Opening statements from Fire Brigades Union, Fire Officers Association, and London Fire Brigade addressing the emergency response, building failures, and fire safety regime.
00:02:03 you
00:10:12 well good morning and welcome to today's hearing we're going to begin with an opening statement on behalf of the fàbregas Union from mr. C word
00:10:25 forgiveness and make these you and your sisters I may go slightly over my allotted time sir I've been given 20
00:10:37 allotted time sir I've been given 20 minutes and can I ask now for some leeway later I've checked with both Louie Brown QC and Steven wolf juicy and they're going to take no longer than there are a lot of times and possibly a
00:10:49 there are a lot of times and possibly a little less so you're gonna hold him to that are you so I think overall we should be okay yeah all right let's see how we get on Shirley thank you very much all right thank you I act for the
00:11:00 much all right thank you I act for the fàbregas Union who represent most of the men and women who were on duty as firefighters and control staff that night and who confronted a situation which was unprecedented in living memory
00:11:11 which was unprecedented in living memory in the UK fire service the fire spread up the East face with shocking rapidity and ferocity soon becoming an inferno with terrible loss
00:11:22 becoming an inferno with terrible loss of life we are humbled by the suffering of the deceased end of the bereaved survivors and residents whom I refer to as the Grenfell tower community ever
00:11:33 as the Grenfell tower community ever since this inquiry has started the FPU has consistently said that the Grenville tower community should be placed at its heart and that is where they rightly are
00:11:45 heart and that is where they rightly are many of those whom we represent were on that fire ground some for long periods they will never forget that night and some of them remain traumatized the fire
00:11:58 some of them remain traumatized the fire presented challenges beyond their knowledge experience training and procedures the bravery of firefighters has been acknowledged by those representing the grenfell town community
00:12:09 representing the grenfell town community and the far Brigades Union invites you sir to consider whether the firefighters were put in an impossible position those representing the Greenville Town
00:12:20 representing the Greenville Town Committee however criticized the London Fire Brigade and say the public confidence in the foreign rescue service needs to be restored we agree with the
00:12:31 needs to be restored we agree with the last part of that we agree the public confidence in the Fire and Rescue Service
00:12:35 Service is of vital importance the fbu recognises the public interest in a successful and productive inquiry we have already assisted the police
00:12:46 have already assisted the police investigating the Granville town disaster and continue to do so we want to assist both the grim felt our community the inquiry and the fire sector nationally including the fire
00:12:59 sector nationally including the fire safety sector to discover what went wrong and why and to contribute to the making of recommendations to avoid a recurrence building upon the work done by the Graham felt our community in
00:13:11 by the Graham felt our community in there moving commemorations and by those representing them we are collaborating and piecing together a picture of who was where in Grenfell tower in the early hours of the 14th of June I want to move
00:13:25 hours of the 14th of June I want to move on now sir if I may to the state of chrome filter on on that night I referred to paragraphs eight to ten of our written submissions summarizing doctor lanes provisional opinion that the window surrounds the rainscreen
00:13:38 the window surrounds the rainscreen cladding system the installation and the incorrectly fitted a missing fire breaks created the means for a catastrophic condition and that important fire
00:13:49 condition and that important fire protection measures were deficient notably the flat entrance doors did not resist the far for long enough the single stairwell was too narrow the lobby ventilation system could only clear smoke from one lobby at a time and
00:14:02 clear smoke from one lobby at a time and like the lifts could not be controlled by firefighters and there was no wet riser the FBO agrees that following the refurbishment from 2011 to 2016
00:14:13 refurbishment from 2011 to 2016 grim felt era was a highly combustible deathtrap as Steven Hauk moon has set out in his written opening submission and a Stephane bar wise has explained
00:14:24 and a Stephane bar wise has explained this week not only was there serial non-compliance with the building regulations but there was no evidence of any attempt sustained attempt at such compliance the FPU invites the inquiry
00:14:37 compliance the FPU invites the inquiry to consider whether there was in the recent refurbishment a complete failure of the fire safety regime at each stage of the design planning building control building works and supervision of works
00:14:52 building works and supervision of works furthermore after the completion of the works further opportunities to mitigate the fire hazards were missed under both the Housing Act 2004 and the fire safety order 2005 in the result Grenfell tower
00:15:04 order 2005 in the result Grenfell tower became a highly combustible deathtrap moving on now to weighing the emergency response the London Fire Brigade did not
00:15:15 response the London Fire Brigade did not create the highly combustible deathtrap moreover there's no evidence of the lfb all the firefighters who responded to what initially seemed a routine call at 54 minutes past midnight on the 14th
00:15:28 54 minutes past midnight on the 14th were aware of the state of the building as Sam steam submitted a couple of days ago any criticisms of the emergency response should be assessed against this
00:15:40 response should be assessed against this background and should not be exploited by those who created the danger we asked the inquiry to maintain this sense of perspective the FBO invites the inquiry to consider to what extent for tool the
00:15:53 to consider to what extent for tool the firefighters including commanders on the fire ground we're aware of the danger of rapid fire spread in the early stages of the fire and at significant stages thereafter and to weigh the emergency
00:16:05 thereafter and to weigh the emergency response at each stage in light of such awareness or lack thereof in this context professor torero indicates it was not uncle this is a his page 61 that
00:16:17 was not uncle this is a his page 61 that it was not unusual for an external fire to travel naturally sorry let me start again that it was not usual for an external fire to travel laterally once it had reached the top of an external
00:16:30 it had reached the top of an external phase in fact having rapidly reached the top of the East face by about 1:30 the fire raced laterally along the crown to the North Face moving
00:16:42 along the crown to the North Face moving on if I may now to firefighters as witnesses the FPU supports Danny Friedman's call for courageous accounting and Pete Weatherbys called for candor and frankness to this end VfB
00:16:53 for candor and frankness to this end VfB you stand shoulder to shoulder with the lfb and the fire officers association to encourage and support those firefighters and control staff for the calls witnesses to give Frank open and
00:17:04 witnesses to give Frank open and complete evidence without fear of a criminal their employer and their trade unions are united in supporting them in this way although there has been
00:17:17 this way although there has been inevitable delay due to the ongoing police investigations we have now received about 250 witness statements of firefighters and control staff Richard Millett indicated on Monday that about 52 of these witnesses will be called to
00:17:29 52 of these witnesses will be called to give evidence the inquiry and about 74 will be read into the record we ask the Chairman to remember when assessing their evidence that these witnesses have not been allowed to retain a copy of
00:17:40 not been allowed to retain a copy of their witness statements nor to see what other witnesses have said they have not had the chance to discuss their witness statements with the FPU or its legal team in that sense they will come cold
00:17:51 team in that sense they will come cold to testify at this public inquiry they are not professional witnesses they are unfamiliar with the witness box and probably dread going into it
00:18:02 probably dread going into it additionally some firefighters may have been affected by metabolic heat stress on the night of the fire without even knowing it this can impair cognitive function including executive
00:18:13 function including executive decision-making coordination and memory recall if needed we will draw attention to the LF B's policy note on metabolic heat stress and the learning that led to
00:18:24 heat stress and the learning that led to it together with the recommendation of senior coroner Nigel meadows following the inquest into the death of Stephen Hunt in Manchester but despite these difficulties the firefighters will do
00:18:35 difficulties the firefighters will do their best to assist the inquiry as they have already assisted the police the inquiry is also invited to hold in mind that firefighters work as a team they
00:18:46 that firefighters work as a team they follow instructions and they operate within procedures that have been developed over decades of experience in which they are trained including high-rise firefighting policy note 633
00:18:57 high-rise firefighting policy note 633 and compartment firefighting policy note 793 the inquiries asked to consider the extent to which firefighters showed initiative by adapting procedures in the extreme conditions of this disaster
00:19:09 extreme conditions of this disaster often a personal risk and sometimes decided to depart from those procedures thereby knowingly putting themselves and their colleagues in danger to save lives where possible equally importantly we
00:19:22 where possible equally importantly we ask the inquiry to decide the extent to which firefighters particularly the early instant commanders had procedures for and were trained in fighting cladding fires or looking out for signs of a breach of compartment ation or what
00:19:36 of a breach of compartment ation or what to do if they notice or suspected such a breach and in particular when to abandon the stay-put strategy and how to affect an emergency evacuation of a high-rise
00:19:47 an emergency evacuation of a high-rise residential building we submit that on the evidence so far discouraged appears there were no such procedures nor had firefighters received any such training the Fire Brigades Union invites the
00:20:00 the Fire Brigades Union invites the inquiry to consider whether there was a lack of national leadership regulation and funding on these key areas in particular in light of the recommendations from the inquest into the lacan all house fatality x' may also
00:20:13 the lacan all house fatality x' may also be relevant to ask what equipment water supplies fire protection and firefighting measures were available to them to fight the fire on the outside once the fire had broken out of the kitchen window and likewise to fight the
00:20:25 kitchen window and likewise to fight the fire internally on multiple levels wanted a broken back in again and later to affect search and rescue operations and assist in voluntary evacuation and subsequently to evacuate the building the FPU invites the inquiry to consider
00:20:38 the FPU invites the inquiry to consider specifically whether unaware of the multiple failures of the fire safety measures that should have been in place to limit and slow the spread of fire and smoke out of the kitchen of flat 16 -
00:20:50 smoke out of the kitchen of flat 16 - and then on the exterior and back into the building and through the front entrance
00:20:53 entrance into the lobbies and thence the single narrow stairway the firefighters were always chasing a sinister fire they had no realistic chance of extinguishing were they placed in an impossible
00:21:05 were they placed in an impossible position from top to bottom with impossible decisions being asked of commanders and impossible tasks being undertaken by firefighters doing their best to apply the equipment training
00:21:16 best to apply the equipment training procedures which were available to them in this context inquiry might be assisted by dr. Lane's provisional view that I do not consider it to have been feasible without prior warning to
00:21:27 feasible without prior warning to implement effective external firefighting to level 4 in the very early stages of the fire that's her paragraph 219 8 communications the evidence is likely to
00:21:40 communications the evidence is likely to raise questions about the communication systems available to the firefighters to communicate with one another and with control particularly at large scale incidents this is another area that which the inquiries asked to consider
00:21:52 which the inquiries asked to consider both hence the problems encountered on the fire ground and recommendations going forward to ensure workable and reliable communications are available a future large-scale instance any
00:22:03 future large-scale instance any amendments to procedures and increased training that may be needed just to include realistic training the inquiry may need further expert advice to assist
00:22:14 may need further expert advice to assist them on this issue possibly drawing on military experience in this field moving on to our control staff the inquiry may conclude that they
00:22:26 staff the inquiry may conclude that they also confronted an impossible and unprecedented situation for which their experience procedures or training were inadequate many of them will be haunted by their memories of that night the
00:22:37 by their memories of that night the inquiry will doubtless ask when were control staff aware the fire had spread from the fourth floor fire fire flash up the exterior and back in again what did
00:22:49 the exterior and back in again what did they know of the fire as it developed were they overwhelmed with far survival guidance calls until they were asked to advise occupants to get out if if you can at about 247 what other advice could
00:23:02 can at about 247 what other advice could they have properly give apart from staples unless your flat is affected by heat fire or smoke in which case leave that's why we prefer to call it stay put unless it's not a rigid
00:23:16 it stay put unless it's not a rigid statehood it's stapled unless your flat is affected as with the work of the firefighters on the fire ground the inquiries asked away the advice which control operators gave in light of their procedures and training the
00:23:27 procedures and training the long-standing successful use of state would unless coupled with far survival guidance and to bear in mind the difference between what can be seen with the benefit of hindsight and what was possible on the night when they were
00:23:39 possible on the night when they were flooded with calls of the most distressing nature moving on now to not moving to an evacuation strategy the FPU
00:23:51 moving to an evacuation strategy the FPU fbu notes the opinion of dr. lane that the primary consequence of the rainscreen cladding fire starting at level four and spreading seven stories within seven minutes and 19 stories
00:24:03 within seven minutes and 19 stories within 12 minutes was that it rendered the staple strategy unfit for purpose before 1:26 bearing in mind however both the difficulties and dangers of devising
00:24:16 the difficulties and dangers of devising and implementing a phased or simultaneous evacuation plan on the fire ground on the one hand and the continuous attempts to firefight to undertake targeted search and rescues and to assist with evacuations in the
00:24:28 and to assist with evacuations in the meantime the FPU reserved its position at the precise time when the state would unless strategy either could or should even with the benefit of hindsight have
00:24:39 even with the benefit of hindsight have been discarded in preference for an evacuation strategy on the night it's clear there is a huge concern over the continued application of statehood unless once compartment ation had been
00:24:50 unless once compartment ation had been breached but there remains no obvious and safe alternative strategy certainly no detailed plan or training for one if you invite the inquiry to consider what
00:25:02 you invite the inquiry to consider what alternative strategy might have been implemented and whether on the night and without any such procedure or training the early instant command was or could not reasonably have moved to an
00:25:15 or could not reasonably have moved to an immediate or phased evacuation at an early stage of the fire development the responsible person under the fire safety border that's the Royal Borough of
00:25:27 border that's the Royal Borough of Kensington Chelsea was required to have an evacuation plan which was described by mr. Stokes in his fire risk assessment of June 16 as a staple unless
00:25:38 assessment of June 16 as a staple unless ie limited evacuation of persons affected by fire which is otherwise contained within one compartment mr. States further recorded the possible need for a general evacuation which
00:25:51 need for a general evacuation which would be arranged by the LF B or TMO employees the inquiry should investigate was this assessment communicated to the NFP or TMO employees what did mr. Stokes
00:26:04 NFP or TMO employees what did mr. Stokes based it upon what arrangements if any were made in case of general evacuation became appropriate the FPU has seen no evidence of any arrangements for any such general evacuation and pending the
00:26:16 such general evacuation and pending the outcome of the inquiry it seems they were none the FBO asks the inquiry to consider whether there was a lack of planning for the scale of risk so that it should not have been left to firefighters to develop a strategy on
00:26:27 firefighters to develop a strategy on the fire ground in the face of a breach of compartment ation should they have been a procedure informed by pre-planning and embedded by training for operational firefighters and control room operators alike to safeguard the
00:26:40 room operators alike to safeguard the lives of those in the building when compartment ation was breached why wasn't there is the answer a lack of funding national leadership and deregulation the inquiry may need expert
00:26:51 deregulation the inquiry may need expert help to consider what sort of procedure pre-planning training and resources should be in place going forward both in the short and medium term to respond to a breach of compartment ation in a
00:27:02 a breach of compartment ation in a high-rise residential building foreseeability the tragedy that unfolded was unforeseen by the fire service the evidence is
00:27:13 by the fire service the evidence is likely to reveal that experienced firefighters were shocked by the unprecedented and rapid spread of fire and smoke across and inside the building thus compromising the lobbies the lifts
00:27:24 thus compromising the lobbies the lifts and the single means of escape the FBR asked the inquiry to consider however whether such a disaster in a high-rise residential building was foreseeable in that it was known from long-standing
00:27:35 that it was known from long-standing firefighting experience and from recent incidents a that far is unpredictable be the compartment ation could be breached and see that fire can rapidly spread
00:27:46 and see that fire can rapidly spread over the exterior of buildings and be very difficult to extinguish internally recent events in the UK include garnet court hereo court Shirley towers McConnell house Shepherd's Court they've
00:27:59 McConnell house Shepherd's Court they've also been relevant incidents such a broad such as in Dubai and Melbourne the FB you asks whether if it was foreseeable this was a failure at a national level in relation to the fire
00:28:11 national level in relation to the fire safety policy and within the national farm risky service to devise and embed an effective response in the event of a breach of complementation if I can now attach on race and class the FPU broadly
00:28:25 attach on race and class the FPU broadly supports the submission of imran khan and other representatives of the grim philatelic community that race socioeconomic factors may have played a role in the tragedy the high proportion
00:28:37 role in the tragedy the high proportion of black and ethnic minority residents Ingram felt our justifies this factor being investigated probably in phase two but they are also factors which we would ask the Chairman
00:28:48 factors which we would ask the Chairman to keep in mind when he weighs the evidence in phase one however the FPU strenuously reject the suggestion but firefighters may have
00:28:59 suggestion but firefighters may have been guilty of discrimination that suggestion is offensive it is wrong and is unconstructive moreover there is no
00:29:10 is unconstructive moreover there is no evidential basis for it
00:29:14 moving on to recommendations the inquiry may later consider that within the Fire and Rescue Service nationally there's been insufficient research into new building methods such as cladding and the risk associated with them a loss of
00:29:27 the risk associated with them a loss of specialist skills in the fire safety departments insufficient inspection oversight and the enforcement and a lack of national leadership funding and regulations on issues that have arisen
00:29:38 regulations on issues that have arisen out of previous fatalities the FPU asks the enquiry to consider whether clear lines of responsibility are needed by legislative reform for taking steps to ensure proper measures are in place for
00:29:50 ensure proper measures are in place for fire safety to cover the structure and exterior of buildings as well as adequate means of escape in the event of fire with refuges as necessary and to include provisions to help firefighters in the event of fire such as working
00:30:02 in the event of fire such as working lift sweat risers and pre-planning we submit there needs to be increased awareness of fire safety within Fire and Rescue Services and in housing departments firefighting is a technical and professional job understanding fire
00:30:14 and professional job understanding fire safety is an essential part of the job and training and service of fire safety departments should be increased such recommendations may involve significant
00:30:26 recommendations may involve significant investment in fire safety in high-risk rise residential buildings in the fire service and in the establishment of national supervisory and advisory bodies
00:30:37 national supervisory and advisory bodies the FPU hopes the inquiry will agree and approve the layered approach described by dr. lane including the need for a properly resourced equips and trained emergency response service and so
00:30:49 emergency response service and so specific recommendations may be needed both to improve our national fire safety regime for high-rise residential buildings to include pre-planning by responsible persons under the fire safety order usually the owner with the
00:31:02 safety order usually the owner with the development of practiced evacuation procedures such as we're all familiar with in offices and to provide the operational procedures pre-planning training and resources which are needed
00:31:13 training and resources which are needed for an effective emergency response that recognizes both the risk the compartment ation might be breached and the far might spread unpredictably as a consequence operational pre-planning should include obtaining information
00:31:25 should include obtaining information the responsible persons evacuation procedure and developing an emergency evacuation procedure in light of their urgently needed recommendations most
00:31:36 urgently needed recommendations most recommendations will require careful thought and we'll await the interim or final reports but some may be needed urgently and we fully support Michael men's fields call for these to be made
00:31:49 men's fields call for these to be made urgently as soon as their need becomes clear the FBI FPU considers that these are methods for expert opinion for example a recommendation that the
00:32:00 example a recommendation that the responsible person should provide an accessible fire blanket in all kitchens in a high-rise residential building may be better than having fire extinguishers above a certain level - to this end the
00:32:13 above a certain level - to this end the FBO suggests that the inquiry instructs all its experts to report the need for any urgent recommendations which the Chairman could consider making urgently
00:32:27 in this context the FPU supports an immediate ban on all but European a1 or UK equivalent class I all but non combustible materials on the exterior of
00:32:39 combustible materials on the exterior of high-rise residential buildings over 80 metres high such an approach has a good track record for example domestic fires markedly decreased following the introduction of furniture and
00:32:51 introduction of furniture and furnishings fire safety regulations 1988 requiring upholestry components and composites used for furniture in the UK to meet specified ignition resistance
00:33:02 to meet specified ignition resistance levels these regulations were recommended by a national advisory body for the far sector known as the central Fire Brigades advisory committee the CF BAC was abolished by the fire and Rescue
00:33:14 BAC was abolished by the fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 over the last 15 years there have been a succession of firefighter fatalities while fighting fire and several of these have been in tower blocks regrettably not all of the
00:33:27 tower blocks regrettably not all of the lessons and those tragedies have been learned in and we asked the Chairman to consider a means of tracking and implementing the recommendations which he will make
00:33:38 recommendations which he will make specifically the FPU calls for a national body to monitor research developments in and advise the far sector including the MH c OG farm rescue
00:33:50 sector including the MH c OG farm rescue services responsible persons under the FSO fire risk Assessors and others that body should include representatives of the trade unions representing those who work in the fire sector thank you sue
00:34:02 work in the fire sector thank you sue thank you very much we didn't do a run too much okay good thank you now mr. Brown you're going to make a statement on behalf of the fire Officers
00:34:13 on behalf of the fire Officers Association
00:34:18 [Applause]
00:34:40 Melissa my name is Louie Brown and I'm instructed on behalf of the fire Officers Association fo a and on behalf of two individual core participants Richard Welch and Li drawbridge I'm
00:34:52 Richard Welch and Li drawbridge I'm instructed by Jonathan wall Mike Mackey and Daniel Reed of Burton Copeland solicitors members of the F away attended the fire crane filter and mr. Welsh undertook certain command roles
00:35:05 Welsh undertook certain command roles during the night at the outset the fo I wish to express their deepest sympathy to all of those who suffered loss in the grant funds our tragedy the magnitude of
00:35:18 grant funds our tragedy the magnitude of the fire at Granville tower and it's devastating consequences cannot be overstated in addition to the tragic consequences it had for the families bereaved survivors and residents and has
00:35:30 bereaved survivors and residents and has had life-changing consequences for many of the firefighters who attended the scene of the fire that night those firefighters were and are deeply moved by the tragic loss of life at Grant Hill
00:35:42 by the tragic loss of life at Grant Hill tower those firefighters were and are deeply affected by the fact that they were unable to do more to save the lives of those who died we submit sir that
00:35:54 of those who died we submit sir that after all of the evidence in phase one has been heard and if you acceded to mr. Khan's submissions you sir will be able to confidently state that issues of race social class or religion and played no
00:36:06 social class or religion and played no part in the decision-making and actions of the firefighters who attended the fire a crane for tyre that night what did motivate their decision-making in actions was the desire to do all they
00:36:18 actions was the desire to do all they could to save the lives of those who were in the tower the scale of the rescue operation can be seen from the following the firefighter rescue
00:36:29 following the firefighter rescue operation in Granville tower was the largest single operation of its kind in England since World War two before the fire the fo a nor so far as the fo way as aware the LF b or the FB you were
00:36:42 as aware the LF b or the FB you were ever informed of the combustible nature of the rainscreen cladding installed at Grenville tower in the refurbishment works undertaken therefore they were unaware that they would or might need to change their
00:36:54 would or might need to change their standard pump response for an intended internal high-rise residential fire rather than having to deal with a fire within one internal compartments a major
00:37:05 within one internal compartments a major fire in the building envelope occurred this was itself on multiple stories and across multiple compartments further there were many flash epiphytes internally in multiple compartments on multiple stories the immense challenge
00:37:18 multiple stories the immense challenge to the firefighters that night can be gleaned from what was said by dr. Lane in her report paragraph two point sixteen point two and I quote the building envelope created an intolerable
00:37:29 building envelope created an intolerable risk on the night of the fire resulting in extreme harm it did not adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls having regard to the height and use of the building the active and passive fire
00:37:40 the building the active and passive fire protection measures within the tower were then required to mitigate and extraordinary events and as a result the consequences were catastrophic this was a truly extraordinary event the only way
00:37:55 a truly extraordinary event the only way to undertake efforts to suppress the fire and rescue people trapped in the tower was through the single protected escape scare stair and through the lobby on each level the conditions on the stairs and in the lobbies were hugely
00:38:06 stairs and in the lobbies were hugely challenging from a very early stage in the fire by reason of their compromise through smoke reduced visibility intense heat and toxicity these conditions meant
00:38:18 heat and toxicity these conditions meant that the fire brigade bridgehead had to remain at or below level three until about 7:30 a.m. on the 14th of June in the context of a multi-story fire the
00:38:29 the context of a multi-story fire the single stair and lobbies did not create nor were they designed to create a safe escape route or safe working environments for the firefighters
00:38:41 simultaneous evacuation of residents in the events of fire is not factored in to the design of buildings such as Grenville tower that is evident from the fact that there is no common fire alarm
00:38:53 fact that there is no common fire alarm and the only means of escape was a single stairwell the state put policy is therefore a building design principle and is not creation of the fire service over the
00:39:04 creation of the fire service over the coming weeks you will hear evidence from firefighters include including those who undertook command roles when the evidence of those firefighters is heard we respectfully ask that it be borne very clearly in mind that these men and
00:39:16 very clearly in mind that these men and women were required to take decisions and the unique and exceptional circumstances they faced often instantaneous decisions balancing risks
00:39:28 instantaneous decisions balancing risks they did not have the time to weigh finally those risks they were required to exercise professional judgment in the most appalling and rapidly changing circumstances accordingly the the inquiry should we
00:39:40 accordingly the the inquiry should we respectfully ask avoid judging their actions with the benefits of hindsight can I then briefly just say something about simultaneous evacuation it is a it is of course right that dr. Lane in her
00:39:52 is of course right that dr. Lane in her report paragraph two point twenty point three reaches the conclusion that there was a need for a total evacuation of the tower at an early stage however shorter recognizes that in
00:40:03 however shorter recognizes that in reaching that conclusion she had the benefits of all the post fire data her analysis of the stairs lobbies and evacuation flow rates in addition we would respectfully ask the
00:40:16 addition we would respectfully ask the inquiry team knows she had she have a further real advantage in that she had a very great deal more time to analyze those issues than those taking command decisions on the night who had only
00:40:27 decisions on the night who had only seconds or minutes this is perhaps why she rightly recognizes paragraph two point twenty point three I do not wish to imply that this was an easy decision to make referring to total evacuation during the unfolding and complex events
00:40:40 during the unfolding and complex events of a culture and the Grenville tower fire we would also ask the inquiry to bear in mind that any change to stay put is not easily dealt with in the UK there is no statutory requirement to provide an automatic detection alarm system in
00:40:52 an automatic detection alarm system in high-rise residential buildings for the purpose of warning will occupants that all building that an all building evacuation was required further a crane for tower there was no fire alarm panel provided with controls for the
00:41:04 provided with controls for the firefighters or others to make an all-out Allah call as was recognized by dr. Lane there were very significant limitations on the ability to communicate she refers to
00:41:15 ability to communicate she refers to those in paragraph two point twenty point eleven subparagraph D drawing all of this together sir are always assuming that was within the authority of incident commanders to direct a
00:41:26 incident commanders to direct a simultaneous evacuation at night do you inquiry really here evidence that such may not have been a truly viable oxygen for the following five reasons firstly the building was not designed or
00:41:37 the building was not designed or constructed to facilitate simultaneous evacuations through the provision of fire alarms secondly the absence of any practical mechanism by which to effectively communicate with the occupants of the entire building thirdly
00:41:50 occupants of the entire building thirdly in the absence of a working firefighter lift the availability of a sting single staircase as a fire escape route and this staircase was the only means by which firefighters wearing breathing
00:42:02 which firefighters wearing breathing apparatus and carrying equipment could access the other floors fourthly the rapidly changing conditions in the building as the fire spread with the consequence adverse impact that had a
00:42:13 consequence adverse impact that had a rescue operations and finally these rapidly deteriorating conditions caused an increase in smoke the development of fire and toxic fumes and those were the conditions through which the men and
00:42:26 conditions through which the men and women and children in the fire would have had sewers have escaped and finally sir we would say this after hearing all relevant evidence from firefighters the inquiry may well be
00:42:37 firefighters the inquiry may well be left a little doubt that these men and women showed extraordinary courage that night acted selflessly and a great risk to their own lives and did all they could to save lives this is particularly
00:42:50 could to save lives this is particularly so in circumstances by the very nature of the building in the condition it was in positively impeded efforts to save life thank you very much
00:43:01 life thank you very much now mr. Walsh you're going to make a statement on behalf of the London Fire Brigade Stephen Walsh is my name as
00:43:16 Brigade Stephen Walsh is my name as because you know I appear together with zero the fair for the London Fire Brigade and so I'm going to say now having just heard from mr. Brown Queens
00:43:27 having just heard from mr. Brown Queens councillor and of course for mr. C wood that it is likely that I am going to echo I'm going to try not to repeat unnecessarily things that both of those lawyers have said but I will have to
00:43:40 lawyers have said but I will have to because it because of the context of the submissions I have to make sir the devastating fire at Grenville tower which took so many lives and caused such
00:43:55 which took so many lives and caused such unimaginable suffering to the bereaved survivors and residents was by far the most challenging incident which the London Fire Brigade has experienced in
00:44:07 London Fire Brigade has experienced in living memory mr. Brown and others have said since the Second World War in very different circumstances but for the
00:44:18 different circumstances but for the firefighters whose job it was to carry out the firefighting and rescue operation and the control staff who took calls from residents in the tower the
00:44:31 calls from residents in the tower the memory of their experiences and the events which they witnessed will never leave them the lfb the London Fire Brigade and its staff at all levels
00:44:43 Brigade and its staff at all levels express profound empathy with all of those who have been left scarred by this tragedy but of course that can only
00:44:54 tragedy but of course that can only extend to empathy in relation to the appalling events of the fire itself but anyone who attended the Millennium Gloucester Hotel and sat through all of
00:45:05 Gloucester Hotel and sat through all of those extraordinary commemorative hearings will know that it is impossible to come
00:45:12 to come the depth and breadth of suffering of the bereaved this was obviously obviously a human tragedy with far-reaching consequences but Sir the
00:45:25 far-reaching consequences but Sir the the London Fire Brigade is not a faceless corporate it is comprised of human beings from novice firefighters all the way through to the Commissioner
00:45:36 all the way through to the Commissioner herself who was once a novice firefighter many of whom experienced the horrors of that night and continued to be profoundly affected by it they are
00:45:49 be profoundly affected by it they are drawn from many different backgrounds reflecting a diversity of which the brigade is extremely proud and I won't
00:46:00 brigade is extremely proud and I won't repeat but will echo the submissions made on behalf of the fire Officers Association and the fire brigade the Union in relation to any suggestion that any form of racism would have in any
00:46:11 any form of racism would have in any sense have affected the carrying out of their duties on that night their collective and individual instinct is and was on the night to protect life and
00:46:22 and was on the night to protect life and property often a great risk to their own safety resulting in physical and mental injury and for many at the commemorative
00:46:34 injury and for many at the commemorative hearings the bereaved in some sense as well on behalf of these survivors and residents reiterated their desire their justifiable demand for answers to many
00:46:47 justifiable demand for answers to many questions
00:46:49 questions the lfb will provide those answers clearly wherever it can and with full candor so sir this opening statement is
00:47:00 candor so sir this opening statement is intended to insist the inquiry fulfill its phase 1 terms of reference and critically understand the reasons why the fire spread so rapidly and how the lfb responded the statement necessarily
00:47:13 lfb responded the statement necessarily concerns primarily the issues which the brigade understands to be relevant to phase 1 that is to say the factual narrative of the fire itself including
00:47:24 narrative of the fire itself including the actions of firefighters control staff and other lfb personnel which will we hope assists the inquiry to identify any lessons which will need to be learned that much we know
00:47:37 to be learned that much we know to that end the brigade has undertaken an extensive disclosure exercise to identify material relevant to the inquiries terms of reference and in
00:47:49 inquiries terms of reference and in particular to the specific disclosure requests made of the lfb the material disclosed includes comprehensive a
00:48:00 disclosed includes comprehensive a comprehensive range of policies and procedures trading material also for high-rise fire fighting together with a document entitled organizational
00:48:11 document entitled organizational overview which has been disclosed to the inquiry and I think has been passed on to CPS which will provide the inquiry in
00:48:23 to CPS which will provide the inquiry in CPS with a synopsis of the primary mechanisms by which the lfb provides fire and rescue services in London with a focus of course on high-rise
00:48:35 a focus of course on high-rise residential buildings as to the investigative process to date it's important to realize that the evidence which has been disclosed to the inquiry
00:48:46 which has been disclosed to the inquiry including the many statements from firefighters has been carried out in conjunction with the ongoing investigation by the Metropolitan police operation North Lea and it is they who
00:49:00 operation North Lea and it is they who have been responsible for taking the vast majority of statements so that there is one central body of evidence I won't repeat but acknowledge what mr.
00:49:11 won't repeat but acknowledge what mr. seaward said about the extent to which firefighters have been able to look at those statements over the last few months they will be given an opportunity to do course but they of course are not
00:49:23 to do course but they of course are not professional witnesses as mr. seabird has made clear in the meantime though the lfb has deployed substantial resources to provide assistance in many forms both to operation Norfleet
00:49:35 forms both to operation Norfleet and to the inquiry it continues to conduct its own complex analysis of the huge body of evidence which has emerged in an effort to piece together the
00:49:48 in an effort to piece together the clearest picture of possible of the events of the fire that includes an operational response report for the first hour of the fire which provides a
00:50:00 first hour of the fire which provides a minute-by-minute narrative of the actions of firefighters it's a complicated document because it draws together their statements and cross revert refers breathing apparatus
00:50:13 revert refers breathing apparatus telemetry much can be learned from that CCTV and other media this has been and continues to be an enormous and
00:50:24 continues to be an enormous and time-consuming undertaking it has been disclosed to the inquiries as I've said and further reports dealing with subsequent hours that's the first half that has been disclosed will of course
00:50:37 that has been disclosed will of course be disclosed as they become available as mr. millet said on Monday the evidence given during phase one is intended in part to provide a clearer understanding
00:50:48 part to provide a clearer understanding of how conditions developed and change within the building including the rapidity and extent of those changes the effects which they had upon the ability
00:50:59 effects which they had upon the ability of firefighters to carry out their function and the impact which they had on the possibility of escape for residents on different floors at different times I'll come back to that
00:51:11 different times I'll come back to that later
00:51:13 later all of this must be understood before any conclusions can be drawn together with a clear understanding of the reasons why the fire behaved as it did
00:51:25 reasons why the fire behaved as it did that much the inquiries experts have acknowledged in their interim reports emphasizing they say that we are as yet at an early stage and much more evidence
00:51:37 at an early stage and much more evidence needs to be given before firm conclusions can be drawn but much of that evidence can only come from firefighters who were deployed into the
00:51:48 firefighters who were deployed into the building
00:51:48 building through the night and from residents of the building in due course sir it is our understanding that the purpose of phase one has never been to determine the
00:51:59 one has never been to determine the rights and wrongs of the actions of individual firefighters including incident commanders and other fire service staff or to apportion blame let
00:52:11 service staff or to apportion blame let alone to prejudge them before any evidence has been given and before they have had a chance to explain the complexities of what they were required to do during the fire and of course
00:52:22 to do during the fire and of course phase two will address all of those issues in detail when the full narrative of the night of the fire has been established at phase one well it is true
00:52:34 established at phase one well it is true to say that one has to wait to hear much of the evidence but certain things are clear from the very beginning for
00:52:45 clear from the very beginning for example the London Fire Brigade is firm in its view that the ground for fire was a singular a singular event the rapidity
00:52:58 a singular a singular event the rapidity with which the fire spread from the flat of origin across the external envelope and within the building itself is already well documented and will be addressed in detail by the experts to
00:53:10 addressed in detail by the experts to the inquiry but while the incidents of external fire spread on high-rise buildings is not entirely unprecedented in the UK it is extremely rare and has
00:53:22 in the UK it is extremely rare and has never of course occurred on the scale of the Grenville far as we know similarly internal fire spread beyond the flat of origin such as that which
00:53:34 the flat of origin such as that which occurred at Lac '''l house in 2009 is not unknown but it is also a rare occurrence in the UK and the extent to which the rapidity with which the fire
00:53:45 which the rapidity with which the fire spread inside granville tower was also wholly extraordinary and in case there is any doubt about it and there appears to be something down
00:53:56 to be something down about it I better clear it up the lfb is of course aware that there can be breaches of compartment ation in these types of buildings and the possibility
00:54:08 types of buildings and the possibility of external fire spread to some extent the brigade has experience of addressing incidents of this kind policies and operational tactics to address them have
00:54:21 operational tactics to address them have been applied successfully on many occasions those policies and tactics are the result of learning from other fires and the difficulties which were identified in them and from national
00:54:33 identified in them and from national guidance this is a national issue it's not just about London but the LFP believes that the scale the sheer scale of failings at Grenville tower and the
00:54:45 of failings at Grenville tower and the sheer scale of the fire which resulted from was a combination of factors which taken together created a unique and in
00:54:56 taken together created a unique and in the UK at least extraordinary and unprecedented set of challenges for the fire service nationally as dr. Lane broadly acknowledges in her interim report there have been references to
00:55:12 report there have been references to other buildings in the UK and around the world which have seen fires break out in in external cladding and which has spread usually nearly always vertically
00:55:24 spread usually nearly always vertically straight up they are of course important factors to consider when assessing the collective knowledge of fire services
00:55:35 collective knowledge of fire services about fire spread on the exterior of buildings and the lessons that can be learned from them and we expect the inquiry to examine those issues in some
00:55:46 inquiry to examine those issues in some detail but it's important to realize as mr. Weatherbee recognized the other day that those other fires were subject to
00:55:57 that those other fires were subject to their own specific facts and circumstances they were often very different fires in different buildings with different regulatory regimes
00:56:08 with different regulatory regimes the extent therefore to which lessons may be learned from those files may be affected for those reasons for example in some of the fires there was little or no breach of internal fire safety
00:56:21 no breach of internal fire safety measures compartment ation the fire went up the narrow part of the external envelope burned away but didn't impinge internally because of the because of the
00:56:34 internally because of the because of the fire measures that were present within the building some involved external fryer spread of fire only as I have said so that most of the building was
00:56:45 so that most of the building was unaffected in Grenville there was both extensive vertical and lateral fire spread which enveloped the whole building so rapidly sprinkler systems
00:56:58 building so rapidly sprinkler systems effectively extinguished or slowed internal fire in certain of the fires and that is a key set fire safety factor in high-rise buildings which the lfp has
00:57:10 in high-rise buildings which the lfp has for many years campaigned for the retrospective fitting of sprinklers in buildings such as Granville town that when they were built were not provided with of course in others of these
00:57:23 with of course in others of these buildings they were expressly and this is this is key to something I'm going to come back to in a moment they were expressly designed for simultaneous evacuation with phased
00:57:35 simultaneous evacuation with phased general fire alarms tannoy systems evacuation plans factored into the design to the design of the building and more than one protected stairwell so
00:57:47 more than one protected stairwell so that firefighting could be conducted while residents are evacuated via a separate protected route which is sometimes pressurized and that was the
00:57:58 sometimes pressurized and that was the case in the cross fire in Melbourne which mrs. Wetherby touched upon where in addition the sprinkler system played a significant part in extinguishing the fire all of these are factors from which
00:58:11 fire all of these are factors from which the inquiry can and I know will sir learn when it comes to making recommendations in due course but those firefighters and other lfp personnel who were engaged in the
00:58:24 personnel who were engaged in the Grenville fire had never experienced anything like it the nature and scale of the fire and the manner in which it developed and spread was exceptional in
00:58:35 developed and spread was exceptional in the long experience and collective knowledge of both yell FB and the fire service nationally the detail and precision of the evidence provided by
00:58:48 precision of the evidence provided by firefighters and by residents and survivors will inevitably have to be considered in the context of the harrowing and challenging events which they will be required to recall we
00:59:02 they will be required to recall we anticipate that we know sir that the inquiry will bear in mind that those who were involved in the emergency response will have been wholly unaware of defects
00:59:17 will have been wholly unaware of defects in the fabric of the building from a fire safety perspective and will not have known much of the information as to the state of the buildings and the conditions within it which has since emerged so as to provide the benefit of
00:59:31 emerged so as to provide the benefit of hindsight as mr. c.width said earlier on anity mr. Brown as well and that is an important point which dr. Lane also recognizes in her interim report
00:59:43 recognizes in her interim report decision-makers on the night she says will not have had the benefit of much of the information the experts now have the
00:59:54 the information the experts now have the extensive fire and rescue policies and procedures which the brigade has established through generations of learning were tested to their limits during the fire and there are likely to
01:00:05 during the fire and there are likely to be examples in the evidence of departures from such policies because of the challenging circumstances in which the firefighters and control staff found themselves and they're just something
01:00:17 themselves and they're just something here about the scale of the operation the emergency response carried out by the LF be required the deployment of an exceptional quantity of resources in
01:00:29 exceptional quantity of resources in terms of equipment and now within a relatively short space of time for example I'm going to talk about fire survival guidance that that is
01:00:41 fire survival guidance that that is where a person calls 999 and is spoken to by control staff and they may not be able to get out of the building in which
01:00:53 able to get out of the building in which they are in that they may feel otherwise challenged and what the control officers are required to do is give them fire survival guidance on the night the LFP
01:01:08 survival guidance on the night the LFP Control Center was required to handle more calls requiring fire survival guidance from residents within granville tower than the total number of such
01:01:21 tower than the total number of such calls in the previous 10 years from the whole of London and that must be understood in the context that
01:01:32 understood in the context that individual control officers might take two or three such calls in a 30-year career more firefighters in breathing
01:01:44 career more firefighters in breathing apparatus were deployed into the building than in any other single incident in the collective memory of the lfb with more than 700 fire service personnel engaged in the emergency
01:01:56 personnel engaged in the emergency response during and after the fire firefighters carried out many rescues of Uruk carried out many rescues of residents within the flats and assisted many others who they encountered
01:02:10 many others who they encountered elsewhere in the building to make their escape down the stairwell so the brigade hopes and knows sir that the inquiry will recognize the extraordinary courage and selflessness
01:02:21 extraordinary courage and selflessness of the firefighters in facing those challenges and the commander's the women and men who attended them to fight the fire and conduct rescue operations were
01:02:32 fire and conduct rescue operations were often placed in intolerable positions and were required to make decisions in some cases which involves stark choices
01:02:43 some cases which involves stark choices with serious consequences whatever they decided to do a few words just a few words now on the design and construction of buildings such as Granville Tower and
01:02:55 of buildings such as Granville Tower and its relevance to fire and rescue operations and the so called stay-put policy mr. millet has taken us through the issues and deficiencies which have
01:03:07 the issues and deficiencies which have been identified in the experts preliminary reports including the active and passive fire measures which were and were not in place principally of course the most important factor is the
01:03:20 the most important factor is the building design concept of compartment ation I won't repeat all of that again here obviously but it but but it bears repetition that fire safety is a crucial
01:03:32 repetition that fire safety is a crucial element of the design process which frequently dictates the way in which fire services are expected to carry out fire and rescue operations buildings
01:03:44 fire and rescue operations buildings such as Granville Tower were expressly designed so as to contain any fire in its compartment of orange of course for sufficient time to allow the fire
01:03:56 sufficient time to allow the fire service to extinguish it before it has the chance to spread accordingly the building design is not intended this is the building design that's when it was constructed it is not intended to
01:04:08 constructed it is not intended to facilitate simultaneous evacuation of the whole building especially at the same time as firefighting that's why these buildings often don't have alarms or anything of that kind so this
01:04:21 or anything of that kind so this principle of compartment ation applies to each flat within the building to the common corridors if there are any to the lobbies and to the single central
01:04:32 lobbies and to the single central stairway which must itself be sufficiently protected from the effects of fire and smoke and the requirement is that each must be protected from the other as we have heard similar but
01:04:46 other as we have heard similar but differently Express principles and the building regulations applied to the external envelope of the building which is expected to be designed and constructed inside to resist the spread of flame over its
01:04:57 to resist the spread of flame over its surface but crucially though from a fire safety perspective the express intention of the current regulatory regime is that
01:05:10 of the current regulatory regime is that in the event of fire the occupants of flats within the building are safe should be safe to remain in place to stay put
01:05:19 stay put unless they are directed directly affected by fire or smoke I say again that is particularly important given the fact that simultaneous evacuation of the
01:05:30 fact that simultaneous evacuation of the building is not factored into the design now this so caught I'm going to call it as so called stay-put policy because some call it a stay put strategy some
01:05:41 some call it a stay put strategy some call it a stay put principle but it is not a creation of fire services in the UK but rather it is a principle of building design which is provided for in
01:05:54 building design which is provided for in legislation which fire surfaces are expected to apply and which underpins the development of fire safety and operational policies for buildings of
01:06:05 operational policies for buildings of this kind nationally and it follows hardly needs to be said that I will anyway that strict adherence to the principle of compartment ation together
01:06:16 principle of compartment ation together with a range of other active and passive fire measures is obviously critical to the safety of such buildings in the event of fire and if during the life of
01:06:27 event of fire and if during the life of a high-rise residential building proper compartment ation is not named maintained to the required standard to the extent that the whole building is
01:06:39 the extent that the whole building is seriously compromised the entire basis upon which fire services are expected to conduct fire and rescue operations in such buildings is fundamentally
01:06:51 such buildings is fundamentally undermined very substantial challenges arise in those circumstances which I'll come to shortly I'm going to I'm going to be well within my time so just in case you were concerned but
01:07:04 so just in case you were concerned but it is important to state very clearly at this point that fire services when attending fires in premises of this kind do not interpret the stay-put principle
01:07:15 do not interpret the stay-put principle to mean that residents should remain in their flats whatever the circumstances it's not how its applied it's not how its applied nationally and it wasn't how
01:07:26 its applied nationally and it wasn't how it was applied by the lfb during the ground for fire quite the contrary part of the advice to residents who call the fire service control room is it if their
01:07:37 fire service control room is it if their flat is affected by fire or smoke they should leave if it is safe to do so and this is where we begin to see some of
01:07:48 this is where we begin to see some of the real dilemmas and problems which fire services face because the 909 calls and the fire survival guidance calls
01:07:59 and the fire survival guidance calls reveal that many of those who call the lfb control room on the night of the fire said that they could not leave because of the conditions in the lobbies
01:08:10 because of the conditions in the lobbies the smoke a lack of visibility the toxicity this was so as early as 1:30 a.m. some set as we know and because
01:08:23 a.m. some set as we know and because there weren't said that they were physically unable to do so to leave their flats whatever the conditions in the lobbies and firefighters were deployed to try and
01:08:34 firefighters were deployed to try and effect rescues on multiple occasions in very challenging conditions indeed but as I say I'll come back to that towards the end of what I have to say at this
01:08:47 the end of what I have to say at this point it's appropriate I think it should be said to to note that while catastrophic failure of compartment ation occurred at Granville Tower on the 14th of June last year in the experience
01:08:59 14th of June last year in the experience of the lfb and I think that this is true nationally the regulatory provisions concerning the design and construction of buildings such as Granville has historically been generally successful
01:09:10 historically been generally successful from a fire safety perspective so from the information available there are around roughly 5,000 residential buildings in London with an occupied
01:09:21 buildings in London with an occupied height of over 18 meters and that's means high-rise residential buildings the lfp attend about 700 primary fires in such buildings a year and in the
01:09:35 in such buildings a year and in the five-year period - December of 2017 of the three and a half thousand primary fires in buildings of this kind ninety four percent were resolved by the
01:09:48 four percent were resolved by the initial attendance the first attendance of the of the fabric a fire brigade a further two percent were resolved by five pumps or less with only four
01:09:59 five pumps or less with only four percent of high-rise residential fires requiring six pumps or more but what is now obviously far less clear and what
01:10:11 now obviously far less clear and what requires urgent consideration by this route inquiry is the extent to which maintenance programs and refurbishments over the years have undermined the integrity of the original design and
01:10:25 integrity of the original design and construction principles of these buildings from a fire safety perspective this is a vital aspect of the consequences of the Grenville fire in the elephant successor the inquiry
01:10:37 the elephant successor the inquiry therefore if we try to pose two questions and it may be helpful to consider the issue in the context of those questions because these are issues
01:10:49 those questions because these are issues that the LFP and fire services nationally must wrestle with is it in the public interest either or perhaps both first to make changes to the
01:11:02 both first to make changes to the regulatory system which address potential non-adherence to fundamental fire safety principles and provides for a mechanism by which proper compliance can be achieved
01:11:14 can be achieved so that fire services may have greater certainty and confidence in the development of operational policies for responding to and dealing effectively with high-rise residential
01:11:26 with high-rise residential or perhaps it's and that's it is is it in the public interest to require and expect fire services to develop new
01:11:37 expect fire services to develop new high-rise and rescue policy and capabilities and receive funding for the purpose on the Express assumption that buildings have not been maintained in
01:11:48 buildings have not been maintained in such a way as to comply with the regulatory regime under which they were originally designed and constructed so as to render them a presumption inherently unsafe in the event of fire
01:12:00 inherently unsafe in the event of fire and when when we say inherently unsafe here we're not talking about the sort of breaches of compartment ation and external spread of flame which which
01:12:12 external spread of flame which which fire services are used to dealing with that we're talking about building wide total failure now it's accepted that
01:12:24 total failure now it's accepted that these questions may oversimplify the complex issues which arise but they do highlight the stark choice faced by fire and rescue services at which it is hoped
01:12:35 and rescue services at which it is hoped the inquiry sir will address in that regard the brigade the London Fire Brigade urges the inquiry to recommend appropriate changes to the regulatory system which provide a greater degree of
01:12:47 system which provide a greater degree of certainty in respect of the provision of fire safety measures in residential high-rise buildings including but not limited to external cladding and addressing many of the issues some of
01:12:59 addressing many of the issues some of which were touched upon by mr. Mansfield yesterday including the retrofitting of sprinkler systems which the lfb has as I've said promoted for many years and
01:13:12 I've said promoted for many years and perhaps I should say and insofar as that reflects at least one of the recommendations which mr. Mansfield urged upon you the LFP is of the view
01:13:23 urged upon you the LFP is of the view that that recommendation is one which is capable of fairly early implementation for the present though the brigade anticipate that the inquiry will wish to
01:13:35 anticipate that the inquiry will wish to consider the extent fire services should be expected to mitigate fire events to adopt dr. lanes phrase in hi Raza Juarez residential buildings under the
01:13:46 Juarez residential buildings under the current regulatory regime which result from substantial non-compliance and in considering that question sir the inquiries encouraged to reflect on a
01:13:58 inquiries encouraged to reflect on a number of factors which I'm just going to set out as briefly as I can which are likely to emerge from the evidence of firefighters and residents during phase 1 first simultaneous evacuation it is a
01:14:16 1 first simultaneous evacuation it is a fundamental misunderstanding of the events of the fire and of fire service capabilities to assume that the building's stay-put policy can be
01:14:29 building's stay-put policy can be changed to simultaneous evacuation at the stroke of a fire incident commander at whatever time that was a point
01:14:42 at whatever time that was a point effectively made by mr. Leonard 4cs Stokes yesterday and there are simple reasons for it if there is no policy applied by the building owner which
01:14:55 applied by the building owner which applies which provides for a policy of simultaneous evacuation and there are no evacuation plans and there are no general fire alarms what is an incident commander on the
01:15:08 what is an incident commander on the fire granted to the inquiry is invited to consider the extent to which simultaneous evacuation was ever a feasible option or could have been a feasible option as part of a contingency
01:15:19 feasible option as part of a contingency plan to fire commanders on the scene at ground for fire given and this there is an element of repetition here but it really does bear repetition that the building a that the building was not
01:15:31 building a that the building was not designed or constructed to facilitate such evacuations through the provision of fire alarms or other mechanisms which might form part of a fire strategy put in place by the building owner be the
01:15:43 in place by the building owner be the absence of any practical mechanism by which effectively to communicate with the occupants of the entire building see the availability of a single staircase as a fire escape route
01:15:54 single staircase as a fire escape route which was also the only means by which firefighters wearing breathing apparatus carrying firefighting medium media and other equipment could access upper floors in the absence of the working
01:16:06 floors in the absence of the working firefighter lift and deed the likelihood that the rapidly changing conditions in the building as the fire developed created toxic and potentially lethal
01:16:17 created toxic and potentially lethal conditions through which resonance would be required to pass secondly the inquiry is also invited to explore the multiple
01:16:28 is also invited to explore the multiple dilemmas faced by firefighters who were committed to the interior of the building and who faced dangerous and rapidly changing conditions in the flats
01:16:39 rapidly changing conditions in the flats common corridors lobbies and stairwell as I've said the instinct of those firefighters who encountered residents in the common areas and within individual flats will have been to
01:16:51 individual flats will have been to effect rescues wherever possible often at significant risk to themselves and to the residents many such rescues were carried out from an early stage until
01:17:03 carried out from an early stage until the last person who was visually impaired and whose safety in his flat was monitored by the LFP throughout the night was brought out by firefighters at
01:17:15 night was brought out by firefighters at around 8 a.m. but there are likely to have been many occasions when firefighters inside the building were
01:17:27 firefighters inside the building were required to make difficult and instantaneous decisions about the viability of immediate rescue depending upon the conditions which they faced at the time the number and the
01:17:38 the time the number and the vulnerability of the residents they encountered and the willingness of those residents to leave a place of relative perceived safety it is probable that firefighters were faced with difficult
01:17:50 firefighters were faced with difficult choices involving decisions whether to advise residents to remain in relatively clean air pockets of air within the building or to encourage them to
01:18:01 building or to encourage them to venture into hazardous and toxic environments and seek escape down a stairwell in conditions that were constantly changing officers in the
01:18:12 constantly changing officers in the London Fire Brigades control room who handled calls from residents faced similar challenges remote from the fire ground they have no means of carrying out an objective assessment of the
01:18:24 out an objective assessment of the conditions immediately outside the flat of a caller that they have on the line the inquiry sir will hear that many of those who made calls during the fire
01:18:36 those who made calls during the fire felt extremely reluctant to leave their flats and to face the conditions beyond and as I've said some were simply unable to do so via the appalling dilemma I
01:18:47 to do so via the appalling dilemma I mean really appalling dilemma which control officers face in circumstances such as this is that they cannot know cannot know when considering whether to advise residents to leave their flats
01:18:59 advise residents to leave their flats whether they may be directing them into a dangerous untenable and potentially lethally toxic conditions there are numerous examples
01:19:10 conditions there are numerous examples in the evidence which the inquiry will hear of rapidly changing conditions within the building by which smoke toxicity and visibility radically changed within periods of time sometimes
01:19:22 changed within periods of time sometimes measured in seconds no visibility one moment clarity the next no visibility seconds later it follows that advice to
01:19:35 seconds later it follows that advice to residence provided by firefighters within the building all by officers positioned remotely in the control center involved assessments of risk which are not of a straightforward and binary yes-or-no nature in a fire such
01:19:49 binary yes-or-no nature in a fire such as that which developed at Granville Tower even from a relatively early point in the fire advice to residents whether to stay or leave involved substantial risk either way and these these are the Intolerable dilemmas
01:20:02 these these are the Intolerable dilemmas which will always be faced by fire service personnel if fire services are expected to mitigate fire events in catastrophically failing buildings
01:20:13 catastrophically failing buildings like Granville I'm instructed to say given all of those issues that the London Fire Commissioner Danny cotton
01:20:24 London Fire Commissioner Danny cotton stands Foursquare behind every firefighter commander and control officer who was involved on the night of the fire so there is a pressing need sir
01:20:38 the fire so there is a pressing need sir to address the question whether it is reasonably practicable in the public interest to expect fire services to develop operational policy on the presumption that buildings such as
01:20:49 presumption that buildings such as Granville Tower are inherently unsafe because they have not been maintained in accordance with the principles upon which they were originally designed and built turning now fairly briefly to it's
01:21:03 built turning now fairly briefly to it's something which cannot be ignored the safety of firefighters themselves Fire and Rescue policy and training must cover a complex range of situations
01:21:14 cover a complex range of situations which any Fire Authority may be required to respond to in London there is a vast array and quantity of buildings and installations all of which have their
01:21:25 installations all of which have their own specific characteristics and risks the safety of firefighters must be one of the primary considerations because the lfb and other fire services around the country hold statutory duties to
01:21:38 the country hold statutory duties to protect the health and safety of their employees and of course firefighting is an inherently dangerous occupation which makes it all the more important that the greatest care is taken to ensure that
01:21:50 greatest care is taken to ensure that firefighters are not exposed to any unacceptable risks of serious injury or even death and in doing so create yet further casualties in the evidence
01:22:04 further casualties in the evidence received sir by the inquiry there are likely to be many examples of firefighters acting instinctively to attack the fire and to try to protect and rescue resident residents with
01:22:15 and rescue resident residents with limited regard for their own safety it's also likely that incident commanders and other decision-makers in the rapidly developing and dynamic system
01:22:27 developing and dynamic system circumstances of the incident were repeatedly required to make instantaneous choices which involved balancing the risks to firefighter safe firefighter safety with that of the
01:22:39 firefighter safety with that of the occupants of the building and that brigade has thus far found no evidence of any occasions when that balance was not struck in favor of the residents of
01:22:52 not struck in favor of the residents of grounds Grenville tower despite the appalling challenges and conditions which the lfb personnel were required to face and finally for the
01:23:04 required to face and finally for the present at least what measures have Fire Services put in place since the fire to address the safety of residence in buildings with the same or similar
01:23:15 buildings with the same or similar cladding to Granville Tower while the lfp waits the inquiries findings and recommendations it has been in closely Azon with the National Fire Chiefs Council the NFC C for the purpose of
01:23:29 Council the NFC C for the purpose of recommending to fire services in the UT UK interim control measures to mitigate failings in high-rise buildings which exhibit characteristics of a similar nature to those which we now know were
01:23:41 nature to those which we now know were present in Grenville tower the result of that liaison is the publication on the 1st of May 2018 of a document entitled guidance to support a temporary change to simultaneous evacuation strategy in
01:23:54 to simultaneous evacuation strategy in purpose-built blocks of flats and that's a national document and by the way this is not a London thing this is not something that's any of concern south of Watford
01:24:08 that's any of concern south of Watford they all all of all of their fire services in the country doesn't matter whether there's a block in in Manchester or Glasgow or Cardiff or London where it may be they all have the same issues in
01:24:20 may be they all have the same issues in relation to the stay put Paulito these stay put strategy of building design and how that is to be dealt with anyway the guidance which the NFC C of
01:24:32 anyway the guidance which the NFC C of NFC see with the assistance the air that the LFP has produced
01:24:40 recommends a process by which certain types of high-rise residential buildings be subject to fresh and immediate fire risk assessments carried out by suitably qualified competent persons acting on
01:24:54 qualified competent persons acting on behalf of building owners or organizations responsible for the buildings where appropriate a policy of immediate and simultaneous evacuation in the event of fire is to be implemented
01:25:06 the event of fire is to be implemented the guidance applies to purpose-built residential blocks of flats where a stay put strategy was part of the original design but has cladding similar to that
01:25:17 design but has cladding similar to that found at Granville Tower in addition the cladding will have failed the large scale tests commissioned by the government and carried out by the Building Research Establishment BRE the
01:25:29 Building Research Establishment BRE the guidance makes it clear that simultaneous evacuation strata strategies should only be a temporary measure until the risks within the building have been rectified and given
01:25:41 building have been rectified and given that the majority of high-rise residential buildings in the UK were designed of this age were designed to have a state put strategy under the
01:25:52 have a state put strategy under the current regulatory regime it is essential to acknowledge that such evacuation cannot be carried out without additional measures put in place by the owners or occupiers of the building and
01:26:04 owners or occupiers of the building and in essence this is achieved by either establishing a 24-hour waking watch by numbers of suitably trained personnel on every floor whose responsibility it is
01:26:16 every floor whose responsibility it is to effect an immediate evacuation from the building as soon as a fire is reported and even before the arrival of the fire brigade or the provision of a
01:26:27 the fire brigade or the provision of a central alarm system combined with an evacuation plan which is communicated to and understood by the residents put in place by the building owner that those
01:26:39 place by the building owner that those the interim measures in London the lfp has also provided for an interim period an increase in the predetermined attendance required for such buildings
01:26:50 attendance required for such buildings we
01:26:50 we increases the number of personnel and fire appliances which will attend a fire in the first instance and the organizational overview document which I mentioned a few minutes ago provides
01:27:02 mentioned a few minutes ago provides further details of that these are obviously significant measures which are dependent upon urgent and immediate risk assessments carried out by competent persons on behalf of the building owners
01:27:13 persons on behalf of the building owners in the absence of a system by which simultaneous evacuation can be carried out quickly and safely there is no doubt that all fire services face significant
01:27:26 that all fire services face significant challenges when conducting the type of fire and rescue operation which the LF be faced on the night of the ground for fire and certain conclusion these are
01:27:37 fire and certain conclusion these are all factors which the brigade urges the inquiry to consider with care when making recommendations for the future safety of high-rise residential
01:27:48 safety of high-rise residential buildings in case of fire in particular it is hoped that the inquiry will reflect upon the fact that the regulations which govern the design construction and maintenance of such
01:27:59 construction and maintenance of such buildings are intended not only to ensure that residents are safe in their homes but also to inform and often dictate how fire services are expected
01:28:11 dictate how fire services are expected to carry out fire and rescue operations in a way which ensures the safety of firefighters the bereaved survivors and
01:28:23 firefighters the bereaved survivors and residents of Granville Tower must be provided with the clearest understanding of what happened on the night of the 14th of June 2017 both us - the causes
01:28:35 14th of June 2017 both us - the causes of the fire and the manner in which the firefighting and rescue operation was conducted which would also of course inform fire service learning so it is
01:28:46 inform fire service learning so it is the LF E's continuing intention to use all of the resources at its disposal to support the inquiry through both phases hearings in the coming months
01:28:58 hearings in the coming months thank you very much well that's probably a convenient point of which to take a break so we'll stop now and resume at 11:35 please thank you
01:29:25 you
01:47:30 right welcome back I'm going to invite mr. millet to make some concluding remarks on behalf of the inquiry Thank
01:47:44 remarks on behalf of the inquiry Thank You mr. chairman I propose to be extremely brief throughout the course of its preparatory work but particularly during the course of the preparation of
01:47:57 during the course of the preparation of the five experts reports published on Monday the inquiry has kept under close and regular review the question whether and if so what recommendations could and
01:48:11 and if so what recommendations could and should be made as a matter of urgency our present view is that it may very well be possible to make certain urgent
01:48:23 well be possible to make certain urgent interim recommendations before your phase one report is published although we doubt whether it would be sensible or
01:48:34 we doubt whether it would be sensible or possible to do so before the phase one factual and expert evidence is completed there is a broad measure of agreement
01:48:46 there is a broad measure of agreement among core participants or at least among those core participants who have chosen to address you for you to make urgent recommendations as soon as
01:48:57 urgent recommendations as soon as possible no core participant it appears has suggested that it is too early to examine that possibility and we think that it is not too early
01:49:10 that it is not too early we will accordingly continue to give very careful consideration to the possibility of interim recommendations and at a time earlier than publication
01:49:24 and at a time earlier than publication of the phase one report and we will keep core participants updated as to that that is all I wish to say by way of concluding remarks mr. chairman we will
01:49:37 concluding remarks mr. chairman we will resume on Monday the 18th of June with the expert presentation of dr. Lane and we will circulate an up-to-date timetable in the next day or so
01:49:50 timetable in the next day or so so unless I can assist you mr. chairman any further that is all I propose to say by way of concluding remarks thank you very much well at this stage then we'll break as you've heard there won't be any
01:50:02 break as you've heard there won't be any sitting next week we shall resume our on Monday the 18th of June when we shall hear the first of the expert presentations and I look forward to seeing you all or as many as possible on
01:50:13 seeing you all or as many as possible on that occasion thank you very much
01:50:26 you