20:18 double zero sorry double zero double one zero six six zero page 10 paragraph um 40. and you say this um in addition on the 12th of August 2015 I received an email from group manager Lee drawbridge attaching a
01:20:31 manager Lee drawbridge attaching a report titled National operational guidance incident command provisional impact review that's the document we've just looked at yes that's correct uh now I just want to look at the document the email chain can we look at that it's at
01:20:43 email chain can we look at that it's at lfb double zero double one zero six seven eight
01:20:53 this is the email chain can we start at page two please and look at the email of the bottom of the string which I think is the email you're referring to uh it's from leap drawbridge to you and
01:21:04 uh it's from leap drawbridge to you and others dated 12th of August 2015 at 1408. that's is that the email you're referring to yes it is um was that the first time that anyone in the lfb had spoken to you about the action that the
01:21:15 spoken to you about the action that the lfp proposed to take in response to the National operational guidance on this issue uh yes it was now we see your response to that email if we go to the to page one please and look at the foot of the page same day
01:21:29 look at the foot of the page same day a few hours later 1755 and you can see that it's it's centrally drawbridge and and a host of others but also copied Peter carrop Danny cotton and Graham Ellis and indeed Dan Daly
01:21:42 and Graham Ellis and indeed Dan Daly thanks Lee and I just want to show you this you say this I just wanted to make a point of clarity around the decision Control process and the DMM as I fear it might be easily misconstrued
01:21:54 might be easily misconstrued I'm just pausing there were you referring in that in that sentence to the paragraph in the in the report that we've just looked at together yes I was right
01:22:05 looked at together yes I was right you go on to say this it was one of the cornerstones of the new guidance and so I think it's really important that the journey is understood I appreciate that there may be some resistance to this given the work that has been done around
01:22:16 given the work that has been done around the DMM in London and I really just want to give some assurances more than CFO pilling the cfoa lead for command and the leader of the national op guidance for IC was making it the conference was
01:22:27 for IC was making it the conference was that the DCP is not a new construct in quotes that replaces the DMM rather it is an evolution and an improvement of the DMM it contains many of the same elements as the DMM which will mean that
01:22:39 elements as the DMM which will mean that there is not necessarily going to be an enormous impact in some respects however it is not simply intended to be an illustration of how people think the point he was trying to make was that the DCP is structured is intended it should
01:22:53 DCP is structured is intended it should be as structured is intended to support commanders and brigades when decisions are scrutinized post-incident by being more representative of how people actually make decisions having done expert witness work on
01:23:05 having done expert witness work on behalf of cfoa in relation to incidents involving FF fatalities I know only too well how both barristers and the HSC will compare actions and statements to the extant guidance and how far away
01:23:16 the extant guidance and how far away from reality such arguments can be this was part of the learning that went into the guidance in the case of the NOG this will be this will be the Exemplar guidance that they go to and the
01:23:28 guidance that they go to and the structure of the DMM did nothing to support whereas the DCP explicitly aims to do so therefore should we deviate from this it would undoubtedly leave us in a very vulnerable position should our
01:23:39 in a very vulnerable position should our commanders decisions be scrutinized following an incident and they'll just read the rest to you the second part around the decision control technique was that the research commissioned by the cfoa is now
01:23:51 commissioned by the cfoa is now published in a peer-reviewed science journal compared the performance of 84 incident commanders half using the DMM and half using the DCP we found that the situational awareness of ICS using the
01:24:02 situational awareness of ICS using the DCP was up to five times higher than those using the DMM and they link their actions significantly more to plans and communicate more explicitly the expectation from cfoa is that brigades
01:24:15 expectation from cfoa is that brigades will build on the learning from the DMM and work with the evolution of the DCP and progress will be monitored through the cfoa working groups it would be great for us to stay ahead of the curve in this respect and Lead the Way in this Evolution particularly as lfp are the
01:24:28 Evolution particularly as lfp are the Guardians and Main funders of the NOG I'd be happy to present on the work that cfoa commissioned around this in September if it might help the journey now
01:24:39 now the uh findings in that penultimate paragraph there is the 84 incident commanders that's the second piece of research I think that we did we looked at together this morning that's right with the three experiments yes now um by
01:24:51 with the three experiments yes now um by this time this is mid August 2015 you had been employed by the lfp for about six months or so yes given your expertise in the area and the fact that
01:25:02 expertise in the area and the fact that you've conducted This research and heard of published article which we've seen uh
01:25:10 uh did anyone speak to you before this provisional impact report was compiled to seek your opinion on what action the lfb should take no you seek an explanation
01:25:21 you seek an explanation as to why not I spoke to AC cotton after this email exchange and offered to present the work as as just discussed
01:25:33 present the work as as just discussed ultimately I was told that the London fire brigade didn't intend to depart from the use of the DMM
01:25:44 did you ask AC cotton for an explanation as to why nobody had consulted you on that text no I didn't I offered to
01:25:55 that text no I didn't I offered to assist I was conscious that in the ownership of incident command wasn't my remit that would come under her as the
01:26:06 remit that would come under her as the head of operational operational assurance and uh Graham Ellis as the head of ort so I I understood that it wasn't within my remit of authority but
01:26:17 wasn't within my remit of authority but I was very happy to assist
01:26:22 yes it's not quite an answer to my my question let me try and backtrack one when you when you when Lee drawbridge sent you this report on the 12th of August 2015 did it it did it
01:26:33 August 2015 did it it did it come out of the blue to you I did I was surprised what was your reaction to reading the paragraph that we read together earlier which this email is a response I was
01:26:44 which this email is a response I was surprised and disappointed which is why I responded to try to clarify those points I was concerned that it might have been misinterpreted and when you
01:26:55 have been misinterpreted and when you then had your conversation with AC cotton did you communicate to her your disappointment I did in in terms that were clear to her do you think
01:27:06 you think I try to do it gently perhaps too gently um my intention wasn't to uh my intention wasn't to try to challenge anyone's authority over the ownership of the incident command policy in any way
01:27:18 the incident command policy in any way but I hope that I might be able to assist in some way did you ask her the question why did anybody consult me about this document no not directly I said it was a shame
01:27:30 no not directly I said it was a shame that no one had but I would be happy to help now um
01:27:37 going back to the email we can see that at the top
01:27:41 first email on the first page that Danny cotton responds to you on the same day two minutes later hi both
01:27:52 hi both I didn't want to include it in the email to all but the report on the future of incident command was approved last week by the presidential board and is being published and sent to all cfas the commission is aware other
01:28:03 commission is aware other recommendations something we want to consider through this working group
01:28:07 and then at the top of the page you'll see that there's an email uh
01:28:15 uh on
01:28:17 on the same
01:28:19 the same day we go to the very top it's it's 7 41 pm
01:28:25 pm from uh
01:28:26 from uh Danny cotton to you uh and to Graham Ellis I think we need to meet I think we need to meet to discuss this I'm back in later next week
01:28:37 later next week uh
01:28:39 uh did you have a conversation with Danny coffin at that point I did that was the discussion I was referring to a moment ago right I see and what was the upshot of that discussion uh I was informed ultimately that the uh the fire brigade
01:28:50 ultimately that the uh the fire brigade didn't consider that the there was sufficient evidence to Warrant moving away from the decision-making model you know now uh you weren't involved in that decision I think no I was not
01:29:02 decision I think no I was not did Danny cotton give you any indication as to the reason for the decision not the reason for your non-involvement forgive me um only that there needed to be
01:29:13 me um only that there needed to be enough of a business reason to move away from it to justify the the effort of moving away from a from a policy that you currently currently have she also mentioned that she thought it might
01:29:24 mentioned that she thought it might adversely impact people with neurodiversity such as dyslexia um breaking those two up what did you understand how to mean by business reason
01:29:37 a policy to justify the effort of misruption that would be caused by moving away from it leaving aside the disruption question why wasn't the fruits of your research and the results that you had published twice I think by
01:29:49 that you had published twice I think by then uh not enough um
01:29:53 um to be a question for AC cotton I continued to advocate for the use of the decision Control process until I left the London fire brigade it may be a question for AC cotton did you ask her
01:30:04 question for AC cotton did you ask her that question which questions precisely why are the results of my research not a good enough reason to justify the effort
01:30:15 good enough reason to justify the effort from moving of moving away from the DMM in our discussions I pointed out that the results of the research were sufficient to move the national picture and for other fire brigades in the fire and rescue service nationally to move
01:30:27 and rescue service nationally to move across to the decision Control process now Graham Ellis who as I've shown you has provided the inquiry with a statement said that the incident command National operational guidance became as
01:30:39 National operational guidance became as he put it a major feature his words of Badcock's review of incident command training that we've discussed now we've already referred to the fact that you sat on the project board and you had you
01:30:50 sat on the project board and you had you assisted in the review by Bad Cop do you remember
01:30:53 remember whether the potential incorporation of the dcep
01:30:56 the dcep was specifically discussed in that context
01:31:00 context one of the boards AC although the decision for the London fire brigade wasn't to move away from the decision-making model she was happy for the decision controls to be used by
01:31:12 for the decision controls to be used by trainers during the training I did point out at the time that that would be a welcome step although it wouldn't fully it wouldn't fully account for the benefits of the decision Control process
01:31:24 benefits of the decision Control process in its entirety right just before I come back to the next question arising out of that you mentioned neurodiversity as a reason given to you by AC cotton for not
01:31:36 reason given to you by AC cotton for not adopting the decision Control process did was there any research or empirical basis for that uh not to the best of my knowledge
01:31:47 knowledge the my understanding was that she had shown it to a colleague who had dyslexia who on uh on first presentation of it found it confusing
01:31:57 right now Graham Ellis also says that in discussions that he'd had about the DCP with with AC cotton and others there was a as he puts it a consensus view that
01:32:08 a as he puts it a consensus view that lfb commanders were already being trained to complete these rapid mental checks under the existing DMM was that consistent was that consistent with your understanding of how the lfp's
01:32:20 with your understanding of how the lfp's incident commanders were already being trained at the time no it wasn't did you know that uh there was if there was a consistent a
01:32:33 there was if there was a consistent a consensus view as described by DAC Ellis I don't know the people for whom he's referring to in that I've seen nothing either in the decision-making model or
01:32:44 either in the decision-making model or the training that would lead me to suggest that they were using the the the the the current decision-making model accounted for those decision controls which was precisely the reason why
01:32:55 which was precisely the reason why nationally we changed it and and explicitly inserted them can I show you Danny Cotton's witness statement because she has also provided some some evidence on this subject now
01:33:07 some some evidence on this subject now this is an lfb double zero double one eight two one three uh page seven
01:33:17 and if we look at paragraph 31 uh if we look at paragraph 31 she
01:33:25 she says in the last sentence there in particular the DCP had not undergone an uh an eia
01:33:34 uh an eia and I understand it has not been tested at larger scale instance with level three and level four incident Commanders now I think it's right that your research had been limited to level one and two incident commanders yes that was
01:33:46 and two incident commanders yes that was the main thrust of our focus in the discussions at the Brigade concerning the decision controls in which you were involved did anybody ever raise with you the fact that the DCP had not been tested with higher level commanders
01:33:58 tested with higher level commanders um I'd heard informally that that had been discussed but not directly with me I should say in relation to level three and level four instant commanders there was a subsequent piece of work done with
01:34:09 was a subsequent piece of work done with a working group for Jessup The Joint Emergency Services interoperability principles and although we didn't conduct a full-scale study in the same way that we did with the decision Control process for fire commanders it
01:34:22 Control process for fire commanders it was uh it was adopted the decision control sorry where adopted in the joint Emergency Services interoperability principles with the addition of two extra decision controls that focused
01:34:34 extra decision controls that focused more on group decision making that you might expect particularly at level four incidents uh way you are operating in a multi-agency environment but also in
01:34:45 multi-agency environment but also in level three environments where you may be having
01:34:48 be having decisions that you're making jointly with other agencies
01:34:55 and when was that I'm trying to recall the precise dates I would be able to find the precise dates for the inquiry it would have been I
01:35:06 for the inquiry it would have been I believe perhaps Autumn of 2015 was when the working group was meeting before grenfell yes yes before grenfell did you consider
01:35:18 yes before grenfell did you consider that the lack of higher level commanders in your research adversely affected the reliability of your findings in terms of its generability I didn't think so because the same your level one
01:35:31 think so because the same your level one to three are all fire ground based incident commanders so the differences that you're looking at are scale and in particular with level three incident commanders you may have more cores to
01:35:42 commanders you may have more cores to have uh multi-agency decisions that you would be making through um uh through tactical coordination groups for example or incident commanders is more strategic
01:35:53 or incident commanders is more strategic so that's a fair point however I do go back to the point that there was sufficient evidence in there to support the Jessup working group with their
01:36:04 the Jessup working group with their review of Jessup and to in implement the decision controls within that with those additional decision controls focused on the group decision making which should have covered that aspect
01:36:17 have covered that aspect um although the other point is of course for level four incident command when you're operating strategically you would be using the joint decision model as opposed to the decision Control process
01:36:28 opposed to the decision Control process itself right that's a quite a detailed answer and I wonder if we can try and just simplify a little bit AC cotton says and it appears by way of giving a reason
01:36:40 and it appears by way of giving a reason for rejecting the inclusion of the DCP in the lfb's training that it hadn't been tested at larger scale incidents with levels three and four incident commanders do you agree that that's a
01:36:51 commanders do you agree that that's a good reason I think that no because with level three instant commanders it's a very similar activity
01:37:02 commanders it's a very similar activity to levels one and two the scale would be different if anything you would be more likely as we discussed earlier to see more instances of analytical decision making as opposed to the uh more
01:37:13 making as opposed to the uh more intuitive decision making but the results were broadly General generalizable I see I see so would you put it this way and please tell me if you wouldn't that it's a bad reason because level three is the same as
01:37:25 because level three is the same as levels one and two but bigger and level four is more strategic and the elements were covered anyway yes thank you now um AC cotton has also referred to that as you can see here that the decision
01:37:36 you can see here that the decision Control process had not gone an eia I think that's an equality rather than an environmental impact assessment that's correct yes and would that mean
01:37:48 that's correct yes and would that mean that it would be inaccessible for individuals with learning difficulties that's what I think she says in the next paragraph in in paragraph 34. Yes I think that's the point that she's trying to make
01:37:57 to make um I should point out that the uh rest of the national operational guidance also hadn't had an equality impact assessment and that's a fair challenge um I do understand that in later uh
01:38:09 um I do understand that in later uh equality impact assessments it the results came out neutral right uh did anybody raise the lack of an equality impact assessment with you at the time IE August 2015. uh Danny had
01:38:23 at the time IE August 2015. uh Danny had mentioned it in discussions but not formally would it have been feasible to carry out such an assessment relating to the DCP yes and would that have enabled it to be
01:38:34 and would that have enabled it to be included in the in the National operational guidance or rather included in the lfb's um response to it if that would be AC Cottonwood cotton required to enable that then yes can you offer any reason
01:38:46 that then yes can you offer any reason yourself from your own knowledge as to why she did not no I cannot do you have your yourself any view as to whether the DCP was in fact likely to be
01:38:57 whether the DCP was in fact likely to be as she puts it inaccessible for individuals with learning difficulties I do have a view it's something that I discussed with Professor honey he'd made further inquiries at Cardiff University with those who uh specifically Research
01:39:10 with those who uh specifically Research into
01:39:12 into neurodiversity and in particular dyslexia and the feedback was that for people in particular those with dyslexia having some kind of scaffolding to support a decision-making process would
01:39:24 support a decision-making process would actually be beneficial as opposed to inhibitory yes Mr chairman I've got one short document I just would just like to show the witness on this very topic yeah and there might be a convenient moment
01:39:36 and there might be a convenient moment for a break yes that's convenient can we please go to lfb0010677
01:39:44 [Music]
01:39:49 um this is an email from you to Steve actor who was director of safety and Assurance dated the 10th of July 2017.
01:40:00 Assurance dated the 10th of July 2017. so this is I think after the grenful tower fire uh and it you um sent him a report rather a briefing note in that email in
01:40:12 rather a briefing note in that email in relation to the scheduled DMM policy review
01:40:15 review and you say in the second sentence I've been liaising closely with Rachel and N OG implementation lead who would greatly encourage the DMM review to reflect nag there are additional ramifications in
01:40:26 there are additional ramifications in terms of scenario development to be held on mdt's mobile data terminals which which are produced by nog in the format of the decision Control process this element alone is likely to outweigh the challenges of implementation of the DCP
01:40:38 challenges of implementation of the DCP and make its consideration worthwhile I'll pop a hard copy on your desk as well now I think you that document is a report that you prepared for him Steve
01:40:49 report that you prepared for him Steve actor in July 2017 isn't it yes that's correct
01:40:53 correct uh and uh summarizing it you is it right to say that that Professor honey who had worked with you on both pieces of the
01:41:04 worked with you on both pieces of the research that we've seen already had actually been consulted on the impact of the DCP on decision making by commanders with dyslexia had been consulted by commanders with dyslexia about about commanders with
01:41:15 dyslexia about about commanders with dyslexia yes I consulted with Professor honey yes and he considered that the DCP would enhance but actually I think you put it provide a scaffolding enhanced decision making in such commanders uh I
01:41:28 decision making in such commanders uh I think that was his wording yes yes and presumably is this right you agreed with that decision yes remember that conclusion could you could you just tell us briefly why
01:41:40 scaffolding or why it would support or why I agreed with it all three all three um so from the perspective of providing some scaffolding it provides an opportunity to consider the information
01:41:51 opportunity to consider the information that's coming in in a way that's quite structured and quite formulated so it would act as a prompt so from my perspective that would assist people whether they have neurodiversity or not
01:42:03 whether they have neurodiversity or not Professor honey contacted other experts at Cardiff University to seek a view as well so given the work that he'd done in the consultation that he had had no reason to doubt that
01:42:16 reason to doubt that and what was the upshot of your provision of your briefing note about this to Steve apter I understand
01:42:26 port to management board that proposed to implement the decision Control process in lfb subjects to a full eia
01:42:36 returned to that after the break if we may
01:42:39 may talk to Chairman yes well thank you well before we do have the break can you just tell me what you mean or what you're referring to when you talk about scenario development to be held on mdts
01:42:51 scenario development to be held on mdts MDT is the mobile data terminals aren't they yes which are carried on the appliances what are you referring to scenario development held on mdts as part of the
01:43:03 development held on mdts as part of the national operational guidance program in addition to the guidance itself the policy itself the team were also producing some tools that might be useful to Fire Rescue Services some of
01:43:14 useful to Fire Rescue Services some of those were training specifications these in particular were scenario templates that would be held on the mobile data terminals that effectively would provide
01:43:25 terminals that effectively would provide risk information to Fire and Rescue Services about the particular incident type that they're going to so for an Incident Commander they would be on route to an incident they could press a button on the mobile data terminal and
01:43:38 button on the mobile data terminal and in front of them they'd be able to see risks that might be typically associated with that incident or the particular premises itself might be information about likely elements of a plan or policy that they
01:43:50 elements of a plan or policy that they may wish to consider and that was structured using the decision Control process to really help again and to embed the use of those decision controls as we explained providing an additional
01:44:03 as we explained providing an additional prompt they are published on the national operational guidance program website and if it helps the inquiry I can provide a link to signpost at all right thank you very much well I think at that point we'll take the morning
01:44:15 at that point we'll take the morning break so we'll stop there and we'll resume please at 20 to 12 and as before please don't discuss your evidence or anything relating to with anyone when they're aware all right thank you very
01:44:26 they're aware all right thank you very much we'd like to go to the Usher then please
01:44:37 thank you 20 to 12 please okay
02:02:57 would you ask uh Dr Cohen happened to come back in please
02:03:04 foreign
02:03:13 good thank you yes um we were on lfb double zero double one zero six seven seven we looked at page one which was the email attached to the email was the
02:03:26 the email attached to the email was the briefing note and if we can go to page four in that briefing note um Dr Karen Hatton you'll see that there's a heading dyslexia expert comments Professor honey School of Psychology Cardiff University
02:03:37 School of Psychology Cardiff University was consulted over the impact of the DCP on decision making in commanders with dyslexia and he reported and I'll just read this to you there's a strong relationship between dyslexia and problems with executive functioning at
02:03:49 problems with executive functioning at both children vavara and adults Brosnan Smith spark executive functioning is a general term for the capacity to control Monitor and change behaviors when needed and to plan future behavior when faced
02:04:00 and to plan future behavior when faced with novel tasks and situations executive functions are Central to decision making in everyday life the provision of additional support and Scaffolding for decision processes should be of particular value to
02:04:11 should be of particular value to Firefighters and incident commanders with dyslexia as well as others who have atypical executive function the provision of effective information about when to use decision controls should enable engagement with the modified
02:04:23 enable engagement with the modified decision-making guidance which should in turn enhance decision making that I think is where we see the use of the word scaffolding which I think you referred to before yes that's correct now did you bring this argument here
02:04:35 now did you bring this argument here this
02:04:37 this relationship identified in the academic literature to the attention of AC cotton in order to support your view that the DCP should be adopted not directly by
02:04:50 DCP should be adopted not directly by the time we had this I think she was already commissioner and Steve apter was the director of assurance safety and Assurance so it was Steve
02:05:01 safety and Assurance so it was Steve actor that I brought that I brought this to his attention and what did he make of it uh
02:05:06 it uh if I did the whole document to him we didn't talk about this piece specifically rather we talked about the document in its entirety and he then went on to take a paper recommending the
02:05:18 went on to take a paper recommending the implementation of the decision Control process
02:05:22 process now let's um go to your statement please and go to page 14 at the foot of the page I'd like to look at paragraph 55 with you
02:05:30 with you and this is Under The Heading training of incident Commanders and you say at the very foot of the page nevertheless AC cotton agreed that I could present the concept of decision
02:05:41 could present the concept of decision controls to Babcock and refer to it during discussions around decisions made during training however this was not a full implementation of the DCP into training
02:05:51 training now that was in the context I think of your role on the incident command project board was it that's correct right and
02:05:58 right and um we've seen that that was responsible for overseeing Badcock's review of The Incident Command training it was assisting the review I didn't have direct responsibility for the review in
02:06:11 direct responsibility for the review in its entirety yeah but the incident command project board did I think that's correct yes now you I think exhibit a set of minutes of the of a meeting of this board on the 2nd of February 2016.
02:06:22 this board on the 2nd of February 2016. can we go to that lfb double zero double one zero six six nine
02:06:30 and we can see just taking it from the top it's a note of the February incident command review project board meeting 2nd of February 2016 a present lfb Danny cotton and you as well as Graham Ellis
02:06:43 cotton and you as well as Graham Ellis Rachel wetheridge and Laurie Kenny I think she's the Rachel described in or just referred to in the emails yes that's correct although she was occupying a different position when I referred to her in the email yes
02:06:55 when I referred to her in the email yes indeed now can we go to page two in the top box third paragraph from the bottom
02:07:03 you can see there that um there is a reference to your attendance at a Pilot that you observed on the 26th of January it's just under the second red set of
02:07:15 it's just under the second red set of red text
02:07:16 red text SCH that's you added the following feedback with regard to the pilots she observed on 26th January yes do you see that yes I do yes and then there is some bullet points then can we
02:07:27 there is some bullet points then can we just look at the last or rather the second bullet point decision controls that the trainers weren't using decision controls it was discussed that with reference to the decision controls trainers would benefit from some further
02:07:39 trainers would benefit from some further input on this subject and how best it can be implemented into the training um is is that what prompted your discussion with Danny cotton or had Babcock already been instructed to
02:07:50 Babcock already been instructed to incorporate DCP into the training by this time uh no they had it didn't put a conversation with Danny cotton that was some time prior this was in relation to
02:08:01 some time prior this was in relation to a previous board where as I said earlier Danny had had agreed AC cotton forgive me had agreed that Babcock could use the decision controls as a tool during training but wasn't going to progress to
02:08:12 training but wasn't going to progress to the full implementation of the decision Control process um I went to observe the training and I saw that they weren't using the decision controls to prompt their discussions
02:08:23 controls to prompt their discussions with incident commanders when they were pausing and doing the coaching work through the decisions was the upshot that somebody perhaps you should go back to Babcock and tell or
02:08:37 should go back to Babcock and tell or teach Babcock how to insert the DCP training into their incident command training uh I did and I should be explicit
02:08:47 full decent pay I just don't want to get that point confused so those three the three prompts as the technique as opposed to the full the the full diagrammatic that you'll have seen
02:08:58 diagrammatic that you'll have seen earlier right so this is this was is it right there for a very scaled down modification to existing training on the decision-making model uh the introduction of
02:09:11 scaled down uh uh actually I don't what I would say rather than a very scaled down version is it was explicitly just the use of those three prompts at what point in the linear
02:09:24 point in the linear normative approach it would it wouldn't so it wasn't inserted into the decision-making model this was simply an opportunity for trainers to use those as a prompt in the same way that I I
02:09:36 a prompt in the same way that I I explained earlier on about a monitoring officer might wish to use these as prompts to explore a decision when the trainers were training incident commanders they would pause at particular points where decisions were
02:09:48 particular points where decisions were being made and they might coach an instant Commander through those decisions and explore the basis for those decisions it was there that I suggested the use of the decision controls might be a helpful addition to
02:09:59 controls might be a helpful addition to exploring those decisions are following this incident command project board I did arrange to visit Babcock and to present to all of the
02:10:12 Babcock and to present to all of the incident command trainers um I presented the decision controls their backgrounds why uh what they do when you use them and I showed them a
02:10:24 when you use them and I showed them a version of the training that we used when we were conducting the experiment the second study that that we discussed earlier on um to try to show Babcock how their
02:10:35 um to try to show Babcock how their trainers could practically use them um throughout the the course of their training yes now in fact I think we could see that to some extent in this um this meeting minute if we go to page
02:10:47 um this meeting minute if we go to page three please uh if we go to the bottom box on page three
02:10:53 um fit to train and human factors trainer training updates uh and you can see the second item down human factors training
02:11:04 human factors training um now Danny cotton in her witness statement we don't need to go to it but just the reference purposes it's page seven paragraph 35. she says that the human factors training there related to
02:11:17 human factors training there related to the the DCP the decision Control process as a human or as human factors impact decision making and that it was agreed that you could present to Babcock on that topic it sounds from what you've
02:11:29 that topic it sounds from what you've just told us is that that is correct yes yes do you remember if you actually delivered such a presentation to Babcock I did you did and how soon after this meeting did you do that do you remember
02:11:40 meeting did you do that do you remember uh due to the passage of time I can't recall but I would imagine a record would be on the system somewhere do you did you continue to monitor where the Babcock trainers were making use of that
02:11:51 Babcock trainers were making use of that element of the DCP in their incident command training yes after you visited them uh yes there were um officers that had visited and I had asked them whether they were using them or not and the
02:12:02 they were using them or not and the feedback that I had suggested that they weren't I believe that was picked up in another set of instant command project board notes yes and maybe come to that in a moment just to get back on an answer that you
02:12:14 just to get back on an answer that you referred you made you gave earlier on you said that it was a series of prompts at what point would the trainers or were the trainers supposed to use the prompt or deploy them
02:12:25 or deploy them in the otherwise normative linear process uh it wasn't in the normalized linear process it was a technique in that capacity and I think this was the
02:12:36 capacity and I think this was the challenge of doing it in the way that that was suggested the the they would pause at particular points in which a decision was required and it was at that point they were just
02:12:47 and it was at that point they were just coach commanders through those three uh those three prompts as opposed to using the full decision Control process itself um yesterday when we discussed my
02:13:00 um yesterday when we discussed my evidence one of the points that you asked me was whether instant commanders were actually using that very that very linear process um and the point that we settled on was
02:13:11 um and the point that we settled on was it's very difficult to observe people using that very linear process so it's difficult to to know whether they're actually using that in practice I think that the point with this is you would
02:13:22 that the point with this is you would get to a decision point and rather than running through the decision-making model they were pausing at that point and then exploring the basis for the decision did you form a view at the time
02:13:33 decision did you form a view at the time about whether that was effective my view is it's not sufficient and I think I pointed that out both in the meeting and in my witness statement that it doesn't
02:13:45 in my witness statement that it doesn't fully account for the full implementation of the decision Control process in its entirety um also we made the point in the National operational guidance that's
02:13:56 National operational guidance that's import it's important for those uh the decision Control process to be well embedded and for those techniques to be well practiced so experiencing some form of coaching
02:14:08 so experiencing some form of coaching um at one training course per year I would argue wouldn't be sufficient to make a significant difference in terms of the use of those decision controls
02:14:19 of the use of those decision controls during the course of your everyday command experience I should point out also for clarity here the human factors training as this relates to was an
02:14:30 training as this relates to was an additional piece of training that was included as a requirement under fit to train where incident command trainers underwent a formal course in human factors delivered by an external agency
02:14:43 factors delivered by an external agency with expertise in human factors to help instant command trainers to develop an awareness of those additional human factors or or in our sector the command
02:14:54 factors or or in our sector the command skills as we term them to understand how they might be being applied in practice so to help to coach people to understand how their effect actively used at an
02:15:06 how their effect actively used at an incident did that happen did you send the trainers off to be trained about the human factors they did a training a training provider came in rather than them going off so yes they were trained and the feedback was positive there was
02:15:18 and the feedback was positive there was a discussion and I think actually it's in the the next paragraph down that it might be helpful for some lfb officers to also uh join in some of the additional slots
02:15:29 additional slots um
02:15:30 um uh in that because it was a very helpful uh example I see so in a nutshell is it right that the upshot of all of this was that Babcock uh or Babcock trainers received some
02:15:41 uh or Babcock trainers received some training on human factors and the use of DCP prompts yes they did yes right that's correct but otherwise uh incident commanders were being trained by Babcock on the DMM as it stood yes that's
02:15:53 on the DMM as it stood yes that's correct now can we go to lfb double zero double one zero six seven two
02:16:00 uh can we go in that email run to page two
02:16:03 two um and it's an email in fact it's a it's a post I think uh uh uh in a format I'm not sure I'm entirely familiar with but never mind um it's a post of the 5th of May 2017.
02:16:17 it's a post of the 5th of May 2017. uh from Lee drawbridge who is sending an email to the nfcc's National command and control user group that's nccug yes that's correct yes uh and you've
02:16:28 that's correct yes uh and you've exhibited it to your statement which is why I'm asking you about it now it confirms I think that the lfb were not intending at that stage to incorporate the DCP into the brigades
02:16:39 to incorporate the DCP into the brigades policy and training and if we look at the second paragraph in this email he says this at present lfp have made a strategic decision not to move away from the decision-making
02:16:51 to move away from the decision-making model DMM as it is felt that there is insufficient evidence to support this when balanced against the business change implications uh we looked at this earlier when we
02:17:03 uh we looked at this earlier when we were discussing AC Cotton's reasons given to you for not adopting the DCP and you refer to business implications do you know what
02:17:15 implications do you know what um is meant there by business change implications my understanding would be this was in relation to changing the policy itself uh changing the training there was also
02:17:28 uh changing the training there was also a view at one point that the decision-making model was used by other groups in London fire brigade to make decisions non-operate in non-operational circumstances so
02:17:40 circumstances so support services for example um there was at one point a meeting of a working group that I was invited to and I don't know if there are any further
02:17:51 I don't know if there are any further meetings of this working group it was the only one that I was invited to where that question was explicitly asked of the heads of functions of support group and they confirmed that nobody else or
02:18:05 and they confirmed that nobody else or certainly no one that was represented in that room at the time were also using the decision-making model so a move away from it wouldn't pose a challenge to them
02:18:14 them so I'm not sure whether in this email when he's talking about the business change implications it's also a reference to the belief that other parts
02:18:26 reference to the belief that other parts of the organization might also be using the decision-making model I see so just to summarize I think what you've just said
02:18:34 said there wasn't actually any argument for business change implications because the non-operational side of LFE wasn't using the DMM anyway I think there was a belief that there were it would be more
02:18:45 belief that there were it would be more difficult to move away from the decision-making model because it was well established in London fire brigade so I think that they I think that officers had genuinely believed that
02:18:58 officers had genuinely believed that although given that other Fire and Rescue Services had all moved away from the DMM quite successfully I think that there's a lot of learning that could be sought from others who had already made
02:19:10 sought from others who had already made the move as to how that might practically be done right and I'm just interested in the use of the the use of the word business there a new exhibited this email but how do you understand did
02:19:23 this email but how do you understand did you understand the word business in that context was it does that imply some sort of budgetary or commercial implication no I think in that context my my understanding is that
02:19:36 that context my my understanding is that that relates to organizational change more broadly right why is the lead business used uh I don't know
02:19:44 um now the email goes on to say in the next paragraph the DMM has served us well since implication and has been used many are hundreds of thousands of incidents supporting millions of Command Decisions in fact
02:19:56 millions of Command Decisions in fact the only time it's been found not to work when subject to our rigorous incident review processes is when it hasn't been applied properly which is obviously a training implication the model has also stood up to Legal
02:20:07 the model has also stood up to Legal scrutiny at a number of high-profile cases
02:20:10 cases in relation to the comment about the lfb having found that the only time the DMM didn't work when it wasn't applied properly that's what he says was that consistent with your understanding as at May 2017. no I think many fire and
02:20:24 May 2017. no I think many fire and Rescue Services would have also said the decision-making model was was well embedded and was working well and it wasn't until we undertook the research to actually explore how decisions were being made that we identified some of
02:20:37 being made that we identified some of the issues with the way that decisions were being made that prompted us to move away from that so it wasn't the case for me that I'd I'd seen that the only time
02:20:49 me that I'd I'd seen that the only time when it doesn't work is when it hadn't been applied properly because as we found during the research actually it wasn't reflecting the way that the instant commanders were making decisions
02:21:00 instant commanders were making decisions at all in fact it neglected an entire uh decision-making pathway now you see that that's in the context of your academic work but I think it's also right that
02:21:11 work but I think it's also right that you had experience uh as head of the Brigade operational review team uh did you all say form a view about whether what uh lee drawbridge is saying here
02:21:23 what uh lee drawbridge is saying here derived from your experience of reviewing operational performance as head of the brigades ort well I should point out that I didn't take responsibility for org y until the
02:21:34 responsibility for org y until the beginning of June about two weeks prior to the fire at Granville this email was sent on the 5th of May so this was sent prior to my experience there but if I
02:21:45 prior to my experience there but if I could perhaps help by sharing my experience after that and the recognition that it wasn't the case at this point in time um I I wouldn't no I wouldn't support
02:21:56 um I I wouldn't no I wouldn't support that I think that people were making decisions as we'd as we'd outlined earlier sometimes analytically more often than not very reflexively and I don't consider that to be a fault with
02:22:08 don't consider that to be a fault with the application of the decision-making model because I think the reality is people will make a decision using one of those Pathways depending on their previous experience depending on the pressures that they're experiencing at
02:22:20 pressures that they're experiencing at the time depending on the situation in front of them as opposed to simply telling them that they should make a decision in a in a particular way with no tools or techniques to assist them in
02:22:32 no tools or techniques to assist them in doing that so sorry I'm sorry I cut you off at the end of your last answer no I was just going to summarize by saying that's not a position that I would agree with right and that disagreement is derived am I right from two things first your
02:22:44 right from two things first your academic work your experiments and your findings is recorded in the academic literature and secondly your experience after June 2017 as head of ort uh yes and also my
02:22:55 as head of ort uh yes and also my experience at London fire brigade from the time that I joined in February 2015 so it wouldn't be limited to my exposure there as a as the head of ort now in the next
02:23:07 as a as the head of ort now in the next paragraph Lee drawbridge goes on as follows however we do acknowledge that the DMM could be improved to take account of recent Doctrine changes and to improve understanding we have therefore developed the attached diagram
02:23:18 therefore developed the attached diagram with descriptors to help our incident commanders understand requirements this has been through our internal operational staff engagement process and has received good feedback so I'm happy to share it to inform User Group
02:23:29 to share it to inform User Group discussion now the diagram is to which he's referring is that lfd008122 959
02:23:42 uh are you familiar with this diagram
02:23:46 was shared through that command and control User Group post which I accessed right were you asked to provide any feedback on this diagram no I wasn't
02:23:57 feedback on this diagram no I wasn't were you aware that it had been it appears consulted on through the internal operational staff engagement process uh no I wasn't it was the process that's reflected in
02:24:09 it was the process that's reflected in this diagram in your view an improvement on the DMM in any way
02:24:17 uh complex forgive me complex uh it's positive that the decision controls are included in there that's of course a positive step but I don't think that
02:24:28 positive step but I don't think that just simply the insertion in that particular way would improve the decision-making model in the way that the move to the decision Control process might and just has helped me please
02:24:42 might and just has helped me please where do we see the decision control elements uh if you look at the Gathering and thinking box on the uh slightly left Center they're just at the bottom they actually fall out of the bottom of the
02:24:54 actually fall out of the bottom of the yellow box yes that's correct
02:24:59 can you explain why you were not consulted on the on this document or the wisdom of adopting it uh no I
02:25:10 know uh the belief that the decision Control process was a a a an appropriate step forward very clear um and it was also made clear to me that that was disagreed with so I I cannot
02:25:23 that was disagreed with so I I cannot say specifically why I wasn't consulted on it ought to you to have been given your place in the structure I would have welcomed it yes well that may be but Orchard have been given your place in the structure at that particular point in time my place in the structure was
02:25:36 in time my place in the structure was the DAC in the Northwest area so there would be nothing formally in my position that would given have given me any Authority or accountability over incident command policy so it could be
02:25:47 incident command policy so it could be argued that no but it would have been a professional courtesy given my experience with the national operational guidance program and the development of the decision Control process and I think I might have been able to assist now um
02:25:59 I might have been able to assist now um as you tell us in your statement of paragraph 48 and as you've just told us now you became head of ort in June 2017. uh just before the fire at Grenville
02:26:10 uh just before the fire at Grenville Tower
02:26:11 Tower um and you um I think have referred to a paper that you drafted for Steve apter in relation to the scheduled policy review for the DMM uh let's look at that that's at lfb
02:26:22 uh let's look at that that's at lfb double zero double one zero six seven seven
02:26:32 uh and if we go to um page
02:26:37 um page 12.
02:26:40 12. no I'm so sorry uh there is no page 12. uh we go to page uh two is this the paper yes that's correct yes we looked at page four of the of this
02:26:52 we looked at page four of the of this earlier on and we looked at the dyslexia element of it um if we go we can see that the date is the 6th of July 2017 so it's a month or so after you took over yes that's as head of ort
02:27:03 head of ort um if we go to page two can we go to paragraph
02:27:08 paragraph two
02:27:10 two and you'll see their research and findings two pieces of research were conducted and you you set out there in summary the summary of your findings of your earlier research in paragraph two and three I think yeah
02:27:23 in paragraph two and three I think yeah yeah yes
02:27:24 yeah yes and at page three um you can see there's a heading benefits which starts at paragraph five and am I right that from paragraphs five
02:27:35 and am I right that from paragraphs five down to 14 you can't quite see it on the screen but it's towards the foot of the page you've set up you've set out under a number of subheadings the benefits of incorporating the DCP into policy and
02:27:47 incorporating the DCP into policy and the subheadings are going to Scrolls up a little bit National alignment interoperable interoperability anticipated inspection equality impact assessment and then the last one at the
02:28:00 assessment and then the last one at the very foot of your screen risk aversion and operational discretion uh and uh if you um go to paragraphs 10 and 11 there under anticipated inspection you suggest there
02:28:13 inspection you suggest there um that um the LFE could be inspected on the basis of energy compliance and in relation to the e i a
02:28:22 um you say that the DCP should in fact assist those the dyslexia and you point to an anticipated reduction in risk aversion and uncertainty and we've looked as I say at page four
02:28:34 and we've looked as I say at page four specifically on professor at Professor hundley's quoted views about that issue what was Steve actor's response to this paper it was positive he sorry forgive me
02:28:45 he sorry forgive me continue sorry uh no it was he he responded positively and said that he intended to draft use this draft to inform a paper that he would take to CMV
02:28:56 inform a paper that he would take to CMV do you know what he did with this report my understanding is that he did indeed draft a report that he took to CMB will you party to any further discussions about the DCP before you
02:29:08 discussions about the DCP before you began your secondment at the inspectorate in November 2017. um perhaps informally with Steve apter I would imagine due to the passage of time
02:29:20 would imagine due to the passage of time I can't recall precisely which conversations I may or who who else I may have had a conversation with but it was broadly Steven I'd also had a conversation with Rachel wetheridge When I Was preparing for this
02:29:33 I Was preparing for this um uh uh particularly because there are aspects I think we talked about in National alignment around the development of the scenarios um but I don't recall whether I would
02:29:44 um but I don't recall whether I would have had a follow-on conversation just to get an update on where they were with that but this this was broadly the the Crux of the uh that that was broadly the Crux of the discussion with Steve apter
02:29:56 Crux of the discussion with Steve apter and do you know whether Steve Raptor did in fact draft a report to take to the CMB yes I believe he did and you know what the cnb's reaction to it was I believe they approved it subject to an
02:30:09 believe they approved it subject to an equality impact assessment did that take place do you know um I don't know now is it right that by the time you left the lfb
02:30:21 left the lfb the DCP had not been incorporated into policy yes that's correct do you understand why that was I believe that Steve apter would have
02:30:33 I believe that Steve apter would have taken as I recall I think the report went to CMB after I'd left yes do you know why the DCP had not been incorporated into policy thereafter no I
02:30:45 incorporated into policy thereafter no I don't know now one observation that was made in the inspectorist report in their report following their 2018 inspection of the lfb was that the Brigade is generally slow
02:30:56 was that the Brigade is generally slow to implement organizational change um that is if we need a reference in the reported SMC six zeros one one page 23 in the third paragraph from the bottom
02:31:08 in the third paragraph from the bottom but I don't need to take you to that is that consistent with your experience of the Brigade attitude to organizational change when you were there I think there are complexities with the structure in London fire
02:31:20 with the structure in London fire brigade that can make it more difficult to implement change what kind of complexities for example if you want to implement any kind of change
02:31:31 you want to implement any kind of change in London fire brigade it requires a agreement from various heads of service who all have um perhaps a narrower remit than you might find in in another
02:31:43 than you might find in in another organization but the depth of that remit is very great so they're responsible for a great deal but in a very narrow range therefore any kind of significant organizational change will by its very
02:31:55 organizational change will by its very nature across various boundaries in London fire brigade because of that structure it does require approval and agreement from a broad range of people who might all have responsibility for a
02:32:07 who might all have responsibility for a small component of that change which is necessary to make it happen all right I think you referred yesterday to
02:32:14 to um cultural aspects of the lfb but your answer just now gave a reason based on its structure yes I think I think the both reasons cultural reasons definitely uh
02:32:25 cultural reasons definitely uh definitely impacted there is a culture in London that is very conservative and I think that that's that that's correct um
02:32:36 um I think there is great comfort in that that is familiar because it's seen as tried and tested what's wrong with that
02:32:47 what's wrong with that uh
02:32:49 uh uh tried and tested is is fine but if there are improvements or change if you always do what you've always done you're all you'll always get what you've always got
02:33:00 always got but
02:33:02 but those who are apparently reluctant to change
02:33:08 so the change is worth doing that may be so I mean sometimes you do have to examine the proposed change quite carefully don't you that's true
02:33:19 carefully don't you that's true did you see examples of that within the lfp
02:33:23 lfp um
02:33:25 um change was definitely considered very carefully but I think one of the more challenging elements was the structure meaning more people would need to agree to a change before that was actually
02:33:38 to a change before that was actually implemented and the more people who have to agree the greater the chance of someone digging his heels in or her correct well all right
02:33:48 yes Mr Billet
02:33:52 uh can we go to inq30 is one four seven nine five please this is uh the inspectorates report of February 2021 this year
02:34:05 February 2021 this year um following their most recent inspection of the lfb and you can see the first page there on the screen can we go to page 31 please in this document
02:34:15 uh and at the top of the page there you can see that they deal with The Incident Command Decision model and the report says this the Brigade is the only fire and rescue service in England not to use
02:34:27 and rescue service in England not to use the national Incident Command Decision model we raised this in our 2019 inspection as an area for improvement so Brigade has reviewed the model it currently uses and compared it with the national model used by all other
02:34:39 national model used by all other services an option favored by several of the senior leaders we spoke to is to have an updated model that combines elements of both the national and Brigade models a decision has yet to be made about which option to select
02:34:50 made about which option to select whatever model the Brigade finally chooses to use must either be in line with or better than the national Guidance the Brigade will need to quickly assure itself of its choice because it will be part of the planned
02:35:01 because it will be part of the planned incident command training now this report came of course given the date after you've left the Brigade in September 2019 to go to West Sussex do you have any knowledge of what the
02:35:15 do you have any knowledge of what the inspectorate had said was apparently under consideration at the Brigade uh not at that particular point in time I believe latterly there was a report that was published that suggested a
02:35:27 that was published that suggested a hybrid model but that report was published quite recently I understand in the last few months I'm not cited on whether that was implemented right
02:35:39 whether that was implemented right uh and have your views been sought about whether a hybrid would work no would it would they work would it work introduction of a
02:35:50 introduction of a it's a welcome step I think there are some challenges with a hybrid model not least the change in terminology so one of the points that we saw in the paper uh that I produced for
02:36:02 saw in the paper uh that I produced for Steve apter earlier on was that point about intraoperability and of course interoperability um it's important when you are dealing with incidents particularly incidents
02:36:13 with incidents particularly incidents that cross borders and particularly incidents that involve decision makers from other Fire and Rescue Services that you have the same expectations and the same language I articulated earlier on
02:36:24 same language I articulated earlier on in my evidence how there are differences between the language used in the London decision making model particularly under the plan formulation element which was just simply objectives in the London
02:36:36 just simply objectives in the London decision making model whereas in the National operational guidance that's broken down further so that you have objectives you have your operational tactics and you also have your Tactical
02:36:48 tactics and you also have your Tactical priorities so there are differences the other points I think that's important to note is the difference that I pointed out earlier on with the decision Control
02:36:59 out earlier on with the decision Control process
02:37:00 process um
02:37:01 um being able to essentially show that you can make decisions in both ways so recognizing the two Pathways the one being a very analytical pathway including that plan formulation but also then accounting for
02:37:13 formulation but also then accounting for the other decision-making process the more intuitive decision-making process that wouldn't be accounted for unless sorry that was accounted for on a hybrid
02:37:24 sorry that was accounted for on a hybrid model that would be another potential disparity and when I'm talking about a hybrid model I'm referring to the version that we saw earlier on appended to Lee drawbridge's post to the National command and control User Group just for
02:37:36 command and control User Group just for clarity for the inquiry and the final point is one of the um active monitoring which again I signed posted earlier on in my evidence because in the decision
02:37:47 in my evidence because in the decision making model all you have is the loop at the end suggesting that you should evaluate once you've gone through that linear process so only the analytical process that's recognized as opposed to
02:37:58 process that's recognized as opposed to consistently scanning your environment and active monitoring your environment for any kind of change that might inform your situational assessment right looking at the first sentence of the
02:38:11 looking at the first sentence of the first paragraph on the screen Dr Karen Hatton was there anything special about London that would justify this kind of exceptionalism when it came to the decision-making model not
02:38:23 decision-making model not reasonably proposed what was the justification within the lfb for not Towing the national line established by the nog
02:38:34 national line established by the nog uh mainly around the points that we discussed earlier so the business change element that Lee drawbridge pointed to in in his evidence the equality impact assessment was one of the other reasons
02:38:45 assessment was one of the other reasons that was that that was given um
02:38:51 right did anybody to your knowledge analyze those reasons critically to see if they were well-founded there was nothing that I was sighted on that said
02:39:02 nothing that I was sighted on that said that that piece of work has been done however it may have been there were there was as we've already established there were several papers that were relevant that I wasn't cited on at the time either so I'm reluctant to give a
02:39:13 time either so I'm reluctant to give a definitive answer to that in case there are papers that I'm not aware of now I'm going to turn to a different subject
02:39:20 subject um it's still in the sphere of incident command but I'd like to explore with you how lfp's consideration of your research and the decision Control process fitted into its consideration of incident
02:39:32 into its consideration of incident command more generally following the lacknell house coroners rule 43 recommendations now of course the recommendations came before you joined the Brigade the date
02:39:45 before you joined the Brigade the date of the letter is the 28th of March 2013. uh first do you agree that the latinal coroner's recommendations formed part of the literature that was considered
02:39:56 the literature that was considered during the development of the incident command National operational guidance yes it was it was
02:40:04 uh if we could look at the coroner's recommendations then that they are at lfb triple zero three two one five eight
02:40:17 uh the first pages I I hope I hope by now very familiar to everybody 28th of March 2013 uh to Ron Dobson the then commissioner
02:40:29 commissioner and if you um turn please to page two you can see at the foot of the page that the second number third uh group of recommendations
02:40:42 number third uh group of recommendations relates to incident command and it says this during the lateral house fire there were six changes of Incident Commander I see with some serving as I see for brief periods it is recommended that the
02:40:53 periods it is recommended that the Brigade review its policy and procedures concerning incident command having regard to whether it is effective for the choice of IC to be tied closely to the number or type of appliances attending an incident and the
02:41:04 attending an incident and the effectiveness of a policy which may result in Rapid and frequent changes of IC it is also recommended that consideration be given to training of ICS and potential ICS to enhance their
02:41:15 ICS and potential ICS to enhance their performance in relation to the following and there are then there are seven bullet points set out a sub areas for training review
02:41:26 training review now the first one reads as follows use of the dynamic risk management model and other management tools to enable ICS to analyze the situation and to
02:41:38 to analyze the situation and to recognize and react quickly to changing circumstances
02:41:43 did you understand from the time you joined the nfb well let me ask this question did when you joined the NFP did you see this document
02:41:53 document not this document no did anybody ever bring this document to your attention and tell you that the local house coroner had made this recommendation uh no but I was familiar with the recommendations from the lacknell house
02:42:05 recommendations from the lacknell house inquiry because it was included in the literature review for the national operational guidance yes so some of the work packages that we developed were based on uh recommendations not just
02:42:16 based on uh recommendations not just from lachenol but more broadly with other critical incidents also and how closely involved were you with the production of the material which went to Gary reason in April 2013 from which he
02:42:29 Gary reason in April 2013 from which he then oversaw the process of carrying the recommendations forward uh I'm afraid I don't know what material that was right um so I think the answer is you weren't
02:42:40 um so I think the answer is you weren't yes now um looking at the reference to other management tools did you ever come to understand that that would include the decision Control process or the dynamic
02:42:51 dynamic um the DMM decision-making model or other policies an element of this was
02:42:59 a driver to develop Ed a coroner here makes reference to tools to help instant commanders to analyze the situation and to recognize and react quickly to changing
02:43:10 and react quickly to changing circumstances um as I explained earlier one of the core parts of the decision controls themselves was aimed at improving situational awareness and helping incident commanders to move past the
02:43:22 incident commanders to move past the point of Simply seeing a a situation recognizing a situation in a here and now and moving to the point where they would essentially be anticipating what
02:43:35 would essentially be anticipating what might happen next which is that highest level of situational awareness to your knowledge
02:43:42 knowledge uh did anybody ever
02:43:45 ever revisit the recommendations made by the coroner
02:43:49 coroner to consider training of ICS and potential ICS to enhance their own performance in the use of these models when deciding not to adopt the decision
02:44:01 when deciding not to adopt the decision Control process I'm afraid I don't know the answer to that to your knowledge did it ever come up when did any discussions to it you were a party nothing that I was cited on
02:44:12 a party nothing that I was cited on right right
02:44:16 did anybody ever to your knowledge consider that there was a risk that if rejected
02:44:22 rejected the lfb might not be carrying into effect that aspect of the local house Coroner's recommendation not explicitly but I had pointed out previously that the work that we did in the National
02:44:34 the work that we did in the National operational guidance was based on the literature review which took learning from a range of critical incidents yes now I think it's right that the training package that the Brigade eventually developed in response to the coroner's
02:44:46 developed in response to the coroner's rule 43 recommendations on incident command training was was called wholecroft house is that familiar to you no not
02:44:56 no not um can I just look then briefly we'll take this quickly at the the whole craft house exercise trainer guide It's a bab60 is one one and the document is oh that's undated
02:45:09 and the document is oh that's undated um
02:45:09 um uh is a crew and watch manager a training exercise and it makes me mention at all of the decisions Control process in fact if you go to page 48
02:45:21 go to page 48 we can be clearer um at paragraph 1.27 it refers to the decision-making model and there it is
02:45:30 um uh and you can see the process in the text and in the diagram underneath it um does this tell us that this is basically the lfb's decision making
02:45:41 basically the lfb's decision making model embedded in this training uh yes it is right do you have any knowledge of whether any consideration was given during the development of this package about whether it would be more appropriate to incorporate the decision
02:45:54 appropriate to incorporate the decision Control process into it no I don't Babcock will only develop training based on extant policy in London fire brigade is my understanding so if the decision-making model was the extant
02:46:05 decision-making model was the extant policy at the time that would be the element they would incorporate into their training and do I take it from all of this that you had no involvement at all and you were not consulted on the content of the TCAP that gave rise to
02:46:19 content of the TCAP that gave rise to this training guide I don't know when this training guide was produced well I think eventually in 2016 uh not that I can recall directly being
02:46:30 uh not that I can recall directly being involved with right I'd like to turn to a completely different topic now and that is revalidation of incident command uh can we go to page 17 of your
02:46:42 uh can we go to page 17 of your statement please and let's look together at paragraph 62.
02:46:47 uh you have a heading above it revalidation of incident command of the lfb and you say there it was proposed that the lfb should introduce a process
02:46:58 that the lfb should introduce a process whereby incident Commander's competencies were revalidated to ensure that they had sufficient operational knowledge and experience to respond competently at incidents as head of development I was responsible for
02:47:09 development I was responsible for reporting to the CMB on the progress of the implementation of a process for revalidation I've set out my knowledge of the status of the implementation below and to be clear when you refer to
02:47:20 below and to be clear when you refer to revalidation am I right that that is essentially a process of continuing assessment uh yes a Contin in the context sorry it was broader than a continuous assessment so the point with
02:47:33 continuous assessment so the point with revalidation is it's something that that should be done once someone has proved competent in role so that process of becoming competent from their development phase is a separate process
02:47:44 development phase is a separate process so if I may Park that for a second revalidation in part was partly The Continuous assessment element but it also Incorporated additional opportunities to practice incident
02:47:57 opportunities to practice incident command with the setting of a minimum number of hours per annum that someone should have an opportunity to practice incident command um along with that one of the proposals
02:48:08 um along with that one of the proposals was to have a a an annual schedule of CPD so you're correct in your assertion that it was a process of continuous assessment but there were additional pieces included within that that should
02:48:20 pieces included within that that should serve to help incident commanders feel confident in the application of their skills rather than just proving competent through an assessment process so continuous assessment plus
02:48:31 so continuous assessment plus development yes uh and would I be right that this would be assessment in the sense of a pass or fail evaluation which would ensure that those who don't demonstrate the required
02:48:42 those who don't demonstrate the required level of skill are not able to continue to act as incident commanders yes that was the initial proposition um laterally after a change of director of operations
02:48:53 of operations um the direction was given that it should be more uh it should inform a training needs analysis more rather than being as as uh past and fail as it was initially maybe we're going to come to
02:49:05 initially maybe we're going to come to this so if we are I apologize for breaking at this point and asking the question but my understanding from evidence we heard on the previous occasions is that the uh the instant Commander is determined
02:49:19 uh the instant Commander is determined essentially by the number of pumps that respond to an incident so the first Incident Commander will almost invariably be a watch manager
02:49:30 almost invariably be a watch manager or a crew manager potential or even a crew manager all right um and then if you if he needs to call in more pumps then the next uh level up will be a station manager yes if he or
02:49:43 will be a station manager yes if he or she needed to to call him more pumps it would be a station manager right or station Commander so how does the revalidation work let's assume you have a watch manager who for one reason or another doesn't
02:49:54 who for one reason or another doesn't isn't revalidated does he he or she cease to be a watch manager or is there a different arrangement for denoting someone as
02:50:05 arrangement for denoting someone as instant Commander when two or three appliances are sent out um within the policy the Dr sorry forgive me the draft policy itself we
02:50:16 forgive me the draft policy itself we set out some of the criteria that would uh be applied to determine whether someone was revalidated or not if someone didn't pass the revalidation
02:50:27 someone didn't pass the revalidation there are a number of steps that were involved in that part of that could be to remove that person from operational duties should they not uh not not not meet the criteria to be revalidated so
02:50:40 meet the criteria to be revalidated so they wouldn't be at that incident necessarily it would be someone else that would be attending so no one was at risk of being reduced in rank no to
02:50:51 risk of being reduced in rank no to prevent
02:50:52 prevent being as it were put in as Incident Commander because of the number of pumps responding no they wouldn't be reduced in rank um the rank would also Encompass the activity that they would foreseeably
02:51:03 the activity that they would foreseeably do as their part of their their day job their day-to-day managerial role but what could happen as is set out in the draft policy is they could be removed
02:51:14 draft policy is they could be removed from operational duties or a number of steps were suggested that could also provide additional assurances to the service like um they're a process called tagging
02:51:25 um they're a process called tagging where an additional officer would be sent to that incident as well to support them and provide an additional level of assurance it could be an additional training course some additional enhanced
02:51:36 training course some additional enhanced training that that person does effectively the uh the the draft policy recommended a period where you'd have a
02:51:47 recommended a period where you'd have a say 30-day opportunity to improve and then you would be retested all right thank you very much is it right to say that during your time at the lfp there was no system for
02:51:59 at the lfp there was no system for ongoing or continuous assessment of incident command competence at least at level one that's correct and that would level one I think is watch manager and station manager yeah uh no just watch
02:52:10 station manager yeah uh no just watch manager forgive me crew management the position I think is this right was that incident command competence was assessed at the point of entry into that role yes that's correct so the point of
02:52:22 role yes that's correct so the point of promotion to um crew manager and watch manager uh or all of the roles yes or all of the roles you know is it right that although there was a system for continuing refresher
02:52:33 was a system for continuing refresher incident command training that training didn't include any element of assessment in other words individuals who perform poorly could still continue to act as incident commanders that's correct can
02:52:44 incident commanders that's correct can you explain why it was that the lfp sought to introduce this revalidation program
02:52:51 program there was a record Shin that the move to ensuring that incident commanders were continuously assured that they were
02:53:02 continuously assured that they were performing at the appropriate level a revalidation program in itself wasn't an entirely New Concept many other Fire and Rescue Services as we explored in one of the reports to CMB that's
02:53:14 one of the reports to CMB that's appended to my witness statement and many of the other Fire and Rescue Services were already using some kind of revalidation process revalidation in London fire brigade was
02:53:26 revalidation in London fire brigade was originally proposed under a different project called Ticket to Ride which was proposed by an officer as part of their executive leadership program
02:53:37 executive leadership program um that it was progressed to a point at which the project was proposed and approved but it wasn't then continued and you say officers as part of their
02:53:50 and you say officers as part of their executive leadership program was that directed The Ticket to Ride project directed at more senior offices no that would have been right now
02:54:00 right now um
02:54:04 was it was there any sense as far as you know that the lack of a system of continuous assessment would be a problem
02:54:11 a problem or some kind of deficiency in the existing system the value of
02:54:17 the commissioner was very keen that CMB oversaw the progress of the revalidation process because it was taken very seriously in London Fire again there was
02:54:29 seriously in London Fire again there was a recognition that it was important both organizationally and to individual commanders as well right now before we look in more detail about how that proposed program of regalization was
02:54:41 proposed program of regalization was progressed I want to ask you about assessment of incident command competence at the moment of entry into the role
02:54:49 the role during your time is it right first that the assessment of incident command competence at the point of promotion took place by way of an incident command exercise that happened at a promotional
02:55:01 exercise that happened at a promotional Assessment Center yes that's correct the instant command exercises would be developed by the operational review team or2 and they would be carried out by
02:55:12 or2 and they would be carried out by Babcock and they would be assessed by lfb officers and the exercise is overseen by NFP officers too yes that's correct did you have any involvement in Your Capacity as
02:55:23 have any involvement in Your Capacity as head of development in the development of those assessed incident command exercises no the responsibility and the authority of those was retained by ort as the effectively the subject matter
02:55:35 as the effectively the subject matter experts on that right did you when you took over head of ort become involved I did right but only for four months yes until you were seconded to the
02:55:47 yes until you were seconded to the constabulary right um did you have any involvement in the assessment of the candidates undertaking the exercises um I didn't oh yes I did I I ran the
02:55:58 um I didn't oh yes I did I I ran the dac's assessments and that meant that you oversaw both the exercise and the assessment yes and in your experience were those incident command exercises effective in
02:56:10 incident command exercises effective in selecting candidates who had the necessary skills and sets of competence that were needed for incident command they were challenging exercises I think it was important that they were challenging exercises
02:56:22 challenging exercises um they were one of the areas that I think that we could have improved on in those was selection against human factors one of the pieces of work that
02:56:33 factors one of the pieces of work that was progressed nationally was the development of a behavioral marker system for incident command the thinks system
02:56:41 system um that system is designed to assess how effectively those command skills are being used so the behaviors that might suggest you're effectively
02:56:52 suggest you're effectively um uh generating good situational awareness for example or behaviors that might suggest you're making a decision effectively for example the uh the the
02:57:03 effectively for example the uh the the assessment process in London fire brigade actually mirrored the assessment process in many foreign Rescue Services at that time and it was focused on the criteria set out in the National
02:57:15 criteria set out in the National Occupational standards for uh for incident commanders namely wm7 for crew managers and watch managers and efsm-2 for station managers and above so in
02:57:28 for station managers and above so in answer to your question very very uh very concisely eight
02:57:34 eight the assessment process was aligned with the assessment process broadly undertaken by Farm Rescue Services nationally but there were later introductions that are aimed at helping
02:57:47 introductions that are aimed at helping nationally um identify how effectively some of the command skills are being used rather than just focusing on the process right now we've already considered in the context of your academic research the
02:57:59 context of your academic research the importance of plant formulation in relation to decision making by incident commanders at incidents did you have a view at the time you were head of development as to whether those promotional incident command exercises
02:58:10 promotional incident command exercises were effective specifically in assessing the candidate's decision-making processes
02:58:16 processes um I think the the issue was that they weren't able to use anything other than the decision-making model so whilst it was effective at identifying the
02:58:28 was effective at identifying the outcomes of the decisions that were being made um it was that so the assessment yes was able to identify that the issue was more that they were you
02:58:42 the issue was more that they were you were only basing your judgment based on the decision-making model which was somewhat Limited in comparison right so does that tell us that they were ineffective because there was an uh a direct link from such
02:58:55 there was an uh a direct link from such a situational awareness to plan execution without going through the process injected or which would have been injected by the decision Control process I I think that the assessments
02:59:08 process I I think that the assessments themselves only looked at the outcomes of the processes so I don't think it would be I don't think I could say something as simply as they were ineffective I think that there are
02:59:19 ineffective I think that there are elements that were later considered nationally that would enhance uh decision forgive me that would enhance an assessment of how effective someone was commanding an incident right I mean
02:59:31 was commanding an incident right I mean overall what did you think they were effective or ineffective they they were they were they were they were good they were good
02:59:38 were good um how did the exercises then achieve uh effective plan formulation as well as plan execution if they were only working on the DMM
02:59:50 only working on the DMM so the exercises themselves were designed to run as an incident may run with specific injects at particular times and I think it's important to separate that from the process by which
03:00:02 separate that from the process by which someone would be making a particular decision so I think that the assessment criteria themselves just focused on the outcomes the outcomes that you would see
03:00:13 outcomes the outcomes that you would see would be more commonly derived from someone seeing a cue in the environment and then responding to that as opposed to the full consideration of some of the safeguards that might that might help to
03:00:26 safeguards that might that might help to support that the other element that the assessment didn't do and I hasten to add nor did assessments elsewhere in Fire and Rescue Services effectively assess how how effective someone's situational
03:00:38 how how effective someone's situational awareness was it didn't look at whether the behaviors that you were seeing would suggest that someone was anticipating what might happen next they had a high level of situational awareness or
03:00:49 level of situational awareness or whether it was essentially in the hearing now because it was more focused on the outcomes of things it was very focused on the process as opposed to how you were going through that process was the absence of any focus on how you
03:01:02 was the absence of any focus on how you were going through that process in your view at the time a deficiency in those incident command exercises I believe
03:01:15 in Step more broadly with what was being done by the fire and Rescue Services so it would be difficult to describe it as a deficiency in that capacity because it was broadly similar the improvements
03:01:26 was broadly similar the improvements came later right the but the fact that it was in Step doesn't necessarily mean that it was effective does it no that's fair so was it effective even though it was in Step it was effective at identifying the areas that it was set
03:01:40 identifying the areas that it was set out to identify I fear it would be an oversimplification to say that it wasn't fully effective now we've already seen the minutes of the incident command project board from the 2nd of February 2016 we saw that
03:01:52 the 2nd of February 2016 we saw that this morning which recorded that the trainers observed during an incident command training pilot were not using decision controls you'll remember that was I think page two of the document did the
03:02:04 think page two of the document did the promotional incident command exercises specifically incorporate the decision Control process at any stage no it didn't and why was that uh the exercise itself wouldn't have afforded an
03:02:15 itself wouldn't have afforded an opportunity to pause and to explore the decisions that were being made at any point in time it was effectively run to simulate an incident right now can I then turn to the revalidation program
03:02:28 then turn to the revalidation program again go back to that can we go please to lfb double zero double one eight one eight six
03:02:39 this is a report entitled revalidation of incident command competence which was written for the Commissioners group on the 17th of November 2015
03:02:52 group on the 17th of November 2015 that I think you wrote I did as head of development that's correct now in summary am I right that this report sets out a proposal for implementing a system of incident command revalidation
03:03:05 of incident command revalidation including a number of different options about what that system would look like that's correct now let's go to page two can we look at paragraph five please you say there
03:03:17 uh that there is a a considerable public and legal scrutiny in to the way in which incidents are dealt with uh the formal scrutiny may come from a number of quarters including the health
03:03:29 number of quarters including the health and safety executive fire investigators acting for loss adjusters as well as judicial inquiries scrutiny of command competence and or Command Decisions has been applied to Fire and Rescue Services following several high profile incidents
03:03:41 following several high profile incidents this includes recent incidents involving firefighter fatalities and if you look at the footnote footnote one it says Harrow Court Hertfordshire Marley Farm East Sussex 2006 and Atherton on stir
03:03:54 East Sussex 2006 and Atherton on stir Warwickshire 2007 and Barrel Balmoral bard strathclyde 2009. uh that and two of those incidents will be familiar I think from earlier
03:04:05 be familiar I think from earlier evidence
03:04:06 evidence uh
03:04:08 uh going on with with paragraph five uh it says uh and other serious incidents involving deaths and members of the public and then there's a
03:04:19 of the public and then there's a footnote too and that's a reference to the London bombings galston mine incident and lacknell house London 2009. it is important therefore that the Brigade can demonstrate that individuals
03:04:31 Brigade can demonstrate that individuals have been adequately prepared and are competent
03:04:35 competent uh and if we go to paragraph six please uh the last sentence says the implementation of such systems to revalidate among competence varies
03:04:46 revalidate among competence varies across the UK although typically involves a formal assessment every 18 to 24 months
03:04:51 24 months now does this mean that the NFP was the exception in not having any system of formal revalidation we looked at a number of Fire and Rescue Services not every fire and rescue
03:05:02 Services not every fire and rescue service so it would be unfair of me to uh to to say that right but did you know of any fire and rescue service which like the lfb had not developed a program
03:05:13 like the lfb had not developed a program of formal revalidation assessment not to the best of my knowledge but there may have been right but on what you saw you didn't see one all of the fire rescue services that we contacted did have one
03:05:24 services that we contacted did have one right now the report goes on to outline the incident command courses that were in place for the lfb within uh within the mfp at that point if we go to page nine and look at page four look at paragraph nine
03:05:36 paragraph nine page four paragraph nine uh under lfb current practice uh it identifies the suite of incident command training courses delivered by Babcock and then says this the content and delivery of
03:05:47 says this the content and delivery of these courses are currently being considered under the course review process which seeks to deliver improvements aligned with current lfp policy and National operational guidance there are currently formalized training
03:05:59 there are currently formalized training courses for levels one to three of incident command with options for the delivery of level four incident command currently incident command training being escaped currently the initial level one incident command course Lim
03:06:11 level one incident command course Lim well 1M I think I must be is the only course which has an accessible element however through the course review process there is the potential to include additional accessible elements
03:06:22 include additional accessible elements to initial and refresher courses a breakdown of the training including the accessible elements is provided in appendix one uh now um level one is initial is this
03:06:34 uh now um level one is initial is this right level two is intermediate level three is Advanced and level four is strategic yes that's correct and so as well as there being no system for ongoing revalidation of competence there was also no training at all for level
03:06:45 was also no training at all for level four incident commanders is that right uh that's correct I from the
03:06:50 from the multi-agency uh gold incident command course the Jesuit the uh the multi-agency gold instant command course would have Incorporated elements of Jessup uh but it's a course that's run
03:07:02 Jessup uh but it's a course that's run by the College of policing that aims at providing
03:07:06 providing um uh uh skills and training to senior strategic commanders um the Gap in London specifically in relation to level four were additional complexities with the Strategic response
03:07:18 complexities with the Strategic response Arrangements that would have been specific to London that would not have been covered in the multi-agency gold incident command course I see was the absence of any
03:07:32 was the absence of any training at all for level four Incident Commander saving the respects you've just identified a concern for you at the time you wrote this document it was clear that it was something that was needed
03:07:42 needed yes but was it a concern to you that it wasn't in place uh was certainly something that that was needed and something that we were progressing through the incident command project board now um
03:07:53 project board now um we saw the 2018 inspection of the lfb um I done by the inspectorate and I think you'll recall maybe that this was a problem picked up in that report
03:08:05 a problem picked up in that report wasn't it yes I believe so um if we go to page 40 in that document that's inq30 is one four seven nine six
03:08:19 um if you go to the penultimate paragraph
03:08:23 paragraph on that page it says this in London refresher training is only available for level one crew manager and watch manager and level two station manager and group manager commanders and it isn't a formal
03:08:34 manager commanders and it isn't a formal reassessment of command competence that is Staff Can't Fail for poor performance and will therefore return to command incidents
03:08:42 incidents and if you look at the next paragraph it says training for level three commanders Deputy assistant commissioner and assistant commissioner isn't consistently in place is that consistent with your
03:08:53 is that consistent with your recollection of level three training level three training was delivered primarily through something that you might have seen abbreviated as a as a poax which is a principal officer exercise those were delivered
03:09:06 exercise those were delivered um my understanding they were scheduled to occur every other year it was more an exercise rather than a course with
03:09:18 exercise rather than a course with um formalized input I think the issue that I was more concerned with here was the lack of a maintenance of skills program the maintenance of skills
03:09:30 program the maintenance of skills program would sit outside of the remit for the training and development department as you would as you have seen in the structure of London fire brigade and the maintenance of skills program is
03:09:43 and the maintenance of skills program is owned by the operations directorate it was covered by a policy called damop it was mainly focused on exercising based on risks in individual boroughs as
03:09:55 based on risks in individual boroughs as opposed to a formalized maintenance of skills schedule that would be applied to all incident Commanders that was something that was outside of
03:10:06 that was something that was outside of the remit of revalidation which I believe was reported in in one of the later reports
03:10:14 but the absence of skills maintenance is something that was picked up as a concern in this report at least so far as levels one and two are concerned
03:10:25 two are concerned yes we get that from the penultimate paragraph on that page don't we yes so and was that consistent with your experience yes yeah if we go on to the
03:10:37 experience yes yeah if we go on to the the
03:10:38 the um last sentence of the paragraph at the foot of the page it says most level three and four commanders we spoke to confirmed they hadn't had training for several years again is that consistent with your
03:10:50 again is that consistent with your recollection and experience at the time I think it depends
03:10:58 depends on how to print officer exercise but again the point that I think is Salient here is that distinction between a principal officer exercise and some formalized input that they might expect
03:11:11 formalized input that they might expect to receive on a training course right
03:11:17 just taking that last sentence at face value and perhaps leaving on one side The Poets or principal officer exercise uh
03:11:28 uh was there no system at all for continuing to continuing assessment of officers of ranks at levels three and four
03:11:36 four following the single assessment they would have undertaken at the point of promotion to that rank no
03:11:45 no through the development mission to rectify that right so the revalidation program was designed at least in part to address that deficiency would that be right that's correct now
03:11:58 was it also the case that you're concerned about the absence of a formal revalidation procedure was aggravated because of a decline in the opportunities that commanders would have
03:12:09 opportunities that commanders would have had to gain experience at real live incidents yes that's correct traditionally in the foreign rescue service in the sector as a whole not exclusively London there was often a
03:12:21 exclusively London there was often a heavy emphasis on gaining experience through exposure to operational incidents with that decline whilst of course incredibly positive there does
03:12:32 course incredibly positive there does mean that those incident commanders would be having less exposure and therefore would need more simulation and more training to adequately prepare them for that it's a it's a point that we had
03:12:45 for that it's a it's a point that we had discussed nationally in great depth and again I have to make the point that when people are typically passing a judgment on how productive a
03:12:58 passing a judgment on how productive a fire and rescue service is they are using measures such as the number of home fire safety visits they may do or the number of fire safety audits they may do or the number of calls that they
03:13:09 may do or the number of calls that they might go to one of the issues that aggravate that then at a fire and rescue service level is that the preparation for going to incidents through training
03:13:20 for going to incidents through training isn't necessarily something that is monitored on a on a national level through for example submissions of data to the home office that is then taken into consideration with the productivity
03:13:32 into consideration with the productivity of a fire and rescue service but it is a crucial element
03:13:37 right
03:13:40 can I just ask you something in that last answer uh you say that this is line 17 in the Raw transcript that as a whole not exclusively London
03:13:51 that as a whole not exclusively London there was often a heavy emphasis on gaining experience through exposure to operational incidents could you just explain how that would manifest itself in London why do you say there was a heavy emphasis on gaining experience
03:14:02 heavy emphasis on gaining experience through going to live incidents uh as opposed to what as opposed to simulations um I think that nationally over time there was an
03:14:13 nationally over time there was an assumption that many most people would get a great deal of experience naturally through going to operational incidents the amount of time that an officer would spend at an operational incident would
03:14:27 spend at an operational incident would previously have been much greater because there were more operational incidents
03:14:32 incidents um at the moment we did some work actually for the revalidation process that analyzed the amount of time officers at various levels would reasonably have spent at
03:14:46 levels would reasonably have spent at incidents we took a sample of about 10 percent as I recall from memory of the uh of officers at each Rank and analyzed how long they'd spent in charge of an incident and it was relatively low
03:14:58 incident and it was relatively low yes but that was uh now that is an answer to a question based on a document I haven't shown you oh let's go to that because you did some work on this lfb double zero double one eight one eight
03:15:09 double zero double one eight one eight six
03:15:10 six now this is your November 2015 report that we saw earlier uh and if we go to page four uh we can see that at paragraph 13 you've set out some statistics
03:15:23 you've set out some statistics uh Under The Heading operational exposure
03:15:27 exposure uh and I'll just read the text to you at the beginning it says this whilst the attendance rate of officers to incidences remained relatively unchanged due to the increasing variety of incidents and skills required there has been a reduction in the number of times
03:15:39 been a reduction in the number of times officers have been required to undertake the role of Incident Commander this means that the opportunity to practice the skills required for incident command under the realistic pressures of an incident have also reduced c table one
03:15:51 incident have also reduced c table one let's take this data focused on time in command as opposed to other other roles as this requires specific command skills to be exercised under pressure now I don't think we need the rest of the text and then you look at table one
03:16:03 the text and then you look at table one and you can see it runs to the foot of the page you've got the various different levels the average number of times I see royal adopted per annum and current annual exposure in hours
03:16:15 current annual exposure in hours between the years I think 2012 to 2015. as you say the Figures were relatively low are these are the figures that you're referring to yes they are they
03:16:26 you're referring to yes they are they are now if you go on to the next page of this document please paragraphs 14 and 15 you have a heading accessible Command Performance promotional assessments
03:16:38 promotional assessments and if you look at the first sentence of paragraph 14 you say currently incident command for offices is assessed on Entry to that role through an incident command exercise ice a promotional assessment
03:16:50 exercise ice a promotional assessment centers the average scores of these assessments at the level of SM GM and DAC over the last three assessment centers are set out in appendix 2. the past Marker set at 75 percent candidates
03:17:02 past Marker set at 75 percent candidates who achieve between 50 and 75 are considered to require development and those who score below 50 fail the assessment outright uh
03:17:12 uh now you then go on to say to give an indication of the current performance of incident commanders entering these levels over the past three assessment centers 25 of candidates passed the station manager ice with no development
03:17:24 station manager ice with no development required 25 of the group passed the group manager ice and 36 past the DAC ice
03:17:32 ice it is anticipated that an effective revalidation process with a focus on effective development would see a significant increase in success at accessible command elements it would
03:17:43 accessible command elements it would provide us an effective guide to Readiness for promotion as well as improving performance on the incident ground in role now are these Pass rates very low or
03:17:55 now are these Pass rates very low or relatively low 25 the 25 and the 36 percent yes I I believed that to be low in comparison to the overall numbers going through I
03:18:06 the overall numbers going through I don't have a comparison to offer you with other Fire and Rescue Services if that's the the Crux of the question that was my name that was a question because but you don't have you didn't have a metric no right nonetheless
03:18:19 metric no right nonetheless uh were these figures a concerned to you uh yes they were are you able to explain why they were what they were
03:18:30 what they were I
03:18:33 I make
03:18:36 I'm these incident commanders are attempting to command an incident of the level or the scale or the complexity that would be expected at that level is
03:18:47 that would be expected at that level is when they go into the assessment itself they didn't have an opportunity to take a development course prior that might prepare them for operating in that kind
03:18:58 prepare them for operating in that kind of environment it wasn't a pass or fail element at the end of a course for example it was a straightforward assessment that you would go into without that prior development
03:19:10 without that prior development so I think the reason that those pass marks are very low are simply because those commanders haven't had the opportunity to develop and practice at
03:19:23 opportunity to develop and practice at the level at which they are applying for or could it be that you're setting the bar justifiably quite High the bar was set appropriately at the level of exercise that you would
03:19:35 level of exercise that you would conceivably be expected to command at that level because of the scale and complexity well I understand that but someone's got to judge whether you come up to standard don't they that's correct
03:19:47 up to standard don't they that's correct and that involves setting a standard yes that's correct and if you set your standards High you're likely to have fewer successful candidates but is that a cause for concern that's true although I don't
03:19:59 concern that's true although I don't think a past Mark of 75 of three quarters is excessively high and I don't think that the complexity of the incidence was excessively difficult I
03:20:12 incidence was excessively difficult I think it adequately reflected the expectations that should be placed on one of those Commanders
03:20:20 do you know how it was or who it was that decided that the pass Mark should be 75 percent I believe uh and I'm I don't have
03:20:32 I believe uh and I'm I don't have um I don't have a document that I could refer to but I believe from recollection it would have been the director of operations that set the pass mark do you know whether the Pathmark was
03:20:43 do you know whether the Pathmark was based on
03:20:45 based on criteria that were common or used in other Fire and Rescue Services for something analogous I don't have an I don't have an analogy I can draw and I'm afraid
03:20:55 afraid Mr chair we're going to move on in the topic but come to a different document which has a number of questions attachment so I went completely before one o'clock good point to stop perhaps thank you yes yes well um
03:21:08 thank you yes yes well um Dr Karen Hatton it's time we all stop for some lunch I think so we'll break off there we'll resume at two o'clock please and again please don't talk to anyone about your evidence over the
03:21:19 anyone about your evidence over the break of course thank you very much would you go to the ashes certainly thank you
03:21:33 thank you very much just a minute two o'clock