Evidence from Gary Reason (former LFB Director of Operational Resilience and Training) regarding radio communications failures, BA equipment issues, response to Lakanal coroner's recommendations, and training rollout delays.
00:21:06 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing today we're going to continue hearing evidence from mr gary reason so would you ask mr reason to come back in please
00:21:22 good morning mr reason that's it make yourself comfortable thank you
00:21:42 thank you please carry on yes mr miller mr chairman thank you good morning to you good morning members of the panel good morning to you mr reason good morning last night when we finished uh for the day we were uh discussing the
00:21:54 for the day we were uh discussing the question of the transmission strength of ba radios uh at latino house can we move on on from that uh or through that um to the next document which is the
00:22:05 the next document which is the statements from the former commissioner mr ron dobson and i want to look with you please at his third witness statement at lfb lfb00810652
00:22:18 there's the first page of it it's dated the 30th of april 2020. can we go please to page 3 and look at paragraph 11 for to the page there and there you see that he explains that
00:22:29 and there you see that he explains that a team
00:22:30 a team led by dac tim cut bill um investigated the communications difficulties at lacanal
00:22:36 lacanal and that there was a report prepared which he said addressed uh as you can see at the bottom of the page the impact of steel framed buildings on
00:22:47 on interference with radio signals you see that yes i say that and uh he says that i'm summarizing his evidence ultimately fed into the lfb's latino operational review report now what he does is that he exhibits at
00:22:59 now what he does is that he exhibits at rjd14
00:23:01 rjd14 uh an email that he refers to let's look at that it's lfb double zero one one zero six five seven
00:23:13 uh and it's uh from group manager zimancik i think that's how you pronounce it peter zemansic that's correct thank you of the 13th of april 2010
00:23:23 2010 to roger tuckly and
00:23:26 and it shows uh that that report has been commissioned now just to be to be clear group manager symantec was um health and safety services i think that's correct and therefore within your directorate um
00:23:38 and therefore within your directorate um in 2010 i was the assistant commissioner operational resilient so um i was not in the director post but within the within the directorate to
00:23:49 but within the within the directorate to which you ascended yes yes uh and um if we look at the second paragraph on this page after the introduction he says this as part of the inquiry into the lack of
00:24:00 as part of the inquiry into the lack of house fatal fire a number of statements made by firefighters suggests their radios failed however having tracked all these statements back i've identified that in reality only one battery set failed and was subsequently repaired
00:24:12 failed and was subsequently repaired would you be able to provide me with a report stroke explanation of why steel framed buildings interfere with radio signals
00:24:20 signals and there's a response to this question from roger tuckley at lfb double zero one one zero six five nine
00:24:30 nine let's look at that um it's a little document called in-building radio user difficulties uh it's a one-page document and uh the second paragraph on that page below
00:24:42 the second paragraph on that page below the bullet points reads as follows and i'll show it to you before i do can i ask you have you ever seen this document before no i haven't no um when propagating into buildings
00:24:53 no um when propagating into buildings radio signals pass through various materials before reaching a receiver's antenna
00:24:57 antenna the interaction of radio signals with building materials usually results in lower signal strength different construction materials have different attenuation characteristics some construction materials very rapidly
00:25:09 construction materials very rapidly attenuate signal strength buildings which have a significant thickness of concrete or amount of metal used in its production will attenuate the signal concrete floors are often poured onto a metal pan which completely blocks most
00:25:21 metal pan which completely blocks most radio signals some solid foam insulation and some fiberglass insulation used in exterior walls have foil backing which will reduce signals energy efficient windows and metal
00:25:33 energy efficient windows and metal window window screens are also very effective at blocking radio signals to be to be specific rf energy entering a building will be partially absorbed and partially reflected by the building materials
00:25:44 reflected by the building materials encountered now you weren't aware of this report as i think you just confirmed can you explain why you weren't aware of this report given your involvement a little bit later on the latino house board and
00:25:56 bit later on the latino house board and the latino house working group in and after 2013. well looking at the date and i assume this report would have been produced uh shortly after that email you've just shown me in 2010 i'd only just taken up
00:26:09 shown me in 2010 i'd only just taken up a position as the head of operational resilience and i didn't sit on the lacrimal house board meetings at that point i didn't sit on them for another two years no
00:26:19 no at that point who was responsible on the latin house board for examining comms if anybody
00:26:26 anybody um it would have been the head of operational procedures which was jim knighton at the time i believe and his boss was gary dobson who was my line manager as well so i took over from
00:26:37 line manager as well so i took over from gary dobson in the director position when he retired right can you explain why when you took over from that position you weren't provided with this report
00:26:45 report um i didn't know the report existed so i don't know why i wasn't provided i don't think
00:26:50 think to be fair i don't think the stuff that happened in the past and obviously i don't know what the conclusion of this uh report was um that i the the people that joined the board would have gone back you know many
00:27:02 board would have gone back you know many years looking at previous documents right that's not that's not what i did anyway right can we take it from that that when the lachmal house working group was established and you were doing
00:27:13 group was established and you were doing from april 2013 and may 2013 the collation exercise of the responses to the rule 43 recommendations nobody went back historically over the records
00:27:24 went back historically over the records to see what lack of house were the lack of house board had done by way of um examining the comms problems that lacking i'm not aware that was done but that
00:27:35 i'm not aware that was done but that doesn't mean it wasn't done i i'm not aware that it was done that exercise as you described it right now and before this report were you yourself aware of the limitations that building construction and materials
00:27:46 building construction and materials could place on the efficacy of transmission of radio signals i was certainly aware that certain buildings and distance of travel were two issues that
00:27:57 distance of travel were two issues that could potentially impact on fire ground radio as i said uh my evidence i'm a very experienced operational officer been to lots of large incidents where uh you know signal issues may have been
00:28:10 uh you know signal issues may have been present so i was certainly aware buildings and distance of travel were two issues that could impact on radio efficiency right do i take it from that answer that
00:28:21 answer that the the problems with transmission of radio signals at latin was was not a new problem
00:28:28 problem um
00:28:30 um no
00:28:31 no various incidents we would have experienced issues with radio comms at varying degrees right i mean your experience um i i can't conceivably challenge but did it lead at
00:28:43 conceivably challenge but did it lead at all during your time before you became d-o-r-d-o-r-d-o-o-r-t
00:28:48 to any kind of wholesale investigation about how things might be made better well some of the equipment that we introduced certainly during my last 10 years things like
00:29:00 last 10 years things like radio repeaters leaky feeders were all designed to overcome some of the limitations that are described in this document successfully yes they they do work uh the right i
00:29:13 yes they they do work uh the right i won't go into the technical details of radio repeaters and leaky feeders i think you've already uh aware of that but yeah they're designed to overcome the very issues that are reflected in this report
00:29:25 reflected in this report now as we've seen from the paragraph i've read you mr tuckley's report identifies the buildings with thick concrete metal foam insulation insulation with foil backing energy efficient windows etc
00:29:37 efficient windows etc might all impact or might entirely block radio signals um do you agree using our own experience that that is likely to reflect a high proportion of buildings uh attended by
00:29:50 proportion of buildings uh attended by the lfb
00:29:52 the lfb um yes that is true but that's not the same as saying that we experienced um a large frequency of radio communications issues or incidents so one of the
00:30:03 so one of the requirements of the pr o and the plc the performance review of operations and performance review of command is to look at incident communications that's one of the topics that the chair of those
00:30:14 the topics that the chair of those review meetings will consider and therefore logically issues relating to incident comms or incident communications equipment would appear in the impd reports if there was
00:30:28 appear in the impd reports if there was a high frequency of communications issues and that's certainly never featured in all the time that i was sitting at odcb comms we did put out information about communications
00:30:39 put out information about communications but there wasn't a sort of a significant trend if to use that term of communication failures or incidents that would depend on the nature of the incident wouldn't it uh it would depend
00:30:50 incident wouldn't it uh it would depend on the nature of the incident the building type that was involved in that incident and the tactical plan that was deployed for those incidents yes just let's just take it in stages because i think you've jumped
00:31:01 think you've jumped to the conclusion without going through the steps with me um first do you agree that looking at the um the physical attributes of the buildings described by mr tuckly in this
00:31:12 buildings described by mr tuckly in this paragraph
00:31:14 paragraph that reflects a high proportion of buildings attended by the lfb at around this time and thereafter yes yes uh and do you agree that a high proportion of high-rise residential
00:31:26 proportion of high-rise residential blocks in london particularly those built or retrofitted in recent years would fall would have one or more of these characteristics identified by mr tarkley yes i'd agree
00:31:37 identified by mr tarkley yes i'd agree with that yes does it follow from that that the lfb's radio signals may be not always but maybe adversely affected at a significant number of operational incidents
00:31:48 incidents um i'd agree with the first part of that statement that the they obviously could be infected by the the issues described here but i wouldn't say
00:31:59 say frequently for the reasons i set out it depends on the nature of the fire where the fire is in the building and the tactical plan that's used to deal with that incident does it follow even from that with your
00:32:10 does it follow even from that with your qualification that ins incidents at high-rise residential blocks in london would be especially prone to problems with radio transmission yes potentially yes now let's go to lfb
00:32:24 yes potentially yes now let's go to lfb triple zero four nine eight seven eight please
00:32:32 uh now this is an email uh from tim cut sorry to kim tim cut bill from david kenneth on the 24th of april 2012. and david kennett was a i think is this
00:32:44 and david kennett was a i think is this right a member of the fire safety enforcement team within the lfb yes he was yes
00:32:50 was yes and this is before the latino house inquest so long before only rule 43 recommendations um it's
00:32:58 um it's 11 months before that uh
00:33:01 uh and as we can see from the foot of the page
00:33:03 page he's responding to a request for comments on the latino operational review report and i just want to show you what he says at paragraph eight he says this communications difficulties my
00:33:14 says this communications difficulties my impression is that comms was a real issue at the incident there are no recommendations regarding this issue the comms problems are attributed to the construction stroke layout of the building bearing in mind
00:33:25 layout of the building bearing in mind that lachen is is traditional construction and not unlike many high-rise in london the report seems to conclude that there is nothing that can be done about the difficulties experienced by the crews with the implication that we expect to experience
00:33:37 implication that we expect to experience similar problems at future incidents now you were not copied into this email as we can see but the question is for you was this issue discussed by the latino house board at this time so this
00:33:49 latino house board at this time so this is april 2012 by which time i think you were on it uh yeah i i my first meeting was in the february of 2012. yes um [Music]
00:33:58 [Music] i
00:34:00 i obviously there was a lot of lack of board meetings i can't remember this particular issue being an agenda item i can't say whether we discuss it or not i just don't remember from the meeting that was nearly eight years ago so
00:34:12 that was nearly eight years ago so unless it's in the minutes of the meetings i i can't help you on that i'm afraid right
00:34:21 would you expect the issue to have been discussed at the latino board given the importance that uh david kennett has
00:34:29 has placed on it in this email i would expect the communications difficulty to appear in the
00:34:36 the incident or sorry the investigation report
00:34:40 report that was produced that responded or you know took account of what the investigation team had found so i have read i've read that at the time i haven't read it recently and i don't know if it contains a
00:34:52 and i don't know if it contains a particular section around communications i suspect it would do if if there was significant communications difficulty at the incident that would have been one of the things that the investigation team would
00:35:03 things that the investigation team would have highlighted right was it one of the 34 items action items do you remember um
00:35:13 my car i can't remember off the top of my head let's go to lfb double zero one zero six seven five five please
00:35:22 now uh the second email on this page is is the email to which i want to draw your attention uh it's from jim a court to tim cut bill uh of the 28th of february 2013 now
00:35:35 uh of the 28th of february 2013 now we're in 2013. so this is um during the latter house inquests for the purposes of the chronology and it reads as follows tim as requested i've considered issues
00:35:46 tim as requested i've considered issues surrounding radio transmissions at latino house with a view to identifying any reasons why radios may have appeared less effective than anticipated my views on this were as follows and then he sets out a lot of detail um
00:35:59 and then he sets out a lot of detail um i i'm going to read quite a bit of this to you so follow along with me um analog radios is used by the london fire brigade for communications at an incident operate in simplex mode this
00:36:10 incident operate in simplex mode this means that only one person can transmit a radio message while all people in transmission range can receive the transmission the incident ground radios work with a within line of sight of each other essentially this means that the radios
00:36:21 essentially this means that the radios operate best when the radio operators are able to see each other and where there are no obstructions between them totally unobstructed lfb incident ground radios will transmit and receive clearly over a distance of more than 500 meters
00:36:33 over a distance of more than 500 meters any obstruction between the radio transmitting and those receiving the signal will mean that the distance for effective operation will be reduced it is not possible to easily identify
00:36:44 it is not possible to easily identify the level of reduction as the physical properties of the obstruction can make a significant difference steel frame buildings are more difficult for radio signals to penetrate than simple brick-built or timber-framed buildings due to physical property of
00:36:56 buildings due to physical property of the steel
00:36:57 the steel the strength of transmission in watts makes a difference to the distance over which radio transmissions can be received the greater the transmission strength the greater the effective distance
00:37:07 distance incident ground radios issue to all operational personnel within the lfb are programmed with different signal strengths depending on the channel and its use
00:37:18 the channel and its use and he then lists the channels as bullet points one two three four five and six which we've covered already and then goes on to say this in the next bullet point due to the requirement to have intrinsically safe equipment attached to
00:37:29 intrinsically safe equipment attached to breathing apparatus sets there's a limit on the transmission strength for all ba radios used by the nfb the limit is set at a maximum of one watt across all radio channels the difference between transmission
00:37:41 the difference between transmission strength means that ba radio cannot transmit as far as incident ground radios
00:37:46 radios typically at incidents in high rise buildings
00:37:50 buildings the bridge head is positioned two floors below the floor on which the fire is located the ba entry control point with ba com's officer is usually located at the bridgehead at lachnall house
00:38:01 the bridgehead at lachnall house conditions meant that the bridgehead was actually located at ground level this meant an extended transmission distance as well as the requirement for radio signal penetration through significant obstructions
00:38:12 obstructions uh there may be other issues he says uh and that's that's the end of the email and can see that from the top of page two which we don't need to go to now you were not copied into this email but were you ever
00:38:23 copied into this email but were you ever made aware of its contents or the detailed issues set out in it uh
00:38:28 uh no it wasn't
00:38:31 given that these discussions were happening
00:38:34 happening in february 2013 and within your directorate can you explain why you weren't ever uh cited on
00:38:43 cited on or notified of the contents or the detailed issues in this email i can't
00:38:49 i can't comment on why jim mccourt didn't copy in
00:38:52 in his head of service which may have prompted a discussion with myself to be fair some of these uh limitations if you're calling them and and technical context of the radio capability that
00:39:04 context of the radio capability that london fire brigade had at the time i was aware of um but i but yeah i yeah the answer to the question is no i haven't seen it and i don't know why i wasn't showing it did no one ever raise these issues with you
00:39:16 no one ever raise these issues with you when a month later the coroner made her rule 43 recommendations relating to communications um i don't recall anyone raising these particular issues but i'm
00:39:27 raising these particular issues but i'm aware that group manager jim mccall was one of the people that drafted the response to the incident comms
00:39:39 response to the incident comms issue that was presented by the rule 43 coroner's report um so the same officer was dealing with the brigade's proposed response to that action as it's the same author as this document
00:39:51 as it's the same author as this document yes i mean putting yourself in the position of the person receiving uh that draft pro forma the collated document we saw earlier with all the yellow highlights on it in april 2013 would you
00:40:02 highlights on it in april 2013 would you have expected jamaica in fact to have drafted something which brought all these issues to your attention so that they could be addressed uh in the context of the response to the rule 43 recommendation on comms uh to be
00:40:15 rule 43 recommendation on comms uh to be fair to mr cole i think some of those issues were in the what i called the working draft of the prophet but uh not all of them might accept that right now were you aware that similar problems with comms presented themselves
00:40:27 problems with comms presented themselves at the shirley towers fire in hampshire in in april 2010. i was familiar with the fatal fire report from shirley towers yes yes let's look at that
00:40:38 towers yes yes let's look at that and that's at lfb double zero one zero seven one three zero
00:40:45 let's look at the first page and there it is the date of the fire is as you can see sixth of april twenty ten and the report is dated um the 8th of april 2010.
00:40:57 2010. if we look at page 53
00:41:01 53 please let's look together at 3.10 handheld radios finding
00:41:09 finding well let me just pause that when you you say you're familiar with it did you read it at the time i read it at the time yes did you read it in the context of your work on the latino house board or later
00:41:20 work on the latino house board or later the latino house working group um this became a separate um rule 43 report to odcb so you will be familiar with the
00:41:31 you will be familiar with the the documents we were reviewing yesterday which focused on the lacrimal house element of that but the bit before that um covers issues that arose from the shirley towers fire yes yes yes you
00:41:42 the shirley towers fire yes yes yes you did you referred to that yesterday and this is i think an example of that then now let's go to paragraph 3.10 handheld radios finding the handheld radios used by hfrs that's hampshire for iron rescue
00:41:54 by hfrs that's hampshire for iron rescue service may not always operate effectively in high-rise buildings these radios are also used by ba wearers to communicate with the baco um that's the um
00:42:05 um that's the um entry controller control officer the ba breathing apparatus engine control officer at this incident communications proved difficult necessitating the need to use other forms of communications notably mobile
00:42:16 forms of communications notably mobile phones
00:42:17 phones the problem of poor radio communication in structures such as high-rise buildings or ships is well known post-incident testing of radios by hc showed that they were operating effectively there were instances
00:42:29 effectively there were instances throughout the incident of some key personnel not having radios eg the second baiko now as i say this report is eighth of april 2013. we get that from page three
00:42:40 april 2013. we get that from page three we don't need to turn it up now this was a week
00:42:43 a week after the lachenal coroner's rule 43 recommendations um did you hear or see this report at the time or hear about it
00:42:55 this report at the time or hear about it i was certainly aware the report as soon as it came to my attention that it was been published i would have read it fairly soon after it was published i'd imagine i can't remember the exact date but it would have been around that time
00:43:06 but it would have been around that time i i would imagine so 8th of april 2013 uh
00:43:11 uh you would have read it around about that time who would have brought it to your attention do you remember um
00:43:17 um i can't remember i may have gone and found it myself someone probably would have said it had been published um there might have even been a chief fire officers association communication about it that would be typical
00:43:28 it that would be typical uh when another brigade has received uh recommendations uh coroner's recommendations that was brought to the attention of all fire and rescue services so it's probably that mechanism that alerted my attention that this document had been published right do you
00:43:39 document had been published right do you agree that as at this time so early april 2013 the problem of poor radio communications in high-rise buildings was now becoming well known as the result of two fatal high-rise fires um
00:43:50 result of two fatal high-rise fires um yeah certainly radio comms within high-rise structures was was known potentially to be an issue at certain incidents yes yes known to the lfb yes yes
00:44:03 and can you tell us what your directorate was doing to combat those difficulties at that time well the this report would have been reviewed to develop an action plan uh
00:44:14 develop an action plan uh in response to the rule 43 and that would have been done uh the communications element of this report would have been done by the head of operational assurance which was jim knighton at the time
00:44:25 jim knighton at the time uh i think he was still at that point he was still the head of operational uh operational policy sorry sorry so just be clear
00:44:33 be clear you say the communications element of this report would have been done well look reviewed should i say that's probably a better word he would have been sent a copy of this to uh look at
00:44:44 to uh look at issues from an nfb's perspective to see if there was anything that we were going to respond to from a lfb position obviously we're not responding to the hampshire coroner but we're responding internally yes
00:44:56 internally yes so how would that tie in with the response to the rule 43 recommendations that you had received about ten days beforehand um i can't say for sure because i wasn't
00:45:08 i can't say for sure because i wasn't the officer doing the work but uh as i said group manager jim mccull would have been
00:45:13 been the person who's leading the incident communications team and i suspect that this report uh ended up on his desk in in relation to this particular issue because he was our head of incident communications uh right now
00:45:26 of incident communications uh right now and we've got effectively two rule 43s two incidents lachlan house and shirley shirley towers
00:45:37 and shirley shirley towers was the shirley towers sorry was the lfb's response to the shirley towers incident
00:45:44 incident and the problems identified on this page that i'm showing you in the report something that was dealt with by the lfb separately from the response to the lack of rule 43 recommendations or to your knowledge did
00:45:56 recommendations or to your knowledge did jim acort tie them together to produce a single composite and consistent response to the problem i don't honestly know the answer to that
00:46:08 i don't honestly know the answer to that but looking at the evidence that i'm aware of and what you showed me yesterday about the lack of house rule 43
00:46:15 43 from memory i don't think there's a specific
00:46:18 specific rule 43
00:46:20 rule 43 action lfb action in response to the shirley towers incident communications issue so i can assume that he did merge the two because they're obviously dealing with the same type of issue right i mean
00:46:32 with the same type of issue right i mean you make that assumption based on the fact that the the same issue but um what does that tell us about the structure of the lfb in in dealing
00:46:43 in dealing responsively with the problem whether the problem comes from hampshire or whether it comes from southwark um
00:46:50 um well i'm assured that the fact that the the information was being dealt with by the right team and that was the intercommunications team um
00:46:59 um so in terms of your question what does it tell us about the structure yes let me maybe be clearer perhaps yeah you assume that it was all being dealt with both
00:47:08 both reports as it were were on jim acor's desk
00:47:11 desk um
00:47:12 um what leads you to assume that he would have dealt with them as a as a single consistent item both addressing the problems raised by by the shirley towers incident and perhaps more specifically by lachlan so
00:47:24 perhaps more specifically by lachlan so looking at the working pro forma as i call it that went to the commissioner's board on the lagrangle house rule 43 which obviously contained quite a bit background information about internet
00:47:35 information about internet communications and reading that and then looking at these issues they're virtually the same issue so
00:47:42 issue so um
00:47:44 i would i would assume i use that word again that the outcome from a service provision point of view and is that if if we address the lacrimal house rule 43
00:47:56 address the lacrimal house rule 43 we'll also go in pretty much all the way and we'll address the issues identified in this report right specifically focusing on this paragraph you'll see that the author
00:48:08 you'll see that the author says that at this incident there was a need to use other forms of communications notably mobile telephones now was there any discussion that you knew about within the in the
00:48:19 that you knew about within the in the context of of the response to the lachenal rule 43 recommendations particularly where she had said please look at personal communications
00:48:30 look at personal communications um
00:48:31 um about about whether or not it would be possible to make greater use on the fire ground of mobile telephones i can't answer that because i didn't do the review work
00:48:42 the review work as you probably know all senior officers were issued with lfb mobile phones so we certainly had the capability to use mobile phones
00:48:54 use mobile phones but all senior officers station manager and above same constituency of officer also had airwave radio so we we already had a if in effect a tertiary opportunity to use airwave
00:49:07 tertiary opportunity to use airwave digital radio as a communications options at incidents if we needed to so we wouldn't need to rely on mobile phones because we've already got a digital device that all senior officers
00:49:18 digital device that all senior officers have available to them available to them maybe
00:49:22 maybe can i just ask it this way you
00:49:26 you receive
00:49:27 receive the
00:49:28 the draft rule 43 pro forma i call it that it's the document of the yellow highlighting on we saw on the 11th of may 2013 and you have a meeting with the other members of the commissioners group on
00:49:40 commissioners group on the 14th yep you established that at that time you've got jim a court's response on comms embedded in the rule 43 pro forma document you've
00:49:51 in the rule 43 pro forma document you've also read this document at that meeting or at that time before ron dobson sent his 23rd of may letter to
00:49:59 to back to the coroner did you
00:50:03 did you think
00:50:04 think to raise the possibility of using mobile for telephones on the fire ground as a better means of communicating um between um
00:50:15 between um between officers on the fire ground by way of satisfying the coroner's recommendation that you look at personal communications uh no i didn't why is that um
00:50:27 uh no i didn't why is that um because we already had uh two command channels and
00:50:33 and the option for airwave radios plus a number of ancillary pieces of equipment to overcome um signal penetration issues that's the repeaters and the leaky feeders
00:50:46 repeaters and the leaky feeders and
00:50:47 and i would have probably at that time felt that that was sufficient to overcome the issues that are identified here right now you say you probably would have felt at that time it was sufficient to overcome the issues was
00:50:59 sufficient to overcome the issues was there any discussion of whether in fact that was so um i can't remember the discussion at that meeting as i expressed yesterday but as comms was one of the key issues i
00:51:11 but as comms was one of the key issues i can't rule out the fact that we didn't talk about we obviously did talk about comms but i can't remember the detailed discussion because it's a meeting that's over eight years ago did anybody think to
00:51:24 ask the question
00:51:27 do airwave radios solve the problem encountered at shirley towers which necessitated the use of mobile telephones
00:51:38 telephones um i don't recall that um and i think the comms issues that shirley tells from my understanding and i've spoke to officers that are more closely informed about shirley towers incident
00:51:50 informed about shirley towers incident that
00:51:51 that firefighters don't have lfb issued mobile telephony devices issued to them so if the issues were between the ba entry control that's indicating that it's actually junior officers and
00:52:04 that it's actually junior officers and firefighters and we we didn't at that time and i think the brigade still doesn't issue individual mobile phones to individual firefighters no we we wouldn't have had that capability at that time
00:52:17 that capability at that time no
00:52:18 no i i can ask the same question in relation to the latino house fire um in your preparations in may 2013 for the response to the coroner's rule 43 did anybody
00:52:29 did anybody stand back and consider whether airwave radios would have resolved the communications or help to resolve the communications problems encountered at latino house
00:52:40 again a similar answer lacrimal houses i understand it was slightly different issue um certainly didn't come up at the performance review of command so i think it was less of a command issue maybe a
00:52:51 it was less of a command issue maybe a firefighter issue so again firefighters are not issued with airwave radios so
00:52:58 so i don't think we're in a position to to roll out airwave radios to all firefighters at that time because the contract for airwave radios was coming to its end uh you know in theory it didn't hasn't materialized as i
00:53:10 it didn't hasn't materialized as i understand now which is not a brigade issue it's a national radio issue um
00:53:15 um but yeah i think our focus would have been on what is the capability we've got available right now um that we what can we use what we can develop is it proven to understand in better training that would have probably
00:53:27 better training that would have probably been the sense of the discussion as i recall it but you know i can't remember the detail of the exact discussion i'm afraid right now um
00:53:36 now um we understand that the replacement of the handheld uhf radios and the ba radios the breathing apparatus radios was given consideration during your time as dort is that right um i think there was discussion about
00:53:48 um i think there was discussion about starting a corporate project and i think that has been done now subsequently after i left so i think there was in the program we have a program of major projects that are
00:53:59 program of major projects that are coming up for the same reason i discussed yesterday you have to manage the resource commitments budgets and all the things that are related to major procurement and potentially training initiatives so uh it was certainly in the work
00:54:11 so uh it was certainly in the work program to look at a replacement radio system i think it was initially for the breathing apparatus but i think it's now been
00:54:18 been expanded to include fire ground radios well i was going to ask you do you remember something or a project called the replacement of incident ground communications it was on what we called the forward
00:54:29 it was on what we called the forward program of projects so there was a kind of look forward of what the major procurement projects were coming up which usually was linked to the life in policy for that particular piece of equipment
00:54:40 equipment and
00:54:41 and that that didn't expire in my time but there was talk about setting up a radio replacement project but i don't think the terms of reference for that project have been scoped during
00:54:52 for that project have been scoped during my time that the project as far as we could see was related to barry radios rather than yeah initially i think it started to with barry and i think it subsequently again post my retirement as being
00:55:04 again post my retirement as being extended to include fire ground radios as well yes now um let's go to lfb triple zero eight eight one eight eight
00:55:15 this is an operational resilience and training
00:55:18 training department um plan
00:55:22 plan for 2014 and 15 or 2014 to 15.
00:55:30 is this a document you're familiar with yes i've seen this before yes um now it's difficult to date this but our best guess of this documents date is the 15th of january 2015.
00:55:41 of january 2015. that'd be about right yes because if you look in the comments box on on the top line it talks about quarter three so obviously it's it's uh that update is for quarter three so this
00:55:52 that update is for quarter three so this would indicate this document uh is post dates quarter three of that fiscal year exactly that is precisely how we came to the conclusion that it was it was it was january 15. um
00:56:05 was it was january 15. um do you do you can you tell us what the purpose of this document was yes so every department had a departmental service plan which was linked to the corporate plan which for london was the london safety
00:56:17 which for london was the london safety plan the integrated risk management plan so the
00:56:20 so the fire authority would sign off on the corporate plan and then the work that flowed out of the corporate plan and the commitments in the corporate plan would a more granular level result in activities and projects
00:56:34 level result in activities and projects etc for each individual department so we had a system called the performance management framework and this is a product of that process so each header service would have had a
00:56:47 so each header service would have had a you know a work program and this is how we or certainly heads of service and directors would have managed the work program to hold their heads of service accountable for all the things that they put in their departmental plan for that
00:56:58 put in their departmental plan for that financial year right now the first item on the list is replacement of the ba radio interface equipment which is what barry stands for and if we move through the columns the end date in the second column you can see is listed as the 21st
00:57:09 column you can see is listed as the 21st of october 2015 and the owner as it were is jim a court yes yes and in the final column you can see the update on under the comments and it says this 7th january 2015 quarter 3
00:57:23 it says this 7th january 2015 quarter 3 during the information gathering stage for this activity it became apparent that the current battery sets are still available and supported and that they continue to operate effectively based on this information action has been taken
00:57:35 this information action has been taken to defer the replacement of barry and is radius until 2018 the relevant omb report has been written on behalf of the lead department i.t it is anticipated that this will be
00:57:46 it is anticipated that this will be accepted by cmb at that point this activity will be shown as
00:57:52 shown as complete now barry reset radios are just to be clear and perhaps remind people of phase one uh the radios embedded within the headsets of breathing apparatus
00:58:03 the headsets of breathing apparatus wearers aren't they um yeah and not all sets not all breeding operated sets but a number of them yes
00:58:11 them yes yes they wouldn't but they're they wouldn't appear anywhere else no they're specifically used with breathing operators now what information was gathered which would which did suggest that barrier sets were operating effectively as this says
00:58:23 effectively as this says i i
00:58:24 i i i wouldn't have seen that detail i mean it's the same officer that wrote the report
00:58:29 report jimmy called yeah it's the same officer but uh so there would have been some um scoping work as that in as that update indicates um i don't know if if you're going to take me to it but
00:58:40 going to take me to it but do you know what the relevancy cmb report is what's the date on that because that may work i don't remember seeing a report to corporate management board on this during my time well i think i was going to ask you that but um
00:58:52 think i was going to ask you that but um you don't but um just going back to my question um the inquiry heard evidence of phase one that many lfb fire firefighters considered that the uh the barry sets were unreliable and indeed
00:59:05 barry sets were unreliable and indeed ac cotton
00:59:07 ac cotton then commissioner cotton gave evidence that she was aware of that were you familiar with those concerns at this time which is just before you left
00:59:16 left um i wasn't aware that they were unreliable in a sense that there was a major corporate issue or an operational issue
00:59:27 corporate issue or an operational issue um there had been some issues with uh the roving of the the wiring um to the face mask which is where the the mic and the and the earpiece yes is work
00:59:38 mic and the and the earpiece yes is work so we'd had some issues and in fact it was a safety event where the cabling had burned through when firefighters had been in hot compartments and that caused the communications failure so we'd done some work to resolve the roving
00:59:50 done some work to resolve the roving issue um to respond to that uh accident investigation but i wasn't aware uh that there was a kind of major issue with uh equipment failure or or its
01:00:01 with uh equipment failure or or its ability to do what it was designed to do it was getting you know to the end of its life but as that said obviously it was still supported by the manufacturer and i assume the maintenance contract we
01:00:12 and i assume the maintenance contract we had for that right the roving issue is that a problem uh whereby the in lay terms the wiring becomes loose which then deprives the firefighter of the ability to use the radio in the
01:00:23 the ability to use the radio in the headset
01:00:25 headset that could be one issue but the the issue that resulted in the senior action investigation was the um cables melting right um so it was because they were on the outside of the firefighting tunic
01:00:37 firefighting tunic and and we took management action to you know uh train firefighters to rove it in a different way so that the cabling would be protected right were you aware of a different issue which is simply that the battery set could come loose
01:00:49 that the battery set could come loose just become disconnected no uh
01:00:53 uh given
01:00:53 given uh well um given what i think you have to take from me was the evidence of phase one that many lfp firefighters considered the barry sets to be unreliable confirmed by
01:01:04 sets to be unreliable confirmed by commissioner cotton at the time
01:01:08 and given the problems with radio transmission strength and rising out of the latin house incident as we've seen yesterday do you know why the radio replacement program wasn't prioritized um i don't think i saw that cmb report
01:01:21 um i don't think i saw that cmb report from the head of it which was julian martin who we spoke about yesterday i'm fairly certain i never saw that cmb report i assume that would have been part of the discussion
01:01:32 would have been part of the discussion in terms of it was a recommendation in that report to defer the replacement of it that would have been part of the discussion but if i wasn't at the meeting i can't really comment on that right so you to the best of your recollection simply
01:01:43 to the best of your recollection simply proceeded on what you were told in this comment column yes because i we wouldn't i wouldn't have made a decision on this this was a departmental plan to make sure that the you know the various groups within these
01:01:54 you know the various groups within these departments were doing the work that we'd set out at the start of the year so it was a kind of performance management as well as an informative document but you were ahead of this at this this department mrt weren't you i was
01:02:06 this department mrt weren't you i was the director uh i wasn't the head of the this department that was um uh jim knighton initially and then subsequently um peter callup uh
01:02:17 subsequently um peter callup uh yes sorry you were head of this directorate yes i was head of the directorate in my head so this is a head of service sort of document but i would have i would have reviewed this with the headset service well that was my next question when you reviewed this
01:02:30 question when you reviewed this with the heads of service did you interrogate them as to why they thought that the current barrier sets were
01:02:38 were continuing to operate effectively i think if the issue was relevant to my department specifically in terms of its performance i did integra i did obviously go through these with the
01:02:50 obviously go through these with the heads of service i think quarterly from memory
01:02:53 memory um i think i would have taken from that update um that there's there's no decision because this would be a corporate management bulk decision around procurement and corporate projects
01:03:02 projects so i would have assumed that a report would have been produced by the head of it as it says there and then we would have had a discussion at the corporate management board level to decide whether we'd accept that recommendation from the
01:03:13 we'd accept that recommendation from the head of it and hopefully that report would have set out you know the you know the advantages disadvantages costs and all the other things associated with a big procurement project
01:03:23 project and we would have made a decision based on the information within that report do you remember what it was well um
01:03:31 well um that the heads of that department told you by way of explaining to you that the barrier sets were continuing to operate effectively i i say i wouldn't have been involved in
01:03:42 i i say i wouldn't have been involved in the detail research so um jimmy call was our head of comms and and clearly had been the head of commerce for quite a long time and had a body of knowledge and experience in in this field
01:03:53 field so
01:03:55 so we would of course listen to his views if it had been expressed in the cnb report
01:04:00 report but i i wouldn't be able to comment on the content of why he's making that proposal other than what it says in the in the words in that box now i want to show you a document that long post dates your departure from the
01:04:12 long post dates your departure from the nfb
01:04:13 nfb it's at nfb double zero one zero five four six six
01:04:19 it's a report entitled review of the specification for fire ground breathing apparatus radios dated the 29th of october 2019 so more than two years after the
01:04:30 so more than two years after the grenfell tower fire itself and it was prepared by the assistant commissioner operational policy and assurance
01:04:40 assurance for the for the commissioner's board of the lfc
01:04:44 the lfc um and if we go to page six uh sorry page two paragraph six we can see that it says this this issue has been highlighted
01:04:55 has been highlighted by a number of fire and rescue services and i i shall just explain this issue relates to the um transmission power which is covered in the previous
01:05:07 which is covered in the previous paragraph or two thank you question of i.s this issue has been highlighted by a number of fire and rescue services and in a number of investigations undertaken by the brigade where poor communications
01:05:18 by the brigade where poor communications at incidents including poor radio performance has been identified as a hazard and or factor that has contributed to injury to operational staff
01:05:27 staff furthermore interviews with brigade firefighters suggest that due to experience with the poor signal propagation of ba radios confidence in the equipment is low and therefore it is common practice for b18s to enter
01:05:38 common practice for b18s to enter smoke-filled environments fires with their non-is 4-watt fire-ground radios on their tunics to improve communications well the use of a medium to high standard of is radio for ba operations
01:05:50 standard of is radio for ba operations has been the historical norm in the uk in recent years many fire and rescue services have moved away from the use of is radios entirely and or reduced the standards of is protection associated
01:06:01 standards of is protection associated with their ba radio equipment this has been predominantly justified through a requirement to increase the effectiveness of ba radio communications i.e increasing available transmitting power and through the general
01:06:12 power and through the general observation that firefighters may carry with them a range of other equipment that is not rated for intrinsic safety there is an additional benefit in that non-is radios can be significantly less
01:06:23 non-is radios can be significantly less expensive to purchase and maintain than their is counterparts however national operational guidance nog states that frs should consider that an explosive atmosphere is likely to occur in normal
01:06:35 atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operation and so a level of is should be retained
01:06:39 retained now during your tenure i've taken that at one go but there are a number of questions during your tenure at the lfb were you aware of this issue being highlighted by other fire and rescue services
01:06:50 services um only in the context of uh the shirley towers report i think the harrow court fatal fire review which is a fire in hertfordshire where two firefighters sadly died i think had some
01:07:02 firefighters sadly died i think had some communications issues but not not intrinsic safety ones i'd from rep from my memory um but not widely uh reported uh in the british fire service but
01:07:13 uh in the british fire service but certainly
01:07:14 certainly there were documents like the shirley towers report where this issue was was highlighted
01:07:24 leaving aside those
01:07:26 those other fires shirley towers and harrow courts
01:07:30 courts and perhaps looking at incidents where there were there were no fatalities were you aware of a number of investigations in other words a body of evidence
01:07:41 in other words a body of evidence highlighting poor communications uh no i wasn't right were you aware that ba teams frequently used their handheld uhf radios in place of ba radios without incident commander approval uh no i
01:07:53 incident commander approval uh no i wasn't
01:07:53 wasn't were you aware that many fire and rescue services had moved away from using is radios and or had reduced the level of intrinsic safety as explained here no i wasn't
01:08:04 safety as explained here no i wasn't would you expect that kind of information to have been gathered by your directorate and communicated to you during your time as director i i think in terms of particularly given the timing of the
01:08:15 the timing of the barry project uh that may have been some of the research i don't know if this is a 2019 document so some of these issues may have been uh more recent to the publication of this
01:08:26 more recent to the publication of this document rather than the time that i served but this is the sort of research that you would anticipate a project team that's looking to re-procure you know a major piece of operational equipment
01:08:37 major piece of operational equipment that's linked to you know safe systems of work would have taken into account and that this this sort of information would have come forward as part of a uh recommendation to go forward with the
01:08:48 recommendation to go forward with the procurement of a particular you know type of radio solution but i i didn't see any of this and it wasn't brought to my attention when i was the director right
01:08:57 right now given that the draft rule 43 pro forma that we looked at yesterday and we can go back to it if we need to explicitly consider the possible reconsideration of intrinsically safe radios in bayer sets
01:09:10 radios in bayer sets do you accept the possibility of using non-intrinsically safe radios in high-rise fires where there was no risk of an explosive environment and that that fact was known to your directorate in 2013. that the the potential to use
01:09:22 in 2013. that the the potential to use non-is radios is obviously uh you can do that radios are somehow is and some aren't uh
01:09:31 uh i'd refer to the answer i gave yesterday that your statement there says it you know i can't remember the exact words but you might not need is protection in a high-rise fire as i said yesterday
01:09:43 a high-rise fire as i said yesterday i don't agree with that i accept that the
01:09:45 the ignition source in a fire compartment is the fire itself but i don't accept that there is never the potential for a flammable gas uh a gas leak you know build up of um
01:09:57 uh a gas leak you know build up of um flammable gases from the fire itself in a different part of the building isn't an explosive risk and i i really honestly believe that if we'd have tried even if we'd have tried to introduce non-is radios i think
01:10:08 tried to introduce non-is radios i think we would not have got agreement with the fire brigade union to do that and i know that's speculation which is probably not helpful for the inquiry but i'm just trying to set out the context of my period um i just think we would not um
01:10:22 period um i just think we would not um in that period of industrial relations and in fact from a safety point of view be looking to downgrade the level of protection that we've already got to a worse level now i understand just looking at the text of paragraph six it's clear from
01:10:35 text of paragraph six it's clear from this report and as i stressed this is october 2019 uh
01:10:40 uh there had grown up a practice as it says in the penultimate line for ba teams to enter smoke-filled environments with their non-is4 watt fire ground radius on their tunics to improve communications
01:10:52 in your time to what extent was that ever the subject of a robust risk assessment so that the brigade could actually satisfy itself of whether the risk you
01:11:03 satisfy itself of whether the risk you averted to yesterday and just now was a risk that was worth taking in order to save life in the building or was a risk that wasn't worth taking
01:11:14 or was a risk that wasn't worth taking because it exposed the firefighters to too greater risk was that assessment ever actually done no why is that i don't think it was the brigade's position that we'd move away from
01:11:25 position that we'd move away from national guidance on this particular safety issue at the time that that would be my personal view and
01:11:31 and and the other thing i think is worth just mentioning might be helpful for context is the issue with firefighters using their handheld radios which is the non-is radio
01:11:41 radio i think if that had become a significant practice that we'd have witnessed
01:11:47 witnessed during my time that would have featured as a safety issue and near-miss potentially as we called them or it would have certainly made its way in the incident management
01:11:58 made its way in the incident management performance reports that came quarterly to the odcb because that would have been a concern around safe systems of work i never saw a comms issue in relation to this
01:12:09 comms issue in relation to this particular issue that came forward now um
01:12:12 now um can i move to a different topic or sub topic
01:12:16 topic which is radio repeaters and leaky feeders you referred to those earlier this morning yeah and uh tcap training
01:12:24 training uh can we go back then to the lfb's response to the rule 43 recommendations of may 2013 at lfb three zeros four two zero eight nine
01:12:37 just throw up the first page just to remind you of what we're looking at this is the dobson letter uh to the coroner of the 23rd of may 2013 2013 if we go to page eight in that
01:12:49 2013 if we go to page eight in that please we can look at the bottom of page eight uh and this is recommendation five you can see the hold off on your screen and proposed action on uh at the bottom of the page which says this
01:13:00 of the page which says this while for the reasons given above the brigade respect respectfully argues against a change in procedure concerning the use of multiple ba channels he will be taking the following action to address the lessons learned from the
01:13:11 address the lessons learned from the latino house fire bullet point the brigade will engage with its training contractor to ensure that issues relating to incident communications are embedded within the current operational training
01:13:24 time scale this work has already commenced and is estimated to be completed by december 2013. and what were the issues relating to incident communications which were the subject of this proposal
01:13:37 subject of this proposal um i think it was the issues highlighted by the coroner about
01:13:44 difficulties with communication uh i say i think it was more with firefighters than command officers at lacanal
01:13:52 lacanal um
01:13:54 so the issue would have been about the whole issue of communications
01:14:00 know using the right piece of equipment the right channel the options for using different channels as we touched on yesterday channel one channel two channel five channel six and
01:14:11 and uh when you experience radio difficulties uh what options and equipment do you have available as firefighters officers incident commanders to try and assist to overcome
01:14:23 commanders to try and assist to overcome that radio communications issues that that's what i understood the issues to cover
01:14:35 i wonder if we can boil that answer down a little bit more specifically what
01:14:41 what this letter tells the coroner is that this is about training brigade will engage with its training contractor to ensure that the issues relating to incident communications are embedded within the current operational
01:14:52 embedded within the current operational training
01:14:53 training what were you going to be teaching your firefighters and incident commanders about communications which would resolve the problem identified by the coroner which gave rise to this
01:15:04 the coroner which gave rise to this recommendation my understanding would be similar what i just said is the equipment available the channels highlighting the issue of
01:15:15 the channels highlighting the issue of signal propagation obviously explaining that there is these issues with certain types of buildings you can experience radio communication difficulties and then the procedures equipment
01:15:29 and then the procedures equipment and tactics that you may deploy to overcome
01:15:32 overcome some of those radio issues i i think you'd agree with me that this wasn't actually a response to the coroner's recommendation uh
01:15:40 uh the recommendation was to the lfb to consider using additional ba and personal cons and incidents not to improve its training yes yes
01:15:48 yes yes but i think the the first paragraph under proposed actions we obviously respectfully argued against a change in that procedure but in but you yeah you rejected that but but as it were told that you'd improve
01:16:00 but as it were told that you'd improve training yes to try and improve you know operational staff's understanding of what you can do when you experience communication difficulties now let's turn to lfb3086741
01:16:12 this is an email chain the week before and it relates to the meeting that we know you had on the 14th of may 2013 with the commissioners group
01:16:23 with the commissioners group and if we can go to page two in the email run please this is an email from you to
01:16:30 to a group so we can see dave brown james knighton danny cotton steve turek glenn seabright etc
01:16:40 etc copy to ron dobson rita dexter sue budden and david atkinson uh all as promised please find below a brief summary of the issues that were discussed and in some cases agreed during the two latino meetings held
01:16:51 during the two latino meetings held earlier today but just pausing there those were the meetings that we saw the invitation for i think in the emails yesterday or the day before uh i think the email you showed me yesterday the
01:17:02 the email you showed me yesterday the invitation email was for the commissioner groups plus the heads of service that we're going to undertake the actions um i think
01:17:10 i think this uh meeting request that i chaired was only for the officers to put together their proposals and this was the the two meetings to review their where we got to by this date i follow i
01:17:21 where we got to by this date i follow i follow now um if we um go to page three please we can see a heading out comes from the second meeting
01:17:29 meeting and what you've just said in your last answer i think relates to the second meeting doesn't it it's a matter of logic yeah yes now can we go down please to recommendation five at the foot of your screen
01:17:40 at the foot of your screen recommendation five incident communications um this email says this it was agreed that we should state with supporting evidence why we do not agree with the first part of the coroner's recommendation to consider additional bae channel radio channels i will work
01:17:53 bae channel radio channels i will work with jim and dave to draft this evidence which will use the benefits versus risks argument to support our position however it was accepted that it would be advisable to offset this by committing to undertake additional awareness
01:18:05 to undertake additional awareness raising on incident communication through some form of training across the various staff groups and what exactly were you proposing to raise awareness of
01:18:17 um you know the whole broad church of incident communications from the equipment provision available to firefighters and officers the use of the various radio channels
01:18:29 the use of the various radio channels that were in use at the time and overcoming any communications failures what what additional equipment procedures and on options are available to incident commanders to resolve some of those
01:18:42 commanders to resolve some of those issues that you might experience
01:18:48 and with this with the some form of training
01:18:53 um what did you have in mind by by some form of training uh well again the the training commissioning process would decide the actual format of the training but i'm certainly
01:19:03 certainly uh expecting something different than just the policy no the policy note was available to people
01:19:09 people we had an intercommunications policy note and notes for all the individual training sorry the equipment that that was in use at the time so i i probably would envisage at this point that this would probably result in
01:19:21 point that this would probably result in a station training support package of some kind and a senior officer computer-based training training solution yes and by offset in the penultimate line there did
01:19:32 offset in the penultimate line there did you mean
01:19:33 you mean a sop to the coroner no not at all i think it was just
01:19:38 just uh to acknowledge that we we accepted that there were issues at lacanal so we weren't just dismissing the coroner's recommendations for the reasons that
01:19:49 recommendations for the reasons that you've seen in some of the highlighted texts from yesterday's document there was a genuine concern that additional radio ba channels would actually create more problems than it would solve
01:20:00 would solve and to be respectful to that uh that we but we accepted that there were issues that with radio comms weren't just specific to ba comms uh at lacanal and that we would take the appropriate
01:20:12 and that we would take the appropriate action to try and improve our performance in that area right um i mean you say that but the context of the offset remark here is that you were using a benefits against risks
01:20:23 were using a benefits against risks argument to support the effectively the rejection of her recommendation uh but
01:20:30 uh but it was accepted that it would be advisable to offset this by committing to undertake additional awareness raising
01:20:37 raising it looks on the face of it that the lfb put simply didn't like her recommendation was going to argue against it but felt that it had to give her something to placate her would that be fair
01:20:47 be fair no i don't think that's fair if we'd have not accepted a recommendation i think as an organization we would have felt comfortable to reject it and obviously respectfully given other reasons why um
01:20:58 um i think we did acknowledge uh
01:21:01 uh as a group that came together to put this response together that we were not going to be complacent in this area there were clearly radio issues that had been reported through the lachnal investigation report
01:21:13 the lachnal investigation report and that we would take appropriate action to try and improve our performance in that area let's go back to the communications rule 43 pro forma at lfb3034062
01:21:25 and can we go to page 10.
01:21:30 and if we look at the very top row this is a continuation of the considerations row we looked at yesterday and if you look at the last paragraph
01:21:41 and if you look at the last paragraph the italics read as follows training and familiarization of using radio equipment there is currently sufficient policy guidance on radio use however there is minimal continuation
01:21:53 however there is minimal continuation training beyond the basic course within the firefighter development program the development of further training has been carried out by the brigade and their training provider babcock these training packages for all operational personnel are expected to be
01:22:05 operational personnel are expected to be completed in may 2013 and then um you've got in addition the first bullet of the row below which is the
01:22:14 the one of the proposals to address the rule 43 recommendations and it says this raise all operational personnel's awareness of the identification of communications incident issues at incidents and the
01:22:26 incident issues at incidents and the methods of overcoming them these include the use of uhf channel 2 repeater and leaky feeder equipment the completion of training materials and the requirement to carry out training by all operational personnel on the use of radio equipment
01:22:38 personnel on the use of radio equipment will reinforce and raise awareness of potential radio issues at incidents and improve radio discipline now just to be clear uhf channel 2 repeater and leakapedia feeder equipment
01:22:50 repeater and leakapedia feeder equipment is a reference isn't it to the portable equipment that can be used by the lfb to boost or enhance weak radio signals it it is and there's also a fixed uhf
01:23:02 it it is and there's also a fixed uhf channel 2 repeater that's fitted to all command units as well but yes in principle that's exactly what it says yes and subject to that was it the brigade's intention at this time since april may
01:23:13 april may 2013 that radio repeaters and leaky feeders should be the primary means of overcoming communications issues yes i think that's true yes and is it right the radio repeaters and leaky
01:23:25 right the radio repeaters and leaky feeders weren't in fact deployed at the latin house fire in 2009
01:23:31 i honestly can't remember if they were or they weren't right now um former commissioner ron dobson gave evidence to the latin house inquest on the 15th of march 2013.
01:23:43 house inquest on the 15th of march 2013. and i just want to show you the transcript of that day it was day 42 of the inquest can we please go to cwj 6010
01:23:52 6010 page 70.
01:23:59 now can we have that expanded a little bit please so we can see it a little bit more clearly um i'd like to pick it up in
01:24:08 in council's question at line 22
01:24:13 where he was asked
01:24:17 what are your views on how best to overcome radio communications problems which as i understand it can have two causes one is communication blind spots in a high-rise building or a steel frame building and if you turn the page the
01:24:29 building and if you turn the page the other is sheer volume of information and in response uh if you look at page 71 at line two the commissioner says this
01:24:40 the commissioner says this taking those two aspects it's not firefighters in london are not uncommon with communications difficulty related to the building environment in which we work
01:24:49 work so radio signals from the report we've commissioned or many reports particularly one that we commissioned following lateral house once again identified and confirmed the signals worked best when they're in clear line
01:25:00 worked best when they're in clear line of sight of each other's radios in high-rise buildings which are constructed from steel construction and steel and concrete there are many factors which will what do something which we call shield the signal from
01:25:13 which we call shield the signal from from getting to the radio or the one that's intended to get to these things are not uncommon to fire fighters in the london fire brigade we are i think unusual in relation to other brigades that
01:25:23 that in order to try and overcome some of these problems we issue every firefighter with a personal issue radio so that we can try to make sure that important messages to get through i don't believe that other brigades do the same but we certainly do issue a
01:25:35 same but we certainly do issue a personal radio to every firefighter and can i just jump ahead in his is his evidence to page 73 two pages on and pick up pick it up at line five
01:25:46 pick up pick it up at line five and he says this if we can just expand it so you can see it with me so in terms of addressing this problem for the future
01:25:53 future and
01:25:54 and and it is at many incident debriefs that we've attended over the years incident ground communication is often very is very often raised in terms of an issue and that does relate to the
01:26:05 issue and that does relate to the shielding of the buildings and sometimes the traffic if the shielding of the building is a problem then there are other facilities available to incident commanders to seek to overcome that as i recall i think mr holland referred yesterday to leaky feeders which is
01:26:17 yesterday to leaky feeders which is basically a cable or an aerial that we run out of the off the drum like an extension lead through a building or through an area and that will pick up the signal and transmit it back to the base station they are predominantly in
01:26:28 base station they are predominantly in place for long tunnels and for things like use on london underground where the communication issues between radios is even the communication difficulties between radios is much greater than it usually is above ground and it would not
01:26:40 usually is above ground and it would not be the incident commander's first choice to use leaky feeders in a scenario such as lachenal because they would firstly they would divert attention from other priority tasks to lay the cable out but more
01:26:52 to lay the cable out but more importantly they would institute and would represent a further hazard in the stairwell where they have to lay the cable up so it would not be the incident commander's preference but it would be a piece of equipment that would be available to them
01:27:06 now given
01:27:08 given commissioner dobson as he then was is evidence that leaky feeders would not be an incident commander's first choice but the reasons he's identified why was the decision taken to release
01:27:19 why was the decision taken to release training on their deployment and use in response to the lack of coroner's rule 43 recommendations um
01:27:27 um i can't answer that i i think um the way
01:27:32 the way the training was presented i don't think i've seen the training um would have been that it's when you experience difficulties wouldn't be what you use as your first line of communication that would be
01:27:45 line of communication that would be through your battery set and if you're not in
01:27:48 not in an area
01:27:49 an area where there's smoke or any flammable gases then you can use your personal issue fire ground radio they would be your kind of primary methods of communication
01:28:00 kind of primary methods of communication but when you experience which i believe the training was designed to to exemplify that if you do experience then you do have repeaters and leaky feeders available as a kind of secondary
01:28:12 feeders available as a kind of secondary or tertiary option for overcoming communication signal problems
01:28:20 did the lfb reconsider its policy on the use of of repeaters and leaky feeders in residential high-rise fires following the latino house fire um i don't think we had a specific
01:28:31 um i don't think we had a specific policy that said you should or shouldn't use them it's just a communication capability that is available to incident commanders should they experience instant communication
01:28:43 they experience instant communication difficulties yes you see the commission as i've shown you from his own evidence explain the practical problems which lay in the way of the incident commander treating it as a primary preference whether a communications
01:28:55 preference whether a communications difficulties in high-rise buildings in the light of that evidence did the lfb stand back and actually ask itself where the use of repeaters and leaky feeders should sit in the hierarchy of
01:29:06 feeders should sit in the hierarchy of of
01:29:07 of alternative approaches to communications where they are experienced at high-rise fires i
01:29:13 fires i don't believe uh i was aware of a piece of work that does what you're describing um i would have assumed that the commissioning department that looked at the new training
01:29:23 training would have only looked at it in the context was what was currently available well let's look at that um that's tcap0039 and we have the form at lfb 404729
01:29:39 let's have the first page up
01:29:43 um there it is is that the training you're referring to um
01:29:49 um use of authority issued rainy communication equipment yeah i wouldn't have seen this document at the time but yes that is the document well you you you say that let's let's see um can we go to page
01:30:01 let's let's see um can we go to page three please
01:30:07 now on page three we can see the version control list there and the date of version one was the 27th of july 2012
01:30:16 2012 and the last version 1.3 final version was the 10th of march 2015. uh the last one i think post dates your departure by two months or so yeah three
01:30:27 departure by two months or so yeah three buttons yeah uh yeah
01:30:30 uh yeah but it but the first three versions one 1.1 and 1.2 are all during your tenure as dort that's correct yes um
01:30:41 that's correct yes um uh
01:30:43 uh so
01:30:44 so it looks as if is this right just looking at these dates that this training need had had in fact been identified and developed sometime before the coroner's rule 43
01:30:56 sometime before the coroner's rule 43 recommendation uh yes i think the timing and chronology there indicates and i think one of the jimmycourt's emails refers to that that there's already work ongoing with
01:31:07 that there's already work ongoing with the training yes contractor so yes it predates the coroners yes and i was going to ask you that the email we saw from jimmy caught earlier picks this up yeah right now um can we go to page seven
01:31:18 right now um can we go to page seven please under background and context uh and and you can see uh that's the box as is often the case with this because it's a pro forma um on page seven fourth
01:31:29 it's a pro forma um on page seven fourth box down background context what is the problem and the text says this with the introduction of new radios it has been identified that there is a training need to ensure all operational personnel have the knowledge and understanding to use
01:31:41 the knowledge and understanding to use authority issued radio communications equipment in accordance with brigade policy to ensure effective communications at incidents this training will cover handheld radios with associated equipment and airwave main
01:31:52 associated equipment and airwave main scheme both appliance and senior officer radios
01:31:56 radios is the reference there to new radios a reference to the replacement of the maxon radio by the hx series uh
01:32:05 uh i know you asked me this yesterday about what date was the fireground radios replaced um it was definitely after the bethel green fire which was 2004 and i my best
01:32:17 fire which was 2004 and i my best recollection is it was around 2007 and 8. airwave was introduced which is the senior officer digital radios in i believe 2009 um so i assume it is the replacement
01:32:30 um so i assume it is the replacement handheld radio that they're referring to in the start of that sentence i mean even in 12 2012 those wouldn't be no there
01:32:40 no there yeah i wouldn't describe them as new at that point right but you can't think of anything else can you i don't believe we purchased any new equipment
01:32:47 equipment in my time right now given that that training was the means or to be the means by which the lfb responded to the latino coroner's rule 43 recommendation even though developed beforehand
01:32:58 even though developed beforehand can you tell us why this form did not refer to her recommendation all the communications difficulties experienced at lachnal given that the last version of it is march 2015
01:33:10 last version of it is march 2015 two years after her rule 43 recommendations just under uh i i can't answer that because i obviously didn't see this does the the later versions were they updated to reflect uh the work
01:33:23 were they updated to reflect uh the work that was done in respect to the coroner's rule well we go back to page three this is the last version oh sorry this is the sorry no i think it's mid-march 2016. oh this is the 15 version is it yes okay sorry um
01:33:35 version is it yes okay sorry um yes i would have expected it to at least reference the current rule 43s and the decisions as i've described in previous answers about the scope of what we were trying to achieve with these two packages yeah do you know why it doesn't
01:33:46 packages yeah do you know why it doesn't no i don't right were you involved in considering uh
01:33:51 uh this
01:33:52 this training having kicked it off as an idea as an offset to the coroner's recommendation uh back in may 2013. no i wouldn't have been involved in the
01:34:03 no i wouldn't have been involved in the development of the tcat process i'd say do i take it that you weren't involved in considering babcock's development uh of
01:34:12 uh of this
01:34:13 this of a case study for this training or no i didn't ever see them until the case studies were produced normally did you sign off on the case studies uh no i didn't have any involvement in the
01:34:24 didn't have any involvement in the business process of signing off training that was developed by babcock through this process well we'll see how we go with the next set of questions mr chairman it's probably a convenient moment to take the break yes all right uh
01:34:35 uh but if you're going on to another group of questions perhaps we should yes we're staying within the topic but we're going on to some follow-on questions but it's a convenient moment because we're about to look at a new documentary we'll take our morning break at that point mr
01:34:46 our morning break at that point mr reason we'll come back at half past 11 please
01:34:50 please and as usual please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room lovely thank you thank you very much
01:35:04 thank you how fast 11 please
01:52:36 would you ask mr reason to come back in please
01:52:47 thank you all right mr reason you're ready to carry on i certainly have thank you very much yes yes mr chairman thank you mr reason can we please go to lfb double zero one double two eight four six
01:53:02 this is the babcock produced station based training on radio equipment
01:53:07 equipment version one and its date if you look at the top of the screen is 14th of march 2014. if we go to page two you can see the four objectives
01:53:18 you can see the four objectives of the session by the end of this session you will be able to
01:53:22 able to list the range of a radio equipment used operationally within the london fire brigade describe the function of the radio equipment select radio equipment appropriate for use in operational scenarios demonstrate the assembly and
01:53:34 scenarios demonstrate the assembly and use of barry radio equipment and the package then goes on to describe key items of communications equipment they're just pausing at this point did
01:53:45 they're just pausing at this point did is this a training package you ever saw at all
01:53:48 at all no i didn't no um if we go to page 14 you'll see the description of the key items of communications equipment page 14
01:53:56 14 breathing apparatus interface equipment this is barry intrinsically safe radio equipment suitable for use in potentially explosive atmospheres fully splash proof and submersible integrated with barry set appliances carry two
01:54:08 with barry set appliances carry two battery sets and the next uh at page 20 if we go to that next slide
01:54:15 slide at 20
01:54:17 at 20 radio repeater capability this equipment enables radio communications to be established in locations where the signal is limited due to location such as large basements or sub-basements it is possible to use the repeater in
01:54:29 it is possible to use the repeater in both surface and subsurface environments as a standalone unit or connected to other repeaters in series mode with the supplied power cable and then if you go to the next slide at page 21 please you can see it says this
01:54:43 radio repeater availability 17 uhf repeaters are available one repeater carried on each command unit can also be used in conjunction with a leaky feeder also carried by the cu if
01:54:55 leaky feeder also carried by the cu if additional repeaters are required the ic must request them through control now
01:55:01 now as far as we've been able to tell that's the totality of the guidance in this training
01:55:06 training package on the use of repeaters you're not familiar with it as you've told us
01:55:12 told us have you any reason to disagree with this proposition that this package contained only a basic description as i've read to you of the lfb's communications equipment and didn't prepare crews for the difficulties that
01:55:24 prepare crews for the difficulties that may be encountered in high-rise buildings such as those experienced at latino house um
01:55:30 um i haven't seen the rest of the presentation but i'll take your word for it that it appears from that and the intended learning outcomes that are clearly
01:55:38 clearly communications failures doesn't appear to be covered in the learning outcome which i would have assumed it would have been given our previous discussion before the break so yeah accepting that it doesn't develop
01:55:49 yeah accepting that it doesn't develop this issue further in the remainder of the package i accept that right and it doesn't for example tell you how to plug in a leaky feeder or where to plug it in or a repeater and get it to work uh it
01:56:00 or a repeater and get it to work uh it doesn't apparently no not from what i've seen no
01:56:03 seen no uh
01:56:04 uh were you aware of any training package that prepared crews for the wholesale loss of communication or how to restore uh communications um if it's not in this
01:56:15 uh communications um if it's not in this package i think uh what i saw in the tcap is that apart from the
01:56:21 from the phase one firefighter development and phase two firefighter development which covers instant communications and i haven't seen those packages either so they may contain more information that this was a package designed to
01:56:33 this was a package designed to in effect
01:56:35 in effect deal with those issues raised by the coroner and other issues that we'd picked up from other incidents let's then turn to the senior office package senior officer package at lfb 001
01:56:47 001 22844
01:56:54 this is the radio equipment senior officer training version 1 initial upload 6th of march 2014. so the week before the version for station based staff we saw just now and if we go to
01:57:05 staff we saw just now and if we go to page 3 on this document you can see the objectives of the package listed on completion of this package you will be able to describe the functions and use of the analog handheld radio radio repeater and digital mainstream radio
01:57:17 repeater and digital mainstream radio describe situations where interagency voice communications and procedures can be used and how it would be implemented identify and find solutions for radio communication issues apply your knowledge of how radio equipment can be
01:57:28 knowledge of how radio equipment can be used to an exercise scenario now
01:57:32 now in relation to radio communications issues
01:57:36 issues it appears that the relevant slides start at page 23 if we can go to that and i'll just show you that
01:57:44 it reads as follows page 23
01:57:48 page 23 communications issues and select radio communications roll over the images below for more information about how these issues can be resolved so it looks like an interactive training package would that be right
01:58:00 training package would that be right yeah that looks like it would be an interactive package yes uh and it says in the box radio relay where poor communications are experienced it's possible to relay messages from one
01:58:12 possible to relay messages from one handheld radio to another uh
01:58:16 uh on the face of this document did this adequately inform senior officers of the way in which high-rise materials such as concrete and metal steel can disrupt radio signals if
01:58:27 metal steel can disrupt radio signals if this is the only slide that covers communications issues no it doesn't no there are a series or is a series of slides at page 17 if we go back five pages six pages or so mr miller i'm
01:58:38 pages six pages or so mr miller i'm sorry to interrupt you but um as you've already read out the this screen invites you to roll over the images for more information yes i wonder whether there's more information we ought to be
01:58:50 there's more information we ought to be aware of uh they're making sure we're getting to them
01:58:53 them no i'm because i'm not sure we have the capability of rolling this over ourselves here live well i'm sure we don't live on the screen but do we have a copy of what you would see if you were to roll over this
01:59:05 if you were to roll over this these particular parts of the screen uh standing here i'm not i'm not able to answer that question but i'm quite sure i can
01:59:12 i can provide an answer
01:59:16 and we do we do and we've we've we have rolled it over and i'm i'm told from those who have that it provides no more information um which would um adequately inform senior officers of the
01:59:28 adequately inform senior officers of the way in which high-rise materials such as concrete and metal disrupt radio signals all right that isn't there thank you very much um now can we go back to page 17 which
01:59:38 17 which uh we can see explores functionality of radio repeaters and leaky feeders and
01:59:46 and again i mean there's no distinction it it looks on the face of it in these slides between or this slide between radio repeaters and telemetry repeaters if we just roll forward let's look at
01:59:58 if we just roll forward let's look at 17. now look at 18. if we look at 18 radio repeater function modes and there's some text which isn't very clear below it i'll read it out to you
02:00:09 clear below it i'll read it out to you single repeater is deployed in stand-alone mode to boost signal coverage
02:00:13 coverage when used in standalone mode the repeater can be operated by using the fist microphone i think that says to transmit and the internal speaker to monitor radio traffic
02:00:26 monitor radio traffic if it helps miss a minute i can confirm that this is uhf radio repeaters used in conjunction with fire ground radios right
02:00:38 i'm told that if we go to page 22 to 26 of this slide
02:00:43 slide show
02:00:45 show that that's the rollover material of the rolled over material if we go to 23
02:00:53 uh and 24
02:00:56 and then 25.
02:01:02 yeah the images are the same yeah the things that change is the blue box is giving an update on whatever box your different text i think that's how it works uh it looks from this that the lfb
02:01:13 works uh it looks from this that the lfb didn't propose to train its crews and senior officers uh on the distinction between radio repeaters and telemetry repeaters uh certainly from what i've seen in this package and i say this is
02:01:24 seen in this package and i say this is the first time i've seen it so
02:01:27 so telemetry was rolled out uh as a new piece of equipment including the telemetry repeaters i believe in 2014 from memory
02:01:38 2014 from memory and i can't remember if there was a separate training package
02:01:43 package when the new telemetry boards and associated equipment was rolled out i would imagine it would have been because it's quite a significant piece of safety equipment but i can't confirm that
02:01:53 that so it might be there is a separate package relating specifically to telemetry boards and associated equipment i can't confirm that right now um peter graves told the inquiry that
02:02:05 um peter graves told the inquiry that although this tcap was signed off as complete in may 2015 so after you left it was never in fact released because of i.t issues um
02:02:15 um can you help us with that at all certainly in 2014 i became aware um that there were issues with training packages that included embedded
02:02:27 training packages that included embedded video footage so that was raised given to me by uh james douglas she was the head of human resource and development and i believe around the
02:02:38 and i believe around the middle of 2014 uh mr douglas was tasked by the odcb to go and speak to the head of it
02:02:46 of it to see if
02:02:47 to see if we could overcome whatever the problem was with the packages and i think from memory
02:02:54 memory it
02:02:55 it it was not that the package didn't work it was just inconsistent in its performance across the whole of the network so um we've got you know 100 fire stations and other locations so the
02:03:08 fire stations and other locations so the wide area network as we called it which is kind of like the pipes that go to the station that you feed information down it wasn't providing a consistent level of performance and i think that was the issue that was
02:03:20 and i think that was the issue that was raised with me it was impacting on the kind of user experience at fire stations the problem didn't exist at headquarters because we had a bigger bandwidth in the headquarters building so we didn't
02:03:32 headquarters building so we didn't suffer when we when we reviewed training we didn't have that problem and so james was tasked by uh miss dexter as the chair of odcb to speak to the head of it to see if there was any
02:03:45 the head of it to see if there was any interim solutions and the reason i used the word intrim is there was already a corporate project to upgrade the wide area network which was the network to all five brigade premises and that was
02:03:56 all five brigade premises and that was due to be
02:03:57 due to be i kind of if it was due to start into december 2015 or be completed in december 2015 but it was certainly quite a way away and obviously we didn't want to wait that long um so certainly james
02:04:09 to wait that long um so certainly james would have raised the issue uh of um
02:04:14 um the kind of performance issue if that's what it was uh with the head of i.t but i don't know if that's the reason why this package was delayed i don't know the answer right um now let's look
02:04:25 know the answer right um now let's look at the
02:04:25 at the final monitoring update you gave to the latino house working group for its meeting on the 31st of march 2014. we looked at it yesterday it's at nfb double zero double one seven
02:04:36 double zero double one seven six six zero
02:04:42 that's the first page we saw yesterday and item three is the rule 43 action plan and item five is the update report and if we go to um page 27
02:04:57 you can see the start of the action plan monitoring report and you can see action update march 2014 um for comms can we please go to page 33
02:05:13 go to the bottom row on that page
02:05:18 and um you can see we uh we looked at this yesterday i think yeah considers whether it would be beneficial to use additional uh breathing apparatus radio communication channels and personal
02:05:29 communication channels and personal radio channels a major incidence to reduce the amount of traffic on each channel that's the coroner's recommendation number five and if you look at the right hand side action update it says this um target date december 2013 two training
02:05:42 target date december 2013 two training packages have been commissioned for babcock to provide training to all operational personnel on the available communications equipment and its effective use of operational incidents the incidents chosen within these
02:05:53 the incidents chosen within these packages include both high-rise and subsurface with scenarios that demonstrate how certain communication issues can be resolved using lfb equipment currently carried on command units
02:06:04 units the first of these packages has now been completed and published the second package which is aimed at senior officers was signed off on mar in on march 14
02:06:16 on march 14 and will be published in april now i think we've seen am i right both packages
02:06:24 packages we looked at the training package uh tcap and we looked at the packaging station-based officers and senior officers
02:06:33 officers given that uh as peter graves told us the tcap form wasn't signed off as complete until may 2015. can you explain why you told the latin
02:06:44 can you explain why you told the latin house working group in march 2014 that the station-based package had been completed and published when that couldn't have been the case
02:06:54 the simple answer is no but i noticed on the uh training package solution that you showed them that the date it said it i commend what the term was at the top
02:07:05 commend what the term was at the top it's been loaded i think was
02:07:07 was uh consistent with the the update here um
02:07:13 um now whether there was something that happened after i reported this i was surprised by the 2015 date if i'm honest um
02:07:21 honest um this is the update obviously we took through odcp that came probably from jimmy call i would imagine as the commissioning department uh i would have had no reason to
02:07:33 uh i would have had no reason to challenge that because i would have taken that as you know particularly the level of detail in that update it's been you know completed published you know that conveys that you know we're almost there obviously that's the start of the
02:07:44 there obviously that's the start of the training process but the actual process of getting that training developed is is pretty much concluded um
02:07:52 um so yeah i was i'm surprised both by the content of the packages doesn't really reflect that update or what the intended uh
02:08:02 uh package was designed as far as i understood to to cover and i'm also slightly surprised or you know surprised that the sign off date is you know after
02:08:13 that the sign off date is you know after i've retired yes yes and in light of that answer would you accept that the
02:08:20 the telling the latter house working group that the package had been completed and published was misleading because it would cause them to believe that the package was effectively in operation and had been rolled out to staff when it had not
02:08:32 been rolled out to staff when it had not been i i agree with that yes now um
02:08:37 now um peter groves told us that the i.t issues were with videos not loading properly because of poor bandwidth and that resulted in a number of of training packages not being released to lfb staff
02:08:49 packages not being released to lfb staff um he gave evidence just for our reference purposes it's day 177 page 178 at lines 14-19 that he'd reported that to his line manager and that that was a topic of repeated discussion at the
02:09:01 topic of repeated discussion at the performance and commissioning board meeting
02:09:05 meeting were you aware of that at this time yes i think refer to my earlier answer that certainly the embedded video uh packages that had an embedded video were not always working consistently across
02:09:17 not always working consistently across the whole of the uh london fire brigade estate the fire stations and other locations um and and that's why james douglas was tasked with trying to come up with the head of it a
02:09:29 trying to come up with the head of it a interim solution prior to the roll out of the new wide area wet network which would obviously increase the bandwidth to station so i was aware in the context of a wider issue but i
02:09:40 in the context of a wider issue but i was not ever aware that this particular package
02:09:44 package was one of the packages that was struggling because from what you've shown me and i'm not familiar with the package it didn't look like it had embedded video and it shouldn't have been one of the packages that was causing problems well i was going to ask you that exact question i think although
02:09:56 you that exact question i think although the station the senior officer video did have a video embedded in it or perhaps functionality with a rollover we've seen the um
02:10:05 the um station-based officer training did not so given that that is the case and there's no video or functionality uh in that can you explain why that wasn't rolled out at least to station-based
02:10:16 rolled out at least to station-based stuff because i t issues wouldn't be a problem yeah i would agree with that from what you've said if there is no embedded video then that shouldn't be an issue and even the senior officer package the vast majority of senior
02:10:27 package the vast majority of senior officers do work at headquarters or can come into headquarters to undertake training if they need uh better performance on the on the desktop as we call it the you know pc on the desk um so i've got
02:10:40 desk um so i've got no
02:10:41 no answer for you why that wasn't rolled out right
02:10:44 out right now um
02:10:46 now um i think i take from your answer that your director was aware of the of the i.t problem and its effect on the training package or packages as early as march 2014 yes yes
02:10:57 march 2014 yes yes um
02:10:58 um and
02:11:00 and can you explain why that wasn't brought to the attention of the latin house working group
02:11:07 group well i didn't know obviously in the update it looked like we had completed this i wasn't aware if there was any other rule 43 solutions that had training packs which i believe they are the policy no 800 had
02:11:19 i believe they are the policy no 800 had a training pack um
02:11:22 um i wasn't aware that any of the the training packages associated with the rule 43s
02:11:27 rule 43s were having difficulties because of the it infrastructure and i would have expected if if that had been the case that someone would put it in the rule 43 update so that we could
02:11:38 in the rule 43 update so that we could have
02:11:38 have raised that with members so somebody wasn't reporting to you completely and fully were they uh not apparently if the reason why this didn't
02:11:48 didn't get rolled out to use the term is because of that i.t issue which doesn't look like that is the reason from what we've discussed i would have expected yes that to be
02:11:59 i would have expected yes that to be reflected in the update now the simple work around for this problem would have been to tell babcock to remove whatever offending video there was
02:12:09 was uh and proceed with the rest of the training package um
02:12:13 um for this particular item if if it was the video uh and i don't know the answer to that that was the problem yes that would have been one potential solution yes or perhaps send a cd to the stations uh yeah there was there's probably a
02:12:25 uh yeah there was there's probably a raft of alternative solutions that we could have looked at um but uh
02:12:30 but uh probably james douglas would be the best person because he would be the person that had the conversation with the head of i.t right about this issue
02:12:39 issue to your knowledge were those discussions ever had
02:12:42 ever had to look at an alternative i
02:12:45 i recall from a odcb report because i think it was raised at odcb around the time you said march if that helps with your document referencing
02:12:56 referencing the march odcb 2014 i think was where it was first raised at that board uh mr douglas was given the task to speak to the head of it to see if there
02:13:08 speak to the head of it to see if there was anything that they could do i from memory uh obviously we tracked all the actions from odcb we ended up with a great long table of actions so we didn't lose track of things
02:13:20 didn't lose track of things and they only got taken off once they've been closed um
02:13:24 um there was an a number of it patches i recall uh don't ask me what an it patch is it something to do with the technology for the station end equipment uh which was designed to try and overcome the
02:13:36 was designed to try and overcome the performance issues i believe one of those patches was rolled out prior to my retirement but it didn't serve to fix the problem at the fire stations it improved performance at
02:13:47 stations it improved performance at other locations but the fire station seemed to be the problem and i believe and i haven't got any documentary evidence for this it's just from memory that the head of it then committed to
02:14:00 that the head of it then committed to develop a second patch as i think as it was referred to to try and fix the fire station end as an interim solution prior to the wide area network being upgraded in 2015 but
02:14:13 area network being upgraded in 2015 but i i haven't got any evidence and i can't remember whether that was completed and successful before i retired i don't believe it was right um now just
02:14:23 now just to pin this down to a document you referred to the odcb meeting in march 2014 let's just um look at that can we go please to lfb3040602
02:14:40 um and this is the odcb june 2014 meeting minutes if we go to page one you can see
02:14:48 can see uh that in fact you were not present you gave apologies for absence okay you see that yeah but but let's go to page three
02:14:59 uh under the penultimate item on that page 10th march 2014 it says this babcock training packages and use of video h o hrd
02:15:10 packages and use of video h o hrd to confirm that arrangements for use of video and training packages fully exploit the terminal functionality of fire stations and then the update is ict need to improve links to stations for
02:15:22 need to improve links to stations for video as there is inconsistency in performance there is no budget for improvements and may have to wait until wa on wan upgrade in december 2015 hoict
02:15:34 wa on wan upgrade in december 2015 hoict looking at interim solutions that is that what you were referring to that's exactly what i was referring to thank you for that yes now just just on the question of the budget there you say no budget for improvements
02:15:47 no budget for improvements first did you read these minutes when they were produced after the meeting even though you went to the meeting yes i would have read these yes um was there any discussion at odcb
02:15:58 um was there any discussion at odcb level or lower down in the organization about finding the money for right for it improvements so that this training program could be rolled out swiftly
02:16:10 swiftly i can't remember a meeting or a report that discussed that particular issue no not when i was working right can you explain why there was no budget for improvements given the importance of this training package
02:16:22 importance of this training package which itself was anchored into the latino house rule 43 recommendation response
02:16:28 response well i set i expect that that update in terms of the the line that starts there is no budget would have come from the head of i.t so he would have been expressing that within his
02:16:39 expressing that within his department that there wasn't a budget other than that which was already committed to the wide area network um i think if we'd have discussed this and and we'd wanted to do
02:16:51 discussed this and and we'd wanted to do this if there was a if there is in fact a technical solution i'm not a technical person so i don't know if there was a a way of improving the performance without upgrading the wan i don't think budget would have been a
02:17:03 i don't think budget would have been a something that would have precluded us considering taking that forward although the budget was obviously difficult during
02:17:08 during that period as you probably are aware but um
02:17:11 but um certainly for things like training we would we would have found the money from somewhere
02:17:17 i mean some people looking at this might think that budgetary constraints explain the lack of speed in rolling this training out to station-based staff
02:17:29 to station-based staff i mean that's uh is that a fair conclusion it's a conclusion but i don't think it's the reality i i i never experienced uh with regards to training and and things
02:17:40 with regards to training and and things that involve frontline service delivery that we would compromise uh unless it was like a ridiculous amount of money but for things like this and i haven't got any sense of what the cost of
02:17:52 got any sense of what the cost of upgrading the when was but um it wouldn't have prevented us from
02:17:59 from spending money on this if if that was a viable solution so yes the fire authority
02:18:04 authority was
02:18:06 was you know in difficult you know we had a difficult budget between 2013 and 16 as you were which resulted in closure of 10 fire stations and a lot of other efficiency savings
02:18:17 other efficiency savings but
02:18:18 but we never discussed that we couldn't afford to do something like this and i don't think that would have been budget wouldn't have been a preventative issue in this context if we'd had that discussion
02:18:29 discussion was the difficult budget between 2013 and 2016
02:18:33 and 2016 any explanation at all for the
02:18:36 for the defects and and delays in the wrote in the addressing of the rule 43 recommendations from the lack of house coroner oh i don't think so no uh now can i then ask you about airwave
02:18:49 uh now can i then ask you about airwave radios so far we've focused on uhf we touched on airwaves before
02:18:56 and we focused also on barry but is it right that the lfe also uses digital airwave radios and supplies them to officers on the fire ground yes they're they're issued to station managers and above operational staff yes and that's
02:19:08 above operational staff yes and that's also called the main scheme radio isn't it yes it's the same technology yes it's the means i think by which the fire ground can communicate with the control room
02:19:16 room and with other emergency services it is indeed
02:19:19 indeed and we as we understand it airwave radios were were before the grenfell tower fires you say reserved for senior station staff station manager and higher ranks yes yes um
02:19:32 we heard evidence of phase one that airwave radios were where they were available used in place of uhf weight radios and that they were far superior somebody described them i think it was mr um it was um brian o'keefe as far
02:19:45 mr um it was um brian o'keefe as far superior to uhf radios was that your own experience um there are completely different technologies so uhf is ultra high analog
02:19:56 technologies so uhf is ultra high analog uh ultra high frequency analog and airwave is digital technology so there was
02:20:04 there was uh airwaves a national radio
02:20:07 radio solution for blue lights and other agencies
02:20:10 agencies and i believe the contract has something like 99.9
02:20:15 like 99.9 coverage and particularly in london uh which was a requirement for the metropolitan police so it's highly resilient in terms of its coverage and obviously it's a digital trunked
02:20:26 and obviously it's a digital trunked radio system so it doesn't suffer some of the issues that you experience with analog radio signals no um let's then go back
02:20:36 back i think now for the final time to the rule 43 pro former lfb
02:20:43 lfb zero six 3034062
02:20:44 page ten
02:20:52 uh and on that page we can see in
02:20:56 in the um
02:20:59 the um bullet point at the the last bullet point in the that block of text explore the use of digital airwave radios to provide additional command channels should communications difficulties be encountered at a
02:21:11 difficulties be encountered at a specific incident and if you if you go please uh to
02:21:21 the top box
02:21:23 box halfway down it says this use of airwave digital radios currently these radios issued to all flexible duty officers are used primarily for communications between the incident ground and the brigades mobilizing control expanding
02:21:35 brigades mobilizing control expanding the use of digital radio talk groups for example for the incident command team would provide the opportunity to free up analog radio channels this does however bring another level of complexity in managing information plays at an
02:21:46 managing information plays at an incident
02:21:47 incident and then i've read you what's next to d the final bullet there explore the use of digital airwave radios as with other topics which we've identified in this pro forma together
02:21:58 identified in this pro forma together during your evidence this suggestion was never mentioned in the lfb's response to the rule 43 letter was it no it wasn't why was that i don't know i i would imagine that and
02:22:09 i don't know i i would imagine that and certainly my expectation this would have been picked up in the wider training solution that we did commit to the coroner that we would do and i know airwave is one of the equipment items that you showed me in
02:22:21 equipment items that you showed me in the package but yeah i would have expected this to feature quite significantly in that new training provision what became of the lfb's exploration of
02:22:33 what became of the lfb's exploration of that issue as proposed in this document um
02:22:38 um well i wouldn't have been involved in the research obviously i know how the radios worked i had one myself um and i would have expected that the use of digital radios
02:22:49 expected that the use of digital radios as an alternative to uhf radios in certain circumstances would have featured in that training so but i can't answer why it doesn't feature more heavily in the training solution because
02:23:01 heavily in the training solution because i didn't see that solution now let's look at the minutes of the odcb meeting on the 6th of may 2010 so this is three years
02:23:12 three years before
02:23:15 it's at lfb 30406
02:23:25 and you can see there from page one who was present rita dexter is in the chair and you are there
02:23:34 there as ac oep you see that yes um if we go to page three please we can see any other business under paragraph
02:23:45 paragraph oops
02:23:46 oops seems to have disappeared hum there it is um this is under any other business action ac stroke op to consider options for use of main scheme airwave radios by borough
02:23:58 of main scheme airwave radios by borough commanders monitoring incidents you see that yes and if you go um
02:24:12 to back to the bottom of page two you can see what this follows on from
02:24:19 at paragraph 9.1 use of main scheme airwave radios ac stroke op advised that the use of main scheme airwave radios by borough commanders in order to monitor incidents had been increasing and there
02:24:30 incidents had been increasing and there was a likelihood of the brigade being billed for usage as we are close to the limit as a result he'd sent out a message advising officers to only use when necessary there were discussions regarding the pros and cons of such
02:24:41 regarding the pros and cons of such usage and the suggestion was that some officers should be using the mobis system instead of the a instead acop to consider options um now
02:24:53 there's a mention there of billing for usage
02:24:57 usage did that cost consideration or the cost of additional airwave handsets more generally play any part in the brigade's decision not not to take the suggestion of use of airwaves
02:25:08 take the suggestion of use of airwaves further forward come april may 2013 three years later i i don't believe so and if with your indulgence there's a little bit of context to this which really might help
02:25:20 context to this which really might help the inquiry yes please so um this issue i remember this issue so
02:25:27 so when you're paged to remotely monitor an incident
02:25:30 incident we provided the mobis system as it's there which is an application on a desktop so you could log on to the incident and you're seeing information that's being generated by the control centers you're seeing the
02:25:42 the control centers you're seeing the messages that are coming back you're seeing people that are being mobilized et cetera so you're remotely monitoring what started to happen around this period bearing in mind airwave was only introduced in london foreign i think i
02:25:53 introduced in london foreign i think i said 2009 from memory that people were leaving their airwave radio switched on just because they're interested in what's going on anywhere in london because it's a trunk
02:26:04 anywhere in london because it's a trunk radio system you can hear the whole the whole of london fire brigade uh and clearly the officers if there's an incident in biggin hill those are familiar with the geography of london is in south london
02:26:15 in south london there could be an incident in barnet which is the diametrically opposite and what was happening everyone who had their airwave radio and was lighting up what's called the base stations
02:26:25 stations and we were being built for the number of times in terms of capacity that we were lighting up those base stations so when the contract was set up with london fire brigade my understanding that we pitched ourselves
02:26:37 understanding that we pitched ourselves in a band of usage which then attracted a cost
02:26:41 a cost and we were very close to that limit because everyone was leaving their radio switched on so it was having no performance improvement it was just people being curious about what was going on and so this was intended to say
02:26:53 going on and so this was intended to say if your page for an incident and that's how we were notified at senior manager level we had pages you should initially use the mobis system because that gives you all the information that's coming across the
02:27:05 information that's coming across the radio
02:27:06 radio and other people that are not associated with that incident should not just switched on because they're interested in the incident because it's actually going to cost the brigade money and actually actually delivering no
02:27:17 actually actually delivering no performance improvement at all right so that that's the i don't know if that helps it it's it's a slightly different issue than just the use of radios we're not saying don't use your radio it's just it was being used inappropriately i
02:27:28 just it was being used inappropriately i suppose
02:27:29 suppose come 2013 was that a a consideration when it came to exploring the use of airwave radios as per the bullet point in the rule 43 draft recommendation response we've seen no i don't believe
02:27:41 response we've seen no i don't believe it was
02:27:43 it was um
02:27:44 um now the we understand that the lfb had access to some 70 airwave talk groups which are i think am i right akin to channels yes yes yeah and they only ever
02:27:55 channels yes yes yeah and they only ever used a handful of those talk groups with any regularity is that right is that that is correct yes is it right that the lfb can actually create or adopt talk groups for specific incidents or exercises yes you
02:28:07 specific incidents or exercises yes you can create a talk group at an incident yes we did follow from that then that an airwave channel could actually be used to set up a change of chain of command at a at an incident such as grenfell tower yes it could
02:28:18 tower yes it could and that would then free up capacity on the uhf radio frequency yes all the officers that moved across to the airwave would obviously not be using their analog radio so that would free up capacity yes i mean
02:28:30 capacity yes i mean would that solution have been in keeping with the
02:28:32 with the the tenor of the coroner's rule 43 recommendation on additional radio capacity yes it would what consideration did your director give to adopting that suggestion
02:28:43 give to adopting that suggestion um
02:28:45 um my understanding was airwave was covered in that training not clearly it's not covered in that level of detail which is disappointing for me
02:28:54 officers did use airwave radio i've used them at very large incidents so it wasn't that no one used the idea and weren't aware of talk groups that that was all part of the training when the when the airwave system was rolled out
02:29:06 when the airwave system was rolled out in 2009 and that was explained to us how to set up a talk group how to switch channels
02:29:11 channels it was also in policy guidance some of the policy guidance that was updated following lachenal predominantly policy note 790 which was the fire survival guidance
02:29:23 the fire survival guidance note that was redrafted in response to the experience at la canal and it clearly says in that particular policy guidance that officers should consider using main
02:29:34 officers should consider using main scheme airwave radio when passing information relating to fire survival calls
02:29:42 calls subject to capacity in control to set up an
02:29:45 an additional main scheme radio channel i think it's also touched on in policy note 633 but doesn't go into so much detail but it does say you know you can use main scheme
02:29:56 use main scheme uh airwave radio to facilitate communication between the incident command command unit and the bridgehead yes but i'm i'm really asking you about sorry more wholesale
02:30:09 you about sorry more wholesale wholesale
02:30:10 wholesale um
02:30:12 um establishment of a chain of command at the major incident yes you can put you can put anyone once you set the talk group up you can then when you're briefing officers that are arriving at the incident to do specific command or functional role capacity
02:30:25 command or functional role capacity roles um
02:30:26 roles um you can you can tell them to switch their mainstream radio onto a particular channel and then they'll be in communication with you right now in fact
02:30:34 in fact let's focus on what happened in january 2013 on this topic um can we go to lfb 3050197
02:30:43 this is an email chain of january 2013 so
02:30:47 so during the inquest evidence but before the rule 43 recommendations came out in the march of that year and the subject matter here is is as you can see fire survival calls
02:30:59 survival calls now um if you go uh to um the email chain if you look at uh
02:31:08 uh the email from graeme ellis to neil withers and danielle cotton um in the second paragraph um
02:31:16 um graeme ellis says and you're not copied into this i i accept but let's see what you say he says i still think that we must ensure that the next generation of fire ground radios may present an opportunity to link into a main scheme
02:31:27 opportunity to link into a main scheme dedicated fsg talk channel las have handheld radios that they can use to communicate locally as well as on main schemes
02:31:35 schemes given that those three senior officers graham ellis neil withers and danny cotton uh reported to you at that time i think january 13th they did yes well you were
02:31:46 january 13th they did yes well you were made aware of the suggestion made by mr ellis here the ac ellis not specifically but i think the context of this email because of the reference to john anthony in the first sentence
02:31:59 to john anthony in the first sentence um just for might help the inquiry john anthony was a former assistant commissioner with the london fire brigade who was seconded on to the national
02:32:08 national radio project which was the project designed
02:32:11 designed to deliver a replacement for the airwave radio scheme which is a national trunk radio system and i suspect graham's reference there is that we need to
02:32:22 to obviously liaise with john who was representing not just london foreign i think he was representing fire services uh
02:32:29 uh within the region uh around the user specification for that replacement airwave system which from memory it was originally designed to be delivered and it's a government-led project it's not a local
02:32:40 government-led project it's not a local foreign fire service project was scheduled to be delivered in in the fiscal year 1516 2015-16 but as i understand it as of today it still
02:32:52 as i understand it as of today it still hasn't been delivered right was any consideration given to procuring this kind of dual purpose radio uh after the lachlan house inquest so after march 2013 uh no there wasn't why
02:33:04 after march 2013 uh no there wasn't why is that um i think uh obviously you've we've touched on the project that was in the ops
02:33:15 ops department's departmental plan which was looking at barry radios as i said i think that has developed into a replacement radio project more widely and we would have
02:33:26 project more widely and we would have been aware that the airwave radio was already programmed for a major upgrade in 2015 2015-16 and i say that is part of a national system that we're part of
02:33:37 of a national system that we're part of a national system so there wasn't alternative national radio systems at that time airwave was the national radio system for the emergency services so i'm not sure if we even if
02:33:48 services so i'm not sure if we even if we'd had gone to the market there was an alternative solution to what we already had
02:33:53 had i can't say that for sure but that that's my understanding which is why i think the government projects has run into so many difficulties because there isn't a lot of solutions in the market right i mean it looks from this email that the las the london ambulance
02:34:05 that the las the london ambulance services already had handheld radios that they could use it at incidents to communicate locally um
02:34:12 um why wasn't consideration given at that very time particularly particularly after the rule 43 recommendations have come from the coroner to do the same as the london ambulance service
02:34:23 ambulance service well they do a slightly different role to us but i accept the point you're making
02:34:27 making london ambulance service i believe are airwave users and i think they only use airwave radios i may be wrong but that's my understanding and we did have the capacity to use airwave as we've already discussed this
02:34:39 airwave as we've already discussed this morning
02:34:40 morning and it was my understanding that the senior officer communications training package responding to the rule 43 would have developed that opportunity and that capacity
02:34:52 capacity to to a greater degree than we've been using that system before but clearly it didn't develop that forward no my question is why not i i can't answer that because i didn't see that package
02:35:03 that because i didn't see that package if i had seen that package when i was working that would have certainly been raised by me and and we'd been investigating why it hadn't achieved what my understanding it was originally designed to achieve right
02:35:14 designed to achieve right now i want to turn to another topic which is or sub-topic which is poli lfb policy and guidance on whole-scale communication failures we've already looked in some detail at specific aspects
02:35:26 specific aspects of the lfb's communications setup as well as as well as the lfb's response to the lack of housing quests coroner's recommendations i want to ask you now about the general approach of the
02:35:37 about the general approach of the brigade
02:35:39 brigade and policy about communications on the incident ground um can we turn please first lfb triple zero eight one sorry eight nine one three nine
02:35:50 sorry eight nine one three nine this is policy number four eight eight on incident communications
02:35:57 uh you can see that it was issued on the 30th of january 2007 and reviewed as current on the 25th of may 2016 so after your time if we go to paragraph 1.1 on
02:36:08 your time if we go to paragraph 1.1 on page 2
02:36:09 page 2 you can see that it says introduction effective communications are the key to success a reliable communications network is essential for safe offering safe operation at incidents and
02:36:20 safe operation at incidents and fundamental for securing the level of command required to manage operational resources efficiently this policy procedure aims to standardize simplify and improve the setting up of
02:36:31 and improve the setting up of communications network at an incident uh
02:36:36 uh i mean first of all can i take it that you would agree with what is stated in the first sentence absolutely yes and second sentence yes yes uh do you agree that communications problems are likely to
02:36:48 communications problems are likely to occur uh or certainly at significant risk of occurring at larger or major incidents such as lack of house or indeed grenfell yes it's more likely that the larger
02:36:59 yes it's more likely that the larger more complex incidents yes yes and would it be fair to say that the amount of personnel and radio traffic at major incidents plays a role in the likelihood of communications problems arising at incidents of that kind yes i'd agree
02:37:10 incidents of that kind yes i'd agree with that
02:37:14 and it would follow i think also from that that it is at such incidents that communication across incident sectors would be particularly important yes indeed yeah now let's look at um lfb
02:37:27 indeed yeah now let's look at um lfb double zero one zero five four three six what i'm showing you is dac dominic ellis's second witness statement to the inquiry of the 6th of
02:37:38 statement to the inquiry of the 6th of march 2020. there's the first page can we go to page 4 please paragraph 13.
02:37:56 he says this
02:37:59 uh in response to question five of the request there are no policies which deal specifically and exclusively with communications failures i highlight below where a policy note refers to communications challenges which may
02:38:10 communications challenges which may arise in a particular operational context the lfb's future intention is to provide clearer guidance and training on steps which ought to be taken if communications issues are experienced
02:38:21 communications issues are experienced i'm currently not able to say at this juncture if that information will be generally in context or equipment specific
02:38:28 specific now i just want to focus on the word future there given that this this statement is dated march 2020 uh and therefore um
02:38:39 uh and therefore um very recently or relatively recently do you accept that during your tenure as dort
02:38:46 dort although policy 488 as we've seen it emphasized the importance of effective communications particularly at major incidents
02:38:55 incidents that you've accepted it doesn't offer crews any guidance on how to ensure the communications are and remain effective
02:39:04 i think there are elements of guidance in breeding operators policy and training relating to specific communications failures for ba crews
02:39:15 for ba crews because it's linked to emergency procedures but i accept that for fire ground radio and indeed airwave if we include that as a
02:39:24 a capability the training pack that was designed in response to the coroner's rule 43 was in my opinion and my understanding was going to deal with this particular
02:39:36 was going to deal with this particular issue and give officers and crews further guidance and clarification on what they should do and what options they had available to them if they experienced communication difficulty and
02:39:48 experienced communication difficulty and clearly from what you've shown me that package did not do that yeah the ba policy and training related to specific communications for ba is one thing i'm asking about policy 488 yes you accept
02:39:59 asking about policy 488 yes you accept there's nothing in there no no and nor anything in there about how to restore communications at an incident in the event that they're lost as indeed they were at lachnal and grenfell no
02:40:11 grenfell no now the evidence we've looked at today um
02:40:15 um would you accept shows that the lfb was aware of the limitations of its communications equipment and problems were common
02:40:25 i think we were alive to the fact that the equipment we had in place at that time you know like all communications even digital radio has its limitations mobile phones have their limitations i think we
02:40:37 phones have their limitations i think we were aware of those limitations we had procured before my time as director but since the rollout of the more modern uhf radios we'd
02:40:50 more modern uhf radios we'd procured
02:40:51 procured leaky feeder
02:40:54 repeaters both u8s and subsequently digital repeaters for the v8 telemetry boards um so yes we were aware
02:41:06 so yes we were aware what was the second part of the question sorry missed a minute uh well
02:41:10 uh well awareness that problems of communications at large were common limitations problems your word but there were limitations like your equipment there is a limitation on the equipment yes we
02:41:22 a limitation on the equipment yes we were aware the limitations of the equipment yes and and can we take it that your directorate didn't take any steps at any stage to provide an overarching communications policy or guidance on communications for
02:41:33 policy or guidance on communications for operational crews so that they would be equipped to deal with communications problems on the incident ground beyond what i've said about the intention of the two case studies or
02:41:44 intention of the two case studies or training packs in response to the coroner's rule 43 no we didn't no and why was that um
02:41:53 i believe because when i was director of the latino house post incident period was focused and obviously commerce was one of the key issues
02:42:02 issues that i believe personally that if we delivered a high quality training package
02:42:08 package in response to that rule 43 that we would have be addressing the issues that you've just described in terms of there was a lack of specific policy guidance for cruz
02:42:20 for cruz to know what to do in the event of communication failure yes why wasn't that done after the latin house fire or specifically after the rule 43 in response to it
02:42:31 rule 43 in response to it that's the first time i've seen the content of that training so i you know i'm disappointed but i can't answer that i'm afraid thank you now we've also seen that the lfb had also seen the rule 43
02:42:43 that the lfb had also seen the rule 43 recommendations relating to the shirley towers fire uh in april 2010 report of april 2013. yes and we've seen that that was circulated i think within the operational procedures department
02:42:55 operational procedures department uh in october 2012. yes um
02:43:00 yes um just to be clear let me show you a document make that good lfb double zero one double zero three zero six
02:43:10 uh this is an email um
02:43:16 from peter come up to jimmy court and others including andy rowe and james knighton 8th of october 2012 draft ap ap for matters arising from
02:43:29 draft ap ap for matters arising from shirley towers that's the subject matter and
02:43:33 and it it says um dear all please see email below and attached draft action plan for op
02:43:39 op regarding issues arising from the shirley towers incident which occurred in southampton in april 2010 and below that you can see there's an email from peter carrup to you and danny cotton and dr bevan
02:43:52 which i think we saw before yep uh attaching the first draft initial first draft review uh
02:43:59 uh if we go to that it's lfb double zero one double zero three zero seven
02:44:11 no there's a draft action plan we have to open it up if we go to the native
02:44:21 this may take a second or two
02:44:44 bear with me these documents take a little time to load
02:45:06 excuse me
02:45:11 no thank you now if we scroll down please to row 49 uh i'm going to just if you're familiar with this document because you were part of the email chain we saw would that be
02:45:22 of the email chain we saw would that be fair um
02:45:25 fair um well familiar as you can be given the lapse of time yes
02:45:30 yes if we go down to row 49 item 23 ops procedures review definition of prolonged radio communication breakdown in relevant
02:45:41 communication breakdown in relevant procedures training materials etc and then in column d gm a court lead officer you see that yes i say that what work was done can you tell us in relation to that action point
02:45:54 relation to that action point um
02:45:55 um i i don't know to be honest um you don't know what i mean do you know why you don't know well jim mccourt didn't report directly to me he would have reported to a deputy
02:46:06 to me he would have reported to a deputy assistant commissioner who then would have reported to the head of service who that that person would have reported to me so
02:46:13 me so um
02:46:14 um i don't think i'd have seen a detailed response to this even if there is one right looking at more at it more widely during your tenure as director of operational
02:46:25 your tenure as director of operational resilience and training to what extent if at all did the lfb seek to learn lessons from communications incidents beyond fire and rescue services for example terrorist attacks
02:46:36 example terrorist attacks in the uk and abroad
02:46:40 i'll take that in two parts so the international issue uh london fire brigade did not have any processes procedures or governance in place to learn from international events
02:46:52 place to learn from international events irrespective whether it's communication or fires or whatever we would rely on a government lead department or possibly seafarer chief fire and rescue officers association to
02:47:04 officers association to provide guidance uh or to raise issues with
02:47:07 with individual fire and rescue services that was typically how the international context was relayed to brigades in terms of uk based incidents
02:47:19 of uk based incidents again
02:47:20 again a bit like shirley towers if if there was reports available um we would typically uh i suspect we would have got people to read them who it was sort of
02:47:31 people to read them who it was sort of covering those areas of responsibility within our service and then if issues needed to come forward a bit like this one there would be a kind of a proposed action plan with
02:47:42 be a kind of a proposed action plan with lead officers allocated and then we'd have expected that work to be progressed right you said in the start of that last answer that
02:47:53 the start of that last answer that uh the lfb had no processes procedural governance in place to learn from international events irrespective of whether it's communication or fires why is that why why so insular mr reason
02:48:07 why is that why why so insular mr reason um
02:48:11 i think
02:48:14 the difficulty with international fires is
02:48:17 is one obviously we don't always get notified if they're not on the news there is no mechanism i don't think unless government tell us uh that they've happened that's the first point the the second point
02:48:28 the the second point which is a real issue is
02:48:30 issue is the regulatory regimes in place in a in a foreign country or a different country in terms of the built environment may be very different to the uh
02:48:41 very different to the uh environment you know the legislative environment in the uk and also
02:48:45 and also the way fire and rescue services respond both in terms of their capability and their policies may not align to sort of uk fire and rescue service
02:48:58 sort of uk fire and rescue service national doctrine so whilst i'm not saying there isn't any opportunity to learn from international fires it wasn't something that we did in my time and i don't even think
02:49:10 did in my time and i don't even think they do it now as i understand it to what extent if at all did the lfb seek to learn lessons from other risk critical industries in the uk
02:49:22 industries in the uk um i don't think we did and again why is that again probably context i'm not saying there isn't any lessons to learn and probably capacity really um
02:49:34 to learn and probably capacity really um you know we're a big organization but we haven't got uh limitless resources and as you can see i think you can see from all the work we do there's a lot going on it's a complex
02:49:45 there's a lot going on it's a complex large organization and
02:49:49 and we probably wouldn't have the capacity even if we wanted to unless we were going to take a policy direction corporately to to start looking at other organizations i don't think it was something that we ever considered
02:50:00 something that we ever considered actively during my time um and that's about as best as i can give and
02:50:08 and finally to what extent if at all did the lfe give consideration to other governmental or national guidance documents when when formulating its communications infrastructure and policies
02:50:20 infrastructure and policies uh if there was national guidance uh as we've touched on things like intrinsic safety we would be we'd be minded to be guided by
02:50:29 guided by uh what the industry you know fire service industry or government departments are putting out as guidance we'd be minded to
02:50:37 minded to stick within those guidelines um but again not not looking at other industries to use this example communications infrastructure obviously we work closely with other blue light responders and in
02:50:49 with other blue light responders and in london they predominantly use airwave radio which we did obviously have capability and access to now i have some final questions for you mr reason um
02:51:00 mr reason um on or as at the 14th of june 2017 you had left the lfb some two and a half years earlier yes when you first heard the news and you saw the images of the fire
02:51:10 fire what was your immediate reaction
02:51:14 uh just to give it context i i was woken up to be told there was a major fire in london um
02:51:20 london um and i put the television on and i saw those awful pictures and i was just shocked that that could happen
02:51:30 happen in london but in the uk fire and rescue service
02:51:33 service and i just could not imagine how that fire had occurred and how significant it had become and obviously i didn't know then about the rapid fire spread but just looking at the images
02:51:45 spread but just looking at the images and this would have been about uh 5 30
02:51:48 uh 5 30 uh you know in the morning of the morning that the fire started uh it was truly shocking and it still shocks me now did you ask yourself in that moment what might have gone wrong yes of course i you know
02:52:00 yes of course i you know in preparing for this i've done a huge amount of work for this because i care and uh
02:52:06 and uh you know of course that immediately my first thought is you know i mean this is going to be really bad for the families and people that are in that tower possibly there could be firefighter fatalities in fact that
02:52:18 firefighter fatalities in fact that i thought that had happened because of the sort of ticker tape update at the bottom said brigade's confirmed fatalities and i i assumed it would be casualties in the tower but also maybe firefighters so that was shocking
02:52:30 that was shocking um
02:52:31 um but yeah the whole of course it you you question yourself you know what have i done as a professional fire officer how would i dealt with that incident and obviously i only could see the images i didn't know the story at that point
02:52:43 i didn't know the story at that point but of course as a professional fire officer it never leaves you that sense of duty and commitment and responsibility that for the level i held in the organization of course you know i did start to think
02:52:55 course you know i did start to think you know should we have known about that uh i didn't think that immediately because i didn't know the context uh you know like cladding and rain screen cladding and all the things that have come out subsequently but
02:53:06 come out subsequently but yeah it never leaves you as a professional fire officer did you think to yourself that this was a one-off fire that was completely unpredicted and for which the lfb could never reasonably be prepared
02:53:18 never reasonably be prepared i i don't think i felt that straight away but certainly you know you know i went back to assist the london fire gate with this internal investigation but once i started to understand a little bit more about you know what had
02:53:29 bit more about you know what had happened and the sequence of events i could have never imagined i can repeat what i said before i could have never imagined a fire on that scale and then understanding how the building
02:53:41 and then understanding how the building by the time i'd seen it you know at 5 30 in the morning how it managed to look like that and how it'd be so catastrophically damaged by fire i i don't think in my whole professional
02:53:52 i don't think in my whole professional career not just when i was director i could have imagined that a fire on that scale
02:53:57 scale with that tragic outcomes could have happened in the uk did you look back on your own time as director of operations resilience and training and ask yourself what you could have done in that position
02:54:09 have done in that position better to prepare the lfb for a response to the grenfell tower fire absolutely i mean you know the scale of the tragedy is just off you know on a different level than i've ever
02:54:20 know on a different level than i've ever experienced and of course you ask yourself those questions because we all do this job because we care and we want to make a difference and you know
02:54:30 you know i've been very hard in scrutinizing my performance both assistant commissioner and director but i honestly you know i'm not complacent and i'm i'm
02:54:41 you know i'm not complacent and i'm i'm certainly not being intensive to the families but i just could never have imagined a fire in that scout and answering the question you say you did ask yourself are you able to identify anything that you could and or
02:54:52 identify anything that you could and or should have done which almost two and a half years on would have better equipped the incident commander at grenfell tower with the benefit of hindsight you're always going to do
02:55:03 always going to do things you always learn from every incident that i've ever been to of you know of any reasonable scale i can honestly say there's always things to learn but is there one thing that i think i could
02:55:15 is there one thing that i think i could have done
02:55:17 have done i honestly don't think anyone in the british fire service at that point in 2017 could have you know dealt with a fire on that scale
02:55:31 well uh mr reason thank you those are all the questions i have for you uh at this point there may be others that those uh who are assisting me have and others uh watching may have for you
02:55:42 and others uh watching may have for you so i'm going to ask the chairman now to take the usual end of questions break yes uh before we come back well as you probably know mr reason when we when council gets to the end of his prepared questions we always have a
02:55:55 prepared questions we always have a a break
02:55:56 a break both to give him a chance to ensure that he hasn't overlooked anything and also to give others who are following these proceedings from elsewhere a chance to suggest questions that perhaps ought to be put to you arising out of your evidence so we'll
02:56:09 arising out of your evidence so we'll break now until ten to one i think okay and uh we'll come back at ten to one and see if there are any more questions for you then thank you and in the meantime of course please don't talk to anyone about your
02:56:20 please don't talk to anyone about your evidence absolutely right thank you very much would you give the usher then please
02:56:36 thank you ten to one then mr militia thank you
03:09:17 yes would you ask us to reason to come back in please
03:09:28 right that's the reason well we'll now see what the position is on further questions yes thank you yes mr chairman um we've had something of a flush of uh of questions for mr reason which um to be fair to him
03:09:39 be fair to him uh i think it's appropriate that we go and consider a little bit more maturely um given that we don't have a witness this afternoon you know we're not going to be starting um
03:09:49 um ac daily until tomorrow morning uh it would probably be better if i was to ask you to rise now until two o'clock if that's not inconvenient uh to mr reason and then deal with those further
03:10:00 and then deal with those further questions at two o'clock well uh this reason i hope you didn't have anything planned for the early afternoon i don't know
03:10:07 know i thought you probably hadn't so it sounds to me as though it would be much more satisfactory if we took just a little bit longer than we might normally expect to to deal with the additional questions now mr minute um
03:10:19 questions now mr minute um i know you're very happy to work over lunch but you do need time to get some lunch as well as to others so um is
03:10:27 so um is the ten minutes that you were going to get between nine and one o'clock enough or would you like to resume a little later than usual say 2 15. no 2 o'clock is fine you're sure yes i'm going to do two things at once
03:10:39 i'm going to do two things at once for once right well there we are mr reason we'll we'll break now i'm sorry we're going to keep you hanging on okay on this basis but i don't think there's really any sensible alternatives so
03:10:50 alternatives so we'll rise now we'll resume at two o'clock and then we'll see how the land lies all right thank you thank you very much
03:11:05 right mr miller well um there it is we'll we'll sit at two o'clock unless you send
03:11:10 you send us a message that you do like uh would like to have some more time that's very good mr chairman if you do i'll let you know you'll be very amenable to that request thank you very much good all right thank you very much
03:11:21 much good all right thank you very much two o'clock