Closing statements from Celotex, BBA, and RBKC on Phase 2 findings, including corporate accountability for dangerous products and systemic regulatory failures.
00:21:26 foreign [Music]
00:21:30 [Music] good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing
00:21:33 hearing today we're going to continue hearing closing statements from various core participants and we're going to begin by hearing a statement from Mr Craig or King's Council on behalf of celotex so
00:21:45 King's Council on behalf of celotex so Mr all when you're ready make your way to the podium and we'll uh afford hearing from you thank you
00:21:56 Mr chairman Miss Estefan and Mr akbore good morning sellotex thanks the inquiry for this opportunity to make a closing statement
00:22:07 opportunity to make a closing statement at the conclusion of phase two celotex welcomes the methodical and rigorous approach that has been taken by the inquiry that was clearly the right approach to
00:22:20 that was clearly the right approach to take when examining the causes of a tragedy of such immense scale and seeking to ensure that no such tragedy occurs again
00:22:31 occurs again celotex repeats its deeper sympathy to the bereaved survivors and all those affected by the grenful tower fire from the outset celatex has been
00:22:43 from the outset celatex has been committed to providing its full cooperation and assistance to this inquiry as well as other official investigations arising out of the fire
00:22:54 investigations arising out of the fire immediately after the fire celotex commenced its own investigations into the supply of its products that were used in the refurbishment of the Tower
00:23:06 used in the refurbishment of the Tower prior to being asked for documents by the inquiry celotex arranged for Relevant documentation to be identified secured and thereafter reviewed by its
00:23:18 secured and thereafter reviewed by its external advisors celotex has been proactive in bringing all relevant information to the attention of the inquiry it has been
00:23:29 attention of the inquiry it has been candid about issues which is current management have uncovered in the course of their investigations and it has taken effective steps to ensure that those
00:23:40 effective steps to ensure that those issues do not reoccur I will return to the issues uncovered by celotex's current management later in this statement it is important that those issues are
00:23:53 it is important that those issues are seen in their proper context in the light of the whole of the evidence which has emerged during phase two in celotex's submission
00:24:04 in celotex's submission that evidence confirms three points of fundamental importance first that any shortcomings on celotex's part had no causative impact on the
00:24:16 part had no causative impact on the specification and use of celetex's products at grenfell Tower second that celatex insulation could safely be used in a cladding system with
00:24:29 safely be used in a cladding system with a combination of other appropriate materials in accordance with the statutory guidance in Force at the time of the refurbishment third that celotex's insulation played
00:24:42 third that celotex's insulation played at most a minor role in the external spread of fire at grenfell Tower the work carried out by the inquiries experts has demonstrated that the
00:24:54 experts has demonstrated that the external fire was driven to an overwhelming extent by iconic's polyethylene cord rainabond ACM cladding panels
00:25:03 panels and not the insulation installed behind those panels as Professor Bisby said rainabond acmpe cladding is a uniquely hazardous product
00:25:15 cladding is a uniquely hazardous product that presents extreme fire hazards and should never be used on building facades given the presence of that cladding on the tower
00:25:26 the tower the fire would have spread in materially the same way whatever insulation was used
00:25:35 sellotex's position in relation to the issues examined during phase two is set out in detail in its various written submissions those include most recently celatex's overarching closing submissions provided
00:25:47 overarching closing submissions provided to the inquiry on the 30th of September celotex's position has been consistent throughout and is strongly supported by the factual and expert evidence heard by
00:25:59 the factual and expert evidence heard by the inquiry in this closing statement I propose to comment briefly on five matters as follows
00:26:08 follows first celatex's role in relation to the refurbishment of grenfell Tower second the regulatory system third the specification and design of the cladding
00:26:19 specification and design of the cladding system at grenfell Tower and the appraisal of that system by rbkc building control fourth celotex's product literature and fifth the expert evidence as to external
00:26:30 fifth the expert evidence as to external fire spread I turn first to sellotex's role celotex's connection with grenfell Tower was as the manufacturer of two
00:26:41 was as the manufacturer of two insulation products used in the refurbishment rs-5000 which was used as insulation in the cladding system and tb4000 which was sellotex now understands used to fill
00:26:53 sellotex now understands used to fill gaps in the window surrounds at the tower
00:26:56 tower both products were PIR A combustible form of insulation their combustibility was clearly highlighted in sellotex's health and safety data sheet which was
00:27:08 health and safety data sheet which was available on celotex's website and expressly cited in sellotex's product literature including the RS 5000 data sheet on which certain construction professionals involved in the
00:27:20 professionals involved in the refurbishment claimed to have relied as the manufacturer of a single component used in the cladding system at grenfell Tower celotex was not responsible for the
00:27:33 celotex was not responsible for the design or compliance of that system the design and compliance of the system was the responsibility of the specialist designers contractors and Consultants engaged on the refurbishment including
00:27:45 engaged on the refurbishment including Studio e as Architects Ryden as the main contractor Harley is the cladding subcontractor and exetera as the fire engineer
00:27:54 engineer each of those construction professionals had specific responsibility in relation to the design and construction of the cladding facade under the terms of their respective contracts they were
00:28:07 respective contracts they were responsible for ensuring that the cladding system complied with the building regulations sellotex was not part of the design or construction team on the grenfell Tower project celatex is not an architect
00:28:19 project celatex is not an architect designer building contractor or fire engineer it does not design manufacture Supply or install cladding systems and it did not do so at Grandville Tower it also does not install insulation and it
00:28:32 also does not install insulation and it did not do that at grenful Tower celotex's sole role in relation to the refurbishment was as the manufacturer if of insulation specified and used by
00:28:43 of insulation specified and used by others in the exterior wall Construction celatex was never asked to verify or provide assurance that the cladding system designed for or installed at grenful Tower was confined and it did
00:28:56 grenful Tower was confined and it did not do so
00:28:58 not do so the market for cladding systems was and is a specialist one celotex reasonably took the view that it was for designers contractors and specialist Consultants to specify design
00:29:10 specialist Consultants to specify design and construct the cutting system on any particular project and to verify compliance of any such system with building regulations as the manufacturer of a single
00:29:21 as the manufacturer of a single component of a multi-component system sellotex could not reasonably have been expected to input into the design of that system or ensure compliance with the system while celatex was provided with some
00:29:34 while celatex was provided with some information about the proposed cutting system at grenfell Tower it was not privy to full details of the design process and had no access to the contractual documents governing the
00:29:45 contractual documents governing the refurbishment or the NBS specification which governed the selection of products moreover celatex had no dealings with the architect or fire engineer whose
00:29:56 the architect or fire engineer whose input would have been relevant to assessing the cladding system's compliance with building regulations
00:30:04 I turned then to the regulatory system now the evidence heard during module 6 and 7 throws important light on the regulatory regime governing the fire
00:30:17 regulatory regime governing the fire safety of high-rise buildings the following matters are sellotex submits clear first the building regulations and
00:30:28 first the building regulations and statutory guidance in Force at the time of the refurbishment permitted the use of combustible insulation in the cladding system installed on a building over 18 meters in three situations
00:30:40 over 18 meters in three situations one where the complete cladding system was shown by full-scale fire tests in accordance with bs-8414 to meet specific performance criteria known as the br135 criteria 2 where a desktop study was
00:30:54 criteria 2 where a desktop study was obtained from a specialist fire engineer confirming that the cladding system would have tested meet the br135 criteria and three were a holistic fire engineering assessment was obtained
00:31:05 engineering assessment was obtained which confirmed that the cladding system met the requirements of the building regulations taking account of the adequacy of the fire prevention measures in the building as a whole there was at the time of the
00:31:17 there was at the time of the refurbishment of fourth route to compliance known as the linear route but that only applied where the insulation used in the cladding system was of limited combustibility that route was
00:31:28 limited combustibility that route was not therefore available where combustible insulation like PIR was used neither rs-5000 nor any other celotex insulation product was marketed as being
00:31:42 insulation product was marketed as being a material of limited combustibility or as being capable of meeting the linear route to compliance each of the routes to compliance I've mentioned was recognized in approved
00:31:54 mentioned was recognized in approved document B which contained the government's statutory guidance concerning the fire safety of buildings this includes desktop studies approved document B acknowledged that
00:32:06 approved document B acknowledged that the performance of materials products and structures could be assessed from test evidence by suitably qualified fire safety engineers although the use of desktop studies has
00:32:19 although the use of desktop studies has been criticized the evidence shows that they were an established route to achieving compliance at the time of the refurbishment several of the inquiries experts
00:32:30 several of the inquiries experts confirmed that desktop studies had become common by that time including Mr Hyde the architectural expert Mr Sackler the cladding expert Ms Menzies the
00:32:41 the cladding expert Ms Menzies the building control expert and Dr Lane the fire engineering expert that is unsurprising given the unfeasibility of carrying out a full-scale bs-8414 test of every
00:32:53 full-scale bs-8414 test of every possible combination of components in a cladding system
00:32:58 what whatever criticism might be leveled against the fire engineering analyzes underlying particular desktop studies that is a matter for the fire Engineers
00:33:10 that is a matter for the fire Engineers concerned and not the manufacturer of an individual component of a multi-component cladding system assessed by way of such a study manufacturers were entitled to operate
00:33:22 manufacturers were entitled to operate within the parameters of accepted industry practice and to rely on fire Engineers to carry out desktop Assessments in accordance with appropriate fire engineering principles
00:33:33 appropriate fire engineering principles it's also important to note that it was clear from the building regulations that whatever route to compliance was followed
00:33:41 followed the external walls of a building must adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls that was an overarching requirement that governed the fire safety of every
00:33:52 governed the fire safety of every external wall Construction
00:33:56 the regulatory principles I have outlined were or should have been known to any competent construction professional at the time of the refurbishment however a number of construction
00:34:08 however a number of construction professionals involved in the refurbishment have sought to rely on alleged flaws in the drafting of approved document B to excuse their failure to have proper regard to the
00:34:19 failure to have proper regard to the applicable principles when designing and constructing the cladding system at Granville Tower these construction professionals have in particular sought to rely on alleged
00:34:30 particular sought to rely on alleged confusion between the concepts of limited combustibility and class naught to justify their design and construction of the non-compliant cladding system at Granville Tower
00:34:42 Granville Tower they suggest that this alleged confusion excuses their misapplication of the linear route to compliance celatex invites the inquiry to reject these
00:34:53 invites the inquiry to reject these submissions so far as the use of insulation is concerned the guidance in approved document B was clear in a building above 18 meters insulation
00:35:07 in a building above 18 meters insulation could only be used in accordance with the linear route if it was of limited combustibility which was a defined term the definition made clear that limited combustibility was a separate concept
00:35:18 combustibility was a separate concept and was distinct from class naught which was separately defined a clear distinction was drawn in approved document B between these two concepts they were not interchangeable if following the linear root class
00:35:31 if following the linear root class naught was not a relevant Criterion for use of insulation under the linear root class not applied only to the external surface of a wall in the case of a cladding system that meant the external
00:35:44 cladding system that meant the external surface of the cladding panel and not the insulation behind the cladding panel as celatex explains in its written submissions class naught was a relevant performance
00:35:56 class naught was a relevant performance Criterion for insulation in other contexts
00:36:01 contexts however under the linear root as I've said classlord applied only to the external surfaces and not the insulation any competent construction professional should have known this insofar as there
00:36:14 should have known this insofar as there may have been confusion within the industry about the distinction between Class naught and limited combustibility that was or should have been clarified by Guidance that was in wide circulation
00:36:26 by Guidance that was in wide circulation at the time of the refurbishment in particular a guidance note issued by the building controller lines warned that rigid foam insulin such as PIR did not meet The Limited combustibility
00:36:38 not meet The Limited combustibility requirements of approved document B and should not be accepted as satisfying the linear route to compliance similar warnings were given in other guidance available at the time
00:36:49 available at the time it therefore was or should have been clear to any construction professional involved in the refurbishment the combustible insulation such as rs-5000 could only be used in the cladding
00:37:01 could only be used in the cladding system if that system was shown by testing or assessment to meet the br135 criteria or a holistic fire engineering study was undertaken of the building as
00:37:12 study was undertaken of the building as a whole
00:37:14 a whole now it's fair to say that there was more room for debate about the guidance in approved document B concerning the use of cladding panels in a building above
00:37:25 of cladding panels in a building above 18 meters
00:37:27 18 meters the evidence heard in module 6 and 7 highlighted the potential ambiguity about whether and how specific provisions of approved document B applied to the core of a composite
00:37:40 applied to the core of a composite cladding panel this included ambiguity but about whether the core of a composite cladding panel comprised filler material and was therefore required to be of limited combustibility
00:37:51 required to be of limited combustibility if the building designer was following the linear route whilst central government is responsible for for failing to address this potential ambiguity before the grenful
00:38:03 potential ambiguity before the grenful tower fire as the department for leveling up has accepted celotex agrees with the Department that a competent professional
00:38:14 a competent professional applying their mind to any confusion caused by the word filler and considering whether to use an ACM panel with a combustible core should have concluded that such a panel
00:38:27 should have concluded that such a panel could not meet the functional requirements of the building regulations this was all should have been clear to any competent construction professional from warnings given in approved document
00:38:38 from warnings given in approved document B and other industry guidance about the hazards of using combustible materials in a cladding system indeed the building control Alliance guidance to which I have referred
00:38:49 guidance to which I have referred advised in clear terms that if following the linear route materials of limited combustibility should be used for all elements of the cladding System including the cladding panels
00:39:03 including the cladding panels the same guidance expressly noted that a surface spread of flame classification such as class naught did not infer any resistance to combustibility a composite cladding panel with a class null
00:39:15 cladding panel with a class null classification could not therefore be assumed to be safe if it contained a polyethylene core had a construction professional applied their mind to the available guidance and
00:39:27 their mind to the available guidance and the functional requirements of the building regulations they should have concluded that the polyethylene core rhinobond ACM cladding panels proposed for use at grenful Tower could not safely be used in compliance
00:39:39 could not safely be used in compliance with building regulations it follows as Professor Bisby said that any perceived ambiguity in the wording of approved document be cannot credibly
00:39:50 of approved document be cannot credibly be used to absolve design or construction Professionals of their responsibility for failings as regards installation of unacceptably dangerous
00:40:01 installation of unacceptably dangerous external cladding on buildings there is furthermore no interpretation of approved document B which permitted combustible insulation such as PIR to be
00:40:12 combustible insulation such as PIR to be used in a cladding system on a high-rise Building without further testing or assessment
00:40:19 I turn then to design and construction of the clouding system at grenfell Tower had the Construction and building control professionals involved in the refurbishment paid proper regard to the
00:40:33 refurbishment paid proper regard to the regulatory requirements I've outlined it would have been clear to them that the cladding system designed for grenfell Tower was not compliant and should be redesigned instead the relevant professionals paid
00:40:47 instead the relevant professionals paid scant or no regard to the functional requirements of the building regulations or the applicable guidance their knowledge and understanding of the building regulations and of approved document b or shown in evidence to be
00:40:59 document b or shown in evidence to be very poor or non-existent among other things the construction professionals gave no proper consideration to which of any potential route to compliance they were following
00:41:10 route to compliance they were following they had no regard to the fact that the insulation and cladding panels were combustible they did not consider what impact that combustibility would have on compliance with a cladding system with
00:41:21 compliance with a cladding system with the functional requirements of the building regulations they failed to appreciate that the linear route to compliance was unavailable because of the celetex insulation they had selected they failed to recognize that the
00:41:32 they failed to recognize that the polyethylene called ACM cladding panels they had chosen were so highly combustible that the panels could not meet the requirement of the building regulations that the external walls of a building must adequately resist the
00:41:44 building must adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and finally they undertook no assessment of the fire performance of the cadding system as a whole whether by way of a bs-8414 test desktop study or otherwise
00:41:56 bs-8414 test desktop study or otherwise these matters were not sellotex's responsibility they represent fundamental failings on the part of the Construction and building control professionals who were
00:42:07 building control professionals who were responsible for the design construction and Appraisal of the cladding facade at grenfell Tower this includes in particular Studio e Ryden Harley exiver and rbkc building
00:42:20 Ryden Harley exiver and rbkc building control
00:42:21 control the evidence heard by this inquiry demonstrates Beyond doubt that those professionals lacked the necessary skills knowledge and competence to carry out their respective functions
00:42:34 out their respective functions celotex has identified in its written submissions the many serious failings by the Construction and building control professionals involved in the refurbishment
00:42:45 refurbishment same failings are identified in submissions made by other core participants including BSR teams one and two
00:42:54 two importantly the failings identified by sellotex are all supported by the expert evidence of the inquiry's own experts who have been trenches in their
00:43:06 who have been trenches in their criticism of the incompetence displayed by the professionals responsible for the design construction and Appraisal of the cladding facade at Granville Tower
00:43:17 cladding facade at Granville Tower in brief summary the failings by the Construction and building control professionals that are Apparent from the evidence include the following as regards Exeter they failed
00:43:29 following as regards Exeter they failed to produce an adequate fire safety strategy despite having agreed as the designated fire engineer to produce a detailed fire safety strategy for the development of the the
00:43:41 development of the the refurbishment which would ensure a high standard of Fire and Life Safety for the occupants of the building Exeter failed to undertake any assessment whatsoever of the cladding
00:43:54 assessment whatsoever of the cladding system the despite knowing that the refurbishment involved overcladding of the tower to make matters worse exuber wrongly stated in draft five strategy reports which they never completed that
00:44:07 reports which they never completed that the proposed changes would have no adverse effect on the building in relation to external fire spread Mr Ashton the fire engineer who authored these draft reports admitted in evidence
00:44:19 these draft reports admitted in evidence that he knew the polyethylene was highly combustible and by polyethylene called cladding panels could exacerbate the spread of fire over external walls
00:44:30 spread of fire over external walls as regards Studio e The Architects they specified combustible insulation for use in the cladding system without considering the fire performance of the insulation or the compliance of a
00:44:41 insulation or the compliance of a cladding system incorporating that insulation they also selected raynabond acmpe cladding panels without any adequate understanding or investigation of the fire performance of those panels
00:44:52 of the fire performance of those panels or whether a cladding system incorporating the panels would comply with building regulations the evidence showed that studio e lacked any meaningful understanding of the fire safety provisions of the building
00:45:03 safety provisions of the building regulations and approved document B Studio he never properly applied their minds to which route to compliance was being followed at grenfell Tower
00:45:14 being followed at grenfell Tower as regards Harley The Specialist cladding contractor they proposed the use of RS 5000 in the cladding system at grenfell Tower without undertaking any investigation of
00:45:25 without undertaking any investigation of the product's Via performance Harley also strongly pushed for the use of acmpe cladding panels despite the hazards posed by such panels
00:45:37 despite the hazards posed by such panels as noted by BSR Team 1 Harley appears to have been actually aware of those hazards at the time Harley's design manager Mr alcantel Jones admitted in an email exchange with
00:45:51 Jones admitted in an email exchange with other members of the design team during the refurbishment that the reinabond acmp cladding panels would be gone rather quickly in a fire Mr Alcatel Jones told the inquiry when
00:46:03 Mr Alcatel Jones told the inquiry when giving evidence that this was a fact known throughout the industry this evidence cannot be explained away as Harley now submits
00:46:14 as Harley now submits furthermore the inquiry's cladding expert Mr Sackler confirmed that any cladding contractor should have known of the dangers posed by acmp cladding panels by the time of the refurbishment
00:46:26 panels by the time of the refurbishment and should have concluded that the use of such panels at grenfell Tower would be unsafe
00:46:33 be unsafe and would not comply with building regulations Harley's criticisms of Mr sackler's evidence are sellotex suggests misplaced
00:46:44 Harley's contention Advanced yesterday that it was not responsible for the fire safety of the cladding facade and not required even to consider the building regulations is celotex submits plainly
00:46:58 regulations is celotex submits plainly incorrect
00:46:59 incorrect Mr Ray Bailey accepted in evidence that Harley had an obligation to comply with the building regulations that must include the functional requirements and
00:47:10 include the functional requirements and the fire safety Provisions in approved document B
00:47:15 I turned to Ryden despite being the main contractor with overall responsibility for design and construction of the refurbishment Ryden
00:47:26 construction of the refurbishment Ryden gave no thought to the fire performance a compliance of either the insulation or the cladding panels use the grenful tower
00:47:33 tower Ryden nevertheless intervened in value engineering discussions in mid-2014 to Advocate strongly for the use of acmpe cladding panels in the face of
00:47:45 cladding panels in the face of reluctance from rbkc's planners ryden's motivation in doing so was to secure approval for the cheapest type of cladding so as to enable Ryden to recoup
00:47:56 cladding so as to enable Ryden to recoup a shortfall in his budget caused by a costing error in its tender ryden's failure to check the suitability of the cladding panels that it was proposing should be used was clearly
00:48:08 proposing should be used was clearly negligent
00:48:10 negligent the evidence shows that ryden's Personnel was so poorly trained and had so little knowledge of design and compliance that they were unable to carry out any effect of supervision and oversight of the subcontractors and
00:48:22 oversight of the subcontractors and Consultants working on the refurbishment including Studio e and Harley indeed ryden's Witnesses admitted that their practice was to rely on building
00:48:34 their practice was to rely on building control to check compliance because Ryden lacked the knowledge and expertise to do so itself it was clearly wrong for Ryden to rely on an external regulator
00:48:47 Ryden to rely on an external regulator to perform what was one of ryden's own essential responsibilities as the main contractor on the project ryden's negligence extended to the
00:48:59 ryden's negligence extended to the wrongful design and construction of the window surrounds on the tower Ryden was responsible for sellotex tb4000 and other combustible insulation being used to fill gaps in the window
00:49:11 being used to fill gaps in the window surrounds
00:49:13 surrounds that was contrary to the contractual specification which required non-combustible insulation to be used in gaps and was moreover not compliant with approved document B
00:49:24 approved document B the wrongful use of combustible insulation in the window surrounds was significant as the inquiries experts confirmed it meant that there was a disproportionately high probability of
00:49:36 disproportionately high probability of an internal fire near a window spreading into the cladding system as in fact happened on the night of the fire the cell attacks tb4000 used in the
00:49:47 the cell attacks tb4000 used in the window surrounds was purchased by one of Ryden subcontractors SD Plastering from a builder's Merchant celetex did not know and had no means of knowing that tb4000 was purchased and
00:50:00 knowing that tb4000 was purchased and used in the refurbishment celotex only learned that this product had been used after the fire the inappropriate use of tb4000 at renfell Tower was a ryden's
00:50:11 renfell Tower was a ryden's responsibility
00:50:14 as regards rbkc building control they failed to carry out any adequate investigation inspection or assessment of the cadding facade in serious breach
00:50:26 of the cadding facade in serious breach of their responsibility as the designated building control body for the refurbishment the extents of failings by its building Control Department have been admitted by
00:50:38 Control Department have been admitted by rbkc which accepts that the completion certificate issued in July 2016 by rbkc building control should never have been issued
00:50:50 issued the evidence shows that rbkc's building Control Department was poorly managed systemically under-result and ill-equipped to carry out its functions
00:51:01 ill-equipped to carry out its functions the building control officer allocated to the refurbishment Mr Hoban was unfit for the task he had no prior experience of high-rise residential buildings he was
00:51:12 residential buildings he was inadequately trained and lacked relevant knowledge about the fire safety requirements for cladding systems in buildings above 18 meters in his expert report
00:51:24 in his expert report Mr Hyatt said that the grenful Tower refurbishment project had been run and delivered in a chaotic manner and that the numerous failings by the
00:51:36 the numerous failings by the professionals responsible for the project
00:51:38 project represented a serious indictment of the services they had provided there is no doubt that if the relevant professionals had acted competently the
00:51:50 professionals had acted competently the design of the cladding facade would have been overhauled and the unsafe construction and consequent fire would have been prevented
00:52:00 I turn next to seller Texas product literature
00:52:10 some construction professionals have sought to argue that they were misled by celotex's product literature into believing that use of RS 5000 in the
00:52:21 believing that use of RS 5000 in the cladding system at grenfell Tower was compliant
00:52:26 compliant however for the reasons set up by celotex in its written submissions there is no reliable evidence that anyone from Studio e Harley or Ryden
00:52:38 anyone from Studio e Harley or Ryden read the RS 5000 product literature let alone relied upon that literature or was misled by it nor is there any reliable evidence that
00:52:49 nor is there any reliable evidence that anyone else involved in the refurbishment was misled by the RS 5000 product literature sellotex respectfully suggests that the construction professionals involved in
00:53:01 construction professionals involved in the refurbishment cannot credibly contend that their design and construction of a non-compliant cladding system can be explained by their Reliance on
00:53:13 explained by their Reliance on sellotex's product literature
00:53:17 RS 5000 was marketed from August 2014 on the basis that it had been Incorporated within a cladding system which had been
00:53:28 within a cladding system which had been demonstrated to meet the br3 br135 criteria by way of a test to be a 8414 part two
00:53:37 part two the rs-5000 product literature clearly stated across multiple documents that the fire performance and classification report issued for the product only
00:53:48 report issued for the product only related to the components of the system described in the literature and that any changes to the components listed would need to be considered by the building designer
00:54:01 designer this accurately reflected the requirement in approved document B for any cladding system containing combustible insulation in a building above 18 meters to be shown by test or assessment to
00:54:13 to be shown by test or assessment to meet the br135 criteria celotex produced a rain screen cladding compliance guide which Drew specific attention to the requirements imposed by
00:54:26 attention to the requirements imposed by approved document B for the exterior walls of the building over 18 meters the risk of external fire spreading cladding construction and the importance of building designers ensuring that any
00:54:37 building designers ensuring that any cladding system incorporating RS5 RS 5000 met the br135 criteria the rain screen cladding compliance guide was a key part of the RS 5000
00:54:49 guide was a key part of the RS 5000 product literature and was distributed along with other product literature to sellotex's customers including in the case of the
00:55:00 including in the case of the refurbishment Harley
00:55:03 criticism has been leveled against some of the celotex product literature for referring to rs-5000 as being suitable or acceptable for use in buildings above 18 meters
00:55:16 18 meters sellotex submits that these criticisms are misplaced references to RS 5000 being suitable or acceptable for use should have been read and understood in
00:55:27 should have been read and understood in the context of each product document as a whole alongside other statements made in the product literature describing the basis for RS 5000 suitability for use in
00:55:38 basis for RS 5000 suitability for use in buildings above 18 meters namely that the product had been Incorporated in a particular cladding system that had met the br135 criteria by way of a BSA 4 and 4 part 2 test
00:55:51 4 part 2 test any competent construction professional would have understood that that RS 5000 suitability for use in any other cladding system needed to be separately assessed by the project designer
00:56:04 assessed by the project designer a competent construction professional would have properly understood the building regulations and guidance and read the rs-5000 product literature against that background carefully and in
00:56:16 against that background carefully and in full and not relied on single words in isolation and out of context furthermore the suitable for use language in the RS 5000 product
00:56:27 language in the RS 5000 product literature must be understood in the context of the growing use of desktop studies at the time RS 5000 was launched by August 2014
00:56:39 by August 2014 desktop studies had become a common method for verifying the compliance of the cladding system prior to launching rs-5000 celotex had been advised by the bre that widening
00:56:51 been advised by the bre that widening the scope of application of a bs-8414 test via field of application reports as desktop studies were also known while standard practice advice to similar effect was given to
00:57:04 advice to similar effect was given to sellotex by specialist fire Consultants as well as by the national house building Council and in this context RS 5000 was suitable or acceptable for use in buildings above
00:57:16 or acceptable for use in buildings above 18 meters
00:57:18 18 meters so long as as celotex warned the building designer considered the effect of changes to the components with which rs-5000 had been tested and obtained any
00:57:30 rs-5000 had been tested and obtained any necessary assessment in relation to those changes
00:57:36 now celotex recognizes as it has from the outset of this inquiry that the cladding system in which RS 5000 had been successfully tested in May
00:57:47 5000 had been successfully tested in May 2014 was misdescribed in the RS 5000 product literature and in the test classification reports published by the bre
00:57:57 bre in particular those documents omitted reference to the use of thinner cladding panels at certain levels of the test rig behind which was installed a layer of magnesium oxide board
00:58:10 magnesium oxide board this misdescription was previously unknown to cele Texas current management the issue was identified in the course of celotex's own investigations
00:58:21 of celotex's own investigations following the grenfell tower fire once established the issue was reported in January 2018 prior to commencement of the phase one hearings to the inquiry to
00:58:33 the phase one hearings to the inquiry to the Metropolitan Police to trading standards to the ministry of housing communities and local government and to the bre
00:58:40 the bre the issue was also publicly announced on seller Texas website and steps were taken to notify customers contractors and developers known to have used RS 5000
00:58:51 5000 and desktop study providers were also notified insofar as they were known to have been provided with copies of the bre reports
00:59:01 celotex reiterates its acknowledgment that the misdescription of the tested system in the product literature in the bre reports involved unacceptable conduct on the part of a number of
00:59:14 conduct on the part of a number of former celatex employees and should not have occurred however
00:59:19 however this misdescription had no causative impact on the specification and use of RS 5000 at rental Tower there is no evidence that any
00:59:31 there is no evidence that any construction professional involved in the refurbishment read let alone relied upon the description of the test of of the tested system in the product literature or the bre reports
00:59:44 literature or the bre reports indeed as I've already explained the evidence before the inquiry shows that none of the construction professionals read or relied upon those documents in any meaningful respect at all
00:59:57 any meaningful respect at all the misdescription of the tested system did not therefore affect the way in which the cladding system at grenfell Tower was specified designed or
01:00:08 Tower was specified designed or constructed even if the construction professionals had compared the system described in the RS 5000 product literature all the bre reports with the system proposed for
01:00:20 reports with the system proposed for Grandville Tower it would have been apparent to them that the system described was so substantially different that it could not be relied upon to justify compliance of the system at
01:00:32 justify compliance of the system at grenfell Tower no competent construction professional could have relied on the system described in the product literature and Bre reports to validate compliance of
01:00:44 Bre reports to validate compliance of the very different system designed and constructed at Grenville Tower
01:00:50 celetex has taken concerted steps to enhance its procedures and processes since the issues concerning the testing and marketing of RS 5000 came to light
01:01:01 and marketing of RS 5000 came to light this has been explained by sellotex in its evidence and in previous submissions celotex has provided further detail of the steps it has taken in a witness
01:01:13 the steps it has taken in a witness statement provided to the inquiry on the 1st of November in response to the inquiry's request for statements from core participants about work undertaken since the fire
01:01:25 the steps taken by celetex include the recruitment of new Technical and operational management implementation of additional training procedures introduction of a new quality
01:01:37 procedures introduction of a new quality assurance system and improvements in cele Texas testing processes and procedures in addition as previously explained to
01:01:48 in addition as previously explained to the inquiry celatex commissioned another bs-8414 test replicating as closely as possible the system described in the rs-5000 product literature and Bre
01:01:59 rs-5000 product literature and Bre reports
01:02:01 reports this test showed that the retested system met the br135 criteria thereby confirming that rs-5000 could safely be
01:02:12 confirming that rs-5000 could safely be used in the system as described in the product literature in accordance with the statutory guidance in Force at the time of the refurbishment the bs-8414 tests carried out by the
01:02:25 the bs-8414 tests carried out by the government following the grandfather fire
01:02:27 fire also confirmed that RS 5000 could safely be used in the cladding system with an appropriate combination of other materials
01:02:36 materials the government test of the cladding system incorporating rs-5000 behind ACM cladding panels with an A2 rated core was shown to meet the br135 criteria
01:02:53 I turn finally to the expert evidence as to external fire spread [Music]
01:03:00 [Music] Professor bisby's module 7 evidence and the testing program that underpins his conclusions confirmed that the external spread of fire at grenfell Tower was driven by
01:03:13 fire at grenfell Tower was driven by iconics raynorbond ACM cladding panels and not the insulation behind those panels
01:03:19 panels Professor bisby's phase two work fully corroborates the finding in the inquiries phase one report that the principal reason for the spread of fire up around and down the tower was
01:03:31 up around and down the tower was iconic's raynorbond acmpe cladding panels
01:03:35 panels as Professor Bisby said rainabond acmpe is a uniquely hazardous product that presents extreme fire hazards and should never be used on building facades the
01:03:47 never be used on building facades the product is clearly incapable of complying with the functional requirements of the building regulations raynabond acmpe contains a core of
01:03:58 raynabond acmpe contains a core of polyethylene which is highly combustible and as Professor Bisby explained melts drips and flows whilst burning at an elevated temperature the heat of combustion of the
01:04:10 the heat of combustion of the polyethylene core is comparable to that of diesel fuel and is the highest of all materials used on the cladding for solid at rainfall Tower the polyethylene core will ignite at
01:04:21 the polyethylene core will ignite at comparatively low heat fluxes meaning that it would ignite in almost any cladding fire scenario of all the products used in the cladding system at grenfell Tower rhinobond acmpe
01:04:33 system at grenfell Tower rhinobond acmpe had the largest potential to contribute to the spread and growth of fire and was the largest contributor to energy release within the cladding system on the night of the fire
01:04:45 the night of the fire by contrast RS 5000 does not melt and drip when it burns rather it Charles and has a comparatively low heat release relate rate
01:04:57 relate rate it also releases energy over a greater period whereas raynabond acmpe Burns very quickly and vigorously that is one of the reasons why raynabond
01:05:10 that is one of the reasons why raynabond acmpe is a uniquely hazardous product in Professor bisbee's words rainabond acmpe is a very very burny material
01:05:21 is a very very burny material there are few Construction Products intended for use on the outside of a building that Professor Bisby had ever seen burn with such intensity he explained that every time he ran an
01:05:33 he explained that every time he ran an experiment to full escalation of Reign upon acmpe he was surprised and alarmed reinabond acmpe is especially lethal in
01:05:44 reinabond acmpe is especially lethal in cassette form as was installed on grenful Tower Professor Bisbee explained that the inside of each cassette provides a perfect container for collecting melting
01:05:56 perfect container for collecting melting and dripping polyethylene this creates a very efficient system for in Professor bisby's words the worst possible fire by providing a mechanism
01:06:07 possible fire by providing a mechanism for collecting pool fires within the cladding those pool fires then have the effect of generating upwards fire spread in the light of Professor bisby's
01:06:18 in the light of Professor bisby's thorough analysis his conclusion that reinabond acmpe are not the insulation in the cladding system was the primary and dominant cause of the spread of fire at grenfell Tower is unassailable
01:06:31 at grenfell Tower is unassailable the evidence is absolutely clear molten and dripping polyethylene from burning Raina Bond acmp drove the fire up around and down the tower
01:06:42 up around and down the tower the combustibility of the insulation in the cladding system played only a minor role in the vertical spread of fire and no direct role at all in the horizontal and downward spread of fire the
01:06:54 and downward spread of fire the horizontal and downward spread of fire at grenful Tower was the direct consequence of the presence of the crown at the top of the building that was comprised of fins of rainabond
01:07:07 that was comprised of fins of rainabond acmpe with no insulation and as the chairman found in the inquiries phase one report and as Professor Bisby explained in his
01:07:18 Professor Bisby explained in his evidence
01:07:19 evidence the crown provided a mechanism by which the fire could go around the building as it did the melting and dripping polyethylene from the rainabond acmp flowed downwards igniting fires low down
01:07:32 flowed downwards igniting fires low down the building which then traveled back up the building thereby alone the flame front to progress diagonally across each face of the Tower RS 5000 had no direct involvement in
01:07:45 RS 5000 had no direct involvement in that process the horizontal and downward progression of Fire
01:07:50 of Fire was simply a manifestation of molten polyethylene flowing downwards from the top of the building the horizontal and downward fire spread would not have occurred without
01:08:02 would not have occurred without rainabond acmpe even as regards vertical fire spread the role played by insulation was hugely overshadowed by the raynerbond ACM PE
01:08:14 overshadowed by the raynerbond ACM PE cladding panels which were by a considerable margin the most important factor in vertical fire spread in Professor bisby's view the contribution from burning insulation to
01:08:25 contribution from burning insulation to Vertical fire spread was less than 10 percent and could have been as little as two percent Professor Bisby further showed that substituting non-combustible insulation
01:08:37 substituting non-combustible insulation for rs-5000 in test rigs with raynabond acmpe made no material difference to the speed of the spread of Fire indeed test rigs with non-combustible
01:08:50 indeed test rigs with non-combustible mineral wool insulation grew to full involvement of the rhinobond acmpe more rapidly than those with the foil-faced combustible insulation products
01:09:02 combustible insulation products this Accords with the results of the government's bs-8414 testing of acmpe cladding systems after the grenfell tower fire those tests fail to meet the br135
01:09:14 those tests fail to meet the br135 criteria irrespective of whether the insulation was combustible or non-combustible and indeed the system tested with non-combustible insulation failed earlier than the system tested with PIR
01:09:28 it is therefore clear Beyond doubt that the nature and speed of the spread of fire on grenfell Tower was caused by iconic's raynerbond ACM PE cladding
01:09:39 iconic's raynerbond ACM PE cladding panels and not not the type of insulation behind them furthermore any other insulation would have performed in much the same way or worse
01:09:52 now the evidence heard during module 2 showed that arconic knew years before the grenfell Tower of fire that rainabond acmp was inherently dangerous
01:10:03 rainabond acmp was inherently dangerous especially in cassette form and that the product would not pass the bs-8414 test and was unsuitable for use on building facades
01:10:12 facades iconic however failed to warn the market about these matters and continued selling rainabond acmpe in the United Kingdom on the basis of a BBA certificate and product literature which
01:10:24 certificate and product literature which to iconic's knowledge misrepresented the product's true fire performance despite this arconic continues to protest its innocence before this
01:10:35 protest its innocence before this inquiry
01:10:37 inquiry those protestations should sell a text submits be rejected the evidence against iconic is overwhelming that evidence is recounted in celotex's written submissions and the
01:10:48 in celotex's written submissions and the submissions of other core participants celotex agrees as stated by BSR Team 1 that the evidence of iconic's knowledge of the True Performance of its cassette
01:10:59 of the True Performance of its cassette panel is damning and that iconic's knowing deception of the BBA and of the design team working on the refurbishment makes it primarily responsible for the spread and growth of fire at grenfell
01:11:11 spread and growth of fire at grenfell Tower
01:11:13 Tower other entities who share responsibility for the spread and growth of the fire comprise the Construction and building control professionals I have mentioned including in particular exiver Studio e
01:11:24 including in particular exiver Studio e Ryden Harley and rbkc building control
01:11:30 in conclusion sir celotex wishes to thank the panel and the inquiry legal team for the care and diligence with which they have
01:11:41 diligence with which they have approached their task celotex has sought to play its part in ensuring that this inquiry helps to bring about effective and Lasting Improvement in the building safety
01:11:53 Improvement in the building safety regime and in construction standards celotex looks forward to the inquiry's final report and in continuing its own role in improving competency and culture
01:12:06 role in improving competency and culture in the construction industry thank you thank you very much Mr all
01:12:15 and the next statement is going to be made by Mr David Sawtell on behalf of the British Board of agrimal we're running slightly ahead of program but that is never a bad thing but Mr Sawtell
01:12:29 that is never a bad thing but Mr Sawtell is here and he's I think ready to address us
01:12:42 [Applause] thank you very much when you're ready Mr Sultan Mr chairman Madam sir I represent the British Board
01:12:53 Madam sir I represent the British Board of agreement and I'm here to provide you with my all closing submissions and at the outset the BBA expresses its deepest sympathy to the bereaved and to
01:13:05 deepest sympathy to the bereaved and to the survivors of the Grenville Tower fire
01:13:09 fire throughout the bba's concern has been for retrieved and survivors and to do everything that it can to improve building safety and to ensure that a tragedy of this
01:13:22 and to ensure that a tragedy of this nature never happens again
01:13:26 to the extent the BBA made errors and mistakes it offers an unreserved apology to those affected by the grenfell fire and its aftermath
01:13:39 and its aftermath as an organization the BBA is committed to improving the safety of buildings that was its original founding purpose and remains Central to the service for
01:13:51 and remains Central to the service for the BBA provides to achieve this aim and in light of the tragic events of the grenfell tower fire but BBA has carried out a number of deep
01:14:03 but BBA has carried out a number of deep reviews of a way in which it operates these changes reflect the findings in the hackage report and also the evidence provided in this inquiry
01:14:15 inquiry the BBA aims to ensure that its agreement certificate a mark of product Excellence based on rigorous National and European standards provides reassurance in today's highly complex
01:14:28 reassurance in today's highly complex construction environment the BBA has fully engaged with the inquiry in an open cooperative and transparent manner and it will analyze
01:14:40 transparent manner and it will analyze your report with considerable care these steps sadly you know cannot turn back the clock the bba's focus now is on doing what it
01:14:53 the bba's focus now is on doing what it can to improve its services to enhance safety and to prevent a recurrence of a tragedy of this type firstly I'd like to outline the
01:15:05 firstly I'd like to outline the background to the BBA the founding purpose of the BBA was to provide an independent authoritative source of data on the performance of construction
01:15:16 on the performance of construction materials and their suitability for use in clearly defined applications the bba's aim and purpose was and remains to enhance safety within the UK
01:15:28 remains to enhance safety within the UK construction industry the BBA was established to accelerate the building of housing in particular through the use of innovative methods and materials in a safe and sustainable
01:15:41 and materials in a safe and sustainable manner
01:15:42 manner the agreement board became the BBA in 1982
01:15:47 1982 coinciding with its change of legal status is now one of a number of certification companies in the UK and since 1983 the BBA is no longer formerly
01:15:58 since 1983 the BBA is no longer formerly part of the UK government however its original remit remains the BBA enhances safety through its work researching auditing inspecting testing
01:16:10 researching auditing inspecting testing and certifying products the BBA now operates as a self-funding non-profit Distributing Company Limited by guarantee with no formal government Association it has no shareholders and
01:16:23 Association it has no shareholders and does not distribute profits any profits made by the BBA are used for benefits of a construction industry or for public good
01:16:32 good and while the BBA has introduced a range of services over the years it remains best known for its agreement construction product certification scheme which we know as the agreement scheme
01:16:43 scheme and that scheme and its certificate allows new and Innovative products to be brought to Market which are safe and fit for their purpose for bespoke standards have been
01:16:54 for bespoke standards have been developed
01:16:56 developed I would outline why there are a range of reasons a recognized UK product certification scheme is and remains a fundamental importance to construction
01:17:07 fundamental importance to construction safety
01:17:09 safety thirsty it is a third party opinion a certificate states of bba's opinion as to a product's fitness for purpose including its compliance or contribution
01:17:21 including its compliance or contribution to compliance with the building regulations as noted in that certificate the agreement scheme's primary function is to determine the safety of a product in addition it also assesses a number of
01:17:34 in addition it also assesses a number of performance criteria such as structural performance thermal performance durability strength but of course fire performance this review is voluntary for
01:17:47 this review is voluntary for construction industry participants and form an industry perspective it adds a level of additional Assurance about product quality and safety but this leads into the second point
01:17:59 but this leads into the second point that of supply chain Assurance especially today much of UK's construction material is imported this is unlikely to change in the near future a failure to so certify products could
01:18:12 a failure to so certify products could increase the risk of imported products not meeting stringent safety demand standards and regulations or for UK construction industry a product certification scheme gives confidence in
01:18:23 certification scheme gives confidence in the supply chain to designers specifiers contractors and products have been assessed against UK regulatory standards thirdly it has a number of uses the
01:18:36 thirdly it has a number of uses the agreement scheme is required is regarded as the primary construction product certification scheme in the UK construction industry it is referenced by users such as warranty providers specifiers and insurance insurers
01:18:49 specifiers and insurance insurers alongside other important sources of information such as building regulations and approved documents BBA certificates State bba's opinion as
01:19:00 BBA certificates State bba's opinion as to products and Clause contributions compliance with a relevant building regulations but they do not themselves demonstrate compliance for a particular installation
01:19:13 installation it is not a legal requirement to hold a BBA certificate in many instances the inquiries heard for Pacifica to seen as a marketing tool it has been relied upon by industry
01:19:25 it has been relied upon by industry professionals and used by product marketers because of their confidence for the bba's experts of grad certificate in terms for the BBA felt was most appropriate
01:19:37 was most appropriate typically on terms of demonstrator products compliance or contributions compliance with building regulations and fourthly the fourth point I'd make is for facilitation of innovation
01:19:50 is for facilitation of innovation the BBA often addresses innovation both products and the circumstances for intended use or both and consequently the BBA is set up to
01:20:02 and consequently the BBA is set up to design and execute where necessary bespoke tests and assessments and to make professional judgments based on its findings
01:20:10 findings this is particularly helpful and Innovative circumstances where standards and regulations have not yet been developed and yet Assurance product suitability and or safety is still
01:20:21 suitability and or safety is still necessary
01:20:24 necessary over the course of six decades the BBA has built up an extensive and in-depth industry and construction product expertise and track record the staff of BBA engaged to assess
01:20:35 the staff of BBA engaged to assess Construction Products typically have a high level of formal education while staff also develop extensive knowledge or product-specific performance standards
01:20:45 standards are now like an outline to set up the context to the work for BBA undertakes and there are some important elements in that context for bba's work particularly
01:20:57 that context for bba's work particularly in the time period the inquiry has been considering firstly a bba's relationship with an applicant for product certificate is contractual the BBA has no powers to
01:21:10 contractual the BBA has no powers to compel any client company to act or not act say within that contractual framework
01:21:17 framework secondly the BBA was not at the time of issuing certificates been relevant to the inquiry aware of any client's company supplying the BBA with false
01:21:29 company supplying the BBA with false information EBA was therefore not on notice of or structured organizationally to prevent a possibility of misrepresentation and we refer to that further in our
01:21:41 and we refer to that further in our written closing submissions the steps are taken to be there since then but BBA does not have thirdly any role to play in setting safety standards in
01:21:53 to play in setting safety standards in relation to building regulations and the approved documents but BBA simply assesses with products against those standards and the contents of the documents and those are beyond the bba's
01:22:04 documents and those are beyond the bba's control a present there is no formal consultation process concerning standards involving the BBA and again there is a point for BBA addresses and
01:22:15 there is a point for BBA addresses and its submissions on recommendations fourthly the BBA is run as a private organization it has been for several decades and that is a conscious decision
01:22:27 decades and that is a conscious decision that was taken by a previous government fifthly and finally the BBA is a small organization it operates out of offices in Watford
01:22:38 it operates out of offices in Watford and Liverpool with a testing facility as well in Watford it is fully privately funded its capabilities are limited by the scale of its operations the size of its contracts
01:22:49 its contracts it is a bba's position that each of these factors are outlined are relevant when turning the role for BBA plays in The Wider safety ecosystem for building products
01:23:02 products I now like to turn to consider oversight and management EBA is regulated by the United Kingdom accreditation service or ucas and ucas
01:23:13 accreditation service or ucas and ucas is the UK's national accreditation body which is responsible for determining in the public interest the technical competence and integrity of organizations such as those offering
01:23:24 organizations such as those offering testing calibration and certification services
01:23:28 services the bba's overarching processes and operations have been sufficient for it to receive approval from ucas throughout the period in question ucas accreditation is not mandatory for
01:23:40 accreditation is not mandatory for certification bodies it provides a further degree of assurance as the quality of BBA certificates it demonstrates the competence and partiality and performance capability of
01:23:52 partiality and performance capability of those providing accreditation the progress of the inquiry however has highlighted a number of the areas in which a bba's processes could improve
01:24:04 which a bba's processes could improve the BBA has always been seeking to make improvements and since the grenfeld fire it has made a number of important changes
01:24:17 changes just to focus on two parts respect of oversight management first in respect to training a BBA has always employed suitably qualified and experienced individuals the effectiveness of a bba's
01:24:29 individuals the effectiveness of a bba's training incompetence for staff involved was examined and approved by ucas during assessment audits significant amount of staff training was and remains on the job trading whether
01:24:42 and remains on the job trading whether specific to the job function and the technical area of business where each individual's work is focused initially staff are assigned a narrow field of operation because the BBA
01:24:54 field of operation because the BBA assesses many hundreds of different product types training requirements are therefore bespoke
01:25:00 bespoke staff have responsibility for just a few materials initially under the supervision of a more experienced project manager and a BBA focuses on training being delivered within teams
01:25:11 training being delivered within teams and in addition to this on job training a BBA provides an addition formal training by way of presentations by experienced staff on relevant technical subjects
01:25:21 subjects in 2017 a human resources manager with a training background was recruited and in 2019 a Learning and Development manager was inducted to formalize the
01:25:34 manager was inducted to formalize the training of Staff as they were on boarded
01:25:38 boarded the second point I would flag at this stage is fire testing BBA is not a file laboratory but carries out far testing it takes results of ucas accredited fire
01:25:49 it takes results of ucas accredited fire tests and assesses those against requirements for document supporting the National Building regulations the BBA acknowledges that between 2004 and 2010 there was no appointed in-house
01:26:02 and 2010 there was no appointed in-house fire expert within BBA the BBA was of a view of a technical manager at the time Brian Haynes had sufficient knowledge of fire in the context of a bba's activities and then
01:26:14 context of a bba's activities and then subsequently John Urban and John donier denier in respect of requirements approved document B external fart advice was obtained on occasions where an issue was outside the
01:26:25 occasions where an issue was outside the knowledge or expertise of the BBA staff the BBA recognized the need to formalize his external fire expertise it entered
01:26:36 his external fire expertise it entered into a console consultancy agreement works over Warrington fire in February 2010
01:26:42 2010 a new role of technical coordinator for fire was set up in 2014 to facilitate liaison with external fire experts in particular to act as a bba's contact
01:26:53 particular to act as a bba's contact with the operation of agreement which over Warrington fire and I'd like to turn to the core of the bba's services and that certification
01:27:06 bba's services and that certification certificates are intended for use by a specialist trained and qualified designers and specifiers their content and format
01:27:18 specifiers their content and format reflect this a certificate should be used as one part of a larger exercise to determine whether the requirements of the building regulations as well as
01:27:29 the building regulations as well as other technical standards such as those produced by nhbc will be met in a particular use case neither BBA nor a BBA certificate
01:27:40 neither BBA nor a BBA certificate certifies a particular building or part of a building one of the central themes that has emerged many evidence before the inquiry has been the importance of considering
01:27:51 has been the importance of considering the building as an overall system and structure for the purposes of fire safety the properties of one product is one element of that system
01:28:04 one element of that system similarly the result of a reaction to fire test and respect about individual products can inform a designer's judgment as to whether or not to specify a product
01:28:15 a product however a view on the overall fire safety of a product cannot be taken in isolation from a selection of other materials and components but detailed an
01:28:27 materials and components but detailed an overall design and a large number of other factors so when we consider how to use a BBA certificate a BBA certificate does not purport to
01:28:40 a BBA certificate does not purport to inform a designer in respect of the overall design of a building instead the design of a structure must make it an informed decision take into account a range of factors including
01:28:52 account a range of factors including performance of that product and the use of a particular material within a wider structure it would not be possible for a certificate to comment on all potential uses and product configurations and
01:29:04 uses and product configurations and building designs instead it provides a reputable and technically qualified third-party opinion on the ability of a product to achieve a particular standard
01:29:15 product to achieve a particular standard referred to within the national regulatory framework based on testing carried out by ucas accredited testing houses
01:29:22 houses test data is provided so it can be used by designers on the basis of requirements of a given installation and view requirements of that prevailing regulatory regime
01:29:35 the designer can then make an informed decision about the properties for product including whether or not further information is required from a manufacturer or by procuring further
01:29:46 manufacturer or by procuring further testing
01:29:48 testing certificates are reviewed every three years necessary updates are identified and they should then be followed by a reissue to incorporate them and the BBA accepts that in the past
01:29:59 and the BBA accepts that in the past this was not always followed up this is an area of weakness that has been identified by the inquiry and the BBA has now put in place a policy but no certificate should be more than three
01:30:11 certificate should be more than three years old
01:30:13 years old reissues can also be undertaken at any time between the views should the need be identified by a certificate holder or the BBA
01:30:22 the BBA my next Point as submit is critical the front page of a certificate any certificate is can and can only be a
01:30:34 certificate is can and can only be a summary of a more detailed content within the body of a certificate itself the BBA has been consistent in its submission but a certificate should be
01:30:45 submission but a certificate should be read in full this will be expected of any qualified building industry professional it is only by reading the certificate in full at all information relevant to the use of a particular
01:30:56 relevant to the use of a particular material can be known by individual relying on the BBA certificate no conclusion should be drawn from the front page of a certificate alone or by
01:31:07 front page of a certificate alone or by relying on any other section in isolation
01:31:12 isolation the BBA considers it is correct to criticize a professional designer who carries out fails to carry out the basic step of reading an eight page
01:31:25 step of reading an eight page certificate in full or alternatively to have even followed through a reference on the first page through to a half page reference on behavior in
01:31:38 half page reference on behavior in respect of Fire this minimum should be expected of a reasonably competent specifier or designer
01:31:50 designer having set out certification more generically I now intend to consider position of iconic and we've heard throughout this inquiry for the
01:32:01 heard throughout this inquiry for the BBA dealt with iconic architectural products SAS formerly our architectural products
01:32:08 products first of all for certificate itself the bba's information comes from prospective certificate holders the our current application form the information
01:32:20 current application form the information provided with it and any informal information provided by Alcoa are important when considering the eventual wording of a resulting certificate at the time of the assessments by the
01:32:31 at the time of the assessments by the BBA Alcoa was aware that this cassette version she's been classified as Class E and our car also had a report at the
01:32:42 and our car also had a report at the same time that showed the riveted version of renaobond product was class B but it's only the latter report that was submitted to the BBA Alcoa did not advise for BBA that the
01:32:56 Alcoa did not advise for BBA that the two installation methods of a product had manifestly different reaction to fire properties again the BBA asserts fat had this test
01:33:07 again the BBA asserts fat had this test data been in The bba's Possession It would have had a material effect on certification and when Alco was presented with draft certificates by the BBA it did not
01:33:19 certificates by the BBA it did not correct them to show that there was this very significant difference between the riveted and cassette versions Alcoa never provided this information to the
01:33:30 never provided this information to the BBA before the grenfell tower fire I now like to call up as a document the contract between uh Alka or iconic and
01:33:42 contract between uh Alka or iconic and the BBA whereas BBA reference BBA 0 0 1 0 7 2 5.
01:33:51 0 7 2 5. and in particular to look at page three
01:33:57 if it's possible I'd like to zoom in to Clause seven thank you and we're looking at Clause at 7A where it says the applicant shall disclose for BBA at full
01:34:10 applicant shall disclose for BBA at full particulars of and relating to the subject including without prejudice to the generality of foregoing and we go through any test data already available
01:34:22 through any test data already available and of the test procedures used to obtain the same provided
01:34:30 foreign
01:34:33 if we go on to G to immediately notify the BBA of any change in a particular supplier for BBA or any third parties
01:34:46 or any third parties but
01:34:47 but those simple requirements were not complied with iconic withheld fire test data in relation to the cassette version of
01:34:58 relation to the cassette version of rhino Bond 55 polyethylene and breach a contract with the BBA
01:35:06 I would now like to call out the available certificate itself and that is reference BBA zero zero zero zero eight zero six two
01:35:21 I'd like first D to turn uh to page three of the certificate and to look at technical uh specification
01:35:34 and there we can see it says described as being available as being either plain edged riveted system or flanged cassette system it's also stated that products are
01:35:47 it's also stated that products are available in a far returned and grade so the first part section one of the detailed contents of a certificate tells a reader about different versions for
01:35:58 a reader about different versions for product with different reactivity to file properties and one of them is far retardant
01:36:06 retardant I now like to turn to section 4 if I may
01:36:11 that's on the uh sorry page for Section six my apologies
01:36:18 if we go so it's on to page five if we zoom into behavior in relation to fire
01:36:27 and this is a detailed but relatively uh short section but first of all BBA understands available on cladding used in the grandfather had a smoke silver or Pure
01:36:40 grandfather had a smoke silver or Pure White zero gloss surface coating noted in paragraph 6.1 of a certificate a file test provided for BBA was actually in respects of a gray green duragloss coating we go on to look at section 6.4
01:36:53 coating we go on to look at section 6.4 it says these performances may not be achieved by other colors of a product therefore remainable and cladding used in refurbishment of grandfather was not covered by a BBA certificate as it did
01:37:06 covered by a BBA certificate as it did not come with the colors before I actually use on the building if we look at paragraph 6.2 as I've noted previously in respect of the first section A specifier or designer on
01:37:19 section A specifier or designer on reading 6.2 would have become alert to the availability of a fire retardant option
01:37:26 option if we then look at section 6.3 first of all it refers back to section 6.1 and section 6.2 and it is only by reference to and it
01:37:38 and it is only by reference to and it says expressly in relation to approved document B where the state that products may be regarded as having a class naught service
01:37:46 service and inquiry may recall the question as to parallel references to class naught and neuro Class B but arise in diagram 40 and paragraph 12.6 of the approved
01:37:58 40 and paragraph 12.6 of the approved document B you know just pausing their diagram 40 refers to class naught's National class or Class B minus S 3 D2 or better European class
01:38:11 European class submit but for the purpose of diagram 40 therefore over two standards were treated as equivalent although in reality we know that they are different
01:38:26 section 6.5 of a certificate States but for resistance to five as performance of a wall could incorporating with products can only be determined by tests and was
01:38:39 can only be determined by tests and was suitably accredited laboratory and is not covered by this certificate the certificate expressly does not certify the wall incorporating the product
01:38:50 the wall incorporating the product instead the professional designer is directed to consider a relevant test
01:38:58 at 6.6 the certificate clearly emphasizes the importance of incorporating cavity barriers as required of course by the
01:39:09 barriers as required of course by the approved document my concluding point then is on reading before section 6 a professional designer would have deemed it appropriate to seek
01:39:21 would have deemed it appropriate to seek further guidance on issues as to whether they should specify a product or a far retardant call whether the color they are proposing would meet either National class Nord or european Class B or better
01:39:36 class Nord or european Class B or better it's very clear the certificate is not evidence of a performance of a product in all different configurations it's as essential as I've outlined before the certificate is read as a
01:39:47 before the certificate is read as a whole including the caveats that it contained a properly experienced and competent individual reading the certificate would need to be aware of
01:39:58 certificate would need to be aware of the performance of a particular component would depend on the performance of adjacent components so there is the certificates that's considered a position after
01:40:11 that's considered a position after certification the BBA was not advised of any significant changes to the specification of a product during the lifetime of their certificate
01:40:22 lifetime of their certificate we can consider I would simply note a reissue contract of November 2016 at Clause 10 a required iconic the disclose
01:40:33 Clause 10 a required iconic the disclose full particulars of and relating to the subject including any test data or other relevant data iconic did give details of minor changes to the product process but
01:40:46 minor changes to the product process but critically did not provide a BBA with available fire test results that were in its possession and it had not previously provided to the BBA
01:40:57 provided to the BBA this was fundamentally misleading it was again in breach of a Connex contract with the BBA
01:41:10 I would now like to turn briefly and to outline
01:41:13 outline immediate actions following uh the grenfell tower fire those are set out in the first witness statement of Brian Moore the former
01:41:24 statement of Brian Moore the former executive director of BBA and the first witness statement of John Alban the head of approvals for Construction Products and they set out the information that
01:41:35 and they set out the information that was not provided to the BBA those witness statements were volunteered to the inquiry were not directed to provide them I'd like to just briefly explain then the circumstances in which they
01:41:46 then the circumstances in which they came into existence at falling we're going to fail to our fire in a process of gathering evidence for the inquiry the BBA was provided
01:41:57 for the inquiry the BBA was provided with Advanced disclosure of appendix o of Dr Barbara Lane's report but we don't know why it was inquiry decided not to disclose these documents before October 2018 but immediately from
01:42:11 before October 2018 but immediately from reading the support it became clear but iconic had been in possession of many more far classification reports than I had disclosed to the BBA and the time certification during the review process
01:42:24 certification during the review process on reissue of a certificate and after the fire
01:42:29 the fire and upon the inquiry sending Dr Lanes reports and the fire test reports referred to their end to the BBA the BBA entered into correspondence seeking urgent clarification from Iconic
01:42:42 urgent clarification from Iconic as iconic were unable to explain the failure to provide this information to the BBA satisfaction the certificate was suspended on the 16th of November 2018 and it was subsequently withdrawn on the
01:42:55 and it was subsequently withdrawn on the 24th of February uh 2019.
01:43:00 if the information would have been available to Dr Lane had been made available either during the application process or afterwards the certificate would either have been reissued or
01:43:12 would either have been reissued or amended to reflect the distinction between the farmer tardent polyethylene called Product and riveted and cassette forms of the product uh BBA simply does not know whether Dr
01:43:25 uh BBA simply does not know whether Dr Lane has been provided with witness statements of uh far more or John Alban uh that are provided in October 2018 and appendix o has not been amended in light
01:43:37 appendix o has not been amended in light of what we now know what inquiry now knows what's the status of bba's knowledge uh at the time of certification and I'd ask inquiry when considering Dr Lane's report and her
01:43:48 considering Dr Lane's report and her recommendations uh to read that in light of a fact the information before her as to the state of bba's own knowledge had limitations
01:43:59 limitations Orvis draws together a larger point the agreement scheme is a voluntary scheme it has been used to create effects over 60 years
01:44:11 effects over 60 years as it is not a legal or regulatory requirement it does require participants to be open and honest if a participant is not there are contractual sanctions
01:44:23 is not there are contractual sanctions well the evidence before the inquiry has demonstrated is that the applicants to such voluntary schemes have withheld information which would be highly relevant to the
01:44:34 which would be highly relevant to the product certifier a BBA has changed its processes as a result of this the outcome of the agreement consultation which has been set out in
01:44:45 consultation which has been set out in our submissions from the 31st of October 2022 has been to accept its recommendations which have been designed to avoid a repeat of these incidents
01:44:59 to avoid a repeat of these incidents and I like to turn on to kingspan and the kingspan k-15 certificate and inquiry will recall that the k-15 certificate went through a number of
01:45:10 certificate went through a number of reissues from 2008 to 2013 before a new certificate was issued in 2015. all of the kingspan certificates the old
01:45:23 all of the kingspan certificates the old certificates came with the following warning
01:45:26 warning but it has to be read considered and used as a whole document it may be misleading it will be Inc incomplete be selective
01:45:35 selective however the material wording of a certificate has changed on each occasion and the inquiry will call at Mr Alban was asked questions by Council to inquiry in respect of that and I don't
01:45:48 inquiry in respect of that and I don't intend to go through that evidence in any detail the version of the inquiry is spent most time on is amended issue one issued on the 6th of April
01:46:00 the 6th of April 2010 and I'll ask this stage for the document BBA zero zero zero zero zero zero three seven uh to be placed up on
01:46:11 zero three seven uh to be placed up on screen
01:46:16 it's noteworthy that although it is dated April 2010 it was not in fact placed into the public domain until the 12th July
01:46:28 12th July 2013. it was then replaced by issue two which was issued on the 17th of December 2013 and therefore this certificate was only in circulation for less than six
01:46:42 only in circulation for less than six months
01:46:44 months I now like to go into some of a wording in particular in respect of prove document B but this certificate refers to can we please look at page five of
01:46:57 to can we please look at page five of this document
01:47:00 if we can zoom in please to section 7.1
01:47:07 and in particular where it says England and it says this product May therefore may be used according to provisions of England Wales uh prove document B and at the end
01:47:20 uh prove document B and at the end paragraph 12.7 and the inquiry will recall a paragraph 12.7 of approved document B
01:47:31 a paragraph 12.7 of approved document B uh in a building with a story 18 meters or more above ground level any installation product filler material multiplication gasket sealants and symbol Etc used an external wall
01:47:42 symbol Etc used an external wall construction should be of limited compatibility full stop then it goes on to say this restriction does not apply to masonry cavity wall construction which complies with diagram
01:47:53 construction which complies with diagram 34 in section 9. the point being there are two parts to this paragraph a general permission on the use of certain materials which are not of limited compatibility in a
01:48:05 not of limited compatibility in a building with a story 18 meters or more above ground level and an exception for masonry cavity wall construction k-15 was therefore suitable for use in
01:48:17 k-15 was therefore suitable for use in some applications in paragraph 12.7 such as a cavity wall where the product is flanked on either side by non-compostable concrete bricks or blocks and I note that during the
01:48:29 blocks and I note that during the inquiry a number of kingspan's witnesses ask questions in respect of its reference to paragraph at 12.7 as I'll suggest however the second part
01:48:41 as I'll suggest however the second part of the sentence makes it clear the Restriction does not apply to these certain masonry cavity wall constructions the BBA does however accept and it did
01:48:52 the BBA does however accept and it did accept during evidence but this wording was allegedly open to interpretation and with the benefit of hindsight it was capable of being tightened
01:49:06 capable of being tightened and indeed as we recall it was removed however at no stage did the k-15 certificate state the product was of limited combustibility a technically
01:49:17 limited combustibility a technically qualified reader reading the certificate alongside paragraph the full paragraph 12.7 would know that k-15 could not satisfy clause 12.7 for a rain screen
01:49:28 satisfy clause 12.7 for a rain screen construction above 18 meters as it was not of limited compatibility as Mr Robin made clear if a BBA considers that a product was of limited compatibility this would have been
01:49:40 compatibility this would have been stated clearly so technically qualified reader reading certificate alongside paragraph 12.7 would know that it could not satisfy such Construction
01:49:52 not satisfy such Construction um as I said Mr Alban was clear it was a statement that was allegedly capable of misinterpretation but it was never stated it was of limited combustibility I also note for warning contained in the
01:50:05 I also note for warning contained in the certificate about the need to contact the product manufacturer for buildings with floor above 18 meters ground level that was retained at paragraph at 7.2
01:50:18 retained at paragraph at 7.2 and so I'm going to move on to another topic now but I note the time would that be a convenient moment to take a break absolutely right thank you very much well we'll break the uh at that point therefore and resume please at off to
01:50:31 therefore and resume please at off to 12. okay thank you very much
02:08:04 yes there's this hotel are you ready to carry on indeed Miss chairman I have three more substantive sections uh before the close of my submissions yeah
02:08:15 before the close of my submissions yeah um Brian Martin's correspondence in July 2014 then relationship with ucas and then the largest of the last three sections organizational changes in the
02:08:26 sections organizational changes in the BBA
02:08:27 BBA a short section with respect of correspondence with Brian Martin uh in July
02:08:34 July 2014. that is contained in a document and BBA zero zero zero zero zero one seven eight
02:08:52 I could ask return to page three please
02:08:58 and this is the start of an email chain between Brian Martin an official Department of communities and local government and of the BBA in July 2014.
02:09:11 government and of the BBA in July 2014. it was in respect of fat paragraph in kingspan k-15 certificate that we had been considering
02:09:22 certificate that we had been considering and it had transpired has transpired from evidence within module six that the matters of which Mr Martin was writing
02:09:33 matters of which Mr Martin was writing was a more generally held concern about the wording of reference to paragraph 12.7
02:09:42 12.7 uh be a point for BBA is the extent which this concern was more widely held and significance of it was not set out
02:09:53 and significance of it was not set out in this email and the BBA was not aware of the significance of a point at that at that time if we return to that chronology in the kingspan k-15
02:10:04 chronology in the kingspan k-15 certificates for wording on the king's bound certificate had already been removed and issued two which had been issued in December 2013.
02:10:17 issued in December 2013. and
02:10:18 and what the email chain shows if you inquiry will recall is that uh John Alvin uh provided Mr Martin with an explanation as to how this had come about
02:10:30 about the point I would highlight in these closing submissions is that the BBA invited Mr Martin to a meeting twice and twice this invitation to a meeting was
02:10:43 twice this invitation to a meeting was uh declined and as a consequence it was not communicated for BBA but this will seem to be a more widespread concern and this
02:10:54 to be a more widespread concern and this was an unfortunate misunderstanding between Mr Martin and the BBA what I'd note is that Mr Alban's response and his line of Correspondence
02:11:06 response and his line of Correspondence raises a more General point what should be the relationship between central government and a product certification company when it comes to
02:11:17 certification company when it comes to issues of construction safety and the policy in 2014 was that Mr Martin did not consider it appropriate to meet with a BBA about
02:11:31 appropriate to meet with a BBA about this issue at one of the points for BBA has flagged in its submissions is it is suggested that the future relationship between entities involved in building
02:11:44 between entities involved in building safety and the government uh need to be Revisited
02:11:52 just to find and finalize a point in respective of K15 before I move on to the next substantive part of our closing submissions as we recall that in 30th October 2020
02:12:05 as we recall that in 30th October 2020 kingspan wrote to the BBA stated would be withdrawing three bs-8414 test reports from circulation so at that time the kingspan certificate
02:12:16 at that time the kingspan certificate was suspended in accordance with the bba's procedures and so product seven product sheet 7 of a certificate for k-15 was suspended
02:12:27 k-15 was suspended the BBA investigation concluded with the previous suspense certificate could no longer be relied upon so product sheet 7 of a certificate was withdrawn on the 25th of November
02:12:38 25th of November 2020 and then as part of a long-term existing project to update the k-15 certificate with new fire data a new product cheat 9 was issued to kingspan
02:12:49 product cheat 9 was issued to kingspan k-15 on the 24th of November 2020 and that product sheet was given a new number so to differentiate it from that which had originally been issued
02:13:02 which had originally been issued so moving on from kingspan k-15 the issues arise from a certificate and turning now to ucas which as I outlined at the outset is for UK's national accreditation body which accredits
02:13:15 accreditation body which accredits Conformity assessment bodies against National or International standards and this includes Fields such as the testing inspection and certification of products
02:13:26 inspection and certification of products once again the relationship between ucas and an accredited body such as for BBA is contractual and the immediate aftermath of the
02:13:37 and the immediate aftermath of the grenfell fire tragedy the BBA will subject to two ucas audits which were specifically examining the bba's assessment and certification of ACM
02:13:48 assessment and certification of ACM materials
02:13:50 materials first considered the records associated with the initial certification and subsequent training views and the second included an examination of the processes leading to reissue of certificate
02:14:03 leading to reissue of certificate 08-4510 so Rhino Bond and also covered the assessment and certification of all other ACM materials at ucas deemed those to give confidence
02:14:17 at ucas deemed those to give confidence in review process we've been conducted by the BBA and they stated it was a robust assessment as we've set out in our written submissions uh the inquiry should have
02:14:29 submissions uh the inquiry should have confidence that the ucas assessment in July and August 2017 was properly carried out in accordance of ucas's procedures and policies and of course it's based on the information known for
02:14:41 it's based on the information known for parties at the time the BBA has been and it continues to be very happy to work in collaboration with
02:14:52 very happy to work in collaboration with ucas in the future development of the accreditation of the agreement scheme and that's something which we set out in more detail in our 31st of October 2022 submission
02:15:05 submission I'd like to turn to one discrete point regarding the immediate reaction to June 2017 the steps of BBA take this arose
02:15:17 2017 the steps of BBA take this arose out of questions which are not put to BBA Witnesses but were put to Lorraine Turner of ucas that was on the 7th of February
02:15:27 February 2022 if I can ask for the transcript for day
02:15:31 day 227 to be displayed
02:15:37 thank you if we could turn please to page 136
02:15:51 and if we could this is relation to a document we see a line six we have a documentary UK as far as a six percent from Nix over it says towards the bottom we should see an email from Nisha Sharma for BBA and
02:16:03 email from Nisha Sharma for BBA and she's email Janet Moe Andy Kearns of Xavier we'll look at this document in just a moment return to the next page please
02:16:13 and you can see that from his extract in the transcript he says Nisha Nisha we'll go and see being a member staff of BBA our opinions are based on test evidence
02:16:24 opinions are based on test evidence interpretation of Standards immigrations and also expert judgment if we could please turn over onto the next page
02:16:37 lines four to seven accounts between inquiry said it might be said Miss exchange a BBA was not making a genuine inquiry about the certificates it was updating it was just covering itself do
02:16:49 updating it was just covering itself do you agree advance and Miss Turner and ultimate quite appropriately says that she can't really comment on the motivation for the question
02:17:00 if we look at this email exchange if I can ask please if we turn to document ucas001080
02:17:13 and we've turned first of all to page three
02:17:20 I said indicator Nisha Sharma was the member staff at the BBA who was engaged to liaise with warrant of X over
02:17:33 to liaise with warrant of X over Warrington fire the external consultant about the BBA had engaged in respect of fire testing and fire standards
02:17:44 fire testing and fire standards and Nisha Sharma there and we can see is in 14th of July 2017 is writing you have provided your opinions and comments and assessments of fire performance of various
02:17:55 fire performance of various constructions in light of a recent fire instance can you please confirm your standby these opinions can we turn now please to page two
02:18:08 response from Xavier was at the bottom and this is Nisha our opinion is based on test evidence interpretation of standards and regulations and also expert judgment it's
02:18:19 and also expert judgment it's overwhelming to fire confirms that our sponsor to your questions were in our opinion in our opinion correct at the time of provision
02:18:30 no Witnesses from the BBA were asked to comment on this document it is a serious allegation it would be unfair I would submit to accept that in his insinuation
02:18:42 submit to accept that in his insinuation that was made in that moment and circumstances where neither Mr Alvin John Alban nor Mr Moore who actually asked about this email exchange the
02:18:53 asked about this email exchange the evidence from a BBA when Mr Moore was asked about this in evidence he explained was that the BBA had a consultancy agreement with Xavier Warrington fire and BBA has asked Mr Alban to comment on
02:19:06 and BBA has asked Mr Alban to comment on the question that was put to Miss Lorraine Turner of ucas by Council to the inquiry which was not put to Mr Alvin himself he has suggested that he was ensuring the Judgment made on the
02:19:17 was ensuring the Judgment made on the basis opinions given by Xavier Warrington fire it remained valid and safe of course if Warrington fire had not indicated that was correct a BBA would have been required to reassess and
02:19:28 would have been required to reassess and potentially reword certificates with the obvious consequence for installations based on the original certificate wording and I'll submit that the steps
02:19:40 wording and I'll submit that the steps taken by the BBA in July 2017 to reach out to X over Warrington fire and to ask him to confirm their previous opinions was appropriate and a responsible step
02:19:53 was appropriate and a responsible step for the BBA to take and I'll ask the inquiry does not make an adverse finding irrespective of a BBA on that point
02:20:03 I now like to turn to the last substantive point for the BBA and it is in respect of organizational
02:20:14 and it is in respect of organizational changes
02:20:16 changes since the Grand Final Tower of fire the BBA has carried out a route and Branch review of its organization and delivery processes
02:20:26 processes this includes the appointment for a new governing body in 2019 significant changes to the management structure and team and a redesign of way in which the organization works this was
02:20:38 in which the organization works this was carried out in consultation with ucas but BBA has made changes to its internal processes the wording of its certificates and the training provided
02:20:49 certificates and the training provided to staff following the grenfell tower fire
02:20:52 fire a significant amount of technical staff time is in particular devoted to building technical knowledge and in the submissions dated the 31st of October 2012 the BBA set out the
02:21:06 October 2012 the BBA set out the numerous steps that it took in the immediate aftermath of the grand Tower of fire in 2017. these included the following firstly an immediate review of all certificates
02:21:17 immediate review of all certificates relating to materials or circumstances of use of products with similarities to those used on grenfell Tower building its Human Resources team to increase focus on Learning and Development and as I previously
02:21:29 Development and as I previously indicated in 2019 a Learning and Development manager was appointed to further formalize the training of Staff as they are onboarded an eternal process review giving specific Focus to
02:21:41 review giving specific Focus to enhancing the quality of certification and the safety assurance it provides and to increase the amount of staff time devoted to developing technical knowledge
02:21:51 knowledge but BBA has supported the government and its efforts to improve building safety and to that end the BBA has engaged with Dame dude of hackett's review of the building regulations and fire safety and
02:22:02 building regulations and fire safety and following the publication of the final report of BBA agitated for a full adoption of a hackett's report's findings which it enthusiastically endorses
02:22:14 endorses in early 2019 Andrew kitchingman was appointed as chair of BBA he immediately carried out his own review of a business and in doing so he identified the need for significant leadership changes
02:22:26 for significant leadership changes across the organization and I'll submit to their changes that enable full business transformation all but one of the directors were replaced and in January 2020 a new CEO Mr hardy Geisler
02:22:39 January 2020 a new CEO Mr hardy Geisler was appointed following the introduction of the new top management the BBA has undertaken a root and Branch review of operational management and delivery processes
02:22:50 management and delivery processes a bba's change program called project Alpha commence in January 2020 and it dominated the internal agenda for a period of two years it looked at all areas of performance
02:23:02 it looked at all areas of performance and it gave further impetus to the ongoing internal process review but it has initiated in 2017 and we would suggest that importantly project Alpha
02:23:13 suggest that importantly project Alpha gave a BBA staff a stronger and more impartial relationship with its clients and further changes in 2019 and 2020
02:23:24 and further changes in 2019 and 2020 ensured Fuller cooperation of Manufacturers and to accelerate for bba's reaction time to update certificates falling provision of new information that process completed in December 2021
02:23:37 that process completed in December 2021 and immediately format chronology we can see running in parallel the process of the inquiry and the steps of BBA was taking
02:23:45 taking the BBA launched an industry consultation in 2021 on how the agreement scheme can be improved to address the specific requirements of higher risk buildings predominantly
02:23:56 higher risk buildings predominantly focusing on strength and on fire performance as well as other performance criteria taken together the recommendations that ensued set out five or more years of work and some
02:24:09 or more years of work and some initiatives where there's a need for research will inevitably go on for longer and so the BBA has adapted its business plan accordingly
02:24:20 business plan accordingly following this process of internal review
02:24:23 review BBA has become Keen to assist government and Regulators to set standards and required processes for Fitness for purpose and other forms of certification to maximize product safety
02:24:35 to maximize product safety and the BBA has launched an independently chaired working group with cross industry presentation with his purpose that group was launched in August 2022 and first met in October of
02:24:47 August 2022 and first met in October of this year
02:24:48 this year and the key objectives include bringing wider engagement with an understanding of certification across a market and to broaden access to certification and to maintain standards
02:24:59 maintain standards and also note the BBA is also digitized as business to ensure its way of working is system driven and system compliance is fully integrated into all of its products
02:25:09 products the BBA set up an industry working groups work with others to increase the use of product certification and set a high standard across industry for product certification this is an ongoing process an external
02:25:21 this is an ongoing process an external party Mr Gus Carroll was appointed to lead review of bba's internal audit in September 2022 he will report later this month it was chief engineer at centrica
02:25:32 month it was chief engineer at centrica for 12 years and his current role was chair of the hse's control of major housing accident hazards strategic form and co-founder and CEO of empiricists
02:25:43 and co-founder and CEO of empiricists the headline point is that in a period from 2020 to the end of 2022 a BBA would have spent the equivalent of 10 years of operating profit to transform the
02:25:55 operating profit to transform the business this is the most significant level of change and investment experienced by the BBA since its Inception in 1966. more details of those plans we have set
02:26:07 more details of those plans we have set out in our submission dated 31st of October 2022.
02:26:13 this comes in the context of the changes which are highlighted and have been highlighted over and over again of the need for Change and change
02:26:26 again of the need for Change and change in the construction industry that comes from the Hackett report that comes from the phase one report of this inquiry it comes from the evidence to
02:26:37 inquiry it comes from the evidence to the inquiry during phase two it comes from the building safety act 2022 and the anticipated framework for
02:26:49 2022 and the anticipated framework for product regulation for the new legislation incorporates BBA has recognized this driving imperative for change
02:27:00 imperative for change both in terms of its internal functions and systems but also externally as a Hackett report confirmed changing the culture
02:27:13 and come on to my conclusion BBA has issued many thousands of product certificates since 1966. and the agreement scheme is seen as providing high value content and
02:27:26 providing high value content and contribution to Industry the inquiry has helped BBA identify areas for improvement including by exposing unsatisfactory elements of its operations which a BBA
02:27:39 elements of its operations which a BBA has responded to with vigor the BBA operates a policy of continual Improvement it has already made significant changes and it fully intends to continue to make changes to work
02:27:51 to continue to make changes to work towards a higher standards of safety and quality for construction industry the inquiry has considered a bba's processes for a span of approaching a decade from Circa 2006 or 7 up to 2017
02:28:06 decade from Circa 2006 or 7 up to 2017 and already by 2014 we can identify a number of changes had been made as to how it had operated from the outset of that period when Renault Bond and k-15
02:28:19 that period when Renault Bond and k-15 were initially assessed for certification subsequent to this period in consideration the BBA has made even more significant changes reaching the end of a third year of its transformation
02:28:31 a third year of its transformation program
02:28:33 so the BBA has invested significant time to understand the changes required to make the construction industry in the buildings it produces a safer place it considers that as an organization it
02:28:46 it considers that as an organization it has more to contribute to transformation of UK construction industry with a new governing board and leadership team and in particular since 2019 when the
02:28:57 and in particular since 2019 when the wholesale management and cultural transformation of BBA began the organization has sought to learn what it can from the grenfell tower fire and to improve safety across the construction industry
02:29:08 industry and we hope this contribution will continue to accelerate the grenfell tower fire brought into sharp Focus the Need For What Dame Judith Hackett described as a need for
02:29:21 Judith Hackett described as a need for cultural change and a need to create drivers for rights behaviors in the design and construction of high-rise residential buildings
02:29:32 of high-rise residential buildings the enactment of rebuilding a safety act 2022 has begun the process of adopting and implementation of recommendations proposed in her final report which a BBA
02:29:45 proposed in her final report which a BBA has campaigned for it is recognized however vet is only the start of the systemic change required the BBA will carefully consider the
02:29:57 the BBA will carefully consider the outcome of the inquiry and it will do what it can to support the improvements required in the UK construction industry the BBA again wishes to express its
02:30:09 the BBA again wishes to express its condolences to the families and friends of those who died in the grenfell tower fire to survivors of a tragedy and to those whose lives have been affected
02:30:21 those whose lives have been affected it considers it is our duty to ensure all Lessons Learned are pursued and implemented create safe spaces in which people can
02:30:32 create safe spaces in which people can live and work thank you
02:30:35 thank you thank you very much just to sort out um
02:30:40 um the next statement is going to be made by Mr James Maxwell Maxwell Scott King's Council on behalf of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea so when we've
02:30:51 of Kensington and Chelsea so when we've done a little bit of housekeeping Mr Maxwell Scott we shall be ready to hear you
02:31:06 right when you're ready good afternoon Mr chairman MS istafan MR Akbar
02:31:15 Akbar the council is grateful for this opportunity to make a final overarching closing statement in December 2017 the full Council unanimously adopted a resolution
02:31:27 unanimously adopted a resolution committing it to openness transparency and candor in its approach to this inquiry that commitment has remained constant over the last five years
02:31:39 over the last five years Council and its legal team have been conscious of it and guided by it throughout that period it is not only a commitment to the inquiry it is also a commitment by the
02:31:51 inquiry it is also a commitment by the council to the bereaved survivors and residents
02:31:56 residents and to the people of Kensington and Chelsea whom the council exists to serve it was fitting that the first and last witnesses to give evidence that this inquiry would have bereaved survivors
02:32:07 inquiry would have bereaved survivors and residents their evidence was as powerful in modulate this summer as it was in the commemoration hearings four summers ago
02:32:18 commemoration hearings four summers ago the council has been heavily involved in many of the phase two modules this reflects the fact that as we stated in our phase one opening statement Council was involved with grenfell Tower
02:32:31 Council was involved with grenfell Tower and its residents in a number of different ways we identified 10 in that statement the Council made unqualified admissions in its module 1 opening and closing
02:32:44 in its module 1 opening and closing statements in its module 3 opening and closing statements and in its module 4 opening and closing statements the council has reviewed all of its
02:32:56 the council has reviewed all of its previous submissions it stands by them and repeats them it apologizes unreservedly for its failings
02:33:07 the admissions made by the council include the following building control failed to ask for comprehensive details of the cladding system
02:33:16 system and issued a completion certificate when it should not have done
02:33:22 residents were not listened to as much as they should have been
02:33:27 the number of council officers devoted to monitoring the TMA was insufficient given the number of residents whose properties were managed by the TMO and the scale and importance of the task
02:33:39 the scale and importance of the task delegated to the TMO
02:33:43 there was no rbkc document setting out what its residual responsibilities were under the fire safety order in respect of properties managed by the TMO
02:33:55 the officers in housing commissioning who monitored the TMO received no training on the council's residual responsibilities under the fire safety order
02:34:08 there should have been a self-close inspection program in place before the 14th of June 2017.
02:34:16 my statement today is divided into two parts
02:34:20 parts the first part is about the cladding system installed on grenfell Tower second part is about the fire safety measures within the tower I will not be addressing you on aftermath related issues
02:34:32 aftermath related issues this is for two reasons first because module 4 finished comparatively recently secondly because those issues are essentially self-contained
02:34:43 essentially self-contained they are clearly distinct from the pre-fire issues considered in the other modules
02:34:49 modules I turn now to the first part of this statement
02:34:53 statement on the 4th of August 2014 Studio e emailed the full plans application form to the council's building controls service
02:35:04 building controls service the council admits as it did in its opening statement in module one that there were failings in how the council's building control service dealt with that application
02:35:16 building control failed to ask for comprehensive details of the clouding system
02:35:22 building control failed to identify that the insulation materials used in the clouding system were not of limited combustibility and therefore did not satisfy the requirements of paragraph
02:35:34 satisfy the requirements of paragraph 12.7 of approved document B building control issued a completion certificate on the 7th of July 2016. it should not have done so
02:35:46 it should not have done so none of the points which I'm about to make are intended to detract from these unqualified admissions
02:35:56 central theme of the first part of this statement
02:36:00 statement is that the council's building control service should never have been in this position
02:36:05 position it should never have been the case but a single local Authority building control service was all that stood between dangerous products being used on Granville Tower
02:36:17 Granville Tower neither Rayner Bond PE 55 or sellotex rs-5000
02:36:23 rs-5000 should ever have been installed on grenfell Tower and the combination of those two products in a cladding system should never have got anywhere near grenfell Tower
02:36:34 Tower there are two strands to this submission one iconic and celotex took active steps to ensure that their products were used on grenfell Tower despite knowing that
02:36:47 on grenfell Tower despite knowing that they were wholly unsuitable for use on a high-rise Residential Building two there were multiple missed opportunities to prevent grenful tower
02:36:58 opportunities to prevent grenful tower being clad with such wholly unsuitable products
02:37:01 products opportunities that could and should have been taken
02:37:06 in our written closing statement we have focused on 14 key dates although many others could have been chosen today I'm going to narrow that down further and focus on 10.
02:37:18 further and focus on 10. I'm going to structure my submissions chronologically and highlight 10 dates when we say events could and should have taken a different course
02:37:29 it is natural following a tragedy of the scale of grenfell to try and identify the most important failings the approach I'm about to take of honing
02:37:40 the approach I'm about to take of honing in on specific key events is a logical approach to take but it is important at the same time to keep an eye on the bigger picture on themes as well as events
02:37:52 themes as well as events immediately after the fire occurred many commentators were Keen to portray it in very largely local terms rather than National terms
02:38:03 National terms I suspect that few people anticipated that the inquiry would need to hear so many days of evidence but as the inquiry progressed the importance of the national Dimension
02:38:15 the importance of the national Dimension became ever more apparent the inquiries list of issues had to be updated and expanded to include a specific issue relating to the testing certification and classification of
02:38:28 certification and classification of products used in clouding systems this ended up with its own module module two
02:38:34 two in addition module 6 relating to the policy and Regulatory framework set by central government had to have its time estimate increased in the end these two modules
02:38:46 in the end these two modules both of which focused exclusively on National issues occupied 91 sitting days and that doesn't include expert Witnesses or opening and closing
02:38:57 Witnesses or opening and closing statements
02:39:00 Mr chairman I have no doubt that when you embarked on this inquiry you expected to identify a sizable number of failings
02:39:08 failings but even you may have been surprised by the nature scale and extent of the failings which you and the inquiry team have so effectively uncovered
02:39:20 have so effectively uncovered in this week of overarching closing statements you may think that this is the most shocking and most disturbing overarching feature of all it seems clear now that over many years
02:39:33 it seems clear now that over many years the construction industry developed and central government presided over a deeply flawed system Dame Judith Hackett described the system as not being fit for purpose
02:39:46 as not being fit for purpose you and the panel may consider that judgment to have been if anything too generous
02:39:53 generous you may think for Not only was the system deeply flawed but the corporates working within the system actively sought to take advantage of flaws within it
02:40:04 it but there was a culture of gaming the system
02:40:08 I turn now to the 10 key dates which I wish to draw to your attention
02:40:17 5th of April 1991. the date of the knowsley Heights Fire in Liverpool
02:40:24 Liverpool this has been described by both bre and Professor Bisby as the most significant of a historic external fires Professor Bisby told you that learning the details of this fire was one of two
02:40:36 the details of this fire was one of two moments in this inquiry which had left him speechless he referred in particular to discovering that the cladding was glass reinforced polyester
02:40:47 polyester his point was that because it was a polyester-based product it was inherently combustible yet it was regarded as class zero so here we have rainscreen cladding
02:40:59 so here we have rainscreen cladding which was supposedly class zero but at the same time was combustible and had in fact combusted in a sizable fire this combination should have been
02:41:11 this combination should have been regarded as highly significant it should have been regarded as worthy of further investigation and Analysis Professor bisby's own words it was
02:41:22 Professor bisby's own words it was impossible to overstate the importance of what was missed nosley is an early example of a theme repeatedly emphasized by Professor Bisby
02:41:33 repeatedly emphasized by Professor Bisby class zero was not a suitable measure for assessing the hazard posed by external fire spread in a cladding system
02:41:42 that knowsley was a pilot scheme backed by central government illustrates another theme in its quest to promote Energy Efficiency central government devoted
02:41:53 Efficiency central government devoted too little attention to the consequences for fire safety
02:41:58 there was always a possibility that the development of new overclouding technologies would have fire safety implications this possibility needed to be analyzed
02:42:10 this possibility needed to be analyzed and kept under review for any such analysis to be effective it would need to be evidence-based and scientists would need to be funded to
02:42:21 scientists would need to be funded to carry out the necessary research in module 7 Professor torreiro told you about his decades-long struggle to obtain funding to carry out such research
02:42:35 19th of September 2002. the date of the report of the CC 1924 tests
02:42:44 tests this report was prepared for central government by bre TT rainscreen systems were tested including an aluminum sheeting system the report stated that the aluminum
02:42:57 the report stated that the aluminum sheeting system achieved the poorest classification in both tests although it was the only system to achieve class zero
02:43:06 zero the full-scale test which was meant to run for 30 minutes had to be abandoned within under six minutes by then the Flames were 20 meters high Flames had reach the top of a 10 meter
02:43:18 Flames had reach the top of a 10 meter rig even earlier within four minutes and 20 seconds everyone who witnessed this test was shocked by the speed with which the fire spread
02:43:30 spread this was the second of two moments in the inquiry that Professor Bisby said had left him speechless specifically it was the discovery of what had been tested but left Professor
02:43:43 what had been tested but left Professor Bisby speechless the aluminum sheeting system which failed so catastrophically was an ACM panel with a PE chord a panel very
02:43:54 panel with a PE chord a panel very similar to the one used on Grenville Tower over a decade later like knowsley ten years earlier it is an example of a class zero product proving
02:44:05 example of a class zero product proving to be combustible and contributing to external fire spread
02:44:11 this test result was not shared to the extent that it could and should have been
02:44:18 been it was contained in a document called a client report which described itself on each page as commercial and confidence central government could and should have
02:44:29 central government could and should have waived confidentiality and made the report public it did not do so the report remained essentially secret until 2021 when a summary of a test was
02:44:40 until 2021 when a summary of a test was leaked to the BBC
02:44:47 14th of January 2008. the date of the BBA certificate for Rhino Bond ACM a document that with good reason was
02:44:58 a document that with good reason was analyzed at Great length during the hearings
02:45:01 hearings today I'm not going to talk about the phrase the panels may be regarded as having a class 0 service I'm going to use this date to illustrate two features of iconic's conduct
02:45:12 two features of iconic's conduct one knowingly and deliberately manipulating the UK's weak testing and certification system two withholding safety critical
02:45:24 two withholding safety critical information
02:45:27 the certificate stated that Rainer Bond 55 or the PE Court was European Class B it noted that the panels were available in both a riveted system and a cassette
02:45:38 in both a riveted system and a cassette system but Drew no distinction between the two systems as iconic fully appreciated the certificate therefore represented but its standard PE product was class B
02:45:51 but its standard PE product was class B even when used in a cassette system yet by then arconic had known for over two years
02:46:00 two years that this product was not Class B when used in a cassette system arconic knowingly and deliberately manipulated the testing and certification system
02:46:11 certification system By ignoring its contractual obligations and not informing the BBA about the safety critical information from the 2005 test
02:46:22 2005 test iconic spent the next nine years actively relying on a certificate but it knew to be inaccurate and misleading the cassette system was retested several
02:46:34 the cassette system was retested several times during those nine years not once did it achieve Class B the best result it ever achieved was class E
02:46:44 class E [Applause]
02:46:48 3rd of July 2009. a date of a lacknell house fire at a time of steady reductions in annual deaths caused by fires Lacon was a
02:47:00 deaths caused by fires Lacon was a warning but a tower block fire with multiple fatalities could still happen the risk of one occurring was not just theoretical it was real and it could happen in the UK
02:47:13 and it could happen in the UK a point that central government should have kept in mind when in later years Cirrus clouding fires occurred abroad many in central government seem to believe that similar fires could not
02:47:24 believe that similar fires could not happen in the UK but such a belief however sincerely held was at best wishful thinking unless it was supported by empirical evidence and reasoned
02:47:36 by empirical evidence and reasoned arguments
02:47:39 13th of May 2013. the date of an email from Deborah French iconic's UK sales manager Catalyst for the email was a BBC news
02:47:51 Catalyst for the email was a BBC news report about a cladding fire in the United Arab Emirates it included the following statement at this stage we will continue to offer both PE and fr core and continue the
02:48:05 both PE and fr core and continue the close working relationship we have with our approved Fabricators to make sure the right technical support Rainer Bond specification and materials are being used and installed on Rainer Bond
02:48:17 used and installed on Rainer Bond projects
02:48:20 Pacific email was clearly to reassure our Connex approved Fabricators concerned by the fire in the UAE and in turn to enable them to reassure
02:48:31 and in turn to enable them to reassure their customers one of the people to whom the email was sent was Jeff Blades of cep it was Mr blades who ultimately supplied
02:48:42 it was Mr blades who ultimately supplied the ACM panels for grenfell Tower the significance of this email is that it establishes one but iconic work closely with its small network of approved fabricators
02:48:54 approved fabricators and two but arconic had an active interest in who used its products and how they were used
02:49:04 in oral evidence Miss French agreed the grenfell tower was a project where arconic had close control of a supply chain and worked closely with the
02:49:15 chain and worked closely with the fabricator she also agreed that arconic was in a position to ensure that the right Corps ended up on grenfell Tower or she left arconic at the end of 2014.
02:49:28 or she left arconic at the end of 2014. Ms French was aware that grenfell Tower was a high-rise Residential Building she was also aware that Rayna Bond PE 55 in a cassette system was going to be
02:49:39 in a cassette system was going to be installed on it those involved in the grenfell Tower project were never informed the the PE Court would perform worse in a fire in a cassette system than a riveted system
02:49:51 cassette system than a riveted system and they were never even informed that a fire resistant FR core was an option in short the assurances provided by arconic in the 13th of May email proved
02:50:04 arconic in the 13th of May email proved to be false iconic could and should have made sure that those involved in the grenfell Tower project had the right technical support
02:50:13 support did not do so iconic could and should have made sure that a suitable iconic product was used and installed at grenfell Tower it did not do so
02:50:25 it did not do so yet people within iconic had known since at least 2007 about the potential benefits of using an FR core
02:50:35 FR core in September 2007 one of iconic's marketing managers suggested in a written report but in future iconic should consider only selling ACM with an FR core
02:50:49 selling ACM with an FR core this followed a meeting he had attended in Oslo which someone asked about the responsibility of the ACM supplier if 60 to 70 people died in a fire in a
02:51:01 to 70 people died in a fire in a building clad in ACM with a PE Corps subsequently in June 2015 Claude Valley sent an internal email in
02:51:13 Claude Valley sent an internal email in which he said in terms PE is dangerous on facades and everything should be transferred to FR as a matter of urgency
02:51:24 as a matter of urgency this wasn't an email from any old employee Mr Verla was the head of arconic's sales technical support team
02:51:33 at least as far as the UK was concerned nothing happened as a result of these suggestions in the period 2007 to 2017. iconic took no or no adequate steps in
02:51:47 iconic took no or no adequate steps in the decade after the Oslo meeting to promote its ACN panel with an FR core as a better safer alternative to its ACM panel with a PE core
02:52:00 panel with a PE core instead it continued throughout this period to characterize the UK as a PE Market
02:52:09 3rd of February 2014. the data on which Mr Verla emailed colleagues at arconic a European classification report for Rainer Bond PE
02:52:20 classification report for Rainer Bond PE 55
02:52:22 55 the report stated that the product was only class E he made clear that this classification applied to both riveted systems and cassette systems
02:52:33 cassette systems the wording of Mr verlers covering email left no room for ambiguity he wrote
02:52:40 he wrote the fire achieved classification is e the previous b-class report done for Rainer Bond PE in riveted system can no more be used from now
02:52:51 more be used from now indeed this new report cancel all the previous reports importantly one of the colleagues who was sent this email was Miss French she confirmed that she would have read
02:53:03 she confirmed that she would have read it at the time for arconic this was a wholly unwelcome development the existing BBA certificate was based on the previous Class B report
02:53:16 on the previous Class B report if that report could no longer be used the foundations of the BBA certificate were built on sand an iconic strategy for the UK Market was under threat
02:53:28 under threat iconic's reaction to this unwelcome development was to do what it had done in the past to withhold safety critical information from people who needed to be told about
02:53:41 from people who needed to be told about it
02:53:42 it didn't even share it with the BBA although it was contractually obliged to do so
02:53:48 do so instead it battened down the hatches and repeatedly ignored requests for information when a BBA was reviewing the certificate in 2014 and 2015.
02:54:01 certificate in 2014 and 2015. iconic continued what it had been doing since 2008. actively relying on a certificate which it knew to be inaccurate and misleading
02:54:13 it knew to be inaccurate and misleading one example of this is the fact that Ms French sent it to both Harley and cep in April 2014.
02:54:27 2nd of July 2014. the date of a meeting of the fire group of the center for window and cladding technology among those who attended were Brian
02:54:38 among those who attended were Brian Martin of dclg and Dr Sarah Colwell of bre ton specifically referred to this meeting in his final answer at the end of over seven days of giving evidence
02:54:51 of over seven days of giving evidence in a section in the minutes on the use of ACM in high-rise buildings reference was made to the fact that ACM normally had a PE core it was stated that paragraph 12.7 of
02:55:05 it was stated that paragraph 12.7 of approved document B was intended to prohibit the use of ACM with a PE core on high-rise buildings thought that this was not clear from the current wording of 12.7
02:55:18 current wording of 12.7 it was suggested that clarification could be achieved by means for frequently Asked question the minutes record for Dr Colwell agreed to raise this with Mr Martin
02:55:31 to raise this with Mr Martin nothing ever came of this publishing an FAQ would have been simple but this never happened no attempt was made by central government to find out how many
02:55:44 government to find out how many high-rise buildings were clad with ACM with a PE core the minutes of a subsequent meeting also attended by Dr Colwell and Mr Martin
02:55:55 attended by Dr Colwell and Mr Martin stated one the paragraph 12.7 Was poorly written and open to interpretation and two that the title of that paragraph Was misleading
02:56:06 Was misleading at the meeting it was said that these deficiencies would be changed in the next revision of approved document B iven that no timetable had been set for
02:56:18 iven that no timetable had been set for when that revision would take place this was in reality a meaningless statement
02:56:25 statement it became clear in module 6 that by this time Energy Efficiency was a central government priority but updating approved document B
02:56:36 but updating approved document B was not
02:56:38 was not finding out how many high-rise buildings were clad with ACM with ape core should by now have been a priority as should stopping any more being clad
02:56:51 as should stopping any more being clad with it
02:56:53 with it doing so would not have undermined Central government's desire to promote Energy Efficiency with rain screen cladding it is the insulation behind the cladding panels it
02:57:04 insulation behind the cladding panels it does the work of energy saving the panels are just there to cover the insulation and protect it from the elements
02:57:11 elements Banning combustible rain screen cladding panels was both possible and necessary
02:57:20 11th of August 2014 this date is about the insulation that was installed on grenfell Tower behind the ACM panels
02:57:31 the ACM panels insulation that according to Professor Purser contributed approximately half of the toxic gases generated by the fire in the cladding it is the date of a classification
02:57:42 it is the date of a classification report prepared by bre for celatex the report stated that the system described in it had been tested and met performance criteria set in br135
02:57:55 performance criteria set in br135 this report represented the culmination of celotex's Ambitions to compete with the market leader kingspan by copying its strategy
02:58:06 its strategy tests had been commissioned to assist the launch and marketing of celotex rs-5000
02:58:14 rs-5000 but the test was not a test of RS 5000 alone
02:58:18 alone it was a bs-8414 system test and therefore tested RS 5000 together with other products in a complete green screen cladding system
02:58:31 screen cladding system as bre's client sellotex was regarded as the sponsor of a test and had free reign in the selection of all the products in the system the other products were not chosen
02:58:43 the other products were not chosen because they were representative of a typical rain screen cladding system far from it they were deliberately and cynically chosen for their fire performance in the hope that they would
02:58:56 performance in the hope that they would increase the chances of the system passing the test
02:59:00 an earlier attempt to test RS 5000 within a clouding system had been unsuccessful celotex could have gone back to the drawing board and tried to improve the
02:59:11 drawing board and tried to improve the safety of its product it chose not to instead celotex deliberately included products within the tested clouding system which a
02:59:22 system which a meant that the system was more likely to achieve a pass but B were unrepresentative of typical clouding systems used by the construction industry
02:59:33 industry sellotex must have known that improved test result could only have been attributable to the presence of the other products which had been
02:59:44 other products which had been deliberately included for their fire safety performance seller text must equally have known that improved test result proved nothing about the safety
02:59:55 result proved nothing about the safety of rs-5000 this was not scientific research commissioned with the aim of improving product safety it was a deliberate and cynical attempt
03:00:08 it was a deliberate and cynical attempt to game the system in order to get a test result that would support a sales and marketing strategy having got this report
03:00:19 having got this report sellotex ceased further testing and focused on marketing RS 5000 as acceptable for use in buildings above 18 meters in height and its Salesforce focused on targeting
03:00:32 and its Salesforce focused on targeting individual high-rise projects grenfell Tower was one such project it was described in an email to the UK managing director of celotex's parent
03:00:43 managing director of celotex's parent company as a must-win project for celotex
03:00:48 celotex sellotex's sales rep assiduously courted Harley in the hope of winning in a contract
03:00:55 contract he informed Harley in writing that RS 5000 was the first PIR board to successfully meet the performance criteria in br135 for insulated
03:01:06 criteria in br135 for insulated rainscreen cladding systems and that it was therefore acceptable for use in buildings above 18 meters this was wholly misleading
03:01:19 this was wholly misleading it had no validity unless RS 5000 was installed in an identical system to that tested by bre which for several reasons would never happen
03:01:31 happen one being that the precise makeup of the system tested by bre was Kept Secret and not set out in the relevant testing certification and marketing documents
03:01:44 certification and marketing documents sellotex knew that grenfell Tower was a high-rise Residential Building it knew the attributes and chemical composition of rs-5000
03:01:55 composition of rs-5000 it should never have targeted grenfell Tower project
03:02:05 18th of September 2014. the date of an exchange of emails between Terry Ashton of ex-over and Neil Crawford of Studio e
03:02:16 Crawford of Studio e in the course of his emails Mr Crawford sent Mr Ashton initial drawings which Harley had sent it and an email from Harley stating that the insulation was class zero and the product data sheet
03:02:29 class zero and the product data sheet for celotex RS 5000. this was as Dr Lane has said a really important moment the exchange of emails on the 18th of September was an opportunity
03:02:41 September was an opportunity but by no means the first opportunity for xover to take the following two actions
03:02:48 actions one
03:02:49 one to advise for the insulation to be used in the cladding system needed to be a material of limited combustibility two
03:02:59 two to reconsider and update the advice in its outlined fire safety strategy by this date Exeter had produced free versions of this document each had included the same one-sentence
03:03:11 each had included the same one-sentence paragraph about external fire spread it stated
03:03:16 it stated it is considered that the proposed changes will have no adverse effect on the building in relation to external fire spread but this will be confirmed by an analysis in a future issue of this
03:03:27 by an analysis in a future issue of this report
03:03:29 report this paragraph did not adequately address the cladding system it was also misleading in his evidence Mr Ashton accepted that
03:03:40 in his evidence Mr Ashton accepted that the paragraph about external fire spread might have given readers of the report a false sense of security he was right to do so in short
03:03:51 in short the statement in that paragraph in the terms in which it was written should not have been included in any of the three versions of the outline fire safety strategy
03:04:04 exiver was a top-tier fire safety engineering firm it knew that a rain screen clouding system was to be installed on grenfell Tower
03:04:15 Tower the 18th of September 2014 was an ideal opportunity for X over to give necessary advice but it had not yet given it was the moment for Mr Ashton finally
03:04:28 it was the moment for Mr Ashton finally to analyze the products proposed for use in the cladding system and advise on the dangers
03:04:33 dangers he didn't do so nor did exover do so at any point thereafter it never updated the one sentence of advice on external fire spread in its
03:04:44 advice on external fire spread in its report
03:04:48 21st of October 2014. this was progress meeting number four attended by the TMO artelia and Ryden it included as an action point
03:05:00 it included as an action point but Simon Lawrence of Ryden was to appoint a fire consultant this action point had also been included in the minutes of progress meetings one two and three
03:05:11 two and three Ryden never did a point of fire consultant and after this meeting this action point disappeared from the minutes of the progress meetings never to return
03:05:23 to return Mr Lawrence's evidence was that in his experience Ryden never engaged fire Consultants Stephen Blake ryden's refurbishment director
03:05:34 ryden's refurbishment director told the inquiry if it's on a project of this size it was normal for Ryden not to appoint one not appointing X over or another fire consultant was therefore a positive
03:05:46 consultant was therefore a positive decision by Ryden rather than an action point that slipped through the cracks Mr Blake confirmed this when he gave evidence
03:05:56 evidence as at October 2014 Ryden should have been aware that ex-over had provided minimal advice on the cladding system Ryden itself had no in-house fire safety
03:06:10 Ryden itself had no in-house fire safety expertise
03:06:12 expertise therefore ryden's decision not to appoint a fire consultant meant that no fire engineer ever properly considered safety of a cladding system
03:06:23 safety of a cladding system Mr Lawrence was surely right to say that in hindsight a fire consultant was definitely essential in short Ryden as design and build
03:06:35 in short Ryden as design and build contractor needed advice from a fire engineer
03:06:38 engineer there were multiple opportunities for riding to obtain the necessary advice opportunities which could and should have been taken but were not
03:06:52 concludes the list of dates which I wish to draw to your attention today although as I said earlier there are many others that I could have chosen the 10 Dates which I have identified
03:07:04 the 10 Dates which I have identified and The Wider themes which they illustrate support my central theme but it should never have been the case but a single local Authority building
03:07:15 but a single local Authority building control service was all that stood between dangerous products being used on ground foot Tower my final date took us up to October 2014.
03:07:26 2014. at that time the installation of the raynerbond PE 55 and the rs-5000 had not begun
03:07:33 begun that remained the case for another six months
03:07:39 the panel will recall that in an earlier stage of this inquiry some people seem to be suggesting that the council's build a control service was part of the design team for the project
03:07:52 design team for the project in the course of the inquiry the factual evidence the expert evidence and the relevant case law all combined to make it very clear that building control services have no role in design
03:08:05 services have no role in design and are not part of design teams
03:08:09 Mr taverner King's Council on behalf of Ryden
03:08:13 Ryden accepted at the end of modules one and two but the council's building control service was not part of a design team
03:08:22 the TMO and Ryden between them assembled a large and apparently reputable team of paid advisors and contractors Dr Lane's evidence on the composition of
03:08:34 Dr Lane's evidence on the composition of the team was as follows it would be entirely reasonable for kctmo and indeed any party to assume that the project team had access to and
03:08:46 that the project team had access to and could rely on highly competent experts for all aspects of fire safety design and compliance nevertheless this team designed and
03:08:57 nevertheless this team designed and installed a dangerous cladding system
03:09:03 I end this first part of this statement where I began there were failings in how the council's building controlled service dealt with the application for building control approval
03:09:14 approval Builder control issued a completion certificate on the 7th of July 2016. it should not have done so
03:09:28 I now turn to the second part of his statement
03:09:31 statement to the fire safety measures within Granville Tower this inquiry is rightly interested in the condition of the inside of a tower as well as the exterior and substantial part of module 3 was
03:09:44 and substantial part of module 3 was devoted to the nature design maintenance and performance of the active and passive fire safety measures within the tower
03:09:53 tower when thinking about the inside of a tower it is worth reminding ourselves of how it was managed Council was the owner and landlord of Grandfather Tower
03:10:05 Grandfather Tower the tower was managed for it by the TMO the council scrutinized and monitored for TMO
03:10:14 the council has previously admitted a number of failings in its monitoring of the TMO
03:10:20 the TMO I reminded the panel of some of them at the start of this statement I'm not going to repeat them again at this point but the council stands by its admissions and apologizes unreservedly for its
03:10:32 and apologizes unreservedly for its failings
03:10:35 in the first part of this statement I sought to focus on the national Dimension out on overarching points I will be taking the same approach in this part
03:10:47 this part it is for this reason that I will be focusing on the role of fire risk assessors generally and the role of the fire risk assessor for grenfell Tower following the lacknell house fire it
03:10:59 following the lacknell house fire it became increasingly common for responsible persons to engage external fire risk assessors to carry out fire risk assessments central government was aware of this
03:11:12 central government was aware of this phenomenon yet it never introduced a competency requirement for fire risk assessors when giving evidence in module 3 Colin Todd told the inquiry for the absence of
03:11:25 Todd told the inquiry for the absence of a competency requirement for fire risk assessors was not an oversight he said that it was intentional government policy he also said that central government
03:11:36 he also said that central government very positively resisted all cause the competence to be made mandatory the evidence in module 6 confirmed this
03:11:47 the evidence in module 6 confirmed this in the years before the grenfell tower fire there were a large number of missed opportunities to impose mandatory competence requirements on fire risk assessors
03:11:59 assessors we listed nine of the most notable ones in our module 6 closing statement
03:12:07 between 2010 and 2017 Carl Stokes was in effect the Sole Provider of fire risk assessments to the TMO this provided him with an opportunity to
03:12:19 this provided him with an opportunity to assess the tmo's fire safety management system
03:12:23 system and to advise the TMO on it but his involvement was not limited to the preparation of fire risk assessments he was frequently asked to advise and
03:12:34 he was frequently asked to advise and did advise the TMO on a wide range of fire safety related issues as a result Mr Stokes learned a lot of important information between fire risk
03:12:46 important information between fire risk assessments which was relevant to the next occasion when he carried out a fire risk assessment
03:12:54 as for tmo's fire risk assessor and go-to person for advice on fire safety measures
03:13:01 measures Mr Stokes was the most experienced and qualified person involved in the delivery of the tmo's fire safety management system
03:13:14 Dr Lane recognized the importance of Mr Stokes
03:13:18 Stokes on more than one occasion in her expert report she stated between Ms Ray and Mr Stokes in my opinion kctmo should have had access to adequate advice
03:13:31 given the importance of Mr Stokes to grenfell Tower we devoted part of our written closing statement to analyzing the evidence relating to his initial appointment by the TMO and concerned
03:13:44 appointment by the TMO and concerned subsequently expressed about his competence by the lfb I'm not going to repeat what we have said in writing other than to remind you of one point which is this
03:13:55 which is this the concerns raised by the lfb with officers of a TMO were not communicated to either the TMO board or the council
03:14:07 I turn now to the issue of flat entrance doors
03:14:11 doors one of many issues which Mr Stokes advised on he also considered them on each occasion when he carried out a fire risk assessment of grenfell Tower
03:14:22 assessment of grenfell Tower at the time of the fire there were 120 Flats in the Tower located on Floors 4-23
03:14:29 4-23 the flat entrance doors to 106 of those Flats had been replaced in the period 2011-2013. all of the 106 new flat entrance doors
03:14:40 all of the 106 new flat entrance doors were fitted with self-closures at the time of installation in the years that followed no program of inspecting those doors to see if the
03:14:51 inspecting those doors to see if the self-closures remained present and functional was ever introduced it is now clear that a significant number of flats within grenfell Tower
03:15:02 number of flats within grenfell Tower did not have functioning self-closures on the night of the fire the council has previously admitted but it was wrong to tell the TMO one that the program to install
03:15:13 that the program to install self-closures should be a five-year program rather than a three-year program and two for there should not be an inspection program the council does not seek to qualify its
03:15:25 the council does not seek to qualify its admissions but it does seek to ensure that they are seen in their proper context
03:15:36 part of that context concerns the discussions that took place between the TMO and the council I have previously made six separate points about those discussions
03:15:47 points about those discussions for today's purposes I can boil those six points down to two
03:15:53 TMO failed to make the best case for an inspection program and a three-year installation program
03:16:02 as a result Laura Johnson's response to the TMO was based on imperfect information
03:16:10 part of that context is the difference between what the TMO knew and what the council knew about what was happening on the ground in relation to self-closures
03:16:22 the ground in relation to self-closures Dr Lane identified three reoccurring faults that arose with the doors installed in a flat entrance door replacement program during the module 3 hearings there was a
03:16:34 during the module 3 hearings there was a good deal of evidence about who within the TMO knew what about his matters but it was no suggestion that the council was aware of them and there was no evidence that anyone from the council was made aware of them
03:16:47 from the council was made aware of them during phase one the inquiry heard evidence that a handyman employed by the TMO had disconnected a number of self-closes within grenfell Tower
03:16:58 self-closes within grenfell Tower there has been no suggestion or evidence that anyone from the council knew about the handyman's actions a third part of the context is the
03:17:10 a third part of the context is the advice sought from and given by Mr Stokes to the TMO on this issue one matter which the inquiries experts agreed on was this it was part of Mr Stokes role to Monitor
03:17:23 it was part of Mr Stokes role to Monitor and assess the adequacy of the system of Maintenance and inspection of the self-closures yet Mr Stokes failed to advise the TMO
03:17:34 yet Mr Stokes failed to advise the TMO of the need for a program of an inspection and maintenance although there were clear opportunities for him to do so
03:17:43 to do so I will give one example of this although many others could be given in January 2013 the TMO sent Mr Stokes a
03:17:54 in January 2013 the TMO sent Mr Stokes a draft of a tmo's fire safety strategy and expressly asked him what else should I include Council to the inquiry asked Mr Stokes
03:18:05 Council to the inquiry asked Mr Stokes why did you not add the need for a policy which would cover a planned maintenance program for flat entrance doors with an inspection every six months as by now set out in the LGA
03:18:16 months as by now set out in the LGA guide
03:18:18 guide Mr Stokes replied I can't answer that question
03:18:22 question Council persisted and asked well is it because you have no answer to which Mr Stokes replied well yes
03:18:32 I return now to a point I made when I started this topic about the fire safety measures within Granville Tower the fact that central government never introduced a competency requirement for
03:18:44 introduced a competency requirement for fire risk assessors anyone
03:18:48 anyone can call themselves a fire risk Assessor it is not a legally protected title and it is not alone in that same is true of engineer fire engineer
03:18:59 same is true of engineer fire engineer and fire safety engineer architect is a legally protected title but an architect's practice can employ someone without that formal qualification to do work for it as
03:19:12 qualification to do work for it as Studio e did with Neil Crawford this approach to competence in the field of fire safety should be a major concern given the evidence of professors Bisby
03:19:26 given the evidence of professors Bisby and Torero about the central importance of competence in a system based on functional requirements and about the low levels of competence they had
03:19:37 low levels of competence they had experienced the missed opportunities to introduce a competency requirement for fire risk assessors had potential consequences
03:19:50 assessors had potential consequences if central government had made fire risk assessment a profession it could have had a number of benefits in addition to requiring all fire risk assessors to hold minimum standardized qualifications
03:20:04 hold minimum standardized qualifications we have analyzed those benefits in more detail in our written statement but I will mention some of the key ones now
03:20:13 introducing a mandatory competence requirement could have raised standards within the fire risk assessment industry it could also raise the status of fire
03:20:24 it could also raise the status of fire risk assessors and it could have provided third parties with an authoritative Benchmark against which to assess fire risk assessors
03:20:35 which to assess fire risk assessors the availability of an authoritative Benchmark could have been a useful Aid memoir and could have provided Mr Stokes with greater Clarity and what was
03:20:46 with greater Clarity and what was expected of him as a fire risk Assessor in addition raising the status of fire risk assessors by making them professionals would have been a decisive break with
03:20:58 would have been a decisive break with the mindset that fire risk assessments would be done quickly cheaply and in-house
03:21:05 professional fire risk assessors would have been able to justify charging more and to justify taking the time required to do the job to the appropriate standard
03:21:16 standard an organization such as the TMO would have had to find the extra money required to pay for the services of a member of a profession TMO needed to apply to the council for
03:21:28 TMO needed to apply to the council for the extra money clear mandatory legal requirements would have provided it with arguments but it could use to make a case of a council for additional funds
03:21:42 that brings me to the end of the second part of this statement
03:21:47 finally some concluding remarks if time permits before the break yes it would be convenient wouldn't it for you to continue for a moment it would very much yes of course then thank you
03:21:59 yes of course then thank you this week our final closing statements is an important milestone in the inquiry on Monday morning you heard powerful and passionate submissions
03:22:11 passionate submissions about the need for robust recommendations to address deep-rooted systemic problems the leader of a council who is here
03:22:22 the leader of a council who is here today
03:22:22 today has asked me to make it clear but as far as she and the council are concerned these closing statements do not Mark The End of the Road
03:22:33 at the beginning of phase one we said that the ultimate achievement of this inquiry would be to ensure that when people design construct and refurbish
03:22:44 people design construct and refurbish buildings in future a disaster like this never happens again the council remains determined to do what it can to achieve this since the fire the council has
03:22:57 since the fire the council has completely changed the way housing is managed in the borough Council now has direct responsibility for the management of its social housing properties it is directly accountable to its
03:23:09 it is directly accountable to its residents for its management of those properties the council has made significant changes in many areas including its building control service resident engagement and how it manages
03:23:22 resident engagement and how it manages fire safety during the course of this inquiry the council has on a number of occasions provided the inquiry with documents detailing changes it has made
03:23:33 detailing changes it has made the most recent such document submit at the end of last month do not only address what has been done it also details some of the council's ongoing work and plans for the future
03:23:46 the council believes that at the national level progress has been too modest and too slow it also believes that too much of the
03:23:57 it also believes that too much of the national fire safety and Building Safety system is too broken to be fixed by minor changes in our submission the starting point for the panel should
03:24:08 the starting point for the panel should be to recognize that fundamental change is needed
03:24:13 is needed but there are vested interests opposed to change which will need to be overcome and that in order to achieve the necessary fundamental change there will
03:24:24 necessary fundamental change there will need to be both legislative change and cultural change
03:24:30 the residents of Grandville Tower were failed by many many organizations from both the private sector and the public sector
03:24:40 sector the council was one of them but the council is conscious that it differed from most of the other core participants in important respect
03:24:51 participants in important respect it was not an anonymous clouding subcontractor or manufacturer whom the residents might never have heard of it was the owner of Grandville Tower the residents were its tenants and its
03:25:03 the residents were its tenants and its leaseholders the council was democratically accountable to them Council apologizes unreservedly for the ways in which it failed the
03:25:14 for the ways in which it failed the residents of grenfell Tower he wishes to say how sorry it is to each who bereaved everyone who survived and all of its residents
03:25:29 thank you very much Mr Maxwell Scott
03:25:34 well we'll rise at that point and we'll resume at five past two when we shall hear a closing statement from Mr James agaros King's Council on behalf of the
03:25:46 agaros King's Council on behalf of the tenant management organization thank you very much too please