Closing statements on smoke control, including PSB UK's defense. PSB argues the smoke control system was designed for a single compartment fire only, was a 'perfectly common system type', and should not be blamed for conditions on multiple floors. Notes experts now agree the system type was appropriate.
00:20:25 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing well today we're going to continue hearing closing statements from the number of core participants the first we're going to hear from is Mr Lee
00:20:37 first we're going to hear from is Mr Lee Bennett on behalf of PSB UK say Mr Bennett when you're ready please come up to the lecture
00:20:48 yes thank you Mr chairman Mr fan and Mr akbore
00:20:53 akbore um thank you for the opportunity to address you this morning um as you have indicated I represent PSB um so my submissions address the topic of smoke control yes
00:21:04 of smoke control yes and the smoke control system designed and subsequently commissioned by PSB as part of the refurbishment project it will be recalled that this was a discrete topic held over from Phase 2
00:21:16 discrete topic held over from Phase 2 module 3 and in respect of which important expert evidence was heard in module 7.
00:21:23 module 7. I will deal first with our general submissions on the evidence heard during modules 3 and module 7 about smoke control and the system the balance of my submissions then addressed the night of the fire and
00:21:35 addressed the night of the fire and specifically the issue of whether or not the system caused or materially contributed to the injurious spread of smoke in the tower so as to the module 3 and module 7
00:21:48 so as to the module 3 and module 7 evidence
00:21:49 evidence that the risk of stating the obvious this is a subject matter that has proven complex and highly contentious during the course of the inquiry
00:22:00 the course of the inquiry strong views seeking to criticize PSB have been expressed in four of the written closing statements you have received that namely those of BSR
00:22:11 have received that namely those of BSR teams one and two the fire brigades Union and celotex as well as in certain of the oral submissions that we all heard yesterday
00:22:22 PSP does not agree with the criticisms that are made indeed PSP does not consider what has been said to accurately reflect where the evidence you have received in the course of this inquiry on this discrete topic now rests
00:22:37 inquiry on this discrete topic now rests in module 3 the panel heard from two employees of PSB Mr Marnie who led on the design at PSB and Mr Crandall Partlow who was the commissioning
00:22:48 Partlow who was the commissioning engineer
00:22:50 engineer it is a matter for the panel to assess the witnesses coming before it and the evidence they give and PSB does not seek to trespass on that function
00:23:01 to trespass on that function however we note that summer program has been directed at Mr Marney by a small number of core participants the SB certainly does not accept the characterization of his evidence from
00:23:12 characterization of his evidence from certain quarters as being in any way capricious or anything other than honestly tendered both Mr Marney and Mr Partlow have wanted nothing more than to assist the
00:23:24 wanted nothing more than to assist the inquiry on this technical subject even though at times no doubt the process was challenging
00:23:33 the inquiry has now also had the benefit of um breams frankly of um written expert opinion evidence from experts addressing some of the fields of expertise upon which the topic of smoke
00:23:46 expertise upon which the topic of smoke control touches namely Dr Lane Mr lay and Ms Menzies
00:23:52 be made plain from the start that it disagreed with the evidence of Dr Lane and indeed that it considered many elements of it to be erroneous
00:24:03 elements of it to be erroneous Mr lay was initially instructed on behalf of PSB to mirror the work being undertaken by Dr Lane and to produce an independent second opinion
00:24:15 independent second opinion in the event Mr lay disagreed strongly with Dr Lane and although Mr lay was not wholly supportive of psb's position PSB considered that the inquiry May benefit
00:24:27 considered that the inquiry May benefit from a second opinion and so Mr Lay's report was provided to the inquiry subsequently counsel to the inquiry called Mr lay as an expert witness to
00:24:38 called Mr lay as an expert witness to the inquiry in relation to smoke control
00:24:42 for those seeking to criticize PSB Mr lay is invariably described as quote psb's expert end quote seemingly with a view to raising a
00:24:53 seemingly with a view to raising a question mark over his independence if that was the intention we would invite you to give that no credence the panel has read Mr late's report and
00:25:04 the panel has read Mr late's report and his witness statement and indeed you heard from him in two very careful days of evidence in module 7. he made clear his duty to the inquiry and his clear understanding of it
00:25:17 and his clear understanding of it it is simply wrong we suggest to paint Mr lay as a PSB apologist whatever view is ultimately made of his evidence and that is a matter for the
00:25:28 evidence and that is a matter for the panel
00:25:29 panel that label is we suggest unwarranted and undeserved it is a disservice to him and the work he has done with the sole purpose of assisting you and the inquiry
00:25:42 of assisting you and the inquiry something which both he and Dr Lane described if you remember as an honor at the end of the days of their evidence
00:25:50 when considering the expert evidence in respect of smoke control the panel must consider the totality of the evidence that is not a trite point a particular challenge in relation to
00:26:03 a particular challenge in relation to this specific topic is to assess where the expert evidence actually rests after the oral evidence was given in module 7.
00:26:14 the oral evidence was given in module 7. unless that exercise is carefully undertaken by the panel there is a risk that the written reports mislead and do not convey the final position of the evidence
00:26:26 evidence the module 7 oral evidence has had a significant bearing on much of the earlier written reports in particular those of Dr Lane in our written submissions and I
00:26:38 in our written submissions and I appreciate they stretched 60 Pages or so we have looked to point out where this is key in respect of the core issues as we see them most importantly
00:26:49 most importantly despite substantial evidence being presented to the inquiry criticizing the system
00:26:55 system including the making of Assessments against what was the wrong standard over the course of modules 3 and module 7. it has become apparent that there is
00:27:06 7. it has become apparent that there is in fact now no disagreement between the experts the pining on smoke control that the system type a mechanical extract based system with
00:27:17 a mechanical extract based system with natural Inlet from the stair was appropriate for grenfell Tower Dr Lane's module 7 report says that quote there has been no criticism made
00:27:30 quote there has been no criticism made by me of the form of mechanical smoke ventilation system chosen by PSB at the time close quote
00:27:41 Dr Lane confirmed in her module 7 oral evidence that she did not criticize the type of smoke control system installed at grenfell Tower describing it as a
00:27:53 at grenfell Tower describing it as a quote perfectly common system type in a suite of options available to designers close quote even adding that they comprise over one-third of the
00:28:06 that they comprise over one-third of the designs that we that being Arab offer to people
00:28:12 it may if I may observe and perhaps to put it mildly um it is a shame um that this was not made clear from the beginning and um frankly a lot of work
00:28:24 beginning and um frankly a lot of work Minds have been avoided had that been the case
00:28:29 it's fair to underline that PSB is concerned that this has led to an over complication of and a sense of transience too the
00:28:40 and a sense of transience too the evidence seduced by Dr Lane on the topic of smoke control and as a result in a simple word confusion for example part of BSR team 2's
00:28:51 for example part of BSR team 2's submission have relied upon Dr Lane's earlier work to erroneously criticize performance and component specification and commissioning on the basis that they
00:29:02 and commissioning on the basis that they did not Accord with that required of a type B pressure differential system under bsen 12101-6
00:29:12 much of this confusion could have been avoided if from the outset it had been made clear that the system designed by PSB was a different system and a
00:29:24 PSB was a different system and a perfectly common system type
00:29:28 significant consequences flow from the eventual agreement between all the experts that the type of system designed Pi PSB was appropriate
00:29:39 Pi PSB was appropriate first
00:29:40 first the choice of a mechanical extract based system which used mechanical extract with natural Inlet from the stair must necessarily mean that the system's core
00:29:52 necessarily mean that the system's core performance objective will be stair protection this was adverted to by Dr Lane in her oral evidence in module 7 when she said quote yes so when you pick that system
00:30:06 quote yes so when you pick that system it can only protect the stair close quote day 287 page 78 line 21. second
00:30:15 second the acceptance of this system type by the experts also reflects their now seemingly consistent position that the system's design objective to focus on
00:30:27 system's design objective to focus on protecting the stair was a reasonable and valid design decision
00:30:33 in relation to the lobbies I know you've heard a lot about the lobbies their travel distances and whether they required any special consideration Mr lay said this in his report quote
00:30:46 lay said this in his report quote I would not consider it unusual for designers and approvers to Simply agree that the existing travel distances required no special consideration close
00:30:57 required no special consideration close quote that's paragraph 557 of the report
00:31:02 Mr Lay's evidence was supported from a building control perspective by Ms Menzies who stated in her oral evidence during module three I know that seems some time ago now but if I might offer a
00:31:14 some time ago now but if I might offer a simple couple of quotes quote had I been looking at it I wouldn't have raised the matter of extended travel distances being a criteria which they would now
00:31:25 being a criteria which they would now have to address under the new proposals day 169 page 32 lines 22-25 and quote I personally would not have
00:31:36 and quote I personally would not have considered it being an extended travel distance in the context of grenful tar close quote day 169 page 33 lines eight to ten
00:31:46 to ten Dr Lane's oral evidence during module 7 was with certain qualifications and readily accept that supportive on this point in particular Dr Lane stated in
00:31:59 point in particular Dr Lane stated in relation to the decision to protect the stair only that and I quote I understand it as a valid design Choice close quote day 287 page 76 lines 13 to 15. moreover
00:32:13 day 287 page 76 lines 13 to 15. moreover that provided fire doors and dampers are maintained to the relevant standard she would have been prepared to contemplate a smoke control system designed with the sole objective of staircase protection
00:32:28 following the module 7 oral evidence PSB suggests that the inquiry therefore is left in the territory of determining whether the criticisms as to the quality of the system designed by PSB are made
00:32:41 of the system designed by PSB are made out or not it seems to PSB that the premise for many of the criticisms alleged against it are now outdated relying as they do on specific parts of
00:32:54 relying as they do on specific parts of reports prepared over many years now which we respectfully suggest do not reflect the position now arrived at in the expert evidence
00:33:06 we offer six observations the first of which I promise I shall try not to repeat too many times but I think you might be able to guess what this is first as agreed by every expert and
00:33:18 first as agreed by every expert and material witness to the inquiry the system was intended to address the effects of a fire on one floor and to deal with smoke from a single
00:33:29 deal with smoke from a single compartment fire based on the principle of compartmentation that is the design assumption on which PSB was entitled to
00:33:41 assumption on which PSB was entitled to proceed
00:33:43 proceed consequently the system was intended to operate on one floor only the system could not have presented smoke from fires
00:33:54 smoke from fires on multiple floors impacting lobbies and the common stair second
00:34:00 second there clearly was contrary to what has been asserted a coherent design basis for the smoke control system the system was a perfectly common system type the
00:34:11 was a perfectly common system type the design elements of which are likewise common
00:34:15 common it was a valid design choice and reasonable in all circumstances third
00:34:23 third it follows that the decision to protect the stairs was likewise valid and reasonable as this system type focuses on protecting the stairs fourth
00:34:34 fourth criticizing these designs as quote surprisingly self-assured end quote or marked by arrogance as some have suggested is therefore we suggest unwarranted
00:34:46 unwarranted fifth Mr lay and Miss Menzies are at one in saying that they would not have criticized the travel distances in the lobbies of the town whether they are described ultimately as
00:34:58 whether they are described ultimately as extended or not as something that PSB would have to address they required no special consideration therefore
00:35:07 therefore criticism directed towards the system and PSB and which focus on the conditions in the tower lobbies at the assertion of some seemingly on all the floors on the night of the fire
00:35:19 all the floors on the night of the fire are we respectfully suggest misdirected sixths asserting that the system pressurized the lobbies as is still being said and going on to criticize
00:35:31 being said and going on to criticize performance component specification commissioning etc etc on the basis that they did not Accord with that required of a completely different type of system I.E Class Type Class Type B pressure
00:35:44 I.E Class Type Class Type B pressure differential system under bsen 12101-6 simply incorrect
00:35:53 panel you have our module 3 smoke control opening written submissions in which we set out our position on the detail of compliance design component specification testing and commissioning
00:36:05 specification testing and commissioning you also have our detailed written submissions on the areas of contention after the evidence has been heard in modules three and seven nothing that has been said by way of criticism causes us
00:36:18 been said by way of criticism causes us to resile from nor warrants any change to the submissions that we have made in writing
00:36:24 writing the inquiry also has the benefit of detailed and careful submissions we know from our client JS Wright in relation to the system with which PSP agrees PSB further refutes the suggestion that
00:36:37 PSB further refutes the suggestion that this part of the refurbishment project is to be elided with the rest of the refurbishment work undertaken at the tar in a narrative of systemic failure incompetence or arrogance on its part or
00:36:50 incompetence or arrogance on its part or the part of its employees this was a particularly challenging aspect of the works package where a sub-sub-contractor was tasked late in the construction Journey with finding a
00:37:02 the construction Journey with finding a real world smoke control solution within the fixed constraints presented to it the panel is also urged to consider the
00:37:13 the panel is also urged to consider the discrete topic of smoke control in context and in perspective adopting the words if I may of BSR Team 1 in their written submission the
00:37:24 1 in their written submission the inquiries investigation of the system has been extensive and although for different reasons we would agree that it now looks disproportionate
00:37:36 disproportionate one meaning of that latter adjective is not deserving of its importance or influence
00:37:44 influence in the context of the grenful tower fire PSB sees a real danger that the topic of smoke control and the system is given an importance and influence
00:37:56 is given an importance and influence that is neither deserved nor evidentially warranted that would be a mistake
00:38:05 in some of the submissions you've received and heard the evidence relating to the system has been strained Beyond credibility as an example the SR team too have asserted in their written
00:38:16 too have asserted in their written submissions that there's a consequence of the system aiming to protect the staircase tenable conditions were not maintained in the tower lobbies and adjacent corridors seemingly on all
00:38:27 adjacent corridors seemingly on all floors on the night of the fire
00:38:31 this is to miss come true myth sorry apologies misconstrue the causal relevance of a system which was required only and designed only to respond to a fire in a single flat on one floor and
00:38:44 fire in a single flat on one floor and where on the night of the fire all the occupants of the fire floor were able to pass through the fourth floor Lobby to safety and the lfb had the facilities to
00:38:57 safety and the lfb had the facilities to access flat 16 to fight the fire in that flat
00:39:03 flat it follows the placing the performance of the system in the correct context and in perspective is also particularly significant in respect of the issues of first
00:39:13 first the extent to which the system may or may not have contributed to internal smoke spread within the building by way of any breach of compartmentation
00:39:24 by way of any breach of compartmentation and second the extent to which any such breach of compartmentation as may be established in relation to the system caused or materially contributed to the outcome of
00:39:37 materially contributed to the outcome of the fire
00:39:38 the fire to that end compartmentation and causative effect are the topics I now focus on for the remainder of my submissions I first want to address the question of
00:39:49 I first want to address the question of what approach the panel should take when considering this essential matter we would suggest the following insofar as under Clause 1A of its terms
00:40:00 insofar as under Clause 1A of its terms of reference the inquiry makes findings as to the immediate cause or causes of the fire and the means by which fire or smoke spread to the whole of the building the panel will no doubt be
00:40:12 building the panel will no doubt be alive to the fact that this is primarily an exploratory exercise which involves attempting to identify what happened as a matter of historical fact
00:40:23 a matter of historical fact in making its findings we would encourage the panel to adopt a straightforward approach finding that a particular event occurred the panel should be satisfied on the
00:40:35 the panel should be satisfied on the evidence before it that it was more likely to have happened than not moreover despite an understandable desire to fulfill the inquiry's terms of
00:40:46 desire to fulfill the inquiry's terms of reference the panel should not feel bound to make a finding of fact one way or the other where it is not supported by the evidence available to it
00:40:57 by the evidence available to it we suggest this is a sensible approach on first principles
00:41:05 this approach will provide a clear delineation between those areas where the inquiry has or has not been able to reach a conclusion on the balance of probabilities as to what occurred on the night of the fire or their causes
00:41:18 night of the fire or their causes this is particularly so where the evidence available to the inquiry is complex and or is contradictory further
00:41:27 further given the potentially serious implications of any findings as to the cause or causes of death or injury on the night of the fire PSP emphasizes the
00:41:39 the night of the fire PSP emphasizes the need for such findings to be supported by evidence which is cogent and reliable fairness if women simply and humbly suspect submit requires nothing else
00:41:52 despite certain alternative approaches which may be urged upon the panel for example Mr Friedman King's Council yesterday referred to applying quote flexible standards of proof close quote
00:42:03 flexible standards of proof close quote the panel must caution against eliding criticism of a core participant's conduct with a finding that such conduct likely cause death or injury
00:42:17 turning then to the evidence in relation to the night of the fire compartmentation and causative effect in short peers psb's position is as follows
00:42:28 short peers psb's position is as follows first
00:42:29 first on the evidence available the panel May reasonably conclude that the system did not breach compartmentation and cause or materially contribute to internal spoke
00:42:41 materially contribute to internal spoke spread
00:42:43 spread second and in the alternative if the panel considers that on the evidence available it cannot safely make a finding on the performance of the system in respect of compartmentation during
00:42:55 in respect of compartmentation during the fire that would be a conclusion also reasonably open to the panel third
00:43:02 third apart from a limited assessment by Dr Lane which itself is caveated with a clear warning that no conclusions can be made without doubt no expert suggests
00:43:13 made without doubt no expert suggests that the system breach compartmentation and caused or materially contributed to the spread of smoke indeed in his detailed analysis Mr lay takes entirely
00:43:24 detailed analysis Mr lay takes entirely the contrary View fourth no expert witness says that the system breached compartmentation and in so doing
00:43:35 so doing caused or materially contributed to the injurious spread of smoke fifth no expert witness says that any act or a mission on the part of PSB in
00:43:46 act or a mission on the part of PSB in relation to the system caused or materially contributed to the injurious spread of smoke
00:43:54 the case for alleging that the system for each compartmentation relays relates almost exclusively to Dr Lane's storyboards and they are contained in sections 12 and 13 of her module 3 smoke
00:44:08 sections 12 and 13 of her module 3 smoke control report those purport to set out facts or hypotheses relating to the night of the fire
00:44:17 fire Dr Lane in in the words of counsel to the inquiry then provides a non-expert opinion as to what may have happened on the night of the fire in relation to the system and its effect on
00:44:28 system and its effect on compartmentation PSB has always been and remains deeply concerned about the way in which these matters have been investigated and
00:44:40 matters have been investigated and presented in Dr Lane's storyboards Council to the inquiry was right in module 7 to clarify and make clear the status of both Dr Lane and Mr lay in
00:44:52 status of both Dr Lane and Mr lay in relation to these matters namely that they are not providing expert opinion evidence
00:44:59 evidence it follows that there is in fact no expert evidence before the inquiry as to the factual questions of the operation of the system on the night of the fire and whether the system caused or materially contributes to the outcome of
00:45:10 materially contributes to the outcome of the fire
00:45:11 the fire moreover and in any event this is an area where Dr Lane has also adverted to the difficulty in coming to any firm conclusions as a layperson
00:45:22 conclusions as a layperson in her module 7 oral evidence Dr Lane said quote I understand well actually this whole thing about what actually happened on the night of the fire is
00:45:33 happened on the night of the fire is quite dangerous territory to get into because there's so many parameters that may or may not have impacted that system close quote day 287 page 129 line 17-21
00:45:48 Dr Lane has also stated in her report that quote I would like to re-emphasize the catastrophic conditions within grenful tar and its impact on the evidence which in my opinion make it
00:46:01 evidence which in my opinion make it impossible to opine with any certainty on one specific scenario close quote that's a paragraph 9.7.7 PSB agrees that in relation to the
00:46:14 PSB agrees that in relation to the system
00:46:14 system this is indeed dangerous territory for the inquiry and the panel to get into especially in the absence of forensic fire engineering evidence whilst it might be understandable
00:46:27 whilst it might be understandable given the terrible loss of life why somebody in the position of Dr Lane may look to assist the inquiry the approach that has resulted and the evidence generated is we respectfully submit
00:46:39 generated is we respectfully submit inherently unreliable in plain terms the various stories as articulated by Dr Lane in her storyboards simply do not add up
00:46:52 storyboards simply do not add up you have the arguments in our written closing submission also that of our client J S Wright but please if you'll allow me just to condense it by dealing with four key elements of the
00:47:03 with four key elements of the allegations against the system on causation as alleged by Dr Lane the first topic is dampers before I get to the causation aspect I need to First deal with some background
00:47:15 need to First deal with some background not much promise the inquiry has heard considerable evidence about the damper selected by PSB for use in the system this is one area where the guidance and
00:47:27 this is one area where the guidance and standards documentation available at the time and reviewed in detail during the inquiry can reasonably described as a mess
00:47:37 mess the certainty with which it is now alleged by some that a specific standard of damper was required for the system was far from Clear at the time
00:47:48 was far from Clear at the time the smoke control industry's understanding in respect of Lobby dampers for use in mechanical extract smoke Control Systems was stated at paragraph 8.2.5 of the sca guide 2012.
00:48:01 paragraph 8.2.5 of the sca guide 2012. namely that quote no formal product standard exists for the use of these products in this application close quote the sca guide went on to list six
00:48:12 the sca guide went on to list six potentially applicable smoke control damper standards as stated by Mr lay it is a fact that the sca guide which was formed from a consensus of Industry
00:48:23 formed from a consensus of Industry opinion with engagement with government reached a practical view on damper standards this was the context in which Mr Marley had to go about his choice of
00:48:36 Mr Marley had to go about his choice of damper for the system and he was reasonably entitled to rely on what the smoke Control Association said in the event Mr Marley specified the
00:48:47 in the event Mr Marley specified the Gilbert's 54 series dampers he knew they were not smoke control dampers he confirmed in his oral evidence that he had conducted a search for smoke control dampers and for fire and smoke dampers
00:48:58 dampers and for fire and smoke dampers and concluded that the Gilbert's 54 series dampers were the only product available on the market and suitable for the system at the time
00:49:09 the system at the time no code and evidence has actually been provided to show that Mr Marnie was incorrect in this conclusion this was despite canceled the inquiry requesting on the 21st of May 2022
00:49:21 requesting on the 21st of May 2022 considerably after Mr Marnie gave evidence in July 2021 that Dr Lane perform a retrospective search of alternative dampers available on the market in June 2015 almost some seven
00:49:34 market in June 2015 almost some seven years before this put Dr Lane in a difficult position and she was correctly reticent in her oral evidence in module 7. entirely appropriately Dr Lane makes no attempt to conclude on the matter
00:49:46 to conclude on the matter turning them to causation it's alleged that the dampers were capable of allowing and did in fact allow undue smoke spread between floors via the shafts however in her module 7
00:49:57 via the shafts however in her module 7 oral evidence Dr Lane revealed that quote I was asked to look at leakage to see if it was a concern night of the fire and I was going to try and quantify the leakage and in the end I wasn't able
00:50:10 the leakage and in the end I wasn't able to do that satisfactorily close quote day 287 page 179 lines 1316. it follows that there is no quantitative evidence before the inquiry as to the
00:50:22 evidence before the inquiry as to the comparative real-world performance of the Gilbert's 54 series damper and either a SCA guide compliant damper or a smoke control damper in terms of cumulative smoke leakage
00:50:34 cumulative smoke leakage noting here that all dampers will lead to some extent further in the absence of either a specific alternative Lobby damper which could have been recommended for use as part of the system and in the absence of
00:50:46 part of the system and in the absence of some form of standardized testing relevant to the system which would compare the performance of the Gilbert's 54 series damper as sized and specified at Grenville Tower against any proposed
00:50:59 at Grenville Tower against any proposed alternative the inquiry is not in a position to make a quantitative determination as to the effect of the specification of the lobby dampers upon the performance of the system on the night of the fire
00:51:11 night of the fire put shortly there is no testing evidence to show that the Gilbert's 54 series dampers in application at Grenville Tower provided a lower level of performance than that
00:51:23 a lower level of performance than that required to meet the functional requirements or that they allowed undue smoke leakage
00:51:33 insofar as any determination can be made as to the likely performance of the Gilbert's 54 series dampers the test evidence that is available does support the dampers having characteristics that
00:51:45 the dampers having characteristics that would make them suitable for use in the system
00:51:48 system as to which please refer to our written closing statement at paragraphs 150 to 158
00:51:54 158 the view is supported by Mr lay as expressed in his evidence to the inquiry in any event even if the inquiry were to find that the dampers could allow and did allow undue smoke spread between
00:52:06 did allow undue smoke spread between floors via the shafts as I will come to later in addressing what actually happened on the night of the fire it seems clear that the volume of smoke that could have been spread by this route was very small in the context of
00:52:17 route was very small in the context of smoke spread by other overwhelming means second return to the allegation that the system did not operate and this is about the initial detection of smoke and
00:52:29 the initial detection of smoke and activation of the system on level four there is a good deal of primary evidence to support that the system was likely activated on level 4 on the night of the fire and this became the active flaw for
00:52:40 fire and this became the active flaw for smoke control ventilation this is dealt with in our written closing submissions but briefly to summarize there's the physical evidence such as the auto dialer the presence of smoke deposits in
00:52:51 dialer the presence of smoke deposits in the level 2 floor smoke extract fan set and the dampers that's all supportive of the system having operated in a smoke control mode evidence is also available
00:53:02 control mode evidence is also available from bsrs and firefighters of the noise indicating the activation of the system's fans and of the movement of smoke from the level 2 vent therefore
00:53:13 smoke from the level 2 vent therefore far from not operating as intended as is alleged the evidence suggests that in fact the system did so at least when the conditions at the tire remained within those for which it was required to be
00:53:24 those for which it was required to be designed
00:53:26 designed third
00:53:27 third the dampers at level four level 11 and level 18 and the alleged smoke spread between those dampers on the shafts there's been a suggestion by Dr Lane
00:53:39 there's been a suggestion by Dr Lane that there could have been a movement of smoke via the north shaft between level 4 and level 11. because after the fire the level 11 dampers were found in the
00:53:50 the level 11 dampers were found in the open position Dr Lena Pines at the dampers at those levels were open simultaneously this is noted by Dr Lane to be a breach of compartmentation an indication of
00:54:01 of compartmentation an indication of failure of the system and a root of smoke spread this has been adopted by BSR Team 1 as fact and characterized as a malfunction of the system during the far for which PSB
00:54:13 the system during the far for which PSB is to blame we disagree it is very far from certain that the north shaft level 11 damper was opened from the start of the fire Dr Lane confirmed that she formed the conclusion
00:54:25 confirmed that she formed the conclusion that it was likely that the level 11 North shaft dampers were open for the duration of the Fire based on the bre analysis of the dampers however Dr Lane conceded in her module 7
00:54:38 however Dr Lane conceded in her module 7 evidence that she was not an expert in such deposition and was not a forensic fire engineer so quote I can't tell timing
00:54:50 so quote I can't tell timing I hope I made that very clear that it's not possible for me to confirm a time anything happened close quote day 287 page 225 lines one to four
00:55:01 287 page 225 lines one to four Dr Lane also added in respect of the position of the level 11 and level 18 dampers quote it can't be taken out of that context and everywhere I have likely and options because I don't find
00:55:14 likely and options because I don't find that it's possible as myself to say one thing definitely happened and I hope I haven't given that impression at all close quote day 287 page 227 lines four to eleven
00:55:27 day 287 page 227 lines four to eleven the panel May therefore reasonably conclude that it is not possible to know with any degree of certainty when the level 11 or level 18 dampers opened for how long they were open and what caused
00:55:39 how long they were open and what caused them to open the panel can also reasonably find that there is no evidence to confirm that the level 4 dampers and the level 11 dampers were likely open at the same time
00:55:52 likely open at the same time fourth the alleged um failure of the level 2 extract fan set and the bypass damper which is number three now Dr Lane contends that the smoke
00:56:03 now Dr Lane contends that the smoke control extract at level two likely failed on the night of the fire resulting in a failure of the system to extract smoke from the south shaft BSR team won in their written submission
00:56:15 BSR team won in their written submission allege that as a result quote Rising smoke filled the South shaft and could leak through the substandard dampers even when closed this again was a breach of compartmentation which worsened
00:56:27 of compartmentation which worsened conditions in the building as a whole we disagree the bre post fire inspection found that the smoke extract fan set and the inlet and Outlet dampers had a significant
00:56:38 and Outlet dampers had a significant coating of what appeared to be smoke deposits
00:56:41 deposits the inlet damper that's damper three was closed but the outlet damper was open the bre observed that quote this suggested that during part of the fire
00:56:53 suggested that during part of the fire the South shaft smoke extract was functioning but at some point either during or after the fire that was shut down or failed the bre said that it is not possible to
00:57:05 the bre said that it is not possible to say how when or why the dampers came to be in that position Dr Lane agrees with Mr lay that one possible reason for the closed position of the damper was due to power removal
00:57:16 of the damper was due to power removal after the fire notwithstanding Dr Lane goes on to prefer other possibilities including her preferred narrative that at all about
00:57:27 preferred narrative that at all about 0147 the level 2 extract fan had stopped operating on account of damper 3 closing and it's this narrative that has been adopted by BSR Team 1 as fact
00:57:39 adopted by BSR Team 1 as fact however this is a dangerous surmise how when and why the level 2 bypass damper 3 ended up in the closed position noticed by the bre during the post-fire
00:57:50 by the bre during the post-fire inspection cannot be answered with any degree of certainty the evidence including the evidence of watch manager more does not support the proposition that extract likely failed
00:58:01 proposition that extract likely failed in the early stages of the fire nor does it support the proposition that the system was not extracting from level two in any event Dr Lane agrees that it's likely that the level 2 smoke extract
00:58:14 likely that the level 2 smoke extract fan turned on initially and this along with damper 3 being open would have drawn smoke down to level 2 and out through the external Louvre this was in accordance with the design installation
00:58:26 accordance with the design installation and the results of the commissioning moreover in so far as Dr Lane Weds herself to a time of 0147 for the level 2 extract to have stopped operating it
00:58:37 2 extract to have stopped operating it should be noted that before that time all lobbies except for floor 7 are said by Professor Purser to have already been smoke-filled
00:58:48 leaving aside the analysis of Dr Lane and stepping back PSB is also bound to point out that there is already a cogent and reliable explanation as to what caused smoke to enter the tower and to
00:59:01 caused smoke to enter the tower and to cause it to spread that is the rapid and catastrophic breaches of compartmentation caused by the external wall fire and the critical significance of the flat six doors at
00:59:13 significance of the flat six doors at each level Professor purse's conclusions are important in this Regard in the summary of His module 7 report Professor Purser opined that quote the main origin of the
00:59:25 opined that quote the main origin of the toxic smoke first filling the lobbies on each floor was Smoke From The Burning exterior cladding insulation and window surrounds materials penetrating via flat
00:59:37 surrounds materials penetrating via flat six on each floor this source of smoke had a rapid catastrophic impact on conditions in the lobbies and it's described by professor in detail and very clearly in his report
00:59:50 in detail and very clearly in his report and as stated by Professor Purser the main origin of smoke spread into the lobbies was via the external fire penetrating through the flat sixes on each floor the overwhelming effect of
01:00:02 each floor the overwhelming effect of the external fire and the critical importance of the flat six fire doors to conditions in the lobbies can be seen in the contrast between floors where the flat six doors did or did not prevent
01:00:14 flat six doors did or did not prevent smoke leakage turning to causative effect relative to death or injury as I said at the beginning when I set up my store we're not aware of any expert which suggests
01:00:25 not aware of any expert which suggests that the system was causally relevant to death or injury on the night of the fire moreover as we've already seen when we've looked at the storyboard analysis and those four elements there is
01:00:36 and those four elements there is considerable factual evidence tending to show that the system and its components were not causally relevant to death or injury on the night of the fire
01:00:53 it therefore follows that the panel May reasonably consider that there is no cogent and reliable factual connection between any act or remission on the part of BSB and the injurious spread of smoke
01:01:05 of BSB and the injurious spread of smoke on the night of the fire I've seen the clock may I just steal a couple of minutes to make some closing comments I apologize
01:01:14 so turning to my closing comments um on the night of the fire the system was required to perform during an extraordinary event a multi-story fire characterized by
01:01:25 a multi-story fire characterized by rapid external fast spread the complete failure of the external wall and Rapid re-entry of fire to multiple floods on multiple levels as Professor torreira observed at the
01:01:37 as Professor torreira observed at the outset of the inquiry's work during phase one and forgive me I think this quote is important quote given the scale of the event and the number of lobbies that were simultaneously compromised by
01:01:49 that were simultaneously compromised by smoke Ingress a fully functioning compliance system would have provided negligible benefits to egressing occupants thus any discussion of its
01:02:00 occupants thus any discussion of its compliance or functionality is secondary in the context of the grenful tower fire close quote PSB agrees with that and proper account of this Central Point
01:02:12 and proper account of this Central Point should not be lost with regards to the system
01:02:17 system it is important that blame for the disaster should be directed at those who truly bear substantial responsibility for what occurred at Grenville Tower and whilst remaining cognizant of the
01:02:29 and whilst remaining cognizant of the major tragedy in which so many people died it is respectfully submitted that PSB does not fall into that category the panel May thus consider that it is
01:02:40 the panel May thus consider that it is time to put the system in proper perspective and to avert the present risk that the topic of smoke control is given an importance and influence that is neither
01:02:52 importance and influence that is neither deserved nor evidentially warranted in the context of the terrible events and consequence of the grenful tower fire ly
01:03:02 having closely followed the entirety of the inquiry proceedings PSB is deeply conscious that as matters stand it does not agree with the bereaved survivors and residents on this discrete issue
01:03:15 and residents on this discrete issue this is not a position that any person individual or corporate could be comfortable with bearing in mind the deeply moving evidence that has been heard about the lives lost and impacted
01:03:28 heard about the lives lost and impacted by the grenful tower fire during the inquiry however it is hoped that by engaging with the inquiry on this complex topic and irrespective of
01:03:40 this complex topic and irrespective of the findings that may ultimately follow PSB has at least done all it can to assist the inquiry and the panel in its work those are my submissions
01:03:51 work those are my submissions thank you very much indeed thank you
01:03:59 the next statement is going to be made by Mr Johnson Laidlaw King's Council and I think he's going to make it remotely and indeed there is Mr Laidlaw on our
01:04:11 and indeed there is Mr Laidlaw on our screens good morning Mr Slade law good morning Mr can I just check that you can see us and hear us clearly we can see you certainly I can see you and I can hear you clearly
01:04:22 I can see you and I can hear you clearly is my voice at an appropriate level sir yes that's fine and I think everything looks set if you would like to go ahead and make your submissions certainly can I thank you first for
01:04:34 certainly can I thank you first for allowing me to make my submissions um from the north of the country and I sincerely hope that the technology will allow you to hear what I have to say without
01:04:44 without um interruption it's now almost um three years since I last addressed you on Harley's behalf at the opening of phase two of your inquiry as you will
01:04:55 phase two of your inquiry as you will recall
01:04:56 recall and then as you know funding difficulties have have constrained the extent of the representation the company has had available to it so I
01:05:07 the company has had available to it so I have not had the advantage of having been present over the months which have since passed and I I know you you will therefore forgive me if my grasp of the
01:05:18 therefore forgive me if my grasp of the detail does not reflect the extent of the learning and what the panel now knows that the events which led to this tragedy
01:05:28 tragedy that said Harley's people Mr Bailey senior in particular have continued to pay close attention to these proceedings he remains concerned about the company's
01:05:40 he remains concerned about the company's position and has been as will be cleared to you from the written overarching closing submissions and the addendum closing submissions as they touch upon the further work done by
01:05:52 they touch upon the further work done by Professor Bisby he he has remained concerned and much troubled by that which has emerged most recently about testing in making these submissions on Harley's
01:06:05 in making these submissions on Harley's behalf I'm not of course going to be repeating the detail of the various written documents the panel has received most recently from the company I I know the panel will have careful regard to
01:06:17 the panel will have careful regard to that material instead in the hope that this is helpful I will complement our printed submissions with short summaries of the principal points Harley seeks to
01:06:28 of the principal points Harley seeks to make in closing I'll also address those parts of the closing arguments of the other CPS which contain criticisms of Harley and the arguments framed to persuade the inquiry
01:06:41 arguments framed to persuade the inquiry that Harley's responsibility for what went so terribly wrong extends further than the company was prepared to accept when their case was opened and so there are five sections to
01:06:54 opened and so there are five sections to my submissions the first is the focus for the these oral submissions but the regard as I will submit it that should be had to balance and for fairness for
01:07:08 be had to balance and for fairness for Harley
01:07:09 Harley the second is the testing of the ACM products by the bre in 2001 and the subsequent inaction the third is the practices of the three
01:07:21 the third is the practices of the three three main manufacturers of the predominant materials in the cladding at Grenville Tower iconic solatex and kingspan who each knew the dangerous
01:07:34 kingspan who each knew the dangerous materials were being used in the refurbishment project four is the significance of the testing which has been carried out in the aftermath of the tragedy
01:07:46 aftermath of the tragedy which makes clear that the overwhelmingly dominant factor in the catastrophic spread of the fire was the use of these materials themselves rather
01:07:57 use of these materials themselves rather than any detail of the design or installation of the facade or the location of the cavity barriers and finally given the importance of the
01:08:09 and finally given the importance of the selection of the materials to be used at grenfell I'll finish with a brief examination and a reminder of exactly what Harley's role was within the
01:08:20 what Harley's role was within the refurbishment project and what responsibilities he did or did not have in relation to the selection of those materials so part one is focus and
01:08:33 materials so part one is focus and fairness by way of shorthand as others have in their written submissions we respect respectfully adopt for our approach your own observation sir at the
01:08:46 approach your own observation sir at the conclusion of the evidence in which you acknowledge that many parties had admitted certain failings but emphasize the importance of focusing in on those failures which materially
01:08:59 in on those failures which materially contributed to the catastrophic fire at grenfell Tower and in light of the expert evidence you have heard we submit with respect that
01:09:11 have heard we submit with respect that the significance of for example the use of XPS infill panels defects and some of the installation work of the facade and the absence of
01:09:24 work of the facade and the absence of cavity barriers around the window openings
01:09:28 openings is of now of far less importance than it might first appeared and it's outweighed by the presence of the highly flammable rain screen cladding and unsuitable insulation
01:09:42 cladding and unsuitable insulation failures in the Regulatory and the compliance regime and a flawed fire safety classification system and the unethical practices of manufacturers
01:09:55 unethical practices of manufacturers next to fairness Holly cannot and does not expect to be airbrushed out of The Narrative of This Disaster
01:10:06 Disaster in its work there were shortcomings there were failings and there were emissions which had been acknowledged and which will no doubt form part of the
01:10:18 and which will no doubt form part of the inquiries findings the recommendations your panel will make will lead to Great change for all and the way Harley worked will have to
01:10:30 the way Harley worked will have to change if the lessons as they must be are learned but Harley are also entitled as I'm sure you will afford them to fairness
01:10:41 you will afford them to fairness to have their part judged both by reference to the company as it was 10 years ago or so it's size and what it did and did not hold itself out to offer
01:10:54 did and did not hold itself out to offer in terms of expertise or otherwise contemporaneous industry standards are of equal importance particularly in terms of the reassurance
01:11:07 particularly in terms of the reassurance a cladding contractor would take in terms of fire safety from stated classification and certification Harley's position in this respect is no
01:11:20 Harley's position in this respect is no different than the many other cladding contractors Architects designers and Consultants who have used the materials this inquiry is now primarily concerned with on many
01:11:32 is now primarily concerned with on many hundreds of high-rise buildings across the length and the breadth of the country
01:11:40 country there is also the nature of this of this project forgive me and the importance of recognizing that a variety of contractors and Specialists were brought together to carry out supervise and then
01:11:54 together to carry out supervise and then to check the various different elements of the refurbishment work that that is of course the norm in construction projects of this sort but it will
01:12:05 projects of this sort but it will necessarily lead to delineate delineation and demarcation in terms of areas of responsibility that said I am as I begin these closing
01:12:18 that said I am as I begin these closing submissions acutely conscious but it must sound desperately unattractive to the bereaved the residents and the survivors of a disaster of the magnitude that befell
01:12:30 disaster of the magnitude that befell the residents of the Tower for one contractor to seek or to be seen seeking to avoid responsibility by placing responsibility for fire safety
01:12:43 placing responsibility for fire safety elsewhere
01:12:44 elsewhere and in certain respects as you sir have already observed responsibility will of course fall to be shared a and I quote Merry-Go-Round of butt
01:12:56 a and I quote Merry-Go-Round of butt passing has become something of a headline in the reporting of parts of these proceedings it figures again in the closing submissions and in certain
01:13:08 the closing submissions and in certain respects it may be true but there are obvious dangers as I know you sir will have recognized with a forensic tool of this sort
01:13:20 forensic tool of this sort there may be corporate CPS who are entitled
01:13:25 entitled as the residents of grenfell were plainly entitled to say we relied on others we did not have and we did not claim to have expertise in fire safety
01:13:38 claim to have expertise in fire safety but we knew that others amongst those responsible for this project had such skills and we relied upon them to get things right and to ensure that we did
01:13:50 things right and to ensure that we did not fall into error and stone and so addressing you in that Vein on behalf of Holly is not to engage in Buck passing
01:14:03 in Buck passing but it is intended to explain why these materials now revealed as a result of the work of this inquiry to be so very dangerous came into the
01:14:15 to be so very dangerous came into the hands of contractors such as Harley and then were trusted and so widely used not just by Harley but by many many other Contracting firms working in this
01:14:28 Contracting firms working in this jurisdiction and indeed abroad finally
01:14:34 finally just this in terms of my introductory remarks at the beginning of phase two of this inquiry in early 2020 Harley's written submission spoke of the
01:14:46 Harley's written submission spoke of the horror which Harley employees felt as they saw on their television screens the unfolding of that tragedy on the 14th and 15th of June 2017.
01:14:59 and 15th of June 2017. as the evidence has emerged over the course of this second phase that horror has been supplemented by frustration and indeed anger those reactions arising
01:15:11 and indeed anger those reactions arising both from the results of the recent testing but also the practices now exposed and laid bare of the key manufacturers who consciously and
01:15:22 manufacturers who consciously and deliberately push dangerous products into the hands of others who both took on trust what they were told but also had no realistic means of discovering
01:15:33 had no realistic means of discovering the truth about those materials part two the BRS is testing in 2001 and the inaction which followed
01:15:45 the inaction which followed and over the course of this inquiry Harley has like others following these proceedings become increasingly aware of the dangerous properties of ACM
01:15:57 the dangerous properties of ACM but even at the time of making written closing submissions at the conclusion of module 3 last autumn they could not have anticipated the evidence which was later to emerge after
01:16:10 evidence which was later to emerge after the testing carried out by the bre in 2001 which demonstrated to those who were aware of those tests over a decade before the installation of ACM at
01:16:23 before the installation of ACM at grenfell Tower just how dangerous this material was the panel will remember during the 2001 testing A system that incorporated ACM
01:16:36 testing A system that incorporated ACM a failing catastrophically what the evidence of Dr Sarah Colwell was and again you'll remember she was the principal consultant at the bre
01:16:49 the principal consultant at the bre a she described and I quote how she was shocked at the speed it took off and when asked whether the outcome of that test could be described as an inferno she replied and again I quote it
01:17:01 inferno she replied and again I quote it was a very large very rapid growth yes Dr Debbie Smith accepted that this was a in her words catastrophic escalation
01:17:12 in her words catastrophic escalation Brian Martin variously described as the building regulations expert especially specializing in fire all the ADB man
01:17:23 specializing in fire all the ADB man working for the bre somewhat reluctantly accepted that the spread of flames during this test was again I quote clearly very rapid
01:17:35 again I quote clearly very rapid within government 2 Anthony Byrd the senior fire safety professional within what was then the department for environment trade and the regions which had responsibility for reviewing the
01:17:47 had responsibility for reviewing the building regulations and accompanying approved documents stated that he was surprised by the results of the test describing the conflagration that
01:17:59 describing the conflagration that resulted from this full-scale test of an ACM rain stream facade facade system at a very Fierce Fast Fire
01:18:10 a very Fierce Fast Fire none of the other materials tested failed as quickly or as dramatically as the ACM
01:18:19 the ACM in short at that stage the danger to life posed by pe aluminum panels if used in Rain stream cladding systems
01:18:30 if used in Rain stream cladding systems on high-rise buildings was obvious to anyone who witnessed or knew the outcome of the testing given that is described by Dr Smith the
01:18:41 given that is described by Dr Smith the whole point of this testing program was to get to the point where we could ensure that the products that perform badly would never ever be able to pass the test
01:18:52 the test as she said the inaction that followed and the failure to prevent ACM from becoming not just permissible widely accepted and used throughout the
01:19:05 widely accepted and used throughout the cladding industry is at as it has been described by various of the CPS shocking Dr Colwell was clear she and again I borrow her words couldn't see that ACN
01:19:19 borrow her words couldn't see that ACN would be an appropriate product for use in that application referring as she was to the use of ACM in the facade of a high-rise building
01:19:32 in the facade of a high-rise building what remains entirely unexplained is how or why that view those views which were clearly the only appropriate response to
01:19:43 clearly the only appropriate response to the outcome of that test did not lead to action being taken either by the bre or the commissioning government Department could not recall and ever been told by
01:19:57 could not recall and ever been told by anyone at bre about the severity of the test outcome and it does not appear from his evidence that he or anyone else in the government Department responsible considered any
01:20:10 Department responsible considered any intervention to stop the use of acms following this test nor any steps even to ascertain how many high-rise buildings then featured ACM rainscreen
01:20:23 buildings then featured ACM rainscreen cladding
01:20:25 cladding it will be for the inquiry and it's certainly not for me if it thinks it's appropriate to categorize the nature of these particular failings
01:20:37 these particular failings but the point from Harley's perspective is is the obvious one which the panel will have grasped for itself they were entirely unaware of this testing
01:20:48 testing all of its clear implication in terms of the use of ACM products in high-rise rainscreen cladding applications if those details have been made known to
01:21:01 if those details have been made known to the industry at the time it is inconceivable that ACM would have become as widely used as it did or that Harley would have accepted the
01:21:12 or that Harley would have accepted the use of such materials at grenfield Tower that that testing not only highlighted the inherent dangers of ACM as a
01:21:24 the inherent dangers of ACM as a material
01:21:25 material it also demonstrated that the fire safety regime and the use of class zero certifications in particular were fundamentally flawed and again despite the dangers
01:21:39 and again despite the dangers highlighted by that test no action appears to have been taken to withdraw or even review class 0 as a concept that was despite the terms of the report
01:21:51 was despite the terms of the report produced by the bre in September 2002 which concluded that in light of those tests issues around class zero and
01:22:02 those tests issues around class zero and diagram 40 in deep ADB and again I quote may require further consideration that further consideration appears never
01:22:13 that further consideration appears never to have taken place again the significance of that issue to Harley's position will be perfectly clear to you all as
01:22:25 will be perfectly clear to you all as Jonathan sukala said a reasonably competent cladding contractor would rely on fire classification certificates
01:22:37 the inquiry has previously heard expert evidence from Dr Lane that the BBA certification in respect of rhinobond ACP ACM forgive me and the claims made
01:22:48 ACP ACM forgive me and the claims made within it that Rhino Bond could be regarded as class zero are factually incorrect and potentially misleading again it is inconceivable that ACM would
01:23:01 again it is inconceivable that ACM would have achieved the dominance it has had the flaws in the very concept of class zero been addressed by those who knew about those tests
01:23:12 about those tests part three the practice of the manufacturers whilst the tests carried out in 2001 Mark perhaps the beginning of a history
01:23:24 Mark perhaps the beginning of a history of missed opportunities to prevent the materials used at grenfield Tower from becoming as widespread as they have become
01:23:34 become the years that followed were also as the work of this inquiry has revealed characterized by the deceitful strategies adopted by the manufacturers
01:23:45 strategies adopted by the manufacturers of those materials in order to push those materials onto the construction industry at large and it's important at this point to weave into this chronology
01:23:57 this point to weave into this chronology Harley's part in or to put it more accurately in fact its lack of involvement in the selection of the materials the grenfell refurbishment
01:24:08 materials the grenfell refurbishment arconic as that company is now known in 2012 through Deborah French the UK sales manager met as you will
01:24:21 the UK sales manager met as you will recall with representatives of Studio e and their contractors lead bitters to discuss providing rain screen cladding panels for use on the
01:24:34 cladding panels for use on the refurbishment of grenfell Tower that meeting happened long before anyone at Harley had even heard of the grenfell Tower project
01:24:47 Tower project and that meeting came after iconic became aware that rhinoborn 55 PE in cassette form had achieved an f and an e
01:25:00 cassette form had achieved an f and an e in European classification tests carried out in June and October of 2011. those tests those results were not
01:25:13 those tests those results were not referred to anywhere in the BBA certificate for Reiner Bond nor anywhere else in our Comics project literature of the time
01:25:23 the time an iconic knew perfectly well in 2012 that the performance of this product in cassette panels was worse than that represented in its BBA certificate
01:25:37 represented in its BBA certificate at this point I paused briefly to respond to the observations made in the in the submissions for BSR group one the BBA certificates cannot be treated
01:25:48 the BBA certificates cannot be treated as sacred cows or a guarantee of compliance that that submission as a matter of respect we would say
01:26:00 as a matter of respect we would say cannot survive Mr sakula's evidence about the position at the time of the grenfield Tower refuragement and he said this and I quote I would expect them
01:26:12 this and I quote I would expect them that's reference to the reasonably competent cladding contractor to rely on the BBA certificate to a great extent because the BBA is
01:26:23 great extent because the BBA is considered a reputable body and their certificates generally to be trusted that is surely right is it not a contractor in Harley's position then was
01:26:36 contractor in Harley's position then was entitled to rely on the accuracy of such certificates neither again with respect was it fair or appropriate for the same CP and their
01:26:49 or appropriate for the same CP and their representatives to suggest Harley and I quote displayed a contempt for the safety of those living at grenfell or to borrow from the submission made
01:27:01 borrow from the submission made yesterday it is more likely than not that Harley did know that acmp was not compliant there is I'm afraid no evidence to support either of those
01:27:14 evidence to support either of those propositions and they should not have been advanced this is also the moment to correct a misunderstanding that continues to exist
01:27:25 misunderstanding that continues to exist about Commons made by Daniel Alcatel Jones in his email on the 27th of March of 2015
01:27:35 of 2015 he observed as the as the inquiry will remember in that message that ACM will be and to borrow his words gone rather quickly in a fire
01:27:47 quickly in a fire that became in the submissions of Miss bar wise the basis for an assertion that Harley knew ACM was highly combustible
01:27:58 Harley knew ACM was highly combustible but that point can only be made if one is prepared to ignore the evidence of the witness what he meant as he explained was that aluminum would melt
01:28:09 explained was that aluminum would melt and fall off that had been the experience of Harley not just with ACM but specifically with renabond ACM during the fire at taplo
01:28:22 renabond ACM during the fire at taplo house
01:28:23 house it was I'm sorry to say plainly wrong to suggest hardly knew anything of the sword or
01:28:33 sword or or of that which is now known and understood about the highly combustible nature of ACN returning then to our Clinic
01:28:45 returning then to our Clinic it's knowledge of the performance of its rainstream cassettes was significant because again as has been observed by Mr sakula
01:28:55 sakula as a manufacturer of rain screen panels are Connex knowledge an understanding of fire safety legislation and testing relevant to its products would be
01:29:07 relevant to its products would be greater than that which could be expected of a reasonably competent cladding contractor such as Harley Miss French's evidence that information
01:29:19 Miss French's evidence that information about the subpar performance of Reno Bond 55 PE cassettes in fire performance tests would be given to customers who
01:29:30 tests would be given to customers who asked for it is the panel may think unconvincing and Miss French herself was adventuring driven to concede customers and by extension Harley would not know to ask
01:29:43 extension Harley would not know to ask about these more recent test results iconic cannot we submit simply abdicate all responsibility for
01:29:54 simply abdicate all responsibility for the use of their products at Grand form they knew perfect they were perfectly aware that that product in cassette form was not suitable for grenfold Tower or
01:30:06 was not suitable for grenfold Tower or indeed any other high-rise building indeed they knew that it was dangerous in sunny in any such application like any reasonably competent cladding
01:30:17 like any reasonably competent cladding subcontractor and as Jonathan sekula has pointed out Harley were Reliant to a very large extent on arconic as a manufacturer of
01:30:28 extent on arconic as a manufacturer of cladding products for advice as to the safety fire safety properties of that which they were supplying no such advice was provided
01:30:39 no such advice was provided and the absence of any warning or of any mention of the dire performance of the Renault bond in European fire testing in 2011. is surely a matter of considerable
01:30:52 2011. is surely a matter of considerable significance as for the other materials used at grenfell
01:30:58 grenfell and those produced by celotex and kingspan I can take the position shortly this is dealt as you will remember in a little more detail at paragraph 70
01:31:09 in a little more detail at paragraph 70 to 86 of our written 2021 submissions when it comes to the manufacturers of the rigid panel insulation used at
01:31:20 the rigid panel insulation used at grenfell it is now clear that those individuals working at celotex from whom the inquiry has heard new and understood
01:31:31 the inquiry has heard new and understood that FR 5000 the products suggested to be used as insulation was not of limited combustibility and was not suitable for
01:31:42 combustibility and was not suitable for use above 18 meters yet every effort was made to drive RS 5000 which was essentially FR 5000
01:31:53 5000 which was essentially FR 5000 rebranded for use in buildings above 18 meters
01:31:58 meters and the question that the inquiry will no doubt wish to consider and to address is whether celetics were driven by the commercial desire to sell a product that could compete with the kingspan product
01:32:10 could compete with the kingspan product which by that time was dominating the insulation Market Harley's consideration of celotex's product literature was carefully
01:32:22 product literature was carefully examined during the course of the evidence but no amount of reading that material would have revealed the truth that RS 5000 had only passed a bs-8414
01:32:35 that RS 5000 had only passed a bs-8414 test as a result of what has been described as dishonest and unethical over engineering again the approach that sellotex took
01:32:47 again the approach that sellotex took towards passing a bs-8414 test provides the essential context against which the eventual use of RS 5000 at grenfell
01:32:58 eventual use of RS 5000 at grenfell Falls to be understood it was the clear ambition of celotex to ensure that that test could be used to Market RS 5000 for
01:33:10 test could be used to Market RS 5000 for use above 18 meters generally the written submissions Advanced on celotex's behalf that Ray Bailey's evidence that Harley
01:33:21 that Ray Bailey's evidence that Harley received assurances that RS 5000 was suitable for use above 18 meters is unsupported by documentary evidence is again to completely ignore context
01:33:34 again to completely ignore context Jonathan Roo was meeting with Harley at exactly the same time that there was this internal drive to sell RS 5000 for
01:33:45 this internal drive to sell RS 5000 for use in buildings above 18 meters Salesforce entries show that sellotex was pushing in relation to two Harley
01:33:56 was pushing in relation to two Harley jobs one of which must have been grantful
01:34:00 grantful there's also Daniel Alcatel Jones evidence about the frequent visits made by Mr roome and the unqualified assurances he and Harley were given
01:34:11 assurances he and Harley were given about the suitability of RS 5000 above 18 meters to that one adds Ben Bailey's evidence of what he was told about the
01:34:23 evidence of what he was told about the suitability of that product the inference is of course for you but we would submit that the irresistible inference to be drawn from the evidence
01:34:35 inference to be drawn from the evidence is that seller text representatives were anxious to convince the market that RS 5000 was a suitable product to be used above 18 meters generally
01:34:47 above 18 meters generally that they were in close contact with Harley regarding the glenfell Tower project
01:34:54 project that they knew what that project was about and
01:34:58 about and that like almost all Harley projects it involved the overcladding of a high-rise Residential Building
01:35:09 Residential Building the tendency to dilute the limitations of the acceptable use of a product but also present Within kingspan and in respect of cool therm k-15
01:35:22 respect of cool therm k-15 long before solatex RS 5000 came into being
01:35:27 being product literature was being produced for cool therm k-15 which by suggesting that it was generally acceptable for use above 18 meters was also thoroughly misleading
01:35:41 meters was also thoroughly misleading critical information was omitted from the BBA certificate issue for k-15 in 2008
01:35:49 2008 that test was based on an old formulation of the product and Kingsman a king span had not the declared the results of the more recent test in 2007
01:36:00 results of the more recent test in 2007 when the newer formulation had failed as a result of this discredible strategy Colson became dominant and widespread in
01:36:11 Colson became dominant and widespread in the cladding industry by the time of the grenfield Tower refurbishment what was not known then at the time of that project and could not have been known by any reasonably competent
01:36:23 known by any reasonably competent cladding subcontractor was the extent of the dishonest methods that we employed by kingspan to achieve that marking market dominance
01:36:35 market dominance part 4 the testing of the claddy materials after the fire I turned then to the post-tragedy testing fourth part of these submissions
01:36:47 fourth part of these submissions what has become clear as a result of the testing commissioned by the department for communities and Local Government after the fire at grenfell is that even
01:36:58 after the fire at grenfell is that even when installed in perfect laboratory conditions complete with correctly designed and installed cavity barriers the combination of materials used at
01:37:10 the combination of materials used at grenfell Tower propagated the rapid spread of Fire that testing like the tests carried out on AC ACM in 2001.
01:37:22 on AC ACM in 2001. saw fire spread so rapidly that the test had to be terminated a little under after nine minutes with flames reaching several meters above the top of the
01:37:34 several meters above the top of the testing rig Harley as the panel would will recall has long maintained that this demonstrates the importance of the materials themselves and the relative
01:37:46 materials themselves and the relative insignificance certainly in causative terms of the design detailing and installation defects in understanding
01:37:57 installation defects in understanding the events of June 2017. that point has now been underlined and Harley stance Vindicated by the experiments carried out by the inquiry's
01:38:08 experiments carried out by the inquiry's own expert Professor Bisby Professor bisby's experiments we we suggest conclusively demonstrate that the predominant cause of the spread and
01:38:20 the predominant cause of the spread and the intensity of the fire was the presence of ACM Professor Bisby has also made plain that this characteristic is not confined to renable
01:38:31 renable 55pe that was actually used at grenfell Tower in his View and I quote all ACM PE products present extreme fire hazards
01:38:43 products present extreme fire hazards there are few Construction Products intended for any use on the outside of the building that I've ever seen burn with such intensity every time you ran an experiment that
01:38:55 every time you ran an experiment that escalated to full involvement of the ACM I was surprised and alarmed but Professor bisby's experiments have also shown new light on the role played
01:39:06 also shown new light on the role played by RS 5000 and the k-15 whilst there has there has quite properly
01:39:14 properly being careful scrutiny of the selection of RS 5000 and the extent to which the combustibility of that material and the k-15 that was
01:39:25 of that material and the k-15 that was subject that was substituted for it Professor bisby's experiments conclusively demonstrate that it was the insulating properties of those materials
01:39:36 insulating properties of those materials rather than their combustibility the contributed so significantly to the rapid spread of fire at grenafil Tower it was that insulating property when
01:39:49 it was that insulating property when combined with the behavior of the polyethylene called renabond that gave rise of the catastrophic spread of fire that was wholly absent in the fire at
01:40:00 that was wholly absent in the fire at taplo house on the chalcott's estate that was an event as the panel recall which Harley had investigated and from which the lesson to be learned appeared
01:40:12 which the lesson to be learned appeared to be that Reno Bond would not contribute to the spread of flames the clear implication of Professor bisby's experiment is plain it was those
01:40:25 bisby's experiment is plain it was those three key materials the rental Bond cassettes the rs-5000 and the k-15 insulation which were the predominant
01:40:36 insulation which were the predominant determinants of the spread of fire at grenenthal Tower and what is of obvious importance to Harley is this
01:40:47 Harley is this the Renner Bond had been included in the MBS specification drafted by the Architects Studio e it having been introduced to them in
01:40:58 it having been introduced to them in discussions with Deborah from French of iconic long before Harley's involvement a point I accept I've now made twice the
01:41:10 a point I accept I've now made twice the RS 5000 or it's near equivalent FR 5000 again was also specified in studio E's NBS specification it having appeared in
01:41:23 NBS specification it having appeared in documents produced by Max Fordham long before Harley's involvement the k-15 which by then had become so dominant in the cladding industry was
01:41:35 dominant in the cladding industry was suggested as a suitable substitution for rs-5000 by s i g whilst Harley has accepted that cavity
01:41:46 whilst Harley has accepted that cavity barriers should have been placed around window openings this was what was required by approved document B these further experiments reinforce the views
01:41:57 further experiments reinforce the views expressed not only by Professor Bisby but also by Professor Torero and Dr Lane throughout this inquiry that in a situation where there is a rapid flame
01:42:08 situation where there is a rapid flame spread and the deformation of the ACM panels the presence or otherwise of cavity barriers will have little impact it is these materials and not the
01:42:21 it is these materials and not the detailing or installation of the building facade or the placement of cavity barriers within that facade which were the driving force between between behind the fire at grenthal and in our
01:42:34 behind the fire at grenthal and in our respectful submissions your conclusions should reflect that part five is the correct description of Harley's role and the proper limits to
01:42:46 Harley's role and the proper limits to be placed upon it next then to the role played by Harley in the refurbishment because their remains a danger of that
01:42:57 because their remains a danger of that role being misunderstood and at times the panel have seen in some of the submissions of other CPS of that role being exaggerated and thus
01:43:08 role being exaggerated and thus misrepresented it is therefore important that I take this final opportunity to return to this issue of precisely what Harley's roles and responsibilities
01:43:20 what Harley's roles and responsibilities were and were not an example of the misunderstanding of Harley's role can be found in ryden's written closing submissions at the conclusion of module 3
01:43:32 conclusion of module 3 where Harley are described as the specialist cladine designer in the written submissions of BSR group one it is asserted that Harley held
01:43:43 one it is asserted that Harley held themselves out as specialists in facade design
01:43:47 design well Tony do these descriptions not only do these descriptions not appear anywhere in the letter of intent in which Harley was identified as the
01:43:58 in which Harley was identified as the envelope package subcontractor they also Allied The crucial but generally overlooked distinction drawn by Jonathan sukala between a
01:44:10 drawn by Jonathan sukala between a specialist facade engineer or specialist facade consultant on the one hand and a cladian Contractor on the other
01:44:21 cladian Contractor on the other at this point I should say just something about the evidence produced by provided by Mr sukala because you know from the written submissions that Harley has made previously that not everything
01:44:32 has made previously that not everything that was said by him is accepted by the company we represent the panel will remember the process of identifying a cladian expert who not
01:44:44 identifying a cladian expert who not only had sufficient expertise but who was wholly independent of any of the core participants was an extremely difficult exercise and one that was drawn out
01:44:56 drawn out and we maintain that there are regrettedly some important but inevitable limitations on the expertise of Mr sukala which must operate a temper the
01:45:07 sukala which must operate a temper the veracity of some of the views that he expressed all the way to be attached to them
01:45:14 them Mr sukala himself has never worked in the role of a cladine contractor he is by his own account a cladine or facade consultant a role which necessarily
01:45:25 consultant a role which necessarily involves more in-depth specialist and Technical knowledge than a credit than a cladding contractor like Harley is likely to have
01:45:36 likely to have he cited only two examples of projects He has worked on involving the overcladding of high-rise buildings like grenfell and he appears to have had
01:45:47 grenfell and he appears to have had little or no experience of working on projects that required even the consideration of ACM products and as such there is a danger of placing
01:45:59 and as such there is a danger of placing undue weight on his opinion when it comes to considering the use of ACM products now particularly in the wake of this tragedy which should have been guarded against
01:46:11 guarded against furthermore as Mr zukala was Frank enough to accept his views on what our accepted industry practice at the time are necessarily impressionistic
01:46:23 are necessarily impressionistic impressionistic forgive me an ability to speak authoritatively or confidently on contemporary practice around amongst cladding contractors such an important
01:46:35 cladding contractors such an important feature of Harley's case is as the panel will no doubt understand of real concern to the company that said let me return to the substance of my submissions
01:46:48 to the substance of my submissions Holly was and remains a cladding subcontractor not a specialist facade consultant and its role and the expertise that it
01:47:00 and its role and the expertise that it brought to the grenfeld project should be firmly understood in that context and no other
01:47:07 no other Harley were not fire safety experts or experts in statutory compliance expertise in those fields would as highly reasonably believed be the
01:47:19 highly reasonably believed be the concern of others moreover in the absence of a formal written contract which of course there ought to have been Harley's understanding of its obligations was inevitably shaped and
01:47:31 obligations was inevitably shaped and informed by industry practices and the expectations upon cladding contractors as opposed to specialist facade Consultants
01:47:42 Consultants some of that industry practice is unsurprisingly reflected in the many documents appended to the letter of intent that was sent to Harley by Ryden
01:47:53 intent that was sent to Harley by Ryden Harley were not unrealistic after that expected of them as Ray Bailey himself observed whether there was a contract or not we had an obligation to comply with
01:48:04 not we had an obligation to comply with the building regulations the numerous documents appended to the letter of intent included the NBS specification drawn up by Studio e but
01:48:15 specification drawn up by Studio e but now our submission is not to it is not correct to suggest as it was by Mr Millet that by reason of the reference to it in the letter of intent that Harley was required to consider the MBS
01:48:28 Harley was required to consider the MBS specification any more than it can be said that Harley was required to consider the building regulations plainly as a matter of universally understood industry practice Harley was
01:48:41 understood industry practice Harley was required to comply with the requirements of the NBS including the materials that have been specified for in that document the potential problem that arises then
01:48:52 the potential problem that arises then is an obvious one how was any conflict between complying with the MBS and complying with the building regulations to be managed
01:49:03 to be managed Clause
01:49:04 Clause 2.12.1 of Dom 2 which was referred to in the letter of intent required the subcontractor to notify the contractor of any Divergence between the NBS and
01:49:17 of any Divergence between the NBS and the statutory requirements but what was not put to Mr Bailey when he gave his evidence on this point is that that same Clause places exactly the same obligation on the contractor in this
01:49:29 obligation on the contractor in this instance right to notify the subcontractor if he became aware of any such Divergence in this regard what the documents show is not a linear chain of
01:49:40 documents show is not a linear chain of responsibilities whereas some would have it the buck stopped with Harley we take issue with what has been said in the most recent written submissions of
01:49:52 the most recent written submissions of Ryden that they delegated design responsibility to Harley but the document I just referred to shows is that Verizon cannot be said to have delegated their shared responsibility
01:50:03 delegated their shared responsibility for compliance to Harley alone instead the reality we argue is much closer to that which Ray Bailey based on his years
01:50:14 that which Ray Bailey based on his years of experience in the cladding industry referred to as the raft of layers with Harley with the architect with the fire Consultants with building control to
01:50:27 Consultants with building control to ensure that the products are or the design is compliant it's not fair or accurate we say to suggest as Xavier have in their recent recent written submissions that nobody in the design
01:50:39 submissions that nobody in the design team including Harley were concerned with compliance although they assume simply somebody else would take care of it Harley had looked into fire
01:50:51 it Harley had looked into fire classification of the Rhino bombed on the previous project at the childcats estate
01:50:57 estate during which others including Specialists cladding Consultants bigadike Allen wintech and Sandberg had also reviewed the fire classification and determined that it was suitable and
01:51:09 and determined that it was suitable and compliant Hollywood further reassured of the suitability of that product by the investigation they themselves carried out in the wake of the fire at taplo
01:51:21 out in the wake of the fire at taplo house
01:51:22 house they engage with discussions with representatives of celotex which the suitability of RS 5000 for use above 18 meters was discovered they sought the
01:51:34 meters was discovered they sought the input of others in the design team of the fire safety Consultants or building control of manufacturers in relation to the design layout and specification of
01:51:47 the design layout and specification of cavity barriers and they submitted drawings for approval by an architect who they believed had engaged in the expertise of fire safety Consultants
01:51:59 expertise of fire safety Consultants so I paused there because I can see the time on on my screen I have about five or six minutes before I can finish but I'm obviously entirely in your hands whether you'd rather I did that or or
01:52:11 whether you'd rather I did that or or you take a break now well I'm just going to check with the transcriber I think if she's content to carry on as she indicating she is it would be better to let you complete your statement now
01:52:23 let you complete your statement now without a break
01:52:29 um so so our position is that Harley simply did not simply abdicate any responsibility for fire safety and compliance they understood
01:52:41 compliance they understood but they understood from their years of experience on similar projects that they were part of a wider team in which other parties would share in the discharge of
01:52:52 parties would share in the discharge of that responsibility Harley's role was to take what was specified by The Architects Studio e and to use Ray Bailey's words productionize
01:53:03 to use Ray Bailey's words productionize the design for the facade set out by Studio e into something that could be fabricated and fitted to the external wall of the tower
01:53:14 wall of the tower suggestions that persist for example in the written submissions of the TMO and the oral submissions of yesterday that Harley pushed for the use of ACM
01:53:26 Harley pushed for the use of ACM Overlook not only the evidence of Mark Harris when that suggestion was put to him maintained that instead Harley were advising on ACM as an option but they
01:53:39 advising on ACM as an option but they also ignore the clear evidence we have seen and heard that long before Harley's involvement in the project ACN was being considered and indeedy and indeed
01:53:50 considered and indeedy and indeed meetings were held between Studio e and iconic about the use of rhino Bond at grenful Tower Harley submitted its drawings to The
01:54:01 Harley submitted its drawings to The Architects for their approval it discussed the nature of the product of the project with suppliers and the manufacturers of products that would be used at ground floor and it raised
01:54:14 used at ground floor and it raised certain matters with building control who were ultimately responsible for checking the compliance of the design and installation and take undertaken and who on any view carried out numerous
01:54:26 who on any view carried out numerous inspections of what was happening on site
01:54:31 site whatever the various sub Clauses of appendices or attachments to the letter of intent said this was the reality of the role that Harley played on the ground and that was a role wholly
01:54:44 ground and that was a role wholly consistent we submit with that which would typically be expected of a cadding Contractor on such a product so may I just take a moment or two to
01:54:57 so may I just take a moment or two to conclude
01:54:59 conclude this inquiry has been intensive exhaustive and far-reaching and all the better for that every aspect of the refurbishment of the Tower
01:55:11 refurbishment of the Tower more than I imagined any of the parties in thought involved in that project would ever have contemplated has been examined and as I've said there are going to be many lessons to be learned
01:55:22 going to be many lessons to be learned not only by those within the construction industry such as Harley but within government within the manufacturing industry and Beyond the conclusions you you reach as you
01:55:35 the conclusions you you reach as you have said must necessarily identify and focus on those factors which most directly led to the tragic loss of life on a scale that no people before the fire could possibly have imagined and in
01:55:50 fire could possibly have imagined and in that respect my submissions by way of summary are as follows one Harley was not primarily responsible for the selection of the materials
01:56:04 for the selection of the materials two like every cladding contractor at work in this country back in 2014 they were misled about the fire safety
01:56:15 were misled about the fire safety properties of those materials the BSR group one Speaking their most recent submissions of and I quote knowingly false and misleading
01:56:26 knowingly false and misleading statements in the BBA certificate for Rhino Bond and they identify the detail of that which was not disclosed of the testing by the manufacturer
01:56:37 testing by the manufacturer what those representing this CP do not explain is how Harley were to know this and how particularly in light of Harley's experience of the fire on the
01:56:50 Harley's experience of the fire on the chalkot estate my client could have known of the dangers of that product three if the truth had been known then
01:57:01 three if the truth had been known then of course as the BSR group one except it is and again I quote extremely unlikely that ACN PE would have been used
01:57:13 that ACN PE would have been used four fire safety was not Harley's area of responsibility and in their criticisms of Harley the BSR group appeared to ignore the obvious
01:57:25 BSR group appeared to ignore the obvious delineation and demarcation of areas of expertise it was not Harley who were the Architects charged with producing a
01:57:36 Architects charged with producing a compliant design including the selection of Safe products neither were they the fire Engineers Harley was entitled as is
01:57:47 fire Engineers Harley was entitled as is described by those representing this CP to rely on Studio e and exovia to discharge this pivotal role this is not as I've said an exercise in butt passing
01:58:00 as I've said an exercise in butt passing because how on Earth could a cladine contractor reasonably be expected or able to discharge these functions and five against that background and
01:58:12 and five against that background and having regard to the hundreds of other similarly Cloud buildings that there are across this nation we with respect say that the panel should reject Mr sakula's
01:58:23 that the panel should reject Mr sakula's evidence that a reasonably competent cladding contractor would have concluded that
01:58:29 that acmpe was unsafe on high-rise building buildings
01:58:35 buildings so those are our submissions on behalf of Harley and I'm sorry to have encroached it into the break no well thank you very much indeed Mr Laidlaw you haven't encroached significantly and
01:58:46 you haven't encroached significantly and I think it was very helpful to hear the whole of your statement in one so thank you very much um we'll rise at that point for the morning break and we'll resume at 5 to
01:58:58 morning break and we'll resume at 5 to 12 please
01:59:00 12 please thank you very much
02:16:37 foreign
02:16:39 well at this point we're going to hear a closing statement on behalf of our conic made by Mr Stephen Hawkman King Council yes was talking
02:16:50 thank you very much sir and good morning to you and to your colleagues it's nice to be here in person once again um and um I would like to begin if I may
02:17:02 um and um I would like to begin if I may by reiterating our profound sympathies for all those directly affected by the grenfell tower fire and I would also like to reaffirm that we fully recognize the importance of the
02:17:15 we fully recognize the importance of the work of the inquiry itself in seeking to arrive at a true and fair analysis of the relevant issues in turn we are confident that we can rely on the
02:17:26 confident that we can rely on the inquiry to consider closely the submissions which we've made both in writing and orally including this present address I have to say that perusal of the
02:17:37 I have to say that perusal of the overarching written closings of some of the other core participants leaves us in some doubt as to whether they've given close consideration to our submissions some of them at least have clearly found
02:17:49 some of them at least have clearly found it convenient to identify our clients as carrying the major burden or indeed the sole burden of responsibility for the tragedy thereby demonstrating not only
02:18:00 tragedy thereby demonstrating not only that they have failed to find answers to the careful arguments which we put forward but also demonstrating that placing blame on others and especially on the company which we represent is a
02:18:13 on the company which we represent is a very convenient way of avoiding their own responsibility so great is the weight of criticism which has been directed against us that it sometimes seemed to our clients that
02:18:25 it sometimes seemed to our clients that there has been an agenda throughout to subject them to condemnation even before the case has been fully heard we are of course entirely confident that the inquiry panel itself will not align
02:18:38 inquiry panel itself will not align itself with any such agenda and will give all our arguments fair and careful consideration if however you wonder why I make the point you've only to recollect the evidence which emerged in
02:18:51 recollect the evidence which emerged in the course of module 6 of the so-called political lie in which within days if not hours of the occurrence of the fire some in government were proposing that the use of combustible cladding was in
02:19:04 the use of combustible cladding was in itself a breach of the regulatory regime by reason of paragraph 12.7 of approved document B even though the evidence in module 6 demonstrated that paragraph 12
02:19:17 module 6 demonstrated that paragraph 12 points 7 had no application to the cladding as opposed to the insulation this is but one example of an attempt to create in advance an agenda for your
02:19:28 create in advance an agenda for your work a danger which I know that you and your colleagues will be alert to avoid the same mindset was seen in an email from a government official on the 19th of June 2017 suggesting that the loss of
02:19:42 of June 2017 suggesting that the loss of one cladding company from the cladding Market would not be severe a clear example you may think of official prejudgment if ever there was one that's
02:19:53 prejudgment if ever there was one that's in CLG triple zeros one five three seven six
02:19:58 six against that background I hope I will be forgiven for starting my substantive submissions today by reminding you that at the material time the manufacture and
02:20:09 at the material time the manufacture and sale of acmpe whether by our clients in France or indeed by anyone in the United Kingdom was entirely lawful moreover we showed in our module 6
02:20:21 moreover we showed in our module 6 closings that for many years the product was accepted in this jurisdiction and elsewhere as being suitable for use on an external facade on the basis that it
02:20:34 an external facade on the basis that it was capable of achieving National class zero
02:20:38 zero or its equivalent without reiterating large sections of our module 6 closings we can perhaps remind you that in this jurisdiction alone it was confirmed
02:20:49 jurisdiction alone it was confirmed after the grenful fire that approaching 500 buildings had been clad in acmpe mainly of course supplied by others and not by our clients you'll recall that in
02:21:02 not by our clients you'll recall that in our module 6 closing we do to your attention the transcript of the lachenal house inquest in 2013 in which a striking passage of questioning took place during the evidence of Brian
02:21:14 place during the evidence of Brian Martin the questioner was Mr Stephen Walsh acting then as now on behalf of the London fire brigade in response to propositions put by Mr Walsh Mr Martin
02:21:26 propositions put by Mr Walsh Mr Martin confirmed that generally the main surface of a building could be expected to be class zero the class 0 was the most restrictive of all the classes the
02:21:39 most restrictive of all the classes the most stringent sure thought of non-combustible and he accepted that class hero was designed to prevent fire on the exterior envelope of a building traveling from floor to floor in a way
02:21:52 traveling from floor to floor in a way that makes it difficult to deal with from a fire Authority's point of view that was what was said in 2013. and we submit that the body of evidence which
02:22:03 submit that the body of evidence which you heard in module 6 requires the inquiry with respect to reject the proposition that such materials could not in the years before the grenfell
02:22:15 not in the years before the grenfell tower Fire have acceptably been used for external cladding I'd like to build on that argument by making reference at this stage to the
02:22:26 making reference at this stage to the European system of classification of course we know that for the purposes of the linear route to compliance approved document B recognized as Alternatives a product capable of
02:22:38 Alternatives a product capable of achieving National class zero and or a product capable of achieving European class or ENB however the evidence also shows that a
02:22:51 however the evidence also shows that a product capable of achieving National class zero need not necessarily be capable of achieving ENB a good example is to be seen in the a Luca Bond BBA
02:23:03 is to be seen in the a Luca Bond BBA certificate a Luca Bond being at the time a major supplier of acmpe which confirmed that their product achieved National class zero but also end
02:23:18 National class zero but also end the relativity reference that his cep triple zero 64071 it follows that in the case of the many buildings clad in acmpe which had been
02:23:29 buildings clad in acmpe which had been supplied by a Luca Bond and supplied on the basis of the nc0 classification in their BBA certificate there is no evidence that the product being used was
02:23:41 evidence that the product being used was capable of achieving a higher European classification than end you may think that this evidence is important in putting into context what
02:23:53 important in putting into context what has been perhaps the most widely expressed criticism of AAP namely that it allowed its product to be used at grenfell Tower even though when
02:24:04 grenfell Tower even though when fabricated as cassette it may not have been capable of achieving ENB in failing to achieve ENB when fabricated as cassette the product was
02:24:17 fabricated as cassette the product was not in the least atypical on the contrary it was almost identical to the product manufactured and supplied by every other supplier at the material time
02:24:28 time you will well recall that the product as supplied was in the form of a panel and was fabricated whether as cassette or otherwise by or on behalf of the
02:24:40 otherwise by or on behalf of the purchaser a purchaser would have been content to acquire the product on the basis that the surface of the panel could be regarded as having an nc0
02:24:51 could be regarded as having an nc0 classification even if it was known that in certain circumstances it might not be classified as attaining ENB I shall return to this point later
02:25:04 return to this point later having reminded you of our argument that at all material times up to the date of the fire the manufacture and sale of acmp was legitimate let me acknowledge that following the fire controls on the
02:25:17 that following the fire controls on the architectural use of the product have now been tightened at any rate in this jurisdiction herein lies however an important point which we have regularly stressed namely
02:25:29 which we have regularly stressed namely that public policy has at all material times concentrated on controlling such products not at the point of manufacture or sale but at the point of use and
02:25:41 or sale but at the point of use and therefore the primary responsibility for any alleged misuse of the product must lie with those actually responsible for the design and construction of the
02:25:53 the design and construction of the architectural project in which the product is used again I should be reverting to this point later
02:26:03 as regards AAP the above propositions do not of course cover comprehensively the circumstances of the sale and in this case the nub of the criticisms against
02:26:14 case the nub of the criticisms against AAP lies in the alleged failure to give a suitable warning as to the use of the product in particular circumstances or alternatively the making of specific
02:26:25 alternatively the making of specific misrepresentations we have throughout submitted Ironically in view of everything that has been said against us that it is the BBA certificate itself
02:26:36 that it is the BBA certificate itself which embodies our defense against the allegations of failure to warn and or of the making of misleading statements this is of course because the BBA certificate
02:26:48 is of course because the BBA certificate read as a whole as it must be not only makes it crystal clear that the product was combustible but also contains explicit limitations or disclaimers as
02:27:01 explicit limitations or disclaimers as to the extent to which a purchaser can use the product in a particular architectural context without himself taking responsibility for testing and
02:27:13 taking responsibility for testing and checking testing and checking that it is suitable again as we have repeatedly pointed out this reflects the express provision in the domestic regulatory
02:27:24 provision in the domestic regulatory regime requiring a purchaser to carry out such tests and to make such checks because of the variability of performance that can arise depending on
02:27:37 performance that can arise depending on the circumstances of use and as you will recall approved document B at appendix a includes in its introduction the following any test
02:27:48 introduction the following any test evidence used to substantiate the fire resistance rating of a construction should be carefully checked to ensure that it demonstrates compliance that is
02:27:59 that it demonstrates compliance that is adequate and applicable to the intended use small differences in detail and Mark this please small differences in detail such as fixing method
02:28:11 such as fixing method joints dimensions and the introduction of insulation materials May significantly affect the rating and then appendix a at paragraph 16 makes a similar Point specifically in
02:28:25 makes a similar Point specifically in relation to tests relating to the surface spread of flame results of tests it says on proprietary materials are frequently given in literature available
02:28:37 frequently given in literature available from manufacturers manufacturers and trade associations any reference used to substantiate the surface spread of flame rating of a material or product should
02:28:50 rating of a material or product should be carefully checked to ensure that it's suitable adequate and applicable to the construction to be used and then this again small differences in detail such
02:29:01 again small differences in detail such as thickness substrate color form fixings adhesive Etc May significantly affect the rating this acknowledged variability in
02:29:13 this acknowledged variability in performance has important implications for the correct interpretation of the BBA certificate no one proposing to use a combustible product could have
02:29:26 a combustible product could have interpreted the certificate as claiming not only that a panel was capable of achieving ENB but that it would achieve ENB in any and every context it is
02:29:40 ENB in any and every context it is precisely for this reason that the certificate stipulated for further testing in order to establish the particular level of fire resistance to
02:29:51 particular level of fire resistance to be anticipated putting the same point in a different way if those concerned in the refurbishment project decided to assume that acmpe panels were suitable
02:30:05 that acmpe panels were suitable regardless of the various factors mentioned and listed in appendix a in other words regardless of such matters as the fixing method the type of
02:30:16 as the fixing method the type of insulation and so on that is an approach for which they must be held responsible it is not an approach which was authorized or even acquiesced in by AAP or for that matter
02:30:30 acquiesced in by AAP or for that matter by the BBA other core participants noting that 2013 email from Deborah French in which he suggested that AAP could control the
02:30:42 suggested that AAP could control the choice of core have relied on this as a convenient method of distancing themselves from the selection of acmpe as opposed for example to the far
02:30:54 as opposed for example to the far resistant alternative for use at grenfell Tower there is however patently no substance in this line of argument none of those involved in the refurbishment project can realistically
02:31:05 refurbishment project can realistically say that they relied on the advice of Deborah French who herself conceives that that email overstated the extent of the advice which he could and did
02:31:16 the advice which he could and did provide of course and again this is a matter to which I shall return if a specific query had been raised and answered by the relevant AAP team then
02:31:28 answered by the relevant AAP team then the situation would have been different
02:31:33 as a supplementary comment in relation to the regulatory regime I think it's worth pointing out that contrary to the oft repeated argument against us that we
02:31:44 oft repeated argument against us that we were seeking to take advantage of a weak regulatory regime such characterization of the then applicable domestic regime is at any rate much oversimplified since
02:31:57 is at any rate much oversimplified since the provisions of ADB paragraph 12.5 contain a very specific warning as to the risks involved in the use of combustible products
02:32:08 combustible products as a further supplementary point this may be a good place to address the evidence on which others have relied to inculpate AAP in terms of attributing to the company what is said to have been
02:32:20 the company what is said to have been its knowledge of the risks involved in the use of the product I'm referring here mainly to the evidence of other fires taking place either in this country or overseas and
02:32:32 either in this country or overseas and there are a number of General points which are worth reiterating in this context
02:32:37 context firstly it is quite clear that although some of these fires did receive publicity at the time that observation Falls a long way short of accepting that there was any known detailed let alone
02:32:50 there was any known detailed let alone scientific analysis of the actual causes of such fires still less of the part played by particular Construction Products the present inquiry having
02:33:01 Products the present inquiry having surely demonstrated how complex and time-consuming such an analysis would have been in any event secondly and even assuming that any one
02:33:12 secondly and even assuming that any one or more of those fires such as the fire in Oslo in 2006 might have been a signal as to the risks in using any particular product it does not follow that the
02:33:25 product it does not follow that the manufacture of that product ought to draw the conclusion that the product should be withdrawn from the market on the contrary and given that public policy universally imposed
02:33:37 public policy universally imposed relevant controls at the point of use a manufacturer would be entitled to expect the regulatory regime to achieve that objective and to conclude until it was shown otherwise that the occurrence
02:33:50 was shown otherwise that the occurrence of a specific fire in a specific jurisdiction was due not to the weakness of the regime but to the fact that for a particular reason reason the regime was
02:34:01 particular reason reason the regime was not complied with in the case of the fire in question so it is with the manufacture and sale of any product which is capable of being used in a dangerous manner
02:34:14 used in a dangerous manner against the information about other fires which might have pointed to risk must be set the evidence of fires which demonstrated that the acmp product in
02:34:25 demonstrated that the acmp product in itself did not necessarily Prejudice safety we remind the inquiry of the taplo and Sudbury examples Sudbury in particular being a building which was
02:34:38 particular being a building which was clad in PE fabricated as cassette in which the spread of far did not Prejudice human health and we stress
02:34:49 Prejudice human health and we stress that in our module 6 closing we dealt in detail with the evidence relating to those two fires and we explained why Professor Bisby was wrong to suggest
02:35:00 Professor Bisby was wrong to suggest that either fire could be described as a near Miss in essence that allegation we submitted is disproved by the contemporaneous documentation
02:35:11 contemporaneous documentation we did incidentally submit questions for Professor Bisby on these topics but those questions were not pursued we also remind you of the other example given by
02:35:22 remind you of the other example given by professor torreiro in Phase One of fires where the spread of the fire up the building did not lead to fatal consequences I now want to refer in Greater detail to
02:35:35 I now want to refer in Greater detail to the issues surrounding the BBA certificate and the circumstances of the sale for grenfell Tower let me emphasize that the outset that in truth those involved in selecting and
02:35:48 truth those involved in selecting and acquiring the product from AAP approached the acquisition in entirely the wrong way firstly and again this is the point to
02:35:59 firstly and again this is the point to which I shall return in view of the scale and complexity of the proposed refurbishment it must surely be clear that on any view it was essential for
02:36:11 that on any view it was essential for the choice and configuration of the components of the refurbishment to be the subject of a holistic assessment by a fire or facade engineer
02:36:22 a fire or facade engineer however even if no such interval individual were to be instructed it was surely manifestly incumbent on all those concerned including Studio e x over
02:36:34 concerned including Studio e x over Ryden and Harley to check carefully the suitability of the materials to be used and the appropriateness of the proposed configuration to check carefully those matters this is
02:36:48 to check carefully those matters this is perhaps particularly true and uh with all respect to what we heard before the break from Mr Laidlaw particularly true in the case of Harley who as we pointed out in our module 6
02:37:01 who as we pointed out in our module 6 closing was at least a specialist cladding contractor and an experienced industry player whose employees had attended cwct
02:37:12 whose employees had attended cwct meetings where topics such as filler and roots to compliance had been discussed not matters which Harley have addressed in their closings
02:37:23 in their closings as I have already mentioned ADB appendix a itself requires that any test evidence underpinning a decision as to fire resistance of a
02:37:34 decision as to fire resistance of a product should be carefully checked to ensure that it's applicable to the intended use as you know our clients had a technical sales support team in France which could
02:37:47 sales support team in France which could answer queries from purchasers and others and sales staff including Ms French were able to refer queries to that team this is a procedure which
02:37:58 that team this is a procedure which notably was never followed in the case of grenfell tower even though the choice of other products such as the combustible insulation and the proposed configuration of say the architectural
02:38:11 configuration of say the architectural crown
02:38:12 crown clearly demanded the utmost thoroughness in assessing the choice of products there is we submit an inference that both Ryden and Harley anxious as they
02:38:24 both Ryden and Harley anxious as they were to achieve what is euphemistically described as value engineering deliberately failed to ask any question which might have led to the choice of a
02:38:35 which might have led to the choice of a different product or fabrication or system
02:38:39 system and given that as from 2011 the ene classification for acmpe in cassette fabrication started as we explained in
02:38:50 fabrication started as we explained in our written closing started to be to be widely circulated it is inevitable that on inquiry of the team in France any of
02:39:01 on inquiry of the team in France any of those involved in the grenful refurbishment would have received this information so the issue is not what any of those involved in the refurbishment
02:39:13 involved in the refurbishment already knew but why they didn't take the trouble to carry out the checks which ADB requires and which the very complex nature of the design would also
02:39:25 complex nature of the design would also mandate
02:39:28 not only that but as I've already stressed a careful reading of the BBA certificate itself would have put everyone on notice of potential problems
02:39:39 everyone on notice of potential problems and would almost certainly and I put it as high as this have saved the lives of those who died in the fire in section 6 of the certificate it provided explicit help to any purchaser
02:39:53 provided explicit help to any purchaser or user as to the steps which they ought to take to satisfy themselves that the system was appropriate particularly as regards the attainment of sufficient far
02:40:05 regards the attainment of sufficient far resistance and again it's a point that I shall come back to
02:40:14 in these circumstances it is profoundly disappointing that numerous core participants in persist in the unjust allegation that the BBA
02:40:26 the unjust allegation that the BBA certificate was misleading an allegation which we have repeatedly challenged and in relation to which we have set out a cogent case to the contrary the key point which we have made and we submit
02:40:38 point which we have made and we submit is absolutely indisputable is that the certificate related to the product manufactured and sold by AAP namely an ACM panel although the
02:40:51 namely an ACM panel although the certificate Illustrated methods of fabrication and fixing and dealt with aspects such as wind loading it made no representation as to the level of fire resistance which
02:41:04 as to the level of fire resistance which would necessarily be achieved once a panel had been fabricated whether for fixing by rivet or as a cassette moreover the inquiry has numerous
02:41:16 moreover the inquiry has numerous examples of other BBA certificates which are in a similar form to ours and which also made no distinction between the level of resistance to fire which might
02:41:27 level of resistance to fire which might be achieved by different methods of fabrication nor did any of the certificates claim that a panel would achieve a particular European class result in any and every system and in
02:41:40 result in any and every system and in any and every configuration you will remember the evidence of Mr Gregorian of the BBA who was at pains to stress The Limited purpose of the certificate as a product certificate
02:41:53 certificate as a product certificate despite repeated questioning to the contrary
02:41:57 contrary it's particularly sad that continued reference is so regularly made to what is said to be an admission by the president of aapsas Mr Claude
02:42:09 by the president of aapsas Mr Claude Schmidt
02:42:10 Schmidt as to the allegedly misleading nature of the certificate if you accept our primary argument which I've just summarized which is the that
02:42:21 I've just summarized which is the that the certificate was not misleading then the very fact that others have been left with the impression that Mr Schmidt admitted that it was tells you that his evidence needs to be considered with
02:42:33 evidence needs to be considered with very considerable caution regrettably the relevant part of the questioning on day 91 from page four onwards and incidentally at a time prior
02:42:45 onwards and incidentally at a time prior to Mr Gregorian giving evidence the relevant part of the questioning proceeded on the basis that the certificate related to the product in fabricated form
02:42:57 fabricated form Mr Schmidt plainly struggling to answer in French a question posed in English on what we submit was an erroneous basis attempted at page 5 line 7 to challenge
02:43:10 attempted at page 5 line 7 to challenge the question by observing that it was said that one wasn't going to be referring to cassette or rivet he also made the indubitably correct point that he was not himself involved
02:43:23 point that he was not himself involved in the drawing up of the BBA certificate which was of course ultimately the responsibility of the BBA it must also be remembered that it was necessary for us in the course of Mr
02:43:34 necessary for us in the course of Mr Schmidt's evidence to point out in correspondence that there was a discrepancy between the French language version of the word misleading and the word in its normal English usage
02:43:45 word in its normal English usage following which as a result as a result the English version of a number of questions was revised at this point the nub of Mr Schmidt's response on Day 94
02:43:58 nub of Mr Schmidt's response on Day 94 page 65 was that the certificate might be misleading especially if you take the reference to ENB in isolation as
02:44:09 reference to ENB in isolation as applying to any and every fabrication of the product without reading the certificate as a whole at this point he was to the best of his ability identifying precisely
02:44:21 identifying precisely the with respect erroneous approach adopted in the earlier sequence of questions
02:44:28 questions in our respectful submission therefore no weight can be attached to any apparent admission as to the BBA certificate being misleading since the propositions put to Mr Smith Mr Schmidt
02:44:40 propositions put to Mr Smith Mr Schmidt erroneously proceeded on the basis that the certificate related to the product in fabricated form
02:44:58 in our written submissions we have also dealt in considerable detail with the position of Mr Claude Verla we remind you that the inquiry has
02:45:09 we remind you that the inquiry has already acknowledged in correspondence that Council to the inquiry will make no reference in his closing to the reasons why any particular witness has not given oral evidence
02:45:20 oral evidence for present purposes I must be selective in reminding you of a number of key points
02:45:26 points the first is the allegation that Mr Verla manipulated the testing process by increasing the size of the gap between the panel and the
02:45:38 gap between the panel and the substructure this allegation has plainly we suggest not been substantiated we now know from Recently disclosed material emanating
02:45:49 Recently disclosed material emanating from the cstb the testing body that matters such as this were closely monitored by them moreover you will recall that Dr Lane pointed out in the
02:46:00 recall that Dr Lane pointed out in the course of her presentation on day 68 in introducing module 2 that the that the 1994 Connolly report showed that a reduction in the so-called
02:46:13 showed that a reduction in the so-called Gap in other words the width of the cavity will reduce the surface spread of flame over over cladding material as we observed in our module 2 closing this
02:46:25 observed in our module 2 closing this would appear inconsistent with the allegation that for the purpose of cstb testing the width of the cavity was increased artificially in order to improve the outcome
02:46:38 improve the outcome secondly I remind you that Mr Verla did have some grounds for anticipating that a panel of the product could achieve National class zero not least because a
02:46:50 National class zero not least because a similar albeit not identical product known as rb33 had achieved class zero even though the combustible core was wider and the aluminum skin narrower
02:47:02 wider and the aluminum skin narrower than in the case of rb55 and again we submitted a question on that point for Professor Bisby which was not in fact put to him by Council
02:47:13 put to him by Council we submit therefore but the inquiry would not be justified in drawing any adverse inference as to the good faith of Mr Verla at the material time
02:47:25 material time insofar as there is later email correspondence sent by Mr Verla seemingly accepting that he believed that there was a problem in relation to the use of acmp
02:47:36 the use of acmp and indeed in the testing process it is our submission that if that was the view of Mr Verla at the material time
02:47:45 time it represented an over cautious view of The Possession since the continued manufacture and sale of the product was in itself legitimate and did not
02:47:56 in itself legitimate and did not necessarily Prejudice health and safety Above All We submit that Mr verla's Reliance on the ENB result for the
02:48:07 Reliance on the ENB result for the product when fabricated as rivet has received strong support from the outcome of the experiments by professors Bisby and Torero particularly in relation to
02:48:20 and Torero particularly in relation to what Professor Bisby called fixing Case C
02:48:24 C as Bisby acknowledged in his report dated the 15th of December 2021 at paragraph 583 fixing Case C resulted in the cladding
02:48:36 fixing Case C resulted in the cladding Arrangements tested simply never growing to full involvement of the ACM he accepted that this can be attributed to the fact that the rivets mechanically
02:48:47 the fact that the rivets mechanically hold the aluminum skins together and prevent the Skins opening up this in turn reduces the exposed surface area of PE that can burn and also discourages
02:48:59 PE that can burn and also discourages mobilization of molten PE into the drip tray this reduces or slows the supply of fuel to the pool fire burning at the base of the ACM and prevents escalation
02:49:12 base of the ACM and prevents escalation into the cladding system the importance of this evidence is that it shows that the results of these experiments was consistent with the
02:49:23 experiments was consistent with the relatively favorable result obtained by a reynabond PE panel on testing in both 2005 and 2011 where rivet fixings were
02:49:34 2005 and 2011 where rivet fixings were used at the very least the evidence shows that a rhino Bond PE panel was as we have submitted throughout capable of achieving an ENB result and that those
02:49:47 achieving an ENB result and that those concerned at the time could genuinely have formed this view those conclusions are we submit not affected by Professor bisby's speculative comments as to what
02:49:59 bisby's speculative comments as to what might have followed if his actual experiment on fixing KC had continued well into the future a point on which as we have explained fully in our written
02:50:10 we have explained fully in our written closing his own evidence underwent a number of variations foreign
02:50:16 foreign I mentioned previously
02:50:21 that a purchaser of the product would have been content to proceed on the basis of an nc0 certificate even if the product was known in certain
02:50:32 product was known in certain circumstances not necessarily to achieved European Class B if this is right it would follow that the fundamental line of attack against
02:50:45 the fundamental line of attack against AAP said to arise from the non-disclosure of the cassette testing in 2005 can be seen as a non-issue in
02:50:56 in 2005 can be seen as a non-issue in the circumstances that prevailed thereafter and up to the date of the grenful fire itself a project a product which could be regarded as achieving National class zero was widely seen
02:51:10 National class zero was widely seen as being fit to use and AAP was no lot was by no means alone in selling product even if in circumstances if even if
02:51:21 even if in circumstances if even if in certain circumstances the en classification the European classification relating to the specific fabrication or system adopted might be
02:51:32 fabrication or system adopted might be lower than Class B and I would add that even if the BBA had been made aware that in certain circumstances the product would not necessarily have an ENB classification
02:51:45 necessarily have an ENB classification they had evidence that the product was capable of achieving that classification and given that approved document B appendix a expressly acknowledges
02:51:58 expressly acknowledges that variations are entirely foreseeable the BBA ought still to have been prepared to conclude that the product could be regarded as having a class zero
02:52:10 could be regarded as having a class zero surface as mentioned in the BBA certificate especially as the certificate was to go on and advise further testing of the level of fire
02:52:21 further testing of the level of fire resistance of the full cladding system
02:52:25 now I need if I may to go on to discuss to some degree the actual causes of the tragedy at grenfell Tower the first key General point to bring out
02:52:36 the first key General point to bring out here will be what perhaps can be described as design failures I refer here to our oft repeated argument that the essential problem
02:52:47 argument that the essential problem critical from a causative point of view was the failure of all concerned including Studio e x overriden and Harley
02:52:56 Harley to actually comply with the advice in the BBA certificate and to arrange for expert fire assessment of the design and
02:53:07 expert fire assessment of the design and configuration the system the newly of the newly designed facade of the Tower it can be said with confidence that had such a comprehensive fire
02:53:19 that had such a comprehensive fire assessment being carried out the combustible nature of the chosen insulation products incompatible as they were with ADB paragraph 12.7 would at
02:53:31 were with ADB paragraph 12.7 would at least have signaled the need for a complete rethinking of the choice of products and their configuration and the tragedy would then have been avoided
02:53:44 I now go on to deal as I did in the in the written closing with the rather extraordinary position taken by the insulation manufacturers in particular
02:53:55 insulation manufacturers in particular cell attacks and kingspan who will have been all too well aware of the market pressures to utilize less voluminous but therefore combustible
02:54:06 voluminous but therefore combustible products
02:54:08 products these companies claim to derive support for their position from The Bisbee Torero experiments in which similar results were obtained in the use of non-combustible as well as combustible
02:54:20 non-combustible as well as combustible insulation in the first place it cannot be assumed that the outcome of an actual fire such as that which occurred at grenfell
02:54:31 such as that which occurred at grenfell as distinct from in experiments that the outcome of an actual fire would have been the same if non-combustible insulation had been deployed that as we pointed out in our written closing is
02:54:44 pointed out in our written closing is pure speculation and indeed as I shall explain in a moment there is evidence that the outcome would not have been the same
02:54:52 same but secondly and equally importantly the conduct of celotex and kingspan in assuring the market that their products could be used at height
02:55:03 could be used at height we're surely a key factor in the failure to which I have referred to carry out the comprehensive fire assessment which was the critical causative failure in
02:55:15 was the critical causative failure in the case of the grenful fire
02:55:19 next I want to cover briefly the evidence as to the start and spread of the grenful
02:55:31 to the start and spread of the grenful fire which we covered in much greater detail in our written closing Five Points I submit stand out one is that in contrast to so many other fires
02:55:44 that in contrast to so many other fires involving combustible cladding at grenfell the spread of the fire and of the resulting smoke was not only external but also internal and throughout the building a process which
02:55:56 throughout the building a process which resulted from the defective internal compartmentation from which of course AAP was not responsible the compartmentation failures were
02:56:07 the compartmentation failures were acknowledged by the inquiry itself in phase one but In fairness to AAP it's vital at this point be fully acknowledged also in phase two not least
02:56:18 acknowledged also in phase two not least because as Mr Walsh pointed out yesterday
02:56:22 yesterday the compartmentation failures were a key factor in the entire building failure which undermined the stay put strategy secondly
02:56:33 secondly it's worth emphasizing the module 7 evidence as to the contribution to the fire of the apartment contents which in the end were probably more significant
02:56:44 the end were probably more significant in quantitative terms in terms of heat loading than any other Factor thirdly as regards external spread the
02:56:56 thirdly as regards external spread the way in which much of the acmpe was fabricated and configured the crown being an example was so unorthodox as to rebut any allegation of
02:57:07 unorthodox as to rebut any allegation of responsibility on the part of the manufacturer in any event fourthly as regards the contribution of the acmpe in quantitative terms it must
02:57:18 the acmpe in quantitative terms it must be remembered that a significant number of the panels fell away in the course of the fire without having reached full combustion the inquiry having confirmed to us in correspondence that no specific
02:57:31 to us in correspondence that no specific information exists as to the number of panels which fell away fifthly we restate the importance of the role of the combustible insulation
02:57:42 the combustible insulation and that is the topic to which I now turn
02:57:48 turn as we pointed out in our written closing a number of important further points can be made as regards the role of the insulation in the spread of the fire firstly we know from the phase one
02:58:01 firstly we know from the phase one evidence that in general terms the insulation having a low thermal inertia would have ignited quickly in response to the fire as it emerged from the
02:58:13 to the fire as it emerged from the window surrounds secondly we know from bisbee's report again the one dated the 15th of September 2021 that the ignition and spread of the fire
02:58:24 that the ignition and spread of the fire through the ACM panels was significantly affected both by the type of insulation and by the absence of foil faces thus in his section 9
02:58:36 his section 9 entitled conclusions Bisbee States the following three points firstly the ability of the insulation to retain energy within the cladding system and to
02:58:48 energy within the cladding system and to promote more rapid and extensive heating of the ACM is the decisive factor for foil faced insulation products rather than its combustibility per se but two
02:59:00 than its combustibility per se but two in the absence of foil faces or in the case of the kingspan insulation the foil facing being perforated the contribution of energy through the burning of the
02:59:11 of energy through the burning of the combustible insulation products may be significant to the ignition spread and fire growth in the cladding system and three the contribution from the
02:59:22 three the contribution from the combustible insulation without foil faces to the total heat release rate may indeed be comparable to that from the acmpe
02:59:31 acmpe this being because the rapid Heating and ignition of the low thermal inertia insulation in the absence of protection from a foil facer results in widespread
02:59:43 from a foil facer results in widespread flaming over the surface of the insulation with consequent additional heat release and those points you will find
02:59:52 find in The Bisbee report at paragraphs 686 to 689
02:59:59 to 689 in his oral evidence on day 291 at page 40 Professor Bisby himself accepted that if non-combustible insulation had been used
03:00:10 used fire spread through the window surrounds would potentially have been delayed albeit not substantially you'll recall my oft repeated comment
03:00:21 you'll recall my oft repeated comment that a five-minute delay would have been enough to enable the fire service to extinct extinguish the fire whilst it was still contained within flat 16.
03:00:33 was still contained within flat 16. I stress that these points are not made simply to attack the manufacturers of the insulation but because they are highly relevant to the contribution of the insulation to the start and spread
03:00:45 the insulation to the start and spread of the fire an issue which the inquiry itself
03:00:49 itself in its phase one report indicated that it wished to examine further in phase two
03:00:55 two and I add therefore that in our respectful submission Not only was Ms bar wise wrong in her categorization of the role of AAP but she was also wrong
03:01:06 the role of AAP but she was also wrong in her approach to the responsibility of the manufacturers of the insulation as her colleague Mr Williamson himself observed yesterday
03:01:18 observed yesterday the final substantive topic with which I must deal concerns the production of toxic gases which were ultimately of critical significance in the case of
03:01:29 critical significance in the case of many of the fatalities broadly speaking one can say that a number of key issues arise in this connection the first issue as is as to the stage at
03:01:40 the first issue as is as to the stage at which toxic gases were produced an issue which may affect the extent to which such gases may have been causative of the fatalities the second issue is as to the relative
03:01:52 the second issue is as to the relative quantities of the individual gases concerned which may throw light on their individual significance and the third issue is as to the chemical nature of
03:02:03 issue is as to the chemical nature of the relevant gases which may throw sunlight on the actual impact of those individual gases in summary it seems clear that both the combustion of the acmpe and the
03:02:16 combustion of the acmpe and the combustion of the insulation would have given rise to the production of toxic gases in the form of carbon monoxide which can insufficient quantity be fatal
03:02:27 which can insufficient quantity be fatal in their effects on human beings even more dangerous to human life however was the hydrogen cyanide which it is clear was produced only by the insulation and
03:02:38 was produced only by the insulation and not by the acmpe turning to the stage at which the gases were produced it seems likely that this occurred mainly following the re-entry
03:02:50 occurred mainly following the re-entry of the fire perhaps preceded by toxic smoke into the various Apartments however there is as we see it no clear or comprehensive evidence as to the
03:03:01 or comprehensive evidence as to the period of time between the entry of the smoke or fire into a particular flat and the pros and the and the moment of the occurrence of fatalities within that
03:03:13 occurrence of fatalities within that flat it can perhaps be said that it is likely that the process of combustion continued for some time maybe for some considerable time after those inside any
03:03:26 considerable time after those inside any particular flat had sadly passed away and that is not only because of the continuing effects of the combustion of the cladding products but also because
03:03:38 the cladding products but also because of the very considerable additional effect of the Bastion of the apartment contents indeed it seems that at least half of the heat loading occurred as a
03:03:50 half of the heat loading occurred as a result of the combustion of the apartment contents rather than the combustion of the components of the cladding system in our overarching written closing at paragraph 25 and by way of further
03:04:03 paragraph 25 and by way of further clarification of that paragraph We mentioned the evidence of Professor Bisby on page on day 290 and one can see from various passages on pages 19 to 23
03:04:15 from various passages on pages 19 to 23 in the transcript for that day that estimating the contribution of the apartment contents at not less than 50 percent and that of the insulation at up
03:04:27 percent and that of the insulation at up to 10 percent the amount attributable to the acmpe could well have been around 40 percent as we suggested in paragraph 25 of our written closing
03:04:40 of our written closing comparing the production of gases from the insulation and the acmpe respectively the evidence of Professor Purser seems to be that the two cladding
03:04:51 Purser seems to be that the two cladding products were roughly equally responsible for the toxic gases
03:04:59 we note the recent correspondence on behalf of celotex attempting to urge a modification of this conclusion in their favor and the response of Professor Purser concluding that the arguments put
03:05:12 Purser concluding that the arguments put forward in that correspondence do not affect his broad conclusions as between these approaches we support the Purser response we have however highlighted a
03:05:24 response we have however highlighted a number of reasons why the inquiry should hesitate before reaching any firm conclusions on the basis of Professor purse's evidence firstly he acknowledges
03:05:35 purse's evidence firstly he acknowledges that the influence of the acmp would be diminished if the combustion of the PE took place in circumstances which were better ventilated
03:05:47 better ventilated on the face of it and since the PE was on the external side of the cutting system it would seem that this should be treated as better ventilated and Professor
03:05:59 as better ventilated and Professor Purser did not adequately explain why his original finding in that respect was subsequently revised secondly as I've already mentioned Professor Purser
03:06:10 I've already mentioned Professor Purser took no account of the fact that a good number of the acmp panels fell away without achieving full combustion and thirdly Professor purser's conclusions
03:06:21 thirdly Professor purser's conclusions depended on drawing inferences from the so-called bre reconstruction which was an an unsound evidential platform given
03:06:33 an an unsound evidential platform given that the bre reconstruction was in any event very different from the actual fire at grenfell and given also that there was a breakdown in data collection during the Reconstruction period
03:06:46 during the Reconstruction period prior to the final few minutes in any event neither sellotex nor Professor Purser take account of the so-called effectives study
03:06:58 of the so-called effectives study the references inq
03:07:02 3014908 involving experimental tests performed on nine different compositions of ACM panels with several incidents this study showed that acmpe has the
03:07:15 this study showed that acmpe has the lowest carbon monoxide production of the various ACM products and that the carbon monoxide as well as the cyanide production is primarily driven by the
03:07:27 production is primarily driven by the k-15 insulation closely followed by PIR in particular one can see from figure 17 in the effects paper that the emission
03:07:39 in the effects paper that the emission rate of carbon monoxide was much higher in the case of acmp coupled with the insulation compared with the rate observed in other experiments and one
03:07:51 observed in other experiments and one can see from figure 18 that the carbon monoxide concentration produced by a combination of acmpe coupled with k-15 or the PIR is several times higher than
03:08:05 or the PIR is several times higher than in the case of acmp coupled with non-combustible insulation uh two further brief points on this toxicity issue firstly the toxicity of
03:08:18 toxicity issue firstly the toxicity of the combustible insulation was surely far greater than would have been the case if the insulation had been non-combustible as it was in some of the effective experiments
03:08:30 effective experiments and secondly it is reasonable to infer that the insulation manufacturers primarily celatex and kingspan must have been aware of the toxicity of their
03:08:41 been aware of the toxicity of their products as explained in detail in the written closing of BSR Team 2 at paragraphs 161 and following
03:08:54 paragraphs 161 and following so I move towards my concluding remarks I have concentrated in what I have said today on the role of the PE and of the insulation but of course it's right to
03:09:06 insulation but of course it's right to remind you briefly of other important causative factors including the failure to remedy critical far precautions or compartmentation defects I've already mentioned and
03:09:20 defects I've already mentioned and stressed the point about compartmentation uh
03:09:25 uh um but defects such as door closers the um
03:09:30 um criticisms made if you accept them of the smoke control system and the failure to upgrade or refurbish the lifts so we respectfully suggest that in our
03:09:44 so we respectfully suggest that in our various submissions both written and oral including this one we have persuasively answered the numerous criticisms launched in our Direction and
03:09:55 criticisms launched in our Direction and we ask you all please to view those submissions with favor and above all we invite you to judge the conduct of AAP Personnel by reference to
03:10:07 conduct of AAP Personnel by reference to what was known or understood at the time and to Discount the wisdom of hindsight thank you very much well thank you very much Mr hochman
03:10:19 much Mr hochman well it's a little earlier than usual for the break for lunch but I think it's convenient to do that now because the next statement is going to be made by Mr Webb King's Council on behalf of
03:10:31 Webb King's Council on behalf of kingspan and he's going to take more than 10 minutes so we'll rise now and we'll resume please at two o'clock thank you very much