Opening statements from BRE (Building Research Establishment) and Siderise for Module 2. BRE explains its role as test house, expresses 'concern and dismay' at Celotex and Kingspan disclosures about misleading test information. Siderise defends its cavity barrier testing and marketing, notes it warned Harley about 'weak link for fire' at window head.
00:00:14 [clears throat]
00:00:16 Well, at this point I'm going to call upon Miss Leak, Queen's Council, to address us on behalf of the BRE. Now, are you there, Miss Leak? I am, sir. Thank you. Well, at the
00:00:27 I am, sir. Thank you. Well, at the moment you're not on my screen, I'm afraid.
00:00:31 afraid. Am I on your Ah, you are now. That's all right. So, I can see and hear you. Can you hear and see me? I can. Thank you, sir. And Mrs. Tong as well, I hope. Right. Well, when you're ready, then off you
00:00:42 Well, when you're ready, then off you go. Thank you. Thank Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Panel members,
00:00:49 members, BR welcomes the public scrutiny in this inquiry of the events that led to the fatal fire at Grenell Tower. BRE wishes to express again its deepest sympathies to all of those affected by
00:01:01 sympathies to all of those affected by the tragic events which occurred. BRE recognizes the distress that both the fire and this scrutiny bring to the bereaveved survivors and residents and
00:01:12 bereaveved survivors and residents and would like me publicly to acknowledge their and their legal team's assistance to the inquiry. BRE2 remains ready to assist in this module and beyond to establish the facts of what happened at
00:01:24 establish the facts of what happened at Grenell Tower and to establish necessary action to prevent a similar tragedy from happening. In this brief oral opening, which supplements BR's written opening, I will
00:01:36 supplements BR's written opening, I will address four issues. But before I do so, BR would like it to be noted that prior to the tragic fire at Grenell Tower, it had no involvement in assessing the safety of the cladding systems installed
00:01:48 safety of the cladding systems installed onto the tower. Its knowledge of those systems is derived from its after theevent assistance to government and from evidence submitted to this inquiry.
00:01:59 from evidence submitted to this inquiry. The four issues are as follows. First, what is B? Second, the cladding systems installed onto Grenle Tower. Third, an overview of how BRE and its witnesses
00:02:12 overview of how BRE and its witnesses may assist in this module and beyond. And fourth, a brief comment on the disclosures made during this inquiry by both Celotex and Kingspan.
00:02:23 both Celotex and Kingspan. Turning to the first issue, what is BRE? Bri is a multi-disciplinary building science center with a mission to improve buildings and infrastructure through
00:02:34 buildings and infrastructure through research and the generation of knowledge.
00:02:45 Sir, I think we got disconnected there for a moment. We did for a moment, I'm afraid. Um, why why don't you start that point again? Then we'll have make sure we got everything on the transcript.
00:02:57 everything on the transcript. Sir, since its founding in 1921, BRE has striven to make a positive difference in the built environment for the health and safety of all of us who live and work in and otherwise use that
00:03:10 live and work in and otherwise use that environment. It is a profit forpurpose organization owned by a charitable trust. Surplus income is used to fund new research and education programs
00:03:21 new research and education programs designed to meet the aims of promoting safety and sustainability. One of BR's functions is that of a testing house. In that capacity, BR is
00:03:34 testing house. In that capacity, BR is engaged by test sponsors to test, for example, products or systems for use in the building industry. Tests are carried out using established methodologies and measured against
00:03:47 methodologies and measured against published standards. As other core participants have already stated in opening, the published standard relevant to the cladding systems installed on Grenell Tower is
00:03:58 systems installed on Grenell Tower is BR135
00:04:00 BR135 and the relevant test methodology is BS8414
00:04:04 BS8414 part 1. A cladding system tested using the BS8414 part one methodology that meets the criteria in BR135
00:04:15 meets the criteria in BR135 is said to have achieved classification. Essentially B is engaged by a manufacturer or supplier of a cladding product or
00:04:26 supplier of a cladding product or system.
00:04:27 system. That test sponsor constructs a cladding system known as a test rig at BR's test site.
00:04:37 site. BR's technicians set fire to the test rig. They observe and record how the test rig reacts to the fire. The data generated is assessed against the
00:04:48 generated is assessed against the criteria BR135 and only if the TE tested cladding system meets those criteria will a classification report be produced. If
00:05:00 classification report be produced. If the test sponsor asks for one, the result is a binary pass fail for that specific system. The test sponsor may then use that
00:05:12 The test sponsor may then use that classification report to evidence that the specific system tested adheres to the fire safety requirements in building regulations approved document B.
00:05:24 regulations approved document B. If components are substituted, altered or moved, it is no longer the same system. So the classification report does not apply
00:05:37 report does not apply in this opening. It is also pertinent to state what BRE does not do due to misapprehensions in some core participants opening statements.
00:05:49 participants opening statements. BR is not a regulator and does not fulfill the function of a building control authority. It has no mandate, role or authority to
00:06:00 It has no mandate, role or authority to monitor what manufacturers and suppliers do with their test and classification reports and has no oversight as to how they are used to fulfill their
00:06:11 they are used to fulfill their obligations under building regulations. B's function is that of a test house in short to burn systems and products and assess how they perform.
00:06:24 assess how they perform. The second issue is the cladding systems installed onto Grenell Tower. It is B's considered opinion that a fire test to classify to BRE135
00:06:36 test to classify to BRE135 as just described would have been the only available route to ascertain whether these cladding systems were safe. These systems were combustible. So the linear route under approved document
00:06:49 the linear route under approved document B was not available. An extended field of application by means of a desktop study was not available either as these systems were not similar to the systems
00:07:01 systems were not similar to the systems that had been classified to BR 135. There was no similar safe application to extend.
00:07:11 extend. The only possible other alternative route i.e. A fire engineering assessment would also be unsuitable due to the lack of the apparent lack of robust relevant
00:07:22 of the apparent lack of robust relevant evidence and information upon which to carry out the assessment. Before installing the cladding onto Grenful Tower, at least one company involved with the manufacturer, sale or
00:07:34 involved with the manufacturer, sale or installation of the cladding should have engaged a test house such as BR to test those systems in a fire test. None of them did so. After the tragic events at
00:07:45 them did so. After the tragic events at Granful Tower, BR provided assistance to the then Department for Communities and Local Government to identify the types of aluminium composite materials that were and are installed on many other
00:07:58 were and are installed on many other blocks of flats across the UK and how they would perform when tested in combination with different types of insulation. In addition, BRE provided technical support to the Metropolitan Police
00:08:09 support to the Metropolitan Police Service investigation into the fire to help ascertain how the how the fire developed and spread in the way that it did. BR's assistance established that the two cladding systems on Granful
00:08:21 the two cladding systems on Granful Tower, one incorporating RS Celletex RS5000
00:08:26 RS5000 and one incorporating Kingspan K15 insulation in combination with polyethylene cord aluminium composite material fail against BR135.
00:08:38 material fail against BR135. It was shown that had any of the companies involved with the manufacturer supply and use of those systems engaged a test house, it is highly unlikely that the fatal fire would have spread as it
00:08:49 the fatal fire would have spread as it did. The facts now known about these cladding systems are shocking. The bereaveved survivors and residents and indeed society at large are entitled to
00:09:00 indeed society at large are entitled to an explanation as to why those unsafe cladding systems were installed onto Grenell Tower. They are also entitled to a proper explanation about the compliance regime
00:09:11 explanation about the compliance regime that should have been followed. Resolute scrutiny of the companies and individuals who did not follow it and an analysis as to how the failures identified by this inquiry came about.
00:09:23 identified by this inquiry came about. Issue three, the RE's witnesses and assistance to the inquiry. The Rh was not a core participant in phase one. As a core participant in phase two, BRE is committed to assisting
00:09:36 phase two, BRE is committed to assisting the inquiry with its investigation as it assisted the police and government and to contributing to lessons that can be learned so that the tragedy of 14th of June 2017 is never repeated.
00:09:49 June 2017 is never repeated. In this module two of phase 2, three of BR's employees, current and former, will give evidence to assist with these issues.
00:09:57 issues. Tony Baker, who will be giving evidence on the 15th of December, is BR's fire resistance laboratory manager and co-author of the current edition of the BR135 standard, which is a standard that
00:10:10 BR135 standard, which is a standard that was funded by the BRE trust [clears throat] is in a position to explain among other things. First of all, BR's role as a testing laboratory accredited by the UK
00:10:22 testing laboratory accredited by the UK accredititation service. Second, the classification process that should have been followed for the cladding systems installed on Granful Tower.
00:10:33 Tower. Third, the limitations of any individual classification report. Fourth, the relevance or more accurately the irrelevance of the tests carried out
00:10:45 the irrelevance of the tests carried out on behalf of Kingspan and Celotex to the question of whether the cladding systems in fact installed on Grenell Tower were safe.
00:10:53 safe. And finally, the difference between classification and certification, in particular, that classification services could not reasonably be taken to include the provision of consultancy
00:11:05 to include the provision of consultancy advice.
00:11:07 advice. Mr. Baker is also able to insist the inquiry the broader legislative regime within which B operates, BR's role within that regime, and the
00:11:18 BR's role within that regime, and the part played by the provision of classification services. He will also be able to clarify apparent misapprehensions raised in some opening submissions about BR's role and
00:11:29 submissions about BR's role and functions. Further, if called upon to do so in this module, Mr. Baker can comment on matters exposed by the witness evidence of other core participants about a lack of
00:11:41 core participants about a lack of understanding about the meaning and significance of classification to BR135 and apparent poor indust industry practice that the facts now reveal.
00:11:53 practice that the facts now reveal. Two former employees of BR will also be giving evidence in this module. Steven Howard and Phil Clark who too may be able to assist with these matters.
00:12:05 able to assist with these matters. Issue four, disclosures made by Celletex and Kingspan. Sir BR wishes to express its concern and dismay about the disclosures from both
00:12:17 dismay about the disclosures from both Celotex and Kingspan in respect of misleading information provided to B about components in cladding systems tested on their behalf. The classification process relies on
00:12:30 The classification process relies on accurate information being provided by test sponsors. B classification reports clearly state and I quote, "This classification is
00:12:42 and I quote, "This classification is valid only for the system as installed and detailed. Test sponsors are contractually obliged to provide accurate information during the testing and classification process.
00:12:55 the testing and classification process. It is now known that Celletex intentionally misled BR about the components that comprised its test rig on the 2nd of May 2014.
00:13:06 on the 2nd of May 2014. Celletex intentionally procured and used a classification report in the knowledge that it was inaccurate. The RE is deeply troubled by this. BRE welcomes Celotex's acknowledgement
00:13:18 BRE welcomes Celotex's acknowledgement by Craig Our Queen's Council during his oral opening on the 5th of November that these events involved unacceptable conduct on the part of Celotex's former employees and that the components to be
00:13:31 employees and that the components to be tested should have been accurately reported.
00:13:35 reported. Turning to Kingspan, BR received from Kingspan a letter dated the 23rd of October 2020. Kingspan informed BR that a test carried
00:13:46 Kingspan informed BR that a test carried out in 2005 used what is now being referred to as old technology K15. There is nothing wrong with that.
00:13:57 There is nothing wrong with that. Further, there was nothing wrong contrary to what is said by other core participants with a classification report concerning that test being produced by B 10 years later.
00:14:09 produced by B 10 years later. classification was achieved as a matter of fact [clears throat] as BR's Mr. Baker can explain. Nonetheless, in light of Kingspan's disclosure, BR now questions the motives
00:14:22 disclosure, BR now questions the motives behind Kingspan procuring a classification report 10 years after the event and 9 years after the so-called new technology K15 was introduced.
00:14:34 new technology K15 was introduced. Kingspan knew or ought to have known that the classification report did not apply to the K15 product on the market. The letter also informed BR first of
00:14:48 The letter also informed BR first of other accuracies in the way in which King Bratton described components and second that two other tests carried out in 2014 used K15 that was not
00:14:59 in 2014 used K15 that was not representative of what was being sold to the market. BRE is actively considering the implications of Kingspan's very recent disclosures.
00:15:10 disclosures. Although the Celotex and Kingspan cladding systems that did achieve classification are markedly different from those installed onto Grenville Tower. So that these classification reports tell us
00:15:23 these classification reports tell us nothing about the safety on GR of those on Granville Tower. The conduct of these companies is alarming. BRE welcomes this inquiry's scrutiny of the conduct of these companies. The
00:15:35 the conduct of these companies. The lessons that can be learned from that scrutiny and the assessment of whether the legal, contractual or ethical failures of these companies demonstrate a need for the regulatory regime to be
00:15:46 a need for the regulatory regime to be reformed.
00:15:48 reformed. In conclusion, BRE used its knowledge to assist government in the immediate aftermath of the fire. It is committed to assisting the inquiry in its endeavor
00:15:59 to assisting the inquiry in its endeavor to establish the facts and to make recommendations as to practical and achievable measures which can be taken to avoid such a tragedy ever happening again and to learn broader lessons as to
00:16:12 again and to learn broader lessons as to how to ensure a healthy and safe built environment for us all. Thank you sir. Thank you very much Mr. Lee. Um well now the next speaker [clears throat] is Mr.
00:16:25 the next speaker [clears throat] is Mr. Campbell, Queens Council, who is going to address us on behalf of Ciderize. Um, he was expecting, I think, not to be called on until half past 2, but I see you're there, Mr. Campbell. Is that
00:16:37 you're there, Mr. Campbell. Is that right?
00:16:38 right? I am, sir. Yes. And are you ready? You can hear me? Are you ready? Yes, I can hear you. Thank you. And I can see you. Are you ready to go? I am, sir. Yes. Well, then we'll hear from you straight away if that's convenient.
00:16:49 away if that's convenient. It is convenient, sir. and Sidrise is grateful for this opportunity to make an opening statement which will be uh relatively brief. Uh so this is the
00:17:00 relatively brief. Uh so this is the first occasion on which Sidrise has made an oral statement to the inquiry and therefore may I take this opportunity on behalf of Sidrise and its employees to extend their very deepest sympathy to
00:17:12 extend their very deepest sympathy to the families of all those who lost their lives as a result of the devastating fire at Grrenful Tower and to everyone who was affected by the tragedy. Sidrise supports the vitally important
00:17:23 Sidrise supports the vitally important work of the inquiry and will do all that it can to assist. So there there are three areas that I'd like to cover in this opening statement. The the first is the testing and
00:17:34 The the first is the testing and certification of Sidris's cavity barriers.
00:17:38 barriers. The second is the marketing of the cavity barriers and the third is the advice provided by Sidrise to Harley. Can I turn then to the first of those
00:17:50 Can I turn then to the first of those topics which is the testing and certification of Sidris's cavity barriers.
00:17:57 barriers. The cavity barriers were made from a non-combustible stonewall material known as lamela which has been certified as achieving an A1 fire rating. It's clear from the evidence that the
00:18:08 It's clear from the evidence that the inquiry has heard that significant errors were made in the installation of the cavity barriers and it's also clear that there were failures in the cavity barrier strategy. Perhaps most importantly the failure to place cavity
00:18:20 importantly the failure to place cavity barriers around windows. However, the cavity barriers as individual components were subject to the correct tests and were correctly certified. The cavity barriers as
00:18:32 certified. The cavity barriers as products we would submit were not non-compliant. It's necessary to descend to some detail to make good that point, but I hope not too much detail.
00:18:45 too much detail. Can I turn first to the horizontal or open state cavity barriers which were tested to the principles of BS476 part 20. Part 20 being the most
00:18:56 part 20. Part 20 being the most applicable part of BS476.
00:19:00 The BS476 part 20 test procedure was not entirely suitable for an open state cavity barrier with an intent strip. With an open state cavity barrier, there
00:19:11 With an open state cavity barrier, there has of necessity to be an air gap along one side of the barrier at the start of the test and the presence of that gap results in an automatic failure of the
00:19:22 results in an automatic failure of the integrity criteria of the BS476 part 20 test.
00:19:28 test. However, subject to that limitation of the BS476 test procedure, the horizontal cavity barriers were tested to and met BS476 part 20. In particular, the
00:19:41 BS476 part 20. In particular, the horizontal cavity barriers were demonstrated as meeting the requirement within table A1 of ADB of having at least 30 minutes integrity and 15 minutes insulation.
00:19:55 Recognizing that the BS476 test procedure was not entirely suitable for an openstate cavity barrier, in 2014, the Association for Specialist Fire
00:20:06 the Association for Specialist Fire Protection or ASFP produced a bespoke test for open state cavity barriers known as technical guidance document or TGD19.
00:20:18 guidance document or TGD19. Siderise's horizontal cavity barriers were tested to and met the requirements of that new test TGD19.
00:20:26 In December 2014, Sidrise arranged a meeting with Dr. Lane and Charlotte Robin of Arab to discuss amongst other things the fact that there was no entirely suitable BS or EN test for an
00:20:38 entirely suitable BS or EN test for an open state cavity bar. It was agreed that TGD19, whilst not perfect, was a good step forward as a suitable test for an open state cavity barrier.
00:20:51 state cavity barrier. Some criticism is made by BSR team one in their written submissions that the testing of the open state cavity barriers was undertaken between concrete lintils which is not representative of a
00:21:04 lintils which is not representative of a rainscreen cladding system. However, that criticism is with respect to them misplaced. and doesn't properly take into account the distinction between component tests and systems
00:21:16 between component tests and systems tests.
00:21:17 tests. It's standard practice in a test under either BS476 part 20 or TGD19 for the cavity barrier to be tested between concrete lintils. The test
00:21:29 between concrete lintils. The test procedure for TGD19 makes that clear. The purpose of such a component or product test is to demonstrate the integrity and insulation of the cavity barrier itself, not to test the fire
00:21:42 barrier itself, not to test the fire resistance of other materials that may be used in the construction. If the test was carried out with the cavity barrier next to material that was not inert, there would be lack of clarity as to whether fire resistance or
00:21:54 clarity as to whether fire resistance or lack of it came from the cavity barrier or the other component. The BS476 part 20 or TGD19 tests are not intended to be a an equivalent to or a
00:22:07 intended to be a an equivalent to or a substitute for a fullscale BS8414 test.
00:22:12 test. Although they're not a substitute for an 8414 test, they are nevertheless valuable and provide evidence for the elemental performance of the component. Table one, sorry, table A1 of ADB refers
00:22:24 Table one, sorry, table A1 of ADB refers to the fire resistance of elements being tested pursuant to the relevant part of BS476
00:22:30 BS476 and thus effectively recommends that manufacturers test their products to the relevant part of BS476. There was also industry guidance for example from the center for window and
00:22:42 example from the center for window and cladding technology the CWCT that cavity barriers should be tested to the principles of BS476 part 20. Therefore, we submit Sidrise should not
00:22:54 Therefore, we submit Sidrise should not be criticized for having tested the cavity barriers to BS476 part 20 and then TGD19 and making clear to customers that they had done so they were the correct um
00:23:05 had done so they were the correct um product or component tests. Turning very briefly to the vertical cavity barriers, they were tested to and demonstrated compliance to EN1366
00:23:16 demonstrated compliance to EN1366 part 4. As with a BS476 test, it's standard practice for a test under EN1366
00:23:24 EN1366 part 4 for the test to be undertaken between concrete lintils. As the standard itself makes clear, the vertical cavity barriers were thus as components also tested and certified
00:23:36 as components also tested and certified to the appropriate standard.
00:23:41 Can I then turn to my second topic um which is the marketing of the cavity barriers?
00:23:48 barriers? Criticism is made of Sidrise by BSR team 1 and by Mr. Hyatt that Sidrise wrongly marketed its products as being suitable for use in raincreen cladding systems.
00:24:02 for use in raincreen cladding systems. There are a number of points I [clears throat] wish to make in relation to that criticism. The first is that Sidrise were and continue to be strong advocates of BS8414
00:24:12 BS8414 testing.
00:24:14 testing. As far as Sidris is aware, a BS8414 test incorporating ACM panels had not been undertaken by anyone prior to 2016.
00:24:25 been undertaken by anyone prior to 2016. That was a collective failure by the construction industry. Siderise had drawn attention to the value of system testing pursuant to BS8414
00:24:37 BS8414 at a conference it hosted in 2012 attended among others by representatives of the BR ARP and Harley
00:24:50 at that conference. side stated that it was keen to test to BS8414 and asked for a cladding partner to come forward to participate in such a test. But unfortunately,
00:25:01 unfortunately, excuse me, no one did. However, if used with appropriate panels and insulation, Sidris's cavity barriers are suitable for use in a raincreen cladding system. Since the fire at
00:25:14 cladding system. Since the fire at Granful Tower, there have been several full-scale 8414 tests which have involved metal rainscreen components in conjunction with siderise cavity barriers and which have passed.
00:25:25 barriers and which have passed. Where the tests have failed, it has not been because of the performance of the cavity barrier. Examples of such tests include those undertaken by the B in 2017 on the
00:25:37 undertaken by the B in 2017 on the instructions of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. Those tests were all undertaken by the BR with cavity barriers supplied by Sidrise.
00:25:49 cavity barriers supplied by Sidrise. Further examples of positive 8414 tests using Sidrise cavity barriers are given in the witness statement of Steven Swales, Sidris's chief commercial officer.
00:26:00 officer. Clearly, therefore, with the right components, it is very possible to design a metal raincreen system with siderises cavity barriers that will pass a BS8414
00:26:10 a BS8414 test.
00:26:12 test. By marketing their cavity barriers as being suitable for raincreens, side were certainly not suggesting or representing representing sorry that their cavity barriers were suitable for any set of
00:26:24 barriers were suitable for any set of components regardless of the fire resistance of the panels or insulation. To put the same point another way, by marketing its cavity barriers as suitable for raincreen systems, side
00:26:36 suitable for raincreen systems, side were not in any way indicating to their customers or to designers that there was no need to consider whether the rainscreen system as a whole was compliant with ADB or the building regulations. It was plainly incumbent on
00:26:49 regulations. It was plainly incumbent on the designers of a rainscreen cladding system to make that assessment for themselves.
00:26:57 Can I turn then sir to the third and final topic I wish to cover which is the advice provided by Sidrise. Siderise had no involvement in the overall design or specification of the
00:27:09 overall design or specification of the cladding system and wasn't involved in the installation of the cavity barriers. Siderise was first contacted in relation to the granful refurbishment project by
00:27:20 to the granful refurbishment project by Kevin Lamb on or about the 3rd of March 2015.
00:27:25 2015. On the third, excuse me, on the 3rd of March 2015, Mr. Lamb sent specification notes for the marine scheme cladding to Sidrise indicating the use of side firs
00:27:39 involvement in the production of that specification. It was not involved in the selection of the other materials for use in the facade, nor would it expect to be. The information provided to side was
00:27:51 information provided to side was limited. for example, it had no information as to the type of insulation to be installed. During the course of the refurbishment, siders were, as you know, sir, from the
00:28:02 siders were, as you know, sir, from the evidence you've heard in module one, asked by Harley to advise on a number of issues relating to the cavity barriers. However, that advice was sought in relation to specific issues. Sidrise
00:28:15 relation to specific issues. Sidrise were not asked to provide general advice in relation to the cavalry barriers and Sidrise's limited role was acknowledged by Kevin Lamb in his evidence in module one. In particular,
00:28:27 evidence in module one. In particular, he stated that he would not have expected Sidrise to comment on the positioning of cavity barriers unless specifically asked to do so. And when asked whether he took advice from
00:28:38 asked whether he took advice from Sidrise as to the position of the cavity barriers, Mr. Lamb's answer was, and I quote, "No, not at all." And consistent with that, when Mr. Mort's weak link for fire email was put to him, Mr. Lamb
00:28:51 fire email was put to him, Mr. Lamb commented, and again, I quote, "But don't forget, this is a comment from a subcontractor or a supplier, but wasn't necessarily in full knowledge of the circumstances."
00:29:04 Neither Harley nor anyone else asked for advice on how to install the cavity barriers.
00:29:10 barriers. BSR team 2 suggested in its written opening that side should have provided greater support to Harley in relation to the installation of the cavity barriers.
00:29:21 the installation of the cavity barriers. Siderise, for probably obvious reasons, would certainly much prefer it if its products were installed and used correctly. However, there's a limit to what Sidrise as a supplier can
00:29:32 what Sidrise as a supplier can practically do. Siderise would have provided such support to Harley if it had been requested, but it wasn't requested.
00:29:42 Mr. Mort and Mr. K of Sydrise will give evidence in module two, and I will not now seek to anticipate all the issues that may be raised with them. However, there's two issues I want to touch on
00:29:54 there's two issues I want to touch on very briefly. The first is the lack of cavity barriers around the windows. Sidris's data sheets specifically refer to the requirement within ADB for cavity
00:30:05 to the requirement within ADB for cavity barriers around all openings including windows.
00:30:09 windows. The siderise data sheet as a clear diagram showing the requirement within ADB for cavity barriers around windows. Side would of course for obvious commercial reasons have been happy to
00:30:21 commercial reasons have been happy to supply cavity barriers for use around the windows had they been asked to supply it. However, Sidrise were not asked to advise on whether cavity barriers were required around the windows and side
00:30:33 required around the windows and side didn't know whether cavity barriers for the windows were being obtained from another from another source or whether the design for the windows was to use steel as the cavity barrier.
00:30:45 steel as the cavity barrier. The second issue I wish to touch on briefly is Mr. Mort's email of the 30th of March 2015 drawing Harley's attention to the weak link for fire at the window
00:30:56 to the weak link for fire at the window head.
00:30:59 head. That weak link is an issue that should have been picked up by amongst others Harley and Studio E. Mr. Mort hadn't been asked to advise on that issue, but he volunteered his view.
00:31:11 he volunteered his view. His advice on it wasn't followed, though Mr. Mort did not know at the time that it wasn't being followed. It's suggested by BSR Team 2 in their written opening that Mr. Mort ought to
00:31:22 written opening that Mr. Mort ought to have followed up his advice to ensure that it was being followed. We would submit that given Sidris's limited role, Mr. Mort and Sidrise had no obligation to do so. And further,
00:31:34 no obligation to do so. And further, it's relatively clear that as a matter of practice, any further advice from Mr. Mort would not have been welcomed. It would also, I suggest, be unfair.
00:31:45 It would also, I suggest, be unfair. having provided advice in relation to a design flaw for which he was not responsible for Mr. Mort now to be subject to criticism that he would have avoided if he had simply said nothing.
00:32:00 So those are my submissions unless I can assist you further. That's very helpful, Mr. Campbell. Thank you very much indeed. Um well [clears throat] that brings us to the end of the opening
00:32:12 that brings us to the end of the opening statements that uh we are expecting to hear today. We've reached that point rather sooner than we had expected, but that's no criticism of anyone. So, we're going to break off now and we shall
00:32:24 going to break off now and we shall resume at 10:00 tomorrow morning when I think we're going to hear from Dr. Lane again. Is that right, Mr. Vinnett? Yes, Mr. Chairman. That's correct. Good. Thank you very much. Well, 10:00 tomorrow morning then, please.
00:32:37 tomorrow morning then, please. Thank you.