Module 3 Day 1 - Monday 26th April 2021 (2/2)

Full transcript

00:00:17 well welcome back I'm sorry about the interruptions of proceedings little earlier but all of those of you who were here when that occurred thank you very

00:00:28 here when that occurred thank you very much for an orderly and I think pain-free evacuation certainly as far as this particular room is concerned I can't speak for any other room but thank you very much and I think we are now ready to go on this minute mr. chairman

00:00:41 ready to go on this minute mr. chairman thank you

00:00:41 thank you right

00:01:01 on the street I'm sorry about that interruption to your evidence yeah I know where it's gone thank you okay mr. Egan just before we

00:01:12 thank you okay mr. Egan just before we break I was asking you a question about whether you had shared your view about the need to evacuate groennfell tower with group manager Welch and you your answer was it not at that stage no did

00:01:25 answer was it not at that stage no did there come a stage when you did share your view about the need to evacuate Granville Tower with group manager Welch I did speak to a group major Welch when

00:01:38 I did speak to a group major Welch when he was in the base of the tower late one June instant and I voiced my concerns that we need to be getting people out but when I first met him at

00:01:49 people out but when I first met him at the command unit it was though the the Rory gave me straightaway was the utmost priority for it and that's what dealt with and if instead of being given that

00:02:01 with and if instead of being given that role which we'll discuss in a moment you had carried out your function as far safety officer what advice do you think

00:02:13 safety officer what advice do you think you would have given group manager Welch about evacuation of the tower

00:02:23 it was it's only from what I know now after being in the tower that I could have given him any information with regards to the stairwell the number of people in the premises and the means of

00:02:37 people in the premises and the means of escape once they they've come down to the ground floor level but I couldn't have given him any information at the time so that would have aided his decision-making in how to get the people out of it our exploring that just a

00:02:50 out of it our exploring that just a little bit more if in your role as fire safety officer had you been left in it you were carrying out your your function under policy to advise the incident

00:03:04 under policy to advise the incident commander all more facilities may be in the building and on the operation of the facilities at the time and on the basis of what you knew at that moment what advice would you have given him there

00:03:22 advice would you have given him there wasn't from what I knew at the moment from what I know at that time I couldn't give him any advice because I didn't know what the premises was what theirs what systems it had I couldn't give him any information now the top of page

00:03:35 any information now the top of page three you say that he just stopped and I said I saw it and said I want you to take charge of the fast survival guidance calls FSG and when he said that

00:03:52 guidance calls FSG and when he said that did you know what he wanted you to do I believe so yeah they did give me a little bit more information that the

00:04:05 little bit more information that the guide Norman was there he was up from the command unit that I was to go on so he said that Norman was got a list of all the fires fire Gardens cause we've had so far and that he just wanted me to

00:04:18 had so far and that he just wanted me to take control of it and start the Izone with the bridgehead would it normally be part of your role as a fire safety officer to handle fire survival guidance calls not as not

00:04:31 calls not as not so where initially I was ordered as fast fire safety officer when I attended that instant but in effect that was taken from me because he didn't want me to

00:04:42 from me because he didn't want me to perform that role he wanted me to perform the role of a station manager in charge of fire survival guidance so my whole thought process then is what do I need to do what sort policy do I have to

00:04:55 need to do what sort policy do I have to follow when he gave you that instruction I want you to take charge of the fire survival guidance calls did you ask him

00:05:09 survival guidance calls did you ask him what advice was being given at that time by Brigade Control to callers no I didn't did you ask him even about the

00:05:22 didn't did you ask him even about the nature of the the nature of the conditions in the building that those at Brigade Control worth finding out about

00:05:34 Brigade Control worth finding out about no I didn't I didn't know did you did you discuss with group manager Welch the

00:05:45 you discuss with group manager Welch the kind of tactics or strategy that those on the ground that would be adopting in order to work with what was what information was coming to brigade

00:05:56 information was coming to brigade control on those calls those fire survival Titans calls no it was it was so it was so dynamic and as I did mention I do know Richard Welch

00:06:07 mention I do know Richard Welch and I've worked for him in the past so where where sometimes you would give it a lengthy sort of handover of what you wanted doing roles and responsibilities it was it was quite obvious for the city

00:06:19 it was it was quite obvious for the city wanted me to deal with the fire survival guidance on a separate command unit that would leave that commands to deal with the operations itself did you ask group manager Welch about whether certain

00:06:33 manager Welch about whether certain rescue was underway in the tower

00:06:40 so will that also mean that you didn't ask him about what search-and-rescue methods were being used no that my intention was to get the information make contact with the

00:06:51 information make contact with the bridgeheads to find out what structures they've got in place what personnel that they've got ready to deal with it okay so say I think I think of the light of everything you've just been been telling us you're you you saw your role as

00:07:04 us you're you you saw your role as really one of structuring the communications rather than addressing ourselves to the actual advice that was being given to call it that be fair summary yes right thank you

00:07:15 summary yes right thank you then we go on in paragraph one of page three you say I asked the details of what we already had and spoke to watch manager Norman Harrison who was one of

00:07:26 manager Norman Harrison who was one of the command unit staff he was writing what information they had up on the board and just pausing there where was this board this the board was on the initial command unit the initial

00:07:39 on the initial command unit the initial command vehicle there's a just like a white boards there so he was writing stuff on it it had flat numbers and flaws we did actually have a redundant

00:07:51 flaws we did actually have a redundant hose mentioned we had a plaque off of the tower that had the floors and the flat numbers as well right so we had a bit more structure in some ways where we can identify hey will work yeah okay

00:08:02 can identify hey will work yeah okay when you say he was writing what information they had on the board you say flat flat numbers and floors any other information I believe you said numbers of persons as well numbers of persons was there any information that

00:08:14 persons was there any information that you saw at that time that he was writing about what deployments had been made to those flats all those floors of bi wearers no there was no there was no

00:08:28 wearers no there was no there was no there was no structure as to what what crews have been sent to from Thunder bridgeheads to people okay and we're

00:08:39 bridgeheads to people okay and we're going to explore this into the detail later but but just for the present you say he was writing up what information they had first of all where to your knowledge at the time was that

00:08:50 knowledge at the time was that information coming wrong into the command unit where was it coming from that information I believe should it should have been coming from control patrol should have been contacting the incident command vehicle

00:09:02 contacting the incident command vehicle and passing fire survivor guidance information through to them right and what was the mechanism by which that information was communicated from

00:09:13 information was communicated from control to the command unit so in the command you would answer the right radio and then they would get details of the person's name if known what floor

00:09:25 person's name if known what floor they're in what flat they're in why you know why they can't get out is their mobility issues ever got young children in there where where is the smoke login

00:09:36 in there where where is the smoke login is it out in the hallway or is it is it coming into the flat information like that would have been asked by control and that information would have been passed to the incident command vehicle

00:09:47 passed to the incident command vehicle who would recalled that on a form and in that form would be one would be kept with the command unit and another one would be taken to the bridgehead just

00:10:00 would be taken to the bridgehead just breaking that answer down first of all in terms of the type of information you say that that would happen and you would set up a list of very detailed information to your recollection was

00:10:12 information to your recollection was that kind of detailed information actually what Norman Harrison himself was writing up was that available and information when I got into the command

00:10:25 information when I got into the command you and Norman was right and up he was writing things on the board what he then had to do was then transfer that onto a bit of paper probably to make sure that he had that he wasn't he didn't have

00:10:37 he had that he wasn't he didn't have anything on the boat that he didn't have on his bit of paper yeah because we was going to take all that information to another unit and when I looked at the papers which I didn't stop him outside

00:10:48 papers which I didn't stop him outside in the streets I didn't wanna go walking off to the other command unit and then we leave some of the stuff behind I wanted to take it all with us and I did get a bit official with him because I just and a bit not angry but I just want

00:11:00 just and a bit not angry but I just want to make sure had the things

00:11:08 so let's take just taken my so I know that's right if you don't sit down from it that would be perfect right thank you so we just thought I just wanted to make

00:11:19 so we just thought I just wanted to make sure that anything that was on that come and doing it yes we had in hardcopy and so we could take it on to the other come to the new Comanche which nothing was cu7

00:11:29 cu7 okay so we didn't miss or drop anybody's names anybody's flat say out of it what we had is what we had and from one unit to another unit okay just to get back to

00:11:40 to another unit okay just to get back to the my question again and tonight it's okay just in terms of you say what we had was what we had was what you had sufficiently detailed in terms of

00:11:51 sufficiently detailed in terms of conditions in the flat people in the flat conditioners perhaps outside the flats to be able to give the VA where as good information to act on then on some

00:12:08 good information to act on then on some of the phones are there was information about where this that the smoke was in the hallway while they couldn't get out but the majority of the forms that were coming in that I've seen after and there

00:12:19 coming in that I've seen after and there was so many okay just in terms of mechanics can I just ask you about the mechanics of the communication you'd like to have a break do you think no I'm

00:12:30 like to have a break do you think no I'm okay okay all right yeah just in terms of the mechanics the information comes in to see you the see you yeah I think it's see you eight it comes in from the control room how does that come in as they come in by radio or does it come in through the

00:12:41 radio or does it come in through the vision log on to a screen or so it's coming through the mainstream radio sort of mainstream radios down fruits from control to the command unit and then oh

00:12:52 control to the command unit and then oh we called them details because of the amount of calls that were coming in yes I think I know from when I was on the other command unit and when I was at the front of the tower you know I was saying

00:13:05 front of the tower you know I was saying to the crew sometimes we don't need all that information yeah because there's like a backlog of calls coming in we needed to just get them the names where they were what flat there was in what

00:13:16 they were what flat there was in what floros it and why they couldn't get out and so we could then make some sort of priority list I see an in cu8 if they could see you at this time and you joined was there like a radio operator

00:13:28 joined was there like a radio operator somebody on the end of the radio and a pen in the other hand writing down the details on these forms I didn't say I didn't see the other operator all I saw as I got to the stairs of the command J

00:13:40 as I got to the stairs of the command J it looked upstairs and then Richard Welch just sent some it just sort of turned as I said turned ray and I said I just need you to do fast well regardless no one was there with a white board that

00:13:52 no one was there with a white board that he'd started to write stuff down and all we've done is made sure that that information he'd already had he had all his paper we took the aluminium sign and

00:14:04 his paper we took the aluminium sign and we take took that to see you seven so then start writing it all up in a logical fashion do you remember how many FS geez I can't if I can call on that

00:14:17 FS geez I can't if I can call on that we're being dealt with when you were given responsibility by mister by group manager Welch for being in charge of FS geez I couldn't really put a number on

00:14:28 geez I couldn't really put a number on it there was just there was just a water paper right it was i if I'm if I'm trying to picture yeah what he had in

00:14:40 trying to picture yeah what he had in his hand and when we started writing him up that what he had at that moment it's been 20 30 FS geez at that stage was there a system in place when you started

00:14:54 there a system in place when you started and you had this initial briefing with group manager Welsh was there a system in place to verify check whether the flats were clear after a FSG had been

00:15:05 flats were clear after a FSG had been acted upon so so once I get on to the cu7

00:15:11 cu7 and in introduce myself to the other guys and and explain to him what we're here for what I'm doing Norman then tells me that the foot he's got some

00:15:23 tells me that the foot he's got some fire fiber guidance forms that have come into the command unit he then tells me that there is another vehicle at the base of the tower that's taken fire survival

00:15:32 survival schools because control have had to contact other people and he said he believes that they're passing that information from the base of the tower into the tower right so I know that I

00:15:46 into the tower right so I know that I know that information was getting to the tower but I just needed I needed to go and find that structure and find out who's responsible for that information was actually just by passing your command you did I think yeah because

00:16:01 command you did I think yeah because because I think initially the the when that when incident would have kicked off there would have been a fire engine a pump would have been taking that the FSG

00:16:12 pump would have been taking that the FSG called me what would then happen is when there's more resources turn out the command unit would then try and take that off of them and it was at that sort of changeover yeah so you still had the

00:16:23 of changeover yeah so you still had the pump getting some some calls and then you also had the commands in against some corners as well yes that's something

00:16:47 that's early stage when you were talking to group manager Welch about the system you were being given did he give you any

00:16:58 you were being given did he give you any indication of how if at all FSG information was being given to other commanders on the ground as I said I

00:17:12 commanders on the ground as I said I don't remember which is Welch actually saying it to me but when I when I got in the other command unit and long gave me a brief of what information he had he

00:17:23 a brief of what information he had he must have had a conversation with Richard okay so that that I think takes us to the next paragraph of your statement group manager well she informed me that command unit seven

00:17:34 informed me that command unit seven would be assigned to far survival guidance and he told me to go there to set it up and then you explain what happened next and then you say in the last sentence a watch manager Norman Harrison and I left the command unit to

00:17:46 Harrison and I left the command unit to make our way over to see you seven which is about two hundred yards away now just so I'm clear you've been in cu8 I think and you went to see you seven two hundred yards away where was see you seven in relation to the tower so see you seven was actually

00:18:00 the tower so see you seven was actually on near the approach Road so it was a lot nearer the tower yeah so in effect a hundred yards from the bases itself okay and can you remember

00:18:12 bases itself okay and can you remember whereabouts you say on the approach Road yeah the southeast of the tower so at the front at the front that I'm sorry about no names the ropes but so at the front of the tower I believe it's the

00:18:24 front of the tower I believe it's the road that approaches it and then we was parked on the right-hand side and then as the door opens you could see the tower and what was going on okay and

00:18:37 you in the next paragraph you say that you asked Norman Harris and how many people have we got

00:18:48 people have we got and he techies he say tells me and then you say I said - Norman Harrison make me a list of everything we've got I was officious I just wanted it done we needed to get a starting point and put a

00:18:59 needed to get a starting point and put a structure in place and then you say at the end we needed to have we needed to prioritize the people we had to help and also avoid duplication so and what is

00:19:10 also avoid duplication so and what is what did what did Norman Harrison then do in response to that command

00:19:20 so it gave him a structure he didn't walk he just gave me a structure I asked him how many people already know how many people he had I didn't want anything else other information that my

00:19:32 anything else other information that my thought process was I want to know how many people we've got and then find out where they are and in sort of cross-reference everything to make sure we had the right number of people in the right flats okay and then you say the

00:19:43 right flats okay and then you say the next paragraph that you and he went into cu7

00:19:46 cu7 where you met watch managers Dan Merrick and Tony Peckham they were see yourself taking FSG calls so just pausing there do you know how long they had been taking FSG calls from brigade command

00:19:58 taking FSG calls from brigade command brigade control i'm sorry i'm so was it your way of thinking did you see essentially two places on the fire ground on the inside of ground receiving

00:20:10 ground on the inside of ground receiving FSG calls from brigade control cu8 where you just beam and cu7 way on our arriving on set on see you on c7 dan

00:20:23 arriving on set on see you on c7 dan merrick was on the was on the phone on the brigade mobile phone and he was he

00:20:34 the brigade mobile phone and he was he was either writing it down or he was saying it aloud and Tony man and Tony Peckham was writing down what information it was right those what may be the first five guys see how long did it take you to go from

00:20:47 see how long did it take you to go from cu8

00:20:48 cu8 to see you seven not long a minute maybe less than a minute and was there a system whereby brigade control we're going to stop sending

00:20:59 control we're going to stop sending messages to see you eight FSG messages to see you eight and start sending them to see you soon no we needed to from me taking it over and move into a different command unit

00:21:10 and move into a different command unit the FSG calls was still going to that base pump that was at the base of the tower right so inflation was still going through and it's only once we had cu7 up

00:21:21 through and it's only once we had cu7 up that when we were speaking to control I our stand merits at just let me know that we was dealing with the fast valving violence but since but you and norman Harrison have now left

00:21:32 norman Harrison have now left CUA but there was this right they were still taking FSG information from Begay control even though you left what yeah I'm not hung up sent sure I don't know if they was taking the the radio

00:21:46 if they was taking the the radio operator on see you right I've just I'm assuming got some information for five five a guy on schools and put it on to see you alright Davidson Ormond did but before you left see you eight did you

00:22:00 before you left see you eight did you take any steps or did anybody taking steps to tell brigade control to stop sending FSG to see you eight and start sending them to see you seven instead so

00:22:11 sending them to see you seven instead so is it possible that in fact brigade controls still sending FSU messages to see you eight even though you are now in charge of SSG calls have left to go to see you seven that is possible that they

00:22:22 see you seven that is possible that they still would have sent the messages to see you right I'm not aware of it and who would be handling those messages at cu8 once you'd left to set up cu7 whoever there would have been a radio operator on see you I thought I didn't

00:22:34 operator on see you I thought I didn't see that they would have sent it to see you eight and if they couldn't in control if they couldn't get response from see you right on the radio they would call up another appliance or

00:22:45 would call up another appliance or another command unit so pass that information on so right but what would and then what would happen to the best of your knowledge of an FSG message was sent to see to see you eight after you'd

00:22:57 sent to see to see you eight after you'd left to go and set up your system what would happen to that message how they were to recover be present they would read the the radio operator would recalled it on the form right there

00:23:08 recalled it on the form right there casually form and then that would have been brought to see you seven if that would have happened if they if if command unit I would have received a call they would have passed that information on to see you seven and when

00:23:20 information on to see you seven and when you got to see you seven and set up your system

00:23:22 system did you actually then receive any paper messages from cu8 of FSG cause they're not aware of okay

00:23:35 and then looking back at the paragraph which says Norman Harrison and I went to see you seven you say watch managers Dan Marik and Tony Peckham were taking they

00:23:46 Marik and Tony Peckham were taking they would take they were Cu staff taking FSG calls do you know how long they've been taking FSG calls for before you'd arrived lardo do you know how many calls they taken just roughly in terms of volume before you'd arrived no I

00:24:01 volume before you'd arrived no I couldn't honestly I can put a number on it I'll just say I'm going to put a number in it they are no men 88 it could

00:24:12 number in it they are no men 88 it could have been ten calls they they were stressed they knew what was going and they also knew that it's yeah once we've said about this bass pump has got the first of all garments cause they were aware of that right so so it wasn't just

00:24:27 aware of that right so so it wasn't just a case of all we've got sort of 34 they knew that there was absolutely loads of them when you say bass pump do you mean g27 one was hurt in the incident command pump initial yeah there was an apply

00:24:41 pump initial yeah there was an apply that was at appliances at the base of the tower one of them appliances was taken four survived fire survival

00:24:52 taken four survived fire survival guidance calls and the driver of that vehicle was giving it to a watch manager who was leaning over the car on it writing it down checking it and when I

00:25:04 writing it down checking it and when I went to see him which is a bit later on he had so much paperwork where they've taken so many calls right I think he might concerts - notes I do know his name but I didn't when I wrote a

00:25:16 name but I didn't when I wrote a statement I'm going to come to that podcast it's just that I'm in the moment I'm just trying to get a handle on on what the channels right all the fire survival guidance calls were from brigade control so we've got them going

00:25:28 brigade control so we've got them going into cu8 we've got them going into cu7 it looks like at the same time and you've now entered the third appliance can I just see if I can pin that down if you go to the ORR mr. documents

00:25:41 if you go to the ORR mr. documents directory please and go to page 60 I just want to show you an entry in this document now mr. Egan this document is a

00:25:52 document now mr. Egan this document is a report together by the London Fire Brigade of the first hour of the fire and it's it's we've put together this may based on a whole lot of information

00:26:12 and and so you won't be familiar with it but can I just show you something against the time stamp Oh 135 36 I'm sorry Oh 135 54 at the

00:26:24 Oh 135 36 I'm sorry Oh 135 54 at the bottom of the page Golf two six one Acton's pump latter interrupts the CRA attempting to pass the radio message to golf two seven one North Kensington pump pump ladder saying

00:26:38 North Kensington pump pump ladder saying they will take the priority message on behalf of golf 271 North Kensington Spandana who have not responded now this is I think before ye or before you

00:26:49 is I think before ye or before you arrive but at any time did you learn that golf two six one Acton's pump bladder was taking FSG information in place and of the incident command pump

00:27:02 now I didn't know the the the station's pump ladder I just knew that there was a pump or pump ladder at the base of the tail that was taking forest fire guards

00:27:13 tail that was taking forest fire guards course okay let's just turn over just at the bottom of page 66 golf 261 Acton's pub that are still on their way and over the page of the page to the incident and

00:27:26 the page of the page to the incident and they state they will pass on the information to golf 271 and then you can see in the next paragraph during the phone conversation that officer Norman had a 135 24 with cu8

00:27:39 had a 135 24 with cu8 the CRO can be heard sending information to golf 261 axons pump ladder so having shown you that and it says there have now been two methods by which FSG calls information have been passed to the

00:27:50 information have been passed to the incident ground and the two methods looks like cu8 and 261 my question having shown you that is when you were int at cu8 but already when you arrived

00:28:04 int at cu8 but already when you arrived at cu7 did anybody tell you that in addition to FSG information going to see you eight FSG intimate information was going to act ins pump ladder two six one

00:28:18 I know information have began to a pump to a base pump but I didn't know pump name or number I knew it began to a pump okay in safety when you come in to see you seven you

00:28:30 when you come in to see you seven you can see see you seven staff taking infest G calls as you say on page three of your statement and the third paragraph down if you forget back to it so does that mean at that point there

00:28:42 so does that mean at that point there were three destinations on the fire ground for FSG calls see you eight axons pump letter to six one and cu7 all at

00:28:53 pump letter to six one and cu7 all at the same time first appeared on that lot saying but we've just with regards to see you seven he was the operator was

00:29:04 see you seven he was the operator was taking the calls on the phone which isn't which isn't the correct policy it should be all done by the fire ground radio right so I think it's just a okay

00:29:15 radio right so I think it's just a okay my opinion is control would have phoned up see you seven to try and find out what's going on is anyone else and they've passed information while they're there

00:29:23 there right so when you've got to see you seven what did you do next so I've got C seven introduce myself said some what

00:29:34 seven introduce myself said some what our priorities were I said to norm had all the information I said what we need to do is we get we need to transpose all that information onto a white board we

00:29:46 that information onto a white board we can work out the floors we can work out the flat numbers because we had the the sheet we need to start prioritizing who we've got and did you do that yes we did

00:29:58 we've got and did you do that yes we did Sharon so we started doing we started doing that and then I think it gets a bit my timeline gets a bit weird because I then make a decision to go down to where the

00:30:09 make a decision to go down to where the base pump is and to find out where this communication is going so at least I can see people where I can visualize along talking see so I go to the to the base and it and that's where I'll meet I

00:30:20 and it and that's where I'll meet I watch manager on a carbonic that's taking fast of our guidance calls ok ok so

00:30:28 so before we look at that can I just ask you you decide you say to go to the base pump yeah

00:30:34 pump yeah did anybody tell you at that time that there was a base pump below the tower taking FSG information or I'm sure long

00:30:45 taking FSG information or I'm sure long I'm sure norm said that there is one at the base of the tower where it is but even still I would I would know that there would be a machine at the base of the tower or you know where the main

00:30:58 the tower or you know where the main seat of fire is because they would have been getting fast viral Gospels somebody there it just by looking around I would have found somebody that was dealing with it right okay and is that is that

00:31:10 with it right okay and is that is that because sorry I was gonna in a different way

00:31:14 way why would you think that they would be in the normal course of things a pump close to the seat of the fire as you say dealing with FSG calls where in circumstances where there was already at

00:31:26 circumstances where there was already at least one and now to command units on the fire ground because pumps get there before the command units so it's the pumps get past that information a

00:31:37 pumps get past that information a command unit will be sweet will be all the pumps and the pump letters will be sent on the initial when there's further calls then we decide to send the command unit so they're on route and the pumps

00:31:48 unit so they're on route and the pumps are there there's a bit like a mess is it the CRO you shout and it says actions intercept this message because even though they're still on roof that

00:31:59 even though they're still on roof that they're helping them out they're saying well they were obviously really busy I could take information because I'm going to be there in a moment right so they can write it down on route and

00:32:10 they can write it down on route and would it be normal to have FSG calls still going to a pump which would I arrived early in in in the incident once a command unit was in place

00:32:35 it was unprecedented hood it okay yes so normally you you might get three or four probably maximum files file Goren

00:32:46 probably maximum files file Goren schools and they would go to the pump and then the Comanche that would come in place and then you put a command unit that would deal with far as fire guidance

00:32:53 guidance we'd send a message to control to say we're now dealing with the fire survival guidance this was one machine could not handle the number of calls for fastball

00:33:04 handle the number of calls for fastball guidance so it was controlled done a great job to to spread the calls out so at least somebody somewhere was writing that down and they got that information together in one single place hose down

00:33:16 together in one single place hose down okay okay you go on then at the foot of page in three foot of page three to say

00:33:28 page in three foot of page three to say and around one-30 a-m as I was approaching the tower I could see a watchman that you're working on the carbonic just first of all that time there then do you think that's right that it's probably not no man you

00:33:41 that it's probably not no man you approached the tower I could see a watchman that you're working on a car bonnet I can't recall his name and you explained you it up to him and he was collating information on a car bonnet there were papers everywhere and I could see a lot of activity you say I told him

00:33:55 see a lot of activity you say I told him who I was and I was there to support him he tell me what he was doing he was receiving information from his driver it was filling in carbonated casualty forms based on information from the control room

00:34:06 room received over the main radio and he go on to describe what was happening

00:34:16 could could you just clarify for us where you thought that watch manager was getting the information from what the

00:34:28 getting the information from what the watch manager was getting information off of a firefighter that was coming out of the drivers position on the vehicle on the ridge vehicles of the pump bladder that was there a firefighter was

00:34:42 bladder that was there a firefighter was getting off of the machine at the driver's seat and walking around to the sort of to this carp on it with the with sometimes two or three casualty report

00:34:56 sometimes two or three casualty report facie I thought it's a it's a the fire survival guidance call that that driver was collating with the watch manager was

00:35:07 was collating with the watch manager was was fart survival guidance information coming to that pump was it yes and from control to that plumber and from anywhere else just that although just just from there I see okay and did the

00:35:19 just from there I see okay and did the driver physically bring the forms in his hand to the water and was he going back and forth

00:35:26 and forth he was yes okay and what was the watch manager physically doing with these pieces of paper on the cardboard remember

00:35:33 remember so what watch watch manager was trying to split the forms up so there'd be one scheduled to breach a them want to go to stay with himself or later on so that I

00:35:45 stay with himself or later on so that I would then take it but that information when I spoke to him he was saying he was giving that information too he believed

00:35:59 it was watch manager D'Souza who was at the bridgehead okay what was the role of these forms we described these forms of

00:36:11 these forms we described these forms of a being that were being filled in were brought by the driver to the watch manager so that the formula forms would say what flat number they're in what floor they're in how many people are there and sucked quite a few of the

00:36:23 there and sucked quite a few of the forms would say if there was any mobility or vulnerability issues if there was small children in there so so you know on the whole that's just information that's

00:36:34 whole that's just information that's five people in that flat but what we had to do later on is to it's a bit which was hard was to prioritize just okay take it take your time mr. Egan would

00:36:48 take it take your time mr. Egan would you like a bridge like the break no I'm okay thank you never do indicate a few words

00:36:52 words yeah well thank you very much the we exit prioritized on me so so where it was five people we then had say you know if it was small children the babies over

00:37:04 if it was small children the babies over the priority because of especially if there were vulnerable and mobility issues then we reduce that because they they won't be able to get and there are resources were they so that's how we

00:37:15 resources were they so that's how we okay I was prioritizing okay what would it just ask your boring paper question if I can can I ask you to look at policy

00:37:27 if I can can I ask you to look at policy bundle tab five and I want to show you what is a standard form control

00:37:40 what is a standard form control information for just see whether that's what you're talking about if I can if you go please to appendix to which is on the internal page eight of policy 790 fire Survival Guide installed

00:37:53 policy 790 fire Survival Guide installed it is that the form that you saw the watch manage of filter handling on the car bonnet yes yeah and what was okay

00:38:05 car bonnet yes yeah and what was okay say but this is is it what the driver was physically bringing yeah watch manager yeah and they were the driver that fill those in had he the driver had filled him in and to be honest state

00:38:19 filled him in and to be honest state they yeah that form looks quite pretty and neat and their spaces to write names and things if they weren't that neat and tidy there it was quite bullet point II this is what we've got and as far as I

00:38:31 this is what we've got and as far as I said sir that was fine right thank you and then the watch manager he did something with with those pieces of paper what did he do do you remember

00:38:42 paper what did he do do you remember so the watchman the watch manager would split them so I think it says there Willie Moses of different colors but I think it's a key at the bottom it says where they're supposed to go but what he

00:38:54 where they're supposed to go but what he was so he was trying to split them up but because there was so many of them and it was difficult to get into the tower he was passing the information on to I believed it to watch manager what's

00:39:05 to I believed it to watch manager what's made a D'Souza and there was a crew manager or a watch manager as well that was at the base in the town so I believe

00:39:17 was at the base in the town so I believe that crew mate watch range D'Souza was at the bridge head yes and he was passed and so that the pump out so I've just gone 4 to 6 1 for example parts of

00:39:30 gone 4 to 6 1 for example parts of information into the tower and then that information was being passed to the bridge head okay so let me see if I've got this right tell me if I've got any of this wrong as I'm not here to tell you what happens so it's the other way

00:39:42 you what happens so it's the other way around so the information comes from control to the pump the driver writes it down onto the form the driver takes the form and takes it to the watch manager on the car bonnet yeah the watch manager on the car bonnet

00:39:56 yeah the watch manager on the car bonnet then gives it to a crew manager or watch manager and he then takes it to Louisa - silver at the bridgehead is that I mean all to put words ago ok so have I

00:40:09 all to put words ago ok so have I summarized your what you would do what you've told us that'sthat's what happened on the night yes on the night yes yeah but can I just can understand that that please been reeled in realto in us in a smaller innocent that you

00:40:22 in us in a smaller innocent that you wouldn't have so many people involved in hand in that piece of information it's just that same thing that the guy that's that was taking that information that so the drivers just busy writing

00:40:33 that so the drivers just busy writing isn't he he would usually just take that to the bridgehead and give that information into was doing fast five coins there was so much information he couldn't get away from the radio so he had to give it to

00:40:45 from the radio so he had to give it to someone else to collate it right that person's now got their information and they're trying to talk to and I couldn't face Louise of the silver but she's never got committed I'm assuming she's

00:40:58 never got committed I'm assuming she's got other things to do as well committing be a cruise briefing trying to control the scene up up there so there's another element of somebody getting all that information off of him because it wasn't safe to keep they

00:41:11 because it wasn't safe to keep they couldn't just get a form and get into the tower it took a little while to manage to get in so normally we wouldn't have that many people in the chain but for that sits right there was so much coming through they tried to at least

00:41:24 coming through they tried to at least hand it over in small chunks for people to deal with rather than what's ranged silver we've now got 15 fast fire alarms calls boom boom boom it would just be an

00:41:35 calls boom boom boom it would just be an overload now in terms of collation of the information that the watch manager on the carve on it was was doing he was getting the information from the driver in the pump and then what was he doing

00:41:48 in the pump and then what was he doing with it was he prioritizing it I don't think he won't I don't think he was prioritizing it I think he was he was trying to keep the forms in it in a

00:41:59 trying to keep the forms in it in a structured way so it was like by what floor they was on so when he handed over they would be violent just flicking through the whole lot there'd be some sort of structure in there I see okay

00:42:10 sort of structure in there I see okay did you see him do that I say new trying to fiddle with the forms and I said to just get the information to the to the tower I was going to go into the tower to find out if I could see what was

00:42:22 to find out if I could see what was going on and so people could see me and then I would then come out and him once that chain of command had been they knew that I was now taking over as fast for

00:42:34 that I was now taking over as fast for guidance I could then relieve these guys of doing the fight from the pump and writing it down because we had a command unit yes and did you have a conversation

00:42:46 unit yes and did you have a conversation with the watch manager at the at the car bonnet about the car bonnet I did yes and what was the what was the upshot of that conversation the carp on the the watch managers to be honest and the

00:42:57 watch managers to be honest and the driver were more than happy to hand it over

00:42:59 over they just wanted to get sets on but it was their words to me they wanted to do so even though yeah I'll sit down good they were dude sar smokes they've okay

00:43:13 they were dude sar smokes they've okay take your time

00:43:18 you know they've done a good done a good job but they you know they wanted to be more hands-on so once once the the walkthrough communicate with the people that were there I didn't get up to what

00:43:30 that were there I didn't get up to what strangers souza when I went into the tower I called her on the radio and there was no response but the radio was

00:43:41 there was no response but the radio was was managed mr. Egan Thank You would we we're going to take a break now I think for you for for a few minutes it's all

00:43:54 for you for for a few minutes it's all of the witness has a break I think so should we I'm in your hands mr. chairman five or ten good five or ten minutes I think it would be some sort of witness district Larry's great mystery all right

00:44:06 district Larry's great mystery all right we'll we'll stop for ten minutes and come back at five to three write this thank you

00:44:29 you

00:55:16 if we could have the witness back please thank you

00:55:36 like you've gone vegan gay thank you know you could we could have another break anytime you think it would be helpful that's fine thank you Thank You mr. Egan mr. Ian can I just can I just take a step back a moment in

00:55:48 can I just take a step back a moment in time slightly and go to the time when you were instructed by group manager Welch to take over the FSG role who had

00:55:59 Welch to take over the FSG role who had been running the FSG function before that do you remember no I'm not aware of if anyone was actually taking control of the hormones

00:56:10 the hormones did anybody tell you that Brett loft station manager called Brett loft and had been operating the fire survival

00:56:21 had been operating the fire survival guidance system until then I was unaware of that right so can I take it that there was no handover from mr. loft to you yeah

00:56:32 you yeah going back to your description of this chain of communication of fire survival guidance material from the car bonnet it

00:56:44 guidance material from the car bonnet it to the bridgehead just explain to me precisely how that was happening I think you met you said it was a crew manager or watch manager running it into the tower no so so the information so from

00:56:57 tower no so so the information so from the carp on it they would have they were collecting all the information so what's homes they're the watch manager was in on the radio to a crew manager or watch manager that was at the base of the tower inside the tower yeah right okay

00:57:11 tower inside the tower yeah right okay so actually inside the building and that person was then passing the information on through the bridgehead okay so that's the bit I didn't get so from the car bonnet to just inside the tower yeah

00:57:24 bonnet to just inside the tower yeah that's a radio connection is it yes I see okay which radio channel was it you do know no I think it was I think I'm assuming it was probably channel one I

00:57:35 assuming it was probably channel one I changed it so I believe I changed it all to channel three in the end because of radio traffic yes and you say that in your contemporary news and but there have been difficulties in

00:57:48 and but there have been difficulties in communicating even that short distance by radio on channel one at the time there would have been a very attractive which was huge well such every firefighter started and

00:57:59 well such every firefighter started and you know and everyone wants to help each other and they call in each other up so you've got to find a service to jump in and with this system the car bonnet system if I can if I can call it that I

00:58:10 system if I can if I can call it that I mean in relation to the information coming from brigade control to that pump and then into the tower through that system

00:58:19 system do you remember whether there was any information that came back to the watch manager on the carb on it from inside the tower there wasn't any information that came back from from the tower he's

00:58:32 that came back from from the tower he's just part he was just passing that on I do remember asking you know what well if we got back who's come out and he was unaware of what information what he done I'm sure he said whoever come whoever

00:58:44 I'm sure he said whoever come whoever comes out has to come past me anyway it was that you know so he wasn't really that worried that nothing had come back because he was saying I'll catch him when they come past right so if a

00:58:58 when they come past right so if a deployment in response to an SSG message which had gone into the tower was for example unsuccessful was there at that

00:59:09 example unsuccessful was there at that stage a system whereby that information would be passed back to brigade controlled via the car bullet and and the pump know so in a in a in a typical

00:59:24 the pump know so in a in a in a typical scenario the information would be given Serbia crew to go to flat X they would then go there and in that information you know if they've got the person out

00:59:35 you know if they've got the person out there formation would then go back to the person that was dealing with force for guidance so they could tick them off that ain't that flat is now completed through through the whole interestin we

00:59:50 through through the whole interestin we didn't get any information back so how would brigade Control be able to monitor the success or failure of FSGS and the quality of the information for

01:00:02 and the quality of the information for advice that they were giving to callers so control might my understand is control stay on the line whilst the the line is still live and then they can hear people at the other end I don't

01:00:15 hear people at the other end I don't know how that that works it regards to the number of calls so the number of lines they've got coming in and and when the lines go quiet or if the line I think the line goes dead then they have to just leave that call it drops out for

01:00:28 to just leave that call it drops out for the Oh Fifi was available finally dropped out a signal or something they would then leave that call I don't know because control have got their own procedures of how they deal with things I don't know if they would didn't read

01:00:39 I don't know if they would didn't read contact that number I don't know but the with regards to control they give us the information we send a crew they go and get the person they bring the person out

01:00:50 get the person they bring the person out we didn't tell control that we've now cleared that flat and did was there a system at that point whereby information

01:01:04 system at that point whereby information was being communicated back to control that the message that had been sent to the bridgehead had gone to the bridgehead and a deployment had been made no but no but we wouldn't have said

01:01:19 made no but no but we wouldn't have said we wouldn't send that message anyway we wouldn't say we wouldn't take the call from control and then tell them that when they ascending someone there

01:01:31 well I understood sure now sure just thinking about now to think the policy says that we should say that we should send a message to say that we've deployed crews to the flattened question

01:01:43 deployed crews to the flattened question but that wouldn't take place because we didn't have it there was so many calls coming in that we couldn't say that with and then we didn't know what information was being sent from the bridgehead which

01:01:54 was being sent from the bridgehead which crews were going to which flat

01:02:02 yes let's can I ask you just a look at policy since you mentioned it can I ask you to be shown policy 790 which is in policy bundle tab 5 and to look at

01:02:15 policy bundle tab 5 and to look at paragraph 9 communication with control

01:02:20 rights on internal page 5 if I can just ask paragraph 9.1 to be highlighted that

01:02:32 ask paragraph 9.1 to be highlighted that says it is vital that control is kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve the Jeff SG called the fact that control is aware of the actions being carried out on the incident ground will

01:02:43 carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice given to those FSG callers then 9 3 the outcome of every FSG call must be communicated to control now mr. Egan in the light of

01:02:56 to control now mr. Egan in the light of that policy what if any steps were being taken in relation to the system that the carbolic system which were focusing on at the moment yeah to ensure that

01:03:07 at the moment yeah to ensure that control was being kept informed informed of actions being taken to resolve the FSG calls that were being sent into the into the tower through that system

01:03:20 control were not kept control were not kept up state as to what action was being taken the number of colors that were coming in they were passed as the information they knew that we was being snowed under with

01:03:31 knew that we was being snowed under with the number of calls that we had no information that I'm aware of went back to control to say that we sent a specific crew to a certain flat would it

01:03:44 specific crew to a certain flat would it follow then that similarly the outcome of every FSG call wasn't being communicated to control not not via mainstream radio when there was when I

01:03:56 mainstream radio when there was when I was on the command unit 7 there was a telephone call with control and I did say to them you know we're prioritizing what we've got we've given that to the

01:04:07 what we've got we've given that to the sort of bridgehead and they're committing Kreuziger that's I think it was just a given that all

01:04:18 I think it was just a given that all efforts were being made if you gave us an F s G all efforts would be made to get to that person I understand now if you follow your statement over to the

01:04:33 you follow your statement over to the top of page five you it's I'm going to summarize it you get you went back to the car bonnet watch manager and you

01:04:45 the car bonnet watch manager and you told them that everything would now go through see you that's effectively what you say in that paragraph yes would that

01:04:58 you say in that paragraph yes would that mean well what would that mean for communication of FSG advice how would we put their push for the question slightly different way how would pushing it all

01:05:10 different way how would pushing it all through the see you improve matters

01:05:18 purely because we would have had the staff on there to deal with that to be able to log it and it would communicate through whereas yo it just it just said

01:05:31 through whereas yo it just it just said that was the dedicated machine it was going to deal with that information and it would be sort of right on proper that you'd have a command unit dealing with fastfire Gardens calls and what did that

01:05:45 fastfire Gardens calls and what did that and watch manager do in response to your telling him that everything will now go through the see you as I mentioned that they were really really pleased it gave

01:05:56 they were really really pleased it gave me all the information that he had in his hands we made sure that was nothing was left behind and they went off to I'm sure they just went off to get sets do

01:06:07 sure they just went off to get sets do you know where the brigade control were told to stop sending FSG messages to the pump the driver from which was sending these messages to the car bonnet no I

01:06:19 these messages to the car bonnet no I did ask for the command units contact control to confirm that we're dealing with the Fast Five license okay and to the best of your recollection did that succeed at

01:06:31 your recollection did that succeed at the best of my knowledge at their Jeff site did you have any radio communications with the bridgehead at

01:06:42 communications with the bridgehead at that stage in other words at the stage when you started operations are put in the sea you know I tried to get through on the radio a couple times more than a couple times numerous times and there

01:06:55 couple times numerous times and there there was no response it was so much radio traffic right and once you'd started up on this on cu7 what happened to FSG calls coming in which had been coming in on cu8 do you

01:07:07 which had been coming in on cu8 do you remember I can't remember any I can't remember any calls once we was on homogeneous sevens I don't remember any paperwork coming

01:07:18 I don't remember any paperwork coming from cui

01:07:19 from cui saying this is a fire survival garden speaking now there was a firefighter called Thomas Goodell who I think was involved in in fire survival guidance cool yeah he's a group manager so he he

01:07:32 cool yeah he's a group manager so he he resolved it's a takeover from me so there's a higher level of command on which see you on cu7 that was when later that was a little bit lighter all right

01:07:43 that was a little bit lighter all right we make we may have to come back to that going back if I can in your statement a little bit to paragraph 2 on page 4 this is that this is at the time I'm sorry to get back in time but I just wanted to

01:07:55 get back in time but I just wanted to see if I could put a time on it this is at a time when you're describing the carbonic watch manager you say at the end of the set of the first made paragraph you say at that point the

01:08:07 paragraph you say at that point the advice from control room to callers was the standard statement advice and then you describe what that advice that was

01:08:16 how did you know that the advice being given by the control room to callers was stay put at that stage

01:08:31 because it that was that's the procedure that's what we do that's how we deal with instance we have the state policy in place and the first of our guidance is that we you stay where you are we

01:08:45 is that we you stay where you are we were seeing crews to come to come and get you and to bring you out okay perhaps I made an assumption that you know if it wasn't in place then we wouldn't be sending crews because we'd

01:08:57 wouldn't be sending crews because we'd be putting crews at risk then while people are coming out so as my question was well you've answered my question another way of asking it was did anybody tell you at the time that the advice

01:09:08 tell you at the time that the advice being given by the control room to callers was stay put no not not in that early stage okay

01:09:23 now we talked about group manager Goodall a moment ago if you go to page five of your statement again we pick up the story where you've come back to see

01:09:35 the story where you've come back to see you seven and you say I gave the pictures I had taken to them and they started writing it up on the whiteboards putting down all the flat numbers and what we knew about them now I just want to ask you about those pictures can I

01:09:47 to ask you about those pictures can I ask you to be shown please exhibit five to your exhibits which is mr. tile director trial documents erect say it's Emmy et zero zero zero one five six

01:09:59 Emmy et zero zero zero one five six three four

01:10:05 [Applause]

01:10:15 is what we've got on the screen there a the one of the photographs that you're referring to not they're not that's that's a photo from later on that's a

01:10:29 that's a photo from later on that's a photo completely all right okay so our yellowish one okay can I ask you to be shown deg four which is met triple zero one five six three six is that like the

01:10:47 one five six three six is that like the photographs we plan nope right okay well here's one of our photos but yeah okay so I think then by princess of the elimination by me we're left with one

01:10:58 elimination by me we're left with one set of photographs I think I can take you to these are the photographs you took on the wall in the bridge s right yes it's my fault for getting getting you couple good not confusing myself good that I think is deg one can we just

01:11:09 good that I think is deg one can we just look at that

01:11:19 is that what you're referring us yeah that's what that was at the inside the tower right on the ground floor okay now I'm going to come back to the detail of what these show later but just in terms of those photographs you say you've

01:11:33 of those photographs you say you've started writing it up on the whiteboards putting down all the flat numbers on what we knew about them just in terms of looking at that information on the screen and taking notes and videos to

01:11:46 screen and taking notes and videos to take flat numbers and floors abut random and let's start with with the top one could you just read across what what we have there so we have a BA with a

01:11:58 have there so we have a BA with a teacher's tick right F 205 so a flat number 205 and on the 23rd floor right

01:12:09 number 205 and on the 23rd floor right and then what and UK what does that mean right and then there's something on the right which I don't think the photograph captures do you know that might be it

01:12:29 captures do you know that might be it may be that there's another picture which isn't terribly good which might help if you go to exhibit two which is M et triple zero one five six three nine

01:12:40 et triple zero one five six three nine just the documents directly may be able to see it better or worse I don't know maybe better we can see there this is now FSG at 2:15 and you've got this UK

01:12:55 now FSG at 2:15 and you've got this UK and then something is that something that don't yet what does that say this

01:13:09 that don't yet what does that say this isn't your handwriting and iesson so far it looks like at door - 13 flames at window - 15 people on roof 260 can you

01:13:21 window - 15 people on roof 260 can you help us interpret that it's the best of your recollection does that reflect what was happening now I'm underway I think those comments Denis

01:13:32 underway I think those comments Denis when I asked the the person that was staying there with them with the other information they weren't aware of what these what these comments were right you

01:13:44 these what these comments were right you you say in your statement you've taken these photographs

01:14:00 well let me just ask you where did you take these photographs so when I went into the base of the tower the first time these these inaudible yes so I couldn't get in touch with the person at

01:14:13 couldn't get in touch with the person at the bridgehead the watch manager spoke to the the crew manager or a bit of watch range it was good summary and I tried to find out

01:14:25 good summary and I tried to find out what information he knew so as far as he was concerned this was the flat numbers and what floor they were saying but where you've if you go back to the other

01:14:37 where you've if you go back to the other one of a photo that says and the be a

01:14:44 yes so I said I said to him well what what have we done about then so have we we've got there be a tick it's a flat so have we been there and his answer was he

01:14:58 have we been there and his answer was he didn't know so I said to him you've got one say without a tick now does that mean that we've sent ba there and the one with a tick means that we've sent ba there and we've cleared it but he just

01:15:10 there and we've cleared it but he just didn't know right he just had that information that was being passed through from the carbonic right so I was going to ask you that first of all just

01:15:22 going to ask you that first of all just to be very clear these photographs were taken or this photograph was taken by you yes you say him in the last paragraph on page four in the middle

01:15:33 paragraph on page four in the middle that you took a photo of the wall that wall is are thinking the in the foyer you say on the ground saw is that right yes this is not the bridgehead that's not the protected right and who was writing that up on the wall the crew

01:15:46 writing that up on the wall the crew manager that was staying in there right and was that the crew manager who was in radio contact with the group on it with the car body right so say the information that was being written up in the wall had come from the carbonate as

01:15:59 the wall had come from the carbonate as it were I believe so yeah right and had not come from the bridgehead no no that information there would have been radioed through to the guy that was standing at the base of the tower and he

01:16:12 standing at the base of the tower and he would have recorded the very basic information that was there so flat 205 on the 23rd floor right then that information should be then passed to the the bridgehead and I

01:16:25 then passed to the the bridgehead and I think the idea behind it is that where the bas is that they committed BAE to them well he believes that they can be ba to their and I'm then going to make

01:16:38 ba to their and I'm then going to make an assumption that the tick means that he got feedback to say that or whoever done the original drawing got feedback say that the VA team have been there right and the feedback and you may not

01:16:50 right and the feedback and you may not know the answer to this but let me see how far we get the tick the feedback tick whether it's cleared or whatever it means did that cut by which by which route of that come to that that that

01:17:02 route of that come to that that that watch manager or crew manager had it come from the bridgehead direct back down to him or had it gone from the bridgehead to brigade control back round to the pump back to the car bonnet and backed by radio to the poyo

01:17:16 the assumption is that the information would have been passed from the base of the tower to the bridge heads the bridge head would have it confirmed to have made sent BAE or not and the guy at the

01:17:28 made sent BAE or not and the guy at the bottom would have would have ticked it stop there how where would he have known where where he got the information from a bridgehead direct from the bridgehead do you think right and how would that

01:17:39 do you think right and how would that have been communicated it would have been communicated by radio but this is all hot hypothetical one occurs because when I asked him what did that mean he didn't know I so when I go back to the

01:17:51 didn't know I so when I go back to the command unit I have to treat all those flares as life as if we've got to go to it there so I think I think the the process was was a good idea but there

01:18:03 process was was a good idea but there was that we we lost some sort of communication in it right yeah got it not that I think even though what you're describing is it is difficult and you'd

01:18:14 describing is it is difficult and you'd be very clear so far and what you do describe to us so we then go back to page 5 CU 7 and the and the pictures that you've taken you give to the Cu

01:18:26 that you've taken you give to the Cu seven staff and you say they start writing it up on the whiteboards and we've got some photographs of days now and I think those photographs of the

01:18:38 and I think those photographs of the whiteboards are where I wanted to take you earlier deg 5 yes checked the the

01:18:49 you earlier deg 5 yes checked the the one the one giving a show we've all agreed yes okay is isn't initially what I had the crews do I had them sort of doing a list form of the floors and the flats and

01:19:02 form of the floors and the flats and it's when group manager Tom Goodell come up he was the one that said right let's get this grid format we'll put all the flat numbers on there and then we come it'll be visually it'll be a lot better

01:19:14 it'll be visually it'll be a lot better to see okay so let me see if I can just put that in pictorial form if you could be shown deg v which is m ET triple zero one five six three four it's that the

01:19:26 one five six three four it's that the list that you started making all the white boards based on in cu7 based on what that's a that's a photo minute nearly in the last stages of the

01:19:37 nearly in the last stages of the incident when we was working out who we who request you who left the premises the one with the grids on the next picture it is so it is from the latter

01:19:48 picture it is so it is from the latter stages of the incident is that it's the last eight stages in the incident and but did it did your initial white boarding as it would look like that no

01:19:59 boarding as it would look like that no no sorry that's where we've got where we found information of where people were that's that's the flat sort of people we got so

01:20:11 got so you then say that in the same paragraph that Tom Goodell came over and informed us he was taking over fire survival guidance how long after you had been at

01:20:26 guidance how long after you had been at cu7 did that did that happen it felt like forever to be honest confront but I found it probably wasn't babe because I would set

01:20:40 probably wasn't babe because I would set summon car I've gone to the tower I came back I think I went back to the base of the tower again and then I came back and I think that's when Tom Goodall was there to take over yes okay

01:20:54 yes okay now we have him on scene Tom Goodell on scene at about 2:04 a.m. and you also go

01:21:05 scene at about 2:04 a.m. and you also go on to say that in the next paragraph station manager Pete Wilson dn't turned up and we have him on scene at about to 12 a.m. so in terms of this discussion

01:21:18 did this discussion happen around about that time or later than that do you think yeah so red-top Goodall came up this is where your mind plays tricks on

01:21:30 this is where your mind plays tricks on time you know said some good all turned up and people for then as Tom Goodell was talking people fraternities walking down towards the tower so they may have turned up it that's the time that you

01:21:42 turned up it that's the time that you say but then they were still there still and delaying and getting briefed of what what's going to happen but they they sort of were about the same time do you know or do you do you recall that the

01:21:57 know or do you do you recall that the fire was declared a major incident I did hear it later on it was declared during in June incident I heard stay at

01:22:08 during in June incident I heard stay at big made a major instant right now we have a time of that at O 206 did your conversation with Tom Goodell and he came over and took over fast vocal guidance - that was that before or after

01:22:19 guidance - that was that before or after the incident had been declared a major incident so I can't I can't recall when when I found out okay then you go on in

01:22:34 when I found out okay then you go on in the second paragraph on page five I can just ask you to look at it to describe that how you were told to transfer the information that you'd taken to a grid

01:22:46 information that you'd taken to a grid system where each row was a floor you say then we could see who we had in there we got this up and running quite quickly I took photographs with my mobile phone of these boards and I think

01:22:58 mobile phone of these boards and I think probably the third time lucky can I do have to be asked and ask you please to look at de G for please just just look

01:23:15 look at de G for please just just look at that it is is that what you're referring to is yes right and how how long did it take to get that up and running you think it was it was very

01:23:28 running you think it was it was very quick it was the guys didn't misspell you know they think they've got that up and they transferred it over while still

01:23:40 and they transferred it over while still taking calls coming in

01:23:44 okay um you then say in the last paragraph on page 5 of your statement I

01:23:56 paragraph on page 5 of your statement I said the advice was still to stay put

01:24:01 but I said we needed to get the residents out who did you say that to

01:24:16 I think I say it's Tom Riddle I'll just think it wise in the context of that but let's look at the wider context the

01:24:27 let's look at the wider context the paragraph before where you refer some people from divide any height and then you explain Tom Goodell what's what you had a firefighter at the base of the tower on the car bonnet passing someone

01:24:38 tower on the car bonnet passing someone passing information to someone inside the tower relating it to the bridge head to deploy be a cruise you say you decided you would take that process over so that's the context ok so to repeat

01:24:51 so that's the context ok so to repeat the question who did you tell that your that you needed to get the residents out some could have Tom good did he react

01:25:04 some could have Tom good did he react Tom Tom Tom could have went to the

01:25:15 Tom Tom Tom could have went to the command unit that was the instant command vehicle to discuss the stay-put policy of alleged believe big letters I

01:25:27 policy of alleged believe big letters I don't know if it's you I don't think it is it my statement I'm available a1 one of the phone calls happens is from control and that then Marik is holding and demo is says to me this controls

01:25:40 and demo is says to me this controls jobs to the watch of control and they they want to know that the state policy is still in place really what's going on can we change it so I made the comment

01:25:52 can we change it so I made the comment to stand to tell them that I'm telling people to get out the building but to change the policy but to change the procedure they need to speak to the command officer in charge I can't change

01:26:04 command officer in charge I can't change that even though we're doing five five of guidance that isn't in my power to do that so I told them that they had to get contacts the insert tomorrow vehicle

01:26:15 contacts the insert tomorrow vehicle and who was in who was the incident commander at that stage you know I don't I'm sorry that I know who the insulin was I know it's Andy but I know it was

01:26:26 was I know it's Andy but I know it was only right at the end and I believe it was Richard Welch when I came to when I attended and I believe it to be an tiro at the end of the incident

01:26:38 at the end of the incident I didn't hear who was in charge at that level

01:26:42 level whatever just backing up a little bit to the first sentence of this paragraph I said the advice was still to stay put but I said we needed to get the residents out you said you said that to

01:26:54 residents out you said you said that to Tom Goodall and then he went to speak to the incident command pump I think it's what you that's not that yeah do you know who he spoke to at the incident cut down on that did he tell you what his

01:27:07 down on that did he tell you what his view was about whether the staples advice should be changed at that stage he agreed that it should be evacuation right what roughly what kind of time was

01:27:20 right what roughly what kind of time was it that Tom Goodell went to speak to the incident commander to communicate his view and yours that the statehood advice should be changed

01:27:35 oh I'm sorry I'm just really bad with times it just

01:27:47 when Tom Tom took over the Oviatt we had a I gave him a brief of what we had what we was doing tom was very good with regards to you know we carry on with

01:27:58 regards to you know we carry on with what we're doing the product the way we're prioritizing it but let's get it on to this bald and then I'm not sure if I had a conversation with him then about

01:28:12 I had a conversation with him then about what we needs what and this is this is my opinion what I believe we needed to do we need to just evacuate the building because we won't get anything back with regards to what information we was put

01:28:23 regards to what information we was put through there was obviously under the cost you know the guys up there you could tell just probably at their building know that everybody's largely in danger

01:28:32 in danger you know residents firefighters everybody and it was a case of they just needed to get out that was my opinion and go I am the station manager and I

01:28:43 and go I am the station manager and I will I can sort of challenge a little bit above and I can give comments that but I can't make them decisions do you know how roughly how long after

01:28:54 do you know how roughly how long after the fire had been declared a major incident that Tom Goodell went to have this conversation with the the incident commander about changing the stay-put advice did it

01:29:11 advice did it occur to you as usual or unusual that the incident would have been declared a major incident but the statehood advice was still stay put

01:29:23 was still stay put I haven't hadn't been changed the no because it that the major incident is to do with the resources to to enter sort

01:29:37 do with the resources to to enter sort of bring the incident to a safe conclusion where I'm focused purely on the fire fire guidance side of it I'm not I'm not focusing on the other 101

01:29:53 not I'm not focusing on the other 101 things that the incident command has got to think of what he's got what they've got to manage so the time frame is I'm probably a bit tunnel vision and what I'm what I'm dealing with and some major

01:30:06 I'm what I'm dealing with and some major incident you could tell that we needed resources that that wasn't a that's like a no-brainer think that was a good call really the state policy and the state

01:30:17 really the state policy and the state but you know in my opinion it's just it should have been it should have been changed we should decide it's doing things to to get map but then also I

01:30:28 things to to get map but then also I don't know what the Bo crews are doing I just hands up I don't know they could have been doing that at the foot of page 11 if we just look at it together mr. Egan you say having having described

01:30:42 mr. Egan you say having having described your discussions with Tom Goodell about stay put and his trip to the incident commander you say I said the same thing too station manager Pete Wilson done over the radio which could be widely heard I also said it in the command unit

01:30:57 did Pete wolf and and acknowledge just a minute I think you've got the wrong page I think you did 11 you probably meant I made my I did mean 5 I'm so sorry

01:31:10 just all that hidden on the right one thank you very much I've been to two task-focused I think yeah at the foot of page 5 of 11 he said I say this I said

01:31:21 page 5 of 11 he said I say this I said the same thing to ascend people from doing over the radio which could be widely heard I also said it in the command unit mr. Egan my question is did people from done acknowledge what you

01:31:34 people from done acknowledge what you were saying over the radio it HS agree with you and II agree Jess right do you know what he did about about it people for the named uptaking was now sort of

01:31:47 for the named uptaking was now sort of the concept for the information coming from the command unit to the base of the tower and in that information four five five requirements to go to the bridgehead right so people didn't was

01:32:00 bridgehead right so people didn't was trying to put pressure on the bridgehead commander to not only sort of get cruising but to go just the specific

01:32:12 cruising but to go just the specific flats that we need to go to

01:32:18 and you say here that you and thought that over it was the right thing to do to overrule the stay-put advice what

01:32:31 to overrule the stay-put advice what what advice do you think should be given instead to residents who were on fire survival guidance calls

01:32:47 side of them

01:32:53 so boss what was what some a union we would have members of public would be managed to get through and asked they'd be asking for help

01:33:04 be asking for help they'd be on the phone we had police officers there that I've got people asking him and my advice to them was you

01:33:16 asking him and my advice to them was you know for them if they were on the phone to the people is to get out of building because and I know it was against what they should have been doing or what I was told to do but you know if in the

01:33:32 was told to do but you know if in the situation there was our tolerance gap so I was I was doing what I felt was right right and did you know anything about

01:33:43 right and did you know anything about how they would get out no I said I tried to advise some of the people by saying yeah you got keep low yeah and I did

01:33:56 yeah you got keep low yeah and I did speak to somebody on the phone and I was just trying to try to be calm say no you've got you've got your time just just get few door belongings that you need there get yourself low open the

01:34:07 need there get yourself low open the door slowly if it's really smoky look for where you the fire exit is and then make your way but you are safer getting out did you at that stage have any

01:34:22 out did you at that stage have any information about what the conditions in the lobbies and the stairwell inside the building were well on one of my visits into this into the tower I heard rumors

01:34:38 into this into the tower I heard rumors that there was some people or some bodies on the stairs but from being in fires as a fire fire going in with hose into sort of sitting you know flat fires

01:34:51 into sort of sitting you know flat fires for example I know that there's the hose is going to be all over the place I know it's gonna be difficult for people to come down it's difficult for firefighters wearing be a walking down stairs with all the hose and and things

01:35:03 stairs with all the hose and and things like that

01:35:05 like that but it was just I couldn't speak to somebody or give somebody advice to stay put when looking at the tower as it went on and on you could see that it was

01:35:17 on and on you could see that it was jumping between it some flex it missed the flap so you just knew my opinion my experience for all the years is that they would have been better off out

01:35:31 there just continuing with this theme if you go to the top of page 6 of your statement please mr. Egan you you say during the incident I also took a couple

01:35:42 during the incident I also took a couple of calls from control but I can't remember exactly when they happened this is the top of page six

01:35:57 do you know and you say I took a couple of calls do you know how you received those calls but that was that on your radio or so these these this is a call

01:36:08 radio or so these these this is a call from that's probably it so that's bit sort of perhaps poetic license if Dan Merrick would take the call on the mobile telephone right because I was there on the on in charge at the time

01:36:19 there on the on in charge at the time he's relaying what's being said robbed in him just giving me the phone he's saying control which I mentioned they're just identical if there's any confusion

01:36:30 just identical if there's any confusion but our controller is it in Merton but on it on this night in question it had fallen back to Stratford for maintenance or something so that's why the officer

01:36:42 or something so that's why the officer from Stratford the officer at watch phoned up so these are just from phone calls from control wanting to know what's this can we do anything about their what's happened me the first

01:36:53 their what's happened me the first twelve Gardens calls was one of them and it was we're dealing with him as a coming in we're trying to allocate things and probably the most important one really was from the officer the

01:37:04 one really was from the officer the watch wanting to know about changing the strategy right can I just follow up what you just told us and to see if I can piece it together so the officer of the

01:37:15 piece it together so the officer of the watch is at Stratford yep do you know did you know his name or her name no and he or she speaks by mobile site speak'st him Daniel Merrick yeah on

01:37:29 site speak'st him Daniel Merrick yeah on his mobile phone oh yeah I'm no come on Janice mobile phone sorry yes oh it's not his personalized person I see and Daniel Merrick at this stage is what's

01:37:40 Daniel Merrick at this stage is what's his role on the command unit he's one of the watch managers who's supporting me trying to do what I could do he was mainly liaison with control if I

01:37:52 he was mainly liaison with control if I remember rightly and taking details of any Fast Five God's calls it was coming through okay so the mobile is it a mobile telephone on the on the CEO or a rate or something

01:38:03 rate or something the mobile telephone when I was talkin right would it be unusual for the control room to communicate with the command unit by mobile telephone it

01:38:15 command unit by mobile telephone it wouldn't be unusual if you see if he was from the fire grounds back to control as a bit frowned upon because people were listening in to messages and they won't know what guess seen see what's

01:38:28 know what guess seen see what's happening but the other way around you had the officer in charge yes they double that really this one time a conversation so they're not going to do that over the main screen radio does they want to you know they want to speak

01:38:39 they want to you know they want to speak to you find out exactly what you're doing

01:38:41 doing I see if does that make sense yes it's the price of potentially the private cool yeah private cool but it's just easier to talk about on Marvin the from me over receives you know doing

01:38:54 from me over receives you know doing that on the radio you just have the conversation together it's Quinn and this means I'm just wondering you've got a little bit further to get I have EMG would it be convenient to have a five minutes that's a good idea and then

01:39:06 minutes that's a good idea and then we'll see how and the rest of the afternoon is going good idea would that be all right mr. chairman yes perfect I think we ought to have a short break now mr. Egan so I'm going to rise we'll

01:39:17 mr. Egan so I'm going to rise we'll start again at quarter to 4:00 and then we'll see whether it's the awesome it takes right

01:39:37 you

01:47:50 right mr. Egan's on his way I think yes thank you

01:48:10 all right mr. hedges thank you for my reason to go on Thank You mr. egan you told us quite a lot of information about the the writing on the wall in the foyer and you took a picture of that and you

01:48:21 and you took a picture of that and you told us all about that information my question is do you know the name of the watch manager who was writing that list on the wall in the for a night don't I

01:48:36 on the wall in the for a night don't I believe people wouldn't probably know the name of the person if that helps it's all right you see if I can I don't want to create a memory but let me see if I can jog

01:48:48 a memory but let me see if I can jog your memory does the name Glen Williams mean anything to you does that trigger a memory it does it does sound familiar all right yeah can I take you back to your statement and turn to page six

01:49:01 your statement and turn to page six please and look at the fourth paragraph down which starts I then went to meet

01:49:14 down which starts I then went to meet people from dal in the tower to brief him where was he do you remember in the tower Pete was in

01:49:25 do you remember in the tower Pete was in there he was at the ground floor of the tower which was near where the sort of site at the base of the stairs near where the information was okay and he

01:49:38 where the information was okay and he then said I explained the new setup we had and what he should do and then you go on to say I said that the command unit would receive the information from the control room and record it

01:49:49 the control room and record it I would then prioritize the calls for assistance I would then pass this on to him telling him which flats needed to be attended in it and then he had to relay this to group manager Richard Welch on the bridgehead in those three lines is

01:50:02 the bridgehead in those three lines is that the system the new set up that you described to Pete Wilson done yeah it was Pete was now gonna the ice I wasn't

01:50:13 was Pete was now gonna the ice I wasn't ordering him you know what he was going to do that but that's where he was gonna fit into our structure yeah but just in terms of what the new setup was it is what you've described in those

01:50:26 was it is what you've described in those three lines what then you said that was better yes yes yes okay now just in terms of that new set up the command unit would receive the information from the control room and record it and then

01:50:39 the control room and record it and then you would prioritize the calls for assistance how would you prioritize the calls what system would you use to prioritize calls

01:50:58 so we're on the basis of those that were most vulnerable so young children people mobility issues people that couldn't

01:51:09 mobility issues people that couldn't make their own way out of the premises old age people that would have difficulties bearing in mind we know it's gonna be difficult because of the stairs etc and also an obvious is the

01:51:21 stairs etc and also an obvious is the smoke I know that but to get people through these stairs is going to take you know a little bit of a care to get through and you couldn't just allow people to do that you'd need to go and

01:51:33 people to do that you'd need to go and rescue them to get them through and how would you know whether particular individuals were priority individuals so that would come through under the

01:51:45 that would come through under the information for control control would speak to the people on the phone the residents on the phone and they would gather that information for us so they would tell us you know whether they

01:51:56 would tell us you know whether they whether they were I don't know if there wasn't he paid for them but I'd say you know they're bedridden I've got my really issues other young children I know people on medication that need assistance out and under that new system

01:52:13 assistance out and under that new system with the prioritization done in the way you've described how how would that information then be communicated from cu7 where you were to the bridgehead so

01:52:28 cu7 where you were to the bridgehead so so what happened was we we have on the graph of what we had you know who was there I would then radio through to Pete worden

01:52:36 worden and giving him perhaps two or three flat numbers on a particular floor and then give him a couple of minutes to process that and then give him a little bit more

01:52:48 that and then give him a little bit more information the message come back that we can't do anything at the moment because there was too much information coming through they're still waiting to

01:53:00 coming through they're still waiting to brief the crews to go in right but under the system then so Pete Wolfington would be what in the tower and you would be in the CEO yes and you would communicate by radio yeah

01:53:11 would communicate by radio yeah I see and what and Pete where would Pete Wolfen Dan under this new system be standing in the tower so he received those from you so we got to this stage

01:53:23 those from you so we got to this stage where we're getting all this information in we've we've set up a priority we can see what what we've what we've got and we're adding to that every moment I'm

01:53:36 we're adding to that every moment I'm then radio fruits to Pete to give that information it then comes back that there nothing's happening you know there's too much information I can't keep giving because all of a sudden

01:53:47 keep giving because all of a sudden everything sort of starts to become a priority there's too much information so I go to the base of the tower again to try and have a face-to-face conversation with Pete let's try and get a feel of is

01:53:58 with Pete let's try and get a feel of is there a better way that we can do this is there something else we can do to try and get this information is it like I said I know the crews we're going in I know they were doing their bit but I'm

01:54:10 know they were doing their bit but I'm focused on fast valve guidance how I'm wanting to do more and they probably can't do any more but it's what I I want does it does that make sense --is I want

01:54:21 does it does that make sense --is I want him to keep going yeah and I'm sure they were but you're gonna get to a stage where there's too many firefighters trying to get through a small gap to go just in terms of the system I just want

01:54:32 just in terms of the system I just want to get a feel for what Pete we're put people fund and was supposed to be it under your system and what he was then supposed to do with the information so he was he the idea was they what he

01:54:43 he was he the idea was they what he would stand in the foyer of the tower and receive your message by radio host at which the initial okay and then what he what was he supposed she do next what

01:54:54 he what was he supposed she do next what was he supposed to do next so he was saying to give that to the whoever was in charge of the bridgehead when Pete first goes to the base of the tower and

01:55:06 first goes to the base of the tower and Tom Goodell takes over from me

01:55:11 I then go to the back into the tower to speak to P to show him what cycle explained to exactly what what I've gone so we've got a list in the command unit

01:55:23 so we've got a list in the command unit he's standing near the wall with information on it and there's the crew manager that's there with it as well order what surrounds oh and that's where we have this conversation the command

01:55:35 we have this conversation the command and control who's gonna be in it Tom good all but I'm going to be taking it Tom's gonna be overseeing it we give it to you Pete and impeach gonna tell the bridgeheads which which flat on which

01:55:47 bridgeheads which which flat on which floor to go through and their priority just taking it in stages would Pete will fund and record the information that he was receiving from you in in cu7 I don't

01:56:00 was receiving from you in in cu7 I don't know I don't know if you did record it I don't I couldn't say I don't know ever he recorded it all I know is that he passed it on that information okay and how did he pass it on by radio right

01:56:12 how did he pass it on by radio right yeah right okay so right so just at that stage we've got the new system which was control room to see you seven see seven to Pete Wilson done by radio in the

01:56:23 to Pete Wilson done by radio in the foyer and then peopleand and from the foyer to the bridgehead again by radio that's right right what was the point of having people's London as an intermediate link in the chain of

01:56:35 intermediate link in the chain of communication between cu7 and the bridgehead because there's there's just too much information this there was too many fire survival guidance calls if there was one or two calls it would just go from the command

01:56:48 calls it would just go from the command unit we'd go straight to the bridgehead and in the bridgehead would then delegate firefighters to go to so that flat or that floor because there was so

01:56:59 flat or that floor because there was so many the bridgeheads got you know they've got their things I have to do their safety systems of work they've got to prepare make sure that the BA crews are safe before they go in they've got to take a gauge of the smoke in the

01:57:11 to take a gauge of the smoke in the building because I think the third or fourth time I go in the bridgehead is now moved to the ground floor

01:57:20 yeah so things would change in order to some backed will come to that we need to yes I understand I did what I decide I have interrupted your first that's okay sorry so it sounds as if that the logic of having

01:57:32 sounds as if that the logic of having more links in the chain was driven by the the volume of fire survival guidance calls being received that is that right yeah I think I think the structure was a

01:57:46 yeah I think I think the structure was a little bit stretched out before we've because we had too many different people taking margin sake technophiles violence calls now we had one specific unit that was taking it and then that information

01:57:57 was taking it and then that information was being passed to the base of the tower and under the new system with people from donors the link in the chain between cu7 and the bridgehead did any

01:58:08 between cu7 and the bridgehead did any information come back from the bridgehead to Pete Wilson done in the FOIA about the success or lack of success of any be a deployment no no

01:58:19 success of any be a deployment no no information came back to to Pete regarding any successful deployments did the information come back to see you 7 from the bridgehead in any other way

01:58:30 from the bridgehead in any other way about the success or lack of success of any individual deployment not a lot from the bridgehead well from what some Tom Goodell found out that there was welfare

01:58:45 Goodell found out that there was welfare centers set up I think it was three separate welfare centers so so he had a I think he had to watch managers that he had them going around and speaking to

01:58:57 had them going around and speaking to people that were there and that's what's recorded on one of the on the fact that we've seen a few times on the left-hand side with the numbers and the flats that's where we got that information

01:59:08 that's where we got that information from okay I'm going to come back to that just a moment because I'm gonna follow that up if I can but before I do can I do sauce key one or two further questions first of all who at that stage

01:59:20 questions first of all who at that stage when you'd set up this new system of communication was in charge of the bridgehead do you remember

01:59:30 when we when we first when it when it was first set out I believed it to still be watch manager D'Souza it's only when I went into the tower and I saw pet

01:59:44 I went into the tower and I saw pet goggle and Richard Welch in dirt in there and that's when I found it and I think I believe a game that Richard Welch was the brigade commander okay

01:59:56 Welch was the brigade commander okay okay in charge of the lobby successful and once they were in place did you did you speak to them about FST communications at all I did I did Jay what was that discussion

02:00:23 the discussion was I wanted them to commit more crews in it's a safe safer life and I probably said it in a in a

02:00:36 life and I probably said it in a in a way that challenge that maybe but I was told that I was told they are doing it you know is it foot but yeah but it just

02:00:49 you know is it foot but yeah but it just didn't feel like they were why didn't it feel like they were because we won't get any information back so everything I was giving them I was getting nothing coming back the guys on the command unit are

02:01:03 back the guys on the command unit are getting stressed out even they're thinking you know can they put sets on no have we not got enough people to go in can we not come in but it's just things changed you know the bridgehead

02:01:14 things changed you know the bridgehead had to move down you can't just you have to be know they've done they probably done the right thing these guys by the commanding and controlling the numbers of BA that went up the tower but to me

02:01:27 of BA that went up the tower but to me as I said it's that's how I felt I just wanted to keep going and just tell me come back to me and tell me yeah we've sent a crew or we haven't sent a crew we won't get my information back did they

02:01:38 won't get my information back did they that's pretty expended they tell you why they weren't sending information back to you about the success or failure of a deployment of being where it no they didn't did you press them for a reason

02:01:51 didn't did you press them for a reason as to why you weren't getting that information back from them hey we're not when I had this or I made the comments to them that that's what I wanted

02:02:02 to them that that's what I wanted people from didn't says that he's already spoke to about it they've just moved the bridgehead so hopefully they're going to start committing crews again

02:02:14 just focusing on the question of you in cu7 receiving feedback from the bridgehead about successful or unsuccessful deployments can I just

02:02:25 unsuccessful deployments can I just press your little dick did you did you push Welch or Golborne to give you that information I didn't push them one plus it I did speak to them and it was frustration

02:02:37 speak to them and it was frustration which I'm sure everybody was frustrated at the time what I did do is I pushed people for them for answers who did you push for answers people for them because

02:02:48 push for answers people for them because I'm giving people I'm giving Pete information and he's not giving it back to me right when he's pushed he says he hasn't got it do you know whether Pete will fund impressed Richard Welch and Pat go home

02:03:01 impressed Richard Welch and Pat go home for feedback as to the success or failure of any deploy need a Jeff and what was what did did you know from him that they had told him I think that

02:03:16 that they had told him I think that there was a unlettered belief well on pizza there was a discussion between P and which Welch similar similar vein people wants bi crews committed into

02:03:29 people wants bi crews committed into what was saying we want them to go and Richard Welch and wishing wells they're controlling how many people go through and the resources that they've got

02:03:43 that's it that's that conversation that they had to the heated discussion was overheard by whoever the crew manager or the watch manager that was writing on

02:03:54 the watch manager that was writing on the wall and that affected that individual because when I came into the tower he was physically or visibly upset

02:04:07 tower he was physically or visibly upset angry and I tried to I thought he was just it was the the pressure of everything that was going on he didn't feel as if he had any support so I tried to speak to him and it was clear that

02:04:20 to speak to him and it was clear that something had happened that to make him change from be really helpful before he was quiet I'm so upset probably angry but controlled and he overheard the

02:04:34 but controlled and he overheard the conversation or the probably the heated conversation between Pete Wolfington and Richard Welch who you you tell us the

02:04:48 Richard Welch who you you tell us the name of the watch manager who had overheard that conversation that's what I thought I don't know if you if it was if it was that Kevin Williams the guy left it leaves the incident ground a

02:04:59 left it leaves the incident ground a little bit later on

02:05:06 okay

02:05:12 you

02:05:19 if you then look at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7 of your statement

02:05:26 you say to them in the second last line of page 6 I said we need to get people upstairs but I was told they worked

02:05:38 upstairs but I was told they worked flooding the tower with firefighters I spoke to Greek manager Richard Welch a group manager Pat Goulbourne who were in charge on the bridgehead and said we need to get people out they said we're doing it I said all these calls are

02:05:49 doing it I said all these calls are coming through we need to get people out and they repeated we are doing it I told Pete Wolfington that they were snowed under

02:05:57 under and he said they thought they would start pushing through we looked at a bit of that discussion my question is was

02:06:09 of that discussion my question is was your impression of that discussion that group managers Welsh and global now agreed that evacuation was the right strategy no that wasn't what what the

02:06:25 strategy no that wasn't what what the discussion was that they need I I wanted Amy to commit I wanted them to commit be a cruise to a specific flat that people

02:06:37 a cruise to a specific flat that people from his tolerant that's that was my priority wasn't it yeah I know they had other things to do but then I needed that feedback if they couldn't do it then I needed that's to let me know my sushi me so it wasn't the in fact right

02:06:50 sushi me so it wasn't the in fact right the whole premise that I understand super so when you say we need to get people out it's you mean do you getting specific people out which are targeted in response to the specific FSG

02:07:03 in response to the specific FSG information you were getting as opposed to overall evacuation is that the words I use there is probably exactly the words I used at the time and it was and

02:07:15 words I used at the time and it was and it was meant that a bit of both really I think we needed to get the people out and they were to group managers at the base of the tower

02:07:27 do you know whether this discussion that you had with them Welsh and Goulbourne was before or after the statement advice was formally but revoked

02:07:46 earth

02:07:52 I think that conversation was after that was revoked and the only reason because we're the command unit would have been told from control that they're changing

02:08:04 told from control that they're changing the strategy I wasn't I wasn't in the command unit even I supposed to I was party to the conversation with control that said we're I'm saying we need to

02:08:16 that said we're I'm saying we need to change it you need to switch the innocent commander when it is eventually changed I'm not in the command unit when

02:08:28 changed I'm not in the command unit when that happens because I I'm at the tower so when I come back all of a sudden it just gets mentioned in past and if that makes sense because we would still

02:08:39 makes sense because we would still thought we was telling one to get out anyway you know say it was like mentioned both changed

02:08:51 from the time when you were in the tower did you well let me just ask you where were you when you were at the tower so the base of the tower so just by at the bottom of the stairs

02:09:03 so just by at the bottom of the stairs and so through the first cut times I think for them the the main exit but in Avatar hats going for the side where we'd made access through lots of glass

02:09:16 we'd made access through lots of glass vision panels did you go up to the bridge head at all only when I've done my hand over at the end at the end of my involvement with the incident right and

02:09:27 involvement with the incident right and when you were in the tower at the base of the tower did you did you see firefighters being dispatched cute or queuing up to go up to the bridge head

02:09:38 queuing up to go up to the bridge head yeah there was loads of firefighters there was there was five serves firefighters on the the grounds wait at that at the base of the stairs there was

02:09:50 that at the base of the stairs there was firefighters on the mezzanine floor that led into the internal corridor and I think there was a few firefighters yeah

02:10:02 think there was a few firefighters yeah there was a few firefighters standing out in the side where the side exit our side entrance was being made because I was making the cutting of glass out that the window yes and did you get any

02:10:14 the window yes and did you get any impression from what you saw of the numbers of firefighters queueing up to go up into the tower that yeah there was lunch

02:10:21 lunch there's loads of firefighters I was up standing there but it was just it was it was quiet

02:10:30 eerily

02:10:46 if you go to page seven of your statement and look at paragraph two you

02:10:57 say that you advise people from done that you that he should ask me for more information if he needed it and they went back to the command unit you explain that and then you you say four

02:11:14 explain that and then you you say four lines up from the bottom of that paragraph we were getting loads of lots of calls but I knew we weren't getting lots of firefighters into the tower so the approach had to be structured and

02:11:27 the approach had to be structured and then you say I decided we should get everyone everyone out below the seventh floor people phoned and said I know I said forget stay put policy if it's safe to get them out and get then get out

02:11:38 to get them out and get then get out from the outside I could see that the flats were being engulfed in flames

02:11:47 and first of all what do you know why you mentioned the seventh floor because when you looked at the building it was

02:11:59 when you looked at the building it was above the seventh floor that it was in effect all alike whereas below the seventh floor you know I think there might have been one or two flats that were affected they it was trying to

02:12:14 were affected they it was trying to remember what it looked like it looked like there was like a clear line that from the seventh floor up here might be from the 8th floor and that's why I said the 7th floor - it's so clear

02:12:25 the 7th floor - it's so clear what I'm thinking there is if we even know those people in them lower floors aren't any effect just if we start getting them out you know it might show

02:12:37 getting them out you know it might show that everybody can get out that's my thought process if we start doing there with it

02:12:42 with it there isn't much smoke well I believe there wasn't much smoke and bit on the other hand group managers Welch and

02:12:54 other hand group managers Welch and Goldberg had said that they were they were getting people out they were doing it as as you said and those are higher floors were they they were it's just it's it's your perceptions it so it was

02:13:06 it's it's your perceptions it so it was really horrible and you outside it's all kicking off yeah from the outside it's it's devastation and then you've got all

02:13:20 it's devastation and then you've got all these firefighters that are trying to get into the building and they can't just walk in because the amount of stuff that's falling down eventually say you know they've realized getting in the police done a brilliant job with a

02:13:31 police done a brilliant job with a shields helping us that I brilliant job getting a scene so he was going for a little gap so even even I could get through flow I mean it was not really tight you couldn't just run in for a

02:13:42 tight you couldn't just run in for a doorway and then once they was in there wasn't this carpet but it was a calmness it was like there was pleased that they've got in and out they're going to do st. but it was just quiet and all the

02:13:54 do st. but it was just quiet and all the firefighters were just lined up and no there was no one jostling for position there was a laughing and joking notice people talking but it was the whole block was quiet you couldn't hear the fire Eddie

02:14:06 quiet you couldn't hear the fire Eddie from that was going on outside it was it was really really weird it's it's like it changed people got inside and it was

02:14:19 it changed people got inside and it was this the firefighters were waiting first honk mr. Egan I'm going to ask the Chairman to stop now for the rest of the

02:14:30 Chairman to stop now for the rest of the day I think if that's I've got a little bit more to go not not much more but I

02:14:41 bit more to go not not much more but I think mr. Egan's had a long day and and rightly braised if you were to tell I

02:14:54 rightly braised if you were to tell I should trim you all questions with that no and I think given that and given that I know that mr. Egan has had had a long day I think I think it's right that we should rise know if mr. chairman that's

02:15:05 should rise know if mr. chairman that's acceptable to you and we can resume tomorrow yes well you heard that exchange mistreatment I'm afraid mr. man it's got some more questions and it's not going to be ten minutes but I hope it's not going to be too long I think it

02:15:18 it's not going to be too long I think it would be in your interests and everyone else is that we stop now I'm gonna have to ask you to come back tomorrow and I hope that's not too inconvenient that's well get to your

02:15:34 inconvenient that's well get to your evidence as quickly as we can okay and ten o'clock well mr. chairman I just I wonder whether on this occasion I might make an application might we state might be say 9:30 or 9:45 and I'll try and trim my

02:15:46 9:30 or 9:45 and I'll try and trim my questions

02:15:47 questions they say that I went to take mr. Egan well maybe I need to tomorrow morning he'll come in from Dagenham did you say Rochefort

02:15:56 Rochefort no sorry geography is it difficult for you to get your last fine how about that's fine that's okay I'm inclined to suggest and the sooner you start the sooner you'll get away there

02:16:07 start the sooner you'll get away there so should we say how FAR's nice alright for you so thank you well we'll stop there thank you and resume at half past 9:00 tomorrow no talking about your

02:16:18 9:00 tomorrow no talking about your every night of course thank you the hot box 9:00 tomorrow please

02:16:33 yep you