Afternoon session examining Katharine Hammond (Cabinet Office) on government emergency response frameworks, COBRA activation procedures, coordination mechanisms, and the Public Sector Equality Duty in emergency planning and response.
00:00:23 would you ask us having to come back in please
00:00:35 all right seven ready to carry on the hoop yes absolutely thank you very much yes mr miller thank you mr chairman uh miss hammond i just want to explore one or two further aspects of the nra process which we looked at
00:00:47 process which we looked at before the break and i think i asked you about whether anybody ever performed a comparison of the differences in the types of community displaced by different incidents you said you thought it was
00:00:58 incidents you said you thought it was unlikely at a national level but the sort of consideration you would expect to happen in relation to a local risk assessment you'll recall that evidence two questions flow from that the first is would the ccs
00:01:11 is would the ccs recognize that the impact of emergencies and in this case displacement mass displacement of residents from their homes could affect different social and economic groups and
00:01:22 different social and economic groups and localities in different ways yes it would it was the mechanism for recognizing that well in a way it is the basis for the
00:01:33 well in a way it is the basis for the principle of um subsidiarity on which the system is based which recognizes that local knowledge is often crucial in a response
00:01:44 response so
00:01:46 so in the example you've given local understanding of the impact of a particular event on a community has been shown pretty regularly to be really important
00:01:58 pretty regularly to be really important in delivering the right kind of response did the nra given that it was leading nationally on risk assessment recognized these differing socio-economic factors
00:02:10 socio-economic factors and consequently include consideration of those potentially differing outcomes within it
00:02:17 within it i think in in the nra risks are set out as single scenarios intended to be usable everywhere in the country
00:02:26 country the the guidance which accompanies it for use by local planners i think does draw out the need to bring in those local factors but they are not
00:02:37 local factors but they are not drawn out
00:02:38 drawn out for every community in the uk understandably in the national document was there any direction or instructional guidance given to local planners to consider these different
00:02:50 to consider these different socio-economic factors which might affect different groups in different ways when it came to outcomes
00:02:56 outcomes i would have to refresh my memory of exactly what the local guidance says i'm afraid but i'm very happy to do that they would of course be um subject to the public sector equality duty in the
00:03:07 the public sector equality duty in the same way as uh anyone in the public sector is so they would have had that in their minds i follow so just to be clear about that are you is your evidence that when the local planners the lrfs
00:03:20 local planners the lrfs created their own risk registers in providing for their planning assumptions and capabilities they would be required in law is this right to take account of to
00:03:32 law is this right to take account of to protect various different protected characteristics under the equality act that's my understanding now then let's turn to the national risk register is it right that the nra forms the basis for the national risk register
00:03:45 the basis for the national risk register correct and that was a public document at the time yes correct and the most recent nrr to use the acronym before the grenfell tower fire was i think published in march 2015 was it uh i think that's correct yes
00:03:57 uh i think that's correct yes and
00:03:58 and we can go i think to um to that document it's cab
00:04:02 it's cab four zero seven zero zero nine
00:04:10 uh uh and we can see under chapter that that's the 2015 edition we can see if we go to page four we can see the contents page or part of it
00:04:34 you seem to be stuck i'd like cab four zero seven zero zero nine
00:04:42 you can see there's a different well let me let me take it more quickly because there may be a snag with the numbering but um do you do you recall that there was no mention in this document of an urban or tower block fire
00:04:54 document of an urban or tower block fire i think that would be correct as it wasn't a scenario identified in the nra right
00:04:59 right but there was uh um wildfire set out uh pages 27 and 28 perhaps we could have pages 27 and 28 there
00:05:11 there which is
00:05:13 which is there you see it there you don't don't if we go to page 27 you can see severe wildfires risk outline and if you turn to page 28
00:05:24 uh you can see under 2.63 casualties from wildfires tend to be low but there could be significant distress and health consequences such as an increase in respiratory ailments due to smoke or fumes
00:05:37 due to smoke or fumes now
00:05:39 now was any work ever done to establish whether a casualty bureau had ever been established as a result of a wildfire or a friends and relatives reception center or a rest center or any other of the um
00:05:52 or a rest center or any other of the um the kinds of center contemplated by certainly by the london resilience frameworks um i'm afraid i i can't recall at this distance but very happy to go away and
00:06:03 distance but very happy to go away and look for the answer to that question right
00:06:07 right right now following the fire the grenfell tariff i think it was right that the nra the national risk register had been updated the nrr and the 20 is it the right the 2019
00:06:18 2019 version of the um of the assessment is now called the national security risk assessment correct uh and that i think does include an example by way of a risk of a fire in
00:06:29 an example by way of a risk of a fire in a high-rise residential building as a reasonable worse case risk yes
00:06:34 risk yes now let's go to your second statement
00:06:38 uh at page 20 where you cover this that cab 30 is 14799 page 20. at paragraph 67 you say i personally
00:06:49 20. at paragraph 67 you say i personally recall being involved in discussions about the inclusion of this risk in the 2019 nsra although we continued to be of the view that the outcomes of this risk were already covered by the existing nrpas we nevertheless took the view that
00:07:02 nrpas we nevertheless took the view that the prominence of the grenfell tower fire in the national consciousness meant that it could not be omitted this was also underpinned by the knowledge that local resilience forums would be looking at their own plans for tower block fires
00:07:15 at their own plans for tower block fires in response to the events at grenfell and we wanted to ensure such plans had a helpful and consistent basis for doing so
00:07:24 just looking at that in a nutshell was it the case that you included grenfell tower fire not because it wasn't adequately catered for in the 2016 version of the nra but but for political
00:07:35 version of the nra but but for political reasons
00:07:36 reasons no not for political reasons but because we knew from contact between my colleagues and lrfs that they would be thinking specifically
00:07:47 that they would be thinking specifically about this type of risk and as it says in the statement because we want it to be helpful to them in doing so
00:07:55 but the risk profile hadn't changed it between the 2016 version and the 2019 version i think if in a couple of paragraphs above the one you're referring to
00:08:07 one you're referring to it does set out some of the differences in our understanding of the risk
00:08:12 risk that were drawn as lessons from the grenfell tower fire those differences and an understanding still meant however that the risk was covered by the planning assumptions are
00:08:23 covered by the planning assumptions are set out in paragraph 67 so it was an enhanced understanding the primary reason for including it was to be of assistance to local planners
00:08:34 be of assistance to local planners right so um let's pick that up then paragraph 65 higher up page 20. you say our enhanced understanding bolstered by updated home office modelling of fire risk following the
00:08:45 modelling of fire risk following the grenfell tower fire meant that the consequences of a tower block fire were more significant than previously assessed now was there a reason why that
00:08:55 that risk had not been assessed
00:09:00 for the specific purpose of the nra until after the fire i think mr miller this goes to a question you you asked me before about previous consideration of similar fires
00:09:11 previous consideration of similar fires where we we have an absence of evidence but um following the grenfell tower fire we of course use the knowledge gained there
00:09:21 there um to look again at this kind of scenario
00:09:24 scenario and make sure we understood its impact fully
00:09:27 fully right well let me be more focused then what was
00:09:31 what was what was it that enhanced your understanding
00:09:36 i think that's quite a specialized question that i would defer to my more expert colleagues on but um
00:09:44 but um the use of the cladding in particular is drawn out in the statement as an element which suggested more serious consequences than i think had previously been understood
00:09:55 been understood what was the updated home office modeling
00:09:57 modeling about in in general terms and modelling of the impact of a fire of that kind
00:10:04 that kind of what kind a tower block fire right but i mean was it
00:10:09 it was it
00:10:10 was it a cladding fire on a high-rise or was it any kind of fire within a high rise that enhanced your understanding leading to the inclusion of this risk in the 2019 nsra
00:10:21 nsra um
00:10:23 um my recollection is it was the modelling of a
00:10:26 of a tower block fire including cladding but i would have to verify that with my home office colleagues
00:10:37 so was it included because of the national consciousness or or now
00:10:45 or now being
00:10:46 being [Music]
00:10:47 [Music] directed to towers like grenfell or was it because an urban fire or tower block fire should have been in the nra before 2019 but it was a historical
00:10:58 before 2019 but it was a historical omission
00:11:00 omission so
00:11:01 so as i said before even with the addition of this new scenario it did not move the planning assumptions for local responders to use so on that basis like we wouldn't describe
00:11:13 on that basis like we wouldn't describe it as a historical emission but clearly the terrible events at grenfell were very much in the minds of planners and we wanted to assist them in reviewing their own plans for this type of
00:11:25 their own plans for this type of scenario so that was the primary driver for its inclusion but of course that drew on the knowledge gained in this event
00:11:32 event so
00:11:33 so does it come to this that it was included not because the risk profile was any different from how it had been in 2016
00:11:39 in 2016 but really for the look of the thing because the national risk register without a grenfell in it would look lopsided or incomplete no not for the look of the thing but to be of assistance to planners focusing on
00:11:50 be of assistance to planners focusing on that type of fire
00:11:59 uh then i think it's right isn't it that the national risk register um of september 2017 which was after the fire but any just was updated to include
00:12:10 fire but any just was updated to include the risk of fire in a residential building do you remember that correct and that made specific reference to the grenfell tower fire within it yes yes for the same reason yes and for reference purposes we could see that at
00:12:21 reference purposes we could see that at cab 6069
00:12:24 cab 6069 i don't think there's a need to go to that but let's go to the 2020 edition of the national risk register at inq50 forgive me inq30 is 15149.
00:12:39 and if we go please to
00:12:43 to chapter four which we're going to find on page 83 under the heading major fires within the section
00:12:51 section major incidents um you can see there's there's a great deal there uh which is set out and one of the questions is have such events happen before you can
00:13:02 have such events happen before you can see that
00:13:03 see that and
00:13:04 and to the left of that you see two card two chunks of text major fires can start for many reasons including
00:13:11 including uh and then consequences of major fires may include potential fatalities physical and or psychological casualties potential evacuation and shelter of affected people damage to property and
00:13:22 affected people damage to property and infrastructure disruption to essential services particularly the availability of fire and rescue services economic costs environmental damage air pollution and potential water contamination uh and then under have
00:13:35 contamination uh and then under have such events happen before as i as i showed you uh there's a reference to the grenfell tower fire itself
00:13:44 now under capability if you go to the right-hand side of the page you can see there's a reference to fire and rescue services having the capability to fight high-rise fires yes
00:13:55 capability to fight high-rise fires yes yes and on if you turn to page 84 you can see a reference to other areas including
00:14:01 including well-being support under government action you see that yes and then if you go to page 85 you can see a reference to independent inspection regimes for fire and rescue
00:14:12 inspection regimes for fire and rescue services
00:14:13 services as part of as part of the independent inspections the question is looking at all of those things why did the ccs not consider those issues for the purposes of the nrr
00:14:24 those issues for the purposes of the nrr before the grenfell tower fire i think because this document is drawing on the much greater understanding of a fire of this type uh drawn from the grenfell tower
00:14:36 uh drawn from the grenfell tower experience and in the way you would expect i think us to learn those lessons and draw them into future processes yes and and that prompts a question i asked you before
00:14:47 asked you before what was it about the grenfell tower fire that prompted lessons to be learnt such that they were embedded in this document
00:14:53 document which had not been learned from fires at lachen house shirley towers uh and at the adair tower fire and other high rise fires before 2017.
00:15:04 high rise fires before 2017. and it is it's difficult for me to answer your question mr millett because that is before my time in ccs and we have not found evidence of consideration of those specific risks
00:15:16 of those specific risks do you
00:15:17 do you accept
00:15:18 accept looking back on it that if an urban or tower block fire had been included in the 2016
00:15:25 the 2016 national risk register as a result of the national risk assessment it would have provided a specific focus for local planners to be able to assess and plan for yes i think they would have used it in
00:15:37 yes i think they would have used it in that way
00:15:38 that way let's then turn to a different topic which is the preparation and planning now i think you you uh accepted earlier as as is obvious that the the emergency preparedness documents is the statutory
00:15:49 preparedness documents is the statutory guidance which accompanies the 2004 act
00:15:54 and additionally there's the emergency response and recovery non-statutory guidance from october 2013. um on that did is it right that that required humanitarian assistance to be
00:16:05 required humanitarian assistance to be provided in the event of an emergency yes that's one uh one element of the response and there's specific uh guidance on human aspects of a response
00:16:16 guidance on human aspects of a response are you able to assist with why emergency preparedness that's the title of the document is uh is statutory guidance but err emergency response and recovery is not it's only
00:16:28 response and recovery is not it's only non-statutory i'm afraid i can't recall that but very happy to
00:16:33 happy to go away and ask the question right and now turning to the second of those then the non-statutory response let's look at that it's at cab404624
00:16:46 and that's the first page of it and you can see at the bottom of the page it's dated october 2013 and its full title is emergency response and recovery non-statutory guidance accompanying the civil contingencies act 2004
00:17:00 and if we go please in that to page 116.
00:17:05 page 116. can i just ask you before we do we were you reasonably familiar with this document at the time of the fire um yes at the time of the fire i haven't uh studied it in any detail for the past two years however no i understand but at
00:17:17 two years however no i understand but at the time of the fire this is something that you would have been reasonably familiar with can we proceed on that basis it would have been used by the ccs team and by local responders who are the primary
00:17:28 local responders who are the primary intended audience for this then let's go to page 116. paragraph 7.1.1 what is humanitarian assistance and it explains what it is
00:17:40 and it explains what it is with the number of bullet points underneath that if you just look at those were you familiar with that provision or at least the gist of it at the time
00:17:48 the time yes those are consequences that are often a consideration following a crisis event right yes i don't read them all out but you can see the basic shelter information about what has happened medical
00:18:00 about what has happened medical assistance financial illegal support psychosocial support etc
00:18:06 etc and and also at the bottom providing a point of contact for longer term support and advice if we go to page 129
00:18:17 advice if we go to page 129 a little bit further on in the document we see 7.7.1 meeting the needs of specific groups as the title and 7.7.1 says the care and support
00:18:27 support needs of a range of groups require special consideration this section focuses on four groups which can make challenging demands on responding agencies these are children and young people faith religious or cultural
00:18:39 people faith religious or cultural groups elderly people and people with disabilities for all more information on identifying vulnerable groups see there's a link identifying people who
00:18:50 there's a link identifying people who are vulnerable in a crisis were you familiar with that
00:18:56 that principle or set of principles with a with set out in 7.7.1 yes yes yes uh now if we then go to i just pick up a point you referred to
00:19:07 i just pick up a point you referred to earlier about about the equality legislation uh robert mcfarlane's third statement we find that at cab3014862
00:19:16 please page six
00:19:29 that's cab 3-0 is 14862
00:20:04 all right why that's taking some time to come up but let me take it more shortly was it your understanding as it was his that the equality act 2010
00:20:15 as it was his that the equality act 2010 required local authorities to have due regard to the needs of people with relevant protected characteristics yes yes and that would inc that may include specific groups when they carry out
00:20:26 specific groups when they carry out emergency planning and emergency responses yes yes
00:20:34 yes yes uh and
00:20:35 uh and do you share his view i'll just give the reference paragraph 17 we don't now need to go to it that
00:20:42 that failure to comply with the public sector equality duty could lead to discrimination in the delivery of emergency responses such that certain groups could receive a less effective authority and thus experience
00:20:54 effective authority and thus experience a greater degree of trauma yes i think that is completely logical and a greater degree of distress and inconvenience yes when compared with other groups yes you do
00:21:05 you do now let's then go back to your first statement please cab 3014764
00:21:12 let's go to page 7 paragraph 26.
00:21:26 and you say that ccs also leads on the following capability work streams and that includes a evacuation and shelter
00:21:36 shelter with the dclg and devolved administrations as key delivery partners and you say that the ccs published the non-statutory evacuation and shelter guidance in 2014
00:21:48 and that we can look at that is that cab406404627
00:21:56 we just look at that
00:22:01 there it is it and if we turn on to page two
00:22:07 uh and then page four you can see the contents
00:22:10 contents on page four
00:22:15 uh and it has annex page 57 scales of evacuation and my question was it was that document designed to help local planners write their local
00:22:26 local planners write their local evacuation and shelter plans yes that it is intended for a local audience
00:22:32 audience right
00:22:33 right and i think as a further document cab 6036
00:22:43 this is called the human aspects in emergency management guidance on supporting individuals affected by emergencies and that's october 2016. was that designed to support local
00:22:54 was that designed to support local responders planning and coordination of human
00:22:58 human aspects activities if i could put them that way in the response and recovery phases of an emergency yes that's correct and would it be fair to say looking at those two documents that the humanitarian needs of
00:23:09 that the humanitarian needs of individuals in the context of emergencies firmly embedded in
00:23:15 in the
00:23:15 the policy framework as something which must be catered for in an emergency response i would say so yes yes and always subject to the public sector equality duty of course because you've accepted
00:23:27 duty of course because you've accepted and our third document uh
00:23:29 uh is
00:23:30 is what i think i can call conops and you've heard of conops have and is its full title the central government arrangements for responding to an emergency concept of operation yes
00:23:41 emergency concept of operation yes correct and that is let's just have it up but cab 60 is 26.
00:23:50 um there it is this one is the one that was updated in april 2013 as you can see from the bottom of the screen am i right in thinking that that describes how the uk central government response will
00:24:01 the uk central government response will be organized and the relationship between central regional and local tiers in england yes that's right right now i've shown you um a a swathe of documents and ask you about them we'll
00:24:13 documents and ask you about them we'll come back to conops later but my question for present purposes is this how are these guidance documents and policy documents such as then we've looked at
00:24:21 looked at disseminated to local responders to make sure that they are properly taken into account
00:24:27 account locally for local emergency planning and response
00:24:31 response so they are made available through an online platform which local responders can access and many of them will also have hard copies of these documents and of course
00:24:44 copies of these documents and of course anybody struggling to find one could come to ccs and ask for it to be sent to them right and would you centrally expect those locally in
00:24:54 in the position of responsibility for planning
00:24:57 planning and making assumptions about capabilities be familiar with these documents yes i would hope so the purpose of them is to assist in that responsibility
00:25:09 is to assist in that responsibility and i now want to turn to well let me just ask you this and before the fire before the grenfell tower fire had concerns been raised by responders about the complexity or quantity of guidance and policy
00:25:21 or quantity of guidance and policy documents out there i i can't recollect a specific concern being raised with me there's certainly a lot of documentation but i i can't remember a complaint being
00:25:32 but i i can't remember a complaint being made right do you recall any occasion on which you
00:25:36 which you received the complaint of criticism or heard others doing so that the civil contingencies framework was an architectural edifice which was of byzantine complexity which
00:25:47 which was of byzantine complexity which defeated local or central planners i can't report recall anybody putting that point to me no in that way or in any other
00:25:55 any other not not in my recollection right let's turn to resilience then um now robert mcfarlane is someone who i've tried to show you um his evidence for before he was the
00:26:06 his evidence for before he was the direct deputy director for uk resilience training in the ccs wasn't he training doctrine and standards i think was his full time right now then let's go let's see if we can get back to his statement please cab
00:26:18 please cab 30149 14794 cab 30's 147 nine four
00:26:24 nine four this is his first statement
00:26:28 and uh if we go to page three paragraph eleven
00:26:38 uh he says here the training aspect of my responsibilities can be divided into two main areas one the direction support and assurance of the emergency planning college the epc in its uk and international operations and to the
00:26:50 international operations and to the development and provision of crisis management training to central government we turn the page please
00:26:59 please central government quantitatively oversight of the epc makes up the majority of this work do you agree with that yes i'm i'm sure rob is correct right and if we get a paragraph 14 on
00:27:10 right and if we get a paragraph 14 on page four
00:27:12 page four uh he says there circo is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the epc but it is operated for and on behalf of the cabinet office do you agree with that yes
00:27:22 that yes and it's right to think also and tell me if this isn't right that the epc provides uh training exercising and advisory services to a wide range of different bodies including government departments but also public authorities
00:27:34 departments but also public authorities and the private sector that's right yes and that includes i think but isn't limited to category one and category two responders yes absolutely not limited too but it does include them certainly it does include them and and is it right
00:27:45 it does include them and and is it right the epc courses are not mandatory for government departments or indeed category one or two responders that's correct they could choose to use a different provider then let's move to
00:27:56 a different provider then let's move to page six of this statement please paragraph
00:27:59 paragraph 21 under the heading central government training he says this civil servants from central government departments can and do attend training at the epc most new starters in ccs will attend training
00:28:10 new starters in ccs will attend training at the epc this is not just say that they will learn about the framework of emergency planning and response arrangements in the uk and the allocation of duties under the 2004 act participation in epc training courses is
00:28:22 participation in epc training courses is also an opportunity for new ccs colleagues to learn alongside delegates from the emergency services with whom most civil servants would have had limited experience prior to joining ccs
00:28:34 limited experience prior to joining ccs i i take it you can agree with you agree with that
00:28:38 with that um
00:28:39 um yes that the final statement of course people come to ccs from a whole range of backgrounds so we do have people from emergency service backgrounds and those with more experience but there is
00:28:51 those with more experience but there is there's a wide range of prior experience i would say and he goes on to say in paragraph 22 the epc also conducts quite a significant amount of resilience training and exercise work for other
00:29:03 training and exercise work for other government departments it is open to departments to approach the epc and request such training the epc will work together with the department to develop bespoke training and exercises to help the department improve its ability to
00:29:15 the department improve its ability to respond to and recover from emergencies that might fall within their area of responsibility do you agree with that yes now against that background that i've shown you from his statement can i
00:29:26 i've shown you from his statement can i show you
00:29:28 show you his third exhibit which is cab 3014793
00:29:38 this is a spreadsheet if we can go to the native please
00:29:44 and what i'm showing you here is i'll wait for it to pop up and if we can go to the top of the document
00:29:53 document please
00:29:54 please thank you yes this is a spreadsheet which records central government attendees
00:29:59 attendees at epc courses in the years 2014 to 2017 and you you can see that on the in the right
00:30:06 right hand foremost columns there now if we go down together to line one one
00:30:13 one one nine row one one nine
00:30:21 scroll down further we can see the entry for dclg
00:30:26 for dclg right and uh if you look across the columns e
00:30:32 and a e f g and h you can see that in those years
00:30:38 years uh two
00:30:40 uh two staff members went in 2014 one in 2015 one in 2016 that's column g and none in 2017 that's column h to june so only four delegates in total in those
00:30:52 so only four delegates in total in those four years or three and a half years
00:30:57 and similarly if we go to row 202
00:31:02 which is the home office we can see that between 2014 and 2017 in total only four delegates attended training with the epc from that
00:31:13 training with the epc from that government department two in 2014 and two in 2016 none in 2015 or in 2017 to june now
00:31:22 now was it normal for that number of delegates from those government departments or government departments of that kind to go to attend epc training
00:31:35 i'm not sure i quite understand your question normal in what sense normal in the sense that were these numbers a handful
00:31:43 a handful was that was that a standard number was it common that so few would attend epc courses i think to answer that question i would
00:31:54 i think to answer that question i would have to look back at records of previous years which i'm afraid i don't have to hand
00:32:02 well let's let's let's compare it perhaps with your own department which which you might be able to help with
00:32:10 uh if we go to row seven
00:32:19 cabinet office and there we see in total
00:32:25 in total take it from me 94 people from the cabinet office are training attain attending a training session
00:32:31 session uh at least one with epc in those years 18 in 2014 26 and 2015 36 and 2016 and 14 in 2017. can you account
00:32:42 can you account for the the difference at least on paper in the sheer numbers of attendees that your office sent for training at the epc in those years and the numbers that the home office and the dclg sent in those
00:32:54 home office and the dclg sent in those years
00:32:55 years i can certainly um account for the the cabin office attendees so cabinet office has a relatively high turnover of staff so we would expect new starters
00:33:07 so we would expect new starters every year and as rob said in his statement the vast majority of them unless they were in roles for which it was not relevant would attend one or more of the epc
00:33:19 would attend one or more of the epc courses as a matter of routine and because the epc is operated from ccs of course that was the supplier we used i i think what i can't do unfortunately
00:33:31 i i think what i can't do unfortunately is is describe the dclg or home office practice but i can certainly describe the cabinet office practice to you well
00:33:42 well at any given time roughly how many staff members are there or were there during your time at the cabinet office um around 100 in ccs right so
00:33:54 um around 100 in ccs right so around 100 so over the four years a very significant it i use an expression which is a description but would you agree that a very significant number of uh personnel in the cabinet office had
00:34:06 uh personnel in the cabinet office had attended epc for training on a variety of
00:34:10 of of topics
00:34:11 of topics yes although i think some of these are delegate numbers so the same person may be represented multiple times but i could certainly agree that um quite a high number of
00:34:22 agree that um quite a high number of courses were attended yes were you aware that in other departments that the numbers that that you were sending to epc courses were not
00:34:32 were not matched uh no i wasn't monitoring those numbers
00:34:37 numbers d did you have a as it were you can use this expression here three line whip within the ccs to send people on training courses at the epc there's strong incentives for them to go
00:34:48 there's strong incentives for them to go it was a part of normal induction and learning processes on arrival did you attend any of the training sessions yourself if you scroll down you could cut your eye down the course name were any of these those which you attended do
00:35:00 any of these those which you attended do you think um you know it's very difficult to recall and i've certainly spent quite a lot of time at the epc and dipped in and out of courses and i would have to go back and check if
00:35:11 and i would have to go back and check if any of these represent me right but do you recall going to the to the epc yes you do let's go then to um
00:35:21 um cab
00:35:23 cab 3014792 this is rhm2 exhibited by mr mcfarlane different spreadsheet can we also have the native of this that cab 30 is 14792
00:35:34 of this that cab 30 is 14792 what i'm showing you now
00:35:38 is
00:35:42 that we need to get rid of that one i think
00:35:47 yes that's that's that's it now um there are two tabs there's uh there's category one responders and category two responders and what these are is a is spreadsheets held by the ccs
00:35:58 is a is spreadsheets held by the ccs recording category 1 and category 2 attendees at epc training in the same year as 2014 to 2017. if we go to the category one responders tab you can see it there if we go please to row 74
00:36:14 we can see the gla
00:36:18 the gla and in the first two years of the of the date range 10 go in 2014 four go in 2015 and none in 16 or 17. uh and
00:36:27 uh and row 317 we can see our bkc
00:36:34 we go to row 317 we can see rbkc
00:36:41 uh and they send uh two in 2014 not in 2015 one in 2016 and none in 2017. and we can see the three
00:36:51 three uh courses that those three delegates attended perhaps they were the same person between years 14 and 16 we don't know but there are the three topics one is crowd modeling one is
00:37:03 topics one is crowd modeling one is working in safety advisory groups and one is an evening lecture on event risk management um
00:37:11 um compare that with
00:37:15 with ro
00:37:16 ro uh well well with westminster if you don't scroll down please
00:37:23 to row 328 you can see very different numbers 47 in 2014 38 in 2015 two in 2016 and one in 2017.
00:37:34 two in 2016 and one in 2017. uh
00:37:36 uh you may not be able to help with the specifics but are you able to help with why the numbers would have dropped off for a central urban l.a local authority attending epc for training on contingencies
00:37:48 contingencies i i'm afraid i can't without investigating further i i don't know the profile and existing qualifications of their
00:37:55 their staff or their turnover right now we've seen the figures for rbkc can i can i take it that you weren't yourself aware that our bkc had not undertaken any
00:38:06 undertaken any epc civil protection training between 2014 and 2017. no i wasn't aware of it but does it surprise you and it's really i'm sorry this sounds
00:38:17 and it's really i'm sorry this sounds unhelpful and it's not meant to be but it's very difficult to make an evaluation of the numbers without understanding the nature of the staff and their their past experience in this snapshot of time
00:38:29 in this snapshot of time so
00:38:30 so it is obviously lower by comparison but i
00:38:33 i i don't have information on the reasons for that i'm afraid well i understand that but it's not uh
00:38:39 uh it's not lower numbers it's nil isn't it would you expect a central london authority rbkc is is the case in point
00:38:50 rbkc is is the case in point to have had no epc training to any of its staff on contingency planning in the four years or three and a half years before the grenfell tower fire
00:39:01 years before the grenfell tower fire i would expect them to have staff trained to an appropriate standard but the epc is not the only supplier and as i say i
00:39:10 i say i have no information on the existing qualifications of their staff so i'm finding it difficult to draw an inference from it now
00:39:21 that leads to another question which is whether or not there was a system within the ccs for monitoring and supervising uh these outcomes uh was there a system whereby the ccs
00:39:33 was there a system whereby the ccs examined the figures and took took the laggards and uh
00:39:39 and uh and notified them that they were not keeping up with their epc training and they should be doing more no not to my knowledge can we go back to mr mcfarland's statement please his first statement cab
00:39:51 statement please his first statement cab 3014794
00:39:52 3014794 [Music]
00:39:54 [Music] paragraph 23 page seven
00:40:04 uh he says that in addition since 2007 and working with ccs colleagues my team has provided introductory training for civil servants in central government whose roles are likely to require them to work within or work with cobra the
00:40:17 to work within or work with cobra the course covers what cobra is what their place in it is what is expected of their departments and what is expected of them as an individual in their particular roles it also addresses behavior how you conduct your role in cobra to good
00:40:29 conduct your role in cobra to good effect under the considerable pressures of working in a crisis the training is divided into two tiers one tier is aimed at sybil's senior civil servants i.e departmental principles and one is aimed
00:40:40 departmental principles and one is aimed at junior civil servants i.e those supporting the principles and decision makers the program is with very few exceptions internal to the central to central government departments and agencies
00:40:51 agencies um is that training mandatory do you recall
00:40:55 recall um i don't think it's mandatory but it's very much expected for those who will be having a direct role in cobra did you yourself undertake it i think i did when i started
00:41:07 i started and have you yourself undertaken any other training relating to resilience and emergency preparedness and response
00:41:14 um
00:41:18 i would have to i would have to go and refer back to my diaries i'm afraid right
00:41:22 right so you can't say you definitely didn't you might have done but you can't remember
00:41:26 remember i'm afraid i had not refreshed my memory of that before today apologies now let's turn then to the third aspect of ccs is focus which is response and recovery
00:41:37 recovery um you referred to the concept of subsidiarity earlier on this afternoon i think and is it right that the uk's emergency planning and response arrangements are based on that concept subsidiarity yes
00:41:50 based on that concept subsidiarity yes it's one of the principles embedded and i i you describe it let's look at your own words uh page three of your first statement paragraph eleven
00:42:03 paragraph eleven i think we've looked at this before but you you say there
00:42:07 there in the second line local responders the best place to identify the risks in their areas and to put appropriate plans and capability in place to respond to these risks within the framework provided by the civil contingencies act
00:42:18 provided by the civil contingencies act 2004
00:42:21 2004 does that tell us that the presumption during emergencies is that they will be handled at a local level so subsidiarity basically means that you take the decision at the lowest possible
00:42:33 take the decision at the lowest possible level and
00:42:35 level and coordinate at the highest appropriate level
00:42:39 level so
00:42:40 so it doesn't mean that you can only take decisions at a local level but the default is that that is the starting position
00:42:47 position with escalation upwards as required yes i see and if you go please to page to paragraph 10 just above that
00:42:58 to paragraph 10 just above that you
00:42:59 you you say
00:43:01 you say the work of ccs is underpinned by the concept of integrated emergency management this recognizes that many types of incident require broadly similar capabilities irrespective of cause and that the response to such incidents should normally be locally led
00:43:13 incidents should normally be locally led and delivered in the main by locally owned and managed capabilities they should be supported when necessary by specialist assets provided through mutual aid arrangements or by national support
00:43:24 support what do you mean by national support there
00:43:28 so um often in a um a moment of emergency or crisis local responders will ask for additional help so
00:43:39 help so a good example for example is asking for assistance from the military for which there's a well-established process so that would come through to a national level body like cobra
00:43:51 national level body like cobra who would authorize that request into the mod i see so national support is this right could only be um secured by cobra or or the other
00:44:03 um secured by cobra or or the other central government bodies not only by cobra sometimes by a direct discussion but often
00:44:11 often in a crisis those discussions aren't tend to be happening in the cobra room or in the ministerial meeting room
00:44:18 room now you refer also there to specialist assets provided through mutual age arrangements what what were those um so that a variety of different types of assets
00:44:30 of assets exist on a national basis including
00:44:34 including for example um capabilities to deal with large numbers of fatalities that would be one instance and there are a number of other types of assets which can be drawn on but which
00:44:46 assets which can be drawn on but which exist once nationally rather than in every local area right and could you give me an example please of of of an asset
00:44:54 asset which would be a capability to deal with large numbers of fatalities so there's a national mortuary capability intended to deal with large number of fatalities
00:45:05 deal with large number of fatalities i see
00:45:06 i see now i want next to ask you back about conops we looked at that before and
00:45:12 and specifically look at nxb if we can can we go to that at cab 6026
00:45:25 there's conops and if we go to page 68 within it i want to show you nxb are you familiar with this yes yes no it's called nxb likely form of a central
00:45:38 it's called nxb likely form of a central government engagement based on the impact and geographic spread of an emergency in england uh and um the diagram i think shows five different types of emergency with a
00:45:50 different types of emergency with a corresponding color is this right which indicates the form of central government involvement escalating in seriousness yes so that the color represents increasing severity across the um
00:46:03 increasing severity across the um the matrix yeah yes now looking at it it it's a it's really just an is this right it's an indication it's not a strict graph based on mathematical certainties is it
00:46:15 based on mathematical certainties is it fixed points correct it's a a guide to a judgment in particular scenarios as to what type of response will be appropriate right and just to be clear
00:46:26 appropriate right and just to be clear along the horizontal axis you've got minimum you start on the left with minimal parliamentary interest significant parliamentary interest dominating parliamentary party national debate
00:46:37 debate and then in the middle one minimum lgd through rrt is that rq or ro
00:46:47 what does that stand for forgive me are you on the second second second row of arrows in the horizontal section i think rrt is um rapid response team yes
00:46:59 rrt is um rapid response team yes uh and uh and then it goes increases in in severity crisis center collective response central direction so central direction would be in the
00:47:10 so central direction would be in the most serious of cases would it yes and then in the bottom line minimum lod
00:47:17 lod policy interest and what's lod is it nod or else it's difficult to see i think but even if we expand it it doesn't much help which is not clear on my screen no i'm
00:47:28 which is not clear on my screen no i'm sorry about that never mind um it increases in severity as well
00:47:36 as well and then on the vertical axis you start with single scene cross force regional coverage cross region national coverage uh
00:47:46 uh and the various different colors go up from green to yellow to ochre to orange to red
00:47:54 um
00:47:57 it say what would happen if you had a single scene but dominated national party or national debate
00:48:05 debate uh and required central direction and which was you might call overwhelming at least locally where would that sit
00:48:14 um so this as you said before there's no hard and fast boundaries in here but clearly that would take you to the bottom right of the matrix although
00:48:26 of the matrix although the judgment is made specific to every event so you'd want to take into account all of the specific circumstances in that moment right and now um there are two
00:48:37 right and now um there are two references to a local response the green and the yellow uh local response only in green and local response with geo providing two-way channel to central government stroke lgd in in yellow now lgd is
00:48:48 stroke lgd in in yellow now lgd is league government department what is go i i think that's referring to the government liaison officer there may be an l missing in the middle oh i see right
00:48:57 right uh
00:48:58 uh in addition in addition to local response i think we see three levels level one is significant g lgd ledger central response cobra not involved
00:49:08 involved level two sirius coordinated central response led by lgd from cobra and then catastrophic level three central direction from cobra
00:49:19 central direction from cobra in red
00:49:20 in red correct
00:49:21 correct yes now if we go back then to your first statement please at page 12 paragraph 37 you say there the response to an emergency is usually carried out first
00:49:33 emergency is usually carried out first and foremost by local organizations in some instances however the scale or complexity of an emergency means that some degree of central government support or coordination is necessary
00:49:44 support or coordination is necessary where this is the case the government department will be allocated as the lead for the overall management of the central government response where necessary the central government crisis management machinery also sometimes referred to as cobra will be activated
00:49:57 referred to as cobra will be activated to coordinate the cross-government response in the aftermath of a major emergency
00:50:01 emergency in that passage are you referring there to the levels on the diagram that we've just been through yes i think though that diagram sets out um in pictorial form the text
00:50:13 sets out um in pictorial form the text which is in paragraph 37 it's the same concept
00:50:16 concept i see
00:50:17 i see now you say that where necessary the central government crisis management machinery sometimes referred to as cobra will be activated in the aftermath of a major emergency how is major emergency defined for the purposes of triggering
00:50:30 defined for the purposes of triggering uh cobra responsibility so that there isn't a specific trigger point
00:50:37 point um
00:50:37 um in the event of an incident there's always a conversation between ccs the lead government department for that incident and number 10
00:50:49 that incident and number 10 to make the judgment whether to activate the central machinery so it's not an automatic point and that's to allow for flexibility really and ability to adapt
00:51:02 flexibility really and ability to adapt to circumstances as they arise
00:51:07 right
00:51:13 you right let me come back to that answer and i'll pick that in a moment but just
00:51:17 but just before i do you say i think in your third statement paragraph 17 that cobra was not formally called in response to the grenaville tower fire is that correct it's correct that the ministerial
00:51:29 it's correct that the ministerial meetings were not given the title of a cobra but
00:51:33 cobra but in their preparation and content they they did exactly the same thing as a meeting with that brand would have done right so
00:51:41 right so that i think that it takes us to the conclusion is this right that that doesn't mean that the grenfell tower
00:51:47 tower was considered to be a level one emergency
00:51:51 emergency no no we it's not the case that at the start of an event we would formally label an emergency at any one of those levels
00:51:59 levels as you rightly said mr miller that that that matrix is to guide judgment rather than a set of hard and fast rules yes
00:52:08 yes and can we go to your third statement please uh at page eight
00:52:16 you say in paragraph 16 there there is no formal declaration of the level at which an emergency is classified which allows for judgment to be applied about where an emergency lies on the scale at any particular time the levels provide a
00:52:28 any particular time the levels provide a guide to activity needed rather than activating a specific set of action or resources which allows for a flexible and tailored approach depending on the specific circumstances of an event this is part of the strength of the mechanism
00:52:40 is part of the strength of the mechanism in my view what's the purpose of having clearly defined levels with corresponding actions as outlined in conops if there's no specific reference to them
00:52:52 no specific reference to them the purpose is to help the um the people in that moment making the judgment it gives a framework within which to consider where you might be on the spectrum but then of course the specific
00:53:05 spectrum but then of course the specific circumstances of the event are always applied to that which is why as i say it's not a not a trigger point but more a guidance document right
00:53:16 right but who makes the judgment so the judgment is made in in the conversation i described a second ago between the lead government department ccs
00:53:27 ccs and number 10. that's in the case of a civil emergency is that procedure is that a procedure which is provided for in conops
00:53:35 conops or anywhere else or is it just how it is um
00:53:39 um i would i would have to refresh my memory i think it has referred to in the in the con-ops but it's certainly a well-tried and practiced um
00:53:49 um way of operating and it allows for a very rapid response that's the advantage
00:53:55 advantage right because of the flexibility because of the ability to make that judgment quickly yes can we go to page four of of this this statement your third statement
00:54:06 this statement your third statement please
00:54:07 please and look at paragraph 4.5 the road of the cabinet office is amongst other things you say to 4.5.1 decide whether and when the central government response mechanism should be activated
00:54:19 mechanism should be activated and then to ensure an lgd lead government department is in place correct without a formal declaration of the level of an emergency how would the cabinet office be able to carry out
00:54:30 cabinet office be able to carry out its role in ensuring that a lead government department was in place so that the fact of the lead government department is not triggered by a particular level of um crisis event
00:54:43 of um crisis event and
00:54:44 and in fact as was the case for um for a fire of this nature lead government department roles are in the vast majority of cases clear and pre-agreed so there's no need to
00:54:56 pre-agreed so there's no need to designate
00:54:57 designate in the moment uh
00:55:01 uh right can we then go back in light of that answer and the one i wanted to come back to to annex b which
00:55:08 which was
00:55:09 was at cab 6026 page 68.
00:55:14 um i wonder if you can just help me with with this because in it you can see that as the colors change so does the role of lgd yes you can see lgd
00:55:28 lgd yes you can see lgd is involved at yellow centrally involved
00:55:36 and coordination being led by lgd in orange
00:55:46 and along the bottom you can see how lgd becomes involved which comes first the decision as to which color you're in in other words what the level is
00:55:58 what the level is uh or the lgd's involvement so that
00:56:03 so that they change as you move up the colours on this spectrum reflects a different level of lead government department activity
00:56:13 activity the fact of being the lead government department remains unchanged and as i said would be pre-agreed and so
00:56:21 and so there is no declaration of being in one colour or another this is describing the likely change in the nature of response needed
00:56:32 change in the nature of response needed from that department as the severity of an event
00:56:35 an event increases
00:56:39 right but for example who decides that
00:56:44 that the
00:56:45 the incident is in an ochre color in other words it's level one and lgd should lead the central response since it's not a decision that would be taken in that way
00:56:57 taken in that way it would be um part of it would be the conversation i described a moment ago between the lead government department ccs and number 10 to decide whether the central government activity was needed and was going to be
00:57:10 activity was needed and was going to be activated
00:57:11 activated that that is the decision rather than saying
00:57:14 saying we are in yellow or in amber or in ochre that the colours are intended to guide that process rather than set hot hard boundaries for it
00:57:32 so who would decide given a local incident at a single scene that this was green as opposed to yellow so in an instant which fell within the
00:57:45 so in an instant which fell within the uh the green box on here i would um i would expect the local area would not be seeking support
00:57:55 support i would expect the lead government department might well be aware of it or dclg colleagues might well be aware of it
00:58:03 it but they would see no need for assistance they would see no wider ramifications that government might need to deal with they would see
00:58:14 see local responders having activated and dealing with that set of issues without the need for help that's what something in the green box would look like and you know the vast majority of
00:58:26 and you know the vast majority of emergency responses in this country fall into that category they're dealt with ably by local responders with with no engagement from the center what would happen in a scenario where
00:58:38 what would happen in a scenario where there were differences in understanding within central government about what level any given emergency was at
00:58:46 so i think that would be unlikely to take place because um
00:58:52 um the decision is not to designate a level the decision is in what a mechanism to activate and if anybody was unclear as to whether the central machinery had
00:59:03 to whether the central machinery had been activated they they would simply contact ccs to clarify that
00:59:09 so i see so ccs would be the the arbiter of the of the rainbow you see what i mean
00:59:16 mean what level i don't think there is an arbiter of the rainbow because this is this is a guidance document but if you were unclear what level of central response was taking place we would certainly be the people who could tell
00:59:28 certainly be the people who could tell you that yes now can we go to your first statement page 12 please paragraph 38 and you you say there that when cobra is activated in the second line when
00:59:40 activated in the second line when activated ccs is responsible for their smooth operation and in civil emergencies acts as secretariat to cobra liaising with departments to understand and resolve issues maintaining cross-government situational awareness
00:59:52 cross-government situational awareness and briefing the chair on issues to be addressed and progress against previous actions
00:59:58 actions do these responsibilities only arise when cobra is activated um they arise in relation to um any ministerial meeting convened to deal with a civil
01:00:10 meeting convened to deal with a civil emergency whether it is branded cobra or not so
01:00:15 not so in the case of grenfell tower fire where those first two meetings were branded as ad hoc ministerial meetings exactly the same set of responsibilities were engaged and the same procedures were
01:00:27 engaged and the same procedures were followed
01:00:28 followed i see
01:00:30 i see so what difference would the formal calling of a cobra make in reality in practical terms it would not
01:00:38 would not right
01:00:40 right now let's then focus on the lgd uh we saw i think if we go to page 12 paragraph 37 the paragraph above it i think we looked at this before
01:00:51 think we looked at this before uh you said that in that the scalable complexity of an emergency means that some degree this is the second and third lines some degree of central government support or
01:01:02 degree of central government support or coordination is necessary where this is the case that government department will be allocated as the lead for the overall management of the central government response
01:01:10 response how has it determined which government department would lead in any given emergency
01:01:15 emergency so that is is predetermined for the vast majority of risks and it it normally reflects the policy responsibilities of that department or their responsibility
01:01:28 that department or their responsibility for particular capabilities that will be critical in the response so in the case of a fire the home office is responsible for fire and rescue services it's therefore the
01:01:40 therefore the logical lead government department and is it right that there will be an lgbt for response and an lgd for recovery yes sometimes they are the same sometimes they're different
01:01:51 sometimes they're different right and what are the responsibilities of the lgd for response um really to to assist in drawing together situational awareness particularly in the early stages
01:02:02 particularly in the early stages they um provide policy advice into cobra or into the ministerial meeting and they are often first point of contact essentially for
01:02:15 first point of contact essentially for that particular event and for recovery the same but with the focus on on the recovery phase which um really means returning to normal or as close as
01:02:27 returning to normal or as close as possible to normal after the response phase of the event has ended
01:02:34 ended and let's go to hom3013085
01:02:42 this is entitled department's responsibilities for planning response and recovery from emergencies and it's dated march 2009 um first was this the version current as
01:02:53 um first was this the version current as at june 2017 um i think that's correct forgive me i would have to double check but i think so
01:03:02 so yeah i mean are you familiar with this document um yes it's been some time since i looked at it i'm afraid but i'm aware of it
01:03:10 it uh and i think i'm right that there was no specific lgd for fire or was there you say it was the home office is that right it was certainly the home office and there was there was no um you know quibble about
01:03:22 there was no um you know quibble about that in the case of this event and it's the home office's role i think to decide whether and when the central government response mechanism should be activated and ensure that there is a relevant lgd in place is that have i got
01:03:34 relevant lgd in place is that have i got that right um not quite it would be the home office working with ccs and with number 10 to make the decision about activation of the central mechanism would it always be the home office or
01:03:46 would it always be the home office or just in this case because it was a fire it purely because it was a fire in this case and home office was the lead government department for that risk so sorry to say just to correct the way i put it to you it would be the it was
01:03:58 put it to you it would be the it was this right it would be the ccs plus the relevant predetermined lead government department correct who would decide whether and when the central government response mechanism should be activated plus number 10 and number 10.
01:04:12 it's a three-way conversation
01:04:16 at what stage would number 10 as opposed to the ccs get involved um it would really depend on the incident
01:04:25 incident normally we would make contact at such point that it looked like it was likely that the central mechanism might need to be engaged or we might make contact earlier just to
01:04:37 or we might make contact earlier just to keep them you know appraised of discussions going on but normally very early right so
01:04:45 would that be a yellow level going back to the
01:04:49 to the chart of rainbow charted annex b or would it be i mean we wouldn't formally declare things as at yellow level it could be at any of those points because of course not all incidents progress
01:05:01 of course not all incidents progress along the trajectory but it would certainly be as soon as it seemed likely that we would need to use the central machinery right
01:05:12 use the central machinery right i see
01:05:13 i see now
01:05:16 if we go to your third statement please page 15 paragraph 36
01:05:23 you you refer there and i could take this shortly given your last answer but you referred there to the pre-agreement arrangements which which led to the home office being the lead government department for the
01:05:34 the lead government department for the fire
01:05:35 fire and for both response and recovery but for the response i think of dclg for the recovery that's right um and you say the rules were pre-agreed so each department had responsibilities for their respective phases throughout
01:05:48 their respective phases throughout when were they pre-agreed was this an annual or periodic agreement or was it ad hoc um
01:05:55 ad hoc um no i mean there was a pre-agreed um list of responsibilities i i'm afraid i i can't tell you um when the home office first
01:06:05 first took responsibility for fire response i would assume when those responsibilities moved
01:06:10 moved into the department from dclg
01:06:16 right
01:06:20 and why would dclg be the pre-agreed department for the
01:06:28 for the grenfell tower fire so that the pre-agreed department for the recovery phase the recovery phase of an incident of this type because that phase is most likely to heavily
01:06:40 that phase is most likely to heavily engage local authority responsibilities for which dclg is the lead department and
01:06:48 and in knowing that does the dclg look at the nr the national risk register what does it what does it look at to know
01:06:57 know which
01:06:58 which uh
01:06:59 uh incidents which emergencies it needs to be prepared to lead on the recovery phases for so there's a pre-agreed list um which both they and
01:07:11 um which both they and we held
01:07:14 we held and is that list related in any way to the um the national risk register yes it draws on the risk categories in there yes i see
01:07:26 can we look at the conops document then uh please at page 15 this is cab 6026 page 15.
01:07:38 and here we have the title role of the lead government department for response 2.16 where cobra is activated the role of the lead government
01:07:49 the role of the lead government department in consultation with other government departments and with support from the cabinet office as necessary will be
01:07:55 will be and then there's a list which goes over the page i'll just show you three of these
01:07:59 these one produce a handling plan as soon as possible
01:08:02 possible two act as a focal point for communication between central government and the multi-agency regional and or strategic coordinating groups on the ground involving relevant government offices in the english regions or the
01:08:14 offices in the english regions or the devolved administrations as appropriate three
01:08:18 three produce a brief accurate situation report on the nature and scale of the emergency and submit this promptly to feed into the production of the common recognized information picture or
01:08:30 information picture or along with central briefing for media purposes to the minister copy to the cabinet office and advise on wider distribution and then
01:08:38 and then for ensuring that responders and affected communities have access to the resources they need to manage the emergency and where shortfalls are required ensure they are addressed
01:08:51 required ensure they are addressed now that role um is prescribed in as you can see uh paragraph 2.16 where cobra is activated those are the opening words what happens where cobra is not
01:09:02 what happens where cobra is not activated
01:09:04 activated and
01:09:05 and if ministers are meeting in response to a crisis
01:09:08 a crisis whether or not it is branded as cobra the same procedure and responsibilities would apply so
01:09:15 so what do we make of the words where cobra is activated i think that is um it's useful shorthand if you like for the activation of the central government crisis machinery which most people would
01:09:27 crisis machinery which most people would just refer to as cobra was that a common use of the term yes i see so when people used cobra they didn't mean this procedure they didn't mean the room or
01:09:38 procedure they didn't mean the room or rooms where um cabinet office briefings took place they meant activation of the central machinery
01:09:45 machinery for contingency responses i would say that is very common usage yes right
01:09:54 now in light of that answer i just want to see if i can understand this so you could you could delete the words where cobra is activated but then what would be the trigger
01:10:05 be the trigger which would lead to the role of the government league government department doing all the things i've read to you it would be the convening of a group of ministers or perhaps officials
01:10:19 group of ministers or perhaps officials to coordinate government support in relation to a particular event and i think you say that that convention would be decided on after discussion between the is this
01:10:30 after discussion between the is this right the cabinet office c or ccs number 10
01:10:35 number 10 and
01:10:36 and the putative lead government need lead government department correct because you might not know which it was in most cases we would because of that pre-agreed set of responsibilities right
01:10:47 pre-agreed set of responsibilities right but putative then in the sense that until the uh machinery is activated they're not actually government department no they would they would still be lead government department in relation to an
01:10:59 government department in relation to an event of that nature whether or not the um the machinery is activated i see so the lead government department by prior designation as you've explained exactly and they take they in that's in
01:11:10 exactly and they take they in that's in that capacity the department uh participates in the discussion about whether they should think a lioness cross say that they should do these things whether further support might be needed
01:11:21 whether further support might be needed basically is the question we'd be asking
01:11:28 so can we take it then moving on then in the logic and perhaps the time that the home office as lgd for the response to the grenfell tower fire was supposed to fulfill the the
01:11:39 was supposed to fulfill the the requirements set out here paragraph 2.16 of conops yes the responsibilities of an lgd were with the home office for the response phase yes
01:11:49 phase yes even though there'd be no formal cobra activation correct right now from what point can you recall in the incident was the home office required to fulfill these functions as lgd
01:12:02 these functions as lgd um
01:12:03 um so the the point at which the crisis machinery was activated was i think
01:12:10 think mid-morning on the 14th of june where the conversation happened between
01:12:16 between stuart wainwright in ccs number 10 and in consultation with home office that was the activation point and one more question before i asked the
01:12:27 and one more question before i asked the chairman for the break but did the absence of a formal cobra activation affect or hamper or inform the home office's response in my view no
01:12:38 in my view no mr chairman is that a convenient moment well it is but i'd like to ask a question first it sounds to me as though there will never need there will never be a formal activation
01:12:49 be a formal activation of a procedure there'll simply be a decision
01:12:52 decision to call a meeting of ministers and or civil servants in response to an emergency
01:12:58 emergency that that is in effect what cobra is a mechanism for bringing people together to take collective action so once someone
01:13:06 someone you can discuss who is let's say but once someone decides to call that meeting then this machinery prescribes what will then happen i think
01:13:17 prescribes what will then happen i think that is a perfectly reasonable description yes well i hope it's reasonable but i have his accurate as well and accurate good right thank you very much well we'll have a break at that point we uh
01:13:28 have a break at that point we uh we'll resume please at 25 to 4 and as before please don't talk to anyone about your evidence when you're out of the room all right thank you very much right we'd like to go the usher please
01:13:48 thank you 25 to 40 please
01:31:38 [Music] would you ask just having to come back in please
01:31:52 all right ready to carry on yes thank you very much yes yes mr chairman thank you um ms hammond i'd like now to turn up our campaigns to the 14th of june the events of that day in 2017. now i think
01:32:04 events of that day in 2017. now i think you tell us in your first statement of paragraph 42 that you were notified about the fire just after 3 a.m on the morning of the 14th of june 2017. is that correct that's correct and i think
01:32:15 that correct that's correct and i think you were the senior civil servant on duty that night yes that's right and uh were you told at that point that a major incident had been declared
01:32:26 a major incident had been declared um
01:32:27 um i i can't recall those exact words being used um it was it was clear that it was going to be a serious incident um and that we could see the scale of
01:32:39 um and that we could see the scale of the blaze from media coverage so i can't recall exactly whether those words were related to me right but did you assume that a major incident had been declared by one or other or more
01:32:50 been declared by one or other or more perhaps of the blue light services or i i think we we certainly assumed it was going to be an incident off that scale right
01:32:58 right now what made the band be duty officer called dclg red at that time did you tell us
01:33:04 tell us in paragraph 43 because we assumed that a strategic coordinating group would be called of local responders and the
01:33:14 the red would provide the government liaison officer who would take part in that call on behalf of central government and provide that link right um did you
01:33:25 right um did you ask the band b duty officer to call red or
01:33:28 or did they do that of their own accord i think we had a conversation about it and he made the phone call following that now at 3 49 then you emailed stuart wainwright who was one of
01:33:39 emailed stuart wainwright who was one of your deputy directors who was head of the readiness and response team yes yes and you told him about the fire i think that's what you say in short in paragraph 44 yes i i emailed
01:33:51 in short in paragraph 44 yes i i emailed him in case anybody was calling him directly to say that the duty team were aware and what was it about the file that you could see that prompted you to send that email as i said i sent the email because i
01:34:04 as i said i sent the email because i suspected
01:34:05 suspected that the scale of it may mean that somebody had called him directly rather than using the duty system that can sometimes
01:34:12 sometimes happen just a human error and i wanted to be him i wanted him to be aware that the duty team were on the case right and then in the middle just before the middle of the paragraph you say after making some small suggestions at 4 33
01:34:25 making some small suggestions at 4 33 a.m
01:34:27 a.m instructed him to send it to number 10 the nsa the dnsa and the duty private secretary in the office of the minister for the cabinet office now
01:34:38 now that's basically the top of uk government isn't it at least for contingency purposes yes so that notification was that the fact as we knew them at
01:34:49 was that the fact as we knew them at that point in anticipation that um people would wake up see the events on the news and and want to be assured that they were being
01:35:00 to be assured that they were being considered was it obvious to you at that point that the fire was not a green local incident but something far higher up the the color bands in the in annex b
01:35:11 in the in annex b well i i think the information we didn't have at that point obviously was um how the how the response might unfold so i think we assumed at that moment it was going to be
01:35:22 going to be significant but wouldn't have made a specific judgment about where it sat in the color bands as you can see at any rate not green i
01:35:31 i i don't think i was thinking in terms of green or other colors but it was clear it was a significant incident right and what what particular characteristic or feature of the fire as you saw it meant
01:35:43 feature of the fire as you saw it meant you thought it was going to be or was already a significant incident uh well we could certainly see the scale of the flames on the building
01:35:54 of the flames on the building i think we we looked at where it would be on a map and could see there'd be wider disruption to the local area so considerations like that now the first strategic coordination
01:36:06 now the first strategic coordination group meeting or scg meeting took place at 5am and i think you say that dclg red dialed in for central government yes correct that's normal yes now is it right in practice that dc lg
01:36:19 now is it right in practice that dc lg red
01:36:20 red was the mechanism by which ccs got scg readouts and found out whether the scg needed anything is that so that yes the government liaison officer is the main point and i
01:36:32 liaison officer is the main point and i think when i went back and reviewed the documents there were also some readouts provided um through the mayor's office who would also have had a presence at the scg but the the glo was the the key link point
01:36:45 the the glo was the the key link point right but the dclg is not was not the designated lead government department only for the recovery phase not for the response
01:36:57 response quite right in the response um say was it the case that dc lg red would was automatically uh the the department which would send the glo into an incident yes correct right then
01:37:10 into an incident yes correct right then um let's go to cab3014082
01:37:16 this is an email if you if you go to um the
01:37:21 the second email down you can see that it's timed at 0.507.56 and it's jill mcmanus and she says just to confirm dclg red duty officers are aware and are
01:37:32 duty officers are aware and are currently dialed in to london scg to receive update following declaration of a major incident we've informed cfra duty officer and home office are aware of the incident so it looks as it looks as if
01:37:45 so it looks as it looks as if it was through dclg red and and jill mcmanus
01:37:50 mcmanus uh who
01:37:52 uh who had uh notified the home office or or knew that they were aware is that is that right um i'm afraid you would have to ask the home office to confirm that i think jill is just
01:38:03 is just confirming that the home office are aware
01:38:06 aware in this email and i i can't add to that evidence i'm afraid um now if we go then to
01:38:11 to cab50157
01:38:16 this is your exhibit 68.
01:38:22 uh if you go please to the
01:38:25 the uh to page two top of page well uh yeah it is the top of page two uh it's an email uh from the ccs uh on the 14th of june uh at 7 13
01:38:38 uh on the 14th of june uh at 7 13 forwarding the readout of the 5am scg to stuart wainwright yes you see that uh and underneath that you can see that
01:38:49 that you can see that denise welch at the dclg had received that at 6 16 at a or before 66 6a sorry 6 1606
01:38:59 6 1606 on that morning yes uh and sent an email readout of the 05 am strategic coordination group fire at greenville tower and you can see who was present at that and there's a situation update which continues over some pages
01:39:11 which continues over some pages you know it appears to have taken ccs control almost an hour to forward the readout to mr wainwright do you know why that was the case um i don't know why that's the case um mr wainwright would have had access to
01:39:23 mr wainwright would have had access to ccs control and the ability to read it so he in all likelihood would have read read it before that in any case right and then if we go please to cab 50157
01:39:36 50157 we can see what happens a few minutes later so stuart wainwright receives the email i've just shown you at 7 13 and then here we are if you go please to the second email down
01:39:48 second email down at 7 27 on the morning of the 14th of june stuart wayne writes to alastair whitehead now aleister whitehead was the private secretary to the prime minister at the time yes correct uh and he had
01:40:00 at the time yes correct uh and he had responsibility for home affairs i think that's right yes uh and uh he sends this email to alistair whitehead does to wayne wright and he copies you in as you can see
01:40:10 can see alastair read out below from an earlier scg at 5 00 am there is another now which clg at ho are dialed into we'll get a readout from this and other sources fatalities are now confirmed as
01:40:21 sources fatalities are now confirmed as we understand now is it right that this was the first update that you'd received from dclg red since jill mcmanus's 0507 email
01:40:32 and i well i also had access to ccs control so it's perfectly possible i had read it as soon as it was received i'm afraid i can't recall this is stewart as you say copping me
01:40:44 this is stewart as you say copping me into
01:40:46 into an update to number 10. right so you you might have heard but you can't remember i'm afraid not uh updating communications through your access to the ccs control system is that i might have read the the
01:40:59 system is that i might have read the the um
01:41:00 um the red update um sooner than this forward right um now he goes on to say uh
01:41:12 after the um i suppose it's really a cut and paste from the scg report he says after the current scg call we should be able to better determine any national support that is needed and any
01:41:24 national support that is needed and any vital coordination that is required is it right that at this stage no decision had been made about the need for national support yes i think that's right and then if we um
01:41:36 and then if we um gabe please to cab 3010263
01:41:41 top of page two we can see a further email from mr wayne right at 8 35
01:41:50 to joel mcmanus and to you copy to peter holland who was the cr the the um cfra sitting within the home office thank you clg ho colleagues grateful for readouts
01:42:01 clg ho colleagues grateful for readouts from the latest scg when available i understand the situation is stabilizing also but do shout if things change and national resources are needed
01:42:12 uh are you able to help with where mr wainwright's understanding the situation was stabilizing might have come from i'm very happy to ask mr wayne wright
01:42:23 i'm very happy to ask mr wayne wright but i can't help with that without doing so i'm afraid but did you you don't you did you know that did you know at the time or do you know now
01:42:31 now it's sitting there i'm afraid not sitting here but very happy to ask him if that would help well are you able to help us as to what the national resources were which would have been available as identified
01:42:43 available as identified so
01:42:44 so at this stage obviously this event is in response phase so it would have been anything that the fire and rescue service in particular might need to assist them that could be
01:42:58 might need to assist them that could be mutual aid from another force it could be other assets that they might need it's the normal question that we would ask do you need anything you can see the reference there to
01:43:10 you can see the reference there to uh stuart wainwright essentially asking for readouts from the latest scg that was the 6am i think that's referring to the 7am scg if i remember correctly um i think we're
01:43:21 if i remember correctly um i think we're probably both wrong actually i think it's the 630 scg um but um
01:43:27 um but um let's go to uh let's go please to cab 3014771
01:43:40 uh this is an email from jill mcmanus at 9 15 later in the morning but if we go please to page two of this email string and we'll come back to that emoji course
01:43:52 and we'll come back to that emoji course if we need to but here is the email from jill mcmanus at 8 40. she's at dclg as we know emailing the ccs a readout from the 630 scg and she says stuart rc please see
01:44:05 and she says stuart rc please see readout
01:44:06 readout from 630 scg glo currently in 8 30 scg say we will provide further information following that meeting now
01:44:15 now does it look as if from this that the ccs wasn't receiving timely information about the situation on the ground
01:44:23 i think it looks to me like stewart is making every effort to ensure that it it comes through rapidly that is really helpful in the early hours of a response like this and yes i think there
01:44:36 response like this and yes i think there is an element of chasing here but nothing particularly unusual
01:44:41 unusual right i mean it looks from this the the dclg red jill mcmanus was sending readouts from the the seg that had happened
01:44:52 the the seg that had happened a little bit later
01:44:55 later than or perhaps at the same time as the next one that was in progress they're obviously happening um in rapid succession at this time of the morning
01:45:06 succession at this time of the morning so every two hours have you ever experienced an incident where there were so many scg's within such a short time frame
01:45:12 frame uh not not at this point i don't think no right
01:45:17 no right at the time given the local authority's role rbkc's role as a category one responder did you have any concerns about the delay in receiving updates from dclg
01:45:28 not specifically in relation to our bkc's role no right do you agree that it was imperative that information was being received by the ccs
01:45:38 the ccs promptly from the scg's yes that is always important would you have expected scg readouts to be sent more promptly than they were from these initial meetings as we've seen from these emails um hard to make that
01:45:50 these emails um hard to make that judgment without knowing exactly what time the scg's finished sometimes they can last some considerable time but we would expect a very rapid readout now i next want to ask you about the
01:46:01 now i next want to ask you about the assessment that support was not needed and we can start this topic or subtopic the paragraph 46 of your first statement on page 14. so your first statement please page 14
01:46:13 so your first statement please page 14 paragraph 46 and you say there
01:46:16 there uh
01:46:20 in the
01:46:22 the second or third sentence sec second sentence halfway down the message we consistently received was that the responders did not need any resources or assistance from national government
01:46:34 assistance from national government and if we go to your third statement please at page nine
01:46:42 paragraph 20 there's a question question 10 which picks up on paragraph 46 of your first statement and the question is what was the source of the sources of
01:46:54 what was the source of the sources of the information that responders did not need any resources or assistance from national government and you say this at paragraph 20 this would primarily be based on the absence of a request for assistance
01:47:06 absence of a request for assistance we would expect local responders to be best place to assess the requirements on the ground and determine whether or not they have the resources to address them now at what point in time are you
01:47:17 now at what point in time are you talking about there so i i think you are your question referred to my 6 10 email
01:47:29 yes but you say in which
01:47:32 in which to which you refer to saying the message we consistently received was that the respondents did not need any resources or assistance from national government um over at what point in time are you referring there oh i forgive me i
01:47:44 referring there oh i forgive me i misunderstood misunderstood your question
01:47:47 question i think i'm referring to the course of the 14th actually right when you can see from stuart's emails he was asking the question do you need national assistance and um
01:47:59 national assistance and um the answer was consistently no
01:48:03 uh and from whom were you getting that message
01:48:06 message um coming from the uh scgs in particular where the government liaison officer would have been you know relaying that question
01:48:14 question was there any proactive inquiry by ccs or by red with rbkc to ascertain whether they might have needed resources or assistance from national government at that stage and ccs
01:48:26 government at that stage and ccs wouldn't normally make direct contact like that we would go through the red network and i'm afraid i can't give evidence on their behalf would it be normal practice
01:48:38 would it be normal practice that national assistance will only be provided if expressly asked for that is that is normally the route by which it
01:48:46 which it is deployed sometimes it's clear that people need help and it is it's also offered but normally responders are very rapid in saying we need some assistance
01:48:57 rapid in saying we need some assistance here
01:48:59 here and if we go please to cab five zero is one five nine now
01:49:06 uh and look at the second email down we now see stuart wayne wright uh sending an email uh
01:49:14 uh and it's not clear to whom but you certainly respond to it if you if you scroll up to the top of page one
01:49:21 but if you look at the second email down as i'm showing you this is at 809 on the 14th of june stuart wayne wright writes bringing lorna in to see the latest now lorna was lorna gratton wasn't she
01:49:32 lorna was lorna gratton wasn't she correct and she was at number 10 yes yes that's right right so bringing lorna in to see the latest so can we date or time the first involvement of number 10 downing street
01:49:44 involvement of number 10 downing street in the grenfell tower of fire to about this time just after 8 00 am on the morning of the 14th i i think there is a previous email to aleister whitehead who was also
01:49:56 email to aleister whitehead who was also in number 10 so i think from memory that is the first the one we looked at before the first engagement with number 10. and that i think um
01:50:07 we saw before uh at um 727 yes right
01:50:14 yes right so law what was the purpose then of bringing lorna greta in so i i think because lorna's responsibilities in number 10 encompass dclgs policy areas
01:50:25 dclgs policy areas and
01:50:26 and um it would have been increasingly clear that there was a significant recovery operation that would be likely and that that would be a dclg lead
01:50:36 dclg lead so those recovery and response phases aren't distinct you would start to think about both very early um so useful to have lorna engaged and aware
01:50:46 aware and we see mr wayne wayne writes uh
01:50:51 uh saying that the lfb was not seeking additional resources and that the nhs had capacity you see that yes did you consider yourself specifically about asking um whether rbkc had enough capacity or
01:51:05 um whether rbkc had enough capacity or seeking assistance um i can't recollect asking that specific question at this moment i would have taken the absence of a request as as reassurance right and it doesn't look
01:51:17 as reassurance right and it doesn't look from the documents that you you yourself considered specifically going to rbkc or asking red red to go to rbkc and ask them whether they needed national assistance
01:51:28 whether they needed national assistance no i would have expected that to come through the scg if it was known to be needed
01:51:34 needed so it's a reactive uh arrangement is it the the national assistance will only be provided if it's asked for by the category one responder through the scg not exclusively but as i
01:51:46 through the scg not exclusively but as i said in my experience most responders are you know very prompt in saying where they need that assistance so that is normally how it would work right i see um
01:51:56 um and what would happen if you could see that
01:51:59 that the local council as a category one responder was in dire need of national assistance but simply wasn't asking for it for whatever reason then then we would we would offer it um
01:52:10 then then we would we would offer it um and i think when you come to the ministerial meetings you know you can see
01:52:15 see the question being asked what can we do to help
01:52:18 to help they think it can be forcibly provided but
01:52:22 but it's not not an issue that has arisen really
01:52:24 really now as right to say that the decision was taken to convene a cross-government ministerial meeting yes yes and
01:52:32 yes and i think we can see that in a document at cab
01:52:37 cab 50337 let's have that up
01:52:42 and i'm going to ask you to look at the second email on page one there uh before i ask you a question about it is it right to say that a decision to convene a cross-government ministerial meeting is one usually taken jointly by
01:52:54 meeting is one usually taken jointly by the ccs number 10 and the relevant lead government department i think that you touched on that earlier but is that have i got that right you have thank you and then let's look at this email from alistair whitehead
01:53:05 alistair whitehead to a range of respondees including you uh 14th of june at 1004. and if we turn to the very foot of this foot of that page it says rie grenfell towers fire situation update
01:53:17 grenfell towers fire situation update and then if we turn police to page two
01:53:22 at the very top of the screen it says i thanks i've discussed with stewart and the prime minister has asked for a cross whitehall coordination meeting this afternoon given home secretary availability i suggest we do this at minister of state level so chaired by
01:53:34 minister of state level so chaired by minister for policing and fire with ministers from health transport housing london etc attending with the mayor of london and operational commanders was it the prime minister therefore that
01:53:46 was it the prime minister therefore that was the person who asked for the cross whitehall coordination meeting i think what what is happening in that email is alistair is formally recording the conversation that would have
01:53:58 the conversation that would have happened between himself and stuart and consulting the lead government department so
01:54:05 so that is how it would be described well as a fact was it i mean was it the case that it was the prime minister who would ask for the cross whitehall coordination meeting certainly suggests that isn't it i i
01:54:17 certainly suggests that isn't it i i would assume that alastair had spoken to her on the back of that conversation and she had confirmed that she would like that to take place that would be my assumption all right
01:54:32 well i mean how does that work is it the case alice the white head would have suggested to theresa may that she should have or convene a cross whitehall coordination meeting
01:54:42 meeting which she then confirmed yes or is it the case that the prime minister herself of her own volition asked for a cross whitehall coordination meeting i think you're drawing a distinction between the two i i'm not
01:54:54 distinction between the two i i'm not for practical purposes and i'm afraid you would have to ask alistair which was the case
01:54:58 the case in this circumstance right either way i think we can take it that whether it was prompted by aleister whitehead or theresa may herself the decision
01:55:08 decision to ask for a cross whitehall coordination meeting came from the very top of uk government yes uh now then let's go to collapse again please if we can
01:55:19 collapse again please if we can cab6026
01:55:25 and on page 45 there we can see paragraph 4.2 point roman 3 top of the page cabinet office will convene a meeting if appropriate in cobra
01:55:35 cobra if there is uncertainty over the direction of the uk central government response to any emergency or the effectiveness of the local local response in england and wales to assess the situation and advise ministers as necessary
01:55:47 necessary now at this stage so we are just after 10 a.m on the 14th as far as you were aware was there uncertainty about the direction of the uk central government response
01:56:02 i i don't think i would have described it as uncertainty over the direction it was clearly um only a small number of hours into this event so um the scale of
01:56:14 hours into this event so um the scale of it was still unfolding and we were still understanding what the implications might be that's how i would characterize it right now you told us there was no cobra
01:56:25 now you told us there was no cobra meeting as such what within the within the ambit of cobra the procedure in it was it that caused the prime minister or
01:56:36 was it that caused the prime minister or the prime minister's office to convene the meeting i i think recognition that there could be serious implications here and a need to
01:56:44 to make sure we had understood those correctly and were able to respond rapidly to any requests for assistance right let me try this slightly more obliquely
01:56:55 slightly more obliquely um did did conops play any part or did the procedures set out in collapse play any part in the processes adopted by central
01:57:06 the processes adopted by central government on the 14th of june so
01:57:10 so i'm not sure i understand your question correctly i mean the conops sets out the the processes which underpin how ccs operates
01:57:20 operates i um forgive me i misunderstood your question well let me be more specific you've told us earlier that there wasn't a cobra meeting because this was a cross a cross-government meeting
01:57:32 a cross-government meeting decided in the light of all the circumstances and not to be regarded as a cobra meeting um i've shown you roman three which says the cabinet office will convene a meeting if appropriate in
01:57:43 convene a meeting if appropriate in cobra so not necessarily in cobra if there's uncertainty about the direction you said there wasn't so that leads to the question well was the collapse procedure
01:57:51 procedure relevant was it being used at all on the morning of the 14th of june yes i i think it was but there's obviously a degree of judgment involved here
01:58:01 here and
01:58:02 and i think this paragraph is not setting out the only reason for which a cross-ministerial cross-government ministerial meeting can be convened right i have to say i get the impression that a meeting was convened because the
01:58:14 that a meeting was convened because the prime minister wanted a meeting to be convened
01:58:17 convened and for no other reason i'm not saying that's not a criticism it's just a fact isn't it i i don't think that is the case i mean i think there was a um a conversation that three-way conversation i described there was
01:58:29 conversation i described there was recognition that this could be a serious incident that required government engagement and in those circumstances bringing ministers together would be a sensible thing to do all right thank you
01:58:41 all right thank you let me ask let me ask you a slightly different way can you point to which bit of cobra
01:58:48 of cobra i need to look at to understand what process was being adopted which led to the prime minister making her decision to convene a cross-government meeting
01:58:57 meeting sorry when you say which bit of cobra which part which section do you mean of the conops yes oh sorry you're quite right of the con-ops procedure um i don't have
01:59:08 of the con-ops procedure um i don't have the whole document in in front of me but in essence it is the process by which that judgment is exercised about where we might be along the spectrum of colours you described before
01:59:24 so a judgment is taken
01:59:27 whether it is whether it is likely that government responsibilities could be engaged
01:59:32 engaged in these circumstances where it looked to be a you know a potentially very serious incident uh it was sensible to bring ministers together
01:59:43 together did you yourself consult conops or think about which part of connex you needed to look at when
01:59:50 when yourself being involved in the decision to convene the meeting um i i can't recollect doing that forgive me can we go to cab60337
02:00:05 we were there before i just want to get back to the email please if we can i don't think i've shown you the rest of it
02:00:12 it oh well i have actually it's back to the first paragraph um now is it right that this initial proposal was for the home secretary to chair the cross whitehall coordination meeting but the less senior minister be appointed
02:00:24 the less senior minister be appointed because the home secretary was unavailable that's the impression one gets from that paragraph is that correct and i think that is a reasonable inference from that paragraph it it yes it is but is it factually correct
02:00:36 it is but is it factually correct to the best of my recollection i'm afraid i i can't remember the details of the home secretary's availability yeah and uh if we go please to the top email page one at 1009 this is from stuart
02:00:47 page one at 1009 this is from stuart wayne right to balance to whitehead and
02:00:52 and it says thanks alistair and we just spoke looking like 4 p.m for nick heard chaired meeting which will be labelled as a cross-government coordination meeting calling notice to issue shortly
02:01:04 meeting calling notice to issue shortly uh
02:01:05 uh so it looks as if is this right nick hurd had been identified as the as the potential chair for that meeting yes yes he's the minister of state referred to in the previous email right and it was going to be labelled as a
02:01:16 and it was going to be labelled as a cross-government coordination meeting was that a thing or was that a known type of meeting recognized in the procedures i think yes i think everybody would have known what that meant and
02:01:27 would have known what that meant and what would they have thought it meant um well i think the title it was actually given was an ad hoc ministerial meeting
02:01:34 meeting it does exactly the same things as a cobra
02:01:40 right then moving on to that was it cobra let's go to the next email in time
02:01:49 in time which is five minutes later at cab3014775
02:02:00 uh stuart wayne write to a number of uh individuals including jill mcmanus as we can see and peter tallanter
02:02:09 tallanter in the cabinet office yes as well as cc to ccs and the home office fire duty officer all heads up likely to be a nick heard policing min chaired ministerial not cobra at 4 pm today
02:02:22 ministerial not cobra at 4 pm today details to come we'll be looking for ministers from clg dh dft mayor invited also clg give me a call about boroughs and local mps so not cobra now he makes a point as you
02:02:34 so not cobra now he makes a point as you can see that this is specifically not a cable meeting can you explain why that is
02:02:40 is i i don't think i'd give you evidence on why stuart wrote that in his email it is factually correct that it wasn't being branded as a cobra yes what's the rationale though i mean i know you weren't you you weren't on this
02:02:52 know you weren't you you weren't on this email and you're not in his mind but what would have been the rationale to your way of thinking at the time for going out of your way to say that this meeting was not a cobra meeting
02:03:04 meeting well he may have just been attempting to be factually correct um
02:03:08 um i think
02:03:10 i think in his in his statement the inquiry alastair whitehead has given his description of the branding of the meeting which to me reads rings very true but as you say i was not
02:03:22 rings very true but as you say i was not myself participating in this in this exchange
02:03:26 exchange i mean the question really is if it made no difference whether it was or wasn't branded at cobra meetings you put it what was the point of what was the point of making the point what was the significance of it not being a cambria meeting well in
02:03:38 being a cambria meeting well in practical terms no significance at all we did all of the same things alistar's um evidence if i can um sort of paraphrase it well i think we
02:03:49 sort of paraphrase it well i think we can read it yeah well i mean i mean alastair's explanation to me means very rings very true right now then uh
02:04:00 let's go back to the diagram please which is annex b on page 68 of conops which is cab 6026 please oh no there it is um this is designed as
02:04:12 oh no there it is um this is designed as i think you say to chart the likely government engagement in response to an emergency now as that mid-morning on the 14th of june 2017 after the meeting the cross government meeting had
02:04:23 meeting the cross government meeting had been convened but hadn't yet happened where did you think the grenfell tower incident fell on this color chart well i think um lots of information was
02:04:35 well i think um lots of information was still emerging at that point and um
02:04:39 um that meant we were it was unclear whether it would land if i can put it this way to the left of um the section you described as ocr or
02:04:50 um the section you described as ocr or in the ochre section there because we were still gathering information about the ongoing event right
02:04:58 right now um
02:05:01 so you thought it was significant level one yes
02:05:06 one yes i think roughly that is that is the area which our understanding would have would put you in on this right i know the chart is not a mathematically accurate chart exactly i'm not asking you a mathematical question really well of impression but you thought it was around
02:05:18 impression but you thought it was around about the level one significant yes with lgd leading the central response so i i think we weren't yet clear whether it would
02:05:25 would be there or on the other side of the line
02:05:27 line and in those circumstances you know it's sensible to bring people together to be prepared for the eventuality that it does require a central response right now
02:05:39 given that a decision had been made not to activate cobra but nonetheless across government ministerial meeting had been decided upon
02:05:49 upon at the very highest level where did that leave the cobra not involved
02:05:57 description cobra hadn't been involved but but something to all intents and purposes the same had so did that tell you that this was ochre or something more serious
02:06:08 or something more serious in other words orange yeah so i mean i think as i as i set out perhaps not very clearly before this is this is not a set of hard and fast
02:06:18 fast trigger points so applying judgment to it we you know it there is an element of there was certainly a potential that it would end up being a more serious response
02:06:31 end up being a more serious response information was still being gathered so um i think that the cobra branding at that point was less important than bringing people together to understand the situation
02:06:42 the situation and make sure action that was needed was taken
02:06:45 taken i mean to your way of understanding this at the time that the the the importance of cobra is was this right was significant here because in the ochre band
02:06:54 band cobra is
02:06:56 cobra is expressly not involved that's why it's underlined the knot is underlined but but that is not saying that cobra can never be involved in a response of this type as as i said before this is a
02:07:08 this type as as i said before this is a guidance framework for the sort of likely and that word at the top of the page is significant response that you would expect in this kind of scenario it does not rule out
02:07:21 kind of scenario it does not rule out calling any kind of meeting in any of these scenarios if it if judgment suggests it's required and what was the basis of your assessment that it was
02:07:32 assessment that it was i can use this expression ochre-ish perhaps tending towards the orange well i think there were obviously there had been um confirmed fatalities by um
02:07:44 had been um confirmed fatalities by um this point on the morning of the 14th i think it was considered to be likely that that number would rise and they were still we were still understanding the impact on the
02:07:55 understanding the impact on the surrounding area so it was not an incident which had concluded and all of the impacts were known they were they were still being understood can we then go to cab401
02:08:11 this is the agenda for the
02:08:14 for the uh meeting at 4 pm that had been the subject of the wainwright emails earlier in the day yes and you can see the title yes
02:08:25 and you can see the title yes uh the grenfell tower fire ad hoc ministerial cobra yes to be held in lg 0410 victoria street wednesday 14th of june at 1600.
02:08:36 june at 1600. um
02:08:37 um can you explain why the agenda circulated ahead of the 14th of june 2017 ministerial meeting describes it as an ad hoc ministerial cobra actually i i can't i'm afraid it may have been um
02:08:50 can't i'm afraid it may have been um in the course of amending the template that that remained in there but no i'm afraid i can't help more than that now i think you've said and you say in your your third statement certainly that the meeting the meetings that took place
02:09:02 the meeting the meetings that took place in the days after the fire were described as ad hoc ministerial meetings and you say that made no difference in practice
02:09:11 and you've explained why that is both in your statement and today i think we're talking about the meetings on the 14th and the 15th yes 14th and 15th uh
02:09:27 what's the purpose of having cobra if it makes no practical difference whether you have cobra or you have a ministerial group well sometimes the um the brand of cobra
02:09:40 well sometimes the um the brand of cobra has a great deal of power it can provide a lot of reassurance including publicly on occasion if it is you know difficult to galvanize a
02:09:51 you know difficult to galvanize a response it guarantees an immediate reaction it certainly wasn't the case on this occasion that there was any um any difficulty in that regard
02:10:02 um any difficulty in that regard what do you mean by any difficulty you mean you didn't need to have the brand to provide the reassurance i i mean that government departments were
02:10:13 were doing what i would expect them to do in these circumstances
02:10:26 well you say do what i would expect them to do in these circumstances we know what they would do where cobra was activated but what are the circumstances you're talking about where it's not activated
02:10:36 activated i mean in respect of an incident of this nature they would they were doing the things that we would expect them to be doing
02:10:45 be doing um let's stick with conops uh and go back to
02:10:50 back to that please cab 6026 page 22. and we have a a a flow chart
02:11:01 yes that's it and it's it's the cobra flow chart and it shows diagrammatically the full cable structure and you can see how it's set out you've got the um the strategy group civil
02:11:13 got the um the strategy group civil contingencies committee at the very top and then you've got some cells below that intelligence and situation and then you've got operational response impact management group recovery group and public information all fed into
02:11:26 public information all fed into by scientific technical legal and logistics
02:11:31 logistics and underneath that it says the cobra structure is designed to be flexible to adapt to the circumstances at hand often there will be no need for all the supporting structures to be activated indeed a full activation is likely only
02:11:42 indeed a full activation is likely only in the most complex emergencies particularly where there is a need to manage a mix of highly and unclassified material
02:11:50 material or there are potentially wide ranging consequences flowing from the initial event for example some terrorist scenarios
02:11:58 scenarios uh
02:12:00 uh and then in 3.4 the cabinet office will in consultation with the lead government department decide on which components should be activated and how they might best be used and now
02:12:11 and now there's nothing here which suggests and i appreciate i'm only saying you're part of an 80-page procedure there's nothing here which suggests that you could just not have cobra but have the same thing by row of an ad hoc ministerial meeting
02:12:24 by row of an ad hoc ministerial meeting on the contrary what suggested is that here is the cobra structure but it can be used flexibly at the decision of the cabinet office in consultation with the lgd yes
02:12:36 based on the text in front of me i think you're right there's no reference to an ad hoc ministerial structure no and so if the same procedures were going to be followed as in effect cobra why
02:12:47 to be followed as in effect cobra why why not activate cobra then everybody would know where they were could look at the structure chart and work on the basis of a known and accepted procedure i think this is a question you you've
02:12:58 i think this is a question you you've asked me a moment ago i mean practically speaking it made no no difference is the assurance i can give you and if you look at the elements of the structure
02:13:09 of the structure described here you know a number of elements of this were activated in support of the ad hoc ministerial meeting so
02:13:20 ministerial meeting so whatever the branding i think exactly the same things were were done in support of the response here yes as a response but i'm sorry to repeat the question but i'm not sure i really
02:13:31 really got an answer or understood the answer in which case i it's my fault but if it's not going to make a difference why not have it why not have cobra i i don't think i can give you a clear
02:13:42 i i don't think i can give you a clear answer to that question not having been in that conversation now then let's move on to
02:13:47 on to another email um this is cab3013996
02:13:54 and if you uh go please to the third email down on page one this is from you and it's it's to camilla marshall from the pm's press office
02:14:08 and uh
02:14:12 uh she asks you and i i i probably should show you
02:14:18 show you the email below it actually yes let's look at page two i'm hesitating only because it's very small on the screen but let's look at it comes in at 12 47
02:14:29 comes in at 12 47 to camilla marshall and it's copied to you as you can see as well as stuart wainwright
02:14:36 and
02:14:40 i'm so sorry it's my fault entirely can we get back can we get to the bottom of the screen page two
02:14:45 page two the first question comes from camilla marshall
02:14:47 marshall uh it's not clear who it's sent to and she says she's at the prime minister's press office she says if asked about the difference between a cobra or ccs convene meeting what would the answer be
02:14:58 the answer be so she's actually asked the question i've been i've been asking you yes and if we scroll up then to the next email
02:15:06 email which is uh on page two um carol mccall uh who is head of civil contingency communications at the nsc sitting in i i i think in the prime
02:15:19 nsc sitting in i i i think in the prime minister's office uh sitting in the cabinet office in the cabinet office yes uh well i think probably both um she says a very good question on the face of it it is location location location but it is a fine line between this being
02:15:32 but it is a fine line between this being an update for ministers and senior officials to ensure all of the right capabilities are brought to bear in dealing with the incident as opposed to it being a start of a series of meetings to provide high-level decision-making on an ongoing basis and then she says do
02:15:44 an ongoing basis and then she says do others copy degree so
02:15:48 so it looks as if um uh camilla marshall has put a finger on the question which seems to be a very good question and then we can see i think your response which is what i've started with but now let's go back to that
02:16:00 but now let's go back to that uh at the very uh bottom of that page you say at 1258 carol camilla there's an oddity here because ccs is involved in both
02:16:11 here because ccs is involved in both formal cobras and less formal meetings like this
02:16:14 like this so the ccs convene tag may tie us in knots a bit i think that probably focusing on the difference between a formal crisis management response the cobra process technically a cabinet subcommittee
02:16:26 technically a cabinet subcommittee versus a less formal coordination meeting would be more helpful the thing which really determines the difference is where the central government has a leading role in the response in this case clearly it's being managed extremely well by local responders and
02:16:38 extremely well by local responders and we are therefore checking in on resource requirements and looking ahead to what support arrangements are going to be needed from across the system in the next few days and camilla marshall comes back and says
02:16:49 and camilla marshall comes back and says that's helpful yes and this is just for our internal awareness our flag of a formal question comes to us now is it is it right that the diff at the time
02:16:58 the time uh the difference in your mind as this seems to demonstrate between the formal cobra process and the less formal coordination meetings with ministers is whether central government has a leading role in the response
02:17:11 role in the response um
02:17:12 um yes i mean i i think what that email reflects more eloquently than i am doing here is that uncertainty on which side of the yellow ochre line as you described it this response would end up being on so
02:17:25 this response would end up being on so at that moment in time in the response phase clearly the fire service were on the ground and leading on extinguishing the blaze the police service were on the ground
02:17:36 service were on the ground leading on managing the area around the tower
02:17:40 tower and therefore what the might the requirement might be on central government in that moment was still emerging
02:17:46 emerging and as i think i said before we were beginning to understand that that was more likely to be needed in in the recovery phase which of course began two days later
02:17:57 later with the recovery task force on friday of that week well you were at pains i think earlier to point out that there was no real difference between cobra and
02:18:06 and the meeting that was convened the four o'clock meeting that was convened named
02:18:11 named not cobra by um stuart wainwright specifically but in fact looking at this it appears that there was a difference in your mind
02:18:22 in your mind is this right that um cobra if activated would have been a formal crisis management response which is something you didn't want at that time what you wanted instead was a less
02:18:33 time what you wanted instead was a less formal coordination meeting by way of information gathering i think i'm really clear that the practical operation of those two things was exactly the same we did all of the
02:18:44 was exactly the same we did all of the things that we would have done for something branded a cobra meeting this exchange is thinking about how to explain that difference um you know in a press
02:18:55 press context i think but the basic point is the same you know the government the central government role was at that point emerging and not yet
02:19:03 yet clear
02:19:10 is it right to say that cobra wasn't activated on the 14th of june because it was understood at least by you on the face of this email that the response was quotes being managed extremely well by local responders
02:19:23 extremely well by local responders i think it at that moment the there was no indication that the responders on the ground were in need of additional assistance and we would we were doing as as far as it's possible to access
02:19:34 as far as it's possible to access exactly what we would expect them to be doing at that moment and was it as a consequence that central government at that stage was thought at least by you not to need to play a leading role i think at that moment there wasn't a
02:19:46 i think at that moment there wasn't a clear decision for central government to take there wasn't a clear ask for resources or for help so
02:19:54 so we were certainly expecting that might come in the days ahead as it headed into recovery phase but there was no immediate and urgent thing that we needed to do and had it been clear
02:20:05 needed to do and had it been clear to you or the ccs at the time that rbkc was struggling in the response would cobra have been called formally um it's certainly a possibility it's
02:20:17 um it's certainly a possibility it's very difficult to make the judgment without uh you know all the circumstances of the of the of that moment
02:20:25 and the distinction you're drawing here in this email is between the formal crisis management response versus a less formal coordination meeting what in practice would have been different
02:20:37 different if cobra had been activated at that time nothing different in practical terms as i've said then the meeting would have been convened in the same way with the same agenda and the same
02:20:49 with the same agenda and the same attendees
02:21:00 mr chen we're going to turn to a different topic which will take me more than five minutes to finish well would you rather break at that point um maybe sensible i think might not might be sensible yes
02:21:11 be sensible yes yes but it's slightly ahead of time it's happened but um it's rather than embark on the new topic at this stage and break it off after a couple of minutes i think it would be
02:21:21 would be wiser to stop at this point so we'll do that
02:21:24 that um i'm going to have to ask you to come back for some more questions tomorrow fred but i think you were expecting that i was
02:21:32 i was um and so we'll resume please at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning and just to remind you if i may please don't discuss your evidence or anything relating to it with anyone overnight understood thank you very much we'll see
02:21:44 understood thank you very much we'll see you tomorrow then thank you
02:21:57 thank you very much mr millet well um we break there we resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow please thank you