Module 5 opening statements examining the London Fire Brigade's operational response. Features submissions from the Mayor of London, Fire Brigades Union, Fire Officers Association, and LFB. Key themes include systemic failures in fire service governance, absence of evacuation procedures, impact of austerity cuts, and challenges facing firefighters on the night. Multiple parties challenge Phase 1 findings criticizing Watch Manager Dowden.
00:20:56 good afternoon everyone we're now going to hear an opening statement from miss anne's stud queen's council on behalf of the mayor of london and i can see miss stud on my screen so
00:21:08 and i can see miss stud on my screen so i hope you can see us miss student hear me is that the case i can see you auntie good thank you very much well now it's time for you to make your statement on behalf of the mayor and would you like to go ahead
00:21:19 mayor and would you like to go ahead please
00:21:20 please thank you very much
00:21:31 in his report of phase one of the inquiry delivered on the 30th of october 2019
00:21:38 2019 the chairman made recommendations which included identifying significant institutional and systemic issues that required change by the london fire brigade
00:21:50 brigade the london fire brigade had been driving forward those necessary changes under the mayor of london's oversight to ensure identified risks are being managed
00:22:00 managed the recommendations from phase one are being implemented and the improvement measures achieve their intended outcomes the evidence to be called in relation to module 5 will examine the operational
00:22:13 module 5 will examine the operational response of the lfb on the night of the fire and will include an examination of where that response might have been lacking in coordination and
00:22:24 coordination and effectiveness the mayor does not seek to comment on that evidence nor on the expert reports in any detail but he does wish to emphasize two points
00:22:35 but he does wish to emphasize two points first
00:22:36 first the most important outcome for the bereaved survivors and residents and indeed for all londoners is that the lessons of grenville are learnt and progressed quickly
00:22:48 learnt and progressed quickly so that they can be reassured that the terrible events of that night will not be repeated secondly as the chairman was careful and right to emphasize
00:22:59 right to emphasize the issues that arose at grenville in relation to the operational response of the london fire brigade were systemic and institutional rather than individual
00:23:12 since the fire at grenville the government's governance of the london fire brigade has changed at the time of the fire the lfb was overseen by and accountable to the london fire and emergency
00:23:24 to the london fire and emergency planning authority elfipa elfipa has since been abolished and from the 1st of april 2018 the london fire commissioner was established
00:23:35 london fire commissioner was established as a corporation soul legally responsible for exercising the functions of the lfb
00:23:43 the london fire commissioner is a functional body of the greater london authority
00:23:48 authority the role of the deputy mayor for fire and resilience was also created under the new governance arrangements the mayor appoints the deputy mayor and the london fire commissioner sets the
00:23:59 the london fire commissioner sets the london fire commissioner's budget and agrees it integrated risk management plan
00:24:06 following the phase one report the mayor appointed andy rowe as the fire commissioner the inquiry will recall that andy rowe has first-hand knowledge of the issues
00:24:18 has first-hand knowledge of the issues that arose at grenville as he served as one of the incident commanders and was responsible for revoking stay put advice and ordering the evacuation of the building
00:24:29 building one of the benefits of the governance change is that there is a more direct oversight by the mayor while the london fire commissioner has operational independence the mayor has
00:24:40 operational independence the mayor has responsible for agreeing key london fire brigade strategies monitoring performance and setting the budget the deputy mayor has established a fire
00:24:51 the deputy mayor has established a fire and resilience board attended by senior staff from the lfb to support her in her duties
00:24:58 duties this enables monthly scrutiny of lfb's performance and provides an opportunity to challenge the lfb on its improvement work
00:25:06 work and for the deputy mayor to be consulted on major decisions it also meets for deep dive sessions on specific issues that require particular scrutiny
00:25:17 scrutiny additionally the gla's oversight has been increased by the formation of its fire team which supports the deputy mayor with his governance and assurance work
00:25:29 governance and assurance work 18 months following the inquiries phase one report the deputy mayor is reviewing effectiveness to identify further possible improvements the aim is to ensure that lfb's learning
00:25:42 the aim is to ensure that lfb's learning does not come only from external inspections and inquiries but rather from the review and assurance processes
00:25:50 processes which should identify potential issues and instill a culture for continual improvement
00:25:58 the london fire commissioner with the support of the mayor has published a transformation delivery plan to address the findings of the phase one report and to transform the london fire brigade in
00:26:09 to transform the london fire brigade in terms of policy procedure culture and training
00:26:14 training it addresses not only the recommendations of the phase one report but also takes into account the december 2019 inspection report from her majesty's inspectorate constabulary and
00:26:27 majesty's inspectorate constabulary and fire and rescue services and considers the priorities for wider reform
00:26:34 reform to assist in this transformation the london fire commissioner has reorganised the leadership of the london fire brigade which includes but is not limited to the appointment of richard mills as
00:26:46 the appointment of richard mills as deputy commissioner to oversee operational matters fiona dolman as director for transformation to lead delivery of the london fire brigades transformation program
00:26:58 program and tim powell as director for people to lead improvements in training organizational culture and diversity to date
00:27:09 to date the london fire brigade has confirmed that it has completed 18 of the 29 recommendations aimed at the london fire brigade in phase one report and the
00:27:20 brigade in phase one report and the mayor continues to ensure that the london fire brigade is taking timely action
00:27:25 action to implement the remainder of the inquiry's recommendations
00:27:31 while not commenting on the specifics in preparing for module 5 the gla and the deputy mayor have reviewed the relevant expert evidence
00:27:42 reviewed the relevant expert evidence london fire brigade has been undertaking a range of improvement work relating to but not as a result of the issues raised by the experts as follows
00:27:52 professor chris johnson has highlighted the need for a systemic approach to ensure resilient communications for firefighters on the ground the lfb is in the process of procuring
00:28:03 the lfb is in the process of procuring new radios and breathing apparatus having identified this as being necessary on its own learnings from the grenville fire tower grumbled tower fire
00:28:14 grenville fire tower grumbled tower fire and reviewed in the light of the inquiries phase one report the gla has requested assurance to be undertaken to ensure that new systems fully address
00:28:25 to ensure that new systems fully address the need for an integrated and evidence-based approach to communication to ensure the safety of the firefighters and the public furthermore and in accordance with the
00:28:37 furthermore and in accordance with the issues raised by steve mccook on alternative approaches to firefighting in high-rise buildings the london fire brigade have developed a new high-rise firefighting policy which has now been
00:28:49 firefighting policy which has now been implemented discussion about this policy demonstrated the challenging position the london fire brigade is in as its consultation document included a
00:29:01 as its consultation document included a procedure for firefighters to go beyond the bridgehead in breathing apparatus sets not started up
00:29:08 up aiming to extend the opportunity to rescue residents affected by fire or smoke
00:29:15 smoke concerns expressed by the brigade union led to an extended consultation on the new policy and the establishment of an independent health and safety advisory panel whose
00:29:26 health and safety advisory panel whose recommendation to remove the procedure was implemented in the final policy this highlights mr chairman the difficulty of balancing firefighters and resident safety in the current built
00:29:39 resident safety in the current built environment central government have indicated that they will promulgate national guidance to support all fire and rescue services in relation to these changes in policy
00:29:51 in relation to these changes in policy however in the continuing absence of a governmental or nationally agreed position
00:29:58 position whether through the nfcc or the national fbu
00:30:03 fbu the london fire commissioner has taken the steps he can to identify and implement measures intended to equip crews to undertake effective action or rescue in such exceptional and extreme
00:30:16 rescue in such exceptional and extreme circumstances where there is savable life
00:30:20 life the final topic concerns professor torreira who's identified areas of concern in relation to fire safety inspections and the capabilities of
00:30:31 inspections and the capabilities of operational commanders within the london fire brigade these issues are being addressed by london fire brigade for instance in its revised policy on the management of operational risk information produced
00:30:44 operational risk information produced after the inquiries phase one report the deputy mayor has recently received a report
00:30:51 report from the london fire brigade's new independent operational assurance advisor on the revised policy who's endorsed it both as a policy and how it's being applied
00:31:03 and how it's being applied these issues are complex and multi-layered and the mayor is confident that the london fire brigade will build on the significant steps they've already taken to improve the planning and response to
00:31:15 to improve the planning and response to emergency incidents in high-rise buildings
00:31:19 buildings much has changed at the london fire brigade since the events being considered in this module however the mayor is not complacent through his deputy mayor and with the
00:31:30 through his deputy mayor and with the assistance of the gla fire team london fire brigade performance is being scrutinized and challenged to ensure that it progresses the recommendations made as a result of the phase one report
00:31:43 made as a result of the phase one report and is responding appropriately to the need for improvement the mayor is also clear that there is more to do to strengthen assurance work both within the lfb where a new
00:31:55 both within the lfb where a new assurance framework is being implemented and at the gla the mayor publishes monthly phase one recommendations and progress reports to
00:32:06 recommendations and progress reports to ensure that the london fire commissioner and other organizations at which recommendations were directed remain transparently accountable to londoners for making the improvements identified by your inquiry
00:32:20 identified by your inquiry the test of the transformation program at lfb is how it works in practice and a recent incident in london allowed for this to be examined on the 7th of may 2021 the lfb attended
00:32:34 on the 7th of may 2021 the lfb attended a serious fire in a 19-story block at the new providence wharf development in the london borough of tower hamlets while investigations into the fire are continuing
00:32:45 continuing it appears that a fire breaking out in one flat
00:32:49 one flat spread to others by the building exterior
00:32:53 exterior around 125 firefighters attended the incident with the first fire engine arriving at the scene approx approximately four minutes after the call to london fire brigade
00:33:05 call to london fire brigade an evacuation of the block was carried out early in the incident rescuing 35 people
00:33:11 people with smoke hoods used to aid the evacuation and aerial appliances in attendance london fire brigade's new fire survival guidance and evacuation and rescue
00:33:22 guidance and evacuation and rescue policies developed since the inquiries phase one report were implemented during the incident ensuring for instance effective communication between the control room
00:33:33 communication between the control room the incident command and the bridgehead the fire was under control within around two and a half hours two people were hospitalized but there was no loss of life
00:33:45 was no loss of life this incident demonstrates london fire brigade's ability to act on the lessons from grendel but it also demonstrates that there remained significant fire risks in london's built environment
00:33:58 london's built environment although a tragedy on the scale of grenville was avoided in this case the recurrence of a fire in similar circumstances clearly illustrates that there has
00:34:09 clearly illustrates that there has undoubtedly been a failure of regulation and its implementation london has many buildings which have been built or modified using unsafe
00:34:20 been built or modified using unsafe materials
00:34:21 materials and there are additional problems with unsafe installations the risk present in london's built environment remains high many buildings are subject to interim
00:34:32 many buildings are subject to interim safety measures such as waking watch the latest figures available at the time are that over a thousand buildings have changed from a stay put to a simultaneous evacuation strategy
00:34:45 simultaneous evacuation strategy the evidence that has been obtained as part of this inquiry has clearly demonstrated that the issues that arose at grenville are far from unique to that building
00:34:59 unfortunately the greater understanding of increased risk
00:35:03 risk gained in significant part as a result of this inquiry has not been sufficiently reflected in increased resources for fire and rescue services
00:35:15 services following the phase one report the lfb received five and a half million pounds to carry out fire protection activity from the government for 2021 to 22 the funding was reduced
00:35:29 for 2021 to 22 the funding was reduced to 3.9 million with no guarantee that the funding will continue in future years the mayor is calling for this to become a permanent annual increase in funding
00:35:40 a permanent annual increase in funding from government until such time as london's built environment is safe
00:35:47 the period between 2009 and 2016 saw significant reductions in funding for the london fire brigade and the closure of 10 fire stations and the
00:35:59 closure of 10 fire stations and the reduction of 27 appliances an independent review commissioned by the current mayor shortly after his election in 2016 found that no further reduction could be
00:36:11 found that no further reduction could be considered it is clear that there can be no further reduction to operational capacity while parts of the built environment in london continue to carry with them such
00:36:23 continue to carry with them such significant risks ultimately this is dependent on funding decisions made by central government the mayor has prioritized the london fire brigade and funded it at levels
00:36:35 fire brigade and funded it at levels higher than those to which he is resourced by central government notwithstanding the financial constraints faced by him as a result of the kovic 19 pandemic
00:36:46 the kovic 19 pandemic it is by demonstrating a commitment to the learning from grammar grenville that we continue to place the bsrs central to the inquiry and its work
00:36:57 and its work and to reassure them that much has changed and that change is continuing where there are more lessons to learn the mayor will do his best to ensure that those two
00:37:08 that those two are addressed diligently
00:37:12 thank you sir thank you very much for the stud now the
00:37:18 now the next opening statement is going to be made by mr martin seaword on behalf of the fire brigades union mr c wood i can see you
00:37:29 mr c wood i can see you i think
00:37:30 i think yes i can see him and you can see us i hope yes sir dean well then if you're ready to make your opening statement on behalf of the fbu
00:37:41 of the fbu we should be pleased to hear you thank you sir and uh fellow panel members and assessors
00:37:49 assessors um you have our written submissions and we will not repeat these today um
00:37:55 um you already and you are anyway fully aware of the issues that are going to be canvassed in module five i won't read out the list but they all concern the fire and rescue services
00:38:07 fire and rescue services this renewed focus on the fire and rescue services should be kept in proper perspective the grenfell tower disaster was an extreme event it was caused by the failures of government organizations and persons who
00:38:19 government organizations and persons who had nothing to do with the fire and rescue service although this was regrettably facilitated by the failure of those in leading positions within the service to challenge or make the case for public
00:38:31 challenge or make the case for public and firefighter safety this was a major failing of fire of chief fire officers and their organizations and of those who advised government on fire policy
00:38:42 fire policy i will list the five main causes as the fbu sees it firstly the not fit for purpose regulatory regime that left the door open to the failed design and build of the refurbishment
00:38:53 the refurbishment e.g removing fast it depicts the demeaning of health and safety in favor of business interests and the constant pressure to cut red tape the one in one out and then one in two out
00:39:04 out secondly the refurbishers the owners um rbkc and tmo the design team fire engineers manufacturers of cladding materials in the construction industry which variously gained the system and
00:39:16 which variously gained the system and failed to think fire and between them installed a new rain screen cladding system which rendered the tower a combustible death trap and failed to provide correlative fire safety measures thirdly stay put
00:39:28 thirdly stay put this is a feature of building design and is not the creation of the fire and rescue service it should never have been applied
00:39:34 applied to grenfell tower after the refurbishment uh destroyed its comp compartmentation mainly by installing a combustible rain screen cladding system in light of what we now know the
00:39:45 in light of what we now know the building should not have been occupied at all with a state board evacuation strategy fourthly the lfb was not advised of the increased fire risk presented by the new
00:39:56 increased fire risk presented by the new grain spring grabbing system on grenfell tower following the refurbishment and was unaware of its capacity to cause rapid insidious fire spread over the whole of the building inside and out
00:40:09 whole of the building inside and out the total building failure at grenfell tower put firefighters in an unprecedented impossible situation on the night of the fire that we know as the grenfell tower disaster
00:40:21 disaster if i can turn sir to the order of modules
00:40:25 modules um the the intense focus on the emergency response in phase one and now again in modules five and six of phase two risks losing this perspective the fpu asks
00:40:36 fpu asks inquiry to look at the underlying systemic causes of the growth of terror disaster avoid condemning individuals in the lfb and recognize that the llp was trying its best to provide a service to
00:40:47 trying its best to provide a service to keep the public safe from fire in face of acute challenges by the government these challenges include firstly deregulation which limited the extent to which new building materials
00:40:58 extent to which new building materials and methods could be understood regulated and taken into account for firefighting purposes secondly austerity cuts which reduced staff numbers in key public sector
00:41:09 staff numbers in key public sector departments including building control fire safety departments operational crews and control thirdly attempts at privatization draining already limited resources
00:41:22 draining already limited resources fourthly the government's fragmentation of the fire and rescue service and then providing insufficient national leadership guidance and scrutiny from ministers the dclg and chief fire
00:41:33 ministers the dclg and chief fire officers
00:41:34 officers in the in the chief fire officers association which later became the the uh national fire chiefs council the nfcc these failings originate because of the
00:41:45 these failings originate because of the failed government policy and the failure of the then mayor of london now prime minister
00:41:50 minister and chief fire officers to stand up for the service for public safety and for standards
00:41:56 standards resulting in a failure to identify emerging risks a failure to plan adequately to respond to those risks a failure to protect the service see particularly the cuts imposed on the fire inspecting offices
00:42:08 fire inspecting offices the fbi has believed from the outset that the inquiry could better assess firefighting procedure and training after looking first at all the regulatory and guidance context within which the fire and rescue services develop their policies and
00:42:20 services develop their policies and procedures the lack of national guidance in respect of evacuation is well known to all those who listen to inquiry the fbu asks note be taken also of the
00:42:31 the fbu asks note be taken also of the dearth of national guidance under section 21 of the fire and rescue services act 2004 or otherwise on other issues of importance to all fire and rescue services notably there was no national guidance
00:42:44 notably there was no national guidance to local fire and rescue services including london on the requirements of for responsible persons to prepare evacuation plans especially peeps
00:42:54 peeps the problems facing fire and rescue services in the fields of communications the growing risk of new building materials and the increasing prevalence of rain screen planning systems on existing
00:43:05 existing often old high-rise residential buildings
00:43:08 buildings the increasingly prevalent breaches of compartmentation in existing high rise despite universal dependence on stay put
00:43:18 and failing to advise on the recommendations to retrofit retrofit sprinklers
00:43:27 sorry i've i seem to have lost my place here
00:43:32 i've just pressed return and it's all disappeared it'll come back in a minute
00:43:38 so i was i was looking at the uh lack of national guidance and citing some examples uh so i've mentioned on the
00:43:49 uh so i've mentioned on the recommendations uh to retrofit sprinklers and also on the requirements for responsible persons to prepare evacuation plans especially personal emergency evacuation plans
00:44:01 personal emergency evacuation plans and on the various recommendations made by coroners and other proper authority following earlier tragedies as well as on when and how to evacuate in
00:44:13 in in a fire
00:44:15 in a fire the fbu has read the criticisms some trenchant of the london pharmacy which are made in other opening submissions and agrees there have been significant failings in the fire and rescue service these failings do not lie with the
00:44:27 these failings do not lie with the firefighters in local stations control room staff or with local far safety teams nor do they lie with the fbu which has challenged these failings every step of the way but module 5 will be heard
00:44:39 but module 5 will be heard before much of the relevant evidence including oral examination of the experts
00:44:44 experts and the senior fire officers including the president london fire commission and his two immediate predecessors the fb urges all those listening to the inquiry hearings including especially the panel not to
00:44:56 including especially the panel not to pass judgment on the fire and rescue servants and particularly the individuals they're in before hearing all the evidence and considering the wider picture outlined above the lfb is not a failed service it has
00:45:07 the lfb is not a failed service it has continued to provide a good service in face of the destructive effect of ministers deregulatory agenda privatization eg in the control room and austerity
00:45:18 eg in the control room and austerity cuts
00:45:20 cuts the fba reserves its position on all module five issues until closing submissions we asked the inquiry to consider leaving closing submissions for module five until the end of module
00:45:31 for module five until the end of module six so the core participants can consider all the evidence produced in these two modules when finalizing their submissions and the overlapping issues to be covered
00:45:42 the inquiry does not currently propose to call the prime minister boris johnson to testify about his period as mayor of london nor to call matt rank general secretary of the fbu we urge the panel to keep an open mind
00:45:54 we urge the panel to keep an open mind on the desirability of calling both these witnesses in module 6. as to the former mayor he repeatedly overrode the london assembly to impose swinging cuts on the nfp
00:46:05 swinging cuts on the nfp as to matt rank firefighters particularly operational crews will otherwise have no one to speak for them in modules five and six
00:46:15 moving on to the role of the fbu it may assist those listening to these submissions to explain briefly what the fbu does
00:46:22 fbu does the fbi is a trade union a voluntary organization of workers funded entirely by member subscriptions ninety percent plus of of far of uk firefighters belong to the including control staff and officers the
00:46:34 including control staff and officers the union negotiates and collectively bargains with employers on their behalf on pay hours conditions pensions health and safety discipline it represents individuals who suffer
00:46:45 it represents individuals who suffer injuries or have other problems arising out of their work and the bereaved families of firefighters who die in the line of duty whose numbers have tragically risen dramatically over the last 20 years
00:46:56 the last 20 years it also represents the voice of firefighters with ministers mayors other politicians chief fire officers and their national bodies
00:47:05 bodies the fbu campaigns for investment in the fire and rescue service and for wider issues eg on climate change the fbi has campaigned to modernize and to improve standards in the uk final risk of service
00:47:15 service for the benefit of its own members and of the wider public for more than 100 years
00:47:20 years however the fba wants to make it clear it's not in charge of the fire and rescue service it ought not to be conflated with the management of the fire rescue service in london or nationally
00:47:31 nationally on the contrary the fbu was formed in london precisely in order to defend and promote firefighters conditions against lfb management especially in recent years the fbu has
00:47:43 especially in recent years the fbu has often
00:47:44 often been attacked ignored excluded by management and government for example since 2004 the fbu has been excluded from
00:47:55 the fbu has been excluded from participating in official bodies like the central fire brigades advisory council
00:48:00 council and the building regulations advisory committee
00:48:03 committee it has been so excluded both by the restructuring of 2004 which deprived the fbi of its statutory rights and duty to participate at this level and by the attitude of those
00:48:14 and by the attitude of those administering these bodies thereafter in particular the fbi has had no legal responsibility to look out for emerging risks like cladding that was the responsibility of the
00:48:25 that was the responsibility of the building owners and clients those engaged in the cladding industry
00:48:30 the government particularly dclg the regulatory body's under building regulations the housing act and the fire safety order such as the bre the bba building control housing
00:48:42 the bre the bba building control housing authorities and fire and rescue services and the national bodies of the fire and rescue service such as cfra
00:48:50 cfra cfoa and nfcc within the lfb or any fire and rescue service it was no part of any firefighter or control room staff's responsibility to look out for such
00:49:02 responsibility to look out for such emerging risks in the built environment
00:49:08 turning if i may the calls for the wholesale structure of the fire and rescue service core participants and some experts in their submissions to this module have called for the wholesale restructure of the fire and rescue
00:49:20 restructure of the fire and rescue service the the fbi wants to ensure that the lessons of grenfell tower are learned that a similar horror never occurs again and supports the work of organizations like inquest that have called for a national oversight body to
00:49:32 called for a national oversight body to ensure that recommendations made of the inquest
00:49:35 inquest and inquiries are implemented we agree such improvements are needed in the frs and call for the highest professional standards in the service
00:49:46 professional standards in the service that is what the fbu campaigns for daily as a trade union it has consistently called for reforms for improvements in standards and training however it is the experience of the eu the so-called
00:49:58 experience of the eu the so-called reforms in the fire and rescue service have rather than improved eroded the fire service a process that has been echoed across the public services in the uk
00:50:07 in the uk we owe these reforms imposed from above and not challenged by the leadership of the fire and rescue service ought to be fully investigated by the panel
00:50:18 be fully investigated by the panel the last attempt at wholesale restructuring of the fire and rescue service in 2004 resulted in firstly the abolition of national standards of fire cover and emergency response and their replacement
00:50:29 emergency response and their replacement with the locally determined integrated risk management planning process
00:50:35 which i referred to as the irmp process secondly the failure of that irmp process which was hopelessly fettered by its link to budgeting and became inextricably tangled in the struggle of
00:50:46 inextricably tangled in the struggle of hard-pressed local authorities to make savings in the face of austerity cuts decisions about the provision of fire and risky services across the country were driven not by risk assessment as they should have been
00:50:57 they should have been by the need to find savings in austerity this has led to huge cuts to funding leading to significant reductions in staffing including in specialist fire safety teams
00:51:08 safety teams thirdly the resulting and near constant attempts to cut the numbers of staff equipment and stations also terms and conditions of service to avoid the payment of pension benefits played out in 47 different brigades
00:51:20 in 47 different brigades have absorbed the efforts of local authorities senior management and the fbu and distracted them from new challenges confronting the fire and risk of service fourthly sideline and ignoring the fpu
00:51:31 fourthly sideline and ignoring the fpu wherever possible instead of engaging fully with representatives of the workforce
00:51:36 workforce fifthly the abolition of national appointment and promotion standards and sixthly um the abolition of the of her majesty's fine services inspectorate
00:51:48 fine services inspectorate the fba contends this led to the consequential dearth of research development and national guidance for brigades into common problems some central to the gti including those listed above
00:52:00 including those listed above the fbi contends that the new national bodies that arose have failed to speak truth to power and as a result have played a leading role in downgrading fire safety leaving the public at risk
00:52:12 leaving the public at risk seafro seafarer and nfcc did not address issues highlighted by fires where compartmentation failed for various reasons including the need for national research and development of solutions to
00:52:24 research and development of solutions to the national problems how to evacuate a high-rise how to communicate effectively when fighting fire in a high-rise and how to augment water flow to achieve a sufficient flow
00:52:35 water flow to achieve a sufficient flow rate
00:52:36 rate neither did they press the dclg for the resources to carry out this work properly
00:52:41 properly on communications they failed to address the fundamental problems as set out by professor johnson and produce no national guidance to benefit all fire and rescue services instead leaving the work to individual fire
00:52:52 leaving the work to individual fire rescue services to struggle ineffectively with this recurring problem
00:52:57 problem they fail to advise government on the need to revise its guidance under section 21 of the fire and rescue services act 2004 the the fire and rescue national framework
00:53:07 framework and on the failure of the irmp process properly to assess risk instead the irmp was used as i've said purely as a budgetary device to make year-on-year savings
00:53:19 savings in short these reforms only made things worse hindering the efforts of firefighters to tackle high-rise fires moving on to uh steve mcgurk the fbu opposed steve mcgowan's
00:53:32 the fbu opposed steve mcgowan's appointment as the firefighting expert to the inquiry and is critical of his report
00:53:36 report his report says evacuation was possible but he doesn't explain how it could have been done here sidestep that difficult question how would you do it by agreeing with the chairman that firefighters
00:53:47 with the chairman that firefighters should have made it up on the night
00:53:51 he is part of the problem he was his chief fire officer from 99 until 2015 he was also prisoner of sifo just before the lack of house fire in 2009 he was a leading national figure among
00:54:04 he was a leading national figure among chief fire officers and an adviser to the local government association between 2009 and 2014 when it produced its guidance on high-rise building fire safety he also chaired the practitioner's forum during his
00:54:16 the practitioner's forum during his brief existence neither mr mcguck nor his his two brigades
00:54:22 brigades developed learning on evacuation and stayed put or assessed risks of catastrophic building failure or warned government of cladding risks or challenge the deregulation of the
00:54:33 or challenge the deregulation of the fire safety in the building control regime or alert government exchanges he must therefore submits the fbu be held to account himself for the failure of cfo and then
00:54:44 himself for the failure of cfo and then fcc to assess the risks of catastrophic building failure and to warn ministers of the dangers of cladding and related hazards he should be asked why cyfa oversaw a deregulated
00:54:55 be asked why cyfa oversaw a deregulated fire safety regime failed to warn ministers or the public that such a regime was likely to lead to a disaster
00:55:04 on evacuation specifically mr mcgowan agrees with the chairman's conclusion that by 130 earliest and 150 of the latest it was clear that revoking the statement strategy in place and moving to attempt to evacuate the
00:55:15 and moving to attempt to evacuate the tower was the only realistic way of minimizing loss of life and serious injury the steps have been taken to carry this out he so agrees notwithstanding he acknowledges there was no national operation operational guidance or
00:55:27 operation operational guidance or direction that provides advice as to how to evacuate a high-rise building and um he reports no practical guidance in the uk as to how evacuation should be
00:55:38 in the uk as to how evacuation should be carried out saying i've also considered a number of international procedures but here too i've not located any explicit operational evacuation procedures
00:55:48 so there are still no agreed uh operational guidance four years after the fire the firefighters on the night had to had no procedure and no trading such situation
00:55:59 procedure and no trading such situation on the other hand they did have a procedure and training in the defending place strategy for high-rise with a stapled evacuation strategy and they carried it out
00:56:10 and they carried it out therefore the fbu contends the firefighters on the scene cannot be blamed or criticized for any failure to evacuate
00:56:18 evacuate turning now to professor torreira are not blaming the fire service professor terraria delivered a lecture at the warren center fire safety engineering project in australia on the 24th of july 2018
00:56:31 24th of july 2018 when he expressed why it is wrong to blame firefighters and the foreign rescue service for the grenfell tower disaster
00:56:37 disaster i'm quoting him directly now what ended up happening in grenfell was that the engineers delivered the building those engineers did not exercise competency adequately their competence was not consistent with the
00:56:50 competence was not consistent with the complexity of what they were doing and they delivered a building on fire to the fasteners that the fire service could not manage it wasn't the fire service failure to address the problem of the building it's our failure to actually deliver the
00:57:02 our failure to actually deliver the building that the firefighters could actually work on so the expectation that the fire service should have understood building performance the expectation of the fire service should have been able to manage the fire is a really unfair expectation
00:57:15 the fire is a really unfair expectation nevertheless today we're sitting in front of the television watching the testimony testimonies of the firefighters at grenfell and we're blaming them for what they were not able to handle
00:57:25 to handle we expected them to come and fix the problem for us we created the mess and they couldn't fix the problem and now we want to blame them professor torreira now calls for reforms
00:57:37 professor torreira now calls for reforms of the fire rescue service the fbi agrees a change of culture is needed particularly for ministers policy advisers and cfos and chief fire officers nationally and at local level to confront not avoid
00:57:50 at local level to confront not avoid difficult issues like communications problems and to learn from recommendations made by proper authority usually following earlier tragedies the way to restore a fire and rescue service
00:58:01 way to restore a fire and rescue service which lives up to these rightfully high expectations and retains public confidence is a to establish national institutions with meaningful trade union representation to assure appropriate guidance is developed and
00:58:13 appropriate guidance is developed and given to local fire and rescue services and b
00:58:16 and b to secure adequate resources for local fire and rescue services to discharge their functions such national institutions might include as has been recommended by professor
00:58:27 as has been recommended by professor johnson for example a national framework for fire safety research a national framework for operational firefighting research
00:58:34 research a national fire safety investigation board
00:58:37 board a modern equivalent to the central fire brigades advisory council a national statutory body to include genuine trade union representation but if reforms mean private sector
00:58:49 but if reforms mean private sector takeover
00:58:51 takeover attacking the workforce and blaming the victims
00:58:54 victims that will let those in power off the hook
00:58:57 hook and fail to confront the building crisis moving on so too dr paul grimwood the the fbu respects dr grimwig's work and notes that he himself recognizes
00:59:09 and notes that he himself recognizes that the practical application of the rice mnemonic to a situation such as grenfell is necessarily limited
00:59:17 dr greenwood says it is important to emphasize that rice is not a policy or procedure but a command decision making tool which is primarily an aid memoir used to alleviate command stress and prompt a predetermined rapid analytical
00:59:29 prompt a predetermined rapid analytical thought process it was not an alternative evacuation policy
00:59:37 the pro former kent standard operating procedure known as the kent soap there's no indication that he had actually been adopted by kent or any
00:59:49 actually been adopted by kent or any other fire and rescue service by the time of the grantful tower disaster or even now
00:59:55 even now the national fire brigades union were not consulted about the pro forma kenso and received no information from any fba representatives in the southeast region about it if kent or any fire and rescue
01:00:06 about it if kent or any fire and rescue service had sought to implement the pro former council they would have been obliged to consult with the fbu because of the increased risk to firefighters if required to work above a fire in a
01:00:17 required to work above a fire in a high-rise residential building subject to evidence that might emerge in module 5
01:00:22 module 5 it's unlikely that the pro former kentuck was introduced as a procedure before the grenfell tower fire and more likely that it remained a pro forma
01:00:36 neither uh
01:00:38 uh the kensal nor rice provides help for vulnerable people with mobility problems and may lead to injuries and deaths of firefighters in any event
01:00:49 any event firefighters and control staff whom we represent in this inquiry and their fbu representatives both in london and national were unaware of the rice demolition or the pro former council until long after the fire
01:01:03 there are still no national guidelines on evacuation since the fire the um the the london fire commission has introduced a revised pn633 which
01:01:14 introduced a revised pn633 which um
01:01:15 um and stud qc referred to a few moments ago which would have required firefighters to work above the fire in a high-rise without starting up their breathing apparatus sets and has been accepted and as has been the accepted
01:01:26 accepted and as has been the accepted safety practice for more than half a century
01:01:29 century the fbu have highlighted the unacceptable risks to firefighters health and safety which the new policy endorsed
01:01:35 endorsed the fbu's concerns were upheld by an independent arbitrator the london fire commissioner accepted the finding of the arbitrator and modified the proposed procedure which is now being introduced in london
01:01:47 now being introduced in london this is to to the credit of both the the lfc and the fbu both of whom have listened and learned from this inquiry and are determined to improve the fire and rescue service including
01:01:58 the fire and rescue service including the operational response to high-rise buildings
01:02:02 buildings those who wish to demean health and safety
01:02:05 safety may see the fbi's intervention as obstructive or being difficult whereas it was in fact both reasonable and well-founded and born after the fbu's long experience of supporting brave families and firefighters who died
01:02:17 families and firefighters who died fighting fire in high-rise buildings for example shirley towers and paracore the lfb should not be blamed for failing to devise
01:02:29 to devise an evacuation policy as we submitted in phase one and as remains the fbi's understanding no other foreign rescue service had an evacuation plan at the time of fire notably not greater manchester
01:02:41 notably not greater manchester fire and rescue service where mr mcgurk was the chief fire officer from 2009 to 15.
01:02:48 15. even now over four years after the fire the national steering group set up by the home office mhclg and the nfcc to implement the chairman's recommendation 12a
01:02:58 12a has still not reported with national guidelines for evacuating high-rise the chairman recommended that the government develop national guidelines carrying out partial or total evacuations of high-rise such guidelines
01:03:10 evacuations of high-rise such guidelines to include the means of protecting fire executes and procedures for evacuating persons who are unable to use the stairs in an emergency or who may require assistance such as disabled people older
01:03:21 assistance such as disabled people older people and young children so far very little has been provided little detail has been provided about the work of the steering group see for example the last update update of march 2021
01:03:34 of march 2021 ensuring excellent standards in the fire rescue service needs the sustained commitment and and leadership of central government to set and maintain standards
01:03:45 to set and maintain standards in light of this delay the four years delay since the fire and and two years since the chairman's recommendation the fbi asks how can
01:03:56 recommendation the fbi asks how can watch manager downton possibly be criticized for not having devised an evacuation plan for grenfell tower on that terrible night turning then to the criticism
01:04:07 turning then to the criticism in in your phase one reports are the criticism of watch manager downton for not deciding to revoke stake or to move to total evacuation of the tower by 150.
01:04:18 150. the fbu submits that some of the chairman's findings in his phase relating to the actions of firefighters on the night of the fire may need to be revisited in light of the evidence heard in phase two
01:04:30 evidence heard in phase two one such finding is the criticism of dowden for failing to evacuate the tower by 150 when he handed over control to station manager walton the chairman found it was or should have been obvious that only a supervised mass
01:04:42 been obvious that only a supervised mass evacuation would minimize the number of casualties and he describes the same window by 150 at the latest report
01:04:52 report found the chairman at the latest he should have realized that the fire had begun to enter the interior of the building
01:04:57 building the compartmentation which underpins the statement advice has been breached in those circumstances he should have spoken to operations manager norman in the control room and have obtained the most recent information
01:05:08 most recent information should have decided to evacuate building a set about ensuring through the control room that all calls from the building were told to leave come on may this is a finding which the firefighting community whom i represent
01:05:19 community whom i represent both
01:05:20 both fbu members who attended or were on duty that night and the fbu and its wider membership and so far as i'm aware the employer the nfb or the london fire commissioner
01:05:32 commissioner finding which they cannot accept which is not out of any disrespect for the chairman or for the process of the inquiry
01:05:39 inquiry but from their own knowledge and experience they believe that watch manager dowden and his senior colleagues around him at the instant crowd should not be criticized for not ordering a full evacuation of the town
01:05:50 evacuation of the town by 1.50
01:05:52 by 1.50 we wrote to the inquiry on the 9th of august 2019 itemizing some of the difficulties with a supervised mass evacuation i won't repeat those here the fbu respectfully submits the watch
01:06:04 the fbu respectfully submits the watch manager down neither knew nor should have known some of the key factors which the chairman considered should have triggered his revocation of stakehood and and started him planning to evacuate
01:06:16 and and started him planning to evacuate the tower
01:06:18 the tower so these key factors are about to run out of batteries
01:06:26 that's right
01:06:37 [Music] um
01:06:43 so turning to those factors so um watch manager down did not know the cladding fire had spread out of control by 150. the spread of fire was unusual since other fires of this kind had tended to
01:06:54 other fires of this kind had tended to burn out after reaching the top of the building
01:06:57 building watch manager dowden and his colleagues could not have predicted the rapid fire development specifically that fire would race across the crown and accelerate lateral fast breath untrained in how to fight creating fires
01:07:08 untrained in how to fight creating fires he continued to expect the fire to be extinguished by firefighting operations and was still planning to fight 150 when he handed over command watch manager dalton could not reasonably have been expected to know his firefighting plan could not succeed
01:07:20 his firefighting plan could not succeed until after he had at least seen the ineffectiveness of the aerial which didn't start applying water until about 147 and continued thereafter until 205.
01:07:32 205. if an aerial had been included in the pta mr dowd may have learned of the futility of trying to fight the external fire over 20 minutes before it became apparent on the night
01:07:43 apparent on the night moreover watch manager dowden and his colleagues on the night were not provided with the tools to enable him to make or them to suggest that decision which had never been made before in the fire and rescue service
01:07:54 before in the fire and rescue service let alone by watch manager the german has found institutional failures these cannot be laid at the door of mr dowden and his colleagues on the night
01:08:03 the night for all the reasons i've outlined additional to the systemic failings already cited essentially the lack of evacuation procedure policy or training in it there was
01:08:14 there was no responsible person's evacuation plan prepared by our bkc or the tmo not even with vulnerable persons nor any practical guidance or even information about who or in which flat such persons were nor any training or drills for
01:08:26 were nor any training or drills for instance on how to evacuate building which would have identified safe places to gather
01:08:30 to gather and practice special arrangements for vulnerable people there was no training on how to go about conducting a section 72d visit on how the materials used in exterior facades might behave in fires and
01:08:42 might behave in fires and mr down could not be expected to assess the risks created by the cladding system or how they might relate to other aspects of the building's fire safety measures nor went to bring in the
01:08:53 measures nor went to bring in the expertise of a fire risk assessor to assist with that task nor how to assess the risks thereby uncovered these were failings of the lfb senior management not with mr dalton
01:09:04 not with mr dalton his training didn't equip him to understand the nature of the fire or how best to combat or contain it in order to equip him to decide whether to undertake an evacuation or how best to do so nor how to evaluate the situation revoke
01:09:17 nor how to evaluate the situation revoke state or plan an evacuation and then implement it as the chairman has found the knowledge that high-rise buildings are constructed on the basis of effective compartmentation itself created a barrier to thinking about
01:09:28 created a barrier to thinking about evacuation and so if he had considered revoking state board and moving to evacuation he would have had to improvise to carry it out improvise in face of formidable
01:09:39 improvise in face of formidable practical difficulties and despite the dangers that would arise including a risk to life the reduced frequency which firefighters have been called upon to attend
01:09:50 have been called upon to attend operational incidents was not compensated by any increased training little unrealistic training in addition to the formidable difficulties impeding evacuation as found by the chairman
01:10:02 found by the chairman for example there being no reliable way to communicate with the residents should be added the unavailability of a fire lift which deprived crews of the chance to get to the upper floors quickly farther left and materially
01:10:13 quickly farther left and materially limited the height which firefighters could physically travel to initiate or assist with evacuation professor johnson reports on their unreliable communication systems used on the night
01:10:24 the night this the the problems were already known to the chairman and all who listen to the evidence in phase one but professor johnson has explained how these communication failures led to reduced situation awareness
01:10:37 reduced situation awareness importantly ba crews up the tower were unable reliably if at all to communicate with brigid nor bridget commander and vice versa there were adjustments that could have been amen could have been made easy to
01:10:49 been amen could have been made easy to reconfigure the barrier headsets to use their more powerful uhf radio but the firefighters were not trained to do this
01:10:57 do this watch manager o'keefe pointedly lamented that he could have done with an airwave radio
01:11:03 radio examples of early communications failures are legion but a few illustrate the point by early i mean in the period up until 150. during the attempt to rescue jessica on
01:11:14 during the attempt to rescue jessica on floor 20 between 134 and 1 157 firefighter dawg who tried unsuccessfully to radio bridgehead but couldn't get through
01:11:23 through watch manager down did not know of any fsg calls until after 135 when the first admin called cu-8 started
01:11:33 started and not until the first list of three fsg calls was thereafter taken by watch manager kenfield today when he was talking to station manager
01:11:44 when he was talking to station manager loft and that's estimated at about 140. the initial service requests sent to the instant command pump had not been picked up and there was no digital record of them
01:11:55 them the instant command pump wasn't manned because all the firefighters were busy elsewhere
01:12:01 elsewhere firefighters cornelius and murphy the first crew deployed by the bridgehead to respond to an fsg call at around 151 tried repeatedly to contact the bridge head on their handheld radios to say
01:12:12 head on their handheld radios to say that they would not be able to bring the people down but they received no answer and heard no radio traffic they didn't debrief to bridgehead until around 219 their end
01:12:23 to bridgehead until around 219 their end of where time so mr dowden was unaware before 150 that the ba deployments to rescue fsg callers had been unsuccessful and and they have been unable to reach
01:12:36 and and they have been unable to reach the uppermost flaws he reasonably tasked station manager loft with coordinating emergency response to fsg calls in line with procedure
01:12:45 procedure pn790
01:12:47 pn790 and as discussed with station manager he couldn't have been expected we submit to obtain information about the success of search and rescue deployments in response to fsg calls before he handed
01:12:58 response to fsg calls before he handed over command at about 150 and we respectfully say that's contrary to the chairman's finding at paragraph 28.21
01:13:06 28.21 of the phase one report having tried but failed to radio the bridge head crew manager stern and firefighter hitler later informed watch manager okey for the bridge head at about one of 38
01:13:18 for the bridge head at about one of 38 of the poor conditions on on floor 16 you'll remember the the the vivid description it's and of the failure of the failed rescue attempt on floor 16
01:13:29 of the failed rescue attempt on floor 16 with one person still unaccounted for watch manager dowden denies learning as critical information which was likely due to communications problems at his handover to station manager
01:13:41 at his handover to station manager walton shortly after 150 watch manager dowden didn't have information about any of the operations inside the tower and there was too much traffic on the radio to get a message to the bridge this is likely to be true because watch
01:13:54 this is likely to be true because watch manager dowden was a patently honest witness and because there were difficulties communicating from outside the tower to the bridgehead in light of all the circumstances including the new factors identified
01:14:05 including the new factors identified above the fbi respectfully asks the chairman and or the panel as he and they think
01:14:10 think think fit
01:14:11 think fit to review his criticism of watch manager dalton for not deciding to remake stateful and move to evacuate before 150.
01:14:19 150. it was not obvious on the country it ran counter to all his training and experience
01:14:28 concluding comments any future reform of the fire and rescue service must be the result of proper engagement with and consultation of the unions representing the workforce the fbu fully supports upskilling people
01:14:39 the fbu fully supports upskilling people who do the work of the frs from top down it fully supports the greater integration of the fire safety department into proper pre-planning and preparation for operational response it
01:14:50 preparation for operational response it fully supports the proposals for achieving better communications of instance better use of existing water supplies centralization of fire service research independence investigation and the collation of reports
01:15:02 the collation of reports but the fbu warns that further structural reform of the fire and rescue service will be seized upon by central government as an opportunity for further cuts for further privatization of parts of the fire and rescue service and to
01:15:13 of the fire and rescue service and to bring in business leaders who may not themselves have been exposed to all the dangers of firefighting and who may therefore appear to or actually will underestimate the value of health and safety which the fbu has fought for over
01:15:25 safety which the fbu has fought for over a hundred years to promote the public services sector is unsuited to private to privatization as seen in the probation and prison services yet it is repeatedly attempted in the
01:15:36 yet it is repeatedly attempted in the fire and rescue service eg the failed attempt to privatize the management of the lfb's fleet of vehicles with asic code going to liquidation or to privatize control rooms which ended in chaos wasting millions of pounds taking
01:15:48 chaos wasting millions of pounds taking up valuable control staff time along the way as explained by scott haywood and joe smith and their witness statements in module five and as exposed by the national audit commission
01:15:59 commission the fabric is union calls on the inquiry to assess the corrosive effect of the restructuring the fire and rescue service has been subjected to in recent years by investigating um the effects of fragmentation of the
01:16:11 um the effects of fragmentation of the dearth of national research and resulting guidance and of austerity cuts on the fire and rescue service over the last 15 years those who oversaw these destructive changes cited above should not continue
01:16:23 changes cited above should not continue to be the architects of further reform the fbu actively supports such
01:16:29 such positive change when possible it has done so in the past for example in developing generic risk systems like gra 3.2 for high-rise fighting in the development of community fire safety
01:16:40 development of community fire safety work and dynamic risk assessment in welcoming women and people from ethnic minorities into the fire risk results encouraging equal treatment and challenging discrimination and will do in the future
01:16:51 in the future the fba believes there is a need for major change and improvement in the financial service and has made this case for many years the union is committed to such changes to improve public safety and the ability of firefighters to
01:17:02 and the ability of firefighters to prevent fires and respond safely and effectively when fires happen thank you sir and your colleagues for allowing us to make this statement thank you very much mr seaword
01:17:15 thank you very much mr seaword the next statement is going to be made by mr louis brown queen's council on behalf of the fire officers association mr brown
01:17:26 mr brown do i have you there i'm here sir i can see you and your colleagues and i can hear you good we can see you and hear you now so um well we're ready for you to make your statement if you'd like to do that now
01:17:37 statement if you'd like to do that now please thank you thank you very much one of us recognized that the chairman made findings in his phase one report relating to the action of firefighters on the night of the fire
01:17:49 of firefighters on the night of the fire we respectfully submit that those findings may need to be reevaluated depending upon the evidence heard in this module and in module six accordingly and in so far specifically
01:18:00 accordingly and in so far specifically relevant to uh
01:18:03 uh the fire officer association richard welsh emphasis will again be placed on the wholly impossible situation firefighters and those in command faced on the night of the fire
01:18:14 on the night of the fire the following must be very carefully born in mind those in lfb command positions inside and outside the tower were motivated solely by taking decisions that would in their honestly hell view
01:18:26 their honestly hell view facilitate the rescue of those trapped in the tower in considering the actions of all lfb personnel on the night it must at all times be born in mind that this tragedy was wholly unprecedented in its scale
01:18:39 was wholly unprecedented in its scale and complexity and the enormous challenges it posed the fire was a multi-story external fire that caused a multi-story internal fire crucially
01:18:50 crucially on the night of the fire none of the firefighters including those in command positions had any knowledge that the tower was clad in such highly combustible range green cladding
01:19:01 combustible range green cladding the evidence given by all firefighters who commented upon it was that the fire at the tower was wholly outside the experience of all personnel who attended turning then sir please to the condition
01:19:14 turning then sir please to the condition of the tower immediately before the fire dr lane's opinion is cogent on these issues
01:19:20 issues in her supplemental report she states as follows based on the relevant test evidence the construction materials forming the cladding when considered either individually or as an assembly did not
01:19:32 individually or as an assembly did not comply with the recommended fire performance in adb 2013 as applicable the entire system could not adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls having
01:19:43 having regard to its height use the position of the building specifically the assembly failed adequately to resist the spread of fire to an extent that supported the required
01:19:54 to an extent that supported the required stay put strategy for the tower the assembly failed adequately to resist the spread of fire to an extent that supported the required internal firefighting defend in place
01:20:05 internal firefighting defend in place firefighting regime the cladding presented an extreme and primary hazard in the event of any internal fire starting near a window there was a disproportionately high probability of
01:20:17 disproportionately high probability of the fire spread into the cladding the type of materials in the cladding and how they were arranged around the window in the kitchen contributed to the speed at which the fire spread from the flat fire origin to
01:20:29 fire spread from the flat fire origin to a multi-storey external fire within the rain screen system the consequence of this was that any individual flat of fire origin was no longer in a separate fire rated box as
01:20:41 longer in a separate fire rated box as required
01:20:42 required the compartmentation required in the building was breached by the ability of the fire to spread on the external wall from that compartmented flat to the next the required single
01:20:54 the required single safety condition stay put was not provided for as was required as a result of the system installed during the refurbishment dr lane did not consider it reasonable
01:21:05 dr lane did not consider it reasonable that in the event of the installation of a combustible rain screen system on a high-rise residential building the fire brigade should be expected to fully mitigate any resulting fire event this was particularly so
01:21:17 this was particularly so where the fire brigade had never been informed that a combustible rain screen system had been installed her overall conclusion was that there were multiple catastrophic fire routes
01:21:28 were multiple catastrophic fire routes created by the construction form and construction detailing that was used the cladding is configured at the tower rented it unsuitable for a state put policy once fire was within the cladding there
01:21:40 once fire was within the cladding there was nothing to impede the spread of fire and smoke around the building and this in her words created the condition for a catastrophic fire event to occur as stated
01:21:51 as stated none of those were matters that those making command decisions on the night were aware of the single stair lobbies and the fire safety provisions they're in were not
01:22:02 safety provisions they're in were not ever designed to create a safe escape route or a safe working environment in a whole building fire the design approach for high-rise residential buildings is it is or
01:22:12 it is or based upon inhibiting that from occurring
01:22:16 occurring the net effect of all of this is that those lfb personnel taking command decisions on the night had no prior opportunity to consider their firefighting and rescue tactics as well as any evacuation guidance to
01:22:27 as well as any evacuation guidance to the residents having regard to how the fire was likely to behave spread once on the exterior of the building
01:22:35 building the impossible scale and nature of the task facing both residents and firefighters that night was encapsulated by dr lane in her supplemental report when she said that it was her opinion that the
01:22:47 that it was her opinion that the conditions created difficult and at times life-threatening conditions for the lfb
01:22:52 the lfb the conditions greatly restricted their ability to implement the standard processes and procedures regarding firefighting once the fire spread beyond flats 16.
01:23:02 flats 16. further the single escaped stairs and its lobbies became the single most important life safety feature the failure of this life safety feature meant that after 0.140 in particular 2am
01:23:14 meant that after 0.140 in particular 2am worsening conditions limited the ability for rescue to occur and created more and more barriers or perceived barriers for residents to overcome in order to self-evacuate
01:23:26 self-evacuate since the stay put strategy as a safety building design condition the lfb and its offices in command reasonably relied upon this building design condition on the night of the fire
01:23:37 the night of the fire there is no building design function in the high-rise residential building provided to enable firefighters in the uk
01:23:43 uk to communicate any change in their evacuation or rescue guidance from within the building then police are just some points concerning mr welsh's role
01:23:55 some points concerning mr welsh's role as fire safety commander on the night as you know he arrived at the bridgehead at
01:24:00 at 2 16
01:24:02 2 16 at that time it was on the second floor he spoke with that watch manager o'keefe and watch manager de silvo concerning their plans he was satisfied that the plans were the correct strategy and
01:24:14 plans were the correct strategy and appeared to be operating successfully watch manager o'keefe requested mr welsh to obtain all available edba resources and this he did by communicating that to the fire grant with viral fiber and
01:24:25 the fire grant with viral fiber and radio
01:24:27 radio with cu-8
01:24:29 with cu-8 he ensured that when the bridgehead was moved to the third floor fsg information which had been collated on the second floor the results of fsg pools were transferred to a wall on the third floor he satisfied himself that calls with fsg
01:24:42 he satisfied himself that calls with fsg calls were being processed properly and when sufficient information was to hand prioritization was given to the rescue of the young and the elderly according to mr welsh there was not a
01:24:53 according to mr welsh there was not a point when there was insufficient numbers of ed dba wearers to be deployed safely into the tower the point in time when he was fire safety forgive me fire sector commander
01:25:04 safety forgive me fire sector commander there were frequent difficulties in firefighters being able to reach higher floors
01:25:09 floors and it was for this reason that he did not consider that stay put should be abandoned
01:25:13 abandoned the conditions would have been to use his words unsurvivable and further conditions were again using his words getting worse by the minute when the bridgehead and forgive me the
01:25:25 when the bridgehead and forgive me the decision to abandon stay put was was communicated by mr welsh to a gm cook at a point when the bridgehead was on the ground floor and so after 308
01:25:37 was on the ground floor and so after 308 at about 4 a.m or thereabouts mr welsh and gm goldborn devised and implemented a plan for systematic searching this involved committing sdba whereas for firefighting starting on the floor of
01:25:49 firefighting starting on the floor of fire and then pushing edba wearers to get as high as they could in the building despite the conditions firefighters attempted to push as high at the tower as was possible
01:26:00 at the tower as was possible in addition mr welsh attempted the use of positive pressure ventilation however that did not work the use of secondary ba sets was not a viable option to assist
01:26:11 was not a viable option to assist residents who needed rescuing and with assistance with uh with assisting and evacuating the tower and that was for these reasons firstly they were not designed for that purpose secondly they are not for use in
01:26:23 secondly they are not for use in firefighter emergencies three were declared that night and thirdly there was an insufficiency of secondary sets can i then move on police sir to deal with
01:26:34 with some comments concerning mr mcgurk's report
01:26:38 report and in particular the comment that he makes at page 61 paragraphs 166 to 167 that there was no request to mobilize either a high-volume pumping unit hvp
01:26:50 either a high-volume pumping unit hvp or hose laying vehicle even as a precautionary measure it is our submission that even had such a request been made no operational advantage could have accrued due to the
01:27:01 advantage could have accrued due to the locations involved traffic conditions and the following the nearest hvp was stationed at barnett is a distance of over 13 miles to the tower
01:27:11 tower given the traffic conditions and the speeds likely to be achieved this would imply 20 to 30 minutes travel to the incident additional time would be required in locating and being briefed by the incident commander identifying a
01:27:23 by the incident commander identifying a suitable water source planning the route and deployment to that water source in the case of grenfell tower the closest sustainable and inexhaustible open water supply was the grand union canal
01:27:35 was the grand union canal secondly on deployments the pumping unit would be located by the canal that would be approximately a mile from the incident as the pump carries two kilometers of
01:27:46 as the pump carries two kilometers of hose a supplementary hose box would be required to secure the supply locating that unit would have been virtually impossible given the gridlock in surrounding roads and streets
01:27:58 that was extensive and impenetrable there can be no doubt in our submission that an operation to lay one mile of hose along the route that would have proved
01:28:10 the route that would have proved impossible and necessitated lengthy operation potentially delaying any delivery of water to the tower by a further two hours at least next
01:28:20 next a hose-laying lorry would encounter similar issues as this vehicle also lays 90 millimeters hose from the back of the vehicle as it drives along therefore needing a clear carriageway this vehicle could not operate
01:28:32 this vehicle could not operate effectively in gridlock conditions again had an hvp been successfully deployed the first delivery of water to the tower would have been delayed by ants
01:28:43 ants as regards the kent fire and rescue standard operating procedure the sop as has been pointed out by mr c wood rice 2 is simply a prompt or mnemonic
01:28:54 rice 2 is simply a prompt or mnemonic which is not a policy or procedure and offers no practical advice on how a full or partial evacuation is to be achieved in any situation certainly after 158 rice was an extremely limited relevance
01:29:06 rice was an extremely limited relevance to the situation of the tower since in the initial stages of the fire which began on the fourth floor eighty percent of the occupants were above the fire ground
01:29:17 fire ground adopting the rice model floors five and six might have been considered primary areas needing to be evacuated due to an imminent danger from the fire
01:29:26 the fire however in the time required to evacuate those floors the speed and ferocity of fire spread was such that in the meantime many parts of the stairwell would have been compromised the core activity underlying rice is the
01:29:38 the core activity underlying rice is the maintenance of the integrity of the means of escape and that was not achievable given the speed and frosty of fire spread it would not have been possible to determine firstly how the various parts of the
01:29:49 firstly how the various parts of the stairwell all subject to fluctuating conditions might be protected and by whom
01:29:55 whom and secondly how hoses might be deployed at which selected levels at which times and with what objective in 20 questions on rice it is estimated that it would take 20 to 40 minutes to
01:30:06 that it would take 20 to 40 minutes to evacuate
01:30:07 evacuate 350 people from a 20-storey building in tenable conditions and average asian fitness with evacuees and single file on the stairway thus whilst it may have been
01:30:19 thus whilst it may have been theoretically possible and therefore it can be said that attempts should have been made to carry out an evacuation the rice evacuation model would be compromised due to a the absence of any effective means of
01:30:30 a the absence of any effective means of communicating to residents and the evacuation plan b fire comp fire comp augmentation had been subject to multiple failures c
01:30:40 c conditions throughout sections of the stairway were not tenable the integrity of the stairway had not and could not be maintained and fourthly while some occupants were of average asian fitness
01:30:51 occupants were of average asian fitness there was no available information with regard to numbers who were not fit and whose disabilities might impact on an orderly evacuation in single file so that's all we propose to say by way
01:31:02 so that's all we propose to say by way of our opening statement well thank you very much indeed mr brown uh at that point we uh shall take the afternoon break and we
01:31:13 and we we might resume know i'd say we'll resume at half past three when we shall hear a closing statement from mr stephen walks queens council on behalf of the london fire brigade so i'll pass three
01:31:26 london fire brigade so i'll pass three then please thank you
01:51:02 welcome back everyone we're now going to hear an opening statement by mr stephen wallscreen's council on behalf of the london fire brigade yes mr walt when you're ready thank you very much indeed mr chairman good
01:51:15 very much indeed mr chairman good afternoon
01:51:16 afternoon to you and zestafan and mr ackball
01:51:21 um just so you know for timing purposes i won't be longer than 45 minutes well you've we've allowed you now so you don't feel under any pressure yeah well i don't but i'm very grateful sir
01:51:32 i don't but i'm very grateful sir so
01:51:35 so by far
01:51:36 by far the most uh important assertion i can make in these submissions as we move into module five of the inquiry if i make no other submissions today
01:51:48 submissions today although i will but the most important and the most meaningful is that the primary focus of the london fire commissioner is concentrated
01:51:59 concentrated on learning meaningful lessons from the grenfell tower fire indeed the commissioner's energy and that of the lfb as an organization has been and remains
01:52:11 has been and remains fully committed to that process
01:52:15 the the tragic loss of 72 lives and the consequent impact which the events of the 14th of june 2017 have had on the bereaved
01:52:27 2017 have had on the bereaved the survivors and the residents of grenfell tower together with a wider public interest remains daily and i mean daily the driving force
01:52:38 the driving force behind the london fire commissioner's efforts
01:52:42 efforts there is no doubt that the brigade must and is
01:52:46 and is doing everything in its power to learn the hard lessons from that terrible night and that is not a platitude
01:52:57 and that is not a platitude it is not a hollow statement as the evidence which the london fire commissioner commissioner rowe will demonstrate in module six if he is given the
01:53:09 in module six if he is given the opportunity to explain in much more detail what has been done although i will summarize certain matters later on so it you won't be surprised to hear
01:53:20 so it you won't be surprised to hear that in common with many other core participants i have no intention
01:53:25 intention of repeating all of the facts and matters addressed in our written opening submissions which are now in any event publicly publicly available instead i would seek
01:53:36 publicly available instead i would seek only to highlight certain key aspects which we believe will inform the understanding of the evidence which is to be heard now during module five
01:53:48 from the very start of the inquiry in early 2018 the lfb the london fire brigade and to an extent
01:53:58 an extent fire and rescue services generally have rightly come under the microscope indeed it has been subjected to my new scrutiny by a large body of experts
01:54:12 scrutiny by a large body of experts commissioned by the inquiry in multiple disciplines the intense questioning of more than 80 brigade staff in phase one of the inquiry
01:54:25 in phase one of the inquiry which i i think is accepted the lfb not only cooperated in but largely assisted in facilitating combined with the scrutiny that the experts have undertaken
01:54:37 experts have undertaken since the inquiry began its complex task has revealed areas in which the brigade has been the subject of criticism and the london fire commissioner has
01:54:50 and the london fire commissioner has made it clear that the london fire brigade must and does
01:54:55 does take full responsibility for its operational response to the fire and for ensuring that the knowledge gained from it is used to maximum effect for the future
01:55:07 is used to maximum effect for the future while enhancing both public and firefighter safety
01:55:13 of course it is true that the lfb was not responsible for the causes of the fire or the manner in which it developed or the failings which were exposed in
01:55:24 the failings which were exposed in modules one to three of phase two on the part of some who were connected with the refurbishment of the building which resulted in the eradication
01:55:35 eradication of essential fire safety measures which in turn caused the devastating fire that is the last and only time in these submissions i
01:55:46 and only time in these submissions i will make that point because among the vital lessons which must be learned from the tragedy is that the lfb and fire and rescue services around the
01:55:57 and fire and rescue services around the country
01:55:58 country must plan and develop operational tactics and procedures in so far as they possibly can which is the key issue which i will come to in a moment
01:56:08 moment to meet the consequences should they occur again of the chain of events which led to the grenfell tower fire and of course much of the evidence to be
01:56:20 and of course much of the evidence to be considered in modules five and six in including the expert reports concern matters and events up to the date of the fire in 2017
01:56:32 date of the fire in 2017 but one of the key factors to address as your phase one report makes clear sir is the question whether the lfb could be said to be a learning organization both before
01:56:44 both before and following the fire those are matters no doubt which will be addressed through commissioner rowe and others in module six for the purposes of these module five
01:56:57 for the purposes of these module five submissions it is right that the lfc provides an account of what it has been doing and the challenges involved in it because it has some bearing on the consideration of the challenges
01:57:09 on the consideration of the challenges faced by fire and rescue services before 2017
01:57:13 2017 which is relevant of course to the evidence to be given in module five and i will come to that shortly
01:57:21 understandably certain core participants in their module five opening submissions have relied upon a number of the opinions of the experts that is to say the experts which have
01:57:33 that is to say the experts which have been instructed as experts by the inquiry
01:57:36 inquiry and extrapolate from them what are said to be hard facts about the manner in which the lfb has gone about its business
01:57:45 but with the exception of mr mcgurk none of the expert witnesses who have been instructed as experts who are undoubtedly
01:57:56 who are undoubtedly expert and knowledgeable in their own fields
01:57:59 fields claim to have expertise in firefighting or managing and operating fire and rescue services indeed many expressly say so fairness to
01:58:10 indeed many expressly say so fairness to them
01:58:11 them obviously there is no criticism against them
01:58:15 them either implied or overtly because their reports actually have provided valuable information to the lfb and i would think fire and rescue services nationally
01:58:27 rescue services nationally in the furtherance of its lesson of their lesson learning processes but in so far as those reports impact upon the operation of the lfb and fire and rescue services generally
01:58:39 and fire and rescue services generally it's obviously necessary to hear from the present and former lfb senior staff who are to give evidence in modules five and six
01:58:50 and six indeed the submissions of certain of the core participants in their module five openings
01:58:56 openings concern matters which are of particular significance to the issues to be addressed in module six because there is an unavoidable overlap between those two modules so far in phase two
01:59:09 so far in phase two of this inquiry there has been no opportunity until now
01:59:15 until now for those who are experienced in firefighting the people who were and are responsible for key areas of fire and rescue
01:59:25 rescue operations training
01:59:28 training resourcing managing budgets according to government expectations and so on to address the issues which the inquiry needs to explore and for the experts to hear
01:59:40 and for the experts to hear actually as well um
01:59:45 um in relation to the key issues for this inquiry from the perspective of operational firefighting and rescue in the field there's a valuable evidence
01:59:56 in the field there's a valuable evidence which will not i hope only inform the inquiry but also the experts views and in order to take any informed view and in the interest of fairness
02:00:07 and in the interest of fairness those witnesses must be allowed to have their say
02:00:11 their say they need to be given a fair opportunity to address issues which have arisen during the course of this inquiry and sir i know that you and your council team
02:00:23 team will provide ample opportunity for them to do that so
02:00:28 so with those factors in mind we resist in these submissions the temptation to engage in counter-argument on
02:00:37 on numerous matters which are raised in certain of the core participants opening statements until the evidence has been heard in both modules five and six which we will
02:00:48 modules five and six which we will address in closing submissions at the appropriate time given that this is an opening
02:00:53 opening submission and not not closing one um
02:00:57 um just briefly in relation to the extensive report of dr steinov on water augmentation issues uh which was disclosed at the beginning of last month or the very end of the
02:01:08 of last month or the very end of the month before the lfp uh has looked at that without a doubt requires further time to consider a range of matters before a fully informed view can be taken
02:01:21 fully informed view can be taken and i know that thames water utilities is continuing to review that report and take the view quite properly as as does the lfb that doctor stolen off will
02:01:32 does the lfb that doctor stolen off will require time to consider what they say about it indeed what we say about it and
02:01:38 and because he's now giving evidence i think in module seven we will say no more about it now but there are one or two assertions which have been made by
02:01:49 which have been made by some call participants in their opening statements which i should briefly address now some of it was addressed i think orally this morning first of all the question of trust
02:02:00 first of all the question of trust can the witnesses for the london fire brigade to be trusted
02:02:06 trusted to provide candid and transparent evidence to this inquiry we say that the answer to that question was provided in large part
02:02:17 in large part in phase one of the inquiry when so many brigade witnesses at all levels of command attended to give open and clear evidence about the night of the fire without
02:02:29 about the night of the fire without hidden or overt agendas and in the spirit of providing the bereaved survivors and residents the truth of that tragic night as they saw it
02:02:41 of that tragic night as they saw it that evidence was of course backed up by multiple volumes of material which was the error which was the lfb's gtart team compiled which provided
02:02:54 compiled which provided minute by minute accounts of what occurred throughout the night of the fire and which i think it's fair to say informed so much of your phase one report
02:03:04 report followed up with the london fire brigade's vast and transparent documentary disclosure exercise to the inquiry
02:03:12 inquiry and of course no london fire brigade witnesses sought and have not done so for modules five or six the protection of an undertaking from the attorney
02:03:23 of an undertaking from the attorney general not to use what they tell this inquiry
02:03:26 inquiry in any subsequent proceedings all that demonstrates we say that the evidence of london fire brigade witnesses has and will continue to be
02:03:37 witnesses has and will continue to be open
02:03:39 open and candid in the full spirit of the duty which public authorities such as the london fire brigade owe and secondly just very briefly the issue of foreseeability
02:03:50 of foreseeability i think it's fair to say that certain of the submissions of cps are predicated on the assumption that the grenfell tower fire was an entirely
02:03:59 entirely foreseeable event the experts differ on their views in their views as we know so it would be crass for me or for anyone else to argue
02:04:11 for me or for anyone else to argue against the proposition that certain factors in this uh
02:04:16 uh chain of events uh were
02:04:20 uh were foreseeable and within the knowledge of the lfb for which in some cases the brigade had policies and procedures in place i'm going to make that clearer because i pause halfway through that sentence it would be crass to argue
02:04:32 sentence it would be crass to argue against that proposition there were elements which were foreseeable but for the purposes of these opening submissions we simply make the point that the question of foreseeability of
02:04:43 that the question of foreseeability of the whole
02:04:45 the whole incident
02:04:46 incident cannot be answered in simple binary terms
02:04:50 terms yes or no it is a complex issue uh with multiple strands which include the very significant issue of the sheer scale of the disaster at
02:05:02 of the sheer scale of the disaster at granville tower and the impact which the matters were revealed
02:05:07 revealed in modules one two three had upon it those shocking revelations by definition uh raised serious questions about their
02:05:18 uh raised serious questions about their foreseeability
02:05:21 so coming back then to the main thrust of of these oral submissions fire and rescue services are in a position where they have to consider the ex the extent to which they can plan their
02:05:34 the extent to which they can plan their operation operational response to procedures to fires in residential high-rise buildings by anticipating similar widespread failures to those
02:05:45 similar widespread failures to those which
02:05:45 which so this inquiry has found planning for such eventualities through operational procedures and training is of course
02:05:56 training is of course highly challenging not least because buildings such as grenfell tower as we know we never intended to allow firefighting and rescue on multiple floors
02:06:07 rescue on multiple floors nor were they designed to facilitate a simultaneous evacuation of the full complement of residents and as i've said the progress which has been made by the london fire
02:06:18 been made by the london fire commissioner in addressing the phase one report recommendations including new and revised policies training and equipment is summarized in the lfc's written statement
02:06:31 in the lfc's written statement uh which and i won't read all of that out again but i will touch upon it i will summarize the summary uh a little later on orally but to make sense of that work the work that has been ongoing since the fire
02:06:45 that has been ongoing since the fire and to better understand the lfc's approach to residential high-rise firefighting before the grenfell tower fire
02:06:53 fire as well as to provide essential context for the issues which will be examined in module five the lfc's written statement revisits the key factors
02:07:04 key factors which impact on the ability of fire and rescue services to conduct operations in dangerously unsafe high-rise buildings and the hard challenges which they face in doing so
02:07:15 in doing so we have also set out again in in that statement the basic key principles of building design for buildings such as grenfell tower in those written submissions they
02:07:27 tower in those written submissions they are all of them in any event by now well known and i have no intention of repeating them here perhaps it is sufficient then
02:07:38 then to summarize the position as follows grenfell tower was designed constructed and should have been maintained to support a well-established fire
02:07:51 to support a well-established fire strategy from a safety perspective which is provided by law and supported by a range of regulatory inquiry requirements that's what should have been the case
02:08:02 have been the case as dr lane put it the strategy she's talking about the stay put strategy which which i think everyone knows is not a fire and rescue service strategy it's a
02:08:13 rescue service strategy it's a it's a design principle the stay put strategy is provided through design construction and ongoing maintenance says dr lay all building occupants including the
02:08:25 all building occupants including the fire brigade rely on it in the event of a fire
02:08:28 a fire it is the single safety condition provided for in the design of high-rise residential buildings in england the statutory guidance makes no provision
02:08:39 provision within the building for anything other than the stay put strategy there is no means of warning nor a means to communicate the need to increase the areas to be evacuated as is
02:08:51 increase the areas to be evacuated as is currently regulated for another building uses
02:08:54 uses which have complex fire suppression systems which have
02:08:58 have evacuation drills strategies alarm systems and so on and so it follows that in developing it's no good
02:09:10 that in developing it's no good fire and rescue services saying well look
02:09:12 look it's not designed so there's nothing we can do
02:09:15 can do that is not what the london fire brigade says
02:09:20 but what it what it means is that in developing operational procedures which must be done to address fires in certain high-rise residential buildings fire and rescue services must do so on
02:09:32 fire and rescue services must do so on the basis that the single safety condition
02:09:35 condition may have been entirely compromised and the provisions for fire and rescue operations which the building was designed to facilitate consequently rendered inoperable
02:09:47 rendered inoperable and to put it in stark terms in short fire brigades must now and they must plan
02:09:54 plan for operations in residential high-rise buildings
02:09:58 buildings which by reason of their design actively thwart attempts to fight fire and to rescue and evacuate residents
02:10:09 some of the constable consequent obstacles which must be overcome have been addressed in previous submissions which we have made to you sir and they shed lies on the approach of fire rescue
02:10:20 shed lies on the approach of fire rescue services
02:10:21 services they are also set out in the lfc's written submissions which i don't intend to repeat now though i will if i may but just by example touch upon the problems surrounding
02:10:33 touch upon the problems surrounding firefighter safety and the challenges of internal firefighting and rescue and can i make this clear that the identification in these
02:10:44 that the identification in these submissions of challenges which fire brigades face in developing policy and procedure to address fundamentally failing buildings cannot be taken as a reluctance to meet
02:10:57 cannot be taken as a reluctance to meet those challenges they are being met as far as possible but it is vital that the challenges and therefore the potential limitations on fire and rescue services
02:11:08 services are understood both before the fire on the 14th of june 2017 and afterwards so briefly what are the examples of challenges to fire and
02:11:21 examples of challenges to fire and rescue services that i just want to touch upon first the very basic point as far as can be discerned all of the inquiries experts agree
02:11:31 agree that for the purpose of developing fire safety measures for residential high-rise buildings of the kind this inquiry is considering the following assumptions are made by the building regulations
02:11:43 the building regulations and the broader regulatory system which determines how these buildings are designed and built only single unit fires are anticipated or allowed for multiple fires on multiple levels are
02:11:56 multiple fires on multiple levels are not anticipated or allowed for vertical or lateral fires on the exterior are not anticipated or allowed for
02:12:05 for and simultaneous evacuation on a large scale is not anticipated or allowed for and clearly the viability of those assumptions and the integrity of the
02:12:17 assumptions and the integrity of the building's fire safety strategy are dependent
02:12:21 dependent upon adherence to the principles of fire safety contained in the building regulations and elsewhere when constructing maintaining and refurbishing the building
02:12:32 refurbishing the building if they are not if they're not the challenges to fire and rescue services in case of fire become extremely onerous
02:12:44 become extremely onerous in his phase one report professor torreira
02:12:47 torreira made the point that the means by which if the fire service can alter the strategy that is to say the same strategy are very basic
02:12:58 to say the same strategy are very basic by knocking on flat entrance doors by operating sounders in residence flats in the unusual circumstances in which they're available and importantly all of these approaches says professor
02:13:11 all of these approaches says professor torreira in his first report are inconsistent with the fire that is spread vertically or horizontally as it did at grenfell at grenville tower
02:13:24 and so that leads me to the question of firefighters safety which is inextricably linked to the safety of residents and the people they strive to protect
02:13:38 and the people they strive to protect one of the primary challenges in planning and executing firefighting and evacuation in buildings in in like this those which are failing
02:13:49 those which are failing uh was identified so by you if i may say so in your phase one report and i hope you
02:13:56 you wouldn't mind if i just repeat one or two examples at paragraph 28 6 3
02:14:04 6 3 you
02:14:05 you and i'm quoting recognize that the mechanics of carrying out an evacuation of any sort in rapidly deteriorating conditions would have presented its own risks
02:14:17 would have presented its own risks to the lives of residents and firefighters and that's a fact we entirely agree with that we i may say so and then at paragraph 28.80
02:14:30 i may say so and then at paragraph 28.80 sir you characterize um
02:14:35 assistant commissioner rose as he then was
02:14:38 was strategy on the night of the fire as an intention
02:14:43 intention quote to flood the building with as many edba wearers that is extended duration breathing apparatus wearers as were available and to provide as much
02:14:54 as were available and to provide as much assistance as possible to the remaining occupants
02:14:57 occupants the strategy was both bold and necessary however it meant that firefighters would be deployed into the tower without any firefighting equipment which was both
02:15:08 firefighting equipment which was both contrary to policy and created a very significant risk to their safety
02:15:16 and one might add and consequently to the residents they're there to try and protect and and assist
02:15:24 assist the london fire commissioner has previously expressed his appreciation to you mr chairman for your acknowledgement of the bravery and selflessness of firefighters who were deployed into
02:15:35 firefighters who were deployed into grenfell tower and your broad approval of the sentiments he expressed in his evidence to you when he acknowledged the fact
02:15:46 when he acknowledged the fact that big organizations must always improve systems and training through learning
02:15:53 learning but at the same time paid tribute to the bravery of firefighters on the night who and these are his words which met with your broad approval who put themselves at enormous risk for
02:16:04 who put themselves at enormous risk for hour after hour after hour and were battling against what was frankly an absolute failure of the building system and they had done their absolute best
02:16:15 and they had done their absolute best in intolerable circumstances my junior officers performed well beyond what was acceptable in terms of their physical and mental capacity and actually in some
02:16:27 and mental capacity and actually in some numbers have paid the price consequently
02:16:32 well of course firefighting and affecting rescue of necessity is a dangerous occupation even where the built environment broadly
02:16:43 even where the built environment broadly adheres to established fire safety measures that's what firefighters take on when they take the job but the potential obligation on fire brigades to assume when planning fire
02:16:55 brigades to assume when planning fire and rescue operations that such measures will be ignored or flouted to a substantial degree by building owners and others places substantially
02:17:06 places substantially higher risks on firefighters and residents alike and the perennial question for fire and rescue services is where the line should be drawn
02:17:17 is where the line should be drawn at what point notwithstanding the overarching desire and will to save savable life does the risk to firefighters become too great to justify under health and safety
02:17:29 justify under health and safety legislation given
02:17:31 given that serious injury or worse to firefighters has a direct impact on the safety of residents
02:17:39 residents how far can fire and rescue services push the risk envelope while maintaining its duty to protect the safety of its employees now that that preparedness to push the risk
02:17:51 that preparedness to push the risk envelope
02:17:53 envelope um
02:17:54 um is one which there was an example of it i suppose during the course of the redevelopment of the high-rise firefighting and evacuation policy which the lfc
02:18:06 evacuation policy which the lfc uh was involved in very recently and which ms stud queen's council on behalf of the mayor mentioned earlier on that dilemma had been highlighted in the
02:18:18 that dilemma had been highlighted in the recent consultation in respect of the brigade's new policy where the appropriate safe use of breathing operation by firefighters above the bridgehead
02:18:30 firefighters above the bridgehead was the subject of considerable debate and frankly disagreement between
02:18:36 between the london fire commissioner and the fire brigades union it is just one example of the ongoing consultation which by the way is required by law the
02:18:47 which by the way is required by law the all fire rescue services are required by law
02:18:50 law to consult with the unions um and that was an example of of just such a thing there's no criticism by the way of the fbu there because it is part
02:19:01 way of the fbu there because it is part of their function to to consider matters of that and it's part of the lfc's function to look to saving savable life and to push that envelope as far as possible but they are very difficult
02:19:13 but they are very difficult very difficult issues to resolve
02:19:17 in the years following the grenfell tower fire the commissioner has made strenuous efforts to address this challenging issue in liaison with many stakeholders including
02:19:28 liaison with many stakeholders including the national fire chiefs council and of course the fire brigades union among others
02:19:35 others and very importantly i i mentioned this in our module three opening
02:19:41 opening but it is actually quite significant the lfc has commissioned and led groundbreaking research in in association with the university of bath into this physiological effects on
02:19:52 into this physiological effects on firefighters who are deployed into high-rise buildings which has revealed significant results which have a direct impact on the capabilities of fire and rescue services
02:20:04 capabilities of fire and rescue services in this country and in fact worldwide what we're discovering and that actually brings me to the relevant issue of internal firefighting in buildings
02:20:15 in buildings of the kind that we are here considering as the evidence in phase one made clear the statutory requirement for the design of residential high-rise buildings are predicated on the basis that fires in compartments
02:20:27 on the basis that fires in compartments must be fought internally there's no provision at least in the regulations for external firefighting they just don't provide for it don't the
02:20:38 they just don't provide for it don't the building regulations although of course at grenfell tower strenuous efforts were made to attack the fire externally in extremely dangerous conditions on the night and we will be revisiting that i
02:20:49 night and we will be revisiting that i think again in module 7. however
02:20:53 however during the rainfall tower fire assuming
02:20:57 assuming that it would have been reasonable at the early stages to anticipate that a fire in the external cloudy would spread as far and as rapidly as it did it would have been a fundamental
02:21:08 it would have been a fundamental departure from high-rise firefighting procedure
02:21:12 procedure to abandon internal firefighting as some suggested plus should have been done and that would have been a departure from
02:21:21 from uh procedure for a number of reasons chief among which in a fire of that kind is the absolute need to continue protecting internal escape routes
02:21:33 internal escape routes for for residents and while the statutory requirements for the design of high-rise residential buildings provide for only internal firefighting as i've said
02:21:44 firefighting as i've said what they don't do they do not contemplate that fire services may be required to fight fires on multiple floors at the same time
02:21:55 on multiple floors at the same time and of course at grenfell tower there were simultaneous serious fires on multiple floors
02:22:02 and importantly whether a building is fitted with a dry or a wet riser because that's how internal firefighting that's how the water is provided to the internal part
02:22:13 water is provided to the internal part of the tower the provision is for only two firefighting jets to be connected to the main the dry wet rising main
02:22:24 the dry wet rising main which is sufficient to deal with a single compartment fire envisaged by the building regulations and this the important thing is that the system of of the main the rising main
02:22:35 of of the main the rising main and the mechanisms do not allow for their use on more than one or perhaps two floors at one time whatever the available flow rates of
02:22:47 whatever the available flow rates of water from the external hydrants with the consequence that fires cannot be fought on multiple floors
02:22:56 floors the regulatory regime simply doesn't contemplate the need for it and the challenge it presents to fire brigades
02:23:04 brigades is the major problem of how do you go about deploying firefighters into areas of a building without the means to protect themselves and residents from fire
02:23:20 um
02:23:23 these are challenges that i'm pointing out as i say again we're pointing out the challenges we're not saying that they can't be done but they are difficult
02:23:31 difficult on the question of evacuation generally more generally so we have set out in our uh written submissions the challenges which fire and rescue services face um in planning evacuation
02:23:43 um in planning evacuation in uh
02:23:45 in uh residential buildings which are significantly failing and which don't allow for simultaneous evacuation those challenges have been well documented in our previous
02:23:56 well documented in our previous submissions and in that document and indeed by the experts to the inquiry uh they are very well understood and i don't propose to repeat them all for you now but they're there in the document
02:24:07 now but they're there in the document for anyone to see but the point is that those challenges all of those challenges one of the i've just given a couple of examples of them existed before the fire before 14th of
02:24:18 existed before the fire before 14th of june 2017
02:24:20 june 2017 and still exist
02:24:23 so that the lfb's new policies and procedures are the products of very careful thought uh in consultation with stakeholders on a national basis they go as far as
02:24:35 a national basis they go as far as possible
02:24:36 possible to addressing this extremely difficult issue and to a significant extent i use that phrase against again pushing the envelope as far as as reasonably possible to meet the real challenges
02:24:50 possible to meet the real challenges and while i'm on the subject of evacuation i just want to mention something which um
02:24:58 um professor thomas uh discussed this morning in of queen's council
02:25:04 council in his oral opening submissions and i just want to resolve what might be a misunderstanding concerning what can be learned from other fires around the world
02:25:15 other fires around the world let me just make it very clear the london fire commission acknowledges absolutely that there is much to learn about fire behavior in modern high-rise buildings from examples of other fires
02:25:28 buildings from examples of other fires around the world which can inform the development of policy procedures to address similar fires in london and around this country recognizing the importance of
02:25:39 country recognizing the importance of this since the grenfell tower fire the brigade has reviewed the process by which information which is which is fixed in the brigades uh engineering and fire safety
02:25:50 uh engineering and fire safety department is channeled to operational staff so as to improve the mass of information available to incident commanders about fire behavior in high-rise
02:26:03 about fire behavior in high-rise buildings in the context of the increasing complexity of construction design and materials used in new builds and refurbishments however
02:26:14 however the extent to which examples of other fires around the world can inform the development of evacuation procedures in the uk
02:26:24 in the uk particularly for stay put buildings is much more restricted and that is because many of the fires were in differently designed buildings
02:26:36 designed buildings with different regulatory regimes and many of those other fires were in buildings which were either designed or built to support simultaneous evacuation or which had other aspects of it so an
02:26:48 or which had other aspects of it so an example was given this morning of the crossfire in melbourne now
02:26:54 now much learning can be had from the way in which that fire developed externally but there's not a great deal of learning it might be said that that could be derived in relation to how you evacuate
02:27:06 derived in relation to how you evacuate a staple building because the lacrosse building
02:27:09 building had very sophisticated fire suppression systems which were phased all the way down the building alarm systems and so on and so forth whereas stable buildings as we know have none of
02:27:21 stable buildings as we know have none of that at all so that i hope was just um i i just wanted to resolve what might have been a misunderstanding about our point on that
02:27:33 uh of course there are examples in this country
02:27:36 country and the latino house fire might be a near example of that but
02:27:43 but just
02:27:45 just slight warning to guard against equating that fire the lachenal house fire too closely with the fire at grenfell tower because the lachenal house fire did not
02:27:56 because the lachenal house fire did not involve rain screen cladding and the primary issues were associated with internal breaches of compartmentation and fire loading in concealed spaces
02:28:08 concealed spaces but that said there is no doubt that the lachenal house fire in terms of lesson learning had a significant bearing on the operation of brigade control rooms we accept that and we
02:28:21 control rooms we accept that and we understand that the issues concerning the operation of the lfb control room on the night of the grenfell tower fire in light of the learning from the latino house fire and the provision of fire
02:28:32 house fire and the provision of fire survival guidance to bi-control staff to residence is to be addressed in module six and in the circumstances we'll reserve more detailed submissions about that
02:28:43 more detailed submissions about that until the appropriate time for the present we remind you that in phase one the london fire commissioner uh expressly accepted in closing
02:28:55 uh expressly accepted in closing submissions that there are undoubtedly lessons which must be learned from the night of the grenville tower fire in respect of control room policy and training
02:29:09 uh on a different topic now that of risk information gathering
02:29:15 gathering we need to touch briefly upon the most recent report but one of professor torreira when i say that there was a very recent report i'm thinking about one just before that we had addressed in fact one aspect of
02:29:27 we had addressed in fact one aspect of that report in our written module five submissions but then we understood he was going to give evidence module six so we took them out so i'm putting them back in now orally only in summary of form
02:29:38 form the lfc accepts that the gathering of information concerning risks to fire safety in the built environment is a vital factor
02:29:49 is a vital factor in the planning of operational procedures to address them indeed significant steps have been taken to improve the process of risk information gathering at the lfb
02:30:00 gathering at the lfb since the grenfell tower fire one of the mechanisms for achieving this involves the effective use of the expertise which exists
02:30:11 of the expertise which exists in the lfb's engineering and fire safety department which among other things monitors develops developments in modern construction and design techniques
02:30:22 design techniques for the purpose of providing advice and guidance to building owners and to the brigade itself as the letters as you may recall from assistant commissioners chureck
02:30:33 assistant commissioners chureck and daily to local authorities
02:30:37 did that was the purpose of them and they were considered in module two i think
02:30:43 think dr lane described them as sensible approaches professor torreira in his
02:30:51 in his recent report considers the matter again but if one goes back to his earlier reports and his published approach much more widely
02:31:03 much more widely he strongly advocates the need for much greater expertise and competence across all stakeholders particularly designers architects engineers and so on
02:31:16 designers architects engineers and so on to keep pace with the angst exponential increase in recent years of the complexity of modern construction methods and materials that's his basic position and it's it's it's a compelling
02:31:28 position and it's it's it's a compelling one
02:31:30 one on that theme it is professor torreira's uh view that fire and rescue services throughout the country should dramatically increase the number of its staff
02:31:38 staff who are trained to a suitable level of expertise
02:31:42 expertise competence in the technical principles of modern construction material materials so as to be able to engage from an early stage in the design and construction phase of significant
02:31:54 construction phase of significant refurbishments and new builds the purpose he says is to enable fire and rescue services to identify failures which can affect the performance of a particular building prior to a fire
02:32:07 particular building prior to a fire event
02:32:07 event and to eliminate previously unforeseeable events through inspection and understanding of building behavior in the modern and more complex context now compelling
02:32:19 more complex context now compelling though such an approach might be for the future and it is compelling in order for fire and rescue services to engage in the design and build process to that extent there would not only need
02:32:30 to that extent there would not only need to be a change in culture involving industry central and local government and the fire sector generally but a significant change in the legislative structure with considerably
02:32:42 legislative structure with considerably increased support and funding to give effect to such changes and i come finally so now as a topic to a very brief explanation
02:32:54 a very brief explanation of the products of the london fire commissioner's intense learning program over the last four years which in many ways is a continuation of the process of learning which the lfc
02:33:05 the process of learning which the lfc would maintain has always been a characteristic priority of the london fire brigade further detail can be found in the written submissions which themselves amount to the summary
02:33:16 which themselves amount to the summary but we re-emphasize that a much fuller account which i know many have expressed the desire for will be provided by the commission himself in module six
02:33:27 himself in module six if he's permitted to do so for the purpose of answering the question posed in the phase one report whether the lfb has learned lessons and if so to what
02:33:38 has learned lessons and if so to what extent since the grenfell tower fire it is fair to say that it has been the lfc's commissioner rowe's priority since his appointment to drive forward progress in
02:33:51 appointment to drive forward progress in relation to your recommendation sir following phase one recognizing the need to demonstrate that the lfb
02:33:59 the lfb is a learning organization committed to continuous involvement and improvement some of the new measures which have been introduced address the recommendations in your phase one report
02:34:10 in your phase one report while others represent the brigade's own ongoing process of learning and development which is central to its ethos
02:34:17 ethos and is a key feature of its operational planning
02:34:21 planning in in very short summary form a suite of new and revised measures has been adopted following wide consultation and careful consideration of the
02:34:32 and careful consideration of the multiple challenges which fire and rescue services face when planning and executing fire and rescue operations in dangerously failing buildings
02:34:43 in dangerously failing buildings among the changes are a range of new and revised policies which address high-rise firefighting evacuation as a separate topic fire survival guidance as a separate
02:34:55 fire survival guidance as a separate topic and each of these policies which are in many respects bring closely interlinked provide guidance and procedures for incident commanders and control staff to
02:35:06 incident commanders and control staff to follow including communication strategies in extreme circumstances of the kind experienced at grenville town in relation to high-rise evacuation
02:35:17 in relation to high-rise evacuation and evacuation issues a i've called it here on my document voluminous i think i hope you know what i mean by that a voluminous face-to-face theory training program
02:35:29 theory training program uh was delivered to approximately four and a half thousand staff over the course of and within a year during in fact the lockdown on the covet 19 pandemic
02:35:41 lockdown on the covet 19 pandemic further policies address risk information gathering and incident command
02:35:46 command while extensive work has been carried out to improve information sharing between the brigade specialist fire safety department and operational staff and in the field of incident command
02:35:59 and in the field of incident command uh training the the commission has established a dedicated incident command training team to ensure that a golden thread of training is implemented from the
02:36:11 of training is implemented from the control room officers through to command unit crews facilitating more effective lines of communication between brigade control and the incident ground and then finally from a summary
02:36:22 and then finally from a summary perspective in addition to the suite of new policies on high-rise firefighting uh evacuation of fire survival guidance and operation risk gathering the lfc has overseen real changes in a
02:36:34 the lfc has overseen real changes in a range of other areas including control communications fire ground and general communications including equipment and the acquisition of new and additional equipment
02:36:46 additional equipment including a fleet of new aerial appliances groundbreaking remote drain drone capability and of course the use of smokehoods across the brigade
02:36:57 across the brigade in conclusion the question whether the london fire brigade is a learning organization will be informed
02:37:08 will be informed by the evidence of those past and present
02:37:10 present officers who are to give evidence in modules five and six when they are given an opportunity to explain the challenges and the realities of providing firefighting and rescue
02:37:22 of providing firefighting and rescue services in one of the most populous complex and densely built cities in the world for the present the lfc reminds the sir you and your
02:37:33 the lfc reminds the sir you and your colleagues on the panel of the assertion he made in his evidence towards the end of phase one
02:37:39 one he has always been clear that large organizations must always develop policy procedure through learning from experience and that culture must be
02:37:50 from experience and that culture must be embedded
02:37:51 embedded and it must be never ending he is clear that the london fire brigade must be proactive in its approach particularly with regard to the increasing complexity of modern construction and design
02:38:02 of modern construction and design methods and materials insofar as the impact on fire safety
02:38:10 that is the the the the fact that that all fire and rescue services are
02:38:17 are well they certainly are now alerted to the dangers which can exist in buildings of this kind where a refurbishment or maintenance of a previously safe buildings has been
02:38:28 of a previously safe buildings has been conducted in a way to fundamentally undermine
02:38:32 undermine that safety is a challenge that those are the challenges which are facing the london fire brigade but all other fire rescue services in the uk and and
02:38:43 fire rescue services in the uk and and those challenges are being met head on the
02:38:47 the commission at the london fire commissioner's paramount consideration is and always has been to protect the safety of londoners in case of fire and other emergencies the same consideration was the
02:38:59 the same consideration was the imperative behind the determined efforts of firefighters on the night to do their best
02:39:05 best in the most dangerous of conditions
02:39:09 and this is always so in the mind of commissioner it is always so in the mind of the women and men who make up the london fire brigade
02:39:20 who make up the london fire brigade the interests of the bereaved survivors and residents of grenfell tower remain at the very heart of the lfb's
02:39:31 at the very heart of the lfb's continuing commitment to learn from the tragic events of the 14th of june 2017 and to affect meaningful change wherever possible
02:39:42 meaningful change wherever possible so i did i didn't have anything further at the moment well mr walsh thank you very much indeed that's been a very helpful statement thank you thank you
02:39:54 well that's all the opening statements we're expecting to receive tomorrow we shall embark on the first of the witnesses in module five that will be at ten o'clock tomorrow
02:40:06 that will be at ten o'clock tomorrow morning but at this point we shall close for the day thank you very much ten o'clock tomorrow morning
02:40:21 you