Closing statements from London Fire Commissioner, Mayor of London, and Government addressing failures in emergency response framework, RBKC's inadequate humanitarian assistance, and systemic issues in resilience preparedness.
00:00:25 [Music] now the next statement is going to be made by miss emma collins on behalf of the london fire commissioner mrs collins we'd like to come up to the lectern and we'll be pleased to hear you
00:00:36 lectern and we'll be pleased to hear you thank you
00:00:40 good afternoon sir mr stefan and mr akbar
00:00:45 akbar the london fire commissioner is acutely aware of the suffering and distress of the bereaved survivors and residents in the aftermath of the fire having heard about their experiences in
00:00:57 having heard about their experiences in his meetings with the grenfell community groups
00:01:01 groups and again in their powerful evidence in module four their experience shows that the framework for responding to emergencies in london
00:01:11 in london failed them in the aftermath of the fire in these brief closing submissions on behalf of the london fire commissioner we wish to start with a general point
00:01:22 we wish to start with a general point about the role of the london fire brigade within the resilience framework before touching upon two issues arising from the evidence as it developed throughout module four
00:01:35 throughout module four first the role and function of the london resilience group and secondly the critical importance of accurate information gathering and sharing
00:01:49 the london fire brigade fulfills two functions within the resilience framework
00:01:55 framework firstly and most obviously its role as a category 1 responder under the civil contingencies act which requires no further explanation or discussion for the purposes of this
00:02:07 discussion for the purposes of this module
00:02:10 module secondly
00:02:11 secondly together with the greater london authority
00:02:13 authority and london local authorities the london fire commissioner jointly funds and governs the london resilience group to act on their behalf to coordinate and
00:02:25 to act on their behalf to coordinate and support resilience in london the fire brigade acts as the host of the london resilience group which means that it employs london
00:02:36 which means that it employs london resilience group staff and provides them with their office space at london fire brigade headquarters with all of the administrative and human resource support that comes with that
00:02:49 support that comes with that but the cost for that is split between the three organizations who fund the london resilience group as i've explained the fire brigade the greater london authority and london local authorities
00:03:03 and london local authorities i don't propose to rehearse the foundation and development of these arrangements which were touched upon in our opening written statement and also that of the mayor of london and also
00:03:14 that of the mayor of london and also dealt with in detail in the witness statement of john hetherington what i do wish to touch upon which leads to the first issue arising from the evidence
00:03:26 arising from the evidence is the remit of the london resilience group
00:03:30 group at times in module 4 there was a tendency by witnesses to conflate or confuse the component parts of london resilience the brand as john
00:03:42 resilience the brand as john hetherington described it in his evidence to the inquiry this in turn risks creating or fostering confusion
00:03:51 confusion about the scope of the london resilience groups remit by way of clarification and i hope not undue repetition
00:04:02 undue repetition the broader london resilience term or brand encompasses three elements first the london resilience forum
00:04:13 first the london resilience forum which is as you know a local resilience forum within the meaning of the civil contingencies act which is chaired by the deputy mayor for fire and resilience and which is responsible for setting the
00:04:26 and which is responsible for setting the strategy and objectives for resilience in london
00:04:31 in london secondly the london resilience partnership which is a term rather than an entity as such which groups together all the agencies involved in emergency response and preparedness
00:04:43 response and preparedness including category one and two responders and thirdly the london resilience group which as i've already stated is tasked with supporting and coordinating
00:04:56 with supporting and coordinating resilience in london and it does this principally by carrying out three related functions first it provides business and
00:05:07 first it provides business and secretariat support and administrative structure for the london resilience forum
00:05:15 secondly it provides support for the london local authority gold arrangements which are governed by the london local authorities panel and thirdly
00:05:27 and thirdly the london resilience group provides the secretariat for the strategic coordination group a multi-agency group established when a major incident has been declared
00:05:40 been declared the london resilience group is a team of approximately 20 people currently headed by john hetherington who is one of three deputy heads at the time of the grenfell tower fire
00:05:52 time of the grenfell tower fire all of whom were involved in supporting the response indeed the entire staff was involved in in supporting the response to the grenfell tower fire he attended the inquiry to give live
00:06:04 he attended the inquiry to give live evidence during module 4 in addition to the comprehensive and detailed witness statements and numerous exhibits that he provided
00:06:14 the detailed witness statements of his colleagues toby gould matthew hogan and hamish cameron were also read into the record
00:06:23 record those statements reveal the scale and intensity of the work carried out by london resilience group in supporting and coordinating the work of those london resilience partners with
00:06:35 london resilience partners with emergency obligations in the aftermath of the grenfell tower fire
00:06:42 by its very nature the work of the london resilience group does not involve deployment of personnel on the ground or any active involvement in the operational response or its
00:06:54 in the operational response or its overriding strategy in general terms the london resilience groups work in the aftermath of the fire included
00:07:04 included firstly providing the secretariat for the strategic coordination group which was led by the metropolitan police service although initially the initial meeting was chaired by the london fire
00:07:16 meeting was chaired by the london fire brigade
00:07:17 brigade and that group met multiple times a day in the first week after the fire it also provided varying degrees of support for the various subgroups
00:07:29 support for the various subgroups established in support of the strategic coordination group and that included the london resilience communications group the humanitarian assistance group the mass fatalities
00:07:40 assistance group the mass fatalities coordination group and the scientific and technical advice cell in addition the london resilience group supported the london local authority
00:07:51 supported the london local authority gold arrangements those arrangements and the nature and timing of their invocation in the immediate aftermath of the fire were the subject of extensive questioning in
00:08:02 subject of extensive questioning in module four it's important to be clear that the london resilience group is not responsible for the decision as to when and how the lag arrangements are
00:08:13 and how the lag arrangements are activated
00:08:15 activated but rather it assists in bringing together and updating the key players while setting up and coordinating the london local authority's coordination center or lac to support them
00:08:29 center or lac to support them as john hetherington described in his evidence
00:08:32 evidence in its paradigm form there was no pseudo organization of london local or authority gold that had access to any greater resources than were already
00:08:43 greater resources than were already available to any other borough at a time of incident that they could ask for directly themselves when the inquiry considers the initial views of the london resilience group as
00:08:56 views of the london resilience group as to the actions of the royal borough of kensington and chelsea and the need to activate the lag arrangements it may wish to bear in mind the narrow scope of the lag arrangements in principle rather
00:09:08 the lag arrangements in principle rather than the more expansive shape they ultimately took as john hetherington described in evidence the grenfell tower fire represented a unique set of
00:09:19 represented a unique set of circumstances and he explained that john baradel's involvement probably pushed the boundaries both of the lag arrangements and what we were asking people to do in
00:09:30 and what we were asking people to do in terms of coming in support in such a large-scale incident and almost run the show for nicholas holgate in response he explained that the words takeover and
00:09:41 he explained that the words takeover and intervention were only ever used in conjunction with the local authority gold arrangements in relation to the grenfell tower fire and only afterwards
00:09:52 grenfell tower fire and only afterwards they were never in the vocabulary of the lag arrangements before then the evidence of the witnesses from central government specifically dr farah and dame melanie dawes as was john
00:10:04 and dame melanie dawes as was john baradel has revealed in greater detail how that state of affairs came about and that the london resilience group understandably given its limited remit
00:10:15 understandably given its limited remit was not instrumental in that decision-making process
00:10:22 turning then to our second and a separate issue arising from the evidence in module four which relates to the critically important and challenging task of information
00:10:33 challenging task of information gathering and sharing in a complex incident involving multiple agencies in phase one of the inquiry commissioner rowe then assistant commissioner roh was
00:10:46 rowe then assistant commissioner roh was asked by council to the inquiry what system he put in place as incident commander to record the details of those residents who had managed to leave the building
00:10:56 building commissioner rowe explained the challenging task of recording the details of those residents who had self-evacuated or been assisted from the building and that he would have expected as a
00:11:08 and that he would have expected as a fallback that their details would have been picked up at some point within rest centers or within the system to gather casualties once they'd come out of the tower beyond lfb cordons and the
00:11:21 tower beyond lfb cordons and the reference to that service in our written submissions the humanitarian assistance framework describes how the information about those affected by an incident can be
00:11:32 those affected by an incident can be gathered at various stages of an emergency response it recognizes that information gathering is very challenging especially at the initial stages of a response and
00:11:43 initial stages of a response and especially when responders are managing a very fast moving and uncertain situation
00:11:50 situation the police via the casualty bureau and also a survivor reception center if established which it was not at grenfell
00:11:59 grenfell and the local authority through its staffing of reception and rest centres are the key agencies involved in gathering
00:12:07 gathering information about affected people commissioners commissioner rose decision log and tactical coordination meeting minutes show the mixture of information
00:12:19 minutes show the mixture of information reported to him from agencies such as the london ambulance service the metropolitan police service as well as the local authority regarding the numbers of people affected by the fire
00:12:32 numbers of people affected by the fire at 7 13 on 14th of june 2017 it's recorded that there were six rest centres with loose estimates given of the numbers number of people attending them as well as a note that rest centre
00:12:45 them as well as a note that rest centre managers will get up and running soon commissioner roe is recorded as asking the local authority for numbers and where people in rest centers were coming from in addition to his request for
00:12:57 from in addition to his request for plans for the tower itself the evidence in module 4 revealed a chaotic situation at the various rest centers in the immediate aftermath and
00:13:08 centers in the immediate aftermath and the lack of any effective system for recording and sharing the details of those who had been affected by the fire the inadequacy of this information is apparent in the meeting minutes for the
00:13:20 apparent in the meeting minutes for the strategic coordination group which show that there was a lack of clarity as to the numbers and identities of affected people
00:13:28 people the evidence of colin brown and michael adamson from the british red cross paints a stark picture of this failure revealing an absence on the part of rbkc of any centralized system of recording
00:13:40 of any centralized system of recording the details of those affected which ultimately took close to one week to be coherently organized the evidence in module 4 highlighted the vital importance of accurate data
00:13:52 vital importance of accurate data collection and sharing so that all emergency responders and those that support them can fulfill their vital functions in both the response and recovery phases of an emergency thereby
00:14:04 recovery phases of an emergency thereby providing effective assistance to those who need it
00:14:10 in conclusion sir the london fire commissioner recognises that the framework for resilience in london can be viewed as complex and not easily understood by those not operating within
00:14:22 understood by those not operating within it
00:14:23 it however this may perhaps be understandable given the complexity of the undertaking in a city such as london and the need for flexibility or elasticity when responding to
00:14:35 elasticity when responding to emergencies in due course the london fire commissioner drawing on the knowledge and experience of the london resilience group team will make considered submissions
00:14:46 will make considered submissions regarding recommendations and will welcome any findings and recommendations that the inquiry may make so that local communities like grenfell are not let down again thank
00:14:58 grenfell are not let down again thank you thank you very much
00:15:03 next we're going to hear a statement made on behalf of the mayor of london by miss and stud queen's council so let's start when you're ready thank you
00:15:27 yes mr chairman in his evidence to the inquiry the right honourable nick heard said i'm ashamed of the failure of the system i was part part of
00:15:39 system i was part part of to provide fellow citizens with the most basic support and comfort that they had every reason to feel totally entitled to in arguably their darkest hour
00:15:50 in arguably their darkest hour each core participant with a commitment to public service must endorse that sentiment
00:15:56 sentiment for those directly affected by the tragedy at grenville tower the damage inflicted by the failures during the aftermath of the fire has caused unimaginable additional and unnecessary
00:16:08 unimaginable additional and unnecessary distress and pain which continues to this day as you were told powerfully at the beginning of this module by hanan wahhabi
00:16:18 wahhabi no one from government looked for us no one helped us we were left exposed and vulnerable and when the authorities eventually did come it felt like a tick box exercise
00:16:31 come it felt like a tick box exercise and this
00:16:32 and this from a family who'd walked out of that burning building and had to watch as other members of their family died in it the bereaved survivors and residents
00:16:43 the bereaved survivors and residents consider that they were treated as they were because we as the state did not care about their community as mark sims from the rugby portobello trust so clearly articulated
00:16:55 trust so clearly articulated but who was really looking after people who had lost their children in the fire was far from people's minds because they were left to god and good neighbors
00:17:05 neighbors and that can't be right in 2017 in central london the issues which the mayor will focus upon in this closing statement are first of all the resilience framework
00:17:17 first of all the resilience framework then the humanitarian response and finally in brief reforms for the future an examination of these topics will illustrate why this community was failed
00:17:28 illustrate why this community was failed so badly in the immediate aftermath of the fire and what this inquiry can and must do
00:17:34 must do to prevent such a situation being repeated
00:17:39 i turn to deal with the resilience framework
00:17:42 framework it may be easy for this inquiry faced as it was with numerous documents guidance and acronyms and no experience of the workings of the resilience framework to reach the simplistic conclusion that
00:17:55 to reach the simplistic conclusion that the system was over complicated a suggestion put to many of the witnesses in the course of the module 4 hearings
00:18:03 hearings such an approach would be misguided the mayor does not doubt that the documentation might be slimmed down that reviews of the guidance material might be conducted periodically as a
00:18:14 might be conducted periodically as a single piece of work and that there might be a need to clarify responsibilities focus on roles and review some of the arrangements in the light of the learning from this inquiry
00:18:25 inquiry however it would be inappropriate to recommend anything that resembles starting again the system in place necessarily relies upon category 1 and 2 responders
00:18:38 upon category 1 and 2 responders cooperating as partners working together each with their own responsibilities as part of the resilience framework by way of examples as part of its
00:18:49 by way of examples as part of its category one duties the london ambulance service will obviously be responsible for providing emergency health care on the scene
00:18:58 the scene justice transport for london will be responsible for handling the impact on its travel network there is no practical alternative to this
00:19:07 this the difficulties arise when responders such as local authorities are required to prepare themselves and resource those preparations for a wide range of major incidents as identified
00:19:19 range of major incidents as identified by the national and london risk registers
00:19:22 registers that fortunately are unlikely to ever occur in their area but if they do are fundamentally different to their daily activities
00:19:34 different to their daily activities that is to be set against the need to also resource the day-to-day business of a local authority which has considerable impact on its residents especially the most vulnerable with the constant back backdrop of
00:19:47 with the constant back backdrop of limited financial resource no one gave evidence that the complexity of the resilience arrangements resulted in failings resulted in the failings by rbkc
00:19:59 resulted in the failings by rbkc perhaps of most significance nicholas holgate himself knew about the resilience framework knew about the role of london local authority gold and the support system available to him and his
00:20:11 support system available to him and his borough by way of mutual aid his failure to invoke substantial mutual aid quickly enough and the consequences of that failure cannot and should not be
00:20:23 of that failure cannot and should not be laid at the door of the perceived complexities of the system those who knew and worked within the system conceded it was complex to the outsider
00:20:33 outsider as john hetherington the current head of london resilience told you i would agree that they the structures and arrangements are complicated yes i think those practitioners in it
00:20:44 i think those practitioners in it understand it but i completely appreciate that to the lady layperson it is a complicated structure i think bodies did understand their roles because they lived and breathed it
00:20:58 roles because they lived and breathed it john baridale identified some issues that were clearly contributory to rbkc's lack of appropriate response he told you in my view there are too few people in local government and some of
00:21:10 people in local government and some of the other sectors as well that are trained ready but more importantly prepare to step in and assist and to lead and because we don't have enough of them we can end up relying on people who are
00:21:23 we can end up relying on people who are perhaps less ready less able less trained less capable to do so that's partly the need for why there are so many different forms of document not simply to provide the framework and
00:21:35 not simply to provide the framework and accountability but frankly the guidebook to do something that may not be needed if you have experienced training and exercising for those functions
00:21:46 there is also the wider issue revealed by the national preparedness commission's report of march 2022 which comprised an independent review of the civil contingencies act and its
00:21:57 civil contingencies act and its supporting arrangements the review concluded that resilience in the ut uk has suffered strategic neglect as john baridale told you towards the
00:22:08 as john baridale told you towards the end of his evidence that conclusion he said reflects my experience in terms of the lack of strategic understanding and intent of resilience in the uk by which i mean i think it's a bit of a
00:22:20 by which i mean i think it's a bit of a cinderella actually for local authorities and for central government if the failures demonstrated by the absence of a structured and effective response in the aftermath of the
00:22:32 response in the aftermath of the grenville tower fire teaches anything it must be in the importance of proper funding capacity and training for resilience the current reactive approach needs to
00:22:43 the current reactive approach needs to change
00:22:45 change the commission's report considered that the united kingdom needs to prioritize resourcing to mirror the progress made by a wide range of other countries to build their risk in emergency management systems
00:22:58 systems the inquiry also needs to take care not to amalgamate the failures by rbkc the individual borough with failings in the system itself importantly the system has been shown to
00:23:10 importantly the system has been shown to work effectively in other scenarios where it has been utilized in particular for terrorist attacks the emergency decant of residents from the child cot estate in camden in june 2017
00:23:24 estate in camden in june 2017 and most recently in the course of the covert 19 pandemic however it relies upon partners being equipped to carry out their own legal duties and for the candid exchange of
00:23:35 duties and for the candid exchange of information between partners neither was effective in this case and the shortcomings in the system such as they may be should not shift the focus from those fundamental failures
00:23:47 from those fundamental failures by rbkc as demonstrated by the evidence heard in module four
00:23:54 i tend to deal with humanitarian response
00:23:58 the aim of the humanitarian assistance framework
00:24:02 framework is to ensure that humanitarian care is delivered in an effective manner that meets the needs of those affected by major emergencies as john baradel explained in his
00:24:13 as john baradel explained in his evidence structures are very important in emergencies because they provide a framework within which people can request ask direct without the structures being sensible
00:24:25 without the structures being sensible and robust the likelihood of a response being frankly adequate is diminished significantly the failures in the humanitarian response to the grenfell tower fire did
00:24:37 response to the grenfell tower fire did not arise because individuals did not know about the london local authority gold arrangements or how to invoke them nor from the complexities of the system
00:24:48 nor from the complexities of the system but rather from the lack of structures caused primarily by a lack of trained people to ensure that the resilience framework could be and was activated
00:24:59 framework could be and was activated the structures required for delivering humanitarian care were not in place in the circumstances where the lack of trained staff was a known issue the failure to invoke mutual aid to deal
00:25:10 the failure to invoke mutual aid to deal with the known gap in the resource had devastating consequences for those who so desperately needed help and support unfortunately the failure of the
00:25:21 unfortunately the failure of the response to meet the objective lies squarely at the door of rbkc the failures in the preparedness of rbkc meant that the response was always going
00:25:32 meant that the response was always going to be inadequate in the face of a disaster on the scale of the gremble tower fire it was clear from the evidence of david kerry that rbkc management board failed
00:25:44 kerry that rbkc management board failed to bite the bullet before the fire when they were made aware of the significant lack of volunteers for the roles required to properly resource resilience within the borough
00:25:55 within the borough in spite of the increasing difficulty of obtaining volunteers for the contingency roles and the consequential lack of staff available to respond to an emergency if required
00:26:06 emergency if required highlighted as it was in the 2016 minimum standards for london review the management board had failed to address this serious issue prior to june
00:26:17 address this serious issue prior to june 2017.
00:26:19 2017. the failure to have sufficient trained staff also compromised the ability to train staff effectively as did the time limit of two hours imposed on the training by the chief
00:26:30 imposed on the training by the chief executive
00:26:32 executive the result was that staff at rbkc were not adequately trained due to insufficient time allocated to deal with the issues that would arise in the event of a major incident in the
00:26:43 in the event of a major incident in the borough
00:26:44 borough the only three council silvers out of the optimal 10 were not trained at all preparedness was the responsibility of rbkc and they failed to meet the
00:26:56 of rbkc and they failed to meet the minimum standards for london in material respects
00:26:59 respects as a borough they were aware of that shortfall and did nothing to remedy it of particular note there was no trained operational humanitarian assistance
00:27:10 operational humanitarian assistance liaison officer in our bkc at the time of the fire the absence had been highlighted in 2016 by the minimum standards for london review and had not been capable of
00:27:22 review and had not been capable of remedy because no one in adult social care would step up to volunteer not assisted perhaps by the absence of any additional remuneration or ring fence preparation time to undertake the
00:27:35 fence preparation time to undertake the role on top of the doubtless demanding job they already held within rbkc david kerry's solution to this was that rbkc would rely upon mutual aid such an
00:27:48 rbkc would rely upon mutual aid such an approach as well as ignoring that mutual aid should be a reciprocal arrangement lacked the advantage of local knowledge and contact within our bkc and pre-existing relationships with the
00:28:00 pre-existing relationships with the local community and the voluntary sector unfortunately mutual aid was not immediately invoked instead sue redmond was given the role
00:28:11 instead sue redmond was given the role in her why me moment she was notified of the role on the 14th of june
00:28:16 of june read the definition for the role that evening
00:28:19 evening and was formally appointed at 10 am on the 15th of june 2017 at the rbkc gold group meeting her appointment was was made because she
00:28:30 her appointment was was made because she was the director of adult social care and the framework provided that the halo will be appointed to support local authority gold and will typically be a director with responsibility for adult
00:28:41 director with responsibility for adult social care that was her only qualification for the role and even using her best endeavors did not equip her in any respect she was not trained and she only
00:28:53 she was not trained and she only received the definition of the halo and what the role entailed on the 14th of june 2017. the humanitarian assistance framework
00:29:04 the humanitarian assistance framework specified in the critical information section that the first step should be appoint the halo call the first meeting of the humanitarian assistance steering group begin assessing the needs of
00:29:16 group begin assessing the needs of people and identify options for providing report support on the 14th of june there was no halo and there could be no meeting the halo
00:29:28 and there could be no meeting the halo should have been in post by 4 am at the latest on the 14th of june a meeting called later that day probably in the morning
00:29:36 morning instead the first meeting of the humanitarian assistance group was during the afternoon of the 15th of june 2017 by which time the trust and confidence of the community have been lost
00:29:48 of the community have been lost and the ability to ensure that humanitarian care is delivered in an effective manner that meets the needs of those affected by major emergencies had demonstrably failed
00:30:00 demonstrably failed stuart priestley and david kerry two of the three silvers for rbkc were aware early on that the response to the grenville tower fire was going to require invocation of mutual aid under
00:30:11 require invocation of mutual aid under the local london local authority gold procedure
00:30:14 procedure and yet for reasons that may never be entirely clear nicholas holgate who could and should have invoked that procedure failed to do so
00:30:24 so the inquiry will have to make findings about why that was but the evidence revealed was that it was clear to nicholas holgate knew about its availability and what mutual aid and or london local
00:30:35 and what mutual aid and or london local authority gold could offer but was reluctant to invoke it until the borough response had been and i quote deemed insufficient
00:30:46 deemed insufficient perhaps because david kerry was known to sit on the local authorities panel as practitioner advisor to the chair and was considered to be quite competent as an emergency planning officer
00:30:58 as an emergency planning officer perhaps because there was a perception that rbkc was a well-run borough perhaps
00:31:04 perhaps because no one practicing in the resilience world would have thought that a borough would fail to ask for help when it was obvious that assistance was required
00:31:14 required the strategic coordinating group coordinating a response involving many important and complex issues accepted the report from nicholas holgate and other rbkc officials that their response
00:31:27 other rbkc officials that their response was effective and adequate and that rbkc was managing without the need for substantial additional resources however
00:31:37 however the lack of strategic oversight the absence of trained staff able to quickly implement the necessary structured approach to fulfill the humanitarian need together with an operational
00:31:48 need together with an operational approach and the continent and the continuation of business as usual meant that the rbkc gold group on the 15th of june did not resemble what mark
00:31:59 15th of june did not resemble what mark sawyer accepted expected to see he told the inquiry i think it was very operational and i think that was because there wasn't for want of a better worth
00:32:10 there wasn't for want of a better worth word consistent understanding of the situation
00:32:13 situation i think it was too big and i think there was no it was too polite and i need to qualify that it was i think it may have been described as a board meeting by other people giving evidence and it was for me
00:32:26 people giving evidence and it was for me very similar to a traditional style of local authority meeting very polite very structured it wasn't dynamic it wasn't forward-looking and i've probably said
00:32:37 forward-looking and i've probably said enough about that
00:32:40 meeting resilience system was logically built on the assumption that if a borough needed help they would ask for it
00:32:49 it there was no contingency in place to address the situation of a borough not recognizing they needed help
00:32:56 help or taking a defensive stance all regarding the request for help as a sign of not coping surrender or failure those explanations have been ascribed to
00:33:07 those explanations have been ascribed to why it was that rbkc chose not to seek the assistance that would have been freely and willingly given had he chosen to utilize the resources available to him nicholas holgate may
00:33:19 available to him nicholas holgate may have been able to provide a very different experience for the bereaved survivors and residents in the aftermath of the fire the failures by rbkc left a chaotic
00:33:31 the failures by rbkc left a chaotic response exacerbating time and time again the trauma of those who had already suffered and its effect was calamitous in contrast to rbkc's approach of
00:33:44 in contrast to rbkc's approach of waiting until the response was deemed insufficient the voluntary and faith sectors were noticeably proactive in driving the humanitarian response these organizations understood from the
00:33:57 these organizations understood from the start the imperative of a warm safe space
00:34:01 space and recognize the damage being caused to the brief survivors in residence by being asked multiple times by multiple agencies to talk about the fact that they were bereaved or that they'd fled
00:34:13 they were bereaved or that they'd fled fire
00:34:14 fire it was traumatizing people over and over again
00:34:19 again the lack of planning lack of training lack of staff and lack of a proactive approach to resilience by rbkc
00:34:28 rbkc left a vacuum filled as far as possible by the community and the voluntary sector
00:34:34 sector the basic human needs identified by the humanitarian assistance framework and best provided for by the state should have been provided by our bkc and were not
00:34:46 were not the lack of proactive planning or effective mobilization of any leadership on the ground led to a disorganized and chaotic setup at the westway center where there was no clear command
00:34:58 where there was no clear command structure and a complete lack of basic and necessary information from those in authority to those in need the bereaved survivors and residents had been failed by rbkc before the fire they
00:35:12 been failed by rbkc before the fire they were failed during the fire and they were failed after the fire how could they not feel that there was institutional indifference towards them as a diverse community
00:35:23 as a diverse community unable to locate their loved ones unable to obtain money a lack of communication from authorities unsuitable hotel accommodation abandoned for days without
00:35:34 accommodation abandoned for days without anyone official having a conversation with them
00:35:37 with them leaving families to figure it out for themselves resulted in people feeling traumatized humiliated and demeaned in one of the richest boroughs in london
00:35:48 in one of the richest boroughs in london this is what happens when the tenets of the system are not prioritized by the borough that has a statutory duty to do so
00:35:58 so it is important to remember that this was not a borough that did not know what their civil contingencies act duty were or how to implement them it is also a borough regarded as having
00:36:10 it is also a borough regarded as having considerable reserves in comparison to others and therefore more able to meet an emergency need this proved not to be the case
00:36:21 this proved not to be the case it is a borough which seems to have considered that the likelihood of having to respond to a single borough major emergency was remote and therefore allocating resources financial and time to it was a low
00:36:33 financial and time to it was a low priority
00:36:35 priority consequently when required to step up and knowing that its preparedness had been woeful it was defensive adopted a siege mentality and appears to
00:36:46 adopted a siege mentality and appears to have been more concerned with its own reputation rather than the welfare of the residents that they had a duty to support and assist as john baradel put it the moral compass here should be for
00:36:58 it the moral compass here should be for those affected not about any other consideration and i think the most concerning thing that i was hearing back on that day was that that did not seem to be the case
00:37:11 looking to the future the inquiry must reflect on these failures by rbkc but it also has to look forward
00:37:19 forward any recommendations have to reflect a solution to prevent individual borough failings and also to look at how the system can be strengthened as a category one responder in its own
00:37:31 as a category one responder in its own right
00:37:32 right the gla has sought to strengthen its capabilities since the fire to respond to emergencies in october 2019 the gla established the london
00:37:43 the gla established the london situational awareness team which sits within the city operations unit at the gla
00:37:49 gla and forms an integral part of the gla's response to an emergency it's staffed with 10 people who work on a rotor basis and provides 24-hour
00:38:00 a rotor basis and provides 24-hour horizon scanning capability research and analysis and incident response function for the gla lsat carries out proactive and reactive
00:38:11 lsat carries out proactive and reactive research into issues that are likely to have an impact on business as usual functions in london identifying emerging threats and ensuring that the gla has the information it needs to carry out its
00:38:23 information it needs to carry out its responsibilities during an emergency it also acts as a crucial point of liaison between the gla and the external partners including the metropolitan police the london fire brigade the
00:38:35 police the london fire brigade the london ambulance service and others
00:38:40 to go inside with the establishment of lsat the gla also expanded the number of staff who could act as the duty manager to ensure that there was resilience within the system
00:38:51 within the system the duty manager attends the strategic coordination group meetings during an emergency
00:38:56 emergency all duty managers have attended and passed the college of policing's week-long multi-agency gold incident command course the incident response protocols and capability also remain under regular
00:39:08 capability also remain under regular review
00:39:11 review returning to the particular failures of rbkc the evidence demonstrated a series of light bulb moments when the various category 1 responders and central government became
00:39:22 responders and central government became aware that rbkc were not coping and did not have a grip in the end sufficient pressure or soft power had to be brought to bear on our bkc to invoke the london local authority
00:39:35 bkc to invoke the london local authority gold arrangements for mutual aid including for leadership of the overall response
00:39:40 response but by then it was too late and the process took too long clearly there is a need for the street strategic coordinating group to be more
00:39:51 strategic coordinating group to be more intrusive
00:39:52 intrusive and for boroughs and other responders to agree that the system should permit the strategic coordinating group to be more intrusive notwithstanding their own statutory responsibilities
00:40:04 statutory responsibilities melanie dawes said that the dclg were over-reliant on what was coming up through the scg via red and david bellamy also referred to the fact we only really had the assurances
00:40:17 fact we only really had the assurances that rbkc provided at the scg meetings given that the humanitarian assistance framework requires the first step to appoint the halo and call a meeting of
00:40:28 appoint the halo and call a meeting of the humanitarian assistance steering group
00:40:30 group it is perhaps somewhat surprising that the scg did not ask for the identity of the halo and the timing of the meeting in the course of the morning of the 14th of june
00:40:41 of june changes may be required to the strategic coordinating protocol to allow for the group to provide more critical questioning of the situation on the ground and how a category one responder
00:40:54 ground and how a category one responder is actually coping and what its capabilities are in the aftermath of a civil emergency there cannot be a repeat of the situation where rbkc's blanket
00:41:05 situation where rbkc's blanket assurances that it was coping limited the strategic coordinating group's situational awareness of the reality as happened on the ground at gwenville
00:41:16 happened on the ground at gwenville the local resilience forum must also receive reliable assurance that proper steps are being taken by a borough to ensure adequate preparedness training and exercising is put in place to enable
00:41:28 and exercising is put in place to enable an adequate response within the borough or adequate assistance to be provided by way of mutual aid if required exercising is a very important element of preparedness because of the time
00:41:41 of preparedness because of the time resource source it requires there is always the risk that it is not carried out sufficiently enforcement in the face of non-compliance remains an issue a report to the government or to the
00:41:52 a report to the government or to the mayor from the local resilience forum with them on receipt having the necessary power to require action by a borough may be an option david kerry's view was that the under
00:42:03 david kerry's view was that the under preparedness of rbkc would have meant that they would have been unable to provide adequate mutual aid response if requested
00:42:12 as noted earlier in this submission the resources required to improve resilience training and importantly exercising must be forthcoming and be ring fenced by
00:42:23 be forthcoming and be ring fenced by central government to ensure that they are not withdrawn as soon as the publicity and concern raised by the response to the grenville tower fire takes a lower profile in the current climate there is
00:42:35 in the current climate there is increasing responsibility and accountability for local resilience forums particularly so in london and those increasing obligations must be matched with equivalent predictable and
00:42:47 matched with equivalent predictable and sustainable funding so far as any expansion of the mayor's role in civil emergency is concerned it should not be considered as political it is to be remembered that there was an
00:42:59 it is to be remembered that there was an early concern raised by mark sedwell the national security adviser on the 20th of june 2017
00:43:07 june 2017 that and i quote k and c didn't realize they were out of their depth for at least two to three days so it can't be a local decision to pull in regional national support we need a
00:43:18 in regional national support we need a push mechanism to nationalize a disaster and insert regional national resources led by a local gold with the national goal to lead on wider implications
00:43:30 goal to lead on wider implications the inquiry heard considerable evidence about john baradel and others having to use soft power to persuade and apply pressure to nicholas holgate to invoke the local london local authority gold
00:43:42 the local london local authority gold arrangements on the evening of the 15th of june 2017. there was and remains considerable concern about leaving the triggering of
00:43:53 concern about leaving the triggering of substantial mutual aid and all the local london local authority gold arrangements at borough level as may be the case here the decision may raise conflict issues in relation to the
00:44:05 raise conflict issues in relation to the capabilities of the borough chief executive or the borough itself the question is who should have responsibility for the decision to step in
00:44:15 in it could be allocated to central government however given their national focus they may not be best placed to assess the situation in the borough the inquiry in this case has heard that
00:44:26 the inquiry in this case has heard that rbkc was well thought of by government or had to put in place the optimum mutual aid the decision could be left to the local authority community for example the
00:44:38 authority community for example the unelected chief executive who chairs the local authority's panel or the chair of london councils however neither has a democratic accountability to the residents of the
00:44:49 accountability to the residents of the borrowing question therefore it is suggested that in london the appropriate decision maker would be the democratically elected holder of the office of the mayor of london
00:45:00 office of the mayor of london on receipt of a request or a report from this strategic coordinating group the office of mayor arguably has the advantage of having regional knowledge being democratically elected by an
00:45:11 being democratically elected by an electorate that would include the citizens of the relevant borough and is accountable for the decision making both to the london assembly and ultimately to the electorate
00:45:22 ultimately to the electorate whatever the procedure there must be a mechanism to allow a much swifter and more coherent intervention than occurred after the grenville tower fire
00:45:35 after the grenville tower fire and by way of conclusion of course the experience of the fire itself will have been life-changing for those who survived it but failing to provide proper
00:45:46 but failing to provide proper humanitarian assistance in its aftermath made that trauma intensified
00:45:54 however there were chief executives and many others from around london local government who through a commitment to public service stepped up and worked hard to provide for the traumatized and to
00:46:05 provide for the traumatized and to recover the trust and confidence that had been lost in the immediate aftermath of the fire due to rbkc's failings it should be recognized that the position they inherited was incredibly
00:46:17 position they inherited was incredibly challenging and the mayor remains grateful to them for their willingness to help and what they were able to achieve at the start of module 4 the panel heard
00:46:28 at the start of module 4 the panel heard from a number of brief survivors and residents in person giving evidence about how the lack of response made the trauma even more difficult to cope with
00:46:39 difficult to cope with many felt dehumanized demeaned and humiliated as mark sims from the rugby portobello trust so memorably told you i remain incredulous that this happened
00:46:51 i remain incredulous that this happened in london in 2017 and people were left to their neighbours to provide care comfort and shelter
00:46:59 excuse me in one of the richest boroughs in the country in one of the richest cities in the world it still shocks me to the core that that is how we treat our citizens in this country
00:47:19 where an individual borrow fails london fails
00:47:23 fails the mayor too is ashamed by the response of casey
00:47:27 of casey in failing to provide for the basic needs of the bsrs in the aftermath of the fire
00:47:33 the fire it is essential that in future the resilience framework is developed to ensure more intuitive monitoring of the response to an emergency coupled with an ability to push resources
00:47:43 resources into a situation rather than wait for them to be pulled in by the borough
00:47:51 there is no better way to conclude this closely submission than by retelling what mohamed rasool salt told you the british public kind of stepped up and they filled in those gaps in an
00:48:03 and they filled in those gaps in an amazing way but it shouldn't have been the case this should have been the responsibility of the people who are in charge of us the people you know the politicians the councillors who are in charge of the
00:48:15 councillors who are in charge of the local authority it is their role they're meant to be leaders looking after us and kind of attending to our needs but they were nowhere to be seen during the whole like the majority in the immediate
00:48:28 whole like the majority in the immediate aftermath and afterwards
00:48:32 the inquiry must strive to ensure that by its recommendations the experience of mr rasool and the other bereaved survivors and residents cannot be repeated
00:48:44 thank you thank you very much well now the uh timetables for the afternoon suggest that we should take a break at this point but it is rather early and i'm just wondering whether mr beer
00:48:56 and i'm just wondering whether mr beer means council would be willing to give us his closing statement before the break is it right by you
00:49:12 thank you mr b i'm sorry to pull you on a bit earlier than you expected but it's very convenient if you can yes not at all sir thank you this closing statement is made on behalf of the department for levelling up housing and
00:49:23 department for levelling up housing and communities which i will refer to as the department as it's done throughout the inquiry in this module the department has assisted and supported the inquiry
00:49:34 has assisted and supported the inquiry by providing by way of disclosure thousands of documents to the inquiry by providing 32 witness statements to the inquiry from 21 witnesses ranging from the then secretary of state the
00:49:46 from the then secretary of state the then permanent secretary and other senior civil servants through to junior civil servants from which the inquiry selected three witnesses
00:49:55 witnesses to give oral evidence dame melanie dawes dr joe farah and jill mcmanus and finally by setting out in its 49-page written opening statement
00:50:07 in its 49-page written opening statement its position in relation to the issues that arise in module 4 supplemented by its 28-page written closing statement following consideration of all of the evidence in doing so it has addressed directly
00:50:20 in doing so it has addressed directly the qualitative question raised by the inquiry in paragraph 13 of its list of issues namely was the response adequate and if not in
00:50:30 in what respects was it inadequate in other words it has again taken a candid reflective and self-critical approach
00:50:40 approach the grenfell tower fire was an appalling tragedy which left a community bereaved homeless and traumatized people lived through events no one should ever have to experience and continue to feel the
00:50:52 to experience and continue to feel the impact of this day the powerful and moving evidence provided by the bereaved survivors of residents and others who lived through the days and weeks following the fire
00:51:03 the days and weeks following the fire makes it clear that they did not receive the level of support that they so desperately needed and deserved serious problems in the handling of the response undoubtedly compounded their
00:51:16 response undoubtedly compounded their suffering
00:51:17 suffering and that is wholly unacceptable where the department in any way contributed to those problems it apologizes unreservedly even though the grenfell tower fire
00:51:28 even though the grenfell tower fire posed significant challenges for all organizations involved in the emergency response
00:51:34 response and though much good work was done the department is nonetheless clear that the initial response to the fire and especially that of rbkc was inadequate
00:51:46 inadequate the issues that which i shall address are accordingly as follows firstly whether the department performed its role before the 14th of june 2017 appropriately by reference to the
00:51:58 appropriately by reference to the legislative and policy system then in place
00:52:02 place secondly whether in the seven days after the fire the department performed its role appropriately by reference to that system and lastly whether the legislative and polity system is the
00:52:13 legislative and polity system is the right one
00:52:15 right one so the department's role in conduct before the fire in its opening statement for this module the department set out in some detail its role in its conduct before the fire
00:52:27 its role in its conduct before the fire the department's position in summary remains that through red it fulfilled its role in accordance with the statutory scheme and applicable policies guidance and doctrine
00:52:39 guidance and doctrine following the fire however the department has taken the opportunity to reflect on its role in the emergency planning system and has made important changes to its internal structure and resourcing which i shall address in a
00:52:51 resourcing which i shall address in a few moments it has also developed further its critical friend role which now includes includes greater challenge of local partners at the planning stage
00:53:03 partners at the planning stage the department's role in conduct in the seven days after the fire having considered all of the oral and written evidence heard by the inquiry during model module 4
00:53:14 during model module 4 the department considers as follows firstly it should not have assumed that rbkc would request mutual aid and activate london gold arrangements
00:53:25 activate london gold arrangements even though it is inexplicable that rbkc did not do these things rbkc's failure to activate london gold arrangements was the department believes
00:53:36 arrangements was the department believes a major cause of the deficiencies in the response however however on behalf of central government the department should have challenged rbkc earlier than it did
00:53:49 second the department considers that although it does not routinely deploy senior officials to attend emergency response sites and there are very good reasons why it
00:54:00 and there are very good reasons why it would not ordinarily do so it now believes that due to the scale and complexity of the incident it should have sent a senior civil servant with experience of disaster management to
00:54:11 experience of disaster management to observe the human humanitarian support arrangements earlier to be a visible presence and to gather early indications on the effectiveness of the support offered
00:54:23 effectiveness of the support offered however to suggest that our bkc was given the benefit of the doubt because they were quote guys like like us is to mischaracterize the database
00:54:34 is to mischaracterize the database checking exercise that was in fact undertaken third
00:54:39 third that when it became clear that rbkc was not capable of fulfilling its statutory duties
00:54:45 duties the department acted appropriately by intervening to support the transfer of gold command to john baridil whilst it took time for these changes to make a tangible difference on the ground
00:54:56 make a tangible difference on the ground the changes to the gold command structure were fundamental to the improvements later felt the suggestions that government auto of exercise its statutory powers of intervention
00:55:07 intervention and that the failure to do so is evidence of quote the disastrous manner in which government dealt with the tragedy
00:55:14 tragedy are unrealistic and do not properly consider the role of national government during a tragedy within a local area at fourth
00:55:24 at fourth it acted appropriately by making multiple offers of support to rbkc on the day of the fire and in the days following including at ministerial and permanent
00:55:36 including at ministerial and permanent secretary level which rbkc refused it also acted appropriately by later providing practical assistance in support of the response
00:55:47 support of the response this included for example deploying departmental staff to rbkc to assist in the coordination of the humanitarian relief effort and to help with re-housing and establishing a central
00:55:59 re-housing and establishing a central government response function at the rest center to help with access to central government services at fifth
00:56:07 at fifth the three-week re-housing commitment arose as a result of proper concerns about the lack of impetus and ambition in our bkc's rehousing program
00:56:18 in our bkc's rehousing program it was motivated by the best of intentions but was too ambitious and inadvertently placed pressure on individuals in the aftermath of an extremely traumatic event
00:56:29 event it was accompanied as has been observed in the submissions of some of the bsrs with what they rightly describe as a blank check from central government
00:56:41 from central government which are bkc senior housing management seemingly failed to appreciate despite that being spelled out for them clearly in writing at sixth
00:56:52 at sixth red did not place excessive focus on building regulations issues whilst information emerging in relation to the cause of the fire was clearly relevant to the department and central
00:57:03 relevant to the department and central government more widely red's essential focus was on what was happening on the ground and whether support was needed in this regard the suggestion that witnesses have used the predefined scope
00:57:15 witnesses have used the predefined scope of the role of red to defend what it did in the aftermath of the fire is wrong-headed a description of doing what it was meant to do is not a defense
00:57:26 to do is not a defense it is a description of a body of people carrying out the work that they were meant to do
00:57:33 seventh red fulfilled its fun its role in sharing information across central government in the aftermath of the fire although the department acknowledges and shares the frustrations of other
00:57:44 shares the frustrations of other government departments about the lack of timely and accurate information in the aftermath
00:57:50 aftermath of a major disaster department considers that it should have better managed the expectations of other stakeholders as regards the speed with which accurate information could be
00:58:01 which accurate information could be obtained and disseminated
00:58:05 the department does not consider that central government taking over the delivery of the response to this fire would have been the correct answer
00:58:15 answer departmentals do not have the training the experience or the expertise in disaster relief nor have they built the local knowledge and relationships that are necessary to
00:58:27 and relationships that are necessary to manage a disaster response the essential problem with the management of the response to the grenfell tower fire was not with the principle of a local response to it
00:58:39 response to it rather it was that our bkc had failed properly to plan and in the event fell to draw on all of the support that was available to it the department continues to believe that
00:58:51 the department continues to believe that the system of locally planned and locally led resilience remains the best model
00:58:58 model as in module 6 the inquiry will wish to consider whether the risk that a category one responder would fail to comply with its statutory duties in this way
00:59:09 in this way is properly identified and catered for in the legislation and guidance in other words
00:59:15 words does local democratic accountability provide adequate oversight and assurance that the civil contingency system is working effectively in practice if it does not what additional layers of
00:59:26 if it does not what additional layers of assurance should be built in
00:59:30 alongside the inquiry's work and in line with the commitment in the 2021 integrated review of security defense development and foreign policy the department will work with other
00:59:42 the department will work with other government departments lrfs and responder organizations to identify ways to strengthen the roles and responsibilities of lrfs
00:59:53 responsibilities of lrfs including empowering their leadership and scope to build resilience into wider initiatives this is in recognition of and builds upon the enhanced role that lrfs have increasingly taken on
01:00:05 lrfs have increasingly taken on especially through the response to the pandemic
01:00:08 pandemic as part of this the department is considering whether a strengthening of assurance and oversight would be appropriate whilst maintaining the emphasis on subsidiarity and local leadership as key principles
01:00:23 lastly then current work and recent developments the department proposed this inquiry so that it could independently establish the facts
01:00:32 the facts identify failures and make recommendations and the department is fully supportive of the work the inquiry does and looks forward to its conclusions and recommendations
01:00:43 conclusions and recommendations on the issues covered by module four at the same time however the department believes that critical self-reflection has been necessary throughout this period and since the fire it has quite
01:00:54 period and since the fire it has quite rightly reviewed its own civil contingencies processes and made changes where it has identified improvements could be made and so the department has restructured
01:01:06 and so the department has restructured and strengthened its resilience and emergencies function bringing it within the new resilience and recovery directorate the number of permanent staff in red has doubled
01:01:17 doubled the number of deputy directors in the staffing model has increased from one to four
01:01:22 four and the regional teams have increased from four to five each headed by a head of regional resilience the department has made improvements to
01:01:34 the department has made improvements to the way that red seeks to fulfill its critical friend role in the local emergency planning system each lrf now has both a lead resilience
01:01:45 each lrf now has both a lead resilience advisor and a support resilience advisor to ensure greater continuity of relationships and to build in more time to spend with their designated lrfs
01:01:58 to spend with their designated lrfs red is more systematic in its planning for meetings at the local level including prioritizing attendance at lrf executive meetings and facilitating more meetings at a regional level to help
01:02:10 meetings at a regional level to help support best practice and sharing between different lrfs the department has adopted an lrf level risk model and is
01:02:21 an lrf level risk model and is continuing to review with the way in which red fulfills its role of providing assurance to central government that necessary capabilities are in place at the local level
01:02:32 are in place at the local level can be strengthened further the department has in conjunction with solace the society of local authority chiefs executives and senior managers
01:02:43 chiefs executives and senior managers updated the good practice guidance for local authority chief executives to assure themselves that they are adequately prepared and equipped to respond to emergencies
01:02:55 respond to emergencies the department now expects and trains red glos to identify overstretch and to challenge local arrangements during an emergency
01:03:04 emergency including by questioning local authorities on their plans and engaging directly
01:03:10 directly wherever offers of support are refused the department has updated the red operating model to provide for direct senior civil servant engagement with the
01:03:21 senior civil servant engagement with the scg in the event of a serious or large-scale emergency the department has created a dedicated situa situational awareness function within red equipped to gather collate
01:03:33 within red equipped to gather collate assess and disseminate information from a range of sources and the department has agreed a protocol for the departmental response to a fire in a large residential building enabling
01:03:44 in a large residential building enabling more effective management of information and reducing the risk of confusion and duplication in april 22 the
01:03:55 the government published the post implementation review of the civil contingencies act 2004 sponsored by the cabinet office to inform the review the department
01:04:06 to inform the review the department consulted representatives from lrfs across england in a series of in-depth workshops following the review further improvements to uk resilience arrangements will be implemented
01:04:17 arrangements will be implemented in particular guidance will be updated and strengthened to reflect the growing coordination role that local resilience arrangements are fulfilling whilst making clear what government can expect
01:04:28 making clear what government can expect from local partnerships new provisions will require local responders to report on how they have fulfilled their duties under the 2004 act improving accountability
01:04:40 act improving accountability driving up standards and improving consistency across local resilience arrangements thereby enabling the development of best practice and lastly a national resilience strategy will be published later in 2022
01:04:53 strategy will be published later in 2022 in conjunction with the scheduled 2004 act review at setting out improvements in the government's approach to uk resilience in conclusion that this department
01:05:05 in conclusion that this department remains committed to supporting those affected by the grenfell tower fire in total central government has committed over 160 million pounds to supporting the community since 2017
01:05:17 supporting the community since 2017 including 132 million pounds that has already been spent to support re-housing efforts to deliver bespoke health and well-being support and the refurbishment of the lancaster west estate
01:05:29 of the lancaster west estate the department will continue to reflect and to learn the lessons of the past and it looks forward to the inquiry's conclusions and recommendations in module four it will continue to make
01:05:40 module four it will continue to make sure that where change is needed it is implemented thank you sir thank you very much mr beer well at that point we shall take the afternoon break we'll rise therefore and resume at 20
01:05:53 we'll rise therefore and resume at 20 past three please thank you very much
01:24:54 and now finally we're going to hear a closing statement by mr andrew warnock queen's council on behalf of the metropolitan police service so please mr will not come to the lectern thank you
01:25:06 will not come to the lectern thank you thank you sir um
01:25:09 um chairman members of the panel the metropolitan police service the mps falls outside the inquiry's terms of
01:25:20 falls outside the inquiry's terms of reference for this module which focuses on local and central government however the mps has had a representative in court throughout the module four
01:25:32 in court throughout the module four hearings and has listened to the evidence
01:25:36 evidence it recognizes that as a category one responder it formed part of the wider response to the aftermath of the tragedy it took a key role in chairing the
01:25:47 it took a key role in chairing the strategic coordination group for an extended period after the 14th of june 2017
01:25:54 2017 and it also fulfilled a key role in policing the local area and supporting the local community in the weeks and indeed months thereafter
01:26:05 indeed months thereafter these brief closing submissions focus on four areas of evidence which touched upon the involvement of the police two are issues very much to be
01:26:17 two are issues very much to be considered within the context of the joint agency response rest centers and the return of residents to the walkway properties two concern functions that fell to be
01:26:29 two concern functions that fell to be delivered entirely by the mps that is the casualty bureau and the allocation and role of family liaison officers to those who were believed by the tragedy
01:26:42 believed by the tragedy the mps prepared an electronic presentation on the function and dynamic location of police accordance both inner and outer
01:26:52 and outer the cordons were initially focused on facilitating the work of the other emergency services and also preserved the location as a crime scene which the mps were
01:27:05 crime scene which the mps were responsible for examining forensically not only for the criminal investigation but also to enable victim identification on behalf of her majesty's coroner
01:27:19 on behalf of her majesty's coroner first the casualty bureau at the casualty bureau telephone telephone line is a police service defined as and i quote an initial point
01:27:30 defined as and i quote an initial point of contact for the assessing and receiving of information relating to persons who have been or are believed to have been involved in an emergency
01:27:43 involved in an emergency it is the mps view having listened to the evidence that the lived experience of some of those who contacted the casualty bureau was not a positive one
01:27:55 was not a positive one and it is
01:27:56 and it is accepted that this exacerbated the impact of the tragedy on those people the casualty bureau fulfilled an important investigatory function
01:28:09 important investigatory function to not only trace identify and reconcile missing people but to provide timely information to the coroner
01:28:18 coroner as part of the mps's disaster victim identification responsibilities mercifully it is a resource which has not had to be activated often
01:28:29 not had to be activated often and indeed it has not required activation by the mps since the grenfell tower tragedy that the casualty bureau telephone line
01:28:40 that the casualty bureau telephone line operated primarily as a means of gathering information was apparent from the evidence of a number of witnesses it is also clear that understandably
01:28:51 it is also clear that understandably this was not the expectation of those calling it who in the absence of any other phone lines or other effective communication option from other organizations in the early
01:29:03 from other organizations in the early response period understood it to be a helpline or at the very least a line where there would be a two-way flow of information it is apparent that many funds calling
01:29:15 it is apparent that many funds calling the line to be a frustrating and bureaucratic process the mps is sorry that this was the experience for some people
01:29:26 people who were so deeply affected by the tragedy
01:29:30 tragedy in the light of the evidence particularly from the bereaved survivors and residents who gave oral evidence and those statements who have been read in the mps recognizes that it needs to give
01:29:42 the mps recognizes that it needs to give consideration as to how the role of the casualty bureau should be better communicated in the future it needs to consider how its operation could be improved
01:29:53 could be improved and how it might fit into a wider system of disseminating information about those who are missing as part of an improved humanitarian
01:30:04 as part of an improved humanitarian response one of the most consistent messages from the witness evidence in this module related to the information vacuum that was felt by those impacted and by
01:30:17 that was felt by those impacted and by those working in the voluntary sector these are matters which the mps will consider further and address through submissions about phase ii recommendations
01:30:29 phase ii recommendations which will be provided in accordance with the inquiries timetable
01:30:36 next reception centers under the existing or so under the extant leslp guidance from 2015 a survivor's reception center src
01:30:49 a survivor's reception center src is normally set up following a major incident
01:30:53 incident and the responsibility for opening one sits with the police with local authority support an src enables police to collect information relevant to an investigation
01:31:07 information relevant to an investigation and facilitates the provision of immediate shelter and initial care to survivors
01:31:14 survivors however the guidance also recognized that an src might be a dynamic venue depending on the ongoing demands of the incident
01:31:24 incident in the early stages of an incident where those involved are leaving the scene it may not be practicable to set one up because of the more pressing primary responsibilities such as life-saving
01:31:37 responsibilities such as life-saving and clearing the public from danger as the panel will be aware from the evidence received in phase one such circumstances prevailed in the
01:31:48 such circumstances prevailed in the early hours of the 14th of june 2017. the police focus was on getting survivors and residents out of danger and the police did not open an src
01:32:01 and the police did not open an src evacuees from the tower needed medical attention and were being assisted by the london fire brigade and the london ambulance service the mps ensured that those agencies
01:32:13 the mps ensured that those agencies continued to have a safe area to work from by maintaining cordons in the area shelter to displaced residents was provided spontaneously by community
01:32:25 provided spontaneously by community organizations src functions were discharged by police attendants at the saint clement james center
01:32:33 center and the rugby portobello club prior to the opening of the west way the leslip guidance did not allocate responsibility for the opening of a
01:32:45 responsibility for the opening of a friends and family reception center but under the draft london resilience partnership humanitarian assistance framework version 5 it was the responsibility of the police to
01:32:57 responsibility of the police to determine the need for an ffrc as part of a wider disaster victim identification process in consultation with the local authority
01:33:10 in consultation with the local authority the guidance provides that it is likely to be set up within 24 hours of the incident
01:33:18 incident the need for an ffrc was determined at a tactical coordination group meeting at 10 am
01:33:26 10 am and tom brady from the royal borough of kensington and chelsea was tasked with setting up the ffrc and it opened at the salvation army building on portobello
01:33:37 salvation army building on portobello road at 12 30 on the 14th of june moving later to the westway center the responsibility for setting up and
01:33:48 the responsibility for setting up and running rest centres lay with the local authority
01:33:54 authority some witnesses gave evidence that they found the police presence at the west way to be off-putting police had an important role at the centre which included helping to keep
01:34:05 centre which included helping to keep order generally and managing the intrusive presence of the press both inside and outside the centre the police officers discharging those functions were uniformed and so were
01:34:19 functions were uniformed and so were inevitably visible visibility provided a reassurance to some
01:34:24 some and might be seen as a positive feature as against the reported lack of visibility of personal personnel from rbkc
01:34:35 rbkc the mps did not deploy firearms officers to police the westway center and the mps is unable to account for what claire richards but no other witness of which the mps is
01:34:48 but no other witness of which the mps is aware believes she saw in that regard
01:34:53 return of residence to the walkways the decision on when it was safe for residents to return to the walkways was not a police one
01:35:05 not a police one the police responded to the recommendation of the london fire brigade
01:35:10 brigade to evacuate certain locations as an emergency life-saving measure whilst mps officers may have facilitated limited access to residents of those
01:35:22 limited access to residents of those properties for specified reasons before they were allowed to officially return
01:35:28 return the mps did not have responsibility for deciding when reoccupation was safe and necessary the family liaison officers
01:35:40 the family liaison officers the criteria for the allocation of family liaison officers or flows has been explained in the witness statement of the detective chief inspector kate kieran
01:35:52 inspector kate kieran dated the 17th of february 2021 they were allocated to families based upon a decision taken by 8 am on the 16th of june 2017
01:36:03 16th of june 2017 to allocate to the family of any person missing and believed to be deceased i set out in the second statement of dci kate kieran
01:36:14 kate kieran the flows voluntarily take on the rule in addition to their existing professional responsibilities and receive specialist training to work with bereaved families
01:36:26 bereaved families the primary role of the family liaison officer was as an investigator which included the identification of victims
01:36:35 victims but they also facilitated bereaved families access to a range of other agencies who were able to provide support
01:36:43 support services
01:36:47 one additional matter
01:36:50 the possibility of islamophobia has been raised by
01:36:56 raised by miss monroe queen's council in relation to a community risk assessment this was not a matter explored in the evidence certainly not as regards the
01:37:07 evidence certainly not as regards the mps
01:37:10 mps the writer of the risk assessment has not been called to give evidence we draw your attention to the fact that following on from the passage cited
01:37:21 following on from the passage cited by ms rowe from that risk assessment the assessment said and i quote community leaders from local mosques
01:37:32 community leaders from local mosques have been contacted and are working with the police and to support those affected as are community leaders from other faith groups
01:37:44 faith groups the mps sought to work in a positive way with all those affected by the tragedy whilst it will not have got everything right
01:37:55 right it would strongly refute any suggestion that islamophobia affected its response to the tragedy
01:38:07 in conclusion the mps acknowledges the difficulties faced by the bereaved the survivors and the residents in the aftermath of this awful tragedy
01:38:19 awful tragedy the touchstone for the success of the joint agency response in the immediate aftermath can fairly be judged by the lived experience of those impacted by the
01:38:31 experience of those impacted by the tragedy
01:38:33 tragedy from the outset the mps has been concerned to engage with bereaved and survivors
01:38:41 survivors as part of its ongoing criminal investigation and inquiries on behalf of her majesty's coroner
01:38:50 coroner the mps is keen to assist this inquiry in any way it can in trying to ensure that should an event occur again
01:39:01 occur again the experience of those affected would be significantly better a full submission will be provided to the inquiry in accordance with the recommendations timetable
01:39:12 recommendations timetable to inform the inquiry as well as core participants what improvements have already been made since june 2017 and what work is ongoing by those
01:39:24 and what work is ongoing by those charged with responding to major incidents which result in mass casualties that is our statement thank you very much mr warner
01:39:36 thank you very much mr warner well that brings to an end the oral closing statements in module 4 there will be no sitting of the inquiry tomorrow
01:39:46 tomorrow but we shall be resuming our hearings on wednesday morning at 10 o'clock when we shall begin hearing evidence from professor persa the expert toxicologist instructed by
01:39:58 the expert toxicologist instructed by the inquiry so
01:40:01 so that's it for today we resume at ten o'clock please on wednesday morning thank you very much