Evidence from tRIIO principal designer on gas riser replacement works at Grenfell Tower, including design decisions, ventilation requirements, and compartmentation failures.
00:00:30 Would
00:00:40 you ask Mr. Derland to come back in, please?
00:00:56 All right, Mr. Dolan. Yes. Ready to carry on?
00:00:58 carry on? Yes.
00:00:58 Yes. Good. Thank you very much. Yes, we screen.
00:01:00 screen. Yes, thank you. Just some brief questions at this point about the health and safety file under the CDM regulations. Now, we we've touched on this file before. Um, and do I take it that you were familiar with um the
00:01:13 that you were familiar with um the requirement under the CDM regulations for the principal designer to prepare a health and safety file appropriate to the characteristics of the project which had to contain information relating to the project likely to be needed during
00:01:24 the project likely to be needed during any subsequent project to ensure the health and safety of any person. Were you familiar with that? Yes.
00:01:30 Yes. Yes. Thank you. And um can you help us? Did TRIO as principal designer seek to obtain the pre-existing health and safety file from the TMO? Were those
00:01:42 safety file from the TMO? Were those efforts made? We didn't specifically ask for a health and safety file, although we would have asked for any information that would have been available um that could help us, but we didn't ask for a health and safety file.
00:01:53 safety file. Right. Why why not if the whole purpose of that file is to ensure that knowledge is passed on from project to project? It's not something that's been part of of the TRIO process to to request the
00:02:04 of the TRIO process to to request the health and safety file from the building owner.
00:02:07 owner. Right. And can we agree that as principal designer it was TRIO's role to prepare, review, and update the health and safety file as the project went along?
00:02:16 along? It was. Yes. Yeah. And that was the duty that started in the preconstruction phase and was ongoing until completion and handover. Yes. Of the file. Yes.
00:02:27 Yes. Of the file. Yes. Who who was it at TRIO who was actually responsible for the health and safety file for these works? The design manager would take an overall responsibility for the process which
00:02:38 responsibility for the process which would have included uh making sure the health and safety file uh was created and was contributed to during the phases or various phases of the design and construction process.
00:02:49 construction process. And was that Mr. Whiskin? That was Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson, sorry. Yes. And did TRIO actually prepare a health and safety file at the preconstruction phase? We did.
00:03:00 We did. Right. And did it keep it updated as the works were going on? Yes, it was. And at the end, was it t uh trio's intention to hand that over to the TMO? Yes, it was. Right. Um it would have
00:03:11 Yes, it was. Right. Um it would have been handed back. It would have been handed back to Caden, the client, right? And then it was their responsibility to give it to the TMO. My understanding would be that that was the the Yes. the requirement.
00:03:22 the the Yes. the requirement. Right. I see. Yes. Thank you. Now, um, you've mentioned in your first statement that that there were several concerns raised about the gas riser replacement works from March 2017
00:03:35 replacement works from March 2017 onwards. Can you help us? When did you first become aware of these concerns? It would have been it would have been later on in the in the in the project. Um we had um an incident with asbestous
00:03:48 Um we had um an incident with asbestous that was raised to me and there was concerns raised around the pipe running through the stairwell in regards to uh vandalism of the pipe and and the consequences of such vandalism.
00:04:00 consequences of such vandalism. Yes, I see. I'm going to take you to u one of the complaints that was received in a moment. You've mentioned twice now, I think, this incident with asbestos. Can you just very briefly explain to the
00:04:11 Can you just very briefly explain to the panel what happened because I think it does crop up in some of the emails. Yeah. Uh one of the flats we had difficulty getting access to. We got called to um Holland Gas got called to
00:04:23 called to um Holland Gas got called to uh reinstate the gas supply. So that was running or relocate the meter to the meter new location, run the outlet pipe wet to the appliances and then commission the customer so that they had
00:04:34 commission the customer so that they had gas. In doing so, the engineer that was sent there drilled through an asbestous board. Now, we wasn't made aware of that until two weeks later when an employee
00:04:45 until two weeks later when an employee of Express Builders went to the property to make good. So, the instant that that that was referred to previously is that that particular incident, right? Um, and is it right that trio
00:04:57 right? Um, and is it right that trio actually had to leave site after that incident?
00:04:59 incident? Yes, the we was asked to leave site for a period of three weeks. I think it was approximately 3 weeks. Right. And why were you asked to leave sight?
00:05:07 sight? Because of the instant uh asbestous being in the property, it had to be cleaned up. There's what that that created some concerns in terms of the activity that was being undertaken. We had to do some work. So we closed the
00:05:19 had to do some work. So we closed the job down, removed the health and safety file and the project pack from the welfare facilities that we had on site and then over the coming days and weeks we address certain issues and and then re pre or recommence the the works.
00:05:33 re pre or recommence the the works. Yes. And approximately when was that those three weeks that you were off site?
00:05:38 site? It was it was around about it was during March. Yes.
00:05:43 Yes. Yes.
00:05:44 Yes. Yeah. Now let's look at an example of some of the concerns that were being raised. Um if we can go to RBK43601.
00:05:57 This is an email from Lee Chapman, one of the residents. um to the TMO copying in a number of others. And if we look
00:06:08 in a number of others. And if we look down at the body of the email, sorry, it's dated the 20th of March 2017. And I just want to read the second and third paragraphs. He says, "We are sincerely concerned as residents living
00:06:20 sincerely concerned as residents living in the tower and that the fire risk that the recent installation of gas pipes has brought to the building. It's not just the installation itself that causes some alarm, but it is the risk that exposed pipes of any kind can cause to
00:06:32 pipes of any kind can cause to residents. The fact that these pipes have natural gas, which I'm sure you will understand is extremely combustible, makes us feel in grave danger in the event of one of the pipes being compromised. And then he goes on
00:06:43 being compromised. And then he goes on in the third paragraph, you may be aware that recently the level of antisocial behavior in the building is increasing, mainly involving children between 10 and young adults up to the age of 25. Given
00:06:54 young adults up to the age of 25. Given that many of the people who gain access to the building relatively easy due to the lack of security adds further alarm to safety concerns surrounding the gas pipes. Very few hours go by without
00:07:05 pipes. Very few hours go by without someone smoking in the fire escape and some sometime light small fires or should I say highly flammable drugs. In the event the in the event the event that just one of the pipes begins to
00:07:17 that just one of the pipes begins to leak, all people in the building will suffer and more importantly are at risk of death or serious injury at least. Please can I insist that you must take this issue seriously as should an event happen, it's our lives at risk.
00:07:31 happen, it's our lives at risk. Now, um
00:07:33 Now, um was this a complaint that you became aware of during the time um that you were involved with the project? I was aware there was concerns over the as I mentioned earlier in terms of the
00:07:45 as I mentioned earlier in terms of the pipe and the risk or the concerns around vandalism and that vandalism could cause a leak. Yes. Yes. And because it's right, isn't it, that others had complained about the risk of antisocial behavior and vandalism causing a potential risk to
00:07:57 vandalism causing a potential risk to this infrastructure. I understand. So, yes. Yes.
00:08:01 Yes. Was that a particular risk to the riser in your view, that particular risk? No, I think it's in my statement and I make mention that that whilst I considered it and took it seriously and
00:08:12 considered it and took it seriously and and the rest of the team did, the pipe was a steel pipe. Um, it was welded. Um and therefore it would be very difficult to damage very very difficult indeed to
00:08:23 to damage very very difficult indeed to damage and in terms of fire it has a very very high temperature melting point. So in reference to the the issues around fire or vandalism, it would take
00:08:34 around fire or vandalism, it would take in my opinion mechanical uh means of actually breaking into that um cutting cutting cutting material machines which I wouldn't expect um standard sort of
00:08:45 I wouldn't expect um standard sort of vandalism to to to happen. I also drew on my experience in between 2006 and 2013. That was the last seven years I worked for National Grid. Between 2006
00:08:58 worked for National Grid. Between 2006 and 2010, I was the network engineer responsible for emergency and replacement uh for a quarter of London. And in that 4-year period, I'd never once experienced um vandalism of any
00:09:09 once experienced um vandalism of any pipe uh causing a gas leak. And then for the three-year period from 2010 to 2013 whilst working on um the gas alliance project, I was the duty engineer for the
00:09:21 project, I was the duty engineer for the whole of London. That's when I was promoted to senior management role and the duty manager for London. Um and again, not once and that was a 24/7 365 day a year emergency service and I can't
00:09:33 day a year emergency service and I can't recall once ever being called out to a gas escape resulting from vandalism. So I base my judgment that whilst the concerns that that the the the residence was a valid concern, the actual risk was
00:09:45 was a valid concern, the actual risk was s very very low indeed if not negligible. Right. Yes. Thank you. Now just but just sticking with this complaint email from Mr. Chapman. If we go to the second page
00:09:56 Mr. Chapman. If we go to the second page and look at the second paragraph, he he continues um he says this. Having seen these pipes numerous times, I am seriously concerned about how I will get out of this building alive in the event
00:10:08 out of this building alive in the event of a fire with this added risk. At no point were we advised that a gas pipe would be installed in a communal area. Nor were we informed of the need to be extra vigilant at the 22nd floor.
00:10:19 to be extra vigilant at the 22nd floor. It's a very long way down from the window in the event that after 30 minutes of fire, our house is engulfed. Um, now
00:10:27 Um, now when you were made aware of these complaints, to what extent did you step back and question whether it was right to have the gas riser in the stairwell? the
00:10:39 the the the the gas pipe in the stairwell was in in our opinion designed and compliant to IGM5 and therefore what we had installed in the in the in the building was a
00:10:51 the in the in the building was a compliant system and therefore there was no concern it was a compliant system unless we started to question the regulations or the specification. So in our opinion it was compliant and therefore safe. So I had no real reason
00:11:04 therefore safe. So I had no real reason to question the only the as mentioned earlier on the only option available to us would have not to have put gas into that building and as we felt we had a safe and compliant route there there was
00:11:15 safe and compliant route there there was no need to yes
00:11:16 yes act upon it but as I think you've just made clear that was purely looking from your perspective at IGM5 and not looking at the building regulations or the approved documents
00:11:25 documents that is correct yes yeah
00:11:28 yeah um can we go to TMO 10001 16548.
00:11:34 16548. Now,
00:11:37 Now, um this is an exchange that um Janice Ray of the TMO had with um John Allen of RBKC building control. And if we start at page three of this, please. At the
00:11:49 at page three of this, please. At the bottom of the page is an email of the 16th of March 2017 from John Allen to Janice Ray and he writes, "Janice, I am content that this work would be regarded
00:12:00 content that this work would be regarded as a repair providing there is no change to the fire safety implications. A building regulation application would not be required in particular to ensure that the riser
00:12:12 in particular to ensure that the riser replaces a riser in the same position." Full stop. Gas rises and meters are not generally positioned within stairways or if they are they should be in fireresisting enclosures.
00:12:24 fireresisting enclosures. They should also reinstate and fire stop any fire resisting enclosures that are affected as part of the installation. So we can see that that's what um building control was saying.
00:12:36 control was saying. Um, now pausing there and from what you've told us, it's right, isn't it, that you understood that work reinstating gas rises was not generally regarded as work that required a building control application.
00:12:48 building control application. That's correct. Yes. Um, we can see here that Mr. Allen is saying it doesn't require um it sorry, it would be regarded as a repair, therefore doesn't need building regulation approval providing there is
00:13:01 regulation approval providing there is no change to the fire safety implications. Now, were you ever told that that was what building control was saying that that it it didn't need approval provided
00:13:13 that it it didn't need approval provided there was no change to the fire safety implications? I wasn't personally aware of of that email.
00:13:19 email. Right. And had you been asked at the time, are there any changes to the fire safety implications, what would your answer have been? My expectation would have been we would we had a a
00:13:30 have been we would we had a a relationship um or engaged with a member of the KCTMO in in sending our design through to the KCTMO. We'd have expected collaboration at that point if they had some concerns that our design what we
00:13:43 some concerns that our design what we were submitting for their approval would have created uh that situation.
00:13:50 Right. I understand that's that's the process. But if you'd been asked at the time, are there any changes to the fire safety implications involved in this rise of replacement?
00:14:02 involved in this rise of replacement? What would your answer have been? Yes.
00:14:05 Yes. Yes.
00:14:08 And TRIO didn't ever see the need itself to contact building control directly. No, we we went through the link the contact we had at the KCTN
00:14:19 contact we had at the KCTN right
00:14:21 right now. There were a few more exchanges between Miss Ray and Mr. Allen over the next few weeks. If we can go to another one, TMO1016548.
00:14:36 This is an email from Janice Ray to John Allen of the 3rd of April 2017. And she writes this. She said, "Thanks. We have now got their commitment to
00:14:47 We have now got their commitment to enclose the riser in a 2-hour fire rated boxing.
00:14:51 boxing. Our assessor has already highlighted the breaches in compartmentation and national grid have confirmed these will be addressed. A number of residents very unhappy and
00:15:02 A number of residents very unhappy and perceive this to be a potential a very high risk and we're asking RBKC to appoint an independent consultant to investigate. LFB are saying though not yet in writing
00:15:15 LFB are saying though not yet in writing that they are unhappy about the riser being on the means of escape but as it is already installed not sure this will have any input. Now, we asked Miss Ray about this during
00:15:26 Now, we asked Miss Ray about this during her oral evidence, and um she said that the LFB were unhappy, but they didn't say that it presented a risk.
00:15:37 say that it presented a risk. And she also said that she raised this with the LFB because Cadent were not responding to her on the point. Now, were you ever made aware of the
00:15:48 Now, were you ever made aware of the LFB's unhappiness about the riser being on the means of escape? I was not personally made a winner.
00:16:00 Um, now I understand that you became personally involved in the project in around March 2017. Is that right? Yes.
00:16:09 Yes. And as we understand it, um, is it right that in sometime in March 2017, you were invited to attend a meeting with the TMO and Cadent to discuss these complaints
00:16:20 and Cadent to discuss these complaints about the original design? Is that right?
00:16:23 right? I don't recall personally being invited to a meeting with the TMO. Right. Okay. But as far as we can tell, before any such meeting took place, the design was changed. Um can you just tell
00:16:36 design was changed. Um can you just tell us briefly what led to that change in design?
00:16:40 design? So design one um the pipe in the stairwell was of a welded and screwed um construction. Yes. Meant to be welded and screwed.
00:16:51 Meant to be welded and screwed. what was actually built or what was introduced into that construction was what we call a a compression fitting and that compression fitting was introduced
00:17:02 that compression fitting was introduced into the uh pipeline at each of the branches onto the lobbies. So we went from a welded and screwed construction to a pipe with a different type of
00:17:15 to a pipe with a different type of component in which changed the requirements of ventilation. Therefore, we could we could no longer rely on the indirect ventilation down the bottom of the stairwell. We was okay with a direct
00:17:26 the stairwell. We was okay with a direct ventilation at the top to to natural air, but we needed to find a ventilation route to air at the bottom of the riser as well.
00:17:34 as well. Right. You talk about a compression fitting. Do you mean um is another word for that or another phrase for that? A flanged joint. It is. Yes. And can you just explain what that
00:17:45 And can you just explain what that means? flanged rather than being screwed um or welded. Yeah. So if if if if you can visualize a straight pipe with a Tpiece, so we got a
00:17:57 straight pipe with a Tpiece, so we got a welded Tpiece in. At the end of that Tpiece, there would have been a thread and that thread out the threaded valve would have would have screwed onto that that um piece of pipe that protruded out
00:18:09 that um piece of pipe that protruded out of the vertical pipeline. The flange fitting enabled us to put a fitting on and tighten it up as opposed to screw it or weld it. So by tightening it up, it creates a seal um via a gasket
00:18:22 it up, it creates a seal um via a gasket which tightens it up. So there is no screwing or welding of the connection at that point. Yes, I see. And I think what you're telling us is that flanged joints are
00:18:33 telling us is that flanged joints are less reliable in terms of leaks than screwed steel or welded construction. Is that correct? It requires a different type of ventilation. They all need to be
00:18:44 type of ventilation. They all need to be ventilated, but there is a different there is a a higher spec of ventilation that's required when you introduce a compression fitting, right,
00:18:52 right, as opposed to a screwed or welded uh fitting?
00:18:55 fitting? Yes.
00:18:56 Yes. Well, at the risk of stealing Miss Grindy's next question, why introduce a flange fitting? It is a very good question. Uh and and it it was it wasn't part of the original
00:19:07 it it was it wasn't part of the original design. Um, it was introduced to speed up, we understand it was introduced to speed up the construction of the riser pipeline in order to get gas back onto those customers that have been without gas for two to three months at that
00:19:20 gas for two to three months at that point.
00:19:21 point. When you say we understand it was introduced, is that because you're explaining what your contract your subcontractor it was? Yes, the subcontractor introduced the fitting. It was managed
00:19:33 introduced the fitting. It was managed by our site manager. We were on site. We were we were observing checking and we never picked that up at the time. It was picked up later and and was addressed as as we probably come on to.
00:19:45 as we probably come on to. Is it fair to say it was an error on site that those flange joints were fitted?
00:19:50 fitted? Yes.
00:19:52 Yes. And it should have been picked up by the trio manager who was observing on site, but it wasn't. That's correct. And and can you just explain to me why you're saying that affected particularly
00:20:03 you're saying that affected particularly the ventilation at the bottom of the riser as opposed to the ventilation all the way up because wasn't the consequence that you then had to box in all of the laterals and the risers all
00:20:15 all of the laterals and the risers all the way up to floor 23. Yeah. So if in design one where we were boxing in the laterals to enable the lateral pipe should a leak occur to vent into the stairwell. Yeah. The ventilation requirements
00:20:27 Yeah. The ventilation requirements allowed us to have direct or indirect ventilation at bottom and top. So we was able to to to comply with a direct ventilation requirement at the top because of the roof end and down the bottom we had the door out onto the the
00:20:39 bottom we had the door out onto the the landing which went into the atrium which went to an external door. That was the indirect ventilation and and and in our view that was compliant with the requirements of G5, the ventilation requirements of G5. When the compression
00:20:51 requirements of G5. When the compression fitting was introduced, the indirect ventilation down the bottom was no longer satisfactory. So we had to create a a a we had to put in place the ability to direct ventilate from the bottom to
00:21:03 to direct ventilate from the bottom to the top. And to do that we had to install then the riser the vertical part in the stairwell in a boxed in enclosure. So it became a segregated system from top to bottom and all the lateral. So the full riser system would
00:21:16 lateral. So the full riser system would then become boxed in. So it becomes segregated from the rest of the building.
00:21:20 building. Right.
00:21:20 Right. So did you save any time after all? No the that's sorry let me just correct myself there. The gas in terms of the approach that was taken and able to get
00:21:31 approach that was taken and able to get the gas back on by the 25th of January. Um it would have taken longer to put the gas on um if we' have and I'm not sure
00:21:42 gas on um if we' have and I'm not sure how much longer. I haven't got that that that that level of detail, but it was decided there was a decision or a view that the gasket could be get back on quicker with the the flange joints introduced. It was easier to introduce
00:21:53 introduced. It was easier to introduce the flange to to the other the correct design.
00:21:57 design. Yes. Can I just press you a bit on on this ventilation point? I I understand that the consequences was and we'll come to it in the design that you then boxed
00:22:08 to it in the design that you then boxed in the riser at this in the stair to create effectively like its own compartment within the stair which you said would ventilate at the top to the roof vent. Yes.
00:22:19 roof vent. Yes. Yes.
00:22:20 Yes. And you said that you could no longer have indirect ventilation at the bottom. So you had to have direct ventilation at the bottom. How did you get over the fact that the
00:22:31 How did you get over the fact that the riser is coming from the basement through a number of riser cupboards and other store rooms before it gets to the stair?
00:22:40 stair? There could never be direct ventilation down there, could there? If if you recall my response to design one where the the the holes through the basement to the riser cupboards under
00:22:51 basement to the riser cupboards under design one would have been sealed. Yes.
00:22:53 Yes. Under design two, those holes would have been kept open. So the coming back to the the uh fire sealing of the holes, the only holes that were been fire sealed under design
00:23:04 that were been fire sealed under design two were the holes that were made into the flats, the direct ventilation at the roof and and if the boxing in had been fully completed, it would have run through the store room into the riser
00:23:15 through the store room into the riser cupboards into the basement and then we would have created a vent in the basement at the boxing in to outside. Right.
00:23:22 Right. So, we would have in installed a ventilation uh point within the boxing in the basement. So, you were boxing in I'm not concerned about the basement because I understand the basement's got its own ventilation
00:23:34 the basement's got its own ventilation and is a ventilated space for all sorts of reasons because it's got dangerous substances in it. I'm really talking about the the point from the top of the basement to the bottom of the stairs that those floors
00:23:45 bottom of the stairs that those floors that you've got to get through. I still don't understand how are you saying that you would create a boxing in around that pipe all the way down. That's right. Yes. The the the boxing in
00:23:57 That's right. Yes. The the the boxing in would have been to comp the design drawing on the design drawing. It talks around fully boxing in all of the design too. Boxing in all of the pipe that would have included the pipe running through the cupboard into the stair into
00:24:08 through the cupboard into the stair into the riser cupboards. So it comes in, it comes down a stairwell into a store room, through a riser cupboard, through another riser cupboard and into the basement and then out to the road. The design, the full fully boxed in design,
00:24:21 design, the full fully boxed in design, design two to provide that ventilation required the whole system to be boxed in as it run through the full extent of the the building and then the ventilation would have been created down in the basement. So we had a fully segregated
00:24:33 basement. So we had a fully segregated system although there was ventilation in the basement and that would have sufficed for design one. We wanted to create a chimney type effect through. Right. And I see. And um is it your evidence that
00:24:45 I see. And um is it your evidence that that wasn't complete? That boxing in at the very low levels wasn't complete by the time of the fire? That's right. Yeah. We had completed the boxing in and the stairwell up to the the 23rd floor or the 22nd floor. A
00:24:57 the 23rd floor or the 22nd floor. A number of the laterals were boxed in, but there was no boxing in completed um anywhere else. I see. Yes. Um, can I just pick up on a couple of other things you said this morning about
00:25:09 other things you said this morning about ventilation at those levels? This morning you said that there were louver doors on the riser cupboards between the basement and the bottom stairwell, but our expert, Mr. Hancock, doesn't recall
00:25:20 our expert, Mr. Hancock, doesn't recall seeing any louver doors in those sections of the building. Can I just check, are you sure that there were loud doors at those portions of the building? Yeah, I I think on the picture that was
00:25:33 Yeah, I I think on the picture that was put up earlier on, I think that was, you know, we talked we we explained the riser route and we went to that that that floor there is you could see the door there with the the the lacks. That's it. The slacks. Yeah. Um so that's what you're describing
00:25:45 Um so that's what you're describing there. Isn't it right though that there was no ventilation at all in the room next to the community center where the riser goes up a cupboard in the corner? That's correct. Yes. So there was no direct or indirect
00:25:57 So there was no direct or indirect ventilation there, was there? the for design one the indirect ventilation it would have been about the the store room being used and the door opening and closing out onto that landing which
00:26:09 closing out onto that landing which would have eventually found a way out to the the front door into the atrium but in design two it would have all been boxed in
00:26:15 boxed in so the ventilation on design one design one and two are different right I see um there was no requirement to box in under design one because it was deemed it was it was compliant at that point but as soon as the flanges were introduced that design two came into be
00:26:28 introduced that design two came into be in and that's when the plan would have been to to box it all in. Yes. So for design one, you're relying on a store room cupboard door being opened. Yes. Did was any assessment done of how
00:26:39 Did was any assessment done of how regularly that door would be opened? No. And you know it's based on advantageous they call it it's called advantageous air movement but there was no calculations done to confirm that
00:26:50 no calculations done to confirm that that that air movement would have been um would have been satisfactory. It was based on engineering judgment right by the designer. sitting here now. Do you think that was a satisfactory way to design at lower level?
00:27:01 design at lower level? I think the design and the ventilation should have had calculations to support what was what was put forward and it wasn't.
00:27:08 wasn't. Thank you.
00:27:12 And um just going back to the flanged joints at the time when that change was made, should there have been a design review of the impact of adding those joints to the overall design?
00:27:25 joints to the overall design? Yes. So, so I mentioned Mr. Johnson, Steve Johnson, that is the design manager, not Ashley Johnson, the the the design analyst who you see on the drawings earlier on. Steve uh was notified of the introduction of those
00:27:36 notified of the introduction of those those uh flange fittings and went to site immediately come back and reviewed the full design and personally took control of the the design change and that's when design 2 became uh live and
00:27:51 that's when design 2 became uh live and that's when he override the design risk register. Again, the process of producing the risk register for design do design two still resulted in a risk a risk score or less than the required the threshold. But Steve override.
00:28:03 threshold. But Steve override. Yes, I'm I'm coming to that. I'll take you to those documents. What I'm getting at is that before that change was made on site, there should have been a design review, shouldn't there, to have assessed the consequences of changing to
00:28:14 assessed the consequences of changing to that flange joint? Yes. They shouldn't have been introduced without a design amendment, we call it. Yeah. Now, let's look at that um revised design in in drawing form. If we can go to TRRI 50's 1 223.
00:28:32 Now this is the same effectively the same drawing that we saw before. But if we can um zoom in on the middle box again with the with the lines here. The
00:28:43 again with the with the lines here. The difference is from the last design that the solid black line is now going around the pipe all the way around the lateral. Do you see that? So the bottom
00:28:56 Do you see that? So the bottom part which is in the stair as well as the bit in the lobby is now boxed in. Is that correct? Yes. The the whole system would have been boxed in. Yeah. And the green pipe that's the the
00:29:09 Yeah. And the green pipe that's the the riser um that was to be boxed in as well, wasn't it? stairs.
00:29:13 stairs. Yes.
00:29:14 Yes. Yeah. So, actually, if this drawing were correct, we'd have black lines around the green line as well. If this particular drawing Yes. Yes.
00:29:21 Yes. So, we've now got boxing in in the stair and the lobby, not just boxing in in the lobby.
00:29:27 lobby. That's correct. Yeah. Thank you. And it says in the red text at the bottom, boxing to be open-ended into protected shaft to allow ventilation of the lateral pipe work.
00:29:38 ventilation of the lateral pipe work. So, we've still got the oversized holes between the stairs and the lobbies to enable there to be ventilation across this boxing in. But once it comes into the stairs, it's now in a confined box
00:29:51 the stairs, it's now in a confined box up to roof level. Is that correct? That's correct. Yes. Yeah.
00:30:01 And then um if we look at the drawing
00:30:08 drawing um above it that's got red arrows above it. Sorry if we look at the photograph immediately above. Yes, thank you.
00:30:20 Yes, thank you. So we can see um blue lines which they show where the boxing in is going to be built in the stair. Is that correct? Sorry, can you just repeat that? Yes. The blue lines in this photograph,
00:30:32 Yes. The blue lines in this photograph, they're showing where the boxing in is going to be built. That's right. It's there. Yes.
00:30:37 Yes. We've got these um orange bars with with a label inscent vents. Um and in the text box, it says all, it's very blurry, but I'll read it out.
00:30:48 it's very blurry, but I'll read it out. All pipe work riser and laterals to flat entry point to be boxed in to 2hour fire rated inscent vents to be installed in stairwell only
00:31:00 stairwell only sleeved entries between stairwell and communal landings to be left unsealed within the boxing in. So taking that in stages all the pipe work was to be boxed into twohour fire rated boxing. Yes.
00:31:13 into twohour fire rated boxing. Yes. Yes.
00:31:15 Yes. There were to be intimac vents in the stairwell side only in this position. Is that correct? That is. Yes, that's correct. And um sleeved entries between the
00:31:27 And um sleeved entries between the stairwell and the communal landings to be left unsealed. So the oversized holes are to be left as they are. That's right. Yes. Yeah.
00:31:35 Yeah. And someone's highlighted. We can see the twohour fire rated in yellow. Um was it unusual to specify twohour fire rated board?
00:31:45 board? No, that was um the standard where boarding was to be installed and fire rated it would have been that would have been our standard 2hour. Yeah. C
00:31:53 Yeah. C can you just help me understand exactly how this is going to work as I now envision this? There was the boxing in of the vertical risers creates a sort of chimney which is ventilated to the open
00:32:06 chimney which is ventilated to the open air at the top. Yes. and presumably draws in air from the bottom somewhere. Yes.
00:32:13 Yes. These lateral risers
00:32:17 risers are sealed as it were from the lobby. Is that right? So if gas escapes, it can't escape into the lobby. That's correct. Yeah. Um now I understand that gas is lighter
00:32:30 Um now I understand that gas is lighter than air. But if you got a significant leak into the boxing in the lobby, would there be enough draw, so to speak, to pull the get that gas out of the
00:32:42 to pull the get that gas out of the lobby and up the chimney? Um, and where would the makeup air come from uh in the lobby? So, the the pipe in the lobbies, there
00:32:56 So, the the pipe in the lobbies, there was no compression fittings in the lobbies. was it was welded or screwed and therefore it was it's extremely unlikely that a new pipe would leak. Yeah. But I mean that's a whole boxing, isn't it?
00:33:06 isn't it? Yes. If it that it's a requirement that you need the boxing um in terms of the I I don't I can't answer that whether or not it would have been sufficient. The expectation would and and I'm stepping a
00:33:18 expectation would and and I'm stepping a little outside of my area of expertise here that with that ventilation with the air movement coming past there would be what I call a ventury type effect where it could pull out any air within that
00:33:29 it could pull out any air within that that area. The intermittent vents um would have enabled it's got clearly a smell of gas as it as it came out of that location into this into the stairwell. There's no I mean I don't
00:33:41 stairwell. There's no I mean I don't know tell me if I'm wrong but I don't think you've described any form of um
00:33:50 um vent or air access into the boxing within the lobbies. That is correct. There isn't. There wasn't.
00:33:57 wasn't. So um drawing drawing a mixture of gas and air out of the boxing would require some sort of flow, wouldn't it? It would do. Um the thinking for the
00:34:09 It would do. Um the thinking for the designers at the time was as that le it would it wouldn't escape outside of the boxing up it would eventually find its way out into the stairwell. The volume would find its way out into the stairwell. Yeah.
00:34:19 Yeah. And as it find it found its way out to the stairwell it would be taken out and the invescent vents would also enable that uh venting a small amount of gas to
00:34:30 that uh venting a small amount of gas to be vented at that point. All right. Thank you very much. Yes. Just on the the intent vent, I just wanted to ask you exactly how that was designed to work. Can you explain what
00:34:41 designed to work. Can you explain what its purpose was and and what it was there to do? Yeah, it Mr. Johnson, the design manager, when he produced design two, Steve's got a a a a
00:34:52 Steve's got a a a a very strong background in in gas transmission and and higher pressure pipeline systems. and his view was that that he wanted because it was a that the the actual boxed in pipeline was a a a
00:35:04 the actual boxed in pipeline was a a a significant length he didn't want his view was gas shouldn't have been allowed to build up in that in that box in area. So by introducing an intermission vent, which wasn't a requirement of G5, it
00:35:15 which wasn't a requirement of G5, it would enable or it would prevent that gas building up. The intermissant vent, they they close up. And again, I'm not an expert on this, but in terms of they would react to heat or fire, and they
00:35:26 would react to heat or fire, and they would close up and seal should they get too too hot. And that that was his think that was that was his thinking. Although it wasn't a requirement of G5, he felt it was a high level of of protection
00:35:37 it was a high level of of protection that was being introduced because of the potential buildup. In the unlikely event that gas did escape from that pipeline, it would enable that to be depressurized through the intermisscent vents. Yes, I see. So those vents would be open
00:35:50 Yes, I see. So those vents would be open allowing you say some ventilation from the the lobby side out. Oh, sorry. If if there was a gas leak. Yeah. And up into the stairs cuz they're open. But in the
00:36:03 the stairs cuz they're open. But in the event of heat or attack by fire, they would close, thus sealing the compartment away from the gas. Yes.
00:36:11 Yes. Yes. I see. They they were al they were placed in that location as well because it you know it allowed access to you can see there what we call line line valves or tailor valves. It allowed access to
00:36:22 tailor valves. It allowed access to those valves for should for maintenance purposes at some point if if needed. Yes. Yeah. Yes. I'll come we'll come back to this in due course. Um but I mean have you
00:36:36 in due course. Um but I mean have you ever seen a ventilation arrangement like this in any other building? I haven't personally. So there was no design template that was being used for this design.
00:36:47 being used for this design. I haven't personally seen a a a ventilation system but ventilation is part of uh the gas design process. You know, I've been, you know, been, as I said, I've been in the gas industry
00:36:58 said, I've been in the gas industry since 1988. As Steve would have been also, you know, one of the things that we have to consider, primary consideration is is gas escaping from a pipe and how we vent that to atmosphere. Yeah.
00:37:07 Yeah. So, this particular system was different. Yeah. Because of the specific problems that it presented, but yeah,
00:37:13 yeah, in general, systems are boxed in and vented.
00:37:16 vented. Yeah. And um inscent vents are not mentioned anywhere in MD5, are they? No. Can we agree based on that that they're not a sanctioned piece of apparatus for the ventilation of gas
00:37:28 apparatus for the ventilation of gas rises?
00:37:29 rises? I I I I don't know that if that's the case or not. Yes.
00:37:34 Yes. And um how did you understand the venting at the top of the stairs would work? I if we pan out of this um this photograph for a moment and look at this
00:37:45 photograph for a moment and look at this design too in the top of the stairs, we get no assistance from this drawing, do we? as to how the ventilation at the top was going to work. Yeah. It's a very simple schematic drawing. Yeah. So, it doesn't it doesn't
00:37:57 drawing. Yeah. So, it doesn't it doesn't show how the ventilation or the access to the roof would would have worked. And again, just to be clear, in this second design, we get no assistance in any design drawings or design documentation as to how it was going to
00:38:08 documentation as to how it was going to work at top level, do we? Only only that the boxing would have gone up to the roof vent. Um it would have extended into the roof vent and and would have vented to to to atmosphere.
00:38:19 would have vented to to to atmosphere. Yes. But we can't see a design for that at the top of the building, can we? And similarly, you said before that there would be boxing in at these lower levels linking the top of the basement
00:38:30 levels linking the top of the basement to the bottom of the stairs. Where do we see that on this drawing? It's not It's not shown. It wasn't shown on the drawing. So, how do you know that that was the intention of the second design?
00:38:42 intention of the second design? At the time, I wasn't aware of the design that was ongoing. I do know that um the site manager was arranging for Andy Radley, the site manager was arranging for express builders um to go
00:38:53 arranging for express builders um to go in and review the down the basement and the and the the rooms. Um that hadn't been priced up, but that that that was in process and I think that's referenced in his statement around the basement as
00:39:05 in his statement around the basement as well.
00:39:05 well. Right. Yes. But again, no designed document.
00:39:08 document. There was no design for it. no drawings, no discussion that tells the reader how it's going to be boxed in at these lower levels.
00:39:16 levels. The only the only thing on the the the design drawing, it says that all pipe to be boxed in uh uh and vent and holes to be left home apart apart from the um holes into the flats which needed to be
00:39:28 holes into the flats which needed to be sealed.
00:39:29 sealed. Are you talking about the little inset drawing there? Yeah, I can't quite see that, but I know. Sorry. Yeah, if we um zoom in on that again.
00:39:41 And the heading for that is internal lateral pipe work requires boxing in on each floor as below. That doesn't tell you anything about the boxing in of the riser at low level, does it?
00:39:52 riser at low level, does it? No, sorry. I was I was referencing the box in the top leftand corner. I can't quite read what it says, but my recollection is that that's
00:40:05 Yes, I I can help you. Let me just go back to my notes on that. Um,
00:40:14 so that says all pipe work riser and laterals to flat entry point to be boxed into two fire rated. So, you're saying that that that would
00:40:26 So, you're saying that that that would tell everybody that it was going to be boxed in not just in the stairs, but further down the building through the cupboards and the the riser cupboards. That was the intent from the designer.
00:40:37 That was the intent from the designer. Whether it was adequate or not, I guess that's open to question, but the intent. Yeah. In terms of that instruction was the whole system was to be boxed in and there would have been
00:40:48 be boxed in and there would have been verbal dialogue ongoing between the parties that were involved in this these activities. Yeah, you said whether it was an adequate or not was a separate question. Sitting here now, do you consider that this design was
00:40:59 you consider that this design was adequate from a ventilation point of view?
00:41:01 view? I don't think the the instruction wasn't adequate. No. Let's look at the design risk register. You mentioned that there had been a a full um well a separate design risk
00:41:13 full um well a separate design risk register filled out for this revised design. If we go to TRI501218.
00:41:21 So this is the CDM design risk register. We can see it's dated the 24th of March 2017. This time this time the designer is said to be Mark BM.
00:41:33 is said to be Mark BM. Um we can see it still gets a 17. But if we go to the bottom of the page, we can see that in the final row this time
00:41:44 see that in the final row this time under the manual DR DRRA override needed, it has been ticked and next to it there's a comment in capitals which reads welded riser system and specific
00:41:56 reads welded riser system and specific ventilation requirements. Do you see that?
00:41:59 that? Yes.
00:41:59 Yes. So this time the the the manual override has kicked in this time. Yes. Yes. And there was a separate design risk assessment done for this revised
00:42:10 risk assessment done for this revised design. Is that correct? Yes.
00:42:11 Yes. Yes.
00:42:15 And then if we go to the fourth page, we can see the analysis that's been carried out.
00:42:23 out. Um if we can blow this up. Um, for the Mo specific hazards items 19 to 21.
00:42:37 Yeah, just we're just blowing this up. Yes. Great. So, we can see there we've got those familiar headings. 19 is breach of fire compartments.
00:42:49 breach of fire compartments. And if we track across to the right, the box has been ticked identified present by designer. And then someone under Mo specific risks has written
00:43:01 has written loss of fire containment as a result of breach.
00:43:06 breach. Do you see that? I do. Yes. So someone's identified that as a specific risk. And then further ac along if we can go to the right we see some action to be
00:43:17 to the right we see some action to be taken. Description of action. Follow building regulations and fire safety order. steel compartments accordingly. Do you have that? I do. Yes. So, is that a reference to the building regulations and the regulator reform
00:43:29 regulations and the regulator reform fire safety order 2005? It would be, I understand. Yes. Right.
00:43:35 Right. Um, and we've just got a generic seal compartment accordingly. It doesn't tell us which compartments are going to be sealed and which not, does it? That's right. Correct. Yeah. Yeah. And then item 20, um, failure mode
00:43:50 Yeah. And then item 20, um, failure mode expansion. that's not ticked. And then below that we get um inadequate ventilation item 21. And we can see that has been ticks
00:44:02 21. And we can see that has been ticks ticked.
00:44:04 ticked. And in the next cell cell along we can see some specific risks identified including asphixxiation, confined space, flamethrough mixture, over pressure, explosion.
00:44:15 explosion. And then if we go along to the right and the action column we can see for this it says generic statement to design for operations to enable ventilation review on site gas safe engineer review. Can
00:44:29 on site gas safe engineer review. Can you just help us as to what that means in terms of action? I I am looking at these statements. I don't they are not helpful in terms of what was needed to be undertaken. They
00:44:40 what was needed to be undertaken. They are very generic by nature. What happened um with the design manager was the it was around the loss of ventilation um compliance hence the change to the design what appears to be
00:44:53 change to the design what appears to be in the design risk assessment is some statements generic statements which completes the documentation and I think we have to accept that that it's not of the required standard um in terms of
00:45:04 the required standard um in terms of this particular part of the the process. Yes. Yes. Thank you. Um, if we go down to the bottom of the page, the second blue header from the bottom
00:45:15 blue header from the bottom has is also relevant here. It says review comments additional information right at the bottom. And we can see that someone's added some notes to first of all to breach of fire compartmentation.
00:45:28 all to breach of fire compartmentation. We can see someone said welded internal riser system. So, I'll just let the Yeah. Um, stairwell considered a shaft in G5.
00:45:39 stairwell considered a shaft in G5. Common areas to be vented back to shaft. Additional fire protection boxing required for protection of valves and flanges in shaft area. So, a little bit more detail there, but it's still pretty
00:45:50 more detail there, but it's still pretty generic, isn't it? It is. And and again, the reference to the gas work design being adequate to convey that information to the the rest of the team was not was not to the
00:46:01 of the team was not was not to the required Yeah. standard. And then the line below that um picks up on inadequate ventilation. There are some more notes there and we can see there what they say. They say see gas works
00:46:13 what they say. They say see gas works design for specific ventilation requirements sealed boxing and intscent vents to be fitted. So that's what we get there. Now in the documentation we see was that the
00:46:25 documentation we see was that the entirety of the consideration that was given to these aspects of the design? My understanding was in terms of what was doc Yes. what was documented would have been on this design risk assessment. And what other consideration was given
00:46:39 And what other consideration was given to the compartmentation and ventilation aspects of the design? The the the full system was to be in terms of the statement earlier on the full system was
00:46:51 statement earlier on the full system was to be boxed in. So it was to be boxed in with fire rated boarding. The sealant used to to for the edges and the screws would have been fire rated to 2hour. Uh so the full system would have been boxed
00:47:02 so the full system would have been boxed in when complete. There would have been ventilation um installed at the bottom of the boxing in in the basement and then as mentioned earlier on the boxing at the roof the ventilation at the roof
00:47:13 at the roof the ventilation at the roof was was so the direct ventilation in the roof was through the roof vent. Yeah. But none of that was recorded anywhere was it? I'm not I'm not aware of it being recorded. It may have been but I've not seen that being recorded.
00:47:25 seen that being recorded. Yeah. Was there any consideration given so far as you're aware to how inspection and maintenance would be achieved in the future with this gas riser? Yes. So the intermission vents would
00:47:37 Yes. So the intermission vents would have allowed access easy access. They would have been taken off and you could have got access to the valves. Otherwise the boxing would have need to have been breached and and to gain access to to the the pipe for inspection.
00:47:51 the the pipe for inspection. Yes. Can we agree that there are large stretches of the vertical riser that were not accessible? Um, some not accessible at all for inspection because they weren't boxed in
00:48:02 they weren't boxed in there. There we do have something called an endoscope which is a c in effect an internal camera which can be introduced into the pipeline to inspect it should need be. Um, so that there are options around future inspection using that kind
00:48:15 around future inspection using that kind of technology. um the access to the pipeline itself in terms of what I've referred to earlier on in terms of break getting into it would have been for the proactive element of it. So getting into the line
00:48:26 element of it. So getting into the line valves that were introduced so we could extend it and then reinstate the boxing in um but should there be need to to to do some visual inspection then you know pipelines are camered um there is
00:48:37 pipelines are camered um there is technology out there to camera. Yeah
00:48:39 Yeah that would have been that wouldn't have been a trio um activity that would have been cadence uh under their inspection regime. Yes. Did you ever think about whether the basement being an area of
00:48:51 whether the basement being an area of special hazard made it um unacceptable to box in the utility sections and treat them as being venting in the basement? Was that ever
00:49:02 venting in the basement? Was that ever considered? No. It so in terms of there's there's two two different ways of looking at design one and design two. design one, the decision was taken that it was a pipe pipeline and fittings that were
00:49:14 pipe pipeline and fittings that were introduced into that basement and there was ventilation within that for other there was the gas 10-in gas supply to the boilers and and various other different um utilities within there in in reference to the second design fully
00:49:26 in reference to the second design fully boxing that pipe in. It would have been fully boxed in. So it would have been segregated for the rest of the baitment in effect segregated from the basement in effect becoming its own compartment
00:49:37 in effect becoming its own compartment and then it would have a vent would have been installed within the boxing into outside to to enable that. I see. So you'd go through the basement with the boxing in to outside.
00:49:48 with the boxing in to outside. Yes.
00:49:48 Yes. How how do you do that? Haven't you got to go back up to ground level again? there would have been a route there would we would have had to have found a route out to to external. So that was
00:49:59 route out to to external. So that was that's referenced earlier on around uh express builders going down there to price that up and review that in terms of how they would have achieved that. That was the next stage. It hadn't it hadn't been designed at the time in
00:50:10 hadn't been designed at the time in terms of how we were going to achieve that.
00:50:11 that. Right. I see. Yeah. Going back to um inspection and maintenance, do you accept that it was a weakness in the design that so much of it would be boxed
00:50:22 design that so much of it would be boxed in? it would make it very difficult to inspect and maintain even though I know you've said that there are ways you can sometimes get around that I I you know the boxing was for ventilation that is a primary you know
00:50:33 ventilation that is a primary you know that in terms of if you have a hierarchy of of what you're looking to achieve it was ensuring that it could ventilate and then because the boxing in could have been uh the pipe could have been exposed by uh cutting out the boxing in it was
00:50:46 by uh cutting out the boxing in it was that was the way that that we decided to to do that. Yes.
00:50:50 Yes. Yeah. Was there ever any analysis done as to uh whether the holes in the walls through which the pipes passed were big enough for ventilation purposes? No, it was it would have been it was
00:51:02 No, it was it would have been it was engineering judgment on behalf of the designers and it was custom and practice that that if you was putting a two 2in pipe through a wall, you would drill a 3-in hole. And that was just general
00:51:15 3-in hole. And that was just general that was practice that with years of experience over but there was no there was no design around that. There was no calculations to support that and I think it follows from what you've said. There was also no uh check that the ventilation of the riser from the
00:51:27 the ventilation of the riser from the bottom to the top would be adequate as a as a complete system. At the time of the design, there was no there was no calculations to support the design. Subsequent to that, I understand
00:51:38 design. Subsequent to that, I understand some work has been done but but but at the time um it wasn't.
00:51:44 Was there ever any um consideration of the effect on compartmentation of these oversized holes between the stair and the lobby before the completion of the
00:51:55 the lobby before the completion of the boxing in? Sorry, could you repeat? Yeah. Was there ever any analysis of the effect on compartmentation of the oversized holes between the stair and the lobby before the completion of the
00:52:08 the lobby before the completion of the boxing in? the the the primary objective was we were getting trying to get gas back on. So we left holes within the fire compartmentation and therefore that
00:52:19 fire compartmentation and therefore that presented a risk. So it was we was aware of it but it was the program was in terms of the priority to get the gas back on and then follow up with the boxing in. So you did actually ask yourself the
00:52:31 So you did actually ask yourself the question did you or yourselves the question what happens if we have a fire in this building before all the boxing in's been completed? I I I I I personally didn't and I'm not sure they that the guys I can't answer for them in
00:52:43 that the guys I can't answer for them in terms of whether that was they would have they would have understood what they were doing. Clearly we we we contacted the KCTMO around the the drilling through the fire compartments but it didn't you know we carried on
00:52:54 but it didn't you know we carried on with the job in terms of the program that we had the sequencing of the project was install the gas the riser system test it commission it and then follow up with
00:53:06 commission it and then follow up with the boxing and and the the other remedial works or the supplementary works to complete the the project in its entirety.
00:53:14 entirety. Yeah. Was there ever any consideration of the fact that this stair was not just a protected shaft but also a firefighting stair that which would be used by firefighters in the event of a fire in a compartment?
00:53:26 fire in a compartment? We understood it to be a protected stairway and it there very well could have been a level of confusion as to whether it was there was there was two purposes for it. The protected stairway would they would the designers would have deemed it to be a protected
00:53:38 have deemed it to be a protected stairway and and whether they considered firefighters needing to get up and down. I'm not sure. I can't answer that 100%. Can you explain why we don't see all of those risks identified in this design
00:53:50 those risks identified in this design documentation and considered and explained? I I think this the process was was weak. I think we subsequently changed that or it has subsequently been changed. um there
00:54:02 has subsequently been changed. um there the only explanation I can give and and and and it's not you know is is a I think it's probably a weak explanation is that the volume of projects that that were being dealt with on the on the contract you know I referenced a number
00:54:13 contract you know I referenced a number earlier on it was around prioritizing the higher level risk assessment and that's where the risk register process came in so every project went through a risk register when it exceeded the threshold another level of detail was
00:54:25 threshold another level of detail was was was undertaken on that but it it was weak I I We have to accept that and that that it needs to be strengthened and it has been strengthened. So at the time it wasn't sufficient for what was needed.
00:54:36 wasn't sufficient for what was needed. Yes. Would you agree with the inquiry's expert that a full design risk assessment for a multi occupancy building should have also included many more topics than we just see in this
00:54:47 more topics than we just see in this proformer. So we've seen the compartmentation, the expansion, the ventilation. They're the three things that in multi occupancy buildings are being flagged in this proformer. Would
00:54:58 being flagged in this proformer. Would you agree that there are many more important topics that ought to be in a proformer such as this? Yes.
00:55:04 Yes. And those would include I'm just going to give you a selection. Um means of escape in the event of fire. Yes.
00:55:12 Yes. Corrosion. Yes.
00:55:15 Yes. Thermal expansion and contraction. Yes. Although thermal expansion and contraction was considered and was introduced, there was uh there was um the design did provide for
00:55:26 the design did provide for Yeah. expansion of the pipe, access for inspection and maintenance again. Yes, valves including access to them and security.
00:55:36 security. So, uh in ter in terms of clarifying that point, yes, it would have been part of it. Yes, in terms of the risk assessment, sorry. Yes. Yes. Thank you. Now, I just want to
00:55:47 Yes. Thank you. Now, I just want to focus now on the effect of the oversized holes through the stairwell and into the lobbies.
00:55:53 lobbies. Um, but before I do, I just want to make clear that the inquiry expert, Mr. Hancock, found no evidence that the new riser pipe had been broken or breached
00:56:04 riser pipe had been broken or breached in the fire. The new steel riser pipe was intact after the fire and there was no failure to contain gas in the pipeline. So, I just want to make that clear. Is that your understanding?
00:56:15 clear. Is that your understanding? Yes. Yes.
00:56:16 Yes. Yes. Yes.
00:56:18 Yes. But the oversized holes that were there between the stairs and the lobbies is potentially significant in terms of the ability for smoke to spread between lobbies on the night. Again, can can we
00:56:30 lobbies on the night. Again, can can we accept in general terms that must be right?
00:56:34 right? The boxing was complete from the bottom of the stairwell up to the 22nd floor. And so any any smoke coming from the lobbies would have entered the boxing in and would have would have gone out up on
00:56:47 and would have would have gone out up on the 22nd floor. So there was a was the last floor. So unless unless the compartmentation was was breached enabling smoke to travel from the lobbies to the stairwell, then I don't
00:56:59 lobbies to the stairwell, then I don't agree with with Mr. Hancock's view that what he said it was boxed in. It was contained. So can we just agree? I think you make this clear in your statement. It was boxed in in the sense that the work to
00:57:10 boxed in in the sense that the work to the riser and the laterals in the stairwell was complete. Yes. But the work to box in at the lobby side was not complete, was it? So on on several floors it was. So in
00:57:22 So on on several floors it was. So in terms of whether is a question whether Yeah, it wasn't it wasn't complete on all the floors. It was complete on I think around about five of the floors. Yes. And so for a number of floors, I
00:57:34 Yes. And so for a number of floors, I think you make clear that um some of the bats had been in installed but not the boxing in. That's correct. Yes. And in in some others um bats had not
00:57:46 And in in some others um bats had not been installed either. I think like you said that's floor six. Yeah.
00:57:55 But in do you accept that there would have been I mean I I appreciate what you say about once smoke from a lobby comes into the pipe you're saying your expectation would be it would go
00:58:06 expectation would be it would go straight up the boxing in the stair and out at roof level. Yes. I I I'm certainly not an expert on whether pipe whether smoke could have traveled from one lobby to another lobby by by entering the the the compartment
00:58:18 by by entering the the the compartment the this the compartment in the stairwell and then back out again through the oversized hole. I'm I can't answer that question. I'm not I don't have that level of knowledge or background to be able to answer that. Um I appreciate you're not an expert on
00:58:29 Um I appreciate you're not an expert on smoke spread. Entirely appreciate that. Let's just look at a couple of images just so we can picture um what we're talking about here. If we can go to 3016722.
00:58:48 This is an image from floor 9 on the stairs. These were taken on the 30th of May, 2018 after the boxing in the stairs had been removed. So just to be clear, as it was on the night, there was boxing
00:59:01 as it was on the night, there was boxing in this part of the stairs. Yes. Yes.
00:59:04 Yes. Um and we can see there's staining on the inside of the boxing. Yes. Yes.
00:59:12 And so what we're exploring is whether there could have been smoke traveling from a lobby going through the oversized hole into this boxing in up to the next
00:59:23 hole into this boxing in up to the next level and potentially across to another lobby because there'd be another oversized hole in floors above this, wouldn't there? There was. Yeah. Yeah. Thank you. And we see a similar thing. If we go to another image, this
00:59:36 thing. If we go to another image, this time on floor 17. There are a number of these images I could show you. I'm just going to show you a selection. If we go to ME3016516
00:59:49 again we can see this is in I've given you one at the bottom or towards the bottom is really from floor nine upwards we see this and then one higher up. This is floor 17 here now and we can see
01:00:01 is floor 17 here now and we can see staining again within the boxing in. Is that correct? That is yes. Yes. Yeah. Now, had this design finished, there would
01:00:13 had this design finished, there would have been boxing in on the lobby side and on the stair side. So, this shouldn't have happened. Is that correct? The smoke should not have been coming through that oversized hole and into this boxing in. That's right. Yes. Because um the box,
01:00:26 That's right. Yes. Because um the box, but because the works were partway through, it had been left like this and then the fire occurred. Yes, that is correct. Yes. Now, can you explain why TRIO didn't put in temporary fire stopping around these oversized
01:00:39 fire stopping around these oversized holes while the construction process was ongoing and before all the boxing in was complete?
01:00:45 complete? The the explanation I can give is that once gas had been introduced into the pipeline, there was, you know, blocking those holes in would have prevented any sort of form of ventilation. So, you know, there there should have
01:00:58 So, you know, there there should have been a a a a program of of as a pro as the project was being sequenced and actually built those breaches of fire compartmentation. Um there should have been an a process
01:01:11 Um there should have been an a process of introducing some form of interim fire stopping that satisfied both the ventilation requirements and the uh fire containment. at the time that the process that wasn't
01:01:22 at the time that the process that wasn't in terms of these reactive type works once gas you know the focus on getting was getting the gas back on was a big focus and therefore the sequencing is questionable as to what that approach
01:01:34 questionable as to what that approach can we agree that the gas should not have been reconnected until all the boxing in was complete I I yes I think that's correct
01:01:48 and do you accept that um trio in accordance with its um CDM duties ought to have been identifying safety risks like this and managing them properly during the project.
01:01:59 during the project. Yes, it was it was a role of the designer and also the the contractor or the principal contractor to identify hazards and and and mitigate those hazards through a proper risk controlled. Yeah. And in this respect trio trio
01:02:11 Yeah. And in this respect trio trio failed to do that, didn't we? We did not fulfill those obligations to the four.
01:02:15 the four. Can we look at an email? This is at TRI60985.
01:02:26 This is an email from Mary Ryan at National Grid to Steven Johnson. So, you said he was the design manager. That's right. Yes. Thank you.
01:02:37 Thank you. And this is copied to you. We can see that you're CCed into this email. It's dated the 21st of March, 2017. And does that indicate that the contents
01:02:48 And does that indicate that the contents of this message were being escalated to you because you're being copied in? I I think yes. That would have been the intent I'm sure of Mary by copying me in that making me aware of the this this issue
01:03:00 issue and um that date of the 21st of March 2017. Can you help? Was that the day that it was discovered that the design had to change because of the flange joints?
01:03:09 joints? Yes, I believe that's correct. Yeah. Now, partway down this first page, there's a heading fire escape. We can see the image underneath it. It's um an image of a riser taken that
01:03:21 It's um an image of a riser taken that looks like a a riser and a lateral in in the stairwell. Is that correct? That is. Yes. And if we go down to page three of this email, we can see um some text and I want to read the top
01:03:34 um some text and I want to read the top paragraph
01:03:36 paragraph there. We can see Mary Ryan says the agreement with the local authority was to install the new supply in the fire exit stairwell and box in to meet their evacuation requirements. This has not
01:03:48 evacuation requirements. This has not been completed, although there are ventilation holes throughout the stairwell which if a fire incident did occur would create a more unsafe situation.
01:03:59 situation. Now, can we agree that that's a very specific warning to you and to Mr. Johnson that the state of the works being incomplete could present a fire risk.
01:04:10 risk. Yes.
01:04:12 Yes. And can we agree that TRIO ought to have paid some attention to this email and made sure that the works were safe as they progressed? Yes.
01:04:21 Yes. Can you help us? What was the response to this warning? Was was anything done about this at all after this warning was received? the the approach we took was to to commence and complete the boxing
01:04:32 to to commence and complete the boxing in
01:04:34 in of the visor. I see.
01:04:37 I see. So just to get on with the works. Yes. Well, so the the 20 this was I'm just make sure I get my my dates right here. So this was sub this was pre prior
01:04:49 here. So this was sub this was pre prior to the design two um being introduced. So design one the the riser in the stairwell was not to be boxed in. As previously mentioned, it was the right it was the laterals in the lobbies that
01:05:00 it was the laterals in the lobbies that were to be boxed in. So those holes into the stairwell as design one was never to be boxed in. If you go back to that, if you can go back to that picture, you see the that's the flanged fitting, the black fitting
01:05:12 the flanged fitting, the black fitting on the pipe that it was flagged up at this point that that fitting was introduced. And it was subsequent to this being identified to Steve that the boxing in the stairwell was part of the
01:05:23 boxing in the stairwell was part of the the design change, the design amendment. So, we was never going to box in that riser in the stairwell. They were always going to be left home for ventilation purposes.
01:05:32 purposes. Yes, I I appreciate the design changed and that's how it was going to be when the design was complete. But why didn't TRIO think about the design in the interim and the fire risk that it posed
01:05:44 interim and the fire risk that it posed while the works were incomplete? In terms of Yeah, it's it's a very valid point. And the approach to reactive risers being cut off was we need to get
01:05:55 risers being cut off was we need to get the gas back on. Referenced earlier on the performance calls every day, two a day in terms of understanding where we are with getting gas back on. So the reactive program we took a different
01:06:07 reactive program we took a different view or a different a different approach to getting the gas back on which unfortunately had left some of these other issues unaccounted for. If it in terms of a planned work, you don't cut
01:06:18 terms of a planned work, you don't cut the gas off until you've completed the new work. So you approach it in a different way, you know. So this in terms of if this would have been approached in terms of commissioning the pipe once everything else had been done.
01:06:30 pipe once everything else had been done. So therefore there was no gas introduced into the riser and no ventilation issues then it could have been done in a sequence that wouldn't have breached the or we could have followed it through. But because it was a reactive, it was
01:06:41 But because it was a reactive, it was done two maybe two months before. or the commission was done two months before and it left these bits to follow left or present leaving a risk that we was was was following on from. Yeah.
01:06:51 Yeah. And and that was the approach at the time and that was the approach across the full mobs uh program reactive mob programs. This wasn't this wasn't specific in terms of or it wasn't
01:07:02 specific in terms of or it wasn't different in the way that this job was done. It was as I just explained in terms of reactive works. Right. Yes. Um, there are a few email exchanges between Caden and Trio
01:07:14 exchanges between Caden and Trio following the this email. Um, I just want to pick up on another one. If we can look at TRI501035.
01:07:27 This is an email from Steven Johnson to Mary Ryan that that same day. And um he says, "Mary, let me rephrase the narrative below.
01:07:39 the narrative below. There is still work to do. Trio trio are aware of it. The work is not compliant at the moment. All complete irrespective of why. I have not defended the work quality on site. All the reasons for
01:07:51 quality on site. All the reasons for being removed from site." And then he he goes on and and deals with other points. So he appears to be saying, "Look, we're aware of it. We know the work's not
01:08:03 aware of it. We know the work's not compliant at the moment. We we're getting on with the work. Um and there there's talk of being removed from site. Now, is that hearkening back to the asbestos incident
01:08:15 hearkening back to the asbestos incident where TRIO had been removed from site for 3 weeks? Yeah. What Steve's referencing there, the non-compliant element is the introduction of the flange compression fittings and the being removed from site
01:08:26 fittings and the being removed from site was the asbestit incident which is referenced in the third paragraph of below.
01:08:32 below. Yes. And what do you understand him to be saying about work quality? He says, "I've not defended the work quality on site."
01:08:38 site." Work quality mean the introduction or the introdu introduction of the flange fitting,
01:08:42 fitting, right?
01:08:43 right? Um and being removed from site. He could very well have been referencing the asbestous incident as well. It could be a combination of both, but they were the two, you know, when I've read this, that's that's what I understand of of his response to.
01:08:55 his response to. And how concerned were you at this point? We can see you're copied in again. Were you concerned about what had been going on on site at Granful Tower? Steve kept me aware. Not every project I
01:09:06 Steve kept me aware. Not every project I was I wouldn't have had a level of detail of every project that Trio were delivering when it was escalated to me and Steve felt it appropriate to escalate to me these two issues. It was the asbestous incident which clearly was
01:09:17 the asbestous incident which clearly was riddle reportable. So serious incident that occurred and also the fact is that we had a design which we deemed were compliant and that through our own of our own making by introducing a non-compliant fitting we had additional
01:09:30 non-compliant fitting we had additional work to do which was causing um these issues that needed to be addressed. Yes, I understand. Thank you. Um Mr. Chairman, I'm just looking at the
01:09:41 Chairman, I'm just looking at the remainder of my notes. I think I've probably got another 15 or 20 minutes to go. Um, I'm just wondering how we synchronize all this with the break this
01:09:52 synchronize all this with the break this afternoon. I can either press on and then we have one break or I'm happy to break now, take the afternoon break and then I carry on. Yeah, I understand. All right. Thank you very much. Well, um, Mr. Donut, I don't
01:10:04 very much. Well, um, Mr. Donut, I don't know how you feel whether you need a break at this stage in the afternoon. The possibilities are that we continue now for another 15 or 20 minutes and then have a a break. Um, we always have
01:10:15 then have a a break. Um, we always have to have a break at the end of council's questions anyway. So to do that would lead to us having two breaks. So we're not short of time. So I think the question is whether you feel you'd like a break at this stage.
01:10:26 feel you'd like a break at this stage. I'm happy to proceed. Um, you sure? Yes. Yes. Absolutely. All right. Well, if if you want to change your mind in five minutes, just indicate. All right. Yes, you do. I think it best if you carry on, Miss Grant combine the two breaks.
01:10:38 Grant combine the two breaks. Yeah. Um,
01:10:41 Yeah. Um, some questions, some more questions about ventilation in the new design. We we've talked about these intent strips in the boxing in. Now, um, were these intent strips ever installed?
01:10:53 intent strips ever installed? No, they weren't. Can you explain why they weren't installed? They would have been they were part of the this the construction element of the they would have been cut in to the boxing in. So they would have involved
01:11:05 boxing in. So they would have involved the boxing to be complete and they would have followed on after in those locations. I I haven't I've not seen a program to support that view. Right.
01:11:13 Right. But it's that's the way that I understand um through talking to to to the designers that's how it would have been approached. I see. So you box it all in and then later you cut in your intent vents.
01:11:24 later you cut in your intent vents. Yes. My understanding that's how I see it installed. Um but but we we can be clear I think that they're not there. They weren't there at the time of the fire, were they? No, they weren't. No.
01:11:35 No. And they were an essential part of the design and the ventilation for the design, weren't they? They they weren't required. So, but by not installing them didn't make them didn't make the system non-compliant
01:11:46 didn't make the system non-compliant with G5. So, a fully installed system a fully boxed in system ventilated at the bottom at the top as described earlier would have been compliant with G5. the
01:11:57 would have been compliant with G5. the the require when Steve introduced or decided to introduce the intermisscent vents, it was on the basis of other higher sort of level specs that he would have been involved in in the past. And there's a requirement under those
01:12:09 there's a requirement under those specifications to install a way of venting an enclosed uh system every 15 mters. Hence why he decided to put those in. But they weren't part of the they weren't a
01:12:20 weren't part of the they weren't a requirement of G5. That was just something additional that he decided to that was required in that location. I I see. I mean, just to be clear, our expert, the inquiries expert isn't
01:12:31 expert, the inquiries expert isn't satisfied that it was compliant with G5 in terms of the ventilation. You understand that? Yes. I I've I've read Mr. Hancock's report. Yes.
01:12:38 Yes. Yes. Yes.
01:12:38 Yes. Yes. But but you're saying had the design been fully completed, your view is it would have been compliant with MG G5? Yes, it would have been. Yes. Right.
01:12:47 Right. Um
01:12:49 Um just thinking some more about the ventilation of the riser through each of the floors in the stairs. Let's look at a picture of this at CAD 41910.
01:13:07 This is a photograph of the riser coming through the stair floor before any boxing in occurred. And it's right, isn't it, that what the intention was is that there was a gap left around these
01:13:20 that there was a gap left around these pipes so that there could be ventilation through the floor. Yes. Yes. There would have been so there's the 2in pipe going through a three 3-in hole and and the boxing would have been 4 in um a 4 in boxed in. So that that
01:13:33 4 in um a 4 in boxed in. So that that would have been the differences between the where the sort of the gaps between the pipe and the the sleeve in and the the boxing in. Yes. Now as it exists there before the
01:13:44 Yes. Now as it exists there before the boxing in, it's got the benefit of all the air around it. But once the riser on the stair was boxed in and created its own chimney or its own shaft, um to what
01:13:56 own chimney or its own shaft, um to what extent can we agree that the concrete floor and the ceiling at each level would have potentially impeded the air flow in that design?
01:14:07 flow in that design? the the designer's view based on their experience was that those for one of a better word gaps between the pipe and the sleeve going through the concrete floor was adequate for ventilation. But
01:14:19 floor was adequate for ventilation. But again, there would I've got no um I can't provide any calculations to support that view. No. Wouldn't it have been better to cut out the floor inside the boxing to create like a a square or
01:14:31 the boxing to create like a a square or rectangle with with greater ventilation around that pipe all the way up the boxing if that's what you were going to do. I think what should have happened I think we should have in terms of the design process is calculated what size
01:14:44 design process is calculated what size um annulus was required between the pipe and the sleeve and and then then if it required if as you just said if it required the whole of that square area out where the boxing was to be installed
01:14:55 out where the boxing was to be installed to be cut out that would have been yeah so there should have been you know some a some analysis and calculations to determine the size of the annulus and that's what should have been should have
01:15:07 that's what should have been should have been installed Yeah. I mean, presumably the vertical riser was the first thing to be installed, was it? Yes, it was. Yes. So, you'd cut all those holes and sleeved them before the introduction of
01:15:18 sleeved them before the introduction of the flange joints. It would have been a a a process would have happened in parallel. So, the the laterals on the lobby, you know, we had a there would have been a
01:15:29 know, we had a there would have been a fabrication area outside. So it would would have been built in modular form and then connected as almost like a bano set as we went up. So I I can't I don't know exactly the sequence but that's how
01:15:41 know exactly the sequence but that's how and I think that goes some way to explain the compression fitting have been able to connect the modular bit and the lateral to the the riser system. It was an easier way of of doing that. It presented less problems.
01:15:52 presented less problems. Yes.
01:15:53 Yes. Thank you. Now, we saw earlier that there was a specification in the design for twohour fire rated boards for the boxing in. And if we can go to your first statement at page 13,
01:16:06 um that's your MET statement here. You've helpfully set out a table of all the materials that were used. And at the very bottom row on this page, we can see it says boxing in a pipe work, envirra
01:16:18 it says boxing in a pipe work, envirra board, fireboard, uni board 12 mm. That's the fireboxing material. And then you've got 88 minutes. Manufacturer specification is up to two
01:16:30 Manufacturer specification is up to two hours.
01:16:32 hours. Now, um
01:16:34 Now, um just to be clear, that was that the product used for the boxing in of the risers at Grenfield Tower. It was. Yes. Yeah. And if we go to the technical data sheet for these Envirra boards, that's
01:16:46 sheet for these Envirra boards, that's at TRI501377.
01:16:54 This is specifically for this um uni board envir version of the envirro boards. And if we go to page two, there's a table at the top with British
01:17:05 there's a table at the top with British and European test results. And if we look at the line, the fifth row down for BS476 part 22, which are the relevant tests, we can see the 12 mm
01:17:16 the relevant tests, we can see the 12 mm board achieve 65 minutes insulation and 88 minutes integrity. Do you have that? I do. Yes. And then at the bottom of the first page, there's a table.
01:17:31 If we look back to the bottom of the first page and it says technical data 12 millimeter up to twohour rated fireboard. Do you see that there? Yes.
01:17:41 Yes. Now saying it's up to twohour fire rated fireboard isn't the same as saying that this board has a fire resistance of two hours, is it? That's correct. And the board only had 88 minutes of
01:17:52 And the board only had 88 minutes of fire resistance integrity, didn't it? It did. Yes. So the board that was used did not follow the specification in terms of fire resistance. Is that correct? wouldn't it wouldn't have been compliant with the requirements of 2 hours. Yeah. Can you account for that error in
01:18:05 Yeah. Can you account for that error in terms of what was installed? I I it was it was I think there was confusion around up to two hours providing 2hour fire rating and you know subsequent to that we now understand it was 88 minutes. So there that is an
01:18:16 was 88 minutes. So there that is an error on in terms of the the the understanding the specification of the the the material that was used against the requirement. And can you account for how that error occurred?
01:18:26 occurred? I I can't. Okay.
01:18:29 Okay. Now, repositioned meters. As we discussed earlier, the new design required the gas meters within the flats to be moved from the cupboard in the kitchen to be located closer to the front door. Now, that location is also
01:18:42 front door. Now, that location is also the position of the sole means of escape from the flats, isn't it? The the designers deemed the room next to the sole means of escape to be a separate room or a a separate cupboard
01:18:54 separate room or a a separate cupboard and therefore it wasn't on the sole means of escape. to their understanding at the time of the term sole means of escape was the hallway itself. Right. I see. The relocation of the meters to enable
01:19:07 The relocation of the meters to enable us to comply with the 2 meter rule in terms of putting it in that location was the room next to the the sole means of escape.
01:19:15 escape. I see.
01:19:16 I see. And do you maintain that that was the correct interpretation of IDM5 G5 at the time? That's the the the interpretation of it. Um I I I
01:19:28 interpretation of it. Um I I I think you can look at it you can look at it either way. Um so you know if you're taking a
01:19:35 taking a a a less less risk say risk is not the right but if you're taking a view that actually it's connected to the sole means of escape then it could be deemed to be on the sole means of escape. But that wasn't how it was understood
01:19:47 that wasn't how it was understood when the designers um were discussing the location of that meter location and where it could go. That's I'm going to interrupt you for a moment. Is it time we had a break?
01:19:59 Is it time we had a break? I think we should do that then. Whatever. I'm sorry. I should have asked the synographer when I asked you, Mr. Don, but I I'm afraid I didn't. And it's time we gave her a break. So, I think we'll have a break at this point, Mr.
01:20:10 we'll have a break at this point, Mr. Yes, that's fine. Absolutely fine. So, um we'll come back at 25 to three, please. And then, uh to four.
01:20:18 to four. Sorry. 25 to 4 and and then we'll carry on there. Okay. All right. and and please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while they're away from the room. Good. Thank you very much.
01:20:37 Thank you. 25 to four, please.
01:36:14 Yes. Would you ask Mr. Dan to come back in, please?
01:36:31 Right, Mr. Dan, ready to carry on? Yes. Good. Thank you very much. Yes, Mr. Green.
01:36:35 Green. Yes, thank you. Yes, before we broke off, we were discussing the location of the um meter um in the flats and the fact that the meter position had to be
01:36:47 fact that the meter position had to be moved to nearer the front doors because of um the new riser replacement program. Um, can we just look at MG G5 second edition on this? That's at RHX705.
01:37:02 And I want to look at page 38.
01:37:09 And if we go at 5.2.3 at the bottom of the page, we can see it says citing meters with respect to solar escape routes
01:37:20 with respect to solar escape routes within individual dwellings. And then below that 5231 it says if it is proposed to install a meter in a sole means of escape within an individual dwelling either the meter
01:37:33 an individual dwelling either the meter shall be enclosed in a box cupboard or other compartment which may open onto the sole means of escape from within the individual dwelling which is at least 30 minutes fire resistant to BS476 and
01:37:46 minutes fire resistant to BS476 and which has a self-closing door or the pipe immediately upstream of The meter installation shall be provided with a TCO. Now, can you just help us uh what
01:37:58 TCO. Now, can you just help us uh what is a a TCO? That's a a thermal cutff valve. Yeah. And can you just explain what the function of that is? Yes. Um it will it will automatically
01:38:09 Yes. Um it will it will automatically close when the temperature in that location gets to a certain level. Right. Yes. And as we understand it, it was permissible by this technical standard
01:38:20 permissible by this technical standard to put the meters um in a sole means of escape provided they are either in this fire rated cupboard at least 30 minutes fire resistant self-closing door or the
01:38:33 fire resistant self-closing door or the pipe has to have this thermal cutff device fitted. Is that how you understand uh that part of M5 guidance to work?
01:38:41 to work? It is. Yes. And does it follow from the answers you gave before we broke off that TRIO did not consider this part of M G5 to be engaged for the Grenful Tower
01:38:54 M G5 to be engaged for the Grenful Tower project because these meters were not being installed in the sole means of escape but just close to the sole means of escape. That's correct. A room that connected to the sole means of escape.
01:39:05 the sole means of escape. Right.
01:39:06 Right. So did TRIO actually consider this point consider whether this provision applied and reject that or are you making an assumption that that must have happened? No, we did consider it and it was
01:39:17 No, we did consider it and it was rejected
01:39:18 rejected right
01:39:21 right now. It doesn't appear that any TCOS thermal cutff devices were installed for these repositioned meters. Is that correct?
01:39:29 correct? That's correct. And nor were there any self-closing doors on the meter cupboards. That's correct. Correct. Nor is there any evidence of the cupboards having at least 30 minutes fire resistance? Is
01:39:40 least 30 minutes fire resistance? Is that correct? That's correct. And is the explanation for that simply that you didn't think this applied? We we we didn't consider it to be a box cupboard or a compartment. It was considered to be a a room connected to
01:39:51 considered to be a a room connected to the sole means of escape. So you mean that the cupboard into which the meter went, you thought that was a room connected to the sole means of escape?
01:40:01 escape? It was just Yeah. designer's determination was that it didn't fall into this requirement. Right. Let's just have a look at an image um at ME30's
01:40:13 image um at ME30's 16651.
01:40:14 16651. This is an image taken by the Metropolitan Police of Flat 22 which is on floor five. Here we can see the meter in this al
01:40:25 Here we can see the meter in this al cove. Do you see that? Yes.
01:40:28 Yes. And um I think we can agree that's not a self-closing cupboard, is it? No, it's not a self-closing cupboard. And by definition, not 30 minutes by resistance.
01:40:40 resistance. There the in terms of the designer's determination is that was considered a room.
01:40:46 room. Right. I see. Um I want to ask you briefly now about valves. Um, and starting with pipeline isolation uh, valves, PIVs. We heard yesterday
01:40:59 uh, valves, PIVs. We heard yesterday from Mr. Harrison that Cadent believes that a pipeline isolation valve, a PIV, was installed in the ground on the east side of Grenell Tower in the gas pipe supplying residential supply too. Is
01:41:12 supplying residential supply too. Is that something that you can confirm? That's correct. Yes. Yeah. So, a PIV was put in there. A PIV was installed. Yeah.
01:41:18 Yeah. Yes.
01:41:20 Yes. Um now inlet isolation valves when the service pipe for residential supply 2 comes into the basement it enters at height around four to 5 mters from the floor. Is that correct?
01:41:31 floor. Is that correct? It is. Yes. And it travels along the ceiling until it comes up through the building. We've seen that in the photographs. Um we don't have any design from Trio about how the pipe layout and
01:41:43 about how the pipe layout and installation in the basement uh should have been designed. All we've seen is the photographs marked up by Simon Boygel which I showed you earlier. Are
01:41:54 Boygel which I showed you earlier. Are you aware of anything else that Trio um did in terms of that design? I'm not.
01:41:59 I'm not. No.
01:42:01 No. Would Trio typically produce a detailed design of the pipe layout in the basement?
01:42:07 basement? Not it.
01:42:10 Not it. In terms of No, not that I'm aware of. Was it just left up to the installers to put in the service pipe in the basement in whatever way they saw fit? It would have been it would have been a
01:42:23 It would have been it would have been a a an an interactive process where the designers were talking to the pre-construction team were talking to the subcontractors. So there would have been constant dialogue and agreement and it was an iterative process in terms of
01:42:35 it was an iterative process in terms of the survey being undertaken into design a design produced the design drawing which was the gas works 9 drawing as you can see and then there would have been dialogue there would have been a project pack created and the details of the
01:42:48 pack created and the details of the route of the pipeline within the basement and through up this the rest of the building would have been part of that process but I'm not aware of a specific detail design drawing that was available to that covered that route.
01:43:00 that covered that route. Yes, I see. I think from that answer, what you're saying is it would have been determined on site in dialogue with the subcontractor and trio. Yes.
01:43:10 Yes. Now, we know that a valve was installed in the pipeline of residential supply 2 once it came into the basement. That was called an inlet isolation valve, an IIV. Is that correct? That's correct. Yes.
01:43:22 That's correct. Yes. Now, this was installed at height, but there was no ladder installed in the basement to get to it. You agree? That's correct. Jess, would TRIO typically plan to install a
01:43:33 would TRIO typically plan to install a ladder so that that valve could be reached?
01:43:35 reached? No.
01:43:38 No. Can you help um as to why Trio wouldn't install a ladder in this position? And what I mean by that is not just a ladder on the ground that someone can pick up, but actually a ladder that's welded into
01:43:49 but actually a ladder that's welded into the side of the basement to to to be able to access that IIV. Yes, I can. Um the reason for that V valve is is it's a plan PL it's to be
01:44:00 valve is is it's a plan PL it's to be used in a planned situation. Yes.
01:44:02 Yes. So um any inspection of that valve or use of that valve would not have been for an emergency requirement. It would have been for a planned uh operation. uh whether that is a for example a
01:44:13 whether that is a for example a six-monthly inspection um of the the valve and and under those circumstances a bpoke temporary works design would have been produced to enable
01:44:25 have been produced to enable the operative to be able to get up and do the inspection. The reason for not installing a ladder is a it's open to other people to use. um it would need to
01:44:39 other people to use. um it would need to be inspected on a regular basis to maintain its integrity and therefore the decision was taken that that you it's it's better and safer to to do it in the
01:44:51 it's better and safer to to do it in the way I just described as opposed to putting something there that people could access um and the issues around inspection and maintenance. So it was never the intention to put something there for constant use because it was a
01:45:02 there for constant use because it was a planned
01:45:03 planned I see
01:45:03 I see frequent um frequent uh frequency around when it would be used. Right. I understand. Thank you. Um, can we go again to JM G5? Um, RHX705
01:45:16 we go again to JM G5? Um, RHX705 at page 43.
01:45:22 At the bottom of the page, it's paragraph 6.1.17 and this says, "Consideration shall be given to the provision of a line diagram at each building entry II depicting the
01:45:35 at each building entry II depicting the dwellings served by that particular network pipeline." Now, is it your understanding that it's good practice to provide a line drawing at the IIV point?
01:45:46 provide a line drawing at the IIV point? My my my understanding of that is around the the the diagram from or the drawing from the pipeline into the PIV into the building um which would show uh the IIV.
01:45:58 building um which would show uh the IIV. I'm not aware of of of any other line diagrams being produced um showing internal pipe work and the associated valves.
01:46:09 valves. Right. Okay. Um,
01:46:14 Um, now just stepping back for a moment, we've been through a lot of different aspects of the design and the construction today and looking matters at matters in the round. Can we agree that overall the design
01:46:25 Can we agree that overall the design work that TRIO undertook at Grenful Tower did not contain sufficient detail about the following things? didn't contain sufficient detail about how the ventilation would be achieved in all the laterals along the whole height of the
01:46:37 laterals along the whole height of the riser.
01:46:38 riser. Yes,
01:46:39 Yes, it made no provision for ventilation through the floors once the riser boxing in was completed. I don't agree with that. How about it made inadequate provision
01:46:52 How about it made inadequate provision for ventilation through the floors once the riser boxing in was completed? The ventilation wasn't supported by calculations I think is the the And can we agree that there wasn't any
01:47:03 And can we agree that there wasn't any detail in the design on how natural ventilation would be achieved in the basement or at the top of the building? That's correct. Yes. And can we also agree that the designer
01:47:15 And can we also agree that the designer does not appear to have approached any building regulation or fire expert with regards to understanding or mitigating the impact of breaching the compartment through the stair walls? Yes.
01:47:28 Now, in those circumstances, would you accept that TRIO's design work lacked thoroughess? I think there were there were elements of it that that could have been improved or should have been improved. Yes. And do you agree that TRIO should have
01:47:39 And do you agree that TRIO should have taken more active steps to assure itself that its contractors and subcontractors were coming up with a safe and compliant design?
01:47:48 design? Its contractors producing a design or trio producing its design. Just can you clarify that for me please? let's say trio producing the designs. Yes, we we we we again, you know, in terms of what was produced and what was
01:47:59 terms of what was produced and what was shared with the the the supply chain, the contractors, there could there was definitely improvements to be made. Yes.
01:48:05 Yes. In terms of information, when we spoke about this earlier, you said that there was an audit regime for the design in place and there were three tiers of audits that were undertaken on all the works that were delivered. Can
01:48:17 all the works that were delivered. Can you explain um how that audit regime didn't pick up the design problems that we've just been identifying? So the audit is not around the design. It's there is an inspection regime on
01:48:28 It's there is an inspection regime on the operational activities undertaken. Um so um our site manager would have had a requirement to do a number of inspections um on site. We would have
01:48:40 inspections um on site. We would have expected our contractors and subcontractors to to undertake their own inspections of their work. we had um the client undertaking um assurance checks uh on on site and also
01:48:52 assurance checks uh on on site and also our health safety team would have would have gone to site and undertaken um inspections in terms of in reference to the uh introduction of the non-compliant flanges that should have
01:49:05 non-compliant flanges that should have and was not picked up by our site manager. It was subsequently picked up by the client audit um Pat Kelly's audit and that was communicated to Steve Johnson and then that was addressed as
01:49:17 Johnson and then that was addressed as you've seen earlier on um around the design amendment and the change in design in terms of the boxing and around ventilation. Yes, I see. And in in terms of the the construction work, can we agree that
01:49:29 construction work, can we agree that TRIO's contractors and subcontractors failed to install the welded joints and put in flange joints? Yes. said, "Failed to install boxing in with a 2-hour fire rated materials."
01:49:41 with a 2-hour fire rated materials." Yes.
01:49:42 Yes. And failed to install temporary fire stopping in the oversized holes between the stair and the lobby, thereby increasing the risks from fire while the work was incomplete. It wasn't installed. Um, yes.
01:49:55 It wasn't installed. Um, yes. Do you accept that TRIO could have exercised much better control over its own
01:50:02 own staff and its subcontractors to make sure they produce safe and compliant work?
01:50:07 work? Yes, I think the sequencing of works could have been different um whereby the non-compliant elements of the work could have been uh avoided. Yes. Now just one one final um topic
01:50:20 Yes. Now just one one final um topic just to return to something about the the consultation process that was done over this riser. We talked before about the decision to place it in the stair and the options that were considered for
01:50:31 and the options that were considered for that and you talked about it being a tripartite discussion between cadent trio and the TMO. Now during those tripartite discussions concerning those
01:50:44 tripartite discussions concerning those options was the need to consult residents ever raised by TRIO or anyone else?
01:50:50 else? So the the the residents were informed via letters in terms of the works that were going to be undertaken on the reactive program and subsequent to that a later date there were letters issued
01:51:01 a later date there were letters issued for the proactive works that that were subsequently suspended. Yes, I appreciate they might have been informed by letter about the works that were going to be undertaken once that decision's made, but were they consulted
01:51:13 decision's made, but were they consulted over the available options in terms of where to put the riser in the first place?
01:51:18 place? Not that I'm aware of. No. And did TRIO ever raise that uh as a something that ought to happen? No.
01:51:27 No. And so far as you're aware, was there in fact ever any resident consultation over those different options? I'm not aware of that happening. And in we looked at the email from um
01:51:40 And in we looked at the email from um Mr. Chapman about his concerns. Did TRIO ever communicate directly with residents about their fire safety concerns in terms of the rise of replacement work? Not that I'm aware of. No. No.
01:51:50 No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I've come to the end now of my pre-prepared questions. Right. If we get have perhaps a 10 minute 10-minut break, I think would be sufficient for questions
01:52:02 would be sufficient for questions or thereabouts. Yes. Well, Mr. Dan, as I indicated earlier, when council gets the end of her questions, we have to have a short break to enable her to check that nothing's been left out and all to let other
01:52:14 been left out and all to let other people who aren't physically present suggestions which perhaps we should be putting to. Yeah.
01:52:20 Yeah. So, we'll have a break now. We'll come back at I think 5 4. Thank you. And at that point, we'll find out if there are any more questions for you. Okay.
01:52:28 Okay. All right. Um so, um again, please then talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. If you'd like to go with the usher, she will look after you and we'll see you in a moment.
02:06:00 is would you ask Mr. Dolan to come back in please
02:06:17 right Mr. Mr. Dolan. Well, we'll see if there are any more questions for you. Yes, Mr. Grinch. No, there are no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
02:06:23 Chairman. Okay.
02:06:24 Okay. Um, I just would like to thank Mr. Dolan for coming here today and assisting us with our investigations. It really is appreciated. Thank you. Yes. And I'd like to thank you very much, Mr. Dolan, on behalf of all three members of the panel. It's
02:06:35 all three members of the panel. It's always very helpful and indeed very interesting for us to hear from people who are actually involved and and had firsthand knowledge of what was going on. And I think it I'd really like to
02:06:46 on. And I think it I'd really like to say as well how grateful we are for your cander in uh describing the events and responding to the questions that we've put to you. It's been extremely useful and we are very grateful. Thank you.
02:06:57 Thank you. So thank you very much. And now you are free to go. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much.
02:07:13 Yes. Mr. Strange. Yes. Thank you. So um we have nothing further for today and tomorrow we will be hearing from our gas expert Mr. Hanok.
02:07:21 Hanok. Yes. Good. Thank you very much. Well in that case we'll break there for today and we'll resume tomorrow morning at 10:00.
02:07:28 10:00. Thank you. Good. Thank you very much. 10:00 tomorrow.