Presentations honoring and remembering those who lost their lives in the Grenfell Tower fire, sharing their stories and the impact of their loss on families and communities.
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00:00:00 Good morning, everyone.
00:00:29 Welcome to today's hearing. Today we're going to hear further presentations in relation
00:00:35 to those who died in the fire. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
00:00:38 Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, members of the panel. I would now call Danny
00:00:42 Freeman QC back to the podium, please, to make his presentation on behalf of Deborah
00:00:48 Lamprell from flat 161 on floor 9, recovered from flat 201 on floor 23. And again, as yesterday,
00:00:58 I would repeat the trigger warning that the statements and materials that are going to
00:01:02 be covered in this presentation may be distressing to some, and those who wish to should leave
00:01:08 the room now or look away from the live stream as the case may be. Mr. Chairman.
00:01:14 Yes, Mr. Freeman.
00:01:30 Deborah Lamprell, Debbie, was born in Walthamstow, London, on the 3rd of August, 1971, to Miriam
00:01:39 and Reg Lamprell. She was 45 years old when she died. She lived in flat 161 on what became
00:01:48 floor 19 of Grenfell Tower, having moved there in September 2005. Debbie's mother, Miriam,
00:01:56 appeared at the commemoration hearings on 22nd of May, 2018, together with Michael Volpe,
00:02:03 who had been Debbie's boss at the Holland Park Opera and read a statement on her behalf.
00:02:09 The commemorative portrait highlighted that as a daughter, friend and colleague, Debbie
00:02:14 was an immensely loving person who was gifted in sharing happiness and hospitality in both
00:02:20 her personal and working life. Miriam recalled what a close and happy family she, Reg and
00:02:27 Debbie were, and following Reg's death, Debbie was particularly dedicated in caring for her
00:02:32 mother. Debbie felt blessed with what she had, and when she remembers Debbie, Miriam
00:02:39 recalls her daughter laughing. Debbie loved people and would help anyone, and Miriam learnt
00:02:46 just how many footprints Debbie left and how many lives she touched after her death. As
00:02:52 you heard, Debbie was hugely popular and respected at the Holland Park Opera, where she worked
00:02:57 as a safety officer and where a stone has been laid as a permanent tribute. May I turn
00:03:05 to the events of the 13th and 14th of June. Debbie's friend, Gary Maunders, was visiting
00:03:11 her on the night of the fire. CCTV footage shows Debbie in the lift lobby at 10.57pm.
00:03:20 She was returning from work at the opera. Just after 11pm, Debbie sent a text message
00:03:26 to Miriam, as she did every night to let her mother know that she had got home safely.
00:03:31 It read, Hi Mum, I'm home alright. Goodnight and God bless. Lots of love and kisses. Analysis
00:03:41 of the fire spread indicates that the vertical reach of the fire came to Floor 19 as early
00:03:49 Before 0128, residents of Floor 19 began to evacuate their flats. Maren Mekkonen, in flat
00:03:59 163, was woken by a call from her aunt Hiwo Daggenau, who lived in flat 26. She told her
00:04:07 to leave because the building was on fire. Records show that the call was made at 0124
00:04:13 and must have completed before 0127. When Maren Mekkonen took her children out of the
00:04:19 flat, she found Amal Tuku, Amadine, and her visiting cousin Amna Idris, who came out of
00:04:26 flat 166 into the Floor 19 lobby. They shouted that their flat was on fire and that everyone
00:04:34 needed to get out. Maren then saw these two women run back into their flat, leaving the
00:04:40 door open. The self-closing device was apparently not working. As all of the inhabitants of
00:04:47 flat 166 died in the fire, there is no further account as to how the fire penetrated their
00:04:52 premises. However, there are accounts from the occupants of the flat below, flat 156
00:04:59 on Floor 18, that the kitchen window exploded inwards, which can be timed at just prior
00:05:05 to 0127 by a 999 call that Mr. Shah Ahmed placed. When Maren Mekkonen first left flat
00:05:15 163, she recalls only light smoke on the landing. However, by the time that Nicholas Burton
00:05:22 from flat 165 and Faduna Ahmed from flat 164 came out shortly after, they recalled the
00:05:30 lobby being filled with thick black smoke. The explanation for these declining conditions
00:05:37 appears to be that the front door of flat 166, as observed by Maren Mekkonen, did not
00:05:43 automatically close. So, yesterday you heard about families moving upwards. As you found
00:05:52 in your phase one report, the great majority of persons who died on Floor 23 reached there
00:05:59 as part of a group who migrated upwards at around 1.30am. Debbie and her friend Gary
00:06:05 were part of this group. May I therefore take this opportunity to set out in one place facts
00:06:12 as established by your phase one report that apply to a number of the deceased, including
00:06:17 Debbie. Others may come back to these matters, but it is important to recall the overview.
00:06:26 Your report found at volume 2, paragraphs 10.287 to 10.288, that before 1.15, 26 people
00:06:37 left Grenfell Tower using the stairs and a further two using the lift. Between 1.15
00:06:44 and 1.31, a total of 77 people used the staircase to evacuate from the building and a further
00:06:51 seven people successfully used the lift. During that period, when an increasing number
00:06:58 of people were successfully evacuating the building using the internal stairs, 15 occupants
00:07:04 made their way up to Floor 23. None of them, other than Faduma Ahmed, survived. The circumstances
00:07:12 of this upwards migration are therefore of considerable significance to many of our clients.
00:07:19 It is known that Debbie, accompanied by Gary Maunders, ascended to the top floor at around
00:07:25 this time of 01.30am and sheltered in flat 201, the home of Raymond Moses Bernard. The
00:07:34 timing of Debbie's movement up is primarily attested to by Faduma Ahmed, who likely left
00:07:41 her flat, flat 164 before 01.30am. She saw Debbie, who she describes as looking frightened
00:07:48 but not panicking, standing by the lifts in the smoke-filled lobby with a male who she
00:07:53 later identified as Gary Maunders. Later on, in her 999 call to North West Fire Services,
00:08:00 which I will come on to, Debbie told CRO Javin that her and Gary came up together.
00:08:09 As the Phase 1 report also found, and is now reinforced by further Phase 2 evidence of
00:08:15 Professor Perser, the upward migration of residents was at a time when the stairs were
00:08:20 sufficiently clear to allow residents who were able to do so to safely evacuate via
00:08:25 the stairs, and many did. To give just one example, Corin Jones was able to evacuate
00:08:32 from flat 145 with her two young sons aged 7 and 10. In this period, just before 01.30am,
00:08:40 she described a relatively smoke-free staircase in which they were able to walk down. There
00:08:46 are certain known facts about why these residents went up as they did. First, a number of residents
00:08:54 heard of instructions of one kind or another. Nadia Youssef and Saeed Bayam left flat 121
00:09:03 on floor 15 at around 01.25am. But before they did, they were told by a firefighter
00:09:10 at the fire exit tour to return to their flat. They ignored him. As he descended from floor
00:09:18 18 at about 01.29am, Shah Ahmed remembered at least one firefighter urging him to go
00:09:25 back up. Notwithstanding that, he told him that there was fire on the higher floor. When
00:09:32 Mehra Mechanan left flat 163 on floor 19, after about 01.28am, exiting the tower at
00:09:41 01.32am, she heard a male voice lower down the stairs shouting in a clear English accent,
00:09:48 go back, go back. The shouted command had the serious consequence of causing people
00:09:56 to turn around in panic. She says that she assumed something terrible, something worse,
00:10:02 was happening below us. I assumed maybe it was another resident who has probably seen flames
00:10:09 in the stairwell. As the Phase 1 report found, it is also a fact that no witness has ever
00:10:18 suggested and none of the call transcripts of 999 calls recalled any of the residents
00:10:24 stating that they were expressly told by firefighters to relocate to the top of the building.
00:10:30 What we have is certain shouted advice to go back to the flat Mehra Mechanan and to go back up Shah
00:10:40 Ahmed. In her statement to the inquiry, the survivor Faduma Ahmed recalled her impression
00:10:48 that Debbie had instructions to go up. But she also made clear Debbie never told her this in so
00:10:56 many words. In the long 999 call Debbie made to North West Fire Services from flat 201,
00:11:02 starting at 01.41am, she did not mention being positively advised by firefighters to migrate
00:11:10 to the top floor. You have already heard that when Maryam Al-Ghwari spoke to her sister-in-law at
00:11:17 01.56am, she relayed what she and her mother had tried to go down. People coming up the stairs
00:11:25 told them to go up and stay inside. She did not say who these people were. Similarly, in her 999
00:11:32 calls she did not mention being positively advised to go to the top of the building. You have already
00:11:38 heard also how Fatima Afrasiabi told her nephew Sharukh Aglani that she and her sister had been
00:11:45 told to go up to floor 23 and in a later call to her niece, Solomon Satter, made clear that it was
00:11:52 residents who had told them not to go down because there was a fire lower in the building.
00:11:59 The Phase 1 report also found that the reasons for some residents to migrate upwards included
00:12:07 perceived danger from fire on a lower floor. The reference is Volume 2, paragraph 10, point 290,
00:12:16 subparagraph B. After migrating up to flat 201, Debbie told the control room operator that she
00:12:26 thought that the fire had started on floor 15 or 18 and Fire Hard Needer confirmed that the group who
00:12:33 came up mentioned that the fire was in the stairwell. Faduma Ahmed recalls that, quote,
00:12:39 Debbie suggested that we make our way up the tower as opposed to going down as that is where the
00:12:45 smoke was coming from. To similar effect, Helen Gebramesco from flat 186 finished the call at
00:12:54 0128 14. Following the call, she knocked on the door of flat 183 but also moved towards the lobby
00:13:03 exit at which she thought was about 130. On the stairwell she saw, quote, lots of people coming up
00:13:10 from the lower floors who told us to go back to our flat. It appeared to us that they were trying
00:13:16 to escape from fire below. There's also a fact that the timing of the upwards migration coincides
00:13:25 with the unfolding emergency on floor 16, concerning Joseph Daniels in flat 135 and the attempted
00:13:34 rescue by firefighters O'Byrne, Stern and Hepple, which you will hear about in the presentation to
00:13:41 come. That floor, as you know, involved a door, flat 136, that was not self-closing and when its
00:13:51 occupant fled following the penetration of the fire into his flat, it is likely that smoke spread
00:13:58 quickly across floor 16. During the tragically unsuccessful effort to rescue Joseph Daniel,
00:14:06 the floor 16 stairwell door was held open at various points, causing smoke to flow into the
00:14:12 common stairwell. This could well have contributed to the perception of descending residents that
00:14:18 there was a fire in the middle of the building. It bears adding that as the chair found in phase
00:14:24 one, a further factor which bore on the decision of some residents to go up was, quote, a belief
00:14:31 that they might be rescued from the roof by helicopter. You have heard how Farhad Nida recalled
00:14:38 that when they came up, one of the Afras Yabi sisters said that they had been told that helicopters
00:14:44 would rescue them from the roof. As I mentioned yesterday, despite all the remaining uncertainties
00:14:53 about the reasons why residents went up rather than down, there is no evidence that the firefighters
00:14:59 in the vicinity ever shouted up the staircase to positively and unequivocally encourage people
00:15:05 to descend and exit the building. Having ascended the stairs together, for Douma Ahmed's evidence is
00:15:16 once they reached floor 23, she, Debbie and Gary Maunders met with a group of people that she has
00:15:23 positively since identified to include,
00:15:44 It appears that they stood at the door of flat 201 before going into that flat to escape the deteriorating
00:15:52 conditions in the corridor. This was likely before 0134. And can I give a trigger warning for the MPS
00:16:03 floor plan that we've already seen that shows just flats and names that I'm about to bring up? The
00:16:11 reference is MET 30s 12 529 page 25. While looking at this image, please look at the middle right-hand
00:16:29 side adjacent to where it says stairs and that is flat 201, although the number one, as with the
00:16:37 other flats is not in diagram. The others who came into the flat at this time, in addition to
00:16:46 Debbie and Gary Maunders, were Raymond Bernard who lived there, Hamid Kani from flat 154, Birakhan
00:16:55 Berkhty Haftoum from flat 155, Jessica Urbano Ramirez from flat 176, Amna Idris, Amal Amadine
00:17:05 and Amir Tuku Amadine from flat 166 and Faduma Ahmed from flat 164. Faduma, as you know, would soon
00:17:16 escape onto the staircase. Gary Maunders subsequently exited flat 201 and we noted yesterday and you will
00:17:24 hear about further went into flat 203. Amaya and Amal Amadine managed to exit the flat at a later
00:17:32 stage but died in the communal lobby. Those presentations will follow. In the period between
00:17:42 0130 and 0141, control operators took a number of calls from occupants on floor 23 to tell them
00:17:50 that the fire had adversely affected the top floor. From flat 201 in that earlier period,
00:17:57 may I just mention the following. Jessica Urbano Ramirez, the 12-year-old girl, began her long call
00:18:03 with CRO Russell at 012930. Ms Munro Queen's Council will detail that call in the next
00:18:11 presentation but for now, bear in mind that in the first minutes of the call, Jessica told CRO Russell
00:18:19 that smoke was coming in and that there was smoke throughout the flat. The operator also established
00:18:26 that she was in flat 201 with 10 other members. As the call went on, it became clear that conditions
00:18:34 in the room were clearly very smoky, frightening and increasingly perilous. Also from flat 201,
00:18:41 Biruk Haftam, the child of Berkhty and also 12 years old, spoke to CRO Housen in the LFB room at
00:18:50 132 and 10 seconds. He said that the window was already burning up. Debbie Lamprell began trying
00:18:59 to make contact with the emergency services at 013444. She told BT Exchange in Glasgow,
00:19:07 we were in someone else's flat. The call lasted for one minute six seconds. The BT operator then
00:19:15 spent the next five minutes and 20 seconds trying to get through to a fire service. The emergency call
00:19:22 system was evidently overloading. There were several other 999 calls from other top flats in this period,
00:19:31 including from Mariam El-Ghraari that you heard about yesterday, as well as calls across floor 22,
00:19:38 which you will hear about next week. During these calls, when occupants reported being affected by
00:19:44 fire and smoke, none of them were told to leave. When Debbie called BT at 013922 for 50 seconds,
00:19:57 she can be heard repeatedly shouting for Gary, indicating by this time she had lost contact with
00:20:04 him. At 0138, Rania Ibrahim had begun to livestream events on Facebook in flat 203, recording which
00:20:14 lasted until 014433. During the course of the video, as I mentioned yesterday, Gary Maunders enters
00:20:25 flat 203, evidently seeking sanctuary from the smoke. The 999 calls from the top floor did lead to a
00:20:35 number of service requests. I mentioned all of them yesterday in the presentation for Mariam El-Ghraari.
00:20:42 The key points deriving from the phase run report is that despite calls starting in bulk from 0130,
00:20:49 no deployments were made to floor 23 for the purposes of rescue until after 0208,
00:20:56 and then they were all diverted or failed to reach that destination.
00:21:03 Of note for Debbie Lamperl and others in flat 201 is what happened as a result of her diverted call
00:21:11 to North West Fire Services. At 0143 AM, CRO Javin established that Debbie was in flat 201
00:21:23 on floor 23 and not her home at flat 161. She did not, however, pass on that information to the LFB.
00:21:34 As a result, firefighters were deployed to flat 161 at 0202, only to find that no one was there.
00:21:43 They would, however, rescue Nicholas and Pilly Burton, who were effectively trapped in flat 165
00:21:51 due to Pilly's disability, as a result of which they were unable to evacuate unassisted.
00:21:57 Sir, on that, may I mention, as Mr Millett, Queen's Council, indicated on Monday,
00:22:03 that Pilly did not die at Grenfell Tower, but you have heard powerful evidence from Nicholas Burton
00:22:09 to appreciate how damaging an experience she had during the fire and days thereafter.
00:22:15 It is for that reason why many BSRC Pilly as the 72nd victim of the fire, and why you and your
00:22:22 council and solicitor team have been good enough to recognise her experience during the course of
00:22:28 this inquiry. The Burton's were rescued from floor 19 and they almost certainly would have died in the
00:22:37 fire had the crew not deployed to that floor. However, in the drama of the night, it meant that
00:22:44 the deployment that tallied out at 0202 AM was never sent to floor 23 and the follow-on deployment
00:22:52 of another crew at 0208 was then diverted to floor 10 and did not reach floor 23. The diversion
00:22:59 of the 0208 crew was never registered at the bridgehead. No further deployments to floor 23
00:23:06 were made until 0224, 0251 and 303. These deployments also did not reach the top floor.
00:23:17 Debbie began what would be a final 40-minute call with CRO Jabin of North West Fire Services at 0141.
00:23:26 This call documents the deteriorating conditions in the bedroom where Debbie was sheltering with a
00:23:31 number of others. During the call, she identified that these included children. I'm not going to
00:23:39 ask for the transcript of the calls to be brought up on screen.
00:23:42 But on any view, this is a fundamentally distressing piece of evidence. And may I give
00:23:48 a trigger warning to those who are present in the room or watching online just about some of the
00:23:52 content I'm about to quote. At the outset of the call, Debbie relayed that there was thick smoke
00:24:00 coming into the flat through the windows and it was immediately visible to the public. She said,
00:24:08 thick smoke coming into the flat through the windows and it was immediately evident that she
00:24:13 was having problems breathing to such an extent it was already impeding her ability to speak.
00:24:20 She subsequently referred to the smoke being thick and black, burning her eyes and to people
00:24:26 vomiting as a result of smoke inhalation. At around 0206, Debbie described the flat as burning
00:24:34 and on fire. Prior to this point, Debbie had been advised to stay where she was
00:24:40 and was reassured that firefighters were on their way to her. At approximately 0207,
00:24:48 Debbie can very obviously be heard trying to open the bedroom door with great determination,
00:24:54 but it became clear that she was unable to do so. Over the final minutes of the call,
00:25:00 she was overcome by toxic conditions and the call cut off. Professor Purser's analysis indicates
00:25:08 that the conditions in the bedroom of flat 201 would have significantly worsened at around 0152
00:25:15 to 0156, resulting in rapidly deteriorating conditions. From around this time until 210,
00:25:24 there was a progressively increasing risk of collapse if the occupants attempted to walk
00:25:29 unassisted down the staircase. After 210, the risk of death even if rescued was high.
00:25:38 Based on the approximate time of unconsciousness of Debbie, timed by reference to the 999 call,
00:25:45 Professor Purser assesses the likely time of death of all occupants in the bedroom in flat 201
00:25:50 as a result of inhalation of the gases from external fire at around 245. The medical cause
00:25:58 of death is properly given as inhalation of fire fumes or an alternative similar formulation
00:26:04 in preference to the less specific and informative formulation of consistent with the effects of fire
00:26:11 used in the early post-mortem reports. I would like to conclude by paying tribute to Debbie's
00:26:21 mother Miriam. She cannot be here today for health reasons, but she is very much here in spirit.
00:26:28 At the commemoration Miriam lets you know that it was some comfort to her that the ashes of Debbie's
00:26:35 body left by the fire could be laid to rest in the City of London crematorium next to her father.
00:26:42 This was obviously an extremely loving family and after alleged rampant lamproll died,
00:26:47 this was a deeply connected mother and daughter. Miriam has made sure that you know what a truly
00:26:54 special person her daughter was. Debbie was open and kind to people she died together with in flat
00:26:59 201 just as she was open and kind to people throughout her life. To lose such a loved one
00:27:07 to an untimely death is terrible, but as Miriam told you, losing Debbie in these circumstances
00:27:14 has been unbearable. Yet in all her suffering and in increasingly frail health herself,
00:27:20 Miriam has somehow managed to find the fortitude to participate steadfastly in this inquiry.
00:27:27 She is determined to see this process through and to see justice for Debbie and those who died
00:27:34 alongside her. Thank you sir, that's the presentation. Thank you very much Mr. Friedman.
00:27:41 May I ask for a 30 minute break please? Yes, I would like to ask you to please stand for a
00:27:47 30 minute break please. Yes, I would think 11 o'clock would be a suitable time to sit again
00:27:55 if that's convenient to others. I'm grateful. Thank you very much. Well we'll rise at that point
00:28:01 and we'll sit again please at 11 o'clock. Thank you very much.
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01:00:30 yes mr millet yes mr chairman thank you i now invite alison monroe qc please to come to the podium
01:00:38 to make the presentation on behalf of the family for jessica obana remires flat 176
01:00:45 on floor 20 of grenfell tower who was recovered from flat 201 on floor 23 thank you yes miss
01:00:53 ronroo good morning chair mrs stefan mr upboard good morning to jessica's family and indeed good
01:01:00 morning to all the other families who are here today to listen to the various presentations
01:01:07 jessica obana remires was one of the 18 children that died in the grenfell tower fire
01:01:15 monday just gone the fourth of july would have been jessica's birthday her 18th birthday
01:01:24 that's a milestone marking the passage from childhood to young adulthood her sister melanie
01:01:32 during the commemoration hearings told us that jessica did not live to see her quinceañera
01:01:39 which in columbia and in other latin american countries is a it's a big deal it's a very
01:01:46 important coming of age tradition when a girl turns 15 back in 2017 jessica was planning well
01:01:55 ahead into the future and why not jessica and the other children of grenfell tower had no reason
01:02:03 to doubt that they would have a future she knew what she wanted for that 15th birthday party
01:02:10 it was a yellow theme and she pictured herself in a beautiful yellow dress sadly these two new
01:02:19 chapters in jessica's life her quinceañera and her 18th birthday were events that she was
01:02:26 destined never to see jessica was 12 years old when she died but jessica was more than a statistic
01:02:37 a victim the deceased jessica was a bright happy sunny school girl she was born in westminster
01:02:46 and raised all her short life in west london in the film played at the commemoration hearings
01:02:52 the family gave us their own little insights into the person that jessica was to her mother adriana
01:03:00 she was her darling baby girl who could make her laugh every single day jessica loved music
01:03:07 she loved cooking especially baking cakes which she was very good at she loved to go shopping
01:03:13 adriana always enjoyed their lazy sundays under the duvet watching films and eating popcorn
01:03:21 to her dad ramero she was that bubbly sometimes cheeky little girl full of life always on the go
01:03:29 with all her after school activities his busy little angel the apple of his eye he told us how
01:03:36 now all that was left is pain and an emptiness for a life and a world without her for the family
01:03:46 for the rest of their days every day every hour and every minute every time they lose
01:03:52 concentration on whatever they're doing be it at a family gathering or at work or even alone at home
01:03:59 jessica will always be in their thoughts to big sister melanie she was just baby sister jess
01:04:07 melanie who never ever thought she would one day be writing an obituary for her little sister jess
01:04:14 jessica who loved clothes who loved looking good and knew how to look good as melanie said
01:04:21 not a day goes by that she doesn't cross my mind and the thought of being not being able to watch
01:04:27 her grow up into a beautiful girl and watch her go to university have her first job and just be
01:04:34 there as an older sister at the time she would need me breaks my heart to her extended family
01:04:42 her aunts her uncle her cousins she was their little girl as well whom they loved and cherished
01:04:53 jessica lived in flat 176 grenfell tower on the north elevation and northeast corner with her mother
01:05:02 adriana ramirez and her sister melanie melanie was at university at the time and lived at her
01:05:08 university digs during term time but would return home for vacations and was living in the flat with
01:05:15 jessica at the time of the fire the tenancy had begun on the 30th of september 2013 at the time
01:05:24 of the fire her father ramirez was living in flat 36 on the sixth floor turning then to the fateful
01:05:31 events of june 2017 this is jessica's story
01:05:38 cctv footage shows jessica in the lift lobby at grenfell tower at 1820 33 on the 13th of june
01:05:48 2017 later that evening melanie spoke to jessica around about 10 p.m as she was leaving
01:05:56 to pop out to see friends and jessica was getting ready to go into bed
01:06:01 all was well at approximately 20 to 1 adriana had to leave the flat as she was called by a friend
01:06:09 in ladbroke grove whose own child was ill adriana kindly offered to take some medicine to them
01:06:18 the fire spread soon after mr kabeddi a flat 16 on the fourth floor made his emergency call
01:06:26 to report the fire in his kitchen at six minutes to one the external fire spread was already taking
01:06:33 hold and that fire spread was rapid by 120 it had spread outside flat 16 and was making its way up
01:06:42 the cladding on the east side of the tower only eight minutes later at 127 59 firefighters on the
01:06:50 ground were asking for 15 pumps and two aerials the analysis of professor bisby confirms that the
01:06:57 fire had spread up the external northeast six flats flat six columns of the entire building by
01:07:05 0126 some residents in the six flats had successfully evacuated such as shah and
01:07:13 so either ahmed a flat 156 who managed to leave the tower at 0127 after their kitchen window had
01:07:22 it exploded inwards the tape recording of a call that went through to the police operator records
01:07:29 the male voice shouting fire and the sound of banging on doors before the call cuts out by 0136
01:07:38 the fire had spread along the entire east side of the tower appearing to spread towards the north
01:07:44 side we can glean details of the internal conditions from eyewitness accounts and the
01:07:51 firefighting activity in relation to jessica at 118 firefighter o'burn entered the sixth floor lobby
01:08:00 and stated that it was quote a little bit smoky a spanish-speaking group of three believed to include
01:08:07 romero and oscar milan gonzalez came out of flat 36 on the sixth floor that's two floors directly
01:08:15 above mr kabeddi's flat they informed firefighter o'burn that their flat was alight romero made his
01:08:22 way to the stairwell intending to go up to flat seven 176 but he was stopped by firefighter o'burn
01:08:30 he was told by the firefighter he told them my family is upstairs but he was told by the
01:08:36 firefighter he could not go upstairs and was directed back down romero understandably made
01:08:44 the assumption at this point that with the fire brigade present and the fire would soon hopefully
01:08:50 come under control and there would be time for his family to escape he says of the internal
01:08:56 conditions that the stairwell and the landing were not too smoky at this point but the smell of toxic
01:09:02 burning was already strong according to the cctv footage romero left the building at 21 minutes
01:09:11 past one his evidence is that once outside he could now see that the fire had reached the 10th floor
01:09:20 the race to rescue jessica first attempt at 126 firefighter dave bedillo met melanie at the main
01:09:30 entrance and she handed him a set of keys to flat 176 dave in his witness statement says
01:09:40 she said her sister was 12 years old and called jessica and that she was in the flat alone
01:09:47 the lady asked me if she could go up with me to get her she looked very distressed panicked and
01:09:53 anxious i told her not to worry that i would go and get jessica on my own as i didn't want
01:10:00 to endanger her she then gave me the keys to the flat i decided the quickest way to go and get
01:10:07 jessica would be to get in the lift and that i would be able to get to the 20th floor bring her
01:10:13 down and then continue with what i was doing i had no idea what was going on outside and i didn't
01:10:21 think that jessica or myself would be in any immediate danger a minute or so later dave
01:10:28 bedillo entered the lift lobby at the ground floor level at around 128 he traveled in the lift
01:10:35 with the intention of getting to the floor 20th floor he was not wearing a ba set however the
01:10:42 lift doors opened on floor 15 and as a result the lift itself was filled with quote black smoke
01:10:51 he therefore had to abort this attempt to rescue jessica and get to the 20th floor he managed to
01:10:58 navigate across the lobby area and find his way to the stairwell where he descended melanie by this
01:11:05 time had left the tower and had met up with her father and told him about dave bedillo and what
01:11:10 she had done melanie called her mother on her mobile and told her that there was a fire in the
01:11:16 building and that jessica was still inside however the family had the hope that jessica
01:11:22 would be rescued and reunited with them the second attempt crew manager chris secret was by the
01:11:32 whiteboard at the bridgehead in his written evidence he said i was standing there basically
01:11:38 choosing one to go to and whilst i was doing that another fsg call came in for a 12 year old girl
01:11:46 stuck on the 20th floor firefighter dogu and i took that call firefighter bedillo was there and he said
01:11:53 someone had given him the keys to the flat with the 12 year old girl on the 20th floor i told watch
01:11:59 manager o'keith we were going to the 20th floor and we reported to firefighter disson torban
01:12:05 on the ecb that as a crew of three it would be myself firefighter dogu and firefighter bedillo
01:12:12 in his oral evidence on the 5th of july 4th and 5th of july 2018 he spoke about the fsg management
01:12:23 issues his experiences at the bridgehead as a ba wearer and standing staring at the wall looking
01:12:30 at the fsg information to determine where he should be deployed he was under no direction
01:12:36 no direction the information regarding the 12 year old and the fsg ultimately came from firefighter
01:12:43 bedillo and not through the bridge bridgehead now christopher dogu was a member of red watch
01:12:50 at kensington fire station and he was outside at this point he had been part of the original crew
01:12:56 that attended the fire at mr kabeddi's flat he came back into the tower at around 1 30 25
01:13:05 and was in the lobby with a hose please note that time 130 and 25 seconds that would have been
01:13:14 after the call that jessica made to cro russell had begun and i will come back to that call in
01:13:21 some more detail later in this presentation at 133 58 that ba team of crew manager secret
01:13:35 and firefighters dogu and bedillo removed their ba tallies and went under air and began their
01:13:42 ascent of the tower via the lift with the intention of reaching floor 20 where they
01:13:48 believed jessica was and to rescue her however this team were only able to get as far as the
01:13:56 eighth floor when the lift doors opened on that floor they were greeted with a smoked filled
01:14:03 lobby and very poor visibility although they could still see they continued their ascent
01:14:09 therefore via the stairwell which was now quote full of wispy smoke but not too bad on route they
01:14:16 did not pass anyone between the eighth and the 20th floor it took them until around 140 to reach
01:14:23 floor 20 so even with breathing aparesis it still had taken them approximately six minutes to go
01:14:30 from floor eight to 20 on foot chris dogu noted chris secret was in the doorway holding it open
01:14:39 for me and he was knackered they went in and searched anyway i stayed outside on the radio
01:14:46 i was trying and trying and trying to get on the radio only chris dogu had a radio set
01:14:54 according to dave budillo smoke on the 20th floor was so thick i couldn't see my hand in front of
01:15:00 my face the front door to flat 176 was slightly agile pausing there the inquiry in their phase
01:15:10 one report found that in relation to some doors the following and this is in volume four part three
01:15:19 conclusions at paragraph 24 at 24.31 the report says in the early stages of the fire when flames
01:15:28 were accelerating up the east face of the tower forcing the occupants of flat sixes to leave
01:15:34 a number of the doors to those flats appeared to have been left open due to the absence of
01:15:40 effective self-clothing devices there is evidence that the doors to flat sixes on the following
01:15:46 floors remained open for this reason flat 76 on floor 10 flat 86 on floor 11 flat 116 on floor 14
01:15:56 flat 136 on floor 16 and flat 146 on floor 17 as a result smoke which had been able to enter these
01:16:05 flats was able to get into the lobbies now there is some evidence that flat 176 jessica's home
01:16:13 likewise had a weak door in his statement to the inquiry and for the record that is iws
01:16:21 five zeros 496 romero obano said this when we moved into the flat it had a new kitchen
01:16:29 and some old linoleum floor the council gave us 200 pounds to buy paint and we painted the walls
01:16:36 and put carpets in the bedrooms our front door was always dodgy it didn't always close automatically
01:16:43 as it was meant to it was also supposed to lock automatically when you closed it and put the handle
01:16:48 up from the inside but it didn't so we would have to lock it with a key i call the council to
01:16:54 complain about it a couple of times but it was never fixed the door had a letter box which did
01:16:59 shut automatically going back to the to the rescue attempt chris dogu had waited on the 20th floor
01:17:08 lobby and tried to send a message to the bridgehead with an update that the radios were not working
01:17:14 in relation to jessica he said in his witness statement that he didn't know at this time that
01:17:19 she was already on the phone to cro russell or that she was talking to control to be honest as
01:17:26 we hadn't had any communications since we left the bridgehead we had no idea that the fire had
01:17:31 spread inside the building engulfing all the flats beneath us it just would never not enter
01:17:37 your head that that would happen smoke travels yes actual fire travel would be unthinkable
01:17:43 the smoke in the flat didn't seem too bad but when you're in a b.a. in the dark it's hard to tell
01:17:50 firefighter bedillo and cm secret conducted the search of flat 176 and of course found no one
01:17:58 there and found jessica not there by the time they had concluded that search the conditions had
01:18:05 deteriorated significantly c.m chris secrets warning whistle had sounded which signified
01:18:13 that he was very low on air and needed to descend and leave the building the firefighters all left
01:18:20 using the stairwell and described the temperatures as being unbearably hot chair you may recall the
01:18:26 very vivid evidence that these firefighters gave in phase one describing those conditions
01:18:31 and how they almost overwhelmed them in particular chris secrets said this
01:18:39 i asked firefighter bedillo to shout for firefighter dogu because i had no energy to do it neither did
01:18:46 he we sat there i looked at my gauge and saw i only had 15 bars left i was in big trouble
01:18:54 i put myself in a corner of the stairwell because i did not want to be in anyone else's way if i
01:19:01 didn't make it out i tried to get my phone out of my pocket to text my mum but i couldn't get the
01:19:07 phone out i sat there for a couple of minutes and said to firefighter bedillo that we couldn't do an
01:19:13 exchange of air because we were both running out he didn't even reply to me firefighter dogu then
01:19:20 suddenly appeared and grabbed my arm he said we better go but he'd lost firefighter bedilla i
01:19:26 told him he was with me and we carried on down the tower now that very graphic and visceral account
01:19:33 from chris secret gives us some much needed context and acts as a comparator if physically fit brave
01:19:42 professional firefighters like chris secrets and dave bedillo were so overcome and so desperate
01:19:48 that they thought their end was imminent one can begin to imagine what the residents just ordinary
01:19:54 men women and children were experiencing in their flats as the smoke and the fire encroached
01:20:01 in developed and overwhelmed them and as they tried to navigate the lobbies and the stairwells
01:20:07 and can one can well imagine for a child and for jessica how very frightening that experience
01:20:13 would have been now firefighter dogu's whistle had also sounded so this rescue attempt for jessica
01:20:23 was aborted despite all their efforts it came to nothing this team as brave as they were were
01:20:30 literally and metaphorically working in the dark they received no information that jessica had in
01:20:36 fact left flat 176 and was now on the 23rd floor and on a long 999 call with cro russell wherein
01:20:45 she was describing the fire and spoke closing in on them jessica's movements upwards between
01:20:53 one o'clock and 150 as we've already heard this morning from danny freedman queens council's
01:21:00 presentation on behalf of debbie lamprell the phase one report made certain findings in respect
01:21:06 of the upwards migration of a number of residents on the night of the fire using a combination of
01:21:13 telephone calls to her family and later the 99 quarter cro russell plus sightings with other
01:21:20 residents and accounts of other residents we are able to plot jessica's movements from flat 176
01:21:27 to flat 201 leaving flat 176 now at around about five past one jessica left flat 176
01:21:38 and went to her neighbors on floor 18 burke t and beric hafton now this estimated timing is based on
01:21:46 melanie having made a phone call to the home around about that time and receiving no answer
01:21:53 melanie also called jessica's mobile at that time and thought she could not be sleeping because
01:22:00 jessica kept her mobile under her pillow and so any call would have woken her up and melanie got
01:22:06 no response so based on that it is likely jessica would have been out of 176 by that time around 120
01:22:16 but he have to have shouted at the logic flat 115 to come out of the flat and then between
01:22:23 approximately 125 and 129 adriana received a call from jessica on the burke t half terms phone
01:22:33 she explained to her mother that there was a fire and that she was on the landing of floor
01:22:38 four nine to 18 and so we can deduce from that that jessica was with the half terms by this point
01:22:45 upward migration shortly before 130 jessica and a number of people had ascended the staircase
01:22:55 from floor 20 we know again around that time from for duma armed that she saw a group of people
01:23:02 gathered inside and outside flat 201 on floor 23 she saw burke t and beric hafton and although
01:23:12 she did not see jessica we know that jessica had moved with them and she'd used the phone
01:23:18 to call her mother at 125 also around 125 the nida family on floor 23 began to hear unusual noises
01:23:29 they'd already been smelling burning smells from about 10 past one they came out onto their landing
01:23:36 to see people coming up the stairs onto their floor they returned to their flat with other
01:23:41 residents from lower floors florida also recalls asking miriam el-goari why she and her mother had
01:23:48 come up the stairs and she was told that there'd been no way out of the staircase because it was
01:23:54 blocked with people running from the fire nemi lee and lydia liao also reported that both had
01:24:02 tried to go downstairs at some point before 130 but had to turn back due to the number of people
01:24:09 who were coming up the stairs
01:24:15 mr freedman queens council has already this morning told us of the number of individuals
01:24:22 including fatima afrasi abi and marian el-goari who saw residents coming up the stairs and their
01:24:28 conversations from jessica's perspective with all these adults migrating upwards it's no wonder that
01:24:37 she as a 12 year old would simply follow them 999 calls chair at this point i'd like to return again
01:24:47 to the phase one report and some of the conclusions in relation to the control room and some of the
01:24:52 advice given to residents on 999 calls again at volume four part three conclusions paragraph 29
01:25:02 i read as follows assurances to callers that firefighters would rescue them paragraph 29.61
01:25:10 a widespread feature of the exchanges between callers from the tower and the control room
01:25:15 is that callers were routinely told that firefighters were on their way to rescue them
01:25:20 or knew that they were there or would be told where they are or some other variant of that advice
01:25:27 however all that was said without any reliable information from the incident ground to back it
01:25:34 up as som smith accepted there was an expectation that crews had been and would continue to be
01:25:42 committed and that people would be rescued but the control room did not know what was happening
01:25:48 on the incident ground where the firefighters were or where or which floors they could reach
01:25:55 the following are some of the examples of the advice given throughout the night
01:25:59 the cro's were well aware that no information about the response to fsg information and in
01:26:05 particular whether crews had been deployed in response to particular fsg's calls was being
01:26:11 passed to the control room from the incident ground the assurances they gave were based solely
01:26:18 on what they expected or assumed to be happening or in some cases were given simply to calm
01:26:25 worried callers as the cro's who were asked about these calls accepted their assurances
01:26:32 were in fact likely to be misleading because they were not based on any information coming
01:26:38 from the incident ground a striking feature of many of the 999 calls in the early stages of the
01:26:44 fire was that in many cases cro's insisted that the fire was on floor four of the building
01:26:51 contrary to what they were being told by the caller they appeared to have been unable to
01:26:56 grasp the fact that it had spread rapidly up the building so that by 130 it was affecting and
01:27:03 indeed had entered flats on the uppermost floors instead cro's treated the callers what the callers
01:27:10 were saying about the location of the fire with skepticism and in some cases actually contradicted
01:27:16 them end quote it is important to remember those observations as we proceed with jessica's story
01:27:26 by the time she made her 999 call the fire spread was continuing unabated by 152 the fire had now
01:27:36 spread along the sides to the top of the tower and two sides of grenfell appeared to be engulfed
01:27:44 the sequence of horizontal spread first engulfed the flats number ones in the centre of the east
01:27:51 face of the building between the 18th and the 23rd floors this happened from 0157 as a result of the
01:28:00 architectural crown at the top of the building catching a light we know internally that no
01:28:07 firefighters reached the 23rd floor indeed the one attempt to get to the very top of the building
01:28:14 by a specialist crew the paddington crew team was unsuccessful they were deployed at 0156 with a
01:28:24 specific task as one of them martin gilliam said in evidence they said they wanted us to go to the
01:28:31 roof find a strong anchor point tie ourselves off make ourselves safe so if we did slip we were not
01:28:38 going to fall to the floor and then put a jet down from the top of the town and spray it down
01:28:43 because obviously it was starting to take the cladding and the tl couldn't throw the water
01:28:48 high enough to reach the top using extended breathing apparatus it was hope this team could
01:28:54 reach the very highest floors they set off a team of six tallying out at 015609 they tallied back
01:29:03 in at 02 2918 just a few minutes then after jessica's call had begun they set off by the
01:29:12 11th floor the ascent was becoming very tough indeed martin gilliam again says we were hot and
01:29:19 bothered and getting very tired so we said there was no way we were going to be able to get to the
01:29:24 roof work on the roof and get down because the set has a certain amount of air in it and we have to
01:29:30 get to our objective do our objective and get out all under air by the 11th or 12th floor they passed
01:29:37 other firefighters from paddington mills and campbell who had been unsuccessful in rescuing
01:29:43 someone on the 20th floor the paddington crew discarded their fire quieting equipment around
01:29:49 about the 15th floor and made it to floor 21 on foot where they rescued a woman but then they came
01:29:56 back down so no ba or even edba crew was able to get to floor 23 and no one no crew was deployed
01:30:06 to floor 23 or able to reach jessica and others returning again if i may to the inquiries phase
01:30:15 one report volume four part three conclusions it is worth reminding ourselves before looking at
01:30:21 jessica's 99 call in detail of the observations made about cro russell and jessica the report
01:30:30 says this at 0129 48 cro russell took a call from jessica abana remarez who by then had moved to
01:30:39 flat 201 on floor 23 in the course of which she told jessica that crews were coming for her
01:30:46 and were fighting the fire and making their way up cro russell accepted that she had no hard
01:30:52 information on which to base those statements but said they reflected what she had expected to
01:30:59 happen and that she was trying to give reassurance while responding to the call made by jessica at
01:31:06 0129 48 cro russell told her that the fire was on floor four because she thought that although
01:31:14 it might have moved it was not anywhere near where jessica was jessica told cro russell that quote
01:31:22 there's fire in the house but she repeated her assurances to jessica that the fire was below her
01:31:30 on four floor number four it is as i said important to remember those observations when
01:31:39 considering jessica's 999 call and others from those on floor 23 between 1 30 and 2
01:31:46 o'clock in the morning the control room operators took multiple calls from occupants on floor 23
01:31:54 all callers informed the control room that the fire had adversely affected the highest floor
01:32:03 again this morning you have heard of other calls that were made from flat 201 on the 23rd floor
01:32:12 from debbie lamprow you've also heard yesterday phone calls that were made by birik haftam
01:32:18 and mariam el guari also made calls from flat 205 the messages being relayed by residents on the
01:32:26 23rd floor was loud and clear we can see smoke we can see fire and we are being affected by both
01:32:34 i now turn to jessica's 999 call it lasted almost an hour some 54 minutes
01:32:45 in parts it's very distressing to listen and read and i do not propose to go into detail
01:32:53 in quotes but rather to summarize what was being said in that call
01:32:57 the call began at 0129 when a bt operator passed a mobile number to cro russell because the line had
01:33:09 cleared and it appeared that the child was on the line who was asking for the fire brigade
01:33:15 this was the 30th call that night so at approximately 130 cro russell called back on that
01:33:24 mobile number and jessica answered the first word she said was mum
01:33:31 thereafter jessica and cro russell were engaged in a conversation for the best part of an hour
01:33:39 as the call progressed it became abundantly clear that conditions in the room where jessica was
01:33:45 calling from were becoming increasingly smoky frightening and perilous jessica was called
01:33:52 perilous jessica explained with detail and clarity that the smoke and the fire was encroaching
01:34:00 through various points she told cro russell during the call that the smoke was coming from the lobby
01:34:08 through the front door and into flat 201 that smoke was also coming through the window
01:34:15 between 130 and 147 on the call jessica said that the fire was coming through
01:34:22 the living room crucially at 134 jessica informed cro russell and i quote we can't breathe
01:34:32 four minutes later jessica tells cro russell i can't breathe then her jessica and the other
01:34:40 families moved into the bedroom indeed throughout the course of that phone call
01:34:47 jessica frequently stated that she could not breathe in the clearest possible way
01:34:53 this little girl jessica aged 12 was describing not only the presence of smoke and fire but the
01:34:59 devastating effects that smoke and the fire were having on her and those around her what is
01:35:06 remarkable about this phone call apart from what is being said and the length of the call is a way
01:35:13 which jessica conducted herself she is clear she is calm remarkably calm showing a level of maturity
01:35:22 well beyond her 12 years of age throughout the call cro russell repeats to jessica that the fire
01:35:29 brigade is coming however she did not have any positive information about this and following
01:35:35 the aborted attempt by mr secret firefighters bedillo and dogu as i said no ba or edba crew
01:35:43 was even deployed to flat 201 it is not until around 138 in the call that cro russell asks
01:35:52 jessica for the first time for the number of the flat she is in jessica very clearly states that
01:35:58 she's in flat 201 and that it's on the 23rd floor jessica also very clearly states that there are
01:36:05 a number of other adults and children numbering 10 with her at around 139 jessica puts the call
01:36:14 on hold for about a minute this is most likely due to jessica calling her mother adriana again
01:36:21 adriana said she received a second call from jessica again using bukti haftam's phone in
01:36:27 her witness statement adriana explains that the second call was around 10 minutes after the first
01:36:33 sandra ures gave an interview to the bbc on the 14th of june and estimated that second call would
01:36:40 have been around about 139 adriana asked jessica where she was and told her to come downstairs
01:36:48 jessica was panicking the phone cut out and andriana tried several times again to get back
01:36:55 she was unable to tragically this desperate phone call were the final words that adriana would ever
01:37:02 speak to jessica jessica then returned to the call with cro russell who at 143 tells jessica again
01:37:14 that firefighters would be getting to her very soon it was now five to two jessica had been on
01:37:22 the call for nearly half an hour cro russell noted that jessica's breathing was now becoming
01:37:29 labored shortly after this jessica referred to a lot of smoke being in the room
01:37:38 the controller miss russell then gives jessica explicit instructions this would be about two
01:37:43 o'clock she tells jessica that no one should leave and everyone should stay where they were
01:37:49 in the same room bearing in mind that jessica would be doubtless disorientated by this stage
01:37:57 and deteriorating by this stage her mother's words to her some 20 minutes before had been
01:38:04 come downstairs jessica but here somebody else the cro russell was telling her no one should leave
01:38:11 and everyone should stay where they were one can only imagine the turmoil and confusion that was
01:38:17 going on in the mind of this frightened little girl six minutes later at 206 jessica informed
01:38:25 cro russell that the fire is now coming through the window in the bedroom 13 minutes after that
01:38:33 horrifying revelation at 09 02 19 jessica stopped responding to cro russell's questions and voice
01:38:43 cro russell could still hear jessica breathing for some time after that but she then ended the
01:38:51 call when the line went silent jessica made no further calls or communications with the outside world
01:39:02 forensic investigation post fire on the 18th of june 2017 jessica's remains were recovered from
01:39:11 flat 201 on the 23rd floor according to archaeological investigations jessica was found
01:39:17 within the bed area in the bedroom forensic odontology analysis was used to identify jessica
01:39:27 between the 2nd of july 2017 and the 17th of august 2017
01:39:33 Dr ben swith carried out a post mortem on the 15th of november 2017 and he found the medical
01:39:41 cause of death for jessica to be consistent with the effects of fire now professor persa has very
01:39:48 recently given very detailed evidence to the inquiry and he noted in his oral evidence
01:39:57 that a finding of more than 40% cohb almost certainly meant death by smoke inhalation
01:40:06 that was his evidence on day 296 line 165 so based on his analysis his view was that by around
01:40:19 2 23 am would be the time that a co lethal dose and 50% cohb would have been reached
01:40:30 he continued that we know that the people in flat 201 were more active because they were trying to
01:40:37 extinguish the fire and that they had certainly would have closed doors within the flat itself
01:40:44 such as a living room which would quote have bought them some more time he notes that jessica
01:40:49 as a child obviously would have a smaller lung capacity and therefore probably accumulate a cohb
01:40:56 even sooner than the adults we know that jessica became unresponsive however at a similar time to
01:41:03 the adult debbie lamprell so there is not a huge discrepancy and it seems reasonable to conclude
01:41:10 that there was not much distinction between the two of them in relation to the time of death
01:41:16 if anything jessica as a child would probably have succumbed first in terms of the medical cause of
01:41:22 death whilst dr fegenold agreed with the conclusions and thrust of professor persa's
01:41:28 scientific analysis and toxological analysis of the grendel tower due to the lack of actual
01:41:34 pathological material available dr fegenold did not feel able to conclude that the medical cause
01:41:40 of death should be recorded as asphyxia from asphyxiant gases or inhalation of asphyxian gases
01:41:47 and that the more appropriate medical cause of death to be recorded was consistent with the
01:41:53 effects of fire which encompasses asphyxia from asphyxiant gases in terms of the time of death
01:42:02 again professor persa opines that jessica and debbie lamprell were on very long 999 calls
01:42:09 and became unresponsive and probably comatose around about 218 and 221
01:42:17 so that is just before becoming completely unconscious and then shortly after that he
01:42:24 estimated that they would have passed away from the lethal they would have passed the lethal dose
01:42:29 of coch chb at around 223 he estimated the time they would have died would have been approximately
01:42:38 0 to 45 so those are the facts of jessica's story but in concluding her story i'd like to return
01:42:53 to where we began
01:42:56 how does a parent ever come to terms with losing a child it inverts everything it flies in the
01:43:04 face of the natural course of life any parent who finds himself in that position cannot help but think
01:43:14 what would my child have been today what would 18 year old jessica have been like
01:43:21 what kind of person would she have been what kind of person could she have been hers was a future
01:43:28 denied a loss of hopes expectations and aspirations their hearts may be broken but this family endures
01:43:39 because they have to endure they hold on to the wonderful 12 years that they did have with jessica
01:43:45 let her legacy and memory be more than the horrific circumstances of her death
01:43:50 let it be how she lived her life a loving daughter a sweet little sister a beloved niece
01:44:00 and cousin hers was a big loving family
01:44:05 loving family in the words of her aunts sandra ana and her uncle manny jessica was everybody's
01:44:18 child she was my child as much as her father and her mother's child we loved her and cherished her
01:44:24 in the same way her cousins loved her and cherished her in the same way she will always be
01:44:32 that sunny bright 12 year old with a wonderful smile thank you thank you very much miss munro
01:44:42 well at that point i think we ought to have a break
01:44:46 so we shall rise and resume please at 12 15 thank you thank you very much
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02:25:02 yes mr.
02:25:08 yes mr.
02:25:09 chairman thank you very much I now call upon mr.
02:25:12 Michael Mansfield Queens council to make his presentation on behalf of the family of Hamid
02:25:18 Carney from flat 154 on floor 18 of Grenfell Tower who was recovered from flat 201 on floor
02:25:26 23. Mr Mansfield, thank you. Good morning, sir. Members of the panel, Thierry
02:25:45 Estefan and also Ali Akbo. Good morning. May I first of all thank you for the time, extra
02:25:53 time we needed. And I wonder if I could just ask for the photograph to come back again just for a
02:26:02 second if it's available. May I say while I'm doing this that there's no trigger warning needed
02:26:09 for my presentation. We're not going to be showing anything that might disturb anybody or hopefully
02:26:15 saying anything. I asked for this photograph to be brought back because when you, he is quite
02:26:24 obviously on the left of the photograph and the person on the right is his mother. And it says a
02:26:34 lot about him and their relationship. He was adored by her and the photograph also exudes
02:26:44 his personality. I think you can see it's there because what I have to present today is not going
02:26:49 to take very long but a photograph often conveys more than words do about the kind of person that
02:26:56 he was. And this was, as far as we can ascertain, the last photograph taken of the two of them.
02:27:03 She died in one sense fortunately before the fire, about two years before. So she was not
02:27:12 obviously in a position to witness what went on that night. Thank you, I just wanted the photograph
02:27:19 back for a moment. The family are represented in the United Kingdom by two cousins and you will
02:27:29 remember from the commemoration, well it's staggering thought that it's now four years ago,
02:27:37 that Masoud who can't be here today actually did the presentation and he's watching remotely.
02:27:47 Amir, another cousin, is sitting in the front row in front of you. I'm going to call all the
02:28:02 through if it's acceptable. I'm just going to use his first name, Hamid. Hamid was a long-standing
02:28:10 resident of Grenfell Tower just under 27 years. His tenancy of flat 154 commenced on the 10th
02:28:21 of September 1990. After the refurbishment, this was located on the 18th floor. He had retired and
02:28:32 lived there on his own but from the start in 1990 he had described back and hip pain which impeded
02:28:44 climbing stairs. As you will gather that is an important feature of what happens later. A tenancy
02:28:51 information form he completed in 2015 confirmed ongoing disability. By the time of the fire he
02:29:00 was aged 61 having been born on the 24th of January 1956 in Iran. He lived and was brought
02:29:11 up in Tehran, the youngest of four children. He made annual visits back to his place of birth and
02:29:20 another was imminent just 10 days away from the 14th of June. He was due to go back on the 24th
02:29:31 of June 2017. May I add at this stage subsequently his remains were returned to Tehran. Amir who sits
02:29:45 here today facilitated that so that he could be buried in his home country near the heart of his
02:29:52 family. He moved to London in the 1970s with Masood to study. He grew to love not only the place but
02:30:02 especially the people. One of his great joys was to generate laughter which came to fruition as
02:30:11 an accomplished actor. During the 1980s he had a major role in two popular satires about the regime
02:30:22 in Iran. Needless to say such a commentary was not welcomed by the Iranian authorities and as a result
02:30:31 he was blacklisted and felt quite unable to attend the funeral of his father. A searing emotional
02:30:41 burden to bear at that time and he ended his acting career. Thereafter Hamid turned his hand
02:30:48 to another passion, cooking. He became a professional skilled chef working in restaurants in London.
02:30:56 He has been fondly remembered in evidence before you in this inquiry for his enduring
02:31:05 humour again in the face you've seen. So sharp, so witty, his warmth, his endearing smile, his love
02:31:16 of family and compassion for others. I hope it's fair to say all those attributes and virtues can
02:31:23 be seen in that one photograph. As Masood said to you he lived to love and he loved to live.
02:31:32 The night in question, his movements and the circumstances and a timeline. On the evening
02:31:46 of the 13th at 5.17.31 he was captured on the CCTV as so many others were waiting to take the lift
02:31:56 up to the 18th floor. And now we go forward many hours later. In the early hours of the 14th he was
02:32:08 caught in a whirlwind of events when a neighbour alerted him to the presence of fire by knocking
02:32:19 urgently on his door. Hamid opened it gingerly, no doubt in consternation about the reason for
02:32:30 the knocking. It was, and you've heard this before in other accounts, it was Shah Ahmed who lived two
02:32:41 doors away in one of the northeast column of sixes. Shah was in 156 and he'd been awoken by smoke
02:32:54 alarms he'd installed in his home. He had four alarms. It was a hot night and like others Shah
02:33:06 had left both his bedroom door and his kitchen window open. His alarms had been triggered by
02:33:15 smoke which had begun to enter his kitchen. He looked out of the window and could see, and this
02:33:23 is a description you have in your Phase One report, what he saw out of the window was a big fireball
02:33:32 coming up from the outside of the building. It was the colour of a burning sunset. So may I just
02:33:43 pause? I'm not going to read out all the references each time I've handed them in so that they are
02:33:48 available. This fireball had its origins several floors below in flat 16 on floor four, about which
02:33:59 you are now very familiar, where Mr. Khabedi had called the emergency services at 0054, shortly
02:34:09 before 1 a.m. in the morning. Initially it was in his kitchen as you will recall, but it broke out
02:34:16 into the cladding outside his kitchen at nine minutes past one, a key time. So the fireball
02:34:24 that Shah was looking at out of his window reached Shah Ahmed's window while he was still in the flat,
02:34:32 exploding inwards, and he immediately dialed 999. The time now was 1.2756. So you can immediately
02:34:46 measure the speed with which this came up the outside. Shah couldn't wait, but he dialed 999.
02:34:55 He couldn't wait for an answer, and nor did he have time to replace the receiver. The call itself
02:35:07 was transferred to the Metropolitan Police and it was recorded. Again, we're not asking for that to
02:35:13 be played, but what can be heard on the recording is of interest. They are the sounds, again reference
02:35:19 has been made, of Mr. and Mrs. Ahmed together knocking on doors and shouting, fire. So you hear
02:35:28 that. One of the doors was Hamid's. The first was 155, but then Hamid's at 154. They told him to get
02:35:38 out. Having tried every door on their floor, that's Shah Ahmed, they returned to their own flat, again
02:35:47 to give us some idea of the speed and what was happening to the sixes flats. He opened the door
02:35:53 to find thick black and white smoke. Shah shut it again, and he quickly descended the stairs, as
02:36:04 Professor Perser has made clear. At this time, so roughly 130, 127 is the call, the lobbies and
02:36:12 stairs would have been tolerable for permitting an exodus. Their exit time, that's again Mr. and Mrs.
02:36:20 Shah, was 131.29 and 131.30, having been able to run down, and this again is in phase one report,
02:36:31 but again it makes clear how possible it was, if you were able-bodied, and how quickly it was that
02:36:38 they were able to, as it were, extricate themselves from serious danger. I interpose, in the period 120
02:36:47 to 130, the flame front extended to envelop all the flat sixes between floors 10 and 23. Again,
02:36:59 phase one report. I pause. We'd return to Hamid himself. Meanwhile, Hamid, back at his door,
02:37:10 took a different decision. The decision taken by Shah to go down was not the decision Hamid took.
02:37:22 He became part of the upward migration about which Mr. Friedman and others have spoken so
02:37:30 eloquently already. It's been described in some detail. Exactly when and why he, Hamid, joined this
02:37:39 migration is difficult to detail with any precision. One of the reasons is that Hamid made no calls to
02:37:48 the emergency services nor to members of his family. So there's an element of speculation,
02:37:58 but hopefully based on a reasonable position posed for him. Because of the position of his flat and
02:38:08 the relatively smoke-free lobby on floor 18 and the stairs beyond that, he may have thought it's
02:38:17 safer to go up rather than down. This assessment may also have been reinforced by the increasing
02:38:25 number coming up from the lower floors along with members of the fire service as described by Shah
02:38:34 himself in his evidence to you. This upward surge was accompanied by an unspecified element of stay
02:38:45 put or at least the need to avoid the perceived danger of going towards as opposed to away from
02:38:54 the fire. Above all in Hamid's case, his mobility must have weighed heavily against negotiating
02:39:04 18 floors of potential hazard in one direction as against a few floors in the other. He was faced
02:39:15 with an impossible and an unenviable choice in critical circumstances for which no one had been
02:39:26 prepared and where in the absence of information he had to make an instinctual rapid response.
02:39:36 And again I interpose a reflection for the future. This dilemma, the one he faced, highlights the
02:39:47 pressing and imperative need to ensure firstly that fire safety procedures in high-rise tower
02:39:55 blocks are carefully crafted in advance and made known to all occupants, especially those needing
02:40:06 assistance with an emphasis on evacuation as supported by recent expert evidence before you.
02:40:13 And secondly therefore that such procedures, particular peeps, have been rehearsed in regular
02:40:23 fire drills so that they have almost become conditioned responses in an urgent situation.
02:40:30 And I say that with the approval of the family who if anything is to be gained from this disaster,
02:40:40 it should be one of the things, should be that proposal for the future. Assuming, going back to
02:40:47 Hamid's position, that he wasted no time in leaving his flat after 1.27. The estimate that
02:40:55 is being made in the various reports is that he left at about 1.28, so within a minute. It's
02:41:03 possible. He encountered Jessica, again if I use her first name, from flat 176. Again, you've heard
02:41:13 this morning very recently, as it were, pair it down to the minimum, she was phoning her mother
02:41:21 at 1.25 through to 1.29, explaining that she was by floor 18. That's where Hamid was. And minutes
02:41:32 after that phone call, she was calling the control room from flat 201 at about 1.29. The importance
02:41:41 of this is that she recounted to the authorities that there was a fire in the flat and smoke
02:41:49 throughout it, which meant they couldn't breathe. A condition which could be detected, as you've
02:41:54 heard, on the call itself. But she mentioned there were 10 other neighbours sheltering with her.
02:42:03 And we suggest it's reasonable to suppose that Hamid by that stage was one of those.
02:42:09 Continuing with the flat itself, deteriorating conditions, difficulties with breathing,
02:42:16 and the numbers of neighbours were referred to in other calls that you've heard about to the
02:42:21 control room. For example, Debbie Lamperl's for 40 minutes, and certainly after 1.41, it is estimated
02:42:30 that 15 occupants made their way up to floor 23. Again, your phase one report. The emergency
02:42:40 services knew from 1.30, that's Jessica, and from 1.43, that's Debbie, about the situation in room 201.
02:42:53 Initially, flat 161 on floor 23 was mistakenly entered on the north-west incident log.
02:43:00 But Debbie had clarified this at about 1.52, so that by 1.53, the log read 10 people in flat 201,
02:43:07 23rd floor. However, this information doesn't appear to have been communicated to the LFB,
02:43:14 London Fire Brigade, to be entered on the whiteboards. And this important detail,
02:43:21 which you've heard now more than once, but it is worth repeating at this stage, that there were
02:43:26 no deployments by the fire brigade to floor 23 for the purposes of rescue until after eight minutes
02:43:35 past two, when a crew were sent and were diverted at the 10th floor. Thereafter, the three that
02:43:43 followed, 224, as you will see in a moment, was already too late for 201. 251 was the next one,
02:43:52 was the next one, and 303. In fact, none of them reached floor 23, let alone flat 201. You've also
02:44:02 heard in parallel the Paddington crew with the extra breathing apparatus at 156. They too,
02:44:11 although they were not heading for 23, but were heading for the roof, didn't make it either.
02:44:17 So therefore, flat 201 on floor 23, the home of Raymond Moses Bernard, is where Hamid met his death.
02:44:28 The last moments.
02:44:33 The archaeological findings suggest that his last moments were between the bed in the bedroom
02:44:42 of 201 and the entrance to the bathroom in the hall. Again, the witness dealing with this is
02:44:49 Harrison. His identity was established by means of dental records and DNA analysis.
02:44:58 Between approximately one minute past two and 2.24, the calls from flat 201 report that fire has
02:45:06 arrived at the window of the bedroom and is coming in. The spread of fire horizontally reached the
02:45:13 flat one's column on the east face of the 18th and to the 23rd floors from 157, once the architectural
02:45:23 crown had ignited. Faduma Ahmed, another occupant, the only one to escape, describes how people
02:45:31 were trying to douse the fire around the living room windows with containers of waters as well as
02:45:38 congregating in the corridor and near the entrance door. They could barely breathe.
02:45:45 Poignantly and critically, at six minutes past two, Debbie Lamprol describes the fire in the bedroom
02:45:55 where everyone had gravitated, including an elderly gentleman who was almost certainly
02:46:03 Hamid. She doesn't name him with extrapolating that. They struggled to leave and it may be
02:46:11 that Hamid got as far as the hall.
02:46:17 There were no more calls after Jessica's last courageous effort, which was terminated,
02:46:23 as you've heard, at 2.24. This framework of times has been employed by Professor
02:46:33 Perser to make correlations and extrapolations about the situation in flat 201 and the likely
02:46:41 impact on Hamid. In general terms, the occupants were exposed to increasingly dense smoke and
02:46:52 asphyxiant gases for an extended period of time up to 2.24 from about 1.30, 57 minutes. By 1.36,
02:47:07 the exterior fire had reached the living room and then the bedroom, where it is surmised that
02:47:14 Hamid may have been, at 1.52. Thereafter, the gradual accumulation of gases would have led to
02:47:24 a dose level consistent with collapse by 12 minutes past two and with death by 2.23.
02:47:35 Hamid would have been unaware of the gases he was inhaling. He would have been unconscious
02:47:43 at the point of death. Professor Perser has cautiously provided his words a very, very
02:47:52 approximate time for this, the point of death, in Hamid's case, as in fact 2.45 on the 14th
02:48:02 of June 2017. The cause has been described, as you've heard, as being consistent with the effects
02:48:18 of fire and this was explained recently by Professor Perser as being a generic way of
02:48:30 talking about what happened, but somewhat unspecific and it was therefore considered
02:48:36 that one could go a little bit further, which I suggest Professor Perser's experience and expertise
02:48:44 mean that his, as it were, his conclusions can be safely relied upon in Hamid's case as being the
02:48:54 inhalation of asphyxiant gas-laden smoke and resultant hypoxia. There had been, in fact,
02:49:03 as it may be clear from others, no toxicological examination had been possible because of the lack
02:49:10 of forensic material to be examined. May I conclude with some final words? On behalf of the family,
02:49:20 they're inspired by the words that were spoken by Masoud before you on the 29th of May four years
02:49:27 ago and so this effect, his family are certain that Hamid would have wanted the legacy arising
02:49:38 from the ashes of this disaster to be respect, support, commitment to community and togetherness
02:49:51 across the nationalities, across religions, regardless of differences in class or culture.
02:50:02 A testament, as it were, to the inherent values of diversity and the community
02:50:09 amongst which he lived in Grenfell Tower. Thank you.
02:50:15 Thank you very much Mr Menciel.
02:50:17 Thank you.
02:50:20 At that point we will rise for the morning. This afternoon's timetable suggests that we might not
02:50:27 start until quarter past two but if it's convenient to those who are going to make the presentations
02:50:34 and if those who wish to be here are present by two o'clock then I suggest that we would be wise
02:50:41 to start at two o'clock but I'll wait to be told whether that's the case in due course.
02:50:45 Thank you very much. We shall now rise.