Catherine Hammond of the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat gives evidence about central government's response to Grenfell, rehousing challenges, communications failures at the Westway Center, and lessons learned about coordinating with local authorities.
00:00:23 would you ask m h to come back in please
00:00:36 right m h ready to carry on I hope good afternoon yes yes thank you very much yes chairman um Miss Hammond 18th of June 2017 and before I get into it in the usual way I need to take a step back
00:00:48 the usual way I need to take a step back um I think it's right and we've seen that um as of the 16th of June I think uh Mr sedwill Mark sedwill had become involved we've seen that from the email
00:00:59 involved we've seen that from the email ch
00:01:00 ch yes yes he attended did his presence indicate the seriousness of the situation as it was by then uh yes I I think his presence indicated um that he
00:01:11 think his presence indicated um that he was taking a close personal interest as was the prime minister at that time right now you knew did you that Mr sedwell had been a long-standing civil servant uh who had worked with the Prime
00:01:22 servant uh who had worked with the Prime Minister both at the home office as National Security advisor and then afterwards um with with um well he became the cabinet secretary after Jeremy Haywood's untimely passing didn't
00:01:33 Jeremy Haywood's untimely passing didn't he he did did his presence to you indicate something of what was really going on namely that there was a national security concern which required his
00:01:44 his expertise uh no um Mr sell's remit in included resilience so that the deputy National Security adviser Paddy mcginness who you referred to before
00:01:56 mcginness who you referred to before resilience was part of his brief and Mr mcginness report Ed uh to Mark sedwell so uh it didn't indicate a a national security concern per se it it would be
00:02:08 security concern per se it it would be normal for very senior officials to attend meetings chaired by the Prime Minister the reason I ask you is because we know from earlier evidence that there had been civil unrest in Kensington at
00:02:19 had been civil unrest in Kensington at the Town Hall I think before Mr sedwell entered the scene and there is in his own words a reference to hurcan Katrina on new or
00:02:31 on new or um I the question is whether it was on your radar CC's radar that that in addition to the local response there was a risk of civil unrest and that is why Mr sell's expertise was required no
00:02:45 Mr sell's expertise was required no let's move then forward um you recall that on the 18th of June at 10:00 a.m. there was another GT recovery task force meeting I think yes yes now that took
00:02:57 meeting I think yes yes now that took place at 10:00 a.m. and was chaired by Patty mcginness I think uh yes that's right were you there um I think so yes now we have no minutes of that meeting we have plenty of documents about it but no no minute can you
00:03:09 about it but no no minute can you explain why um I think from uh having reviewed the documents it was a very extensive actions list was produced um and and I suspect at the
00:03:20 produced um and and I suspect at the time an additional minute felt unnecessary but I I'm afraid I I can't provide much more explanation than that we would normally produce a minute of those meetings what was the purpose of
00:03:31 those meetings what was the purpose of the meeting it it was primarily to ensure that actions that had been um agreed in the previous two days were being uh pursued and completed and then I think after that
00:03:43 completed and then I think after that meeting you provided advice to the dclg about how about how it could be supported uh as the response shifted into recovery
00:03:54 into recovery mode I'm not sure which specific document you're referring to your statement paragraph 79 would you would you like to look at that yes uh first statement paragraph 79 page
00:04:06 22 you say following the officials level meeting CCS resumed preparation for next day's um next day's prime minister chair ministerial meeting
00:04:17 meeting yes and then you say this included updating the first Secretary of State Etc and then you say I provided advice on how dclg could be supported as the grand grenfell response shifted into
00:04:28 grand grenfell response shifted into recovery this suggest this included suggesting that Ian White House one of my Deputy directors be seconded to dclg he moved to dclg from the 19th of June to help them in their
00:04:39 to help them in their role we just when we've touched on that before that that was was that the only um action that fell to you after that meeting um I I would have to look at the
00:04:51 meeting um I I would have to look at the actions list to refresh my refresh my memory I think on that uh well we do have an action tracker but um it's the only only action
00:05:04 tracker but um it's the only only action I think you refer to in your in your statement but there are others you don't know without looking at the tracker um let's move on then into uh the 19th which is the Monday morning correct
00:05:18 19th which is the Monday morning correct uh and on that the afternoon of that day I think it's right isn't it that the third Grandfield Tower fire recovery task force meeting took place I think that's right yes and that was at 4:00 and I think you attended yes I I think
00:05:29 and I think you attended yes I I think that's right and if we go to cab 4 is 2741 we can see who was present uh Again chaired by the Prime Minister and you can see the cast of attendees if you go
00:05:40 can see the cast of attendees if you go to the second page please you can see well you can see that John baradel was there on page one if you go to page two please you can see um under item two support for those affected page two
00:06:05 page
00:06:10 two thank you uh and uh item two foot of screen support for those affected a housing you see that yes uh and then you need to go to page three under 5B
00:06:22 need to go to page three under 5B paragraph
00:06:23 paragraph 5B and that says uh at that time 217 households were being housed in hotels around 100 to 120 of these
00:06:34 hotels around 100 to 120 of these households were thought to be category a former residents of grenfell Tower or of properties of the nearby grenfell walk but a final picture on this was still to emerge now is it right therefore that
00:06:46 emerge now is it right therefore that now 6 days into the emergency response it appears that there was still a lack of clarity about the precise number of grenfell Tower and grenfell walk
00:06:56 walk residents um who are described there uh in emergency accommodation why why was that so yes I think it's right that there were still
00:07:08 think it's right that there were still difficulties in getting precise numbers at that time why was that um well it I mean it's often a
00:07:19 that um well it I mean it's often a challenge to get data like this in an emergency because the situation is very fluid on the ground I I think our assumption at the time was that it it was a symptom of um some of the
00:07:30 was a symptom of um some of the challenges we've already described uh around um the coordination of the response um to victims in particular now if we go to the beginning of paragraph 5 it says this read with me continuing the
00:07:42 it says this read with me continuing the department sorry continuing the department for communities and local government outlined the latest situation in relation to finding temporary accommodation for those affected the effort to do so within 3 weeks was
00:07:54 effort to do so within 3 weeks was largely thought to be on track now the reference there to 3 weeks was that reference to the prime minister's undertaking to rehouse everybody within 3 weeks yes I think that's correct right
00:08:07 3 weeks yes I think that's correct right now in evidence we have a number of accounts from survivors and residents who are in hotel accommodation for a significantly extended period of time can you explain why there was such a discrepancy between the optimism about
00:08:19 discrepancy between the optimism about rehousing everybody expressed in the discussions at central government level is indicated here within 3 weeks and the reality on the ground at the time what I think the three weeks as you say was a a
00:08:32 think the three weeks as you say was a a an intention uh and obviously something which everybody was working to deliver I I think the precise reasons why that proved so challenging on the ground others will give you better evidence um
00:08:44 others will give you better evidence um than I will having been more more closely involved but um I mean it was far from a straightforward undertaking and hampered by a difficult start my was
00:08:55 and hampered by a difficult start my was was a reality that that the undertaking to rehouse everybody Within in 3 weeks was wildly wildly and unreasonably optimistic it could never be done in reality it it didn't seem so at the time
00:09:07 reality it it didn't seem so at the time when did it first become apparent to you to the best of your recollection when it became an impossible Target that alen an achievable undertaking I I've have no no
00:09:18 undertaking I I've have no no recollection of of reaching that conclusion in this 7-Day period I'm afraid we have heard evidence from others particularly involved in hous the housing at the sharp end of the of the
00:09:29 housing at the sharp end of the of the undertaking uh that it was always a wildly
00:09:33 wildly optimistic promise to make and could never be achieved what would you say to them um I I don't recollect that being the advice given at the time but I don't question their professional
00:09:47 judgment now uh page SE page three paragraph 7 foot of the screen the recovery gold highlighted uh that there were issues with the provision of hot water and gas to a number of affected properties situated within the wider
00:09:59 properties situated within the wider Cordon around 400 households in all the recovery gold raised concerns about the effectiveness of the Kenington or Chelsea tenant management organization TMO who managed the
00:10:10 organization TMO who managed the grenfell tower and surrounding properties in conjunction with the department for communities and local government return the page recovery gold was tasked with considering how these concern concerns could be addressed it
00:10:22 concern concerns could be addressed it was noted that all such affected households were entitled to Hotel accommodation and access to the discretionary fund was this the first occasion
00:10:30 occasion so far as you can recall on which issues were raised regarding hot water and gas provision to those within the wider
00:10:39 Cordon um I I can't recall precisely I think may this may be the the first time where or the first moment in time where there's serious consideration of people returning to their homes within the
00:10:50 returning to their homes within the Cordon so that may have increased its prominence at this moment but I'm afraid I can't recall exactly right so why would this be the first time this
00:11:02 so why would this be the first time this is now
00:11:04 is now Monday why there's when there's F when there's serious consideration of people returning to their homes within the Cordon um because obviously every effort had been made to ensure it was safe for them to do
00:11:16 them to do so I must say my my recollection of exactly this conversation I'm afraid is not precise was this the first time that you became aware that there were concerns regarding the
00:11:27 concerns regarding the TMO um I I can't recall I'm afraid I was certainly aware of their existence and and their role and um but but I don't think I was aware of concerns distinct
00:11:38 think I was aware of concerns distinct to the concerns about RB CK on whose behalf they were managing the properties do you recall what the specific concerns about the TMO were uh I think there were um some
00:11:50 were uh I think there were um some concerns arose although whether it was exactly at this point I can't remember about their their relationship with the tenants of the properties they managed there was some uh difficult history
00:12:02 there was some uh difficult history there was my understanding and concern about the effectiveness of their of their management so um in in relation to the ability for example to determine who
00:12:13 the ability for example to determine who who they believe was in the block on that night what was the source of your understanding that the relationship with the tenants of the properties and the TMO was a strained one my word not yours
00:12:26 TMO was a strained one my word not yours um I I can't recall I'm afraid um I think I think at at some points in these discussions it it became clear that there had been um past difficulties and
00:12:38 there had been um past difficulties and and I think that was the source of that conclusion now let's go to cab 42739 what I'm showing you now miss Hammond is the list of actions following that 19th of June task force meeting um
00:12:50 that 19th of June task force meeting um paragraph one says Department of communities and local government and Recovery gold to consider urgently how best to address concerns around the effectiveness of the Kensington and Chelsea tenant management organization
00:13:01 Chelsea tenant management organization and to take a decision today Monday on next steps um now this is addressed as item one on the action list can we take it that the performance of the TMO by
00:13:13 it that the performance of the TMO by this stage was a a significant enough concern for its performance to be item one on the action list uh so so the presence it um sorry let me start again
00:13:26 presence it um sorry let me start again actions are recorded generally in the order in which they are um directed in the meeting not by order of priority but but I certainly think it was a a an issue of concern hence the action as
00:13:37 issue of concern hence the action as it's worded and what was proposed as the next steps to address these concerns what well I think as you can see here the responsibility was placed on dclg uh
00:13:48 the responsibility was placed on dclg uh and Mr baradel to identify what they thought the the most effective step would be I so can we take it that there was no discussion about what those next steps would be simply that a decision was made that it would be department
00:13:59 was made that it would be department plus Mr baradel who would decide that today Monday I I can't be sure there was no discussion of what the options were but certainly the action reflects how that was to be brought to a conclusion
00:14:10 that was to be brought to a conclusion now did you realize at the time that the TMO was a separate entity from rbkc and not itself a category 1 responder um I can't remember having a
00:14:23 responder um I can't remember having a specific conversation about their status but yes we understood they were a management company operating on behalf of of rbkc and do you remember having any concerns about whether the TMO was
00:14:34 any concerns about whether the TMO was sufficiently resourced or had the relevant capabilities to be able to assist in the way that was expected by Mr baradel given that the TMO was not a category one responder I I don't think
00:14:45 category one responder I I don't think concerns about the TMO were were linked to its to its status I mean it was operating on on behalf of an on the instruction of a category run responder so we wouldn't we wouldn't have been
00:14:57 so we wouldn't we wouldn't have been concerned on on that basis I think those concerns were based on the performance issues which are being alluded to in the the documents you've shown me well what were the performance issues well so a
00:15:09 were the performance issues well so a poor poor relationship with um with the tenants and difficulties in getting precise
00:15:16 precise information um and you know a sense that that that they that they were not fulfilling the function that was needed of them at that
00:15:26 time um let's move to the Tuesday the 20th of June now I think you will recall there was another meeting you've called it in your statement an officials level meeting chaired by Patty mcginness yes
00:15:37 meeting chaired by Patty mcginness yes correct and I think you attended yes yes and it's I think it was at what it was at 15:30 and we can look at the minute of that meeting at cab
00:15:48 of that meeting at cab 42792
00:15:51 please and we can see that it still carries the title grenfell Tower recovery task force min of officials meeting on Grille Tower of fire
00:16:02 fire 1530 uh
00:16:04 1530 uh June uh 20th June president chair um met Patty mcginness Deputy National Security advisor and then others so you had Patty mcginness
00:16:15 others so you had Patty mcginness essentially taken the chair over from the Prime
00:16:18 the Prime Minister uh so so the so these kind of meetings can operate at a variety of different levels so the Prime Minister chaired the ministerial meeting the day before before Paddy was chairing the the
00:16:31 before before Paddy was chairing the the officials version of that meeting that the the level of the meeting and its chair can can move from dayto day depending on what what's needed I see so just so I understand this um there was no such thing or body of of people
00:16:44 no such thing or body of of people called the grenfell tower recovery task force am I right in thinking it was simply a name given to what whoever happen to attend officials at meetings convened on the
00:16:57 officials at meetings convened on the subject of the Grandfield Tower recover y i i wouldn't phrase it quite like that but I think basically you're right yes right um now we can see the meeting um
00:17:08 right um now we can see the meeting um if you go to um page two
00:17:12 please uh you can see uh
00:17:19 that uh apart from um in paragraph three the identification of a proposed day of Rage uh we can see under item
00:17:33 four uh that the chair asked for John baradel to provide an update on the housing situation John baradel updated that 249 households were in emergency accommodation 109 of which were within
00:17:46 accommodation 109 of which were within the Cordon area 33 households had been offered properties but none had accepted media reports suggesting the families were being rehoused outside of Kensington and Chelsea Barrow were untrue 18 offers of temporary
00:17:57 untrue 18 offers of temporary accommodation had been made but none have been accepted Ed there remained one family in the rest center who had declined offers of accommodation four times John baradel said he believed that the the 3-we target to move everyone to Temporary accommodation was still
00:18:09 Temporary accommodation was still achievable and if you go please to page three of the minutes of paragraph six um you can see uh there under paragraph six the chair asked what was
00:18:21 paragraph six the chair asked what was needed in order for the hot water to be restored John barel replied that an engineering solution was required uh now first was your impression at the time that the rehousing effort uh was going
00:18:34 that the rehousing effort uh was going uh reasonably well no concerns about it I I think I would have accepted Mr badell's judgment that it was achievable within three weeks it was obviously not going to be
00:18:46 weeks it was obviously not going to be straightforward now second did you consider that sufficient emphasis had been applied to the problems with evacuated properties and the understanding of the scale of the
00:18:57 understanding of the scale of the problems
00:18:59 problems um I
00:19:00 um I I I don't think I would have second guessed recovery Gold's judgment on that point um it was certainly an issue that he seemed to have in his sights and um
00:19:11 he seemed to have in his sights and um you be dealing with right so was it your view or understanding at the time that not withstanding the problems that we'd already seen in the in the previous cross government meetings to date and
00:19:23 cross government meetings to date and the problems which Mr baradel was identifying as I've shown you in paragraph four you nonetheless had uh unqualified confidence in John badell's statement that he thought three weeks was still achievable I had every
00:19:36 weeks was still achievable I had every confidence in his professional judgment yes
00:19:39 yes right now I want to ask you some specific questions next about the Westway center now we go back in time a little bit to the 18th of June if we can please and we can start with cg3 is
00:19:52 20672 uh and if we go to the foot of page two you can see at 18 36 on that
00:20:26 day uh if we go please to the foot of page
00:20:32 two this is an email um on the 18th of June at 1836 from Suzanne
00:20:40 kenowski uh to Jillian K and to you and if we go to the top of Page Three please um it says uh Catherine thanks for helping
00:20:51 says uh Catherine thanks for helping pressing departments the attached messag has gone out to departments through our contacts and you can see specific Department to phys to physically deploy staff to the community Assistance Center
00:21:02 staff to the community Assistance Center at one crowthorne road W10 Westway Sports Center we need to make clear this is a PM priority no ifs or buts if they have a problem then ask them for the name of their director or DG and we can escalate need two shifts and then you go
00:21:15 escalate need two shifts and then you go into the detail is it right that civil servants from those departments did not attend the Westway Center in in the end until Monday the 19th of June despite this being directed in the prime minister's meeting on the 17th as we've
00:21:26 minister's meeting on the 17th as we've seen
00:21:28 seen um I I'm afraid I don't have the details of when individual staff deployed I would have to go and look at the evidence well no I mean do you have a general do you generally know that they
00:21:41 general do you generally know that they didn't go till the Monday I'm not asking you about specific people at specific times it's a general overall impression was it your recollection that civil servants from the Departments listed didn't go to the Westway until the
00:21:52 didn't go to the Westway until the Monday I I I don't think I can give you a blanket answer which encompasses all of those those departments I think my impression at the time was that some departments had moved more quickly than
00:22:03 departments had moved more quickly than others but I'm afraid I can't be more specific right now in your third witness statement of paragraph 47 you say it's not common to have staff from central government departments deployed on the ground uh in an emergency in this way
00:22:15 ground uh in an emergency in this way but it can sometimes happen in what circumstances would it sometimes happen um so so for example um I think a number of the requirements here were for
00:22:26 of the requirements here were for reissuing of identification documents which have been lost in the fire so sometimes there are things which only um civil servants from Central departments can do that in my four years in CCS was
00:22:40 can do that in my four years in CCS was relatively un
00:22:44 uncommon why did it happen in in this case do you know um because there were specific uh needs which those in which those departments could address like for example reissuing um document driving
00:22:56 example reissuing um document driving licenses I I seem to recall that had been
00:22:59 been destroyed in the flames right and we know that there is such a thing as a surge team isn't there which I think central government can offer can offer there there's a surge team um
00:23:12 offer there there's a surge team um which is operated from uh's revenue and Customs which um essentially provides uh staff in teams in order to perform
00:23:23 staff in teams in order to perform specific administrative functions what what they don't come in with is e expertise in doing specific tasks like issuing a driving license for example let's then go to uh cab
00:23:35 let's then go to uh cab 49946 please which is an email on the 20th of June the Tuesday at 11:46 uh and uh we can find that
00:23:50 uh at the foot of your screen and it's from Sebastian James within the cabinet office this I I think just to clarify um Mr
00:24:02 this I I think just to clarify um Mr James was working for um Bays but using a a cabinet office address because he had previously worked in the department I think that's right right and we we do have indeed
00:24:14 right right and we we do have indeed seen his name in other contexts yeah in that role uh and we know that um uh we yes that's right now he says hello I hope that we're contacting the
00:24:25 hello I hope that we're contacting the right team if not please could you pass on the comments to the relevant central government team we bay that's it we bay have a physical Presence at the Westway contact center which will continue until we believe we no longer add value we had
00:24:37 we believe we no longer add value we had our first representatives there yesterday just pausing there you you refer to Bay had he been seconded from Bay over to the the cabinet office which is why he has a cabinet office email address no I I think no that's not right
00:24:50 address no I I think no that's not right he had previously worked for the cabinet office and I think was still using that email address presumably because there was some issue with his Bay's it oh I right moving to page two
00:25:03 then we can see as you say he said he has a physical presence uh through his department at um uh the Westway Center and then at page two he says and there's
00:25:14 and then at page two he says and there's quite a lot of text here um but let's look at it he said there didn't seem to be any controlling elements in charge of the center it is our understanding that the local authorities should be running the center but given the particular situation we recognize there may be a
00:25:26 situation we recognize there may be a need for some central government oversight s of the center should this be dclg uh and then he goes on to say that there seem to be no roote for information for either government agency
00:25:38 information for either government agency staff nor for the victims on entering the center where there were teams dealing with the registration and security once you got three of them into the Hall there was no Central Point for information for who to speak to about what issues this leads victims wandering
00:25:50 what issues this leads victims wandering around the hall a number of times asking individual desks so what can you do for me which is completely unacceptable individual teams and desks have started putting their own sign up but there's no Central signage or support three citizen
00:26:02 Central signage or support three citizen advice would du to act as a triage casew worker support structure working with victims to ensure they were accompany throughout the the process and could get answers from Individual desks in the center question to does dclg know why
00:26:15 center question to does dclg know why this is not happening or whether the local authority of putting additional structures in place does provide support staff and additional signage they're just pausing there in a long list of problems he's identified were you aware
00:26:27 problems he's identified were you aware of any of the problems of this kind being encountered by central government at the
00:26:33 at the Westway uh so I I don't think I this email was shared with me at the time so I I didn't see this precise diagnosis I I think I was aware that
00:26:45 diagnosis I I think I was aware that um some officials when they had arrived had had struggled to work out exactly how they could be most useful um but I hadn't seen this account and then he cons he cons he
00:26:57 account and then he cons he cons he continues at paragraph four we're deeply concerned that victims are being passed from Pillar To Post and being told to call lots of different numbers by lots of different teams we believe we need more coordination and more information about what services already are already
00:27:10 about what services already are already being provided inside the the hall again is that a a problem that was brought to your
00:27:16 your attention I mean I don't think I can add more to my previous answer I hadn't seen this particular diagnosis before right so we've got five little coordination between government teams six unclear
00:27:27 between government teams six unclear who's part of the task force and what team has responsibility for uh seven if all the above issues are all due to lack lack of coordination from the local Authority we would very
00:27:38 from the local Authority we would very much like to suggest that central government takes responsibility for elements of the response and provide an SCS team to the LA to provide support to help with leadership command and control of the supportive organizations in the contact center
00:27:50 contact center Etc again I I'm going to assume unless you correct me that you you knew nothing of these problems and complaints I I haven't seen this account no which I think I assume was sent to dclg from the
00:28:02 think I assume was sent to dclg from the way it's phrased right what can can you explain why problems on the ground of this very precise nature were not brought to your
00:28:14 brought to your attention I I don't think I can is there something wrong with the reporting chains and channels within the cabinet office which meant that Mr James who was within uh your office he wasn't just to
00:28:27 within uh your office he wasn't just to be clear he he was working in Bays but nonetheless he was he was working in Bays but um operating in a in a I suppose a recovery
00:28:38 operating in a in a I suppose a recovery role but on behalf of that department not cabinet office right so does that indicate that there's a problem with communication between the department on the
00:28:48 the ground who are um victim facing if I can put it that way and the cabinet office who are
00:28:55 who are coordinating well I mean you're asking me what my understanding was at the time I'm not sure who else Mr James spoke to at that moment I would
00:29:06 James spoke to at that moment I would have expected if issues were being raised with departments then they would look at them and that would be shared upwards as they as they thought necessary in the process of creating
00:29:18 necessary in the process of creating Crips and situation reports so I it may have been the case that dclg looked at some elements of this and and didn't agree with the assessment I I I'm I can't tell
00:29:34 you looking at the top of page
00:29:41 one uh we can see to whom he sends the email below it MH uh and he thanks dclg for a prompt and positive response and he sends the
00:29:52 and positive response and he sends the email to M mhclg red but copies it to a large number of uh individuals in in in different parts of what looks like the
00:30:03 different parts of what looks like the beis is that right including civil nuclear and resilience that's right why why was civil nuclear and resilience involved in the Grandfield Tower response or recovery so I I I don't know
00:30:17 response or recovery so I I I don't know that individual but most likely what you have there is officials from across the department being drawn in to support the departmental response so very likely
00:30:28 departmental response so very likely that person was just acting in a in a general response capability but their day job was in civil nuclear and resilience would be my
00:30:41 guess right in fact yes forgive me that that is right because other names on the list I I know who which have the same heading after them indeed that this is
00:30:52 heading after them indeed that this is the Bay's um Central response function in
00:30:56 in action now you you you told us a moment ago that you hadn't seen Sebastian james' email no not to my recollection no right let's see if that's right can we look together at cab3 Z1
00:31:09 we look together at cab3 Z1 12389
00:31:15 please and here it is MHM
00:31:24 again yes uh and you can see that above it uh it it it seems to be sent from Paul in the ccs to Alex Taylor at the
00:31:37 Paul in the ccs to Alex Taylor at the cabinet office so I may have been wrong when I put it to you that it didn't come into the cabinet office it certainly appears to have done that would that be right yes it looks from the copy list like it came into the central CCS
00:31:48 like it came into the central CCS mailbox so that is um one member of CCS staff accessing it from the shared mailbox and sending it to um a member of
00:31:59 mailbox and sending it to um a member of the team working on the response so to be clear you had access to this as well I did have access to that mailbox as I said I have no recollection of having um seen this at the time can I ask you as a
00:32:11 seen this at the time can I ask you as a matter of your uh practice at the time would you only look at emails that were sent to you either directly or in copy or would you sometimes spot check the CCS uh email box to see if there was anything that concerned you in relation
00:32:22 anything that concerned you in relation to a project you were working on even though you weren't on the email so I would I would sometimes into it but and generally speaking there were staff um assigned to be monitoring the Inbox and
00:32:34 assigned to be monitoring the Inbox and they would um make me aware of emails that I needed to see and looking at this email would you agree that this is an email which really ought to have been brought to your attention once it had arrived in the CCS inbox well it it's
00:32:45 arrived in the CCS inbox well it it's certainly describing some concerns with the situation on the ground I wouldn't have expected that normally to be escalated directly to me um the chain you've got here uh gives a shows a
00:32:57 you've got here uh gives a shows a member of the senior civil service in s in
00:33:01 in CCS um directing it to a relevant person in the response team to look at and draw on it for the chair's brief so that would be a normal practice I
00:33:12 so that would be a normal practice I wouldn't expect it to come directly to me yes I mean it says in the text Alex said being very CCS but but good but some good points here we will want to factor into the
00:33:23 here we will want to factor into the chair's brief now I can't imagine what he means by being very ccs but there are good points to factor into the chair's brief but the chair am I right in thinking would be Patty mcginness yes I
00:33:35 thinking would be Patty mcginness yes I I assume that's correct yes you would want to know what was in the chair's brief wouldn't you absolutely would read the chair's brief and therefore can we take it that you would want to know what these factors
00:33:46 these factors were I I would certainly um I would certainly have read the chair's brief for the meeting yes yes I mean I would not necessarily have read all the documents which fed into it no but can we take it from what he's saying here
00:33:57 we take it from what he's saying here that this would feed into the brief uh that the Seb James email and the Seven Points in it were matters which ought to have been brought to your attention I I think it's being flagged as something as
00:34:09 think it's being flagged as something as one input to the work being done that morning normally what CCs is doing is taking information from a variety of sources and drawing them together and crosschecking so it's one input I
00:34:21 crosschecking so it's one input I wouldn't expect each of those inputs to be brought to my attention why is that given that this was something to be factored into the chair's
00:34:29 chair's brief um because there's a team of people whose job it is to bring that together and synthesize it and I I would not second guess all of their work now let's turn to a different topic
00:34:41 work now let's turn to a different topic which is Lessons Learned uh I'm going to ask you about some of the some of the correspondence and Reflections uh at the time of the response itself and then look at the more formal lessons Lessons Learned
00:34:54 more formal lessons Lessons Learned exercises uh now now first I think you make the general point in your first statement that many of the ministers in attendance had only been appointed hours uh before the fire after the 7th of June
00:35:07 uh before the fire after the 7th of June or 8th of June I think it was general election and the formation of the government on the 11th yes correct so these were ministers senior though they were who um in all fairness to them were not fully on top of their briefs or only
00:35:20 not fully on top of their briefs or only just been handed their briefs well I would I wouldn't make the Judgment that they weren't on top of their briefs but they were uh in some cases new new to the role all right let's let's go with new to the role um did did that impact
00:35:32 new to the role um did did that impact on the effectiveness of the central government's response in any way you could
00:35:37 could detect um I I don't recall um it being an issue at the time no I mean I think there was a very um impressive ability of departments to um get their ministers
00:35:49 of departments to um get their ministers up to speed on these issues and as you can see there were officials present in a lot of the meetings so that that longer standing expertise was there
00:36:05 yes um can we go to cab3 is 14769 please this is Peter talent's first statement uh and at page five paragraph 18 He says uh that on the 17th of June
00:36:20 18 He says uh that on the 17th of June he says I recall there were difficulties with obtaining clear accurate information and being frustrated by this given more than two days had passed since the fire started I had expected to receive better data from either rbkc or
00:36:33 receive better data from either rbkc or dclg as the liaison between central government and local authorities on key issues such as who was responsible for what and the number of people needing support uh would you agree with that
00:36:44 support uh would you agree with that assessment I I've got no reason to uh disagree with Peter's assessment and we've talked about the the the data issue previously and who do you consider was responsible for the lack of data
00:36:56 was responsible for the lack of data available on key issues including the number of people needing support um so the the data we would expect to come from rbkc and into us through dclg as as this suggests can we
00:37:09 through dclg as as this suggests can we go to cab
00:37:15 43152 this is an email from Peter Talent late on the Saturday night 2319 to you mhm and I think you alone
00:37:26 2319 to you mhm and I think you alone because the only other person receiving it is himself would that be right I think that's right uh and the subject is grenfell
00:37:34 grenfell ramblings I was reflecting on progress and where we are compared to other emergencies so a few Nate late night ramblings no two emergencies are ever the same and we are in unique
00:37:45 the same and we are in unique circumstances but my instinct would be to try to do more to shape our destiny currently one we are poorly cited on thinking within dclg two we currently operate ating in a
00:37:58 dclg two we currently operate ating in a largely reactive and passive way and have L limited levers to influence Direction three there doesn't appear to be core narrative joining together the various strands into a coherent
00:38:11 various strands into a coherent approach on dclg if we are not going to pull people into the center I think it is too late and probably the wrong solution I think we should deploy an an lo I think that says an Lo to dclg to
00:38:23 lo I think that says an Lo to dclg to work alongside stroke support the dclg team not NE necessarily in the Victim's Unit but maybe with Helen or Jill so we know what they're thinking can shape events and help them join up government
00:38:34 events and help them join up government it will be a resource drain but I think it will make our lives easier unless we expect to withdraw completely imminently yeah did you respond to this message we can't see a document that you
00:38:46 message we can't see a document that you did that shows that you did um I I can't recollect I'm afraid I certainly would have talked to Peter about it if I hadn't responded in writing uh you say you certainly would
00:38:58 writing uh you say you certainly would have talked to him would you have rung him on the phone that night or perhaps at a more civilized hour the next morning I think it's unlikely I'd have rung him after 20 11 in the evening I would probably have talked to him the
00:39:10 would probably have talked to him the next day do you remember H having a conversation with him on the telephone in one hand and your laptop on the other no no I'm afraid I can't recall this distance do you agree that that CCS was
00:39:23 distance do you agree that that CCS was poorly cited on thinking within dclg I don't know exactly what Peter is referring to there I mean by this time there's a a big dclg effort underway
00:39:36 there's a a big dclg effort underway which spans very widely across uh future housing they were looking at the wider policy issues around cladding so I I I
00:39:47 policy issues around cladding so I I I can't identify from the document exactly what he was thinking about there when you received it and you saw the words we are poorly cited on thinking within dclg did you think oh we're wrong he's wrong
00:39:59 did you think oh we're wrong he's wrong about that or did you think he's right about
00:40:03 about that I I'm afraid I I can't recollect well did you do you remember asking him what he meant I I'm sure I would have had a conversation with him about it I'm afraid it's very difficult to recall I
00:40:15 afraid it's very difficult to recall I mean that you know the the the solution he's proposing further down the line is that we should Lo is liais an officer is that we should essentially deploy a CCS
00:40:26 that we should essentially deploy a CCS member of staff in to support dclg in the um recovery efforts and indeed I sent one of my Deputy directors to do just that two days later so um you
00:40:39 to do just that two days later so um you you know I I think the sort of proposals which are being made here are things which clearly entered into our thinking right did you agree with him or disagree with him either in your own
00:40:50 disagree with him either in your own mind or expressly in a conversation that you are currently operating in a largely reactive and passive way with limited levers to impr Direction I think probably the we he means there is is government as a as a
00:41:03 means there is is government as a as a whole so um it's drawing on the difficulty in getting information from the local response at this time which is you've previously referred
00:41:14 you've previously referred to I I would say um that departments were responding well but there were difficulties in understanding what was needed of them I don't think I would
00:41:26 needed of them I don't think I would quite to phrase that as reactive and passive passive but um I I can see the point that Peter is making if he's referring to government as a whole and is saying that government as a whole has
00:41:37 is saying that government as a whole has have limited levers to influence Direction how does that sit with the fact that the Prime Minister herself had convened and shared two meetings on the 16th and 17th that we've
00:41:49 16th and 17th that we've seen yeah I'm afraid I I I can't explain what Peter means by that point I think the prime ministerial meetings did set Direction and agree actions do you know why one it was one of your Deputy
00:42:01 why one it was one of your Deputy directors raising these issues rather than you given your own role and your presence at the ministerial meetings from the 14th of June so I think what you've got here is Peter um who had
00:42:14 you've got here is Peter um who had taken a a temporary covering role in the response as you as you saw reflecting on the time he had spent doing that and offering his thoughts as an input
00:42:26 offering his thoughts as an input upwards to to me to help shape my thinking now can we go to uh cab
00:42:35 50119 this is exhibit 22 to Peter talent's statement first uh second statement I think and he says in this
00:42:46 statement I think and he says in this email and he sends it to Lucy Hancock who has a cabinet office address does that mean she was at the cabinet office um I I assume so I'm afraid I
00:42:57 office um I I assume so I'm afraid I recollect the name at any rate it goes into the CCS system and it comes to you directly uh and where we are is the title you see that yes and if you look at the
00:43:08 at the um uh the text underneath that it says after a strong initial response from the Emergency Services victims were let down by a lack of support from the local Council this has now largely been
00:43:19 Council this has now largely been addressed by a surge from across the London councils by John baradell chief executive of the city of London supported by a number of other London and chief Executives within central government departments have upped their
00:43:30 government departments have upped their game and are now firmly gripping issues and it continues um and then you look at the um the the reference uh lower down to bullets for PM response could
00:43:41 to bullets for PM response could include and the second bullet point says we were slow to recognize the failings in the council response and to Gear Up support activity across government and that's a suggested response for the
00:43:53 that's a suggested response for the Prime Minister uh did you agree with that as
00:43:58 that as M well well I think when when you look back on the events of those days I think it's certainly true to say that an earlier intervention with the local Authority would have been
00:44:10 Authority would have been helpful in that moment based on the information we had it's difficult to see how that would have come about but I don't think that undermines um Peter's
00:44:21 don't think that undermines um Peter's point that earlier action would have been helpful well all right let me just see if I can f us a bit more closely on that answer um although you are right that this is a a
00:44:32 that this is a a hindsight reflection it is only three days worth of hindsight because this is going out mid morning on the Monday the 19th of June uh would you agree that
00:44:43 19th of June uh would you agree that even at that point a few days after the
00:44:49 fire that central government had been quote slow to recognize the failings in the council response and to Gear Up support activity across government well I mean a
00:45:01 activity across government well I mean a lot had happened in those few days so reflecting again that the surge being described and the appointment of John baradel happened on Friday morning and
00:45:13 baradel happened on Friday morning and we are now uh what three days beyond that in this email this is already reflecting back on fast moving events from three or four days ago so I I think
00:45:25 from three or four days ago so I I think it's definitely a hindsight that m i don't disagree that earlier action might have
00:45:31 have um you know might have produced a different outcome but as I think it says in the Lessons Learned report based on the information we had at the time that that would have been a very difficult judgment to make what was the primary
00:45:43 judgment to make what was the primary reason for the slowness I mean I I I think at risk of repeating what I just said th those judgments were made once
00:45:54 said th those judgments were made once the information um was there to suggest that that was the right conclusion to reach and what should have been done differently look at that point mid morning Monday morning looking back over
00:46:07 morning Monday morning looking back over the previous 5 days what at that point did you recognize or do you think could have been recognized should have been done
00:46:15 done differently well I think it's a very difficult question to answer we we did that really through the Lessons Learned process and I would agree with the conclusions there which recognizes that
00:46:28 conclusions there which recognizes that that um you know an an earlier push to provide more support to the local Authority or to intervene there could have been very beneficial but on the basis of the information we had it was a
00:46:40 basis of the information we had it was a very difficult call to make so it's that offer of support which I think it's being suggested um could have happened sooner let me try and get at this in a slightly different different way did you
00:46:52 slightly different different way did you think at the time having received this that but but briefing the prime minister to admit that government had been slow to recognize the failings in the council was a fair thing to ask the
00:47:03 council was a fair thing to ask the prime minister to say I I'm not sure what this briefing is being provided for but I think they're reasonable points as set
00:47:14 out now let's go to your first statement please to page 22 paragraph 79 uh you say
00:47:27 79 uh you say uh
00:47:28 uh there uh
00:47:31 there uh that it's about I'm sorry about this it's about 3/4s of the way down the text five lines up from the bottom yes and and the the previous moment is the 19th of June that's what you're referring to and you say I also started thinking
00:47:43 and you say I also started thinking about some preliminary Lessons Learned in response to a proposal from number 10 for a civilian I'm sorry for a civil disaster resilience task force cdrt which I set out in an email to Patty
00:47:54 which I set out in an email to Patty mcginness at 8:48 on the 19th of June 2017 uh now um we can look at the email but was the was that prompted by Peter talent's own late night ramblings as he
00:48:06 talent's own late night ramblings as he himself put it on the Saturday night uh we've just seen not not prompted by I don't think but I'm sure Peter's thinking would have fed into my own right can we go to the email then it's
00:48:17 right can we go to the email then it's cab4 is
00:48:21 2960 and if we go to page two
00:48:28 we can pick this up at 8:25 a.m. there's an email from Natalie black who I think is within number 10 is that right correct uh and it's to Jamie callling
00:48:39 correct uh and it's to Jamie callling and Lor
00:48:40 and Lor Gratton Peter Hill and will mcfar and copied also within number 10 uh the pm has asked for the following to be included in her narrative for the Qs and the Qs was was what queen speech
00:48:54 Qs and the Qs was was what queen speech queen speech we will also develop a new strategy for national and local resilience in major disasters which could include a new civil disaster reaction force that is dispatched to help at times of
00:49:06 help at times of emergency and just help me I'm sure it's a matter of public record but I don't have a grasp of it when was the Queen's speech to which this is a reference oh I forgive me I I can't remember the date
00:49:18 forgive me I I can't remember the date of the queen speech in 2017 it would have been a day or two after this I assume but but within a very short time frame after this fine now I assume so right so so is it right that actually within number 10 uh uh content for the
00:49:32 within number 10 uh uh content for the Queen's speech the proposed queen speech was being developed at the same time as the recovery at Grandfield Tower was was being handled yes I think that's
00:49:46 right uh and then if we look up the page Peter Hill who who who uh is one of the recipients sends an email to Mark sedwill same morning a few minutes
00:49:58 sedwill same morning a few minutes later uh and to paty mcginness and says if you think this is not a good idea you'll need to come back on an ASAP I think the deadline for Qs stuff is this
00:50:09 stuff is this morning and then if you go up the chain please into page um one there was an intervening email but at the thought of page one patty mcginness back to Peter Hill Peter I'm
00:50:21 mcginness back to Peter Hill Peter I'm wary of rushing this local authorities do Mutual assistance which is what we see London burough doing now not just not quick enough and the critical point have the skills to reinforce another Authority resilience and emergency
00:50:32 Authority resilience and emergency division in dclg is meant to be the central government reinforcement and support for this but is underpowered I don't think putting this right is Qs territory or to be done on the hoof though we should do it quickly the
00:50:44 though we should do it quickly the political risk is that this is seen to be sticking plaster over under resourcing stra alleged poor leadership of
00:50:50 of dclg signed off by Patty mcginness on the next page did do you agree that dclg read was underpowered and under resourced I think at the time um red was
00:51:03 resourced I think at the time um red was being reduced in size and and and yes I think that was an issue for concern the reduction and I think if you go to my email up the chain there is there is
00:51:14 email up the chain there is there is reference to um reversing that reduction yes there is I'll come to that in a moment did you also consider that there had been poor leadership within dclg as um Peter Hill seems to be suggesting so
00:51:27 um Peter Hill seems to be suggesting so I Patty mcginness I'm sorry it seems to be suggesting yeah I mean I think Patty is referring to allegations of poor leadership in dclg um I don't think that is the phrase a phrase I would have
00:51:38 a phrase I would have used
00:51:40 used right I the political risk he's referring to there as we can see is the existence of certain defects were these problems uh a systemic set of
00:51:53 were these problems uh a systemic set of issues before the Grandfield Tower of fire under resourcing of dclg poor leadership of dclg uh so I think the um the reduction
00:52:04 dclg uh so I think the um the reduction the potential reduction in the size of red was um was under discussion before the the fire I I don't know which allegation of poor leadership Patty is referring to precisely so um I can't
00:52:17 referring to precisely so um I can't tell you what when that arose now um if we go to the top of page one uh as you've pointed out you responded at 84 8 yourself paty better Alternatives from
00:52:29 yourself paty better Alternatives from my perspective would be enhancing clg's Red Division currently being downsized which would enable us to spot failing laas much more quickly and ensure support reach them laas will not want central government teams turning up but
00:52:41 central government teams turning up but rather local government folks who know the
00:52:44 the system putting in place better Mutual Aid Arrangements between local authorities this is the surge capacity as we've seen in London but it can be a bit slow to kick in we could offer National deployment mechanism as the
00:52:55 National deployment mechanism as the police and Fire have a body to manage coordination of Volunteers in emergencies currently an LA thing but often an issue now just on that last point you say often an issue what was
00:53:07 point you say often an issue what was your experience that informed that view um I I think experience of talking to lrfs who often um found it
00:53:18 to lrfs who often um found it challenging to manage very well intentioned and very um kind offers of support in crisis but which didn't always meet their needs at the time so
00:53:29 always meet their needs at the time so we were um already working I think at this time on a piece of guidance about how to manage that kind of spontaneous offer of
00:53:38 offer of help you refer to better Mutual Aid putting in place better Mutual Aid Arrangements what was what was wrong with the mutual Aid Arrangements operating in London so far as you could tell given that they hadn't in fact been
00:53:51 tell given that they hadn't in fact been invoked uh by Mr Holgate until the evening of the 15th of June so I I don't think this is referring to exactly that that Arrangement nor is it a point specifically about
00:54:02 specifically about London but the the difference um the difference I'm drawing out is that for um for the police for example there's a essentially coordinated mechanism which
00:54:15 essentially coordinated mechanism which would uh receive a request from One support from one force for additional support and then would source that support for them and deploy it for local authorities it was a much more um ad hoc
00:54:27 authorities it was a much more um ad hoc set of arrangements so the the suggestion here is that there some should be something um more centrally controlled to manage
00:54:38 that and looking at the first point the Red Division we've gone backwards up this email I'm afraid but do I detect or are we to detect in this response a hint
00:54:50 are we to detect in this response a hint that it
00:54:52 that it was red divisions being downsized which in perhaps contributed to its inability to spot rbkc as a failing local Authority in this
00:55:03 Authority in this response I think I think you can detect that enhancing the capability of that team would in my view be be helpful in enabling us to do that now if we go to
00:55:15 enabling us to do that now if we go to cab 301 12068 please we're now on the 20th of
00:55:25 June and if we go
00:55:30 please uh down uh to uh the foot of uh page one I'm sorry the writing is very small foot of page one there's an email from
00:55:44 of page one there's an email from you
00:55:45 you [Music]
00:55:46 [Music] to uh to naab aaz who I think is the National Security Secretariat on behalf of Mark sedwell is that right um I I as AB name is that way round and he was one
00:55:59 AB name is that way round and he was one of Mark's private secretaries right I as NOAB uh and the uh email itself is at the foot of page
00:56:14 two Katherine just sending to you sending just to you at this stage copying Patty and Mark thanks very much to the team for the note some initial thoughts from Mark which we might get from the process that we put in
00:56:26 from the process that we put in place to produce a new strategy and then there are some bullet points underneath that and then over the page on page three he
00:56:37 says and how do we trigger that K andc didn't realize that they were out of their depth for at least two to three days so it can't be a local decision to pull in Regional stroke National support
00:56:49 pull in Regional stroke National support we need a push mechanism to nationalize disaster and insert Regional Stoke national resources led by local goal with a national goal to lead on wider [Music]
00:57:00 [Music] implications so is it right that those within the CCS itself including the National Security advisor saw during the actual incident itself or the recovery from it that the
00:57:13 itself or the recovery from it that the L
00:57:14 L Arrangements which left triggering them to the chief executive of the local Authority were unworkable or potentially unworkable I I don't think Mark is using the word
00:57:26 don't think Mark is using the word unworkable here um he's offering Reflections you know very soon after the event on the sorts of things we should be thinking about in terms of future
00:57:38 be thinking about in terms of future policy work and and these kind of um in the moment Reflections then fed into the work that was done over that summer which formed the national resilience project well I I I
00:57:49 project well I I I say in my my question unworkable or potentially unworkable precisely because I as
00:57:56 I as uh I has now abets um so it can't be a local decision to pull in Regional stroke National support we need a push mechanism so just to put the question a slightly different
00:58:07 to put the question a slightly different way C can we take it that even during the incident itself the CCA understood or learned that that the laag arrangements which left triggering triggering them to the chief executive
00:58:19 triggering them to the chief executive of a local Authority let me put it this way carried very considerable risks given that the arrangements could only be acted on at at his in or her invitation I I don't think you can say
00:58:30 invitation I I don't think you can say that a firm conclusion was reached on that I I think Mark is putting forward you know thoughts to be tested you can see from my um responses as well that we could see there was there was an issue
00:58:42 could see there was there was an issue in how support was got quickly to local authorities particularly when what they you know really needed was support from other local authorities
00:58:57 well cutting to the Chase has a push mechanism to nationalize a disaster where Regional and national resources can be inserted actually been established since the Granville Tower fire so I I don't think something
00:59:10 fire so I I don't think something matching that description exactly has no um this these these um observations fed as I said into the national resilience project and one of the conclusions there
00:59:22 project and one of the conclusions there was a significant piece of work which I I believe dclg have taken forward although forgive me it's 2 years since I left
00:59:30 left ccs to work with local authorities on on much more um stable and preset Mutual Aid
00:59:36 Aid arrangements so I think the the spirit behind this which is to make sure that help gets there quickly when it's needed has been whether it's I don't think it's exactly the proposition which Mark is um
00:59:48 exactly the proposition which Mark is um you know asking questions about here now if we go to the foot of page one your email in response at 2026 on the 20th of [Music]
00:59:58 [Music] June and you say hi I have some quick thoughts in return uh and then you say in point One MH not all LR lfrs are the same they
01:00:10 MH not all LR lfrs are the same they vary considerably in size and skills R have been developing an approach to essentially identify the highest risk ones once
01:00:17 ones once they I'm not sure identify the highest risk once they once do they become the focus of support which I agree with the lessons from grfa suspect will be that the lrf structure actually worked okay
01:00:30 the lrf structure actually worked okay the scg was up and running fast and the multi- agency response was good it's the local Authority recovery element that has fallen down and that appears to have been about leadership which is where I would suggest we should focus any task
01:00:42 would suggest we should focus any task force a c and then this is in bold a C3 capability that can help areas get a grip and organize for no notice events like this plus a better Mutual AER
01:00:54 like this plus a better Mutual AER mechanism for bulk capability ities feel like the right sort of thing but obviously we need to do a proper piece of policy
01:01:01 of policy work
01:01:03 work now um what did you mean there by a C3 uh
01:01:08 C3 uh capability um C3 stands for command control and coordination what is what is that capability where do where does one find it who has it so so I'm describing here
01:01:22 it who has it so so I'm describing here the the sort of thing I think we should be thinking about not a thing which current Curr exists so what I mean is um if an area is struggling and needs support in the
01:01:34 is struggling and needs support in the leadership of its response what capability would you deploy to um to help them
01:01:46 basically right but within that was it your proposal that the capability would be applied or imposed perhaps uh without necessarily being invited or would it be
01:01:58 necessarily being invited or would it be at invitation only I mean my proposal here is actually that we should do a proper piece of policy work to think this through so I I don't think it's specific on that point no you're right that was your your proposal um let me
01:02:09 that was your your proposal um let me put the question slightly differently when you were setting out your quick thoughts was it part of those quick thoughts that the C3 capability would be applied or imposed without necessarily
01:02:21 applied or imposed without necessarily being invited how did you see that point I I I don't I don't think I had a verm view on that point in this in this moment it's it's it's a point that M that um Mr naab had set out with Crystal
01:02:35 that um Mr naab had set out with Crystal Clarity in his point three yes did what was your reaction to that well well I think my reaction is that we need to we need to take a proper look at the evidence and do the policy work on it I
01:02:47 evidence and do the policy work on it I think it's a you know it's a reasonable it's a reasonable point and it's certainly fed into thinking but there's obviously a danger in in not testing the the conclusions that you reach in the moment
01:03:00 properly yes I'm really just trying to get a feel for whether your conclusion and proposal in your own mind was the same as
01:03:07 same as his in other words from what you had learned so far a pull-in approach wasn't effective and a push mechanism would be better I I don't
01:03:20 mechanism would be better I I don't think I don't think that is exactly what my proposal is there but clearly I'm recognizing that we need some time and space to think it through properly and then let's look at your point four triggering is about better local
01:03:32 triggering is about better local intelligence again in bold that is the job of the resilience and emergencies division in red it needs to be bolstered not least because it's currently carrying a lot of vacancies and key posts I would advise against multiple people called gold that should be kept
01:03:45 people called gold that should be kept for the Strategic operational lead what we need is a clear lgd ready to cope and a person in the lead within it in the vast majority of civil emergencies we
01:03:56 vast majority of civil emergencies we have that think DFT or on selker or def on floods we have quite clear descriptions of what national nationalizes a disaster the trick is to ensure we know when those boundaries have genuinely been reached so the only
01:04:09 have genuinely been reached so the only so only the right things make it to that level now when you say what we need is a clear lgd ready to cope but a person in the lead within it what was the
01:04:20 the lead within it what was the problem so that that's not stating a problem that's stating the requirement for
01:04:26 for success right what was missing I I don't think I'm describing an absence here I think I'm I'm asserting that the thing which is which is helpful in these moments is a lead
01:04:39 is helpful in these moments is a lead government Department which is prepared and a person to lead within it so that's not diagnosing a specific problem well a need is normally a response to an absence isn't
01:04:51 absence isn't it I I I don't think I completely agree with that statement you don't need something that you have already do you uh but but needing it doesn't imply that
01:05:02 uh but but needing it doesn't imply that you don't have it I'm sorry I feel we're getting into semantics now I mean what I think what I can say to you is that was intended to say this is the thing we should focus on ensuring is the case for
01:05:14 should focus on ensuring is the case for lead government departments well if let me try it slightly differently I mean if the lead govern Department uh had been ready to cope and had a person in the lead within it then you wouldn't have needed to say
01:05:26 it then you wouldn't have needed to say that you needed one but this is this is this is making a general point I think not about this specific
01:05:34 specific um specific response because what we're doing is reflecting here on the lessons from Grenville that one would learn more widely so I mean there have clearly been
01:05:45 widely so I mean there have clearly been discussions you know in and around this email about appointing lead officials on the recovery for example and I think that you know that was a very good move and you saw all my support for that so
01:05:57 and you saw all my support for that so I'm reflecting that the learning from that is um as set out here and when you um write there about um clear descriptions of what nationalizes a
01:06:09 descriptions of what nationalizes a disaster what do you what were you referring to I'm I'm referring to um the guidance we referred to yesterday which which sets out the framework you
01:06:20 which which sets out the framework you use to think about whether this is now at a a level requiring a national response so the element of the conops so page 68 of the con yes conops which we looked at yeah did you consider that the Grandfield Tower fire fell within that
01:06:32 Grandfield Tower fire fell within that description at which description sorry uh the description uh that uh that uh this was something which nationalized a disaster I I I don't think I have
01:06:44 disaster I I I don't think I have anything to add to the answers I gave yesterday which is that you know in the early phases there were there were questions about which side of that line it was on but clearly it became something um for which a significant
01:06:57 something um for which a significant central government um contribution was required in the recovery phase right well when you wrot we have quite clear descriptions of what nationalizes a disaster were you saying that you don't
01:07:09 disaster were you saying that you don't need to worry about that because grel to wasn't something which nationalizes a disaster no I think I was saying we we don't need to um reinvent that framework
01:07:21 don't need to um reinvent that framework for thinking about when government steps in
01:07:27 in right and when you went on to say the trick is to ensure we know when those boundaries have genuinely been reached was the problem that government had didn't know when those boundaries had
01:07:39 didn't know when those boundaries had genuinely been reached that's I think that is um reflecting the difficulty in being clear When government um help was may have been um required yes and was
01:07:52 may have been um required yes and was the problem that in the case of the grenfell tower response government had not known that those boundaries had genuinely been reached um
01:08:04 reached um so I I think the question is is there a way we could have known sooner right that additional help was required when I look back on the
01:08:15 look back on the paperwork um you know based on the information we had I think we acted as as soon as it was clear that was needed but but the question is is there a way we could have known sooner right and if
01:08:26 we could have known sooner right and if we go up the email chain we can see there's a response from Patty mcginness on the 21st of June at 750 foot of page 1 and it's at 7:50 in the morning and he
01:08:40 1 and it's at 7:50 in the morning and he says K you've caught it well this does look to be about failure in the locality and I mean is routine work as well as crisis response the TMO construct looks to have been a long-term
01:08:51 to have been a long-term failure did you agree with that assessment I um I I can't recall I can't recall um really um understanding some of the
01:09:04 really um understanding some of the long-term issues around the TMO although as I I said before I I think we were starting to learn that there had been you know challenges in the relationship with the tenants for some time so I think probably that is what Paddy is
01:09:15 think probably that is what Paddy is talking about there and within the concept of failure in the locality and I know it's not really a concept it's just an expression he's using but did it occur to you this time that
01:09:26 but did it occur to you this time that there was a problem with the TMO being involved but not having a formal category responder role within the Civil contingencies framework no because they
01:09:38 contingencies framework no because they were um acting on behalf of rbkc who are clearly a category one responder and if we go up the chain please page one at 858 that day top of the uh not quite top
01:09:51 858 that day top of the uh not quite top of the chain but you you say patty just to add one final point I was mulling over last night the other thing we need to think carefully about in this work in in how we align the incentives correctly cash strapped local authorities would
01:10:03 cash strapped local authorities would happily deprioritize resilience work in some areas and rely on a government task force to do it for them lrfs are already things that happen on top of the day job for most members some careful presentation will be needed to ensure we
01:10:14 presentation will be needed to ensure we don't appear to take responsibility away from those who actually really need to grip local
01:10:21 resilience uh are you saying that was the sense of what you were trying to say here that that the resilience is often not prioritized by local authorities because of financial pressures no I I
01:10:33 because of financial pressures no I I think I'm um I'm raising a risk which arises if you uh create a very heavy Central mechanism that um it creates a
01:10:45 Central mechanism that um it creates a disincentive for local areas to put their time and effort into it and that they might if then faced with a prioritized decision uh choose to do less so it it's a it's a future risk I'm
01:10:57 less so it it's a it's a future risk I'm describing not the current situation yeah yes but as part of that future risk was it was relevant presumably uh that it would be cash strapped authorities who might de deprioritize local resilience work so my question is is
01:11:11 resilience work so my question is is does this reflect an underlying concern that
01:11:14 that resilience uh was something that some local authorities might wish to spend much less on if they could it reflects an understanding of
01:11:25 could it reflects an understanding of the risk that local authorities sometimes have to make very difficult um decisions about their resources was that a weakness so far as you saw it in the effectiveness of the of the subsidiarity
01:11:36 effectiveness of the of the subsidiarity model um no I don't think so because they retain those responsibilities I think what I'm flagging here is that creating a central mechanism um uh could
01:11:47 creating a central mechanism um uh could undermine that subsidiarity principle by giving uh by putting the incentive the wrong way
01:11:58 and then after the uh response you received an email I think from Peter Hill uh on the 20th of July now this takes us a month forward Also let's go to that briefly it's at cab3 is1
01:12:11 to that briefly it's at cab3 is1 12063 and I'd like to go in it to the foot of page two and over to the top of Page Three on page
01:12:21 two uh you all you see at the very bottom is from Peter Hill and if we turn to the top of Page Three now as we do that will you confirm I think pet Peter Hill was the principal
01:12:32 I think pet Peter Hill was the principal private secretary to the prime minister at the time yes correct yes and he says Katherine it's to you Katherine you may have had feedback from cabinet discussion of grenfell on Tuesday one of
01:12:44 discussion of grenfell on Tuesday one of the issues raised by a number of ministers around the table was the response of central government dclg and Co to the incident I spoke after Grenville to Patty and Mark I think about a light touch review of our response and recommendations for Action
01:12:56 response and recommendations for Action I'm not sure where that has got to but given the discussion at cabinet we now need to task something out from here on this could you speak to Chris in private office and agree today the terms of a tasking including how much of this can
01:13:08 tasking including how much of this can be addressed in the NSS capability review what capability work review work and how much needs to be done separately or more
01:13:16 quickly uh and if you um then look to up this chain please that's the that's the context if you look up the chain please to the top of um page two there's an
01:13:28 to the top of um page two there's an email that comes to you from Chris Gray on the same day at 1635 uh and follows a conversation with you and he he says Katherine we've discussed as Peter has mentioned
01:13:40 discussed as Peter has mentioned ministers raised significant concerns at used his cabinet regarding the capacity of local authorities across the country to respond to civil crises from floods to fires they also question whether there was a greater role for central government to play in addressing this
01:13:52 government to play in addressing this these concerns are shared by the PM in the immediate aftermath of the gral Tower of fire it became clear that the Royal burough of Kensington and Chelsea was unable to provide adequate support for victims and the community or to run
01:14:04 for victims and the community or to run the communications operation required to keep the community The Wider public and other public bodies informed as events unfolded despite this it took a number of days before they requested London resilience partnership gold command
01:14:16 resilience partnership gold command support and a number of weeks before the government established a task force to support and advise the local Authority while gold command's leadership dramatically improved the situation the lack of any Central coordination in
01:14:28 lack of any Central coordination in Kensington in the first few days had a disastrous effect victims did not receive the Urgent support they required and large amounts of resentment built up in a community who felt ignored and uninformed this will take months if not
01:14:40 uninformed this will take months if not years to undo even once gold command was in place the local Authority continued to struggle to deliver the elements of the response it was responsible for or to prepare plans for the medium and
01:14:51 to prepare plans for the medium and long-term
01:14:52 long-term response is it right that this email from Chris Gray who was assistant private secretary to the prime minister at the time accurately reflects so far as you know the concerns in number 10
01:15:05 as you know the concerns in number 10 and the Prime Minister herself about the response to the Grell Tower
01:15:11 fire I would assume so since it's written by uh an assistant private secretary to the Prime Minister but I think you would have to um you would have to confirm that with him I'm afraid well I'm asking you as a recipient of
01:15:23 well I'm asking you as a recipient of the document you had no reason to think that it didn't I had no reason to think that that was misrepresenting the views no no and when you received this description did you agree with it or did
01:15:36 description did you agree with it or did you take issue with any part of it in
01:15:40 your well so so I think it it's undeniably true that the local Authority struggled and we've talked about that at some length I think there were elements of it which don't look quite right so a
01:15:53 of it which don't look quite right so a number of days before uh support was requested is is two which is um perhaps the phrase implies more
01:16:04 more um so I mean I I don't disagree with the thrust of it that there's an issue to be um dealt with here I I wouldn't have phrased it quite like that I don't think right and then it goes on PM
01:16:16 right and then it goes on PM feels I'm so sorry I have set out he says the key questions that the PM Fields need to be addressed below and then there are some six bullet points uh with some Greek letters at the front of
01:16:28 with some Greek letters at the front of them for reasons which I don't need to ask you about but uh they're there I'm not going to read them out to you uh we can take them as red my question is what work if any was then done by the the ccs
01:16:42 work if any was then done by the the ccs to address the questions the key questions posed by the then prime minister so as I set out at the bottom of the email these questions along with
01:16:53 of the email these questions along with others um fed into the national resilience project which formed part of the National Security capability review so it fed into that report and and that D then reported in the Autumn is that
01:17:05 D then reported in the Autumn is that right um it reported um to the National Security advisor in the Autumn and then was published in I think March 2018 Mr chairman is that a convenient moment yes
01:17:16 chairman is that a convenient moment yes it is thank you very much well we'll take the afternoon break at that stage Mr Haven uh we'll break there we'll resume please at 25 to 4: and and uh as before please don't talk to anyone about
01:17:27 before please don't talk to anyone about your evidence of course all right thank you very
01:17:37 much thank you Mr milet 25 to4
01:17:53 please
01:18:23 e
01:18:53 e
01:19:23 e
01:19:53 e
01:20:23 e
01:20:53 e
01:21:23 e
01:21:53 e
01:22:23 e
01:22:53 e
01:23:23 e
01:23:53 e
01:24:23 e
01:24:53 e
01:25:23 e
01:25:53 e
01:26:23 e
01:26:53 e
01:27:23 e
01:27:53 e
01:28:23 e
01:28:53 e
01:29:23 e
01:29:53 e
01:30:22 e
01:30:52 e
01:31:22 e
01:31:52 e
01:32:22 e
01:32:52 e
01:33:22 e
01:33:52 e
01:34:22 e
01:34:52 e
01:35:22 e
01:35:52 e
01:36:22 e e
01:37:11 would you ask this hel to come back in please
01:37:24 right on we go then yes yes Mr thank you Mr chairman M Hammond I want us to look at one or two of the reviews conducted uh after the fire um by the cabinet office or with the input of the cabinet
01:37:36 office or with the input of the cabinet office and the first is the summary grenfell fire response CCS internal lessons of July 2017 uh and we have that I think at cab 50105 can we look at that
01:37:54 uh The Heading seems to be cut cut off there it is summary GRL TI response CCS internal lessons now can you help us who created this
01:38:06 created this document um it it would I think have been created by Peter talent's team they normally LED on uh these kind of Lessons Learned processes and would this have been under your supervision or with your
01:38:18 been under your supervision or with your input uh it would have had input from uh anybody involved in the resp resp was it reviewed or overseen by you um so I I've always been very careful not to impose
01:38:30 always been very careful not to impose my specific perspective on these reports over other people so my input was one input but the the team would have um you know empowerment to draw together their
01:38:43 know empowerment to draw together their their views I mean was your input one of just feeding in particular personal experiences and perhaps your own view about lessons or was it a a holistic input editing Tiding overseeing the
01:38:55 input editing Tiding overseeing the production of the document and I would have fed in my perspective and then let the team create the document paragraph one it says uh the grill TI the Grandfield fire occurred on the 14th of June Cobra was activated with the first
01:39:09 June Cobra was activated with the first meeting taking place later that day was that correct I I think again that's using Cobra as a short hand for the the central government Machinery which is common particularly in an internal
01:39:20 common particularly in an internal document like this right and we see repeated references to COBRA yes through this all meaning the same thing well it's I mean well uh I wonder I mean the Cobra
01:39:31 well uh I wonder I mean the Cobra response ran through to the 25th of July so you say that wasn't a cobra response it was it was what a response of the of people pull together for particular purposes that that is referring to I
01:39:43 purposes that that is referring to I think the the you know the centrally organized ministerial meetings right and then in the third line throughout this period ccs ordinated the central
01:39:54 period ccs ordinated the central response through Cobra uh what was cobra in that sense again it means the central crisis Machinery it's just a Shand way of referring to it well there's also a reference to a
01:40:06 it well there's also a reference to a Handover in line three to a ministerial Recovery Group that was another central body wasn't it so Central group so I think that's referring to the Handover between the the 15th which was the the
01:40:18 between the the 15th which was the the ministerial meeting and then the body named recovery task force on the 16 the Friday well but it it's the do say that does it it says the Cobra response ran
01:40:30 does it it says the Cobra response ran through to the 25th of July unless that's a misprint when the hand when the Handover to the ministerial Recovery Group took place yes I I can't quite
01:40:41 Group took place yes I I can't quite explain that the dates look don't quite right to me but I'm I'm happy to take it take that away take it away what do you mean take it away and and ask the ask the question what's behind that I mean it certainly it doesn't rect reflect the
01:40:53 it certainly it doesn't rect reflect the pattern of events that we've talked about over the last two days no while I've interrupted Mr milet can I just say this I mean this document doesn't appear to be signed by or adopted by anyone
01:41:05 to be signed by or adopted by anyone whose document is it it's a document for use within CCS so it's an internal document for the team to use particularly the um the response team
01:41:16 particularly the um the response team when thinking about future responses well what I really meant was I I would have expected someone to put his name to the bottom of it or her name to the bottom of it to someone knew who was who
01:41:28 bottom of it to someone knew who was who was putting this forward but doesn't seem to be the case no I mean it reflects a you know Collective views gathered together so I think I think that's pretty deliberate all right thank you who was overall responsible for it
01:41:40 you who was overall responsible for it well I'm director of I was director of CCS so it certainly sat within my responsibility yes but I mean if you were asked if you're if the CCS was
01:41:51 were asked if you're if the CCS was asked too uh I identify the person with overall responsibility for this document and to answer questions on it would that be you um I think so but I I was not the person who drafted it I think that's the
01:42:04 person who drafted it I think that's the distinction
01:42:08 right now you told us that not withstanding the mult the multiplicity of references in this document and many many others that we've seen about Cobra that this whatever whatever it was this
01:42:19 that this whatever whatever it was this was not a cobra response um was the failure to activate Cobra on the 14th of June as a result of central government consciously deciding not to
01:42:32 government consciously deciding not to go there or fundamentally misunderstanding the
01:42:39 reality I don't think there was a fundamental misunderstanding of the reality um I think the evidence that we went through in detail yesterday I I can't really add to that it was
01:42:51 can't really add to that it was certainly a decision to to convene an ad hoc ministerial group but I say again for the record in my view that that made no difference to the quality of the
01:43:02 no difference to the quality of the preparation or the the conduct of those meetings yes I mean maybe in the sense I asked the question that it could be suggested that there was a a false opposite being proposed to you but my
01:43:13 opposite being proposed to you but my question let me try it differently was there a conscious decision not to activate Cobra but instead to go along with these cross government me meetings which bore the
01:43:24 government me meetings which bore the loose label Cobra although not in fact Cobra yes I I think the evidence we we talked through yesterday shows you that was a a decision yes and why was there a
01:43:35 was a a decision yes and why was there a decision not to activate Cobra per se within the conops and instead have uh meetings of ministers exercising the same powers and procedures what was the point of that I I don't think there's
01:43:47 point of that I I don't think there's there's much I can add to my answers on this yesterday I mean as I said at aliser Whitehead's uh succinct account of that rationale Rings very true to me
01:43:59 of that rationale Rings very true to me reflecting you know the likelihood of a relatively short response phase with a relatively low level of government involvement and a much bigger uh engagement in recovery that that I think
01:44:12 engagement in recovery that that I think is the the best explanation right well before we look at what he says and I'm going to do that with you can we look at um page one paragraph five where you uh where you or the
01:44:23 five where you uh where you or the document rather says there were challenges in maintaining situational awareness uh in in the last part of that there's a bold section and it says this whilst recognizing the stretch on dclg
01:44:34 whilst recognizing the stretch on dclg resource arguably CCS should have pushed harder for both Le dclg liazon officer to be embedded in the Cobra situation cell and for a change in the internal dclg clearance process Etc what was the
01:44:47 dclg clearance process Etc what was the Cobra situation cell so that is is one of the elements of the structure in the document um we looked at yesterday so the situation cell is basically a group of officials
01:44:59 cell is basically a group of officials whose key role it is to um prepare the information that goes into the CP so their task is to ensure situational awareness in the ministerial meeting was
01:45:10 awareness in the ministerial meeting was there a cobra situation cell there was certainly a situation cell in relation to these meetings again I think the Cobra tag is just being used in relation to the crisis machinery
01:45:23 to the crisis machinery you see the the Cobra situation sell and you're absolutely right is one of those little boxes we saw in the flow plan within
01:45:30 within conops yes yes yes and this document says that there was one yes and yet you maintain Cobra wasn't activated how how is that so how is that
01:45:42 activated how how is that so how is that consistent because this is describing the the use of um a form of structure which is referred to in that way so it it this is and you know I I'll
01:45:55 way so it it this is and you know I I'll be very Frank that there would be no incentive for me to disguise from you a cobra activation at all and I'm absolutely not trying to do that this is just a shorthand way of of referring to
01:46:08 just a shorthand way of of referring to a structure which commonly exists and did the same function uh in relation to this
01:46:15 meeting and did the situation cell report to or appear at the meetings the situation cell um prepared the CP which was used as the meetings and people in
01:46:27 was used as the meetings and people in uh the CCS response can perform different roles so it's very likely that some of the people working in the situation cell would also then have been part of the Secretariat for the meeting
01:46:38 part of the Secretariat for the meeting right um now can we go to alist Whitehead's statement please that's at cab1 1484
01:46:46 cab1 1484 14857 page 4 cab3 is 14857 Page 4 paragraph
01:46:54 paragraph 15 now the question he's asked I should show you this for the purposes of paragraphs 1.7 to 1.8 at nxb of responding to emergencies the UK central government
01:47:06 emergencies the UK central government response concept of operations conops and we've seen this just pausing there miss Hammond haven't we that's the the colored chart the question is please set out what level of emergency number
01:47:18 set out what level of emergency number 10 understood the Grandfield Tower fire to be categorized as on 14th June 2017 and the reasons why who made this decision these categories include and then they're set out and his answer is this I cannot be certain now four years
01:47:31 this I cannot be certain now four years after the event but I do not recall that there was an explicit Declaration of the categorization of the fire in accordance with the level set out in conops I've been involved in the response to several other incidents and do not recall there
01:47:42 other incidents and do not recall there being a declaration of the categorization of those incidents my understanding is that the levels in cops are Broad and indicative and that each incident requires careful evaluation based on a range of factors with the
01:47:53 based on a range of factors with the level of incident being subsequently demonstrated by the nature of the government's response to it now just pausing there I think that's that encapsulates the evidence you you were giving us yesterday and today I think
01:48:05 giving us yesterday and today I think yes yes I I would agree with what aliser says then yes then he says this not activating Cobra will in itself have been a key indicator for local responders of the likely form of central
01:48:16 responders of the likely form of central government engagement in the initial stages but it is important to note that no National assistance was requested do you agree that not activating Cobra
01:48:27 you agree that not activating Cobra would have indicated to local responders that there would be limited central government engagement I I wouldn't put it like that no I think um I would agree that um not
01:48:40 no I think um I would agree that um not using that label would indicate that there there weren't likely to be you know immediate decisions required from central government because obviously if they if they were if they were then we'd
01:48:52 they if they were if they were then we'd very likely um use that label quite quickly so I I think it indicates as I said before that the the central government role in that very immediate
01:49:04 government role in that very immediate you know 48 hour response phase was likely to be much less than in the the more extensive recovery phase yeah yes I mean the point well is what we get from this that actually what
01:49:17 what we get from this that actually what you were doing was de facto operating cobra
01:49:24 but just not calling it Cobra because if you called it Cobra that would indicate that local responders might expect central government engagement in the initial stages I I think that is not a
01:49:37 initial stages I I think that is not a correct characterization of the rationale but as I said before the processes followed are the same
01:49:46 same essentially well that's the point the processes followed are the same your internal documents call it Cobra but it's the same and yet you were at pains and you've been at pains to make it clear that this was not an activation of
01:49:58 clear that this was not an activation of Cobra and I'm putting to you that the logic of not activating cobra in publicly was because you didn't want to indicate to
01:50:09 indicate to rbkc that central government might come in no I I don't think that is the logic I don't think any part of that rational was about rbkc it was reflecting our
01:50:20 was about rbkc it was reflecting our understanding of what might be required from central government at that time and why wasn't Cobra activated on the 15th or 16th of June in its full
01:50:31 the 15th or 16th of June in its full public sense we are activating Cobra when it became clear that there were significant issues as we've been through um because on the 16th of June the uh the grenfall ministerial recovery task force was formed it was clear that the
01:50:44 force was formed it was clear that the issues that were arising um you know could be dealt with very effectively under that Banner it was only at the meeting on the 15th that the really significant concerns about rbkc fully
01:50:56 significant concerns about rbkc fully crystallized as as we went through
01:51:01 earlier yes so why not activate Cobra then on the 16th because we had a a prime ministerially chaired ministerial recovery task force which could do uh
01:51:13 recovery task force which could do uh the job which was which as I said was was more under the the job under the heading of recovery perfectly well yeah let's then look in light of that to clg4
01:51:31 8533 now this is a contemporaneous document it's an email from Melanie doors to the late Jeremy Haywood uh on the
01:51:43 Haywood uh on the 16th of June this is the Friday at 1949 on that evening subject are you coping and that the reason it's the subject from is because in the second
01:51:54 subject from is because in the second email it's the sole sub subject comment of the of the email from Jeremy H to melan doors and she comes back she doesn't answer his question but she says
01:52:06 doesn't answer his question but she says by the way the new gold command is clear that this is more complex than 77 one clear lesson we should have had a PM chaired Cobra on Wednesday do you agree
01:52:19 chaired Cobra on Wednesday do you agree uh no you don't agree with melan DOs no that that doesn't match my assessment no why
01:52:26 no why not um for the reasons that I've already given the the evidence we had at the time um didn't indicate that a significant there was a significant requirement from central government and
01:52:39 requirement from central government and um even if it had done we had already drawn together ministers in exactly the same way as we would have done for a cobra meeting so it's not clear to me
01:52:50 cobra meeting so it's not clear to me what what difference it would have made was it the case that despite being told about the unprecedented nature of the fire central government underestimated the magnitude of the
01:53:01 underestimated the magnitude of the disaster which informed their hands-off approach in the first few days until perhaps the Friday I I definitely wouldn't agree with the term hands-off approach I mean you had groups of ministers being brought together on a
01:53:13 ministers being brought together on a daily basis monitoring very actively events on the ground all right let let me rephrase the question then you don't make hands off okay let's try this um do
01:53:24 make hands off okay let's try this um do you accept that as of the Friday evening a clear lesson to be learned was that that the disaster was of such a magnitude that it would have Justified a
01:53:36 magnitude that it would have Justified a PM chaired Cobra on Wednesday the day of the
01:53:42 fire no no I don't because um I even with the benefit of hindsight when I look back I can't identify a decision that was not taken by the group of
01:53:54 that was not taken by the group of ministers that came together that would have been taken by something with a cobra brand on it now let's go back if we can to the internal Lessons Learned document at cab50
01:54:14 105 and I read the the the first paragraph the first part of this paragraph to you but let's just look at it in full it says there were challenging in maintaining situational awareness and the in particular
01:54:25 awareness and the in particular engagement with dclg and the timeliness of information were raised as key issues the agreed dclg process for clearing key data did not work returns consistently failed to meet reporting deadlines and
01:54:37 failed to meet reporting deadlines and there were issues with the quality of data once received often returns were incomplete data tables did not add up or conflicting data was provided financial support figures been point where different Figures were quoted by dclg
01:54:49 different Figures were quoted by dclg and DWP ministers at a number of Cobra meetings um first what was the agreed dclg process for clearing key data that's referred to here um I can't
01:55:00 that's referred to here um I can't recollect I'm afraid I would have to go and ask ask colleagues about
01:55:08 that well you might I think that you're doing yourself an injustice can we go to your third statement please uh page 28
01:55:26 and paragraph 73 you say I believe the reference to the agreed dclg process for clearing key data refers to issue with verifying information about financial support provided to victims although it
01:55:37 support provided to victims although it falls outside the 7-Day period specified by the inquiry me you attach an email chain and you go on to say demonstrates that it was confusion about the basis on which these figures were being provided DG's preferred process was that
01:55:49 provided DG's preferred process was that information cleared by recovery gold should be used rather than information provided by the department of work and pensions now my question uh which perhaps is better directed to this paragraph was what was
01:56:00 directed to this paragraph was what was the agreed dclg process that you're addressing
01:56:06 here so I think my understanding of the process is drawn from the email chain which is exhibited and it it's set out here which is um that the that
01:56:17 here which is um that the that information should be only information which had been cleared by recovery gold that is to say Mr baradel should be used in in the CP uh rather than the DWP
01:56:29 in in the CP uh rather than the DWP numbers and um clearly those numbers had not been consistent at all points so that's my understanding but it's it's based on that email chain and when did
01:56:40 based on that email chain and when did you or to your knowledge your department first become aware that there were problems with the agreed dclg process for clearing key data such as those set
01:56:52 for clearing key data such as those set out in this paragraph the paragraph of the internal review I I think as we've we've covered there were there were challenges um from the early stages of this response in
01:57:05 the early stages of this response in being completely clear about numbers of tenants for example this particular process is about the um the financial grants which were
01:57:16 the um the financial grants which were provided to families into individuals so I'm afraid I would have to refresh my memory um on exactly when that began and when those issues began now let's go
01:57:27 when those issues began now let's go back to the internal uh review document please that's cab50 105 page 1 paragraph 5 in the Bold
01:57:36 the Bold section and we' we've covered this already uh to some extent um where it says CCS should have arguably CCS should have pushed harder for both of DCL gazon officer to be embedded in the Cobra
01:57:48 officer to be embedded in the Cobra situation cell and for a change in the internal DC LG clearance Pres to improve quality and timeliness of information is it right that you haven't been able to locate any correspondents to indicate that the CCS asked for a
01:58:01 to indicate that the CCS asked for a dclg liaison officer to be embedded in the situation cell I I think that's correct yes so is it right that rather than CCS not pushing hard enough for a DCL G leas officer to be embedded it
01:58:14 DCL G leas officer to be embedded it appears that actually the CCS didn't push at all um it's hard to be sure because obviously uh large amounts of contact between ccs and dclg would have been taking place on the telephone so
01:58:27 been taking place on the telephone so there may have been a request through that means which of which I would have no evidence I think I all I can say is we we can't find an email chain evidencing that request do do you accept that the CCS should have pushed harder
01:58:39 that the CCS should have pushed harder for for a dclg leaz an officer to be embedded in the Cobra situation cell yes I mean I have no reason to disagree with the findings of this report no and and on page two if we go to next
01:58:53 no and and on page two if we go to next steps it
01:58:56 says subject to views the intention is to pick up the recommendations as part of the refresh of our Cobra operating procedures and crisis Management training
01:59:07 training material now F first was there in fact afterwards a refresh of you as it's put of the Cobra operating procedures and crisis Management training material I'm afraid I can't recollect but I will very
01:59:18 afraid I can't recollect but I will very happily go back and ask my colleagues right
01:59:23 right what was wrong with the Cobra operating procedures not least since Cobra wasn't triggered so the Cobra operating procedures here is referring to the to the conops and it would be really normal
01:59:35 the conops and it would be really normal after any Lessons Learned exercise to draw those lessons back into the doctrine so in the case of the um you know the the point you were just
01:59:46 know the the point you were just exploring um you might add to the conops a suggestion that if there were data problems Al an officer be embedded for example continuous improvement process but if conops wasn't operated but a sort
01:59:57 but if conops wasn't operated but a sort of ghost version instead what was the point of reviewing the actual written operating procedures for improvement so so it's not the case that a ghost version of conops was operated that is
02:00:08 version of conops was operated that is the the framework of Doctrine used to inform how the central response operates whether or not it has a cobra badge on
02:00:20 it just to go back there on Co Cobra if a full Cobra activation would not have made a difference uh what would what what's the point of
02:00:33 point of Cobra I think Mr milet there's not much I can add to my answers on this to you yesterday I mean the the point of Cobra is it's a mechanism to bring ministers together to ensure quick decisions are
02:00:46 together to ensure quick decisions are made in a crisis it's not the only means of achieving those things but it is an effect Ive one the brand in particular has got um you know resonance both um or
02:00:59 has got um you know resonance both um or particularly in the public eye actually because it it is often um used to describe the activation of of government in support of a response but you know in Practical terms
02:01:12 response but you know in Practical terms you can achieve some of the same things um you know through a less formal structure I think that is true so are you able to give us an idea of what sort sort of
02:01:22 sort of emergencies would attract an actual Cobra trigger where the government says we are triggering Cobra Well and one which doesn't I I can give you some
02:01:34 which doesn't I I can give you some examples from my experience so um um serious flood events for example which have um which have significant consequences Cobra has been um triggered
02:01:47 consequences Cobra has been um triggered for those that would be one example why for those and not for granted film um for the reason I gave before that that usually in in that kind in an event in a
02:01:59 usually in in that kind in an event in a a a large magnitude flooding event it's clear um pretty early on that central government decision making in the response phase is going to be
02:02:10 response phase is going to be required and that wasn't you say clear at Grell so I I think you can see from the evidence that that in the first couple of days the response phase you
02:02:22 couple of days the response phase you know effectively led by the police and the the fire service and the ambulance service primarily they were not asking for um support or assistant so there was
02:02:33 for um support or assistant so there was no reason in that moment to to um you know to deploy the Cobra label but having said that if if they had done so in that moment the group that was assembled would have been able to
02:02:45 assembled would have been able to provide
02:02:46 provide it and you've used the word brand or label as if that is what Cobra is I mean is that right Cobra isn't actually anything different from the response as you've been at pains to repeatedly in
02:02:58 you've been at pains to repeatedly in answer to my questions point out but actually it just has a a public resonance so that government decides whether or not it should brand a particular response Cobra or non- Cobra Well I I do think the the same effect
02:03:10 Well I I do think the the same effect can be achieved through other means that's right it's not just a brand you know it's something which uh which you know has strong common understanding and that is on occasion very useful and I as
02:03:23 that is on occasion very useful and I as I said yesterday it can be very useful you know in galvanizing activity where that has been slow to take place that wasn't that wasn't the case here from government
02:03:39 departments uh let's go to cab 30 is
02:03:45 14827 I'd like to turn to a slightly different topic on this document which is discussions with number 10 uh and this is an email
02:03:56 from uh well it's actually a
02:04:08 note so this is cab3 is 14827 uh yes thank you official sensitive key points from discussion with number 10 now um I should tell you
02:04:20 with number 10 now um I should tell you that this is a note um drafted We Believe by Peter talent but is it something you've seen before Miss Hammond um I have seen it
02:04:31 before Miss Hammond um I have seen it before this hearing yes right am I right that it's it was written by Peter Talent yes I I think what it is is um the contemporaneous note that he made
02:04:44 the contemporaneous note that he made for himself of his discussion with uh number 10 officials in the course of preparing the cross White all Lessons Learned document right and I think we can date this to August 2017 would that
02:04:56 can date this to August 2017 would that be would that be right that that time scale would fit yes right now he he records a number of points uh and the first is took too long for rbkc to ask for help uh and you can see what he said
02:05:08 for help uh and you can see what he said there but if you look at the third paragraph down he says unclear and unsatisfactory division of responsibility between John baradel for the victims in the tower and rbkc for everyone else not clear how this worked
02:05:19 everyone else not clear how this worked in practice and whether it added to confusion straight poor information flow why was this distinction created and by who are you aware of what led to that distinction as I said to you earlier
02:05:30 distinction as I said to you earlier today I to my mind there was no distinction I understood John to be responsible for um for both um and Peter is obviously recording here a perception
02:05:42 is obviously recording here a perception related to him by officials in number 10 yes uh and when did you first become aware that that distinction existed and I asked you that question before before but I'm asking it again now given we
02:05:53 but I'm asking it again now given we have a date for it being being clear at least to number 10 and Peter talent in the
02:05:59 the CCS um I I I don't recollect I don't recall it being an issue during the activation and the response this is obviously a review of it
02:06:12 obviously a review of it afterwards do do you agree or did you agree did you perceive that that inevitably led to differential treatment as between effect residence between those in the tower on
02:06:24 residence between those in the tower on the one hand and those in the walkways and other buildings on the other no I didn't because I understood John to be responsible for both groups and then paragraph seven uh which
02:06:36 groups and then paragraph seven uh which says
02:06:37 says data which is 3/4 of the way down your screen it says there was no grip on the data centrally or locally seemed unable to provide stats on housing EG offers
02:06:48 to provide stats on housing EG offers made or to present and track it in a consistent and ible way significant capability Gap in both rbkc and dclg I think you agree with that
02:07:02 dclg I think you agree with that conclusion um don't you so I certainly agree there were there's some data challenges and those are those are well recorded I I think this is you know this is how that played out in the perception
02:07:13 is how that played out in the perception of number 10 so you know legitimate from their point of view U legitimate from their point of view because it's in a number 10 do document but it's a number 10 document or rather it's a CCS
02:07:25 10 document or rather it's a CCS document taking points of discussion from number 10 does it reflect the CCS understanding as well at the time so I the CCS understanding was was
02:07:36 time so I the CCS understanding was was certainly that there were issues with the data and and we've been through that um this is the number 10 presentation of that issue the CCS one is obviously captured in in other ways
02:07:49 is obviously captured in in other ways but I think the points of you know fundamental very similar that there were there were challenges in being precise on some of these important data points uh and then impossible to contact people
02:08:00 uh and then impossible to contact people in dclg so hard to get answers quickly stroke at
02:08:04 stroke at all that that's the number 10 experience relayed to Peter Talent did it reflect yours uh no I don't think so added to pressure on private offices
02:08:16 so added to pressure on private offices as they were used as conduits better info management structures critical lack of phone numbers and email addresses that were answered that was number 10's experience was it yours uh no and I think you you've seen
02:08:29 yours uh no and I think you you've seen a number of examples of you know emails sent by me being responded to by dclg officials should have augmented dclg private office capable people one of best out of Crisis but out of depth here
02:08:41 best out of Crisis but out of depth here and couldn't handle volume of info flowing through that was number 10's impression was it yours I had no impression of dclg private office in this period i
02:08:52 this period i wouldn't have been interacting with them directly and now are you able to explain why at least on some of these points number 10's impression was rather
02:09:03 number 10's impression was rather different from yours well I think everybody involved in a particular incident you know sees it from their from their distinct perspective with their you know set of
02:09:14 perspective with their you know set of responsibilities in mind that that's why these Lessons Learned processes draw in lots of inputs and look for commonality and themes between
02:09:24 between them what was number 10 seeing that you weren't which so far as you can understand it would lead them to these conclusions but not you well clearly they're engaging with
02:09:36 you well clearly they're engaging with different parts of the department perhaps so the um number 10 private office would be engaging directly with dclg private office in a way that I wouldn't be doing so that would give
02:09:47 wouldn't be doing so that would give them a different perspective for example but your role was one of coordination yes between between government departments and number 10 so my my dcc's role is one of coordination of the
02:10:00 coordination of the response
02:10:02 response um private offices obviously are directly in respon in in support of ministers or senior officials and they would be interacting with number 10 you know continually that that's completely
02:10:14 know continually that that's completely normal way that government business has
02:10:19 done and then it says dclg MD reassured jjh that all okay and had all the staff they needed but evidently not the case is that your
02:10:30 case is that your experience um I so there were definitely some concerns which you've alluded to in in that were contemporary with my understanding at
02:10:42 contemporary with my understanding at the time about the capacity in red um which was a relatively small team hence the the recommendation that they should be added to I don't think I ever
02:10:53 should be added to I don't think I ever had any reassurance or or sort it from um Melanie who I think is the MD referred to here about that
02:11:06 right and what I'm really just seeking to get to get a handle on is is how come if if the CCS was doing its role of liazon as you as you've explained why it
02:11:18 liazon as you as you've explained why it is that that number 10 had these uh these impressions are set out in this document as reflected to Peter talent but you didn't I mean why is that
02:11:31 but you didn't I mean why is that because everybody has different sources of information you know depending on their role and are interacting with different people on on different topics we were obviously very focused on
02:11:44 we were obviously very focused on coordinating uh the response um we wouldn't you know just to pick an example be focused on briefing for prime minister's questions which is referred to further Below in the same way that
02:11:56 to further Below in the same way that number 10 would have been that that would have informed their experience it wouldn't have informed mine we have we have different roles so was number 10 closer to the the
02:12:08 roles so was number 10 closer to the the facts than the CCS the particular facts set out in the precise paragraphs I've I've read to you well I think these are views rather than facts um and I and as such I don't think
02:12:22 facts um and I and as such I don't think you can be closer to them or otherwise I'm just seeking to understand the discrepancy between the reflection uh conclusions let let's call them that
02:12:33 uh conclusions let let's call them that in this document and your own conclusions on the same problems well there are some points of commonality here of course of course there are so um you know the the first point I I think I
02:12:45 you know the the first point I I think I would agree that um rbkc had it known it was in difficulty sooner should have asked for help sooner but there are elements of this which just reflect different
02:13:03 roles now I think it's right that in September 2017 CCS produced a document called grenfell Tower tragedy lessons for the central response do you recall that yes I think that is the um the
02:13:16 that yes I think that is the um the cross White Hall Lessons Learned conclusions let's go to that it's at cab3 is
02:13:33 14768 and am I right in thinking that it was intended to capture uh wider cross government lessons for the future operation of the central response yes that's right and I think
02:13:44 response yes that's right and I think the document we were just referring to would have been one of the conversations which fed into this document yes and my right also that Peter Talent LED on this project but
02:13:55 Peter Talent LED on this project but given your role um did you review the report or oversee the process um so Peter LED on drawing it together and and as I said before I I would not have interfered toose My Views
02:14:08 would not have interfered toose My Views he would have shown me the report once it was drawn
02:14:14 together now uh if you look at this first page of the document
02:14:22 document um under
02:14:25 timeline uh it starts with the identification of the fire by the National Security Secretariat watchkeepers around 130 from social media and then halfway through the
02:14:36 media and then halfway through the paragraph it says this information informed a discussion with number 10 as to the central government response and led to the decision by 10: a.m. to convene a ministerial meeting that
02:14:47 convene a ministerial meeting that afternoon 400 p.m. chaired by the minister of State for police and the fire service to review the situation and consider the need for further central government assistance now just just
02:14:58 government assistance now just just pausing there I think we can agree that that's clearly a reference to the 400m 14th of June meeting chaired by Nicholas herd yes yes I think that's correct yes and it goes on those present alongside
02:15:10 and it goes on those present alongside those government departments directly involved included the mayor of London the chief executive of the royal burough of Kensington and Chelsea rbkc and the Metropolitan Police now we know that
02:15:21 Metropolitan Police now we know that Nicholas Holgate was not present at that meeting correct and therefore that is an error are you able to explain how that error came to be made in this report I mean I think it is as you say
02:15:32 report I mean I think it is as you say um an error my assumption would be that um you know perhaps a recollection of the 15th had been transposed onto the 14th but I I don't think I can help
02:15:43 14th but I I don't think I can help further than that but I I do agree that is incorrect is is it an error that you well I me take it in stages did you review this document it come to you for review yes I would certainly have read
02:15:54 review yes I would certainly have read it I'm afraid I I must not have spotted that at the time otherwise I would have corrected it yes how carefully did you review it well I would have um read it
02:16:05 it well I would have um read it thoroughly with a particular focus on um actions that needed to be taken I I think I would not have checked it back against all of the records of the
02:16:16 against all of the records of the meetings in a forensic way if we go to page two
02:16:23 the report uh says at paragraph 11 at the foot of your screen uh foot of page two as is often the case in the early stages of an emergency there was confusion over the situation on the ground particularly sorry in particular
02:16:36 ground particularly sorry in particular the number of households displaced in the surrounding area and the vulnerability of many of those affected this was not helped by the apparent inability of the rbkc to get sufficient trained people out on the ground to
02:16:48 trained people out on the ground to assess the situation or to appreciate or anticipate their needs the situation was compounded by reassurances from the council's senior leadership that they were on the job and a reluctance to accept offers of help despite offers
02:17:00 accept offers of help despite offers from London authorities and central government as a result there appeared to be a significant discrepancy between the situation is generally understood in whiteall for the first 24 to 36 hours
02:17:11 whiteall for the first 24 to 36 hours and that facing the local community the full scale of the problems only became clear across whiteall following the community secretary's visit to the scene on Friday the 16th of June and the subsequent discussion in
02:17:23 subsequent discussion in Cobra now uh do you agree well let me let me put it this way sitting there now do you disagree uh with any part of what I've just read to you no I think that is that is
02:17:35 you no I think that is that is consistent with what the the evidence shows was it consistent with your experience to date in September 2017 I'm sorry I don't quite understand
02:17:47 2017 I'm sorry I don't quite understand that question well you you've your answer was that you thought it was consistent with what the evidence shows which is a judgment on the evidence what I'm asking you is for your recollection yourself and what I've put to you does
02:18:00 yourself and what I've put to you does it is it consistent with how you remember things yourself as at September 2017 looking back on it from that date to the
02:18:10 June I mean I I I can't recall what My Views were in September 2017 I'm afraid but I I don't see reason to take issue with it and if if we go to page four
02:18:21 with it and if if we go to page four paragraph
02:18:23 paragraph 17 it says it was sensible to convene a ministerial meeting on the Wednesday afternoon and to involve key Partners from the London responder Community with the benefit of hindsight this might have been chaired by a more senior Minister
02:18:35 been chaired by a more senior Minister as recommended by cabinet in the aftermath of the flooding in 20145 however to have made a real difference ministers and officials needed a much better understanding of the real situation on the ground
02:18:47 the real situation on the ground particularly the scale of the need and the lack of effective support report from the statutary agencies again is there anything in that with which you would disagree so I I think the final point is
02:19:00 disagree so I I think the final point is the key one there so I wouldn't disagree that it could have been chaired by a more senior Minister and that would have been you know within the bounds of normal certainly but the second point is
02:19:12 normal certainly but the second point is the key one that it's difficult to see what would have been different based on the information available at the time and and there's a reference there to a recommendation made by cabinet in the aftermath of the flooding in 2014 to 15
02:19:25 aftermath of the flooding in 2014 to 15 what was that recommendation oh I I can't I can't recall I'm afraid I'd have to go back and look at the documents were you aware uh on the 14th of June that a recommendation had been made two to
02:19:37 recommendation had been made two to three years previously that a more senior Min a senior Minister should chair an aftermath
02:19:45 aftermath meeting um I I can't remember I'm afraid
02:19:51 and would it have made a difference and I know that these counterfactuals are very difficult questions but do you did you in September 2017 perceived that it would have made a difference if the Home Secretary had been available to chair
02:20:02 Secretary had been available to chair the first ministerial meeting on the 14th of June as this note suggests I I don't think I did and that's because I as I said before I I can't identify something that that wasn't done because
02:20:13 something that that wasn't done because a more senior Minister wasn't in the chair paragraph 18 under public Communications says this the failure to understand the local community or the
02:20:24 understand the local community or the poor support provided to those affected fed through into the government's public and parliamentary handling with no coherent central government media strategy in place until some days after the fire do you disagree with any of
02:20:37 the fire do you disagree with any of that I I don't have reason to second guess that judgment no and sitting there in September 2017 what impact did you think that that had on the
02:20:48 had on the response um well I think this is fun fundamentally talking about public perception of the response rather than the the decisions and the actions that were
02:21:03 taken yes my question was what impact do you consider that that had on the response is the answer none yes I don't think this is about impact on the response per se I think
02:21:14 impact on the response per se I think it's about um the the public perception of that response so Instinct so let just let's just focus then on the precise words at the very
02:21:25 then on the precise words at the very beginning of that sentence the failure to understand the local community or the poor support provided to those affected fed through into the government's public and parliamentary handling are you saying that the failure
02:21:38 handling are you saying that the failure to understand the community and the poor support provided to those affected had no impact on the response of central government no I'm not to be clear I was taking that sentence as a as a as a whole which is citing
02:21:51 whole which is citing that failure to understand or Provide support the consequence of that was felt in the media strategy so I I would agree that that that in its
02:22:02 that that that in its totality um you know did not have an impact on the decisions taken in the response but I I would agree that um you
02:22:14 response but I I would agree that um you know that the the absence of high quality immediate support had a material impact particularly on the people directly affected now there are 11
02:22:25 directly affected now there are 11 recommendations made in this report which I think we can see from page four onwards just they're just just appearing at the foot of your screen and we can scroll down to the foot of the page I'm not going to take you through all of
02:22:37 not going to take you through all of them um but uh you might like just to look
02:22:41 look at uh Roman 2 there should be a presumption until shown otherwise that even large well-run organizations will struggle to cope with a major no notice
02:22:52 struggle to cope with a major no notice emergency and are likely to require sustained support and communication to a large displaced Community smaller po performing organizations are even more likely to
02:23:02 likely to fail
02:23:04 fail uh what was it about the Grandfield Tower fire incident in particular that led to that
02:23:13 self-discovery well I I think the recognition that um the the challenge is in the rbkc response um would uh you know were not
02:23:25 response um would uh you know were not known it was not known in advance that they would find it so difficult to manage an event of this type which was you know within the planning assumptions we expected local areas to be able to
02:23:37 we expected local areas to be able to deal
02:23:38 deal with right I mean cast your eye down the recommendations Roman 3 mechanism mechanism in place to ensure crisis managers are aware of any significant concerns within government over the
02:23:50 concerns within government over the effectiveness of a significant local responder four deals with category 1 and two organizations should should have robust crisis management structures that are flexible and scalable Etc and then
02:24:01 are flexible and scalable Etc and then over the
02:24:02 over the page five is about Staffing over the page two-way communication between the cabinet office and dclg review Into the support provided to victims in an
02:24:14 victims in an emergency CRA Secretariat checklist chair's brief Etc I I I'm I'm going to assume you're familiar with the detail of
02:24:23 of those my question on them is why were all of
02:24:27 all of these needs for recommendation not revealed by previous incidents or by training
02:24:34 training exercises carried out by local local forums um well well some of them may may have been I mean after every response
02:24:46 have been I mean after every response there's a there's a set of it's It's a a discipline after every response to look back against um you know what should have happened what went less well and think about what would address that in
02:24:58 think about what would address that in the future so some of these things uh you know may have been identified in other responses but this is recording the the fact of their appearance in this event and therefore
02:25:09 appearance in this event and therefore the importance of making sure they're addressed going forwards well one can understand that after an incident there's a Lessons Learned process my question is let me try try it differently what was it about the Grandfield Tower fire incident that that
02:25:22 Grandfield Tower fire incident that that reveal the need for these
02:25:27 recommendations can you put your finger on it well well I I think
02:25:34 the it's very different very difficult to answer that question simply I mean this is an accumulation of all of the experiences of many people in that response so that's what leads to these
02:25:45 response so that's what leads to these recommendations
02:26:00 now um finally in your first statement let's go to page 24 paragraph
02:26:11 85 and this was your first statement not your second or third it's fair to point out but uh in paragraph 85 you say this answering the question was the response
02:26:22 answering the question was the response adequate and if not in what respects was it inadequate overall I believe that CCS responded well promptly and appropriately to the grandell fire I've commented on this as part of my response to 13B
02:26:34 to 13B above now look Looking Back Now and having reviewed further material from the time uh partly as a result of your second and third statements and partly as a result of uh giving us the
02:26:46 as a result of uh giving us the assistance that you have over the last day and a half for which we're grateful uh do you consider that ccss response to the grvi tire fire was adequate um yes I do based on the
02:26:58 adequate um yes I do based on the information that we had at the time I would stand by that statement and do you have any further observations on the adequacy of the response delivered by central government more widely well only to say that I would endorse the you know the carefully
02:27:10 endorse the you know the carefully gathered and compiled lessons that were put together afterwards Mr chairman uh is that a convenient moment we we've come to the end of the usual break yes yes well M
02:27:22 end of the usual break yes yes well M you probably know that although Mr milet reached the end of his questions as he thinks we have to give a little break now so that he can consider the position and also so that others who are
02:27:33 and also so that others who are following the proceedings from other places can suggest questions that may need to be put to you so we'll we'll break for 10 minutes would that be enough Mr milet 20 to 4 20 to 5 I'm
02:27:44 enough Mr milet 20 to 4 20 to 5 I'm sorry 20 to 5 yes yes right we'll break down until 20 to 5 and then we'll see off with the are any more questions for you thank you thank you very
02:28:00 much thank you very much 20 to5 thank
02:28:19 you
02:28:49 e
02:29:19 e
02:29:49 e
02:30:18 e
02:30:48 e
02:31:18 e
02:31:48 e
02:32:18 e
02:32:48 e
02:33:18 e
02:33:48 e
02:34:18 e
02:34:48 e
02:35:18 e
02:35:48 e
02:36:18 e
02:36:48 e
02:37:18 e
02:37:48 e
02:38:18 e
02:38:48 e
02:39:18 e
02:39:48 e
02:40:18 e
02:40:48 e e
02:41:42 [Music] would you ask M Hammond to come back in please
02:41:54 [Music] you right well we'll see if there any more questions for you m Hammond yes yes Mr chairman U Miss Hammond I only have one further question for you and it's a question reserved for Witnesses of
02:42:05 question reserved for Witnesses of particular responsibility and it's this um we've you in the process of doing all your witness statements have gone through a huge number of previous events a long time ago and during the course of
02:42:17 a long time ago and during the course of the last one and a half days we've covered a lot of ground you may also have heard the evidence given earlier in this module particularly from the families uh uh and the bereaved looking back on all of that material and looking
02:42:29 back on all of that material and looking back on your time in those days after the fire is there anything that you yourself would have done
02:42:40 differently well I I think I would draw on the lessons we learned at the time and
02:42:49 and um the thing I take away is the need the continual need always to probe that when people say they don't need help they do in fact mean
02:43:00 in fact mean it so I guess that's what I would have done
02:43:05 differently well thank you very much it only remains for me to thank you very much for coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our investigations we're extremely grateful to you and say thank you very much indeed thank you and
02:43:16 thank you very much indeed thank you and indeed we are grateful thank you very much indeed for giving up quite a lot of time to help us with our investigations it's particularly interesting and useful for us to have some insight into the
02:43:28 for us to have some insight into the workings of government otherwise we just get the documents which often don't really give us the picture that we really need to obtain so we're are particularly grateful to you for coming along thank you very much indeed and of
02:43:39 along thank you very much indeed and of course you're free to go thank you my my pleasure I wish you every success in concluding your inquiry thank you
02:43:53 thank you Mr minut well that must be it for today it is but we shall have another W another witness on Monday next week is right we do good we do we have I think it's David Bellamy on Monday
02:44:04 think it's David Bellamy on Monday morning yes I believe we'll be taken by Miss Mal hotter of council good thank you very much right well we stop there then and we shall resume at 10:00 on Monday morning please thank you very
02:44:18 much e