Department for Levelling Up, Housing, and Communities Evidence - Thursday 26th May 2022 (1/2)

Full transcript

00:00:23 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing today we're going to hear evidence from day melanie dawes who at the time of the fire was the permanent secretary of the

00:00:34 was the permanent secretary of the department for communities and local government yes mr mitch yes mr chairman good morning good morning members of the panel

00:00:41 panel i now call please day melanie dawes

00:00:54 good morning dave melanie you're going to make the affirmation i understand is that right yes that's right thank you well the words are there on the screen would you read them out please i do solemnly sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence i

00:01:06 declare and affirm that the evidence i shall give shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you very much and please sit down make yourself comfortable

00:01:20 is that chair not let's bring it down slightly

00:01:23 slightly all right

00:01:24 all right thank you yes mr villain yes thank you mr chairman dave melanie good morning and i can i start by thanking you very much for coming yet again to give evidence to the public inquiry we're

00:01:36 evidence to the public inquiry we're extremely grateful to you you are i think one of a handful of factual witnesses who have been asked and have been good enough to come more than once so you will know what i'm about to tell you but i will nonetheless repeat it

00:01:47 repeat it first could i ask you please to keep your voice up so that the transcriber can get your evidence down clearly on the transcript also not to nod or shake your head

00:01:56 your head you have to say yes or no as the case may be

00:01:59 may be we'll be taking breaks during the course of the day at the usual time but if you feel you need to break it any other time we can take a break and finally if there's anything i ask you which you don't understand or you would like me to repeat or put in a

00:02:11 would like me to repeat or put in a different way i can do that now um you've made three statements to the inquiry the first two of which relate to this module module four and your third statement relates to module six um which you were asked about

00:02:23 module six um which you were asked about by kate grange queen's council when you gave evidence in module six in march of this year

00:02:28 this year i won't i won't be asking you about that statement but i will be asking you about your first two statements which will appear on the screen in front of you as will all the documents to which i'm going to take you

00:02:39 going to take you let's go to that first statement then it's at clg 3030653

00:02:47 is that your first witness statement dated the 20th of may 2019 yes it is and if we go please to page 39 you can see a signature above the date is that your signature

00:02:58 above the date is that your signature yes it is your second statement is that clg three zero is three zero eight

00:03:07 date of the 3rd of november 2020 is that the first page of your second witness statement yes it is thank you and if we go please to page 15 you can see a signature there above the date uh

00:03:18 see a signature there above the date uh although it's an electronic signature can you please confirm that it is yours yes it is mine thank you

00:03:25 thank you uh have you had the opportunity to read these statements recently yes uh and can you confirm that the contents of each of these statements is true yes thank you now um i just want to ask you

00:03:36 thank you now um i just want to ask you one or two further questions about your background we've heard quite a lot of evidence already about it but just to confirm at the time of the fire at grenfell tower in june 2017. you were the civil service head of the department

00:03:47 the civil service head of the department for communities and local government dclg yes yes yes uh and that was the road i think you had held since the 1st of march 2015. yes and you left that post in february 2020

00:04:00 and you left that post in february 2020 yes yes at the time of the fire then you were is this right responsible for the overall leadership and management of the department yes at the civil service level yes at a civil service level yes

00:04:12 level yes at a civil service level yes now looking at the structure of the dclg at the time of the fire is it right that there were three commands across the department each led by a director general

00:04:21 general yes that's correct and we've heard some of a little bit of of that in module six but just to recap and help me with this and confirm the first of those commands i think was housing and planning led by

00:04:32 i think was housing and planning led by helen mcnamara yes yes and the second was local government and public services led by dr joe farah yes and we heard from her yesterday and is it right that the third was the um was

00:04:44 it right that the third was the um was simon ridley leading on economic growth and devolution yes yes and i think there were also three direct-led commands who oversaw corporate activities

00:04:55 oversaw corporate activities including finance human resources and strategy

00:04:58 strategy that's correct is it yes it is correct yes and they all reported to you today yes

00:05:04 yes um

00:05:05 um in relation to ministers i think it's right that the department had five ministers of state yes uh i believe so sometimes we had six sometimes we had five during that period but yes i think it was five at the time

00:05:18 but yes i think it was five at the time very well and one of those ministers at the time was alex sharma mp who was minister of state for housing and planning yes yes and he i think was appointed on the 13th of june 2017 so

00:05:29 appointed on the 13th of june 2017 so the day before the fire yes in the evening

00:05:32 evening in the evening yes right so he was in in post for a matter of hours yes and is it right that the secretary of state for the uh for the department was such a javid mp yes and he had been

00:05:44 such a javid mp yes and he had been appointed on the 14th of july 2016 so he'd been imposed for nine months or so yes he was reappointed after the general election in twenty seven appointed after the general election i think on the eighth of june yes

00:05:56 i think on the eighth of june yes um and they were both key ministers in responding to the grenfell tower of fire yes

00:06:01 yes yes they were now if you go please to your first witness statement page 36 paragraph 120 you say this

00:06:12 you say this at the foot of the page you say in addition the fact that some ministers were newly appointed also made their jobs harder in the early days as they learned about the issues for which they were responsible at the same time

00:06:23 they were responsible at the same time as getting to grips with the situation created by the fire in my opinion the department was very lucky to have alok sharma and sajid javid as our two key ministers at the time the fact that the secretary of state

00:06:35 the fact that the secretary of state already knew the department and had strong working relationships with the senior team was essential his and aleksandr's wholehearted commitment to helping the individuals and families affected was clear from the start

00:06:48 affected was clear from the start now was it your or is it your recollection that the very recent appointment before the fire of the minister of state for housing and planning namely alok sharma had an

00:06:59 planning namely alok sharma had an impact in in any way on the department's ability to respond to the fire well it certainly had an impact on alex sharma himself he arrived to the best of my recollection

00:07:11 arrived to the best of my recollection for the first time in the department on that wednesday morning and of course was dealing with some of the issues uh in north kensington but was also the lead minister of state on all the issues to do with building

00:07:22 all the issues to do with building safety that we were dealing with at the time so he had a very very steep learning curve to get through um i believe my colleagues in the department and particularly helen mcnamara were supporting him uh did a very good job in

00:07:35 supporting him uh did a very good job in in helping him with that but he had an enormous amount of material to absorb i think he did that extremely well but i'm sure he would have wished that he'd had you know more time to get across the brief before the crisis hit i mean

00:07:47 brief before the crisis hit i mean looked at coolly did the gradient of his learning curve have an adverse effect on his response to the fire or the department's ability perhaps to respond to the fire in the early hours

00:07:59 to the fire in the early hours um

00:08:00 um i can't honestly think of any issue where aloc's uh

00:08:04 uh newness in the role made a difference i spoke to him a number of times and i i thought he was very very quick to get to the heart of the issues that he was addressing but

00:08:15 addressing but um you know as i said it made his life a lot harder i should add that the prime minister had no choice but to appoint a new housing minister because um gavin balwell had been housing minister but had lost his seat in the general election the previous week so

00:08:27 general election the previous week so the vacancy had to be filled somehow right

00:08:30 right um i'm going to turn to a different subject before i do can i just ask you the the your voice is coming through a little bit dim somewhere and it may just be the angle to which you're sitting so far as

00:08:41 you're sitting so far as the microphone is concerned let me try that's better okay my apologies not at all

00:08:47 all right

00:08:48 right that's better thank you now can i turn then to the subject of red um now it's right that within the dclg and that may be a question sits something called red the resilience and emergencies division

00:08:59 the resilience and emergencies division is that right yes um did you have a role in the operating function of red in june or as of june 2017

00:09:08 2017 uh not specifically no i was not part of the command structure but um red um was located within dclg and as i think you may be hinting it was

00:09:19 think you may be hinting it was effectively a cross-government resource and that's how i always saw it and

00:09:25 and it was part of the overall civil contingency's machinery which was of course headed and led at a strategic level and at an operational level in the cabinet office but red's role was at the local level to do the liaison with local

00:09:38 local level to do the liaison with local resilience for and then in a crisis to be the main point of liaison between central and local governments so i always saw red as effectively pointing towards the overall cabinet office leadership but the people

00:09:50 cabinet office leadership but the people were clearly part of our department and um

00:09:53 um and and their leadership uh individuals were part of my senior team i think you've answered my next question but just to tick them off catherine richardson deputy director yes reported to you

00:10:04 to you yes she reported to jillian k who reported to joe farah right perfect that exactly um then turning to the function of dclg

00:10:14 of dclg um well sorry before i move on did any of those individuals report across government for example to anybody in the ccs

00:10:23 ccs no i don't think they did i think that's a good question um i think

00:10:30 i think julian k had wider responsibilities and not just for red as a director um catherine richardson's catherine richardson's role was entirely within

00:10:41 richardson's role was entirely within red

00:10:43 red but i don't recall there being anything like a dotted line for example which could have uh provided some management oversight and feedback and so on as part of performance reporting i don't recall that and i think it's a good question as to whether that could have been helpful

00:10:55 to whether that could have been helpful thank you now then looking at dclg and its function what is the department's function

00:11:01 function when an emergency occurs it's a broad question but can you enlighten us well um firstly there is red of course and their main function is to provide liaison between

00:11:13 between local responders and the centre of government and of course that varies depending on the nature of the crisis but that's one part of of what dclg was supposed to do as i say very much on behalf of the

00:11:24 as i say very much on behalf of the cabinet office and then we also held a number of if you like capabilities so i would include in that the bellwin financing scheme we were there to hold that system and to

00:11:36 were there to hold that system and to work out when that financing system needed to be deployed in response to a request from local responders local government um in addition to that and i think some of this was not as clear as it could

00:11:48 of this was not as clear as it could have been at the time if i'm honest um there were there was of course the national risk assessment and the national risk register and

00:11:57 and dclg as then was was

00:12:01 was had been the recovery lead for some emergencies over the preceding years and i particularly remember the floods of 2015 2016 over that winter when we took up the recovery lead role i remember

00:12:13 up the recovery lead role i remember that being a decision that was taken at the time it wasn't automatic but i knew at the time that the fire hit that we were likely to have a role in coordinating cross-government efforts on recovery but i don't believe that was as

00:12:26 recovery but i don't believe that was as clear at the time to be honest as it might have been and then finally there were certain risks on the national risk register of which we were a part um

00:12:35 um i think in 2016 2017 we were the designated lead government department for response for returning british nationals or others arriving from overseas but not in

00:12:46 others arriving from overseas but not in any other risk and so we had capabilities in red able to discharge that risk should it have materialized and should we have needed to swing in to lead any government response on it right right in

00:12:58 government response on it right right in light of that answer um was read

00:13:03 was read the dclg element which might respond in the response phase to

00:13:09 to emergencies arising out of risks other than returning nationals i don't think so no not automatically anyway so

00:13:20 anyway so i would draw a distinction between red which was a capability for the whole of government and very much part of the overall system of oversight for civil contingencies headed by the cabinet

00:13:31 contingencies headed by the cabinet office

00:13:33 office by the way i should add that one thing i don't think was a problem here was a lack of such a system or of an understanding of it in the way that there was a lack on building safety it's quite different there was a system i think the question is whether or not it

00:13:44 think the question is whether or not it had any holes in it which need to be addressed and still haven't been addressed but that's we'll come on to some of that um but i'll distinguish between that role and the role that we then played in the

00:13:55 and the role that we then played in the days following the fire on what i would call the department's core responsibilities so that included housing including temporary accommodation and it included

00:14:08 and it included some of the things we did in

00:14:11 in working with other departments to set up the victims unit later in the week and we could have and sort of did lodge that victims unit alongside the red capabilities but i don't think

00:14:22 the red capabilities but i don't think it would ever be automatic for the department to have it i think it's quite important to have a separation between red and its role and things the department might do as part of a response or recovery effort alongside

00:14:33 response or recovery effort alongside yes i see we will we may come back to the victims unit later in your evidence yes and examine what happened there um but but

00:14:42 but but coming back to the question of recovery

00:14:45 recovery which you've mentioned um

00:14:48 um is or was it the case that dc lg's involvement in the recovery phase after an emergency be dictated by the um the national risk register

00:14:59 um the national risk register so my recollection is that the national risk register had us as the recovery lead for floods and

00:15:09 and i think the understanding was that we were likely to be the recovery lead for

00:15:15 lead for other

00:15:16 other crises particularly those happening at a local level which are being led by a local authority on the ground but i don't remember that latter more general default role for dclg really being written down and i'm not sure it

00:15:28 being written down and i'm not sure it was very clear i see well let's look at that a little bit more closely in looking at the lead government department um just before i do that do you remember at the time of the fire was dclg involved in any other recovery

00:15:40 dclg involved in any other recovery phase any other emergency we had through red mobilized throughout the summer following a series of of terror attacks

00:15:52 following a series of of terror attacks at london bridge and in manchester and also earlier in the year um i recall uh westminster bridge am i right about that um but perhaps the timing was different but there had been a series of other

00:16:03 but there had been a series of other attacks so we had mobilized quite a lot along with the rest of whitehall in response to those events right and does that mean that your staff in red were to some extent already deployed in the recovery processes after those

00:16:16 the recovery processes after those emergencies i don't recall whether there was very much by way of recovery for manchester and london bridge my recollection is that the local authority and other responders were very

00:16:27 authority and other responders were very much leading on that um one small thing that we were still involved with was the remaining work following the floods of 2015 2016 because there was continued support needed for local families local

00:16:39 support needed for local families local businesses and we were holding still holding

00:16:42 holding a very small and i believe almost complete set of actions and duties on that

00:16:48 that did the continuing role of the dclg or or red perhaps but i think dclg generally

00:16:55 generally in attending to the recovery phase of those emergencies have an adverse effect on resourcing in order to deal with either the response or the recovery phase of the grenfell

00:17:06 or the recovery phase of the grenfell tower fire

00:17:09 i don't think so no um but those who were more directly involved in it would you know i would not want to say i would not want to disagree with them if they said they did feel it had an impact um

00:17:20 said they did feel it had an impact um because they would be a better place to say i think what definitely was the case was that people were very tired there had been a series of events to respond to and of course there was the finsbury park attack the following week as well

00:17:31 park attack the following week as well so i think it had been a relentless few months for red and indeed for the civil contingencies secretary and the cabinet office

00:17:38 office now turning then to the topic of lead government department we've heard evidence from katherine hammond from the ccs about that at the time of the fire was dclg acting

00:17:51 at the time of the fire was dclg acting as the lead government department in any other

00:17:54 other existing emergency apart from the very small remaining legacy issues on the floods no and what did you understand the role of the lead government department to be

00:18:07 the lead government department to be the lead government department for response is that is that what you're referring to or recovery well take okay so the lead government department for response of course dclg didn't

00:18:18 for response of course dclg didn't really have any of those responsibilities apart from that that quite narrow question of of handling um people arriving from overseas um

00:18:28 um but my understanding is that such a department should have got plans in place should have thought about the sorts of issues that would arise um should be thinking about

00:18:39 um should be thinking about who they were turning to to lead the recovery effort as part of their response planning and would be liaising with the cabinet office on working out whether or not the cobra machinery needed to be mobilized

00:18:50 cobra machinery needed to be mobilized or any cross-government ministerial meetings needed to be mobilized in response to a crisis as recovery as recovery um

00:19:02 i mean that really does depend and of course a lot of the time there isn't a particular need for central government to get involved in recovery but there

00:19:09 but there i would expect the recovery department to be owning whatever the cross-government set of activities were that needed to be carried out and if it was only maybe one department involved i wouldn't necessarily expect there to be

00:19:20 wouldn't necessarily expect there to be a very big cross-government recovery effort to be needed but for something like grenfell tower or indeed the floods you've got lots of departments involved business department and all sorts around the table and so the

00:19:33 all sorts around the table and so the role of the recovery department is to coordinate that with support from ccs in the first instance but actually in the end operating on their own because typically you're talking about these things continuing over a long period of time dr farah told us i think yesterday

00:19:45 time dr farah told us i think yesterday that

00:19:46 that um the the role of elite department government department was to act as first point of contact but not to be operational on the ground oh yes that's absolutely clear um i should have said

00:19:57 absolutely clear um i should have said that already really the key principle within all the civil contingencies um guidance and planning is that of locally led um response in terms of the

00:20:08 locally led um response in terms of the substance the substantive response that's needed to support the communities that are affected now can i show you a document hom3013085

00:20:18 please

00:20:24 this is a document entitled department's responsibilities for planning response and recovery from emergencies march uh were 2009. familiar with this document

00:20:36 familiar with this document not particularly known it's a document as you can see prepared in march 2009 but catherine hammond told us in her evidence that she thought it was still current as of june 2017 but without accord with your recollection uh yes

00:20:49 accord with your recollection uh yes especially if catherine had confirmed that right uh i see um so you can't do better than her

00:20:55 her you can't confirm no i can't really add anything to her recollection though she was much closer to that and to the operational leadership of it right let's then go to page five please

00:21:06 right let's then go to page five please item 10 bottom of the page hazardous materials

00:21:10 materials chemical biological or radiological materials released other than as a result of terrorist activity and we're not covered in nine above or 11 below 11 and nine above is radiation hazards

00:21:24 11 and nine above is radiation hazards and 11 below take this from me a serious industrial accident and you can see from that

00:21:32 that that the

00:21:35 lead government uh on recovery there are the the columns i should just explain are risk in the left-hand column central column is is response and right-hand column is

00:21:48 response and right-hand column is recovery

00:21:50 recovery the clg is the lead government department for recovery where mainly displaced people or wider disruption occurs in relation to an event

00:22:03 from a hazardous material does that accord with your recollection yes it does and over the page if we look at item 11 serious industrial accidents

00:22:16 serious industrial accidents you can see there that

00:22:20 it says a to c which is impact on transport impact on power impact or built environment sorry um so sorry uh hsc wider economic and commercial impact

00:22:33 hsc wider economic and commercial impact pollution arising from if you look at the very top on the right-hand side it says clg if wide-ranging issue you see that yes and then um item 12 severe storms and weather

00:22:45 severe storms and weather a to c is impact on transport impact on power impact on built environment and then on the right in the right hand column a to c significant recovery activity unlikely and

00:22:55 and lead likely therefore likely to remain with response lead department unless otherwise determined if wide-ranging consequences arise um

00:23:06 um now that

00:23:08 now that they are um examples i think of where um

00:23:14 where um the dclg is listed as a lead uh in the

00:23:19 uh in the in the response

00:23:23 um in the recovery in the well well um yeah in the recovery the recovery phase as lgd

00:23:33 again with that accord with your recollection looking at this document well yes it would i think though that it's important to say that those are all conditional statements if wide-ranging issues if significant displacement of

00:23:45 issues if significant displacement of people on the previous page so my understanding at the time was that

00:23:52 was that there was

00:23:53 there was probably a default and i believe catherine hammond said this in one of her witness statements a default that dclg would lead recovery in these sorts of circumstances but i don't think it was automatic

00:24:05 but i don't think it was automatic and that was why on the morning of the fire i rang joe farah or messaged her first thing to say i think we'll be leading the recovery here because i didn't think it was automatic

00:24:16 because i didn't think it was automatic and i thought it was quite important that we stepped in straight away and didn't wait to be asked and that's what we did

00:24:23 we did however

00:24:24 however i don't think it was clear and i don't recall at any point anybody asking us to do that um and i don't particularly in fact i don't at all recall the home office

00:24:35 don't at all recall the home office asking us as the league department for response after grenfell talking to us as the recovery partner we just did it right now just looking into the central column

00:24:45 column the reason i asked you about response is because if you look at c impact on built environment england the response phase is uh with the clg in the in the response

00:24:58 uh with the clg in the in the response phase see that in response to severe storms and where they yes so that is an example isn't it where the clg is

00:25:07 clg is uh

00:25:08 uh the lead government department in the response phase albeit in a in a particular impact arising as a result of severe storms and weather yes i have to say that i don't recall

00:25:19 yes i have to say that i don't recall that happening during the floods of 2015 when there was an impact on the built environment in the sense that people had to leave their homes and businesses had to leave their businesses but defra were firmly in the lead on the

00:25:30 but defra were firmly in the lead on the response what we picked up was the recovery issues right

00:25:37 i see and then if you go over the page to item 15 page seven you you can see earthquake earthquakes uh and their england clg in

00:25:50 earthquakes uh and their england clg in the the

00:25:51 the the uh response phase yes yes i'm not sure that that column sorry that row was still there by the time of the 2016 risk assessment right earthquakes i mean i don't recall that

00:26:04 earthquakes i mean i don't recall that right

00:26:05 right and if you go finally to page 9 please item 24

00:26:10 item 24 this i think is the instance you were referring to before which is um reception and housing of uk citizens evacuated from overseas england clg

00:26:21 evacuated from overseas england clg in both phases yes both response and recovery yes and the department held capability to be able to respond in those circumstances through red right

00:26:32 right now look at looking at um item 24 there can you tell us whether the response and recovery for dclg in the reception and housing of uk citizens evacuated from overseas would entail

00:26:44 evacuated from overseas would entail dclg's involvement in housing those who'd been displaced yes i think it would have done in my time in dclg i don't recall this becoming relevant

00:26:55 i don't recall this becoming relevant but i did when i was at the cabinet office prior to that pick up as one of my duties leading the emergency planning for eurozone scenarios which included

00:27:06 eurozone scenarios which included the possibility of countries in the eurozone leaving the eurozone and all the potential monetary and fiscal consequences that could have resulted from that which may well have led to citizens being evacuated and

00:27:18 led to citizens being evacuated and coming home to the uk and so i remember at the time coordinating that from the cabinet office requiring dclg to have their plans ready and that was definitely about liaising with local authorities

00:27:30 about liaising with local authorities and it was quite challenging because you didn't know where exactly people might come home to and what their housing needs might be so i remember those discussions at that point

00:27:39 point and i've shown you i think three examples of where the where the clg is lead department in the in the response phase um severe storms and weather impact on

00:27:50 severe storms and weather impact on built environment earthquakes uh and

00:27:55 uh and reception and housing of uk citizens evacuated from overseas um

00:28:00 um each of those i think would have a re-housing uh

00:28:06 uh aspect wouldn't they yes they would i'm really not sure that the earthquakes or indeed the built environment in response to storms were still there at the time of the 2016-17

00:28:18 2016-17 risk register my apologies if i'm wrong about that but my recollection is that the risk register slightly changed and that what was left was was this

00:28:27 was this one here under row 24 but yes you're right it would have involved different forms of rehousing challenge but i do yes and that would have been as much a recovery

00:28:39 much a recovery um

00:28:40 um thing as a as a response issue

00:28:44 issue you know

00:28:45 you know it appears that this as as catherine hammond told us this document remained the same uh

00:28:51 uh in june 2017 as it had in march 2009 on that basis just looking at the paperwork it seems as if the dclg did have a lead role in the response phase of an emergency in

00:29:03 in the response phase of an emergency in those three instances and each of those would you accept involved as an outcome potentially mass displacement of individuals from their homes

00:29:13 homes yes i would accept that and indeed i observed that during the flood so lots of people who needed to be re-housed locally

00:29:20 locally um in the in the floods of 2015 2016 and that was managed quite effectively as i recall by the local councils of which there were many which were involved yeah

00:29:31 yeah just just help help us with this is there or do you know whether there was a system in place whereby this document would be updated uh um

00:29:41 uh um annually or biennially to reflect revisions in the national risk register

00:29:49 well the reason why i am perhaps a little bit you know confused by this is that my understanding was that the national risk register was updated quite frequently and that the most relevant version at the time of the

00:30:01 relevant version at the time of the grenfell tower fire was an update from early 2017 for which the work had been done mostly during 2016 and that that had changed the risks that compared to the ones shown in this document so

00:30:13 the ones shown in this document so i'm not going to disagree with those who are closer to this about which document was extant at the time but i my understanding was that the most relevant risk register was much more recent than than this one

00:30:24 than this one now thank you now if you go to your first statement uh we can move on with the point i think uh paragraph 14 please page five

00:30:34 you say there in the first bullet point there was no precedent for an emergency that left so many households homeless and in crisis while the department was not involved in providing emergency and temporary

00:30:46 providing emergency and temporary accommodation we were quickly drawn into the longer term housing re-housing challenge

00:30:52 challenge i cannot recall another occasion when the department had to work with the council on long-term rehousing of individual families in this way would you agree that uh it's envisaged from the list of

00:31:04 that uh it's envisaged from the list of lead government departments that we've just been looking at that the dclg are or are supposed to be involved in the recovery phase at least where complex matters or wide-ranging issues

00:31:15 complex matters or wide-ranging issues are involved particularly housing yes if those issues are presented in response to events however i think uh you would always expect the council to be leading on those re-housing

00:31:27 to be leading on those re-housing efforts as indeed they did after grenfell tower even after the first week or so they were still in the lead so the department's role would have been to think about what support might be needed

00:31:38 think about what support might be needed um i i still cannot recall any event where the department had to lean in so extensively on the longer term rehousing challenge and that was for a number of reasons after grenfell not least the

00:31:50 reasons after grenfell not least the fact that this was the most expensive housing market in the country that we were dealing with and the need to re-house people close to where they had lived before made it an extremely difficult challenge and a very expensive

00:32:01 difficult challenge and a very expensive one which was why the government lent in with so much resource so i still think i stand by this bullet i still think that there was no precedent for quite the circumstances that we were faced and

00:32:12 circumstances that we were faced and that the council was faced with after the grenfell tower fire right well let's just see if we can take that in stage first would you agree that it was envisaged from the documents we've been looking at that the dclg would be involved in the recovery stage where

00:32:24 involved in the recovery stage where people were displaced there was mass displacement yes in those circumstances although i can't think of an example where that had happened

00:32:34 happened and where permanent rehousing was needed because after the floods this was temporary rehousing not permanent rehousing that was needed yes but we also see that the displacement could include housing of uk citizens

00:32:46 include housing of uk citizens uh evacuated from overseas yes to the extent that any government or local government support was needed for that uh that was potentially something that that the government might have needed to have got involved in yes

00:32:58 needed to have got involved in yes and do you agree that that could reasonably uh involve very large numbers of people well as i said earlier it it could have done but um i think the circumstances of

00:33:10 done but um i think the circumstances of grenfell where there was a very large number of people requiring social housing in other words provided by the state

00:33:17 state um and paid for and subsidized by the state

00:33:21 state in a local area and with so many others whose homes were also damaged um uh from the other buildings surrounding grenfell um i would not have expected

00:33:32 um i would not have expected the

00:33:33 the for example the the movement of people following a eurozone crisis to have had that same local very intense impact and need for the housing teams locally that was i think quite unusual

00:33:46 locally that was i think quite unusual and in the case of floods often you're talking about people who own their own homes and whose first port of call will yes perhaps be to go to hotels provided for by their local council but

00:33:58 provided for by their local council but again

00:33:59 again not with the same level of trauma i think that's the other thing that's important that was very different about grenfell that just made the whole set of circumstances so difficult and so much more in need of

00:34:10 difficult and so much more in need of central government support in a number of different respects what i'm really trying to get at is whether you might agree that the displacement of large numbers of people was a an outcome which the

00:34:21 people was a an outcome which the department might reasonably have anticipated given its predetermined role in the recovery phase of a number of uh

00:34:30 uh emergencies yes i think we might have anticipated it but i don't think we had experienced it before

00:34:37 before no

00:34:38 no that i follow and you say there's no precedent for an emergency but the fact that there wasn't a precedent for an emergency on with an outcome of this scale i i think you're accepting is this right

00:34:49 i i think you're accepting is this right is not itself a reason for not anticipating it and preparing for it no but i i think to have anticipated this particular set of circumstances

00:35:00 this particular set of circumstances would have been quite surprising i i think for a reasonable worst case scenario planning to have anticipated this and i've just you know

00:35:09 you know mentioned the words in crisis they were people were homeless and in crisis following an unbelievably traumatic set of events so i'm not denying that some of the planning would have been useful but i

00:35:20 planning would have been useful but i think

00:35:20 think in response to grenfell it's unlikely that it would have taken us to quite the situation that was being experienced

00:35:31 are you drawing a distinction in your evidence between reasonably anticipating mass display displacement as an outcome as a result of floods

00:35:42 as a result of floods in those parts of the country where they have been experienced on the one hand and mass displacement of

00:35:50 of densely housed individuals in social housing in an urban environment on the other

00:35:56 other in part yes i think i'm also um thinking of other previous events such as for example lachenal house which i was not involved in and i have no recollection of myself but my

00:36:07 recollection of myself but my understanding there is that the local council managed that re-housing effort at least i'm not aware of any particular issues surrounding that at the time so i think a lot of what the department

00:36:20 so i think a lot of what the department was was thinking in working out how to prepare for any potential recovery leads that we might have had was a reasonably uh

00:36:31 uh good track record of local councils actually managing their any local rehousing need uh pretty well on their own and and indeed the following week uh the week following the grenfell tower fire we saw camden

00:36:43 grenfell tower fire we saw camden council we house hundreds of people following the evacuation of the five blocks because there were fire safety issues on that friday the week following the fire and

00:36:54 friday the week following the fire and there was a panel under the response hotels were provided people were looked after and there was no need on that occasion for central government to get involved at all we were aware of what was going on but we weren't involved at

00:37:05 was going on but we weren't involved at all so i think there was a very strong track record actually of of local councils being quite effective at rehousing people both temporarily and in the rare circumstances that were needed permanently

00:37:17 needed permanently does that tell us is that answer tell us and tell me if i misunderstood your evidence dave melanie but does that tell us that the degree and uh nature of the preparation of dclg for

00:37:30 uh nature of the preparation of dclg for mass displacement following

00:37:33 following uh an emergency was conditioned upon the role that the local authority might play in the first instance well yes it would always be conditioned on the role that the local authority uh would be expected to play first they

00:37:46 would be expected to play first they were the ones with the housing duties they were the first responders and we would always have expected them to be discharging their duties in in this case very specific duties in relation to housing homeless people in fact

00:37:58 housing homeless people in fact so

00:37:59 so um

00:38:01 um i don't think it's really that surprising that the department had not previously stepped in on a rehousing challenge like this and therefore therefore was not particularly expecting that it needed to in response

00:38:12 expecting that it needed to in response to grenfell tower i think with the benefit of hindsight the scale of the rehousing challenge was so immense and the trauma of those who needed to be rehoused was so extreme that this was

00:38:23 rehoused was so extreme that this was categorically different in the sense it was in a different category of crisis and i think we we

00:38:31 we recognized that quite early actually on the wednesday and began to sweep in on the housing issues and indeed that was the one thing where the council did say that they needed help and i think they realized that particularly the longer

00:38:42 realized that particularly the longer term challenge was going to be something where they needed financial support now looking at the list and we don't need to give action to anything unless you'd like to but looking at the 2009 list of relevant government departments for both

00:38:53 relevant government departments for both response and recovery is it right that there was no lead government department for fire yes that's my recollection yes do you know why that was no

00:39:04 know why that was no did did you ever ask that question at the time no now we know that in the response phase um following the fire at grenfell tower the home office was the lead government

00:39:15 the home office was the lead government department yes yes

00:39:18 yes yes and

00:39:19 and do you know why they were the lead government department well my understanding is that fire was added to the national risk register later and not a fire specifically in a

00:39:30 later and not a fire specifically in a town block in an urban area but in a more general sense and that the home office as the lead government department for fire were given that lead uh government department role for the response so is it right there was there

00:39:41 response so is it right there was there for a policy that um or convention perhaps is a better word whereby um

00:39:48 um the response would sit with the department into whose remit the event creating the emergency fell that seems to have been the case yes so for fire is this right after january 2016 that was the home home department

00:40:01 2016 that was the home home department yes but before the transfer of the responsibility for fire to the home department that would have been that that would have been dclg yes that's right

00:40:13 that's right and in respect of the recovery phase after grenfell um we're told that dclg became the lead department lead government department yes that's right is it that is correct do you know when it exactly or even not

00:40:25 do you know when it exactly or even not exactly but within a reasonable time frame um dclg took over the role of lead government department do you mean after a grant after the grandfather yes um

00:40:36 grandfather yes um well no i don't think it's very clear to be honest um and i think there is a wider point here that

00:40:43 that um

00:40:45 um the home office were the lead government department but um

00:40:51 um i think they saw that role primarily as observing and checking the blue light response and in the early ministerial meetings it was the um

00:41:01 um it was the fire and police representatives who were those who were most being called upon to provide information is my recollection i wasn't at the first two ministerial meetings but that was certainly what i was told and that's

00:41:12 certainly what i was told and that's what i observed at the later meetings so i think the home office's role as league government department was seen by them as fairly narrow um

00:41:21 um i think that on the recovery side as i was saying earlier and as i mentioned in my witness statement one of the first things i did on that morning was to contact joe farah and say we will

00:41:32 was to contact joe farah and say we will be leading on the recovery i believe and i did that because joe had been in the department for 10 months but had not to the best of my recollection experienced a major crisis through which dclg would be responding and i just

00:41:43 dclg would be responding and i just wanted her to be really clear that that was my expectation um i don't recall though any moment in the subsequent days where the cabinet office in the form of ccs

00:41:55 the cabinet office in the form of ccs actually said you know who's doing the recovery phase it's you dclg please explain to us how you're doing this work we just simply stepped into that space and i can see having read others witness

00:42:07 and i can see having read others witness statements that i think they began to return to that recovery question really on the saturday um that's in catherine hammond's witness statement and at that point i began to have conversations with mark sedwell

00:42:18 have conversations with mark sedwell about

00:42:19 about the recovery phase and how it should look and whether or not we needed a designated gold lead for whitehall as a whole well we'll come to the to the events

00:42:27 events um a little bit more closely later on just for the moment can you tell us what were dc lg's responsibilities as you understood them at the time of dclg as a lead government department

00:42:39 of dclg as a lead government department in the recovery phase our role would have been to coordinate a wider cross-government effort i think that's the sort of thing we did on the victim support side for example

00:42:52 victim support side for example and also in making sure that issues like immigration issues for some of the families

00:43:00 families all of those practical questions like driving licences and and bank accounts and

00:43:08 benefits payments those were areas where the cabinet office was leading in the first instance but where i would have expected quite a long tale of recovery work potentially and that we would have been in the leading coordinating that

00:43:20 been in the leading coordinating that um i would also have expected that that we would have been in the lead anyway even if someone else was leading the recovery on the housing issues which we were

00:43:29 were now would you agree i think that you think you do that in ensuring the right arrangements for the recovery phase uh should be all in place already as a standing preparedness

00:43:41 standing preparedness for any lead government department responsible for recovery yes i do yeah yeah now if we go to your uh first statement please again and go to page five

00:43:54 please again and go to page five and stick with that go up a paragraph to page to paragraph 13 you say that some elements of the department's contribution to the response to and recovery from the grenfell tower fire but therefore well rehearsed

00:44:06 but therefore well rehearsed the red teams performed their usual role belwin was activated very quickly and the department took on the role of coordinating the central government contribution to recovery a role it continues to have

00:44:18 continues to have was there any aspect which you considered was not well rehearsed

00:44:34 well i think on the housing side we had not

00:44:37 not previously thought through uh what a longer-term rehousing challenge might look like on this scale and i think the scale matters because if

00:44:48 and i think the scale matters because if it was only a few families i don't think we would have needed to have been involved but it was the numbers and the extreme circumstances in which those people were in that made this so difficult

00:45:00 and so we had not rehearsed before what we would do if there was a huge rehousing challenge in a very very expensive local authority that had almost no spare social housing um

00:45:10 um and

00:45:13 i'm not sure to be honest that that kind of scale of challenge is really what is anticipated by the scenarios in the national risk register either i think that government as a whole had a presumption that the local authority would normally deal with that

00:45:25 would normally deal with that and i think we were ready actually although we were not rehearsed we were ready to respond to that housing challenge and we were able to send some people to help and we were also ready um

00:45:36 um you know with finance the homes and communities agency stepped in to help try to find actual homes and to work with developers towards that so so we

00:45:47 so we we were ready and i think we deployed quickly but we were not rehearsed on that longer term rehousing challenge which as i said i believe was unprecedented to the best of my knowledge and recollection

00:45:59 knowledge and recollection just ask did you have any um

00:46:02 um plans to put it that way as to where you would go to find all this additional housing

00:46:08 housing no we didn't want to give much thought to how you obtain it no and of course the homes and communities agency didn't have a role in london anyway so even if we had had a plan it would almost certainly not have

00:46:21 plan it would almost certainly not have covered london as well as it would have covered other parts of england um

00:46:27 i think it's you always have to think with planning as to what the scenarios are that you're planning for and um

00:46:37 i i still believe that the number of circumstances in which a local authority can't manage this on their own

00:46:43 their own are going to be very small and quite exceptional and so if this had happened in even in another urban conibation like birmingham or manchester the homes and communities agency i'm sure would have

00:46:55 communities agency i'm sure would have stepped forward to talk to the council because the hca owns land it's often developing sites it has a very strong relationship with local developers and offering that help is something it would have been able to do

00:47:06 have been able to do should it have been doing more planning in advance for performing that role i'm not sure

00:47:11 not sure whether that would have helped if i'm honest because they had a capability we deployed it quite quickly and it did actually make a difference albeit that nothing was really able to cope with the scale of the problem that

00:47:22 cope with the scale of the problem that we were facing all right thank you can i just tease out a further distinction arising from what you've just said i mean in your statements of paragraph 13 and 14 here you you have

00:47:34 you you have said what was well rehearsed and then said in other respects the department's contribution to the relief effort was unprecedented so you're

00:47:43 so you're i think would this be fair to you that your explanation for those elements which were not well rehearsed were the unprecedented nature of the outcome

00:47:54 outcome yes right

00:47:56 yes right now to what extent in the outcome was there a difference in that lack of preparedness between on the one hand grenfell tower being social housing

00:48:07 being social housing uh and on the other hand uh another building in the borough being privately owned and full of um

00:48:15 um tenants

00:48:16 tenants leasehold leaseholders owning their own flats

00:48:21 i think there is a difference um and it's it's a number of different factors that create the difference i mean in the private sector

00:48:33 private sector where people own their own homes then there will be insurance and

00:48:41 people are not looking to the government to provide them with a long-term housing solution

00:48:47 solution i think that is one very important difference i think the other difference is that

00:48:54 that some of the families in grenfell tower were

00:48:56 were there as temporary accommodations so they were already actually involved with the council's housing department and had an expectation that i think was justified that

00:49:07 justified that the council was going to step in and support them very very quickly and

00:49:11 and so

00:49:12 so i

00:49:13 i i think just the nature the nature of social housing is very different so

00:49:18 so i think the obligation on the authorities was different and particularly on the local authority and that's partly a legal point in terms of temporary accommodation but it's also just

00:49:26 just the nature of what families needed so was the thinking at the time doing the best you can that there was no need to include mass displacement

00:49:38 mass displacement of social tenants as a result of a disaster in their building

00:49:44 building because

00:49:45 because the response of the local council was reliable enough to take up the the recovery phase

00:49:54 well i think the assumption was firstly that the local authority was responsible secondly that this was an area where local government was

00:50:05 local government was very clear in its responsibilities and

00:50:09 and despite the fact that the situation at the time was very challenging especially in london and we were certainly aware that there were real challenges for local authorities in finding temporary accommodation that was adequate or permanent accommodation

00:50:21 permanent accommodation we believed that they knew what they had to do

00:50:25 and so from that point of view i wouldn't have expected the department to feel that it needed to be looking over the shoulder of local authorities and checking that they were dealing with

00:50:37 checking that they were dealing with certainly the temporary response to a housing challenge and

00:50:41 and on a more permanent response you've got a bit more time there to think about the issues and i would have expected a local authority to come to us and say this is where we need help not least because it's often

00:50:52 need help not least because it's often going to be involving financial help which may be beyond their means which indeed is what happened even to kensington and chelsea um

00:51:01 um i hope that's helpful but it's fair to say i think is it from your understanding of the civil contingencies uh framework that even if a

00:51:13 uh framework that even if a privately owned block had um suffered the same disaster as grenfell tower had uh rbkc

00:51:21 uh rbkc assuming that it had happened in that borough would be a category one responder yes of course and hotel accommodation um certainly the wider range of support that might be needed for people you would have expected the

00:51:33 for people you would have expected the council to be uh to be able to provide all of those things but um and i'm speaking beyond any direct knowledge and about a scenario that i'm not aware of having really happened in quite the same way but you would have uh

00:51:46 quite the same way but you would have uh i think when people own their own properties they have recourse to funding and insurance that is different and a different expectation from the of what the local authority is expected to offer them and indeed what they want

00:51:58 to offer them and indeed what they want to be offered so

00:52:01 so does it come to this and maybe i'm putting it a little bit bluntly but when it came to preparedness in

00:52:08 in for the outcome of mass displacement as a result of a fire or perhaps structural collapse of a tower block uh

00:52:16 uh dclg's preparedness uh was uh

00:52:20 uh it was adversely affected by an assumption first that it was privately owned um the tenants were insured and could look after themselves uh but if it was socially if it was social housing

00:52:32 was socially if it was social housing then the local council would take up the recovery

00:52:36 recovery well i think that's what we would expect yes

00:52:39 yes however

00:52:40 however there was no mention of a fire on the national risk register of this nature at all as far as i'm aware

00:52:47 aware um even in 2016-17 and that has subsequently been changed and a major residential fire has been added but uh that risk wasn't catered for the

00:52:59 but uh that risk wasn't catered for the national risk register had it been i think the lead government department would have been the home office

00:53:06 office and i don't believe that that planning for response had really been done in government but i also believe that my own department's assumption that that the first response must be with the

00:53:18 that the first response must be with the local authority whether it's a private or a public sector block was was correct and all the history we had was that local authorities were pretty good at this actually

00:53:29 this actually they knew how to deal with temporary crises they had resilience arrangements with other boroughs particularly in london that they could draw on and so although the circumstances of grenfell tower were very exceptional

00:53:41 grenfell tower were very exceptional i think we were right to assume that the council would step forward into the temporary re-housing effort rather better than it actually did

00:53:50 let's then turn to the events themselves and we start on the 14th of june and can we start with a clg402877

00:54:07 and if we look together at the email at the foot of the page uh timed at 907 in the morning of that day it comes from your office to nicholas holgate

00:54:18 nicholas holgate copied to joe farah subject fire incident

00:54:22 incident and uh you say nick i just wanted to express how shocked and sad i was to hear about the terrible fire at grenfell tower this morning

00:54:32 morning we are ready to help however we can from central government joe farah from dclg is already leading on this obviously today you'll be dealing with the immediate response but do let us know as

00:54:43 immediate response but do let us know as and when it's helpful if there is anything we can do would it be correct to say that this email suggests that you didn't think that rbkc would require assistance from dclg in the immediate response at least

00:54:55 dclg in the immediate response at least that day

00:54:58 i think my email is pretty open in offering support as and when it is helpful if there is anything we can do

00:55:09 obviously the last thing you would want to do particularly only a few hours after a crisis like this has first started is to get in the way from central government but um

00:55:20 but um i think this is a pretty open-ended offer

00:55:23 offer did you think at the time that assistance from the department would be required immediately either in the response phase or very early in stages in the recovery phase

00:55:34 early in stages in the recovery phase well i

00:55:35 well i don't think i really knew at that point

00:55:40 it was it was clear within a matter of hours certainly by mid-afternoon that

00:55:46 that they were going to need some help with the longer term rehousing challenge and we swept in to support them on that actually on wednesday evening and certainly on thursday both from the department and through the

00:55:57 both from the department and through the homes and communities agency but more widely

00:56:01 widely i don't think i knew at that point and this is you know nine o'clock in the morning my priority was just to reach out to the council and make sure that they knew we were there and to make an offer of support and to

00:56:13 and to make an offer of support and to make contact what was it about the incident that you knew at 907 that morning that prompted you to offer central government's assistance

00:56:25 assistance well i was aware of of course that you know the bellwin scheme the support for families and individuals that were subsequently provided the um sums of money that were paid out

00:56:38 sums of money that were paid out through government uh support um those were two very specific things that must have been in my mind at the time i don't recall sitting in and writing a list or or itemizing it or anything like

00:56:50 list or or itemizing it or anything like that but i knew that central government support was like to be needed particularly financial support yes

00:56:56 yes the question i had was really one of impression what impression had you gained from what you knew at the time which prompted you to offer central government help as opposed to thinking

00:57:08 government help as opposed to thinking that

00:57:09 that it's the council's responsibility and they can cope without central government assistance well simply the tower itself and the scale of the of the fire and the damage that was clearly going to be an enormous

00:57:20 that was clearly going to be an enormous amount of work uh

00:57:22 uh and require as it has done a huge amount of financial um commitment to to to support and you know just just the scale of that made this obviously

00:57:33 of that made this obviously an enormous incident where it was unlikely that anyone was going to be able to to cope on its own i mean at the time i wasn't i don't think particularly thinking about the humanitarian

00:57:46 thinking about the humanitarian support for families which i would have seen as very much for the council to lead so i was more i suspect but to be honest i'm really now inferring something about

00:57:57 i'm really now inferring something about what i was thinking five years ago and i don't want to go too far in that or i might mislead you but i was i was

00:58:03 i was i don't think i need i don't think i really thought about about the fact that they would need help it just seemed so obvious that they would

00:58:10 would given the scale of what it happened i i have to say that i read this was your first contact with tolgate yes it was yeah i i read it as being uh

00:58:20 being uh not entirely unconventional expression of support

00:58:26 not in so you well i mean i would exp if you're going to make contact with him your your department's responsible for local government yeah i don't find it surprising that you should make uh

00:58:38 make uh contact in these terms offering support without anything specific just as a as a measure of solidarity just to show that i was there really that we were there and i i knew nick colgate a little

00:58:50 there and i i knew nick colgate a little bit we had uh worked together in the treasury some years before i didn't know him very well i didn't have his phone number

00:58:56 number but just as a matter of human connection that was partly what i was trying to do and i mean my second paragraph starts we are ready to help however we can from central government

00:59:08 central government yes

00:59:09 yes um and you go on to say jo farah from dclg is already leading on this uh what was she leading on at that point so she um

00:59:18 so she um as our

00:59:20 as our director general for local government and also as the overall director general on red um i knew joe would be involved in thinking about the local aspects of this and what was going on in north kensington particularly

00:59:32 kensington particularly uh

00:59:34 uh not the housing issues i mean this is still very early in the day for us to have really worked out what we were dealing with to be honest uh and so later helen mcnamara later in the day in fact was very clearly leading on the re-housing issues with the council but i

00:59:46 re-housing issues with the council but i would have expected and indeed my conversation with joe earlier in the day had uh

00:59:52 had uh i think

00:59:53 i think created an agreement amongst us that she was leading on the wider issues around the local response

01:00:00 earlier in the day do you remember when um

01:00:03 um i believe it was um

01:00:07 um at around 7 or 7 30 in the morning that i contacted joe it's in my first witness statement i believe right let's see if i think we can probably short circuit that question can we go to

01:00:18 that question can we go to uh clg three zeros three zero four one four please page five what i'm showing you um dame melanie is dr farah's witness statement at

01:00:29 dr farah's witness statement at paragraph 20 and she says i spoke to by phone to melanie dawes at around 7 45 am on my way into the department we discussed the fire red's response and involvement mhclg's role in supporting a

01:00:42 involvement mhclg's role in supporting a locally led recovery effort and mhclg's responsibilities in relation to housing and building safety given the location of grenfell tower it was obvious that our bkc would have a key role in the

01:00:54 our bkc would have a key role in the relief effort melanie dawes indicated she knew nicolas hellgate during her time at hm treasury and would contact him to offer government's support uh does dr farah's recollection of that

01:01:06 uh does dr farah's recollection of that telephone conversation accord with yours yes and as you've told us in just now

01:01:13 just now as she says in the last sentence you knew nicholas holgate from hm treasury your time there yes i didn't know him very well but we had worked alongside each other for a number of years and i had seen him once or twice since i

01:01:24 had seen him once or twice since i arrived at the department um

01:01:27 um because of his role at rbkc but i hadn't visited the council or particularly got to know them can we then go back to the email chain please at clg402877

01:01:39 please at clg402877 uh we can see nicholas holgate's response to you the uh the next email up on page one at 909

01:01:47 909 many thanks plenty of blue light resource at present do you remember what your reaction to that was

01:01:53 that was i was a bit surprised i didn't really think it was uh

01:01:59 uh an answer to my email to be honest um the fact that there's plenty of blue light resource didn't really seem to me to

01:02:09 be especially relevant to be honest to what i thought i was offering in my previous email which was a much more general

01:02:16 general support for the council as opposed to the blue light resource which was was clearly part of the immediate response but was

01:02:23 but was in some ways rather distinct from what the council were going to need to do so i was a little bit surprised i then went into a whole morning of meetings um and

01:02:33 and didn't give it much further thought until um later in the afternoon now um let's see just moving forward into the day a little bit more if you can help us with a date um can we

01:02:46 if you can help us with a date um can we go please to your first witness statement page nine paragraph 23 and you describe communication there with the council uh and this is under the um the broader

01:02:58 uh and this is under the um the broader heading i think of the 14th of june um

01:03:03 um if you go to i

01:03:07 i can tell you take it from me without scrolling up this this part of the statement deals with events on the 14th of june

01:03:13 of june and if you go five lines down from the start of the paragraph you can see um you say joe farah spoke to him that's nicholas holgate

01:03:24 to him that's nicholas holgate yes at 12 30. yes she actually spoke to him at 12 30 on the 15th of june which i clarified with my second witness exactly fine so that's that that's that's clear yes now um

01:03:35 yes now um nonetheless let's just um

01:03:38 read on to the end of paragraph 23 uh you say as confirmed by their by email their initial view based on lbkc's strong record track

01:03:49 based on lbkc's strong record track record of service delivery and their relatively healthy financial position was that there were no risks to flag we thought that our bkc's partnership arrangements with westminster council and the general strength of crossborough working in london as it recently has had

01:04:02 working in london as it recently has had been recently demonstrated during the westminster bridge and london bridge terror attacks would further enable them to cope with a disaster on this scale

01:04:11 did you in fact have a conversation with joe farah on the 14th of june regarding the council's ability to manage as you set out here or did that conversation take place and only take

01:04:23 conversation take place and only take place on the 15th of june i can't recall and my apologies that i uh

01:04:30 uh got the date wrong when i was writing my first witness statement so i did place these events on the 14th of june um the email that would help me to

01:04:42 um the email that would help me to clarify that is the one that came from the local government risk teams in response to jo's request which uh and whether that was on wednesday or thursday my recollection is it might have been thursday

01:04:53 have been thursday but what so that would that would tie some of these conversations to thursday rather than wednesday but i i spoke to joe a number of times during the wednesday

01:05:04 during the wednesday and

01:05:05 and um so i i i'm pretty certain we will have spoken about the council before the end of that first day once again and not just first thing in the morning

01:05:16 just building up a little further then were you aware that joe farah had sought information from her oversight and risk teams about whether there were any general concerns about our bkc yes i was and i think she and i

01:05:29 yes i was and i think she and i discussed it before she did it and it's probably helpful just to clarify what those teams were and what the information was that they were giving us

01:05:36 giving us when i arrived in the department in 2015 the audit commission had just been abolished and i was very concerned that i didn't have any oversight function that allowed me to discharge my

01:05:47 that allowed me to discharge my responsibilities as a counting officer particularly for the overall financial health of the local government system with 45 billion pounds a year of money going through the department's own accounts

01:05:59 the department's own accounts and so i set up a very small but quite focused team of about 10 or 15 people and they held an overview with support from the local government association of all councils on three dimensions

01:06:13 of all councils on three dimensions finance leadership and service delivery the service delivery element was pretty much entirely focused on children's social care and adult social care in other words services for vulnerable

01:06:25 other words services for vulnerable people

01:06:26 people not wider

01:06:27 not wider services and certainly not resilience planning

01:06:30 planning so in seeking information for those teams from those teams what joe and i were doing was and i believe i was involved in this before she did it was asking is there a red flag

01:06:42 was asking is there a red flag we weren't asking can you give him a clean bill of health we were just asking is there anything we need to know about and the answer was no kensington and chelsea was one of the richest councils in the country so finance was not an

01:06:53 in the country so finance was not an issue there were no questions around their service delivery that we were aware of and indeed the tri-borough arrangements were generally perceived to be pretty strong and helping them in that respect and we weren't aware of any

01:07:05 that respect and we weren't aware of any issues around the leadership let's go to clg402954

01:07:13 and the middle email on the page um

01:07:18 um is at 1405 from alex powell to joe farah which you get if you go to the top of the screen

01:07:29 the screen by way of

01:07:31 by way of passing on at 14 20 that day you can see you receive what comes below let's go back down to the foot of the page and see how the email chain starts um it comes from joe

01:07:43 chain starts um it comes from joe farah's office to alex powell and emily bliss of 1343 on the 14th of june alex emily

01:07:49 emily joe

01:07:50 joe that's joe farah joe would like a little more information on our relationship with kensington or chelsea are they on your radar for any reason and if so why or is there any other information that would be useful to her to note

01:08:01 would be useful to her to note thank you for your help this morning with the phone number and then alex powell back on at 1405. abigail k and c aren't on our radar at all and therefore we don't hold anything on them the ministerial support unit

01:08:13 on them the ministerial support unit have an app stroke database on councils which can provide general info facts and figures on funding housing tf etc if that's of use the most recent development of note that i'm aware of is

01:08:24 development of note that i'm aware of is the breakdown of the triboro agreement but i suspect joe is already cited on that and that comes to you now would you agree that the email from alex powell um who was the dd in local government

01:08:36 um who was the dd in local government stewardship as you can see he is the way he describes himself that um there is no explicit statement that there are concerns or risks about rbkc that's right he's saying they're they're

01:08:47 that's right he's saying they're they're not on our radar yeah and and it did nothing in this email that tells you anything of the of the kind that you've set out in paragraph 23 um which i think you attribute to this message

01:08:57 message so it look it looks as if the conversation that you had as you say was the next day or is that wrong was there a conversation about the matters at 7 45 that morning

01:09:08 matters at 7 45 that morning i'm sure there was a conversation with joe

01:09:10 joe between me and joe on the wednesday and um

01:09:16 um what i put in my witness statement is a full summary of what joe and i believed about the council and its overall capability on the basis of the information that we had

01:09:27 information that we had which as i said was narrow in some respects

01:09:31 respects because it was designed for a specific purpose um

01:09:36 but i i think i was aware of this exchange on the wednesday i'd be very surprised if i wasn't so although i got the date wrong about

01:09:47 so although i got the date wrong about uh joe's call with nicholas holgate which was on thursday not wednesday um

01:09:52 um to the best of my recollection the other uh comments in that paragraph i think probably took place on wednesday having seen the date of this email which was on the wednesday right thank you now

01:10:03 was on the wednesday right thank you now um

01:10:06 so the information of paragraph 23 of your statement is something you think you got from joe farah during that early morning conversation no i think i um

01:10:18 um or later in the morning could i just see what was in my witness statement again and then i might be in this house can we go back to your first statement please paragraph 23 page nine

01:10:28 i mean i say she subsequently sought information from her local government over sight and risk teams so i think it's probable but i honestly can't remember in detail that she and i discussed it in our early morning

01:10:40 discussed it in our early morning conversation at 7 45

01:10:43 at 7 45 and that then she sought information and i think i am correct in my recollection that i knew she was going to seek that information and there were no concerns flagged um

01:10:54 um and we also thought that the partnership arrangements gave them extra resilience and although the tri borough arrangement had broken down because hammersmith and fulham had pulled out they still had that partnership arrangement with westminster council we thought that

01:11:05 westminster council we thought that would give them extra resilience but i think it's important for me to say that this wasn't what we didn't do after this was go oh everything's fine we were simply saying that there was no

01:11:16 we were simply saying that there was no risk particularly to flag on the wednesday that this council would not be able to cope now about the same time your office did receive another email i think providing basic background on the leader and the chief executive

01:11:30 and if we go to that please that's at

01:11:38 clg

01:11:42 sorry clg-402952

01:11:49 and it's an email that comes uh uh to alex sharma's office from your office i think at 14 19. so it's about the same time as the emails

01:12:01 it's about the same time as the emails that are being sent back sent up to you from the powell bliss team as it were joe farah's team and it's copied to helen mcnamara subject background on kensington and

01:12:13 subject background on kensington and chelsea council hi danella this is some really basic background about kensington and chelsea and the department's relationship with them kris krasnowski can provide further background if needed

01:12:24 background if needed info on kensington chelsea fact sheet attached leader and there he is nicholas paget brown his relationship with the department is good he is well respected and open to discussing various ideas

01:12:35 discussing various ideas the general view of officials is that he is a safe pair of hands who runs a tight and steady ship he's been impressed since 2013 was part of the tribal system with hammersmith and fulham and westminster this will officially end in 2018. dclg secretary

01:12:49 officially end in 2018. dclg secretary of state has spoken to him today there's been no readout of this call and the minister for london is also trying to speak to him prior to the meeting later this afternoon and then underneath that chief executive

01:13:01 and then underneath that chief executive nicholas holgate and there he is uh melanie has emailed and joe has text today he had confirmed that he has that he have received or perhaps they have received

01:13:11 received lots of blue light support and then over the page at the top of page two previously worked in hmt the department has a very good relationship with him now neither of those emails mention

01:13:23 now neither of those emails mention anything about the council's civil emergency capabilities let alone capabilities to respond to the tower to the grenfell tower of fire do they no they don't and we had no role in

01:13:34 they no they don't and we had no role in assuring those capabilities at the time even through red did you have any concerns by this point in the early afternoon of the 14th of june about the ability

01:13:45 june about the ability of any council uh in the country to respond to a disaster such as the grenfell tower fire um

01:13:53 um i don't recall having any concerns about this particular council at that time um can i just be reminded of when this email was sent yes it was sent to 14

01:14:04 14 uh uh

01:14:07 yeah it was sent

01:14:10 if you go to the top of the screen we can see it probably the easiest thing for me to do 14 19 and 49 seconds yes i mean it literally may help just to say that i was not in the department at

01:14:21 say that i was not in the department at this point i um during the morning and through the lunch period until about three o'clock i was um

01:14:30 there's a number of meetings in the department which particularly at the time were focused on building safety um i was particularly concerned about that and

01:14:40 and then i

01:14:42 then i had to go to the weekly meeting of permanent searches at the cabinet office i then came back to the department and then i went out to a meeting which lasted for a couple of hours and came back in at three o'clock so this conversation will have been going on

01:14:54 conversation will have been going on before i came back and it was really in the mid-afternoon that i began to pick up the threads of what was going on and i had meetings with some of my colleagues i'm sure i will have spoken to joe again at that point i certainly

01:15:05 to joe again at that point i certainly spoke to helen mcnamara and that was when we really began to when i began to get a sense of what was going on and what the issues were aside from the building safety ones now i mean given the limitations of the

01:15:17 now i mean given the limitations of the information in the emails that you had so far

01:15:21 so far both the no red flags emailed that come to you making all allowances for where you were on the day and the information so far as it is information in this email considering the

01:15:33 in this email considering the limitations of that information why did you think that rbkc would be able as you say in paragraph 23 of your statement to cope with the disaster of this scale

01:15:46 well i think for the reasons i set out in my witness statement that there were no flags they had resilience from the triborough arrangements albeit that those had been scaled back and the wider london resilience and that's actually

01:15:58 london resilience and that's actually extremely important that we had seen that in action on the terror attacks over the summer and

01:16:08 and knew it to be strong and knew that experience in london to be very strong and we knew the cross borough working relationships to be effective so all of those things gave us some confidence that the council with help

01:16:21 confidence that the council with help from others would be able to cope with this

01:16:23 this and to this day i'm very surprised at the scale

01:16:27 the scale of their failure to cope to be honest and

01:16:31 and um

01:16:32 um you know this is despite the fact that nicholas hallgate and others i know are people who would always have tried to do everything they could in a situation like this but um their response was not adequate and i

01:16:44 um their response was not adequate and i remained surprised by that and particularly surprised that the london gold arrangements weren't put in more comprehensively right at the very beginning

01:16:53 beginning can we just then go back to paragraph 23 of your statement on page nine

01:17:01 and you you you say there that the partnership arrangements with westminster council and the general strength of crossborough working in london would further enable them to cope with the disaster on this scale

01:17:13 the disaster on this scale was it your view that rbkc

01:17:17 that rbkc wouldn't would be able to cope with a disaster on this scale without those partnership arrangements and crossborough working or only with them

01:17:28 them um the latter only with them can i just add that of course this early assessment on the wednesday turned out to be incorrect um

01:17:39 um you know we know that now that they didn't cope so what i'm not saying here is that what's in paragraph 23 um

01:17:47 um you know by the time we got to thursday was still was still our view it wasn't um we realized overnight coming into thursday morning and particularly by thursday afternoon that there were very serious concerns

01:17:58 serious concerns and took steps to address those on friday morning this was simply stating to you honestly what our view was on wednesday afternoon about whether or not the council with

01:18:09 about whether or not the council with support from others would be able to manage this and there were no flags that suggested they couldn't well um at that point no flags that would suggest they couldn't manage it alone or no flags that would suggest

01:18:21 alone or no flags that would suggest they couldn't manage it uh with cross borough working the last sentence of paragraph 23 is extremely important that was a very important part of our thinking so was it your view at the time

01:18:34 so was it your view at the time that notwithstanding the absence of any flags rbkc would not be able to cope with a disaster on this scale without

01:18:45 with a disaster on this scale without cross without without credit i don't think any council could have coped with a disaster on this scale on their own and that's what the local resilience arrangements are designed to provide is layers of support and resilience that

01:18:56 layers of support and resilience that can be activated to provide support now you told us as indeed dr farah told us yesterday that you knew nicholas holgate from your time at the treasury

01:19:08 holgate from your time at the treasury and you've said this morning not well but you knew him

01:19:14 is it the case that you were more inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt or perhaps be more generous towards his management of the response

01:19:23 response than

01:19:24 than otherwise might be the case had you not known him

01:19:26 known him no i don't believe that's the case at all

01:19:29 all mr chairman is that a convenient moment yes all right thank you well as you know dave melanie we have a break during the morning and this is a good time to take it so we'll stop there we'll resume

01:19:40 it so we'll stop there we'll resume please at

01:19:41 please at 25 to 12.

01:19:42 25 to 12. and you know this only too well but i have to ask you please not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room right thank you thank you very much would you go with the usher please

01:20:00 thank you very much mr millet 25 to 12 please

01:38:26 would you ask dave melanie to come back in please

01:38:41 all right melanie ready to carry on i hope yes thank you thank you yes mr miller thank you mr chairman um i'd like to ask you about uh the um

01:38:50 um housing arrangements within the dclg and it's right i think that sally randall at the time of the fire was the director for housing standards and support yes yes and i think she was made

01:39:01 yes yes and i think she was made responsible and tell me if this is wrong for the initial program of building safety checks from the afternoon of the 14th of june

01:39:10 june uh yes i believe so that was a decision uh made by helen mcnamara i believe but i think that's correct yes and she i think as director for housing standards and support answered to

01:39:21 to um reported to helena mcnamara yes she did yes now um if we go please to clg402883

01:39:34 you can see here is an email from sally randall

01:39:37 randall to housing standards and support looks like a a team email address subject grenfell tower timed at 10 33 so this is earlier in the day

01:39:48 day and

01:39:49 and she says this following the terrible fire at grenfell tower this morning teams across the department are involved in putting together briefing for our ministers and supporting the resilience and emergency division on their response

01:40:00 and emergency division on their response inevitably there's a little bit of chaos and hyperactivity in the department this morning and some potential for duplication and confusion to try to minimize that could i ask that if anyone asks you for any briefing or

01:40:12 if anyone asks you for any briefing or information that you root through jane everton who will hold the main contact within red red thanks for all your support already this morning now um would you agree with the

01:40:24 now um would you agree with the description of the department at that time that there was a little bit of chaos and hyperactivity in the department no not particularly there was a lot going on

01:40:34 going on and

01:40:35 and we uh

01:40:37 we uh we had a lot that we needed to do and did in the subsequent days to put a structure around how everyone was communicating but um

01:40:45 but um no i don't think it was um chaotic or hyperactive

01:40:50 now fiona darby was the deputy director within sally randall's division wasn't she

01:40:57 yes she was she was one of the deputy directors yes yeah she reported herself yeah i'm sorry yes and she reported to sally randall and she was responsible for homelessness i think wasn't she yes she was now let's

01:41:08 i think wasn't she yes she was now let's go to rbk three zeros four eight nine nine zero

01:41:25 yes this is an email from fiona derby to laura johnson within rbkc timed at 11 22 on the 14th of june hi laura dclg are briefing ministers on this and

01:41:36 dclg are briefing ministers on this and i've been asked to contact you to understand what has been done already by knc and what support you potentially need from government could i call you please

01:41:45 please do you know if the department received any response to that message no i'm was unaware of this email and i don't know if there was any response now your offer to of assistance to nicholas holgate that we saw earlier

01:41:56 nicholas holgate that we saw earlier together in 907 that morning 14th of june is this right was the first offer of assistance from the department to the council

01:42:06 um i don't know if there was any offer via red in the scg uh earlier in the morning um

01:42:16 um but subject to that then yes i think my email was the first email that went across and subject to that was this the second offer of assistance from central government your

01:42:27 assistance from central government your department to rbkc i don't know if there were any other communications

01:42:35 i believe that joe farah tried to text nicholas holgate after my email exchange with him and prior to her conversation on the thursday

01:42:45 thursday um but i'm not aware of any other direct offers of help particularly at this early stage then let's go to clg 3030 466.

01:42:59 this is an email

01:43:04 yes if we go to the top email this is an email from fiona derby to jane everton at 12 16 p.m on the 14th of june uh re grenfell tower fire cross

01:43:16 uh re grenfell tower fire cross government meeting today and

01:43:19 and she says uh i haven't been able to get through to anyone at knc and so have no information currently as to actual progress by k and c i'm still trying

01:43:30 progress by k and c i'm still trying um

01:43:31 um were you aware by this point in the day just just before lunchtime on the 14th that there was a problem in establishing communication with rbkc

01:43:43 in establishing communication with rbkc no i wasn't aware of that now just while we're on this email we can see that she goes on to say assuming

01:43:51 assuming sorry in terms of rehousing it's just above that in terms of rehousing media reports say that an emergency rest center has been set up for those that were not able to stay with family or friends assuming it is a council housing

01:44:02 friends assuming it is a council housing block which it appears to be from the media reports then i would anticipate that the households will be moved from the emergency rest centre into hotels or emergency accommodation whilst the council looks to longer term solutions

01:44:14 council looks to longer term solutions was it appropriate that the department was relying on media reports for its information on what the local authority was doing in the response well i think it's entirely appropriate that fiona was given whatever

01:44:25 that fiona was given whatever information she had and that included what was in media reports but i mean i i hadn't seen this email before but she's saying in the first sentence that she hasn't been able to get through to anyone and so she has no information

01:44:36 to anyone and so she has no information currently as to actual progress and that's

01:44:39 that's you know clearly the context for her then

01:44:42 then giving the information that she did have yes i mean my question is perhaps better put the did the fact that there were problems getting through to knc necessitating reliance by the department

01:44:53 necessitating reliance by the department on media reports hampered the ability of the department to obtain reliable and up-to-date information

01:45:00 was that your recollection at the time

01:45:05 well my recollection is that on wednesday thursday and

01:45:12 even into the weekend actually the lack of information about how

01:45:17 how uh those who had survived the fire were being offered accommodation where they had gone how many there were that that information was extremely hard to find the council didn't have it

01:45:28 to find the council didn't have it themselves it was one of the major problems i think for the gold recovery effort once it started that that that data collection that mapping that listing of who had been offered what just somehow wasn't functional

01:45:42 and that combined with what i think was rather a defensive approach by the council and not really opening up to others on the wednesday um

01:45:50 um made our job very difficult yes it did and this is one of the early signs of that i suppose in this email although i hadn't seen it before i see um did you detect at this stage

01:46:03 did you detect at this stage that there was or might be a problem with rbkc leading the response in circumstances where and correct me if this is wrong on a chronology but it was beginning to appear

01:46:13 appear that the council may be the object of criticism about the cause of the fire um

01:46:22 i don't see anything in this email about the cause of the fire but you're asking a more general question about whether that was becoming a consideration yes um

01:46:32 yes um well look i as i was explaining before the break i i was out of the department at this stage and it was really a bit later in the afternoon that i began to come back and form my own sense of what was going on so at this stage i was not

01:46:43 was going on so at this stage i was not aware of any of this um i don't know when it was that that connection between the fact that the council owned the block had refurbished it

01:46:54 block had refurbished it you know had been involved in the causes of the fire in some way and also the history of complaints and so on

01:47:03 and so on i don't remember when those issues began to become part of the consideration i just can't remember i think by the time we got to thursday we were definitely aware of that

01:47:14 definitely aware of that wider context at this point do you remember thinking about or having discussions about deploying somebody either to the town hall

01:47:23 hall to be the department's eyes and ears on the ground receiving information or to the s sec at lambeth

01:47:31 lambeth no i i don't uh i don't recall that and as i said i wasn't involved in any of those discussions i i think with hindsight when i look back on this i think two things um

01:47:42 i think two things um were a gap in our intelligence one was

01:47:46 one was um whether or not london gold arrangements had been mobilized even when they were mobilized on thursday afternoon that didn't come in through red and i think that was a gap um

01:47:57 um and

01:47:58 and something that we could have looked more for actually if i'm honest i think joe and i perhaps could have of sought to find out about london resilience on the wednesday or the thursday that's my main reflection actually

01:48:09 that's my main reflection actually really rather than whether or not we should have visited um as the months have gone by and the other gap i think is that there was nobody as part of the beck arrangements the gold arrangements in

01:48:20 arrangements the gold arrangements in kensington and chelsea and i think we offered

01:48:22 offered for the to be a point of liaison because liaison helps the local responders because it helps them manage what can sometimes be quite a difficult set of requests from central government and that as i understand it was refused i

01:48:34 that as i understand it was refused i think those two gaps were gaps in

01:48:38 in uh in process and in uh aspects of the of the response that that meant that we were over reliant on what was coming up through the scg via red did did it occur to you at the time that

01:48:49 did did it occur to you at the time that notwithstanding those the structural gaps as you've just described nonetheless you or somebody reporting to you sort of got a grip and and just gone down there

01:49:00 and just gone down there and inserted themselves into the back or the scc at lambeth just in order to get it primary information well by the time it got to thursday uh particularly in the afternoon when it

01:49:12 particularly in the afternoon when it was clear that um things were going wrong really clear that things were going wrong i think it began to be clear on thursday morning overnight really as the information came in

01:49:22 in um

01:49:23 um then we were thinking about that and of course my own secretary of state wanted to go on wednesday and wanted to go again on thursday and was unable to do so for a number of reasons mainly because the prime minister's visit was being arranged instead

01:49:34 being arranged instead for thursday and i think had he gone we would have gone somebody would have gone with him probably joe or jillian k or somebody like that and we would have got a better feel for what was going on more immediately but um

01:49:46 was going on more immediately but um for us to have gone particularly on the wednesday i mean would have been very difficult you can't just walk into a room like that when there's a command structure in place at least one hopes there is that's effective you can't just

01:49:57 there is that's effective you can't just sort of show up from central government and expect uh

01:50:01 uh you know to be able to effectively interfere and challenge um so as i said i think there are some bits of intelligence that we could have had some that we would have liked to have

01:50:12 some that we would have liked to have had and weren't able to get um

01:50:16 um and i also think it's quite right that red's role has been broadened to look for signs of stress now their role was quite narrow it was to him to report what information there was on the ground

01:50:28 what information there was on the ground and they did that um and i think they discharged their duties uh correctly but i think the role the role now needs to be slightly wider and i think we've learned from that through this experience

01:50:40 through this experience and i'm just sorry we have to learn it through this frankly

01:50:48 if you go back to the email please and look at the paragraph four lines up from the bottom

01:50:55 bottom where fiona darby says in any event can you see that yes she says in any event the ce of k and c

01:51:05 and c is likely to make contact with fellow ce's as chief executives across london as they have emergency pan london protocols and agreements to support each other in these circumstances and might

01:51:17 other in these circumstances and might ask homelessness teams across london to assist with ta that's temporary accommodation i think the sub-region is very close-knit and it could be that the sub-region rather than pan london might be asked to assist with emergency

01:51:29 be asked to assist with emergency accommodation now you referred earlier to the triborough agreement and the partnership with

01:51:34 with westminster council we looked at that and here we see reference to the pan-london and sub-region being involved in the response was it your expectation at that point

01:51:45 was it your expectation at that point that

01:51:46 that pan london uh and sub-regional arrangements would kick in or already kicked in

01:51:55 yes i don't recall explicitly asking myself the question have they kicked in as i said as earlier as permanent secretary i was looking across the whole

01:52:06 secretary i was looking across the whole range of the issues that the department was dealing with including building safety

01:52:13 and so i did not specifically ask myself that question but had i done i would have assumed that they would have kicked in and i wouldn't have assumed that central government needed to make that happen or really to check to be honest fiona darby had

01:52:24 check to be honest fiona darby had joined us from a london borough and so her description in that final two sentences is based on her direct experience of working in local government in london and as such

01:52:35 government in london and as such you know i think she's absolutely correct in what she would have assumed having worked in local government as well as what we were assuming from central government right so does from your recollection at the time does

01:52:47 from your recollection at the time does this email although you didn't receive it tell us that

01:52:52 that uh

01:52:53 uh that the department's expectation is that nicholas holgate would would be likely to make contact and ask for

01:53:04 contact and ask for pan london or mutual aid or pan london arrangements in in dealing with a potential homelessness problem yes

01:53:13 yes this is fiona's view she's expressing it but it would have been a shared view across the department and fiona's direct experience would have been quite authoritative in saying what she thought would have happened did you have any reason at this point to

01:53:25 did you have any reason at this point to think that nicholas holgate uh not only had not done that but was not going to do that but to try to manage matters himself no i had no inkling of that at this

01:53:37 no i had no inkling of that at this stage now let's turn to uh the secretary of state uh

01:53:43 uh we

01:53:44 we looked at an email where we saw that the leader and chief executive's details were provided to your office and a reference was made there as you can see to the fact that the secretary of state had spoken with the leader

01:53:55 of state had spoken with the leader of the council councillor nicholas padgett brown you you saw that were you made aware of what was discussed between them

01:54:03 [Music]

01:54:07 if there was a record of it then i think i will have seen it and i do recall some conversations i recall the secretary of state's conversation with the mayor of london

01:54:14 london i don't specifically recall this one with nick padgett brown do you remember whether the minister reinforced your message from just after nine o'clock that

01:54:25 from just after nine o'clock that morning that the department stood ready to provide assistance

01:54:29 um i can't immediately recall that without seeing uh the note of of that discussion but i would have expected the secretary of state to offer assistance we were very much in that mode we were

01:54:40 we were very much in that mode we were already starting to mobilize on permanent re-housing issues certainly by the afternoon of wednesday right was it your understanding that the secretary of state had offered

01:54:51 secretary of state had offered assistance specifically in relation to housing

01:54:56 housing um well i'm i'm flying blind a bit here because i i'm not i don't know if there's a record of the the the meeting but uh what i recall is or that rather not at the meeting of

01:55:07 is or that rather not at the meeting of the of the conversation what i recall is that the council via nick padgett brown did say that they were going to need help with the permanent rehousing i believe they also said they needed help with

01:55:18 said they needed help with communications i can't remember whether that was just was that whether that was wednesday or whether it came later but it did definitely come later and

01:55:27 and i

01:55:28 i i i think that that request on the permanent rehousing came quite early because we responded to it actually um and were were on those issues in pretty

01:55:39 and were were on those issues in pretty early on the permanent rehousing issues on on wednesday afternoon and on thursday

01:55:44 thursday let me just show you um sergio javid's first witness statement please uh this is at clg one triple zero nine seven two eight i just want to show you page ten paragraph thirty nine

01:56:01 uh and he says uh by 1419 and following the 12 15 briefing i'd spoken to councillor nicholas paget brown we discussed what support mhclg could offer

01:56:12 discussed what support mhclg could offer the council we were ready to offer anything that the council requested such as help with money or personnel to book emergency accommodation i.e hotels i was clear throughout the first seven days that i didn't want money to become an

01:56:23 that i didn't want money to become an issue and that day requested and received briefing on belgium funding and it goes on at 40 there was no request for help with emergency accommodation i.e rest centers and hotels

01:56:33 hotels now did you did you know that did you know that the council had had not asked for help with emergency accommodation no um but that's those two paragraphs

01:56:44 no um but that's those two paragraphs are consistent with what i just said i think um my understanding of what is likely to have been said between nicholas padgett brown and sergey javid and in addition i do recall that they asked

01:56:55 in addition i do recall that they asked for help on the permanent re-housing and i think that that happened on the wednesday perhaps it was the conversation with alex sharma later in the day i don't know but i don't think it was long before they were asking us for help on the permanent rehousing as

01:57:06 for help on the permanent rehousing as well but i don't i don't i don't recall any requests for help on the emergency accommodation either in those early few hours and days so this is consistent with my recollection

01:57:17 with my recollection then let's move to what was happening in or from number 10 at this point which is halfway through lunchtime ish on the 14th of june can we go please to clg four zeros two nine four six

01:57:32 uh we go to page one in this email run bottom of the page

01:57:39 this is an email from lorna gratton uh

01:57:43 uh who was the prime minister's private secretary

01:57:46 secretary uh at the time and uh this is an email timed at 1354. to louise morgan copy to aleister whitehead louise we spoke about the incident at grenfell tower you kindly

01:57:58 incident at grenfell tower you kindly agreed to get us what you can on and then there's a list of bullet points starting with building regulations at the foot of the screen and then over the page please

01:58:08 if you look at the second set of three bullet points uh re-housing efforts i understand that some of this will already have been dealt with by ccs if

01:58:19 already have been dealt with by ccs if that is the case please do feel free to reuse what was produced for that how is the council coping with rehousing requirement does it need additional support from us if so what kind of support are we able to offer

01:58:30 support are we able to offer and if we go to the top of that email chain back to page one please uh we can see that this email comes into your office at

01:58:40 at 1404 so half of them 10 minutes later or so

01:58:45 or so directly to bob ledson and richard harrell

01:58:48 harrell for reasons to do with the other bullet points i haven't shown you but copied to helen mcnamara and

01:58:55 and and others and also to the offices of alex sharma who was the minister of state and the secretary of state office of sajid javid afternoon thanks for all your hard work

01:59:06 afternoon thanks for all your hard work on this to complement the questions from sheridan at number 10 which i know you're working on there are some questions from lorna on the official side i'd be grateful for answers as soon as you possibly can and if necessary we can send over in parts

01:59:22 were you made aware at the time yourself that number 10 was asking these questions particularly about re-housing efforts

01:59:30 efforts um

01:59:31 um i don't recall seeing the specific email at the time but

01:59:37 by the time i came back to the department later in the afternoon yes i think i will have been made aware that number 10 were asking questions if i might add i think this also shows a

01:59:49 if i might add i think this also shows a certain amount of duplication that was going on in the conversations across government because here you have number 10 on the political and the official side asking questions of the department and of the secretary of state's office

02:00:01 and of the secretary of state's office while in parallel a cobra meeting is being called that doesn't involve the principles from number 10 or anybody at cabinet level including the secretary of state so that's one of the reasons

02:00:12 of state so that's one of the reasons why i think it would have helped to have had one meeting that involved cabinet ministers on the monday i think it would have helped communication and made things a bit easier for everybody to

02:00:23 things a bit easier for everybody to handle

02:00:25 handle you say on the monday do you mean the wedding sorry i meant the wednesday because it was the beginning yes why my what's my brain went to monday

02:00:34 monday now do do you remember what action if any you you or the department took once you'd come back

02:00:41 back to the department later that afternoon in response if any response to number 10 questions about rehousing i don't remember anything specifically in response to those questions no just a

02:00:54 in response to those questions no just a general sense of coming back and meeting with helen mcnamara and sally randall to think about all of the issues on the housing side of the department which included building safety but also the issues in north kensington

02:01:07 the issues in north kensington now you mentioned the minister's meeting um it's right to think that and this is a matter of record but just to get your confirmation of it the cabinet office through the ccs

02:01:18 of it the cabinet office through the ccs arranged a ministerial meeting across government ministerial meeting at 1 600 hours that afternoon 14th of june yes yes yes now you didn't attend that meeting did you

02:01:29 you didn't attend that meeting did you no

02:01:31 no i think you had another engagement to go to yes

02:01:34 to yes no i think i was back from that engagement at around 3 30 so i could have gone but um others went instead um it was a meeting at junior minister level and so you know

02:01:46 at junior minister level and so you know i would never pile in as the permanent secretary and get in the way of my colleagues unless i was needed right was there any reason why you didn't clear your diary from the morning

02:01:57 from the morning not least because your department was always going to be the lead government department on recovery in respect of this incident i did clear my diary um everything apart from that one meeting

02:02:09 everything apart from that one meeting over lunchtime on wednesday was stripped out uh i think there may have been one meeting with an external stakeholder on the friday that remained but everything else was cleared out

02:02:20 else was cleared out i went ahead with the meeting at lunchtime on wednesday it was with all of the newly elected mayors in the combined authorities it had originally been set up as a ministerial meeting

02:02:31 been set up as a ministerial meeting no ministers were able to attend and that was partly because of the reshuffle in the general election and i felt it was essential for me to go it would have been extremely rude of me

02:02:42 it would have been extremely rude of me not to go so i went to that meeting came back but from that moment on there was nothing else so you came back so why didn't you go to the four o'clock meeting

02:02:49 meeting um

02:02:51 um well as is quite normal um those who are closest to the work would attend in support of ministers so um i can't remember exactly who went from the department did helena mcnamara go or was it catherine richardson i

02:03:02 go or was it catherine richardson i think definitely went to represent red in particular and i believe somebody else went to perhaps it was steve quartermaine because of the building regulations

02:03:13 because of the building regulations issues which he was at the time still responsible for so um

02:03:18 so um i'm not sure but my guess is that it was decided while i was out who would go but i don't think there was any question that i would go as permanent secretary right now we know the housing minister did attend yes and the local government

02:03:29 did attend yes and the local government yes that's alex sharma did he feed the relevant points back to you did he brief you

02:03:35 brief you afterwards no he didn't believe me afterwards but uh i was informed of the meeting i will have seen the actions at some point um later that evening when they came round

02:03:47 later that evening when they came round i was in the office until about 11 pm so i i had many conversations through that evening about what was going on and i i caught up on emails as they came in right

02:03:56 right now if we go to your first witness statement please at page 10

02:04:01 10 um paragraph 27 on that page at the foot of the screen it says this the cross government ministerial meeting agreed the following actions for the department to liaise with rbkc regarding the urgent

02:04:12 to liaise with rbkc regarding the urgent provision of temporary accommodation for those displaced from grenfell tower although it was clarified in the minutes that rbkc was not seeking additional assistance at this time and to discuss with the national fire

02:04:23 and to discuss with the national fire chiefs council and the devolved administrations how best to take forward the identification of at-risk buildings and associated safety advice across the uk

02:04:36 were you made specifically aware of the need for an urgent

02:04:42 urgent provision of temporary accommodation

02:04:47 i was certainly aware of the need to support the council on the housing effort and as i said i think by wednesday evening we were quite focused on that

02:04:57 on that and in my first witness statement i sought to give the inquiry as much information as i could about all of what the department was doing during these days even when i wasn't involved in it myself i think this is a

02:05:09 involved in it myself i think this is a a good example of me just trying to be helpful by saying what had happened because it helps the narrative and flow of of how i was then explaining um what i recalled of those days yes did you understand

02:05:22 yes did you understand that

02:05:23 that the urgent provision of temporary accommodation for those displaced was emergency temporary accommodation in the very short term or the next stage in rehousing people affected by the fire

02:05:36 in rehousing people affected by the fire yes i thought it was both it was going to need to be both and how did the department resolve to act

02:05:42 act on the action taken away from the ministerial meeting of liaising with the council about temporary accommodation um

02:05:51 um i can't quite recall exactly what we did that evening but i mean i know my colleagues witness statements will have explained that um but

02:06:03 but we you know over the following days we we in particular embedded support through lizzie clifford with

02:06:10 with the council to help them but above all in the end the gold command structure came in and took over those efforts eventually to put them onto a more sustainable footing

02:06:20 footing now if we turn the page in your statement please to page 11 and go to paragraph 31

02:06:27 you say at the foot of the screen at 15 30 i met with helen mcnamara and sally randall to take stock of the implications of the grenfell tower fire for the housing side of the department at this meeting it was agreed that

02:06:38 at this meeting it was agreed that dedicated resource would be needed to coordinate activity across the housing and planning group and camilla sheldon was appointed to lead this now this is half an hour before the

02:06:49 now this is half an hour before the start of the cross-government ministerial meeting um was it agree between you that a dedicated resource would be needed to coordinate activity across the housing and planning group yes

02:07:02 and planning group yes and did you discuss immediate need for emergency accommodation for those affected by the fire perhaps you could show me the next uh the remainder of that paragraph yes of

02:07:13 the remainder of that paragraph yes of course

02:07:15 course it says we also then if we turn the page to page 12 discuss the building safety checks the building regulations and the need to investigate any potential failures across the system

02:07:26 yes so so that's the best of my recollection as to what we discussed at that meeting i mean my question was did you discuss the immediate emergency accommodation needs of those affected by the fire i

02:07:38 needs of those affected by the fire i think we must have done um and

02:07:42 you know but whether we discuss the need for the department to take any action in relation to it i don't know um probably not although i was writing this witness statement you know recalling

02:07:52 recalling uh trying to recall what we had discussed in a meeting um you know at a very very busy time when there were a lot of such conversations so i can't be absolutely clear that we did or didn't discuss the need to do do

02:08:04 did or didn't discuss the need to do do you remember on the temporary accommodation do you no i understand but doing the best you can with your recollection do you remember whether there was an action that you decided to take forward as a result of your discussion at this meeting about

02:08:17 your discussion at this meeting about immediate emergency accommodation needs i don't think i took forward any actions and throughout this whole period i was trying to give my own staff as much space as possible to make decisions

02:08:29 space as possible to make decisions without constantly having to refer back to me or for me to tell them what those answers were the thing that we struggled with on wednesday and particularly once we got into thursday and friday and the

02:08:40 got into thursday and friday and the weight of the situation became clearer and the number of actions we were dealing with became clearer was that we we had to set up some kind of coordination mechanism inside the

02:08:51 coordination mechanism inside the department to manage that and that was distinct from the coordination and information mechanisms that were red were in charge of in terms of feeding information from the ground and it was that lack of a

02:09:03 that lack of a dclg cell response cell and a structure around that with shift patterns and information flows and timings of meetings that held us back and i mentioned that in my in my first witness statement as one of

02:09:15 in my first witness statement as one of the things that that was difficult in those early days and we we eventually sorted it um first with a significant improvement when liz and bossier came in on friday

02:09:26 when liz and bossier came in on friday to sort it out but in the end we needed support from ccs which is why i was so keen to get someone seconded and eventually we had ian whitehouse join us um in the following week so

02:09:37 join us um in the following week so that's that's very much an internal departmental resourcing issue but what i would have expected us to do and what we were definitely doing once we get into thursday was logging all the actions that were coming from the ministerial group any other actions that

02:09:50 ministerial group any other actions that we were dealing with besides and we were tracking those we were communicating and we were trying to not duplicate so that people weren't um colliding with each other and doing the same thing we were trying to be clear about accountability

02:10:02 trying to be clear about accountability let's then move on to clg402995

02:10:08 this is back on the topic of the interactions with rbkc um and uh here is an email um

02:10:16 um from

02:10:17 from uh joanna beck at 1637 to fiona derby and sally randall subject grenfell hello fiona and sally i've managed to get hold of elton smargy who is the housing options manager in

02:10:29 who is the housing options manager in knc he's not at work today but has been keeping in touch with colleagues and was about to go into work for the overnight shift his information was ta need particularly demanding as seven to eight surrounding blocks have been evacuated

02:10:40 surrounding blocks have been evacuated and cordoned off until found to be safe they are receiving a lot of offers of support rp is offering voids for use as ta

02:10:48 ta other local authorities offering properties for ta etc three rest centers have been set up for residents and again a lot of offers of support from all over to help with staffing these i asked alton to keep us informed including if

02:11:00 alton to keep us informed including if there is any way in which we can support them further fiona are you now doing the 530 meeting on ramai thanks very much joe

02:11:09 now my question is a broad one and first i don't know whether you saw this email at the time or message a message like it but it was this an example of the general office of assistance that dclg

02:11:21 general office of assistance that dclg were providing to the council on the afternoon of the 14th of june yes it looks like a good example of that i wasn't aware of this at the time right and what would the department be able to

02:11:34 and what would the department be able to do in practice by way of further support

02:11:43 when it comes to the temporary accommodation needs i

02:11:48 i would have expected the main issue to have been one of finance which i think we did provide on the temp accommodation as well as on the permanent accommodation side and you can see from

02:12:00 and you can see from the very foot of your screen at the end of the email that jay beck is team leader in the homelessness reduction act delivery

02:12:06 delivery support

02:12:08 support preventing homelessness team what was that team's capability in delivering immediate emergency accommodation there was no capability for us to provide immediate emergency

02:12:20 for us to provide immediate emergency accommodation that's not a function of central government and it wasn't a function of the department this was a policy team overseeing a number of very specific projects to tackle homelessness working

02:12:31 projects to tackle homelessness working in tandem with a number of london boroughs

02:12:34 boroughs and other boroughs now then let's look at the mayor and the secretary of state's role again

02:12:42 clg403011 please

02:12:51 um if you um

02:12:56 go please to

02:12:59 the email on

02:13:06 i think we need to go to the foot of the emails chain please go to page

02:13:15 i'm looking ah i see what's happened now we need uh clg four zero is three zero one one not four zero one one

02:13:27 yes that's it thank you uh now um this is an email from the office of sanji javid at 1856 on the 14th of june

02:13:38 14th of june uh two um

02:13:39 uh two um a wide range of recipients including your own office and the office of joe farah and alok sharma and sanji javid so it went right across the department's subject readout so has

02:13:50 the department's subject readout so has called to study khan hi all please find a quick readout of the sos call with the mayor of london below sadiq khan dialed into the ministerial meeting chaired by nick heard this afternoon and he was impressed with the government's response

02:14:02 impressed with the government's response so far the mayor flagged two key points to the sos rehousing both the sos and the mayor are very keen to ensure that we are working closely with rbkc to ensure that everyone that has been

02:14:13 ensure that everyone that has been displaced by this incident is permanently relocated to homes in central london where possible and are definitely not housed outside of london camilla please can you work out what support we can offer our bkc on this

02:14:26 support we can offer our bkc on this was anything done do you know following that request yes i'm sure it was um i think that would have been followed up probably mainly on the thursday um

02:14:37 mainly on the thursday um given that it was already approaching seven o'clock in the evening um but uh

02:14:43 uh i don't exactly what was followed up but that's very consistent with the general conversation at the time of beginning increasingly to worry about supporting the council on rehousing right now um uh there's no need to go to

02:14:55 right now um uh there's no need to go to it but a paragraph 24 of your statement of page nine uh i think we saw this you were made aware that the minister for housing and planning along sharma had spoken to nicholas patrick brown on on the evening

02:15:06 nicholas patrick brown on on the evening of the 14th of june and mr patrick brown had reported progress on rest centers and accommodation and had flagged challenges that the council would face in providing permanent rehousing that's

02:15:17 in providing permanent rehousing that's what you say in paragraph 24 i've summarized it for you but is that i'm sorry could i see that of course of course it's page nine of your first statement page uh paragraph 24 yes

02:15:28 yes essentially uh yes and that's repeated no it's fine the the the sentence about providing permanent re-housing that that sentence yes plus the mention

02:15:39 that that sentence yes plus the mention of permanent re-housing by the mayor in the conversation with the secretary of state

02:15:43 state are both consistent with what i was saying to you earlier which is i believe the department was getting pretty focused on the permanent rehousing challenge as early as wednesday evening and that's some of the work that we did later

02:15:55 some of the work that we did later through the homes and communities agency to try to find accommodation and so on so that that was i think the thing that we were gen you know really picking up the baton on once we got to this stage in the

02:16:07 once we got to this stage in the response so that's a longer term recovery question it is and it's the one permanent is there in both those conversations and that's my recollection as i was saying earlier that that was a

02:16:18 as i was saying earlier that that was a main focus for us rather than the temporary accommodation it was the permanent accommodation that was going to be so difficult because fundamentally this is one of the most

02:16:29 fundamentally this is one of the most expensive housing markets in the country and there just wasn't very much social housing available so it was going to need a huge effort to try to find accommodation for the families now i'm just

02:16:40 now i'm just focusing a little bit more on that's the first part of that answer did you regard the emergency need for temporary accommodation as part of the recovery or part of the

02:16:52 as part of the recovery or part of the response

02:16:55 i don't know i think i'd i didn't think at the time about that distinction but

02:17:02 but my personal view is that the distinction between recovery and response is

02:17:08 is does not help sometimes when you're actually faced with an actual emergency and need to think about the issues that you're facing so

02:17:16 facing so um

02:17:19 um as i said to you earlier nobody ever said to us you are responsible for recovery please get on with it we did it anyway but neither do i think it was clear what

02:17:32 but neither do i think it was clear what the response issues were and what the recovery issues were the lead government department the home office didn't really get involved in any of this and i think that in practice issues like rehousing are on a continuum and the

02:17:44 rehousing are on a continuum and the recovery needs to start right from the beginning and in a way does it matter whether or not temporary accommodation is part of recovery or in response the important thing is that it's dealt with so i think it was clear that it was for the local responder and the local

02:17:56 the local responder and the local authority and i personally think it's clear that they should always be in the lead central government can't add a lot to the real emergency response

02:18:04 response but um

02:18:06 but um i think i think the cabinet office in particular perhaps with my former department needs to do some thinking about this because this difference between response and recovery was not clear and i think it got in the way a bit

02:18:17 it got in the way a bit yes and does that tell us

02:18:21 tell us that

02:18:22 that well let me ask it differently at the time did you think or ask yourself or anybody else

02:18:28 else what is the home office as the lead government department for the response doing about temporary accommodation emergency temporary accommodation

02:18:40 i didn't ask myself that question but had i answered it i would have said they weren't doing anything i wouldn't really have expected them to do anything to be honest i would have expected them to look to us to talk to

02:18:51 expected them to look to us to talk to the council about what was going on and that is what happened i think it's a very good example of how their role as lead in response wasn't really one that

02:19:02 one that i thought really made sense in the response to grenfell to be honest

02:19:08 and did you think at the time that notwithstanding that the dclg was not the lead government department for the response

02:19:18 that nonetheless it should act as if it were so far as emergency temporary accommodation was concerned

02:19:26 i think i think my demeanor and that of my secretary of state and of all my colleagues was just to lean into whatever needed doing so we weren't thinking about response or recovery um and the planning hadn't been

02:19:38 recovery um and the planning hadn't been done

02:19:39 done on either response or recovery really in my opinion and so there was nothing really for us to be drawing on and the home office weren't really drawing on anything either so what we did was simply

02:19:50 simply try to

02:19:51 try to try to manage and to listen to deal with whatever information we had and to do whatever we could to help that was our overall approach and demeanor but

02:20:01 but a bit more advanced planning and preparation would have helped us there's no question in my mind about that yes and would you agree that that would have

02:20:12 advanced planning and preparation the need for that would have been more obvious

02:20:17 obvious to each of the government departments if their roles in the response had been more clearly delineated

02:20:25 yes i think for me there are two dimensions to this one is

02:20:30 one is the dimension of response versus recovery whereas i think there is an where i think there is a natural assumption that response is what matters in the first few days and recovery kicks in later which is why i think the recovery planning is not

02:20:43 i think the recovery planning is not really expected of gclg or any other department in the same way as it is expected for a league government department for response because the recovery issues generally present themselves as the crisis unfolds and so you have time to pick them up and

02:20:55 and so you have time to pick them up and i think that's just not really very helpful i think in practice the recovery thinking needs to be planned for and needs to be thought about explicitly and tasked by the cabinet office at the beginning now it may be that at the

02:21:07 beginning now it may be that at the start you say there isn't going to be a central government role in recovery and it may be that as the days go by that judgment changes and you have to switch something on but i believe this should be a more explicit consideration of

02:21:18 be a more explicit consideration of recovery issues and a lot more preparation further in advance that's one dimension i think the other dimension is about the actual issues and the outcomes and the problems we were dealing with the home office was the

02:21:30 dealing with the home office was the league government department just because it was a fire but the home office didn't really have anything to do and indeed they didn't really do very much there was some extremely hard working officials

02:21:41 working officials who came to every meeting they were the people from fire and police but it was the emergency services themselves who are doing all the uh who were answering all the questions in the cobra meetings and who were really the ones

02:21:53 meetings and who were really the ones who were feeding into the cross-ministerial discussions so i i think it was just wrong to assume that the home office was going to be able to cover off all the response issues in relation to a crisis like this we should have been much more

02:22:05 we should have been much more involved and perhaps prior to the moving of fire

02:22:09 of fire across to the home office in 2016 it would have been the department would have been more joined up although there was not a fire on the national risk register at that point thank you now let's then go to page 12

02:22:21 thank you now let's then go to page 12 of your statement back to your first statement please paragraph 34 page 12. uh end of day one you say you remained in the office until around 2300 and then you say this

02:22:32 around 2300 and then you say this i spoke to jeremy hayward cabinet secretary head of the civil service in the early evening to update him on the situation

02:22:39 situation i also spoke to philip ruttenham permanent secretary of the home office much of my focus that evening was to ensure that there was a full inquiry into what had happened and why including how the fire had spread and the links to

02:22:51 how the fire had spread and the links to the building regulations uh and and then you go on there um

02:22:57 there um did you discuss the building regulations

02:23:01 with jeremy hayward or with yes i believe i did i can't remember exactly uh what aspect of it but i think we must have discussed it because it was such a big issue and indeed was a lot of what

02:23:13 big issue and indeed was a lot of what we were concerned about in thinking that an inquiry was needed right and did you discuss what then became the building safety program yes um we didn't know very much at that point of course but i i will have

02:23:25 point of course but i i will have discussed with jeremy what i knew and he i'm sure will have asked me a lot of very good questions because that's what he always did

02:23:34 can we take it from these discussions late on the evening of the 14th of june that there was real concern within the department uh about

02:23:43 uh about the department's own actions in response to lachenal yes there was real concern and

02:23:49 and um

02:23:51 um most of us as you know certainly me and helen mcnamara and my ministers were new to these issues had been unaware of them and as i explained in my previous

02:24:03 and as i explained in my previous evidence to the inquiry and we were grappling with this trying to make sense of it trying to gather the information and we were deeply worried even at this stage we were to become even more worried as the days unfolded

02:24:15 even more worried as the days unfolded but that was a lot of what i was worried about this evening and this particular evening and and and the need to have a full investigation of what had happened with your concerns

02:24:29 in relation to this topic something that perhaps diluted the attention that the department was giving to the immediate response or the immediate early stages of the recovery in the aftermath of the grenfell tower

02:24:40 in the aftermath of the grenfell tower fire

02:24:41 fire no i don't i don't think it's fair to say that it was diluted i think on that wednesday evening we didn't have the information that we had on thursday morning and throughout that

02:24:54 on thursday morning and throughout that second day on the failure of the local authorities response and

02:25:01 and as i said earlier i think you know

02:25:05 you know there was a question for me as to why those issues weren't aired in the sgcg meetings we were finding out things by talking directly to the council when we were able to that weren't coming up through the scg so i think there's something about why that wasn't in the

02:25:16 something about why that wasn't in the scg conversation but

02:25:19 but it wasn't and therefore we weren't getting that through the normal red channels the council wouldn't really engage on that first day i wish we had checked what london resilience were up to and what they

02:25:31 resilience were up to and what they thought because i think that would have been a very good conversation on the wednesday with john baradel or elena kelly kelly or others but we didn't do that

02:25:38 that um but i don't think it was about the building safety issues dominating i was trying to manage effectively two crises yes and so with my secretary of state but i did have joe farah on the

02:25:49 state but i did have joe farah on the local issues and helen mcnamara on the housing issues and the department i believe you know mobilized pretty effectively in response to both of those things did you discuss what was done by

02:26:00 did you discuss what was done by southwark

02:26:01 southwark in the immediate aftermath of the latino house fire to see whether any good practices commended themselves to be adopted in the aftermath of this fire i don't particularly recall that no no

02:26:12 particularly recall that no no let's then turn to the next day the 15th of june and start let's let's start at hom 30 44761 bearing in mind the conversation that you'd had

02:26:23 you'd had in the late evening of the 14th that we've just been through um this is an email from philip rutnam to the home office permanent secretary

02:26:34 to the home office permanent secretary and others in the home department update

02:26:38 update not for onward distribution at 703 in the morning and he says

02:26:46 i think i'll leave speaking to melanie thanks i'm off to manchester and in the last paragraph he says um i'm worried that for the sake of the government

02:26:57 government as a whole about what will happen if clg do start taking the lead on the basis of yesterday there is a real risk they will comprehensively mess it up both sos and perm sec seemed frankly to be at risk of

02:27:09 perm sec seemed frankly to be at risk of panicking i know we think more of this issue is likely to shift clg in time given the building standards issue but i think number 10 should consider the need for a single calm lead across government

02:27:23 calm lead across government do you know what might have given sir philip rutnam calls to harbor those concerns he expresses there i think it was the conversation i had with him on the wednesday evening um

02:27:35 with him on the wednesday evening um which

02:27:36 which was referred to in the excerpt for my witness statement which she showed me a moment ago and that conversation was about the public inquiry and as i said elsewhere in my statements uh we believed that we

02:27:49 in my statements uh we believed that we needed a public inquiry we believed it needed to be set up as quickly as possible i had discussed that with sue gray at the cabinet office it was part of my conversation with jeremy hayward philip was of the view that this would not be a good idea and

02:28:02 that this would not be a good idea and um

02:28:03 um that's what i think he means by me and my secretary of state panicking that we were panicking by believing that a public inquiry was needed were you were you i didn't think we were

02:28:14 were you i didn't think we were panicking no and

02:28:16 and uh

02:28:17 uh i

02:28:18 i a week or so after the fire i think everybody was looking at our leadership of this which i think is what we did alongside the covenant officer number 10 and

02:28:30 officer number 10 and um was actually rather glad that we'd been in charge was it you who came up with the idea of instituting this inquiry no it wasn't me um i think it was helen

02:28:42 no it wasn't me um i think it was helen mcnamara mostly alongside the secretary of state i was fully in support of them as was jeremy hayward and sue gray and the prime minister announced it the next morning but we had sent an email

02:28:53 next morning but we had sent an email that evening at about half past 10 i believe via i think james nation in the secretary of state's office to number 10

02:29:02 number 10 on some of the wider questions and uh we had intended that email to be agreed with the home office but they had gone by the time we were ready to send it and we discussed earlier drafts with them and i think it it although actually

02:29:15 them and i think it it although actually it's quite nuanced about the need for an inquiry because we knew their position i think they were still pretty cross about it because they had quite strong views

02:29:24 now um let's then go to a little bit later on the same morning 15th june sclg one triple zero nine seven five

02:29:34 zero uh and

02:29:40 that's uh clg one triple zero nine seven five zero

02:29:49 uh it's

02:29:52 it's it's from sir jeremy hayward to you on

02:29:57 on the 15th of june at 9 12 subject fire lots of concern here that the la is not gripping the aftermath re-housing etc is that fair should clg second in some

02:30:10 that fair should clg second in some people to help which of your ministers is now gripping this tightly uh

02:30:19 uh now um

02:30:20 now um if if you go to

02:30:22 to your first statement please at page 14 if we can go to that you can see what you say paragraph 41 about this email uh and you say

02:30:33 email uh and you say that you replied to him at the end of the day with an update and i also made sure you say that joe farah was aware of his email before her visit to kensington and chelsea the following day

02:30:44 following day is that right yes um why did you wait until the end of the day 15th of june to respond to sir jeremy

02:30:54 jeremy well there was a lot going on that day and

02:30:56 and [Music]

02:30:59 [Music] i

02:31:00 i you know had a good working relationship with jeremy hayward and i knew he didn't need me to go back straight away what i believe happened is that his concerns were circulated around um

02:31:11 um i know i saw his email straight away i would always have seen an email from jeremy if i'd missed it my office would have brought it to my attention so um

02:31:20 um his concerns alongside those of nick heard and others were definitely part of the thinking and the gathering concern that was

02:31:27 that was you know beginning on on thursday and then when the prime minister visited i think those those were even more uh acutely felt and seen and heard um because we were actually on the

02:31:38 um because we were actually on the ground with quite large numbers of people from central government that afternoon

02:31:42 afternoon when he received his email did you share his concerns did you recognize them or did they come as a surprise to you um

02:31:51 this was quite early for us to be hearing those concerns and so i don't think i think his email was probably one of the first that i saw that began to express those concerns

02:32:04 sorry yes that's fine i'll finish there why didn't you go back to him either immediately or shortly afterwards and ask him what he meant and what the problem was

02:32:15 problem was well i thought the most important thing was to hear the concerns and to take them into the thinking and we had a meeting with the secretary of state at 9 30. um

02:32:24 30. um and

02:32:30 you know that that didn't conclude actions more broadly on the response but it did include getting confirmation on the housing situation in particular which was one of the concerns that

02:32:42 which was one of the concerns that jeremy had raised

02:32:45 and essentially what i think i did was to take jeremy's concerns into that meeting and into subsequent meetings inside the department um

02:32:56 um as one of several bits of information that we were getting that there was a problem

02:33:00 problem and then

02:33:01 and then the cross ministerial meeting later that afternoon was the place where that really crystallized yes but my question is a bit more prior to that i mean why didn't you get on to him by email in response and say what do

02:33:12 him by email in response and say what do you mean what exactly is the problem

02:33:16 um

02:33:20 well i don't think i needed to i think he was being quite clear actually that there were problems with rehousing we were hearing that from from others as well so

02:33:29 you know i don't know really i'm i you know i had an immediate meeting to to go to but i felt the important thing was to pick up the worries and to try to deal with them and to try to validate the information as i say it was it was

02:33:40 the information as i say it was it was one amongst several emails and bits of uh intelligence that were coming in because some ministers had been on this on the ground as well yes well let's look at exactly that uh this may be another example or an example hom three

02:33:53 another example or an example hom three zero is four six zero nine zero

02:33:57 um if we go please to the foot of the page um here is an email from um the foreign minister's private secretary to um sanji javid's office

02:34:09 um sanji javid's office james thanks so much for your time on the phone sorry it was at 8 45 that morning i should point out to you 15th of june as promised here are the points we covered and then the first bullet point um if number 10 would like the

02:34:20 um if number 10 would like the parliamentary session to be a joint hodclg event then we're planning for it to be at 1330 etc uh that second bullet point the minister has been told there is an urgent underlined issue with the access to cash

02:34:31 underlined issue with the access to cash for former residents of grenfell tower he's also been told uh via margot james mp bei as minister that the post office as a local one around the corner from the tower have

02:34:42 around the corner from the tower have offered to facilitate access to money for residents he'd be really grateful if your teams were able to facilitate a link between the post office and the local council so that they can make people aware and then this

02:34:53 and then this third bullet point there have also been a couple of concerns raised with him about the quality of the sleeping materials that were available for people last night and asked if there was anything hmg to could do to help the

02:35:04 anything hmg to could do to help the council upgrade and now we were made aware of any of these concerns being relayed by nicholas heard's office on that morning i was aware that nicholas heard had had

02:35:16 i was aware that nicholas heard had had some concerns when he'd visited i can't remember when i became aware of that it's possible that it was at the 9 30 meeting with the secretary of state because

02:35:23 because every time the secretary of state picked up anything of concern he was on it straight away and asking us to investigate it right i wouldn't have felt i needed to investigate it myself but i was certainly confident that those

02:35:35 but i was certainly confident that those dynamics were working through the department and then the other time i might have been made aware of this was at 1 30 when i chaired a stock take across the department to try to pull together

02:35:46 department to try to pull together all the different issues we were grappling with and where i was describing earlier it was the first such top stock take meeting really um and there again i suspect some of these questions were

02:35:57 these questions were were raised i can't remember exactly what we did in response or who followed it up but

02:36:02 it up but when a minister raises something like this civil servants will act on it then let's go to cab5 four zeros five nine four one

02:36:13 nine four one this is f this is at 9 15 on the same morning

02:36:16 morning so half an hour afterwards here comes an email from um alastair whitehead to lorna gratton internally uh and the second email down says can

02:36:27 uh and the second email down says can you get a debrief from peter on what needs to happen today uh it's peter hill i think in short seems to be a mess in terms of rehousing and coordination for the families affected and we need to send dclg teams

02:36:39 affected and we need to send dclg teams down there to help were you aware that number 10 had concerns about the response on the ground that morning i was aware on the basis of the email from jeremy hayward and i was aware of

02:36:50 from jeremy hayward and i was aware of the

02:36:51 the conversation between the prime minister and the secretary of state um

02:36:56 um i mean when aleister whitehead says in short seems to be a mess in terms of rehousing and coordination that seems to be with what i know now to be accurate did you know it at the time uh no i think that is put more strongly

02:37:08 uh no i think that is put more strongly than we knew at the time and we didn't see that email list i didn't see it but i think look honestly i think it took us

02:37:16 took us you know quite a long time on thursday to realize the scale of that problem um we were relying on the information that was coming up through the scg where these issues weren't being raised we

02:37:27 these issues weren't being raised we the council didn't want us coming to their meetings we offered to have somebody in those meetings and that offer was refused as i understand it and

02:37:37 and you know that's the day when i think in an ideal world joe farah or i would have perhaps called london resilience actually if i had to think of one action that i think we could have done on that

02:37:49 that i think we could have done on that day that might have made a difference that's the one rather than visiting which would also have been good but i think would have been very difficult to arrange in practice can i say one more thing which is when you get lots and lots of bits of

02:38:01 when you get lots and lots of bits of information like this coming in from lots of different places it's quite hard to validate them quickly because you do need to go and find out what's going on

02:38:12 need to go and find out what's going on but we had read there but the information sources read had were not

02:38:17 were not really confirming this and we weren't able to get into the local authority which is the place where i think we would have seen that there was a problem that's why i go to london resilience being the place that i think we could have and should have turned to

02:38:28 have and should have turned to to go what's going on you know this is this is just so odd why is it that the response seems to be going so badly and then maybe we would have got there a bit earlier in the day on thursday

02:38:41 bit earlier in the day on thursday um rather than on friday morning so it's a question of i don't know 12 to

02:38:47 12 to 12 to 15 hours that that we might have been able to have just got there a bit sooner maybe a little bit longer but probably not much more than that um and if we go to the top email on the

02:38:58 um and if we go to the top email on the page alistair white head to laura gratton in response uh two minutes later pm speaking to sanji directly now essentially making that point and asking what we can do to support our bkc

02:39:10 support our bkc now you cover this at paragraph 40 of your first statement on page 14 if we can go to it and you refer to this email traffic and you provide a readout there of the call

02:39:23 and uh you you say uh a response was sent just before 1500. why is that why was it not sent before

02:39:34 why is that why was it not sent before that

02:39:36 well i think it was quite a long request with quite a tight deadline on exactly what the department's role was what was going on and i think it took a while for that information to be collated

02:39:47 that information to be collated because i think it's right isn't it that the secretary of state um aps assistant private secretary it actually asks for a response by 2pm yes yes it strikes me when i look at that request that it was quite a big one for such a tight

02:39:59 quite a big one for such a tight deadline if i'm honest well let's look at what you sent back clg 403194 [Music]

02:40:06 [Music] here's the note

02:40:20 and it's a one-page document confirming the function of red and what red had been doing and i'm summarizing very briefly but that's right isn't it

02:40:32 well towards the end it talks more about dclg's um

02:40:36 dclg's um support on funding um for example uh i think we'd mobilize bellwin by thursday morning um

02:40:44 um at least it agreed with the council that we were mobilizing it and also that we were discussing um the provision of emergency accommodation but yes i think this is a rather red centered response and i think that this

02:40:57 centered response and i think that this document or this request was actioned to red

02:41:00 red and to be honest i would have expected a slightly broader response i think it's a bit narrow um and doesn't really relate to the breadth of the issues that the department was dealing with in terms

02:41:11 the department was dealing with in terms of the emergency response yes i mean at risk of pedantry it also doesn't refer to the building correctly does it no it doesn't and

02:41:22 correctly does it no it doesn't and i i i i find that um as i see it throughout the documents you know very jarring and i i just i'm sure that those directly involved

02:41:34 involved in the fire must find it potentially quite offensive and very difficult and i'm very sorry about that it just is a it's an oversight which i can't really explain because i know i was calling it grenfell tower right from the very

02:41:45 grenfell tower right from the very beginning on wednesday so i don't know how it came to be that um grenfell house was used for so long does it tell us anything about the degree of engagement of your officials

02:41:56 no i don't think so but um

02:42:01 no i don't think it does but um

02:42:05 um it perhaps speaks to a certain level of stretch that was going on

02:42:10 in the teams this doesn't look to me like it's a note that's had a very great deal of senior oversight or checking and um

02:42:22 you know it goes to what i was saying earlier that i think and what's in my witness statement that i think red mobilized to do the job that red was supposed to do but what the department was not really ready for was that the job was the job

02:42:34 ready for was that the job was the job that the department was supposed to do on the areas of our responsibility including housing but also a wider role in recovery and we were not prepared for that and we

02:42:45 and we were not prepared for that and we did not have the structures within department to be able to action and deal with requests properly and i think this is a symptom of that i would also say though that you know it isn't always helpful in

02:42:56 you know it isn't always helpful in situations like this when the center asks for a note on something when you're actually trying to deal in real time with the issues so

02:43:05 so um

02:43:08 um it's a rather clunky way of asking for information and i think what came back was a rather clunky and not particularly impressive response if we look at the fifth paragraph down under grenfell house activity

02:43:20 under grenfell house activity which starts the whole local authority you see the paragraph there in the center of the screen it says the whole local authority is involved in the response alongside key partners organized in line with their emergency

02:43:32 organized in line with their emergency response protocol an offer was made for dclg staff to attend our bkc offices this was not felt to be useful do you know why that was the case

02:43:41 the case um

02:43:42 um no just to be clear my understanding is that this was an offer made by dclg for our staff to attend and it was refused by the local authorities when i first saw this document i thought it was the other way around but i think it is that we made the offer to them yeah um i

02:43:55 we made the offer to them yeah um i don't know why they refused it um i i think they were very defensive really almost from the very beginning and were unable to see really quite how much help they needed and i think that

02:44:06 much help they needed and i think that um

02:44:07 um they were particularly defensive about central government coming along and telling them what to do and getting involved

02:44:14 uh now can we go then to cab 3-0 could i just add what's missing from this note is any mention of whether or not the london resilience arrangements have been

02:44:25 have been engaged and for me that is a gap in the way that we were thinking about this that we weren't looking to see if that had happened we were relying on it but we weren't looking to see whether it had happened and i think that's one of the

02:44:36 happened and i think that's one of the big gaps

02:44:37 big gaps that i feel joe and i and others uh didn't fill in those early days is checking that those arrangements there and you can see that in this note it wasn't part of the conversation and they

02:44:48 wasn't part of the conversation and they weren't invited to the wednesday afternoon meeting of ministers either now looking back on the conversation you had with 9 30 that morning with the secretary of state and also on the email we saw earlier from the

02:45:02 we saw earlier from the from joe beck about rehousing did the subject of

02:45:08 of nicholas holgate potentially reaching out to the pan london arrangements at least so far as re-housing was concerned come up during that conversation i don't think so no

02:45:19 i don't think so no can you explain why that is

02:45:22 um well as i said i think it was a gap in our thinking that we should really have been thinking more and i think red should have thought about it um i think joe and i should have thought about it

02:45:33 about it that we

02:45:34 that we about whether or not london gold were involved in the way that we would have expected was necessary given the scale of this

02:45:41 of this emergency

02:45:43 emergency now can we go then to cab three zeroes one four eight five nine

02:45:50 we've already touched on the conversation between the prime minister and sajid javid on that morning here is a readout of that at 9 29 from lorna gratton

02:46:02 from lorna gratton uh internally you're not on it but um let me just show you parts of it and the timing is i i would assume just before your meeting with the secretary of state

02:46:13 with the secretary of state which you say took place at 9 30 so one minute later the pm spoke to the community secretary on the topic of the grenfell tower fire the pm noted that commentary in the media this morning reported that the operation to look

02:46:24 reported that the operation to look after the victims was less than well organized the pm asked what sajid knew about this and what further we can do to support kmc who are leading the effort sajid said he had no reports for it

02:46:35 sajid said he had no reports for it being disorganized clg stood up emergency response within a couple of hours and had called k c leader and the mayor both indicated that they had what they needed the mayor had urged clg to focus on re-housing and that it should

02:46:47 focus on re-housing and that it should be very local sergeant agreed with that and said that the government would provide funding to facilitate this if necessary they had agreed that when the emergency had settled down they would further discuss the necessary recovery

02:46:58 further discuss the necessary recovery efforts sadiq and nicholas knc leader had both been told that they should call sajid directly if they need anything i.e not go through officials if that delayed things clg teams are still on the ground

02:47:10 things clg teams are still on the ground at the site now can you account for the secretary of state sanji javid having no reports for it being disorganized as he says or as he said of him

02:47:21 he said of him i think that is the information that we had on the wednesday night and at the start of thursday morning we didn't have reports of it being disorganized we uh he had spoken to the leader and the

02:47:33 uh he had spoken to the leader and the mayor alex sharma had also spoken to the leader and we were not getting through that those channels all through red channels uh any of the reports that began to

02:47:44 uh any of the reports that began to emerge on thursday morning so

02:47:47 so i read this email and i've not see this is number 10's record of that conversation i've not seen it before of course but um in what sajid javid is saying in that second paragraph that seems to me to be

02:47:58 second paragraph that seems to me to be a faithful description of what the department thought was going on on wednesday night and it was on thursday morning that that began to change i mean we've seen the email from sir jeremy hayward to you about the reports

02:48:10 jeremy hayward to you about the reports coming to him that rbk and c was not gripping this are you able to explain why the secretary of state did not know that when speaking to the prime minister a little bit later not much later but a

02:48:22 little bit later not much later but a little bit later that morning i don't know when the conversation was between the secretary of state and the prime minister and whether it came after my

02:48:30 my email from jeremy before 10 past nine about 9 10 and then this is a new this is the readout from it but just before your meeting with the secretary of state but we also saw the email from earlier

02:48:41 but we also saw the email from earlier that morning from sir jeremy to you telling you about rbkc not getting a grip so would you accept that there appears to have been some kind of breakdown in

02:48:52 to have been some kind of breakdown in the communication line between number 10 the cabinet office and your department about what was actually happening on the ground no i don't think it was a breakdown of communication i think that number 10 um and i'm not sure from quite

02:49:06 number 10 um and i'm not sure from quite which sources but

02:49:09 number 10 were very clear and i'm sure jeremy haywood will have been talking to the prime minister about this and probably part of the early morning meetings in number 10 on that thursday morning they were very consistent in their concerns jeremy emailed me about

02:49:21 their concerns jeremy emailed me about them and the prime minister raised them directly with the secretary of state i didn't as far as i recall forward that email to the secretary of state but um at least not before he's meeting with

02:49:32 um at least not before he's meeting with the prime minister but i don't think there was a breakdown of communication i think they communicated very clearly to us something which we were not aware of at the time

02:49:42 but we were becoming aware of it no quite quickly

02:49:51 yes

02:49:57 in fact it's the case isn't it that at this point the dclg

02:50:03 the dclg had not contributed anything to the response on the ground beyond offering help which had been refused

02:50:10 refused i think the team that sadja javid is referring to there is the red team right and that was there right uh now um if we go please to cab

02:50:21 uh now um if we go please to cab six four

02:50:23 six four we move forward in time i think you've already covered this to some extent uh but um here is an email from lorna gratton

02:50:32 gratton to alistair whitehead at 17 35 32 that day um about further help we've asked them to look into further support eg secondes

02:50:45 to look into further support eg secondes would be welcomed from the la and as you told us that did happen but not some not until some days later i think

02:50:54 think um lizzie clifford to westminster and fiona derby uh on the on the 18th of june 17th and 18th of june respectively um in response to questions um from the

02:51:05 um in response to questions um from the inquiry i provided a full list of all those seconded in my second witness statement i believe that lizzie clifford and fiona darby started working with the council on the thursday but not actually in the council

02:51:17 but not actually in the council buildings but they began to work with them i believe on the thursday afternoon and coming back to the morning of that day let's go to clg403084

02:51:32 and this is an email

02:51:37 uh from your office to nicholas holgate call with melanie doors at dclg is the subject

02:51:42 subject and the diary manager writes to nicholas holgate and says melanie has asked if you might be available later this morning to speak melanie is currently in a meeting with the secretary of state that is due to finish around 10 15. now

02:51:53 that is due to finish around 10 15. now that's the that's the meeting that started at 9 30 i think is it yes

02:51:59 yes um

02:52:01 um did you get a response to this i don't think so no were you concerned that your office was unable to arrange this call yes and joe farrow spoke to nicholas a little bit later on that morning finally

02:52:13 little bit later on that morning finally that was the first time i that either of us had spoken to him right what has prompted your desire to speak to him the concerns about what was going on on the ground

02:52:25 about what was going on on the ground that

02:52:26 that must have been part of it and and and also

02:52:29 also uh just a general feeling that it was appropriate for me to speak to the local authority lead and he hadn't been in contact the previous day so i think in any circumstances i would have wanted to have a chat with him that

02:52:41 have wanted to have a chat with him that morning but particularly given the concerns i think it was it was essential then chronologically the next thing i think is that is it clg 403102

02:52:52 403102 1036 that morning 15th of june clg403102

02:53:00 and and uh this is uh a note to self essentially second email down at 1036

02:53:08 at 1036 rbkc update from joe that's joe farah and there are four bullet points there was a there was quick responses in terms of providing temporary accommodation last night the task for today and

02:53:19 last night the task for today and tomorrow is finding more permanent homes our team is in contact with the director of housing who is holding a meeting and will report back after 11am there is a strategic coordinating group at 11am where this will be discussed our staff

02:53:31 where this will be discussed our staff are on this group now

02:53:35 now in relation the first three of those temporary accommodation more permanent homes but did that reflect the concerns that you had or had heard that morning

02:53:50 i don't quite know where joe's updated come from uh or what she was particularly aiming to inform

02:54:00 inform me of that i wasn't already aware of but

02:54:04 but i think those first two bullets are consistent with where we were on the wednesday night which is

02:54:09 which is that we hadn't been asked for help on temporary accommodation and as far as we were aware there had been a quick response

02:54:15 response and that the task that we were particularly helping them on was providing more permanent homes and that's very consistent with where the department was did you manage to speak to nicholas holgate uh at all before

02:54:28 holgate uh at all before the

02:54:29 the cross ministerial meeting at uh four o'clock that day

02:54:35 you didn't no we think we know that joe farah did i think

02:54:40 think now if we go please to uh clg

02:54:46 well let me just sorry let me let me let me preface that can we look at her witness statement clg 3030653 page 16 paragraph 50 first of all

02:55:02 this is where she deals with that call and

02:55:05 and she

02:55:13 um this is you actually your statement um you say that joe ferris spoke with him shortly after midday her office circulated a readout of that call yes yes and then let's look at that

02:55:25 yes and then let's look at that clg-408140

02:55:34 and if we turn to page two in that email run second email down at 1626

02:55:44 that's the end of it i think we well we want page one it straddles the page thank you uh 1626 from your office to mhclg red and also sergio javid's office read out

02:55:57 and also sergio javid's office read out joe's calls with lga and chief executive knc

02:56:00 knc for information please see readouts of joe's calls today with mark lloyd lga and nick holgate

02:56:08 and you can see that there are a readout of two calls i think the first is at 12 30 15th of june where joe farah has a call with nick holgate you see that

02:56:20 holgate you see that yes

02:56:21 yes and um

02:56:23 and um if you go to the top of page two during the call nicholas holgate is reported as saying that rbkc was receiving plenty of

02:56:35 that rbkc was receiving plenty of support from dclg and others you see that yes

02:56:41 that yes uh risks if a lot of people come back who can't get into their homes getting people into permanent homes in an orderly and quick way post traumatic stress

02:56:51 stress and then if we go um up to page one again please

02:56:59 um he he says in the first bullet point there

02:57:03 there or as noted as having said they have found hotel accommodation for anyone with need he thinks that can roll over for as long as needed now do you remember reading this email

02:57:14 now do you remember reading this email at the time yes you do what what was the impression you were left with remember

02:57:25 i can't quite remember when i read it but if i only saw it after the time that it's stated in this particular version of it ie1626 then by

02:57:37 particular version of it ie1626 then by then i would have been extremely worried about the council and have thought that this was really i'm afraid a sign that nicholas holgate was not gripping the situation and didn't really understand what was

02:57:48 and didn't really understand what was going on

02:57:50 going on why because of the discrepancy between yes right and in particular the fact that there was plenty of help on the second page there um from dclg when we knew that that that they hadn't really asked for any help

02:58:02 asked for any help um indeed on the contrary had resisted it yeah what we didn't know at the time i think was quite how uh problematic the hotel accommodation was that had already

02:58:13 hotel accommodation was that had already been provided and how many issues there were with things like food and also about the uncertainty about how long people were able to stay there so he he's saying that that can roll over for as long as needed what we know

02:58:24 over for as long as needed what we know now is that that wasn't necessarily the case

02:58:27 case um

02:58:29 but at the time there were still plenty of signs that this just felt complacent and i think that was joe's view my guess is that joe and i talked about this before i even read the readout and

02:58:40 this before i even read the readout and that she conveyed her concern

02:58:44 now if you look um about three quarters of the way down that bullet point list you can see there's a reference there to 845 non grenfell tower households are currently without access to their homes

02:58:56 currently without access to their homes most are making their own arrangements they're looking at when police and fire can reduce the size of the cord did you read that as homes or into households or individuals do you remember i don't think i really thought about that difference no um

02:59:08 about that difference no um did the scale of the problem become apparently reading that yes i don't remember exactly when it was that the lancaster west estate issues really began to become evident to

02:59:20 issues really began to become evident to us

02:59:21 us um

02:59:23 um but they were clearly very serious in the scale of the number of people who were

02:59:27 were homeless temporarily homeless or in some cases it turned out to be permanently homeless

02:59:32 homeless um

02:59:33 um i don't quite remember when that crystallized this may have been one of the first indications of it i don't remember

02:59:39 remember now let's just look at the next two bullet points grenfell tower residents have been complaining for a long time about the council they have a trail of letters written to the council nick said several people could make this

02:59:50 nick said several people could make this worse than it is and the council is worried that they might need assistance from the police what was your understanding of what that was about those two bullet points were taken together all separately

03:00:02 together all separately well i don't really know i i've

03:00:05 i've i see it now as a sign of their defensiveness that you know obviously there had been a lot of complaints about the tower and about other housing um

03:00:16 um and

03:00:18 and that perhaps had led to a certain perhaps siege mentality even in the council in how they responded to those residents

03:00:27 residents um that's how i interpret it i i don't i don't think i can say any more than that i don't want to over interpret what nicholas holgate was saying there

03:00:39 was your perception at the time and i don't want to put words into your mouth you refer to siege mentality was it your

03:00:46 it your perception at the time that

03:00:49 that the

03:00:50 the relationship between the residents and the council as recorded here might have had some kind of influence on the way in which nicholas holgate was

03:01:01 approaching offers of help from outside

03:01:07 yes possibly um

03:01:10 um i mean i should say that although i don't know nicholas holgate very well um he is you know a man i believe of of integrity and and actually a very kind man

03:01:20 man and

03:01:22 and i don't in any way interpret his actions in these few days as somebody who didn't care

03:01:28 care or who wasn't trying to do the right thing

03:01:30 thing i think he was completely overwhelmed by the task not perhaps with the operational background in local government that might have helped him he was a policy official from the treasury originally

03:01:41 originally and

03:01:42 and he

03:01:43 he uh in the moment didn't realize he needed to call for help and i mean perhaps this is the right moment to raise this but i think it is very difficult to know

03:01:55 but i think it is very difficult to know how you help somebody in that kind of situation because the last thing you want to do is to stop people leading when they need to lead and get on with it but when somebody is under stress and they don't realize they need help

03:02:06 they don't realize they need help they're usually the last person to see it

03:02:08 it so i don't think you can rely on people under pressure to know when they have to be as he was removed from the situation because they're unable to discharge those responsibilities so i think he was in a

03:02:20 responsibilities so i think he was in a very difficult position um and

03:02:23 um and all sorts of factors were making it very difficult for him to lead the council in the way that was needed thank you mr chairman is that a convenient moment yes

03:02:33 yes i think it is i think it's time we stopped so we can all get some lunch so we'll and we'll break there we'll resume please at five past two and as before please don't talk to

03:02:44 and as before please don't talk to anyone about your evidence over the break all right thank you thank you very much

03:02:57 thank you very much mr millett find faster than please keep