Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities/Home Office Evidence - Wed 9th March 2022 (2/2)

Full transcript

00:00:25 uh

00:00:30 yes mr may call sir ken knight thank you

00:00:42 good afternoons again i understand you're going to affirm thank you sir yes would you the words should be there on the screen would you like to read them out please i do solemnly sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the

00:00:53 truly declare and affirm that the evidence i shall give shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you very much please sit down and make yourself comfortable [Music]

00:01:04 [Music] thank you sir yes mr kadir thank you sir um first of all would you confirm your name for the record yeah so kenneth john knight thank you sir ken um thank you very much for attending to

00:01:15 um thank you very much for attending to give evidence today now my questions are intended to be short and simple sometimes they're not if you wish it to be clearer please say so and i'll correct myself secondly if at any stage

00:01:27 correct myself secondly if at any stage during

00:01:28 during the afternoon or tomorrow morning you require a break please say so that's not a problem

00:01:34 a problem thirdly and perhaps most importantly please keep your voice up so the transcriber can capture everything you say and everything you say accurately now you have given two witness

00:01:45 now you have given two witness statements to the inquiry the first statement is dated the 13th of september 2018 and can be found at home trouble0046025

00:01:58 and if we go to page 24 is that your signature it is the second statement is dated the first of september 2021 and can be found at hom trouble zero

00:02:11 and can be found at hom trouble zero five double zero eight zero if we go to page seven is that your signature at the bottom of that page it is now i understand you wish to make three

00:02:23 now i understand you wish to make three minor changes uh to your second statement um the first change is a paragraph eight in the second line uh where you say that the word

00:02:35 uh where you say that the word program

00:02:37 program should be inserted so that the phrase reads the national operational guidance program board that's correct and if we could turn to paragraph 14

00:02:50 uh you'd like to in the first line add the underlined words so that it says the london fire commissioner ron dobson in his role as the lead advisor on fire

00:03:01 in his role as the lead advisor on fire matters to the local government association proposed that is that correct that's correct and finally in the third line of paragraph 14 you'd give the date as early 2012 rather

00:03:13 you'd give the date as early 2012 rather than late 2011 is that right that's correct

00:03:17 correct now have you read those two statements recently

00:03:20 recently i have

00:03:21 i have and subject to those three minor changes to your second statement are their contents true they are

00:03:28 they are are you happy for those statements be taken as your evidence to this inquiry i am

00:03:34 am and each of those statements has a number of documents exhibited to them can you confirm that you've also recently read those exhibits i have yes thank you and finally have you discussed

00:03:46 thank you and finally have you discussed your evidence with anyone before coming today to give evidence i've only discussed my evidence with my legal advisors however it's been inevitable that i've discussed grenfell pre-grenfell and post-grenfell tragedy

00:03:58 pre-grenfell and post-grenfell tragedy in my ongoing interest and work thank you

00:04:02 you now the first section i'd like to and topic i'd like to discuss with you is your roles and responsibilities now you first became a firefighter in 1966 is that right that's correct sir and that you first joined the london

00:04:14 and that you first joined the london fire brigade in 1987. that's correct and you were initially appointed as a deputy assistant commissioner is that right that's correct and a few months later you were promoted to the position of

00:04:25 you were promoted to the position of assistant chief officer for technical services that's correct in 1990 you were appointed the deputy chief officer in devon is that right yes and in 1992 you became the chief officer

00:04:38 and in 1992 you became the chief officer at dorset correct and then commissioner of the london fire brigade in 2001 is that right uh i think we've missed out the chief of west midlands in that gap between dorset

00:04:50 west midlands in that gap between dorset and london fire brigade i was more interested in you became that's commissioners and you served as london um fire brigade commissioner in 2000 until 2007 at which

00:05:02 commissioner in 2000 until 2007 at which date you were appointed to the role of chief fire and rescue advisor is that right that's correct and you served as the chief fire and rescue advisor until january 2013 is that right and that's correct

00:05:14 that right and that's correct now if we can look at your role as the chief fire and rescue advisor um the post was newly created when you're appointed in 2007 is that right yes and is it right that the role scope was

00:05:26 and is it right that the role scope was limited limited to england because the devolved administrations had their own uh chief fire and rescue advisers yes it was so it was a position that was placed in the the then government department that had

00:05:38 the then government department that had the lead policy on fire which was mhclg and is it right that the role of the chief fire and rescue adviser replaced that of her majesty's chief inspector of

00:05:49 that of her majesty's chief inspector of fire service it replaced it in the the homage to spectra was disbanded uh 18 months or a year before but it didn't

00:06:00 months or a year before but it didn't replace it in its role and function what were the significant differences between your new role as the chief fire and rescue advisor and the previous role of the chief inspector well the role of the

00:06:11 the chief inspector well the role of the chief fire rescue advisor was to give advice within the department on fire rescue service matters um to ensure that the

00:06:24 um to ensure that the relevant advice was was appropriate and current it was not an inspectoral role or assuring the government or indeed the public

00:06:35 government or indeed the public of the um working of the fire and rescue service in the same way that an inspectorate does in carrying out routine inspections there's no routine inspection role as part of the chief fire and rescue advisor my secondary

00:06:47 fire and rescue advisor my secondary role but an important role was responsible as the enforcing authority for the fire safety order for crown premises

00:06:55 premises thank you if we can turn to your first witness statement and paragraph seven in that statement which can be found at h o m

00:07:04 m 0 4 6 0 2 5 forward slash 2 and if we turn over the page to page 3 this roughly summarizes the substance of your role as the chief fire and rescue

00:07:16 your role as the chief fire and rescue adviser

00:07:17 adviser can i summarize it thus first you advise ministers and officials about english fire and rescue services is that right that's correct can you give the panel an idea in broad

00:07:28 can you give the panel an idea in broad terms the types of issues on which you would advise ministers uh

00:07:33 uh yes um

00:07:34 yes um you will you will see and i'm sure we'll come to it sir during the during the evidence

00:07:40 evidence that i was also involved during that period in giving advice on generic operational guidance to fire rescue services and updating that as well as

00:07:51 as well as advising on the government's national framework for the fire rescue service which was a feature of the fire rescue services act 2004 and the position of the chief farm

00:08:03 and the position of the chief farm rescue advisor was graded as an equivalent to a director level in the civil service so it gave me access to both colleagues at a senior level in the civil service as well as to ministers as

00:08:15 civil service as well as to ministers as required thank you and you would also provide a strategic oversight on emerging issues particularly those following ones of national significance is that right i did and therefore that gave me a

00:08:27 i did and therefore that gave me a direct access and involvement as i'm sure we'll come on to with both the police and the hse as required on such incidents and would you prepare circles and guidance to english fire and rescue services yes yes we did as well as

00:08:40 services yes yes we did as well as introducing a process uh for circulating all um coroner's rule 43 letters to all foreign rescue services

00:08:48 services and in providing oversight and guidance to english fire and rescue services were you free to advise as you saw fit or were you subject to the authority or

00:08:59 were you subject to the authority or direction of the secretary of state no i i i've worked for a number of administrations labor as well as of course the conservative and indeed lib dem ministers in that uh administration

00:09:12 dem ministers in that uh administration um i have never felt fettered for the advice i needed to give following on from that answer would you describe the role of the chief fire and rescue adviser as independent of

00:09:24 rescue adviser as independent of government

00:09:28 independent and giving advice yes the decision of course may well have been a government decision because advisers advise but never felt that i needed to give less advice than i

00:09:40 that i needed to give less advice than i was professionally able to do so at any time

00:09:44 time also following on from an earlier answer did you feel that you had sufficient access

00:09:50 access to ministers or senior officials when you felt the need to raise an issue of concern i did and do you felt that the liaison between the various units and ministers and

00:10:01 the various units and ministers and yourself at clg was effective particularly dealing with those who were responsible for housing and building regulations well it was a very new role and though so that that was

00:10:12 was precisely the bridge building and a work that i was required to do as a new uh role having a professional fire officer within the um

00:10:23 within the um within the home of the civil service responsible for fire but i never felt that was gave me difficult access in fact far from it i had very very helpful conversations on both sides

00:10:34 very helpful conversations on both sides between those officials thank you now you mentioned also earlier on your role in relation to enforcement of fire safety under the regulatory reform order 2005 for crown premises in england

00:10:47 2005 for crown premises in england and also in paragraph three you say that you offered professional and technical advice the secretary of state on determinations under the fire safety order to what extent did you advise the

00:10:59 to what extent did you advise the secretary of state generally on the meaning effect of the 2005 order um i didn't that that was very much a policy area in the uh in the policy area

00:11:10 policy area in the uh in the policy area of administration of the fire safety order the reform fire safety order 2005 has a number of enforcing authorities one of which of course predominantly is

00:11:21 one of which of course predominantly is the fire rescue services locally but crown premises were a national enforcement and so i was responsible as an enforcing authority uh not for policy of the of the uh the order itself a

00:11:35 of the of the uh the order itself a separate topic did you uh also advise uh the secretary of state ministers on the competency and regulation of fire risk assessors

00:11:45 assessors no i didn't

00:11:49 how closely did you work with civil servants in the fire safety policy team in dclg as it then was um i think i had a good working relationship with the people involved

00:12:00 relationship with the people involved in the campaigns that were required and the application of community staff community fire safety non-regulatory fire safety work the fire rescue services were emerging through

00:12:12 services were emerging through into um and so i i would i would consider i had a good working relationship with those officials how closely did you work with louise upton who was the head of the fire safety policy team during your tenure as the

00:12:24 policy team during your tenure as the chief fire and rescue advisor well she was another official within the department who i obviously knew as a work as a professional colleague so i knew louise in that respect

00:12:35 knew louise in that respect pretty well did she seek your advice yes she did um and we had a number of conversations around a arraign a number of issues including some fire safety

00:12:47 of issues including some fire safety initiate initiatives that were emerging uh during the time i was there how closely did you work with officials in the building regulations division of dclg uh less so in building regulations

00:13:00 dclg uh less so in building regulations because that was quite um separate

00:13:04 separate until um probably the implications of the lack of like in our house fire uh were discussed which was broader than building regulations of course because it also involved housing

00:13:17 course because it also involved housing and the director of housing so would you work or did you work closely with brian martin after those implications of the latino fire started to become more apparent well i i

00:13:28 started to become more apparent well i i know i knew brian martin extremely well i wouldn't say i worked closely with him but he was certainly one of those uh many officials in that department that knew building

00:13:40 department that knew building regulations and the application builder regulations uh far better than i i of course because i wasn't involved in bigger

00:13:46 bigger building regulations did he ever seek your advice on any fire safety related matters

00:13:53 matters i don't recall that being the case

00:13:58 now during your tenure could we discuss the the ministers uh to whom you gave advice um first of all would you advise the secretary of state who had ultimate responsibility for fire and resilience

00:14:10 responsibility for fire and resilience matters

00:14:11 matters yes

00:14:13 yes and the secretary of state was john denham in 2009 and he was also the secretary of state at the time of the latter house fire is that right that's correct

00:14:21 correct and then he was succeeded following the may 2010 election by eric pickles is that right that's correct and he was secretary of state between may 2010 and may 2015. that's correct

00:14:33 may 2015. that's correct would you also advise the the then parliamentary under secretary of state for communities and local government which from 2010 to 2012 was bob neal that will be my principal ministerial

00:14:45 that will be my principal ministerial contact as the as the uh minister is directly responsible for our matters and from september 2012 until 2014 um brandon lewis filled that post is that

00:14:56 brandon lewis filled that post is that right and and the same relationship with um brandon lewis would you advise anyone else

00:15:04 no i had i had conversations in the first administration eventually with john healey who was housing minister at the time of la canal house fire but otherwise um and there were

00:15:15 but otherwise um and there were ministers of course a number of ministers along that uh along that route that i would have spoken to on a number of occasions but they were the principal contacts that i had at a ministerial level

00:15:28 that i had at a ministerial level during your time as the chief fire and rescue advisor would you engage with or work with the fire sector partnership or as it became known after may 2012 the fire sector federation yes i knew the

00:15:40 fire sector federation yes i knew the fire secret federation well uh not least some of them a number of them were my ex-fire rescue service colleagues as chief fire officers and so there was it was a group that i

00:15:51 was a group that i knew and know well can you give the uh the panel excuse me a more detailed idea of the issues or the programs on which you worked with the fire safety federation

00:16:02 worked with the fire safety federation well it wasn't a member of the fire sector federation that was a federation of the other professional bodies that existed at that time and some of them beyond fire themselves in in for example

00:16:13 beyond fire themselves in in for example the construction industry so i'm not sure that i work with them on on matters but they invited me to attend a number of their meetings and i attended a number of their meetings and i had a good liaison in contact with

00:16:25 i had a good liaison in contact with them on an as required basis now after you stood down as the chief fire and rescue advisor in january 2013 did you continue to advise government on

00:16:36 did you continue to advise government on fire safety matters um not on fire safety but i was asked contracted to produce a report on the effectiveness and efficiencies of the fire rescue services in england

00:16:48 the fire rescue services in england which are entitled facing the future which included matters including fast safety in that report which was published thank you and after you stood down as the chief

00:16:59 and after you stood down as the chief fire and rescue advisor would you

00:17:02 would you be ever called upon to advise or discuss matters with your successor mr holland um

00:17:09 um no again he peter holland is an individual obviously no well as an ex colleague in the fire rescue service and continues to know well so we had hand over arrangements of

00:17:20 well so we had hand over arrangements of course in the role including in crown premises but not ongoing discussions thank you

00:17:26 thank you now the next topic i'd like to discuss with you is national operational guidance and generic risk assessments now you say in your second witness statement which we can find at hom

00:17:38 statement which we can find at hom trouble zero five double zero eight zero forward slash two now you say in your second statement at page two in paragraph four

00:17:50 page two in paragraph four that national operational guidance was produced and i quote as a function of central government close quotes and that the inspectorate was responsible for its publication until 2006 after which you assumed that

00:18:03 2006 after which you assumed that responsibility as chief iron rescue advisor until 2012. a basic question to start off with uh sir ken

00:18:12 sir ken are generic risk assessments a form of national operational guidance um

00:18:19 um well i think the key description of them is being generic the responsibility for safety and training rests with each of the

00:18:28 the then 45 fire rescue authorities in england

00:18:33 england and so it was generic in order to give that overview so that each fire rescue service each fire rescue authority which held the legal responsibility of course to translate that into operational

00:18:44 to translate that into operational policy for their fire rescue service now although you are primarily responsible for the production of guidance is it right that you are assisted by others at dclg in its

00:18:56 assisted by others at dclg in its preparation yes i had a very small team there but

00:19:00 there but the main function of both looking at that guidance and updating it and historically looking at those that needed updating was to ensure that it was very much

00:19:12 very much written and understood by the sector rather than this very small team i i had so the program that i was responsible for was a program that involved a wide section not only inside

00:19:25 section not only inside the department but in the sector itself i think

00:19:28 i think part of the way in which you achieve that particular aim was the some of the tasks were delegated to seconded staff is that right that's absolutely correct so we had a quite a traditional principle of a

00:19:40 had a quite a traditional principle of a programme board and project board the programme board gave the strategic oversight which i chaired and the programme board had the individual at the project board i became had the

00:19:51 the project board i became had the individual projects of each of the projects in play at that time reporting to it due to completion in a timely manner now if we can turn to page five in this your second witness statement

00:20:03 in this your second witness statement and paragraph 19. where you say this the review and revision of gra's that's generic risk assessments was one of the work streams projects of the operational

00:20:14 work streams projects of the operational guidance program it was agreed in 2008 that the work would be led by derrick clough from surrey fire and rescue service it was also agreed that surrey fire and

00:20:25 it was also agreed that surrey fire and rescue service would host the project and derrick clough would be seconded to cfra but based within surrey frs for the duration of the project the programme of

00:20:36 duration of the project the programme of work and delivery of the projects would be controlled by dclg

00:20:43 so flowing from that were you as the chief fire and rescue advisor or you together with the secretary of state ultimately responsible for the contents of the generic risk assessments yes the

00:20:55 of the generic risk assessments yes the final sign off as you describe the project itself reported to the project manager my my immediate uh colleague chris bolton who rang the project board and this was typical of ensuring that

00:21:07 and this was typical of ensuring that the work was understood and undertaken in the sector for which the department was paying but in this case uh it selected a uh a sorry fire rescue service to carry out

00:21:18 sorry fire rescue service to carry out this piece of work on its behalf that may not be necessarily an answer to the question i asked my question was this were you and you alone as the chief fire and rescue

00:21:29 alone as the chief fire and rescue advisor

00:21:30 advisor or you together with the secretary of state ultimately responsible for the contents of generic risk assessments i think

00:21:38 think i think

00:21:39 i think i was signing them off but it did require the final sign off by the secretary of state for the national framework so i think they were finally issued in the name of the secretary of state

00:21:51 secretary of state but he would need to have confidence in me that i was content with the content of their program so i think it's both but i don't shirt my responsibility of being responsible for the content of

00:22:02 being responsible for the content of that guidance would it follow that it would be you to all intents and purposes who would decide the subject areas that would be addressed by gras no uh that was done collectively by the

00:22:16 no uh that was done collectively by the strategic board which is why it was broader than just dclg there was a good deal of historic guidance that needed updating so it needed updating on a risk basis uh risk to uh the risk of having

00:22:29 basis uh risk to uh the risk of having old guidance out with a risk to uh firefighters and that was the prioritization that was agreed with the sector which was which was widely represented on the strategic board

00:22:41 represented on the strategic board could i put a mata bluntly to you as the chief fire and rescue advisor would you to all practical intents and purposes be responsible for any emissions or flaws in the gra

00:22:54 emissions or flaws in the gra i suspect that's true in signing off the guidance i would accept that responsibility thank you now if we could go back to page three in your second witness statement and paragraph eleven

00:23:07 now you'll see at the bottom of the page it says this in early 2012 it was agreed by the then minister

00:23:14 minister that the operational guidance program would be transferred to the london fire brigade who would take responsibility for the production of operational guidance as part of the sector-led approach

00:23:25 approach it was agreed that the nog

00:23:28 nog pb that's the national operational guidance programme board and the

00:23:33 and the nogpg the program group would remain until a revised structure of strategic governance was put in place in 2012.

00:23:42 in 2012. the minister and cfra would remain responsible for the final sign-off and publication what was the reason for that transfer um the the transfer

00:23:55 um the the transfer well there was there was there was two reasons probably there was a move to a sector-led approach generally in government no less so than in the fire rescue service and probably more particularly

00:24:07 service and probably more particularly the sector itself wishing to be responsible directly for that guidance and thirdly um the fact that uh it was one of the

00:24:18 um the fact that uh it was one of the changes i made in my statement that you you recalled earlier on the the lead advisor to the lga fire aspects was the commissioner of london fire brigade

00:24:30 london fire brigade and through ron dobson and through through his um leading the work for the lga made arrangements for london fire brigade to lead physically on the

00:24:43 brigade to lead physically on the program and the projects that were going on and indeed if i recall to fund it for the first three years what was the rationale driving the sector-led approach it's a phrase that will be heard frequently i think over

00:24:55 will be heard frequently i think over the next five days but it'd be useful to hear from you what the principled rationale was for that well sector-led probably ran alongside a term called

00:25:07 probably ran alongside a term called localism

00:25:09 localism which intended to ensure that the local services were designed

00:25:15 designed and aimed at the local community rather than a one-size-fits-all and that's not unreasonable in its broadest sense that the needs and risks and requirements of a very rural indeed

00:25:27 and requirements of a very rural indeed a coastal brigade may be very different to a metropolitan fire rescue service so meeting the local needs of the local community

00:25:35 community but the this broader sense here was to understand that the sector-led approach put the sector in the forefront of being responsible for

00:25:46 the forefront of being responsible for its own guidance and not being done eventually arm's length by government on a top-down approach so that was the general thrust of that that whole change but it wasn't it wasn't against the will

00:25:59 but it wasn't it wasn't against the will of the sector far from it in fact they were pressing hard for that to happen and so the sector wanted the responsibility of bearing and forming its own risk assessments policy programs the rest of it very much so

00:26:11 the rest of it very much so could we look an exhibit um to one of your statements and it's exhibit kk 8 which can be found at hom 0018353

00:26:27 now this is a document produced by c fur the chief fire officers association and the fire protection association the fpa and it's entitled

00:26:38 association the fpa and it's entitled operational guidance sector-led sector owned now this document you can take it from me is dated the 5th of april 2011. and if we look at the

00:26:49 and if we look at the second paragraph on the first page it says this

00:26:52 says this up until recently the production review and distribution of guidance fell to central government latterly following the hiatus which occurred following the demise of her

00:27:03 occurred following the demise of her majesty's fire service inspectorate if i can just pause there that's the gap of 12 or 18 months it is between the the hmis

00:27:12 hmis being disbanded and the role the chief firm rescue advisor uh be informed thank you

00:27:18 you continuing with the quote there has been an attempt to involve more systematically sector stakeholders in the production and critique of draft products

00:27:28 products nevertheless ownership of the process and authority for the guidance has remained with government through dclg however

00:27:37 however through the recent national functions discussions and fire futures debate government has signaled its intention to move away from this arrangement now that set out the broad direction

00:27:50 now that set out the broad direction can you help us as to what some of the other drivers might have been behind that

00:27:55 that was the availability or otherwise of public resources a relevant factor in this policy move yes i think that's true there was always of course um limited resources um in

00:28:08 of course um limited resources um in terms of and therefore the need to prioritize the work that was required but it was one of the drivers but the main driver was this this this this

00:28:19 main driver was this this this this approach which you see is jointly sector led by the chief fire association and indeed by the fire protection association who really saw they wanted to take ownership and responsibility for it so it probably met both of those

00:28:31 it so it probably met both of those objectives of limited resources and yet the sector actually wanting to do it and following on from that if we can turn over the page to page two and it's really the second paragraph down from

00:28:42 really the second paragraph down from the head of the page it says this that the fpa c c four

00:28:49 c c four would contend that full sector involvement in the production process is crucial

00:28:55 crucial both to capitalize on the available expertise but also to ensure any products are subjected to the rigor of scrutiny only a broad church of interest can provide importantly we consider that central

00:29:07 importantly we consider that central government through dclg remains a key partner in this process it would be wholly inconceivable for the government department with policy responsibility for the fire service

00:29:19 responsibility for the fire service local authorities as both enforcers and landlords

00:29:23 landlords building regulations and planning to not be an active partner moreover all of government has a responsibility for national resilience as we reference above

00:29:34 as we reference above the ability for the fire service to operate consistently and effectively with other emergency responders represents a component of protecting the nation

00:29:44 nation a straightforward question following that did you agree with that statement yes i do and that's exactly what turned out to be the case of course now gra 3.2 which we discussed earlier

00:29:56 now gra 3.2 which we discussed earlier in the inquiry and a number of other specific

00:30:00 specific pieces of legacy guidance remained with dclg is that right first of all it did why did certain legacy guidance stay with dclg

00:30:11 with dclg i think i think some of it was unfinished business some of the breathing apparatus guidance that came out following the atherstone on star fire

00:30:23 atherstone on star fire and some of the other guidance that uh emanated from lacking our house but at the time i left was not completed because it was awaiting the coroner's findings so there

00:30:34 awaiting the coroner's findings so there was inevitably some overlap of unfinished business in guidance that needed to be completed and

00:30:41 and looking at more specifically looking at gra 3.2 did the coroner's recommendations following the latino inquests inform the decision to keep gra 3.2 within with the department

00:30:54 3.2 within with the department well of course i i had left by the time the coroner's findings were published which was after i'd left so that fell to my successor but it was a consideration that the

00:31:06 but it was a consideration that the guidance was likely to be reviewed and probably updated following the inquest and therefore although it was reviewed before after

00:31:18 although it was reviewed before after the fire before the inquest there was nothing significant that wouldn't need to wait until after the inquest findings now can we look at the latin house fire in more detail sir ken now that fire

00:31:31 in more detail sir ken now that fire happened on the third of july 2009 and in your first witness statement and we can find that at hom trouble zero four six zero two five and

00:31:43 trouble zero four six zero two five and if we go to page five

00:31:48 and we see it paragraph 17 and the bottom half of that page you explain that in the immediate aftermath of the fire the secretary of state asked you to undertake an independent

00:32:00 asked you to undertake an independent overview

00:32:02 overview of the investigations into the latino fire and to report urgently on progress and the emerging findings is that a first summary yes it is

00:32:11 is now immediately below that paragraph and over the next page you set out the scope of the report and if i may summarize were you intending to identify first emerging

00:32:23 intending to identify first emerging fire safety issues secondly lessons to be learned and thirdly whether national guidance remained appropriate yes now your report was to be produced

00:32:34 now your report was to be produced within four weeks do you think that was sufficient time to allow you to investigate properly what appear to be the complex and wide-ranging issues that were revealed

00:32:45 wide-ranging issues that were revealed by the latino house fire no no it never was intended to be a full investigation because as you as you rightly suggest 28 days was insufficient to do that

00:32:56 to do that but it was to give some early impressions of early discussions with those involved in the fire what immediate steps might need to be taken what advice might need to be given to both fire and rescue

00:33:08 to be given to both fire and rescue service and indeed to housing authorities i hope i put this sadly was it intent to be something of a snapshot of where people's thinking was in the immediate aftermath of the fire

00:33:19 in the immediate aftermath of the fire or more precisely four weeks after the fire that's not unreasonable

00:33:27 now if we can stay

00:33:33 dealing with your report were you the sole author or did you rely upon the substantive contribution of others if so whom and to what extent i assembled a small team around me to

00:33:46 i assembled a small team around me to produce

00:33:47 produce the findings of this report and it was important to do so um i i might struggle with that with with all of the names i apologize sir um but there was a representative my own my own

00:33:59 there was a representative my own my own uh head of fire safety in my group who was a fire engineer um uh the lead representative of fire safety the fire brigades union um someone from the

00:34:12 um someone from the fire industry association and i think probably we drew upon uh martin ship's advice as well who was doing by then the immediate

00:34:25 doing by then the immediate investigation on behalf of the department as part of the files of special interest work did you hold the pen though i did now can we turn to the interim reports you produced on the fire um but

00:34:38 reports you produced on the fire um but can can we go to your first witness statement mr kenya i'm sorry yeah my screen's gone blank as well yes i expect yours

00:34:46 yours yes we've been having this trouble i'm afraid today um

00:34:52 all right thank you i think maybe we'll be patient for a moment mr kinnear sir last time it came back quite quickly i can plow on with the question i don't necessarily have to go to the statement

00:35:04 necessarily have to go to the statement itself um if so ken you feel you need the statement might it be easier if you just say so and then we pause there to wait for the i.t to catch up i'm i'm content with it right yes you have to do that right thank you now

00:35:17 that right thank you now for the reference for those following it's paragraph 18 of your first witness statement which is a hom travel zero four six zero two five forward slash six and you explained there and over the page that there were two versions of

00:35:29 page that there were two versions of your report a slightly longer version which was a version eventually put before the coroner and the published version which excluded some matters that fell within the scope of the then continuing police

00:35:41 of the then continuing police investigation is that right that's correct at the request of the metropolitan police service here now in addition to those two versions of the final report which are both dated the third of july um there were three

00:35:53 third of july um there were three interim reports is that right that's correct and they were respectively dated the 8th the 16th and the 23rd of july 2009 is that right i don't remember the dates but if that's where they are they

00:36:05 dates but if that's where they are they were yes

00:36:06 were yes now can you help us what was the purpose of

00:36:09 of those interim reports well as you've alluded to it was a very uh short period to produce those early thoughts early findings

00:36:20 those early thoughts early findings and because there was a high level of interest in this fire in which six people tragically died um i'd had agreed with the secretary of state that i produced some interim reports to keep the momentum and see if

00:36:32 reports to keep the momentum and see if there was anything that we needed to do of real urgency within that period and that was the period that was the reason for keeping the secretary of state updated on the progress thank you and very slickly i can now refer to

00:36:44 very slickly i can now refer to paragraph 18 of your first statement which is on the screen and you'll see um it opens with the sentence and i quote i was given a four week period to produce the report and so i did not do a

00:36:56 produce the report and so i did not do a detailed evaluation of either products or the fire nor did the review include the operational performance of london fire brigade can we bearing what you say in mind

00:37:07 can we bearing what you say in mind there could be turn to the first interim report which is a hom treble zero four six zero one two

00:37:19 and we see the uh there's an emboldened heading purpose of review

00:37:24 of review and point three below that heading says this

00:37:27 this to give a professional overview of the london fire brigades assessment of its performance including the appropriate and application of current procedures the impact of the

00:37:38 current procedures the impact of the procedures adopted on the firefighting operations now um

00:37:43 now um had the scope of your review developed

00:37:48 between the date of your being commissioned by the secretary of state and the first interim report yes it did yes it did to exclude the operational performance of london fire brigade now were the lessons to be learned from

00:38:00 now were the lessons to be learned from the lfb's operational response relevant to determining whether gra 3.2 required revision and if so to what extent it required revision

00:38:12 extent it required revision it probably the answer to that is yes it probably could have been in both those matters but it was london fire brigade who requested that it did not include the operational performance of london fire brigade and made representations in that

00:38:24 brigade and made representations in that way

00:38:27 and was were those representations made after the first interim report uh they were

00:38:33 they were made causing that change to occur that we

00:38:37 we did not involve ourselves with the operation performance of london fire again

00:38:42 again now your final interim report and we don't need to go to it indicated that you were to meet ron dobson then the commissioner on the 27th of july 2009

00:38:54 do you remember that meeting at all i don't remember the meeting but i had a good relationship with ron dobson of course was with my successor as london fire commissioner

00:39:06 fire commissioner but i was also minded which i know that will come on to as well by then there was also or very soon after that a police investigation which included uh um

00:39:17 which included uh um an oversight board which excluded both principal parties london and london borough southwark from that to ensure transparency openness and avoidance of any conflict of interest thank you so

00:39:29 any conflict of interest thank you so the conversations were in the in the knowledge of that thank you could we look at a chain of email correspondence uh which can be found at hom treble zero double one five nine six

00:39:45 and if we can look at the final email in that chain stated the 26th of july 2009 that's to say the day before the proposed meeting with ron dobson and

00:39:58 the proposed meeting with ron dobson and the email was sent to chris bolton copying in kelly fairman first of all who was mr bolton and what was his role chris bolton was a senior fire officer

00:40:10 chris bolton was a senior fire officer on secondment to my unit uh as a uh as one of the uh i would argue the two uh very senior officers i had a very small team one i've already mentioned peter wise

00:40:22 one i've already mentioned peter wise who was a fire engineer although chris bolton was also a fire engineer by by his profession he was also advising me on operational matters in particular and the operational guidance

00:40:33 the operational guidance uh who was kelly fehrman before you answer this again might i ask that for the sake of the transcriber you slow down slightly

00:40:44 transcriber you slow down slightly apologize

00:40:46 apologize um

00:40:46 um and kelly uh was my um

00:40:50 was my um chief of staff who was also on secondment from london fire brigade and uh worked with me for a period as the chief firm rescue advisor thank you

00:41:01 the chief firm rescue advisor thank you now you start the substantive thrust of the email on the second line and you said this and forgive me for reading it out we are tight for the completion of the report so i suggest my meeting with ron

00:41:14 report so i suggest my meeting with ron is really only an overview leaving you to obtain the detail for the report whilst i return to the office for typing etc i'm assuming you are using page 10 of

00:41:25 i'm assuming you are using page 10 of the draft as your aid memoir for the meeting

00:41:28 meeting if so i would be glad if you add detail on the following what lfb investigations are taking place information on one one d pausing there presumably that's the

00:41:40 pausing there presumably that's the predecessor so again if you can wait for me to finish the question again it's just the clarity of the transcript going on bdag consumption tables when what change

00:41:53 bdag consumption tables when what change pausing there what does bdag stand for it was um it stood it stood for stands for the building dis building disaster services an advisory group advisor

00:42:05 services an advisory group advisor advisor group it was a group that uh that was formed after the twin towers attack in new york edba duration how many used and available

00:42:15 available was it for women and two children who died where what flats floors bottom out the gas leaking issue was the fire fighting lift a factor if it had been working what difference

00:42:27 it had been working what difference would it have made dry riser single outlets did they use dividing breachings how many jets from dry riser how many people rescued was it external

00:42:38 how many people rescued was it external or by assisting evacuation down the main stairs was a general evacuation initiated

00:42:45 initiated now looking at the two last bullet points what did you want to understand about the rescue and evacuation of residents well

00:42:57 well we knew by then remember i of course didn't go to the incident itself it was on the immediate aftermath that i went to it so it was from hearing what happened and what it was like so we knew in the immediate

00:43:09 like so we knew in the immediate aftermath that um six people had died but about 150 people had been evacuated i think it was in that order and i was interested and it was a and of course it

00:43:20 interested and it was a and of course it was a staple strategy building and i just wanted to know how and why they had been evacuated or rescued as i put in this email so we fully understood

00:43:31 put in this email so we fully understood the implications of that that have taken place at this stage so nearing the end of july did you anticipate or expect that revisions would be required to

00:43:44 that revisions would be required to uh

00:43:45 uh fire fighting policies in high rise buildings

00:43:48 buildings um

00:43:50 residential buildings sorry so yeah we were open to exactly that view by reviewing um the generic risk assessment in light of these early findings

00:44:03 these early findings thank you

00:44:04 thank you i'm now going to turn to the final report and can we turn to your the longer unpublished version of that document which you exhibited h o m

00:44:16 document which you exhibited h o m quadruple 0 1 0 9 2 and if we could keep that version on the right hand of the screen and open another

00:44:27 another on the left hand which is at hom trouble zero four five seven nine one

00:44:39 thank you

00:44:42 you will see the version on the left in the top left-hand corner bears a manuscript the writing op elderville which is short for operation elderville which was the

00:44:55 for operation elderville which was the name of the police investigations the latino fire is that right it is now we've

00:45:01 now we've identified some differences between the two versions of your long report now

00:45:07 now an analysis of the metadata and the family documents of these two versions suggest that the version on the left hand side was provided to the secretary of state in july 2009 whereas the version on the

00:45:20 in july 2009 whereas the version on the right was sent to the coroner in february 2010. now does that accord with your memory yes it does if i might explain

00:45:31 yes it does if i might explain the police had asked not to release the whole report to ensure there was no conflict with the work they were doing but the coroner had asked for a report

00:45:42 but the coroner had asked for a report and of course we agreed to give the coroner a full report on the basis that she needed the full report but it was still subject to the restrictions the police had placed on it thank you now

00:45:54 police had placed on it thank you now i want to focus first on your observations about the cause of the fire and the subsequent fire spread and now given that your report was produced a few weeks after the fire um

00:46:07 produced a few weeks after the fire um it's fair to say presumably that your conclusions on these points were necessarily preliminary and provisional very much so now could we start with the version that

00:46:18 now could we start with the version that was sent to the coroner so that's the one on the right hand side and turn to page 24 and in particular section 2.2

00:46:30 there we see 2.2 comes under the heading the incident and in section 2.2 you said this although investigations are still ongoing it is believed that the fire

00:46:42 ongoing it is believed that the fire then spread externally to the 11th floor where the masonette directly above became involved in fire this is not unique fire spread caused by the significant heat and flame coming

00:46:55 the significant heat and flame coming from the uncontrolled the firefighters having withdrawn from the ninth floor far on the tenth floor and rising externally up the face of the building

00:47:04 building the fire in the flat on the 11th floor was particularly ferocious and there appears to have been an abnormally high fire load in this area at this point it seems that the fire

00:47:15 at this point it seems that the fire also spread downwards externally setting light to masonettes on the fifth and seventh floors now in paragraph 2.3 you explained the external fire spread

00:47:27 you explained the external fire spread appeared to be caused by burning products falling from the floors above and if we turn over the page to page 25

00:47:37 we see your effective conclusion in paragraph 2.4 and you said this from the early findings the method of external fire spread is not seen as

00:47:48 external fire spread is not seen as particularly unusual now when you said that the method of external fire spread what were you referring to there

00:47:59 what were you referring to there um

00:48:02 it it was that the fire that occurred in that flat

00:48:07 that flat had rapidly come out of the windows and spread up to the floor above so we saw significant flames spread up the building and the

00:48:19 and the there was nothing particularly unusual about any of that fire spread what was

00:48:25 what was unusual about the fire spread was not that

00:48:29 that it was however that the fire had appeared to have burned downwards and as you i know that you've heard from other um evidence at the first instances it's thought there may be someone

00:48:40 thought there may be someone deliberately fast sitting in the building

00:48:43 building staying on this page looking at section three under the heading internal and external fire spread you went to say this in the first paragraph under that heading

00:48:54 paragraph under that heading although the cause of the fire at latino has has been identified the fire development and fire spread was unusual the initial investigations have not as yet been able to identify the mechanisms

00:49:06 yet been able to identify the mechanisms that caused the fire development and spread

00:49:09 spread now given that you had already concluded that the method of external fire spread was not particularly unusual was it this element of the fire burning

00:49:20 was it this element of the fire burning downwards that you consider to be unusual

00:49:23 unusual yes i regret that's not as clear as that but i i think that's absolutely the case it was the downward fire spread that was unusual rather than the natural spread of the fire that you get in most fires of that

00:49:34 of that in intensity now with my apologies to the document manager could we now turn to the contents of the document on the left hand side of the screen and turn to page 21 in that particular

00:49:47 and turn to page 21 in that particular document

00:49:49 and you'll see at paragraph 28 on the left hand side you said this it appears that this was spread the fire was spread by burning products from the fire above which dropped down and

00:50:01 fire above which dropped down and entered the maize nets for open windows on what was a very hot day these products could have come from anything that had burnt within the masonettes

00:50:12 masonettes from initial observations the windows and infill panels did not appear to have burnt unduly however this subject this is subject to further confirmation arising from the full investigation

00:50:26 arising from the full investigation can you help us what evidence were you relying upon when you concluded from initial observations the windows and infill panels did not appear to have burnt unduly

00:50:38 burnt unduly um yes i can the uh the panels we're talking about of course are what are called spandrel panels below the windows those infill panels um

00:50:49 um and and i've described in the report it was not only a very warm day the windows were open and there were inward opening windows

00:51:00 inward opening windows and not outward windows and the wind direction was directly onto the building

00:51:06 building and so the observations that i picked up from witnesses that saw the fire was that saw that the products of fire from the flat from curtains from things burning

00:51:17 burning came out of the fire and blew back in towards the building and into those other flats and that's what caused the downward fire spread and there was no evidence that i saw that the spandrel panels actually

00:51:29 that the spandrel panels actually contributed there was no for example droplets no the spindle panels didn't further cause the uh the fire spread um in this building now when you said that uh

00:51:42 building now when you said that uh the windows and panels did not appear to have burned unduly can you help us what did you mean by well if you wait for the question to finish what did you mean by the phrase burnt

00:51:53 what did you mean by the phrase burnt unduly

00:51:54 unduly uh

00:51:55 uh i probably meant unusually and i apologize for those words but it i meant that whilst they had disintegrated in fact you'll see later on in the

00:52:07 in fact you'll see later on in the reports it was actually the windows themselves the window frames that collapsed uh causing some of that far spread

00:52:15 spread not the spandrel panels in their own right now before you stood down as the chief fire and rescue advisor

00:52:22 advisor were you aware that further investigations carried out by the bre did indicate that the window panels when tested were seen to be flaming strongly with a lot of flaming burning debris uh

00:52:34 with a lot of flaming burning debris uh not not at the time of this report uh but during your time as the chief fire and rescue advisor um i don't recall that i recall the subsequent conversation but some of it of course has been in subsequent reading

00:52:47 of course has been in subsequent reading about the standards applied and indeed letters i received but i don't recall that during that period no now if we can uh stay on page 21 but look at paragraph 39

00:52:59 look at paragraph 39 you said this from the early findings the issue of external fire spread is not seen as significant the initial inquiries do not point to

00:53:10 the initial inquiries do not point to any particularly new methods of fire spread externally now can you help us there what was the evidence you lied upon for the statement that external fire spread was not seen

00:53:21 that external fire spread was not seen as significant because it wasn't seen as a significant external wall fire there was external fire but it wasn't called by the external wall itself or the make up

00:53:33 external wall itself or the make up uh and and i i know that the london commissioner at the time giving his evidence to you uh agrees with that position that it was not seen as an external wall fast spread in the way that it that it might be suggested it

00:53:45 that it that it might be suggested it wasn't a cladding system that caused this fire looking at the word significant was that your own view that you reached exclusively on your own or was it a view

00:53:58 exclusively on your own or was it a view that been informed by the advice of others for example david crowder or martin ship or someone else um

00:54:05 um i think it was a collective view but i take full responsibility for the wordings because it was my sign off for the report when you say collective who was within the collective the group i mentioned earlier so your unit yes and and those

00:54:18 earlier so your unit yes and and those outside that i talked about were part of this review

00:54:27 now if we can compare the two versions of these documents we can see that in the version provided to the coroner so that's the one on the right

00:54:35 right in paragraph 2.3 3 rather there was no reference to the sentence which says that from initial observations the windows nim fill panels did not appear to have burnt unduly and we see that's

00:54:47 to have burnt unduly and we see that's in paragraph 38. can you help us as to why that particular observation was not included in the version provided to the coroner

00:54:59 no i i can't actually um if we go on if we look at looking at the right hand side if we can look at paragraph 2.4

00:55:10 and we see the first sentence there said from the early findings the method of external fire spread is not seen as particularly unusual and looking at that compare that on the

00:55:22 and looking at that compare that on the right hand side to paragraph 39 on the left

00:55:29 where it said that the external fire spread was not seen as significant

00:55:36 is there a material difference there between the two

00:55:43 i don't think there is in my mind in seeing many fires over many years of seeing the particularly unusual and significant in seeing fire spread no are you using the word significant and

00:55:57 you using the word significant and unusual interchangeably as synonyms there i i i would be yes and is there any

00:56:03 any substantive reason for the use of different language in these respective versions of this and i can't explain that

00:56:12 that but you don't remember the difference being the product of detailed discussion or debate between you and your unit no i don't and i don't think that was uh an issue these the paragraph below 2.4 was

00:56:25 issue these the paragraph below 2.4 was an issue because of wide reports of the plastic windows melting which we quickly found wasn't true because there weren't plastic windows were you aware that brian martin had ended the bre's investigation into the

00:56:37 ended the bre's investigation into the latin house fire on the 28th of july 2009 um

00:56:42 2009 um no i wasn't i've obviously uh read some of the background papers um and they would have been bre would have been appointed of course as part of the files of special interest program that

00:56:54 files of special interest program that was common between the department and and bre which is how i utilize them for some of the advice in this report anthony bird gave evidence last week and he said that brian martin's decision

00:57:06 and he said that brian martin's decision would have been discussed with him and bob ledson that they probably discussed it with you also is that correct they may have done because by then the

00:57:18 they may have done because by then the police had started their investigation with the hsc and the

00:57:24 and the and they had taken over the investigation as and was the crown prosecution service um and therefore by then the london fire brigade invest investigation who were using the bre

00:57:36 investigation who were using the bre had um become the primacy not the files of special interest investigation so i i can well imagine how that transfer took place from being a fairer special interest

00:57:47 from being a fairer special interest to a potential criminal investigation mr bird said it was probable they discussed it with you looking at the word probable i don't recall that

00:58:00 i don't recall that did brian martin tell you that he thought there was nothing about the external fire spread which required further investigation no i don't recall he did

00:58:11 were you aware that david crowder from the bre was disappointed that the bre's investigation had been shut down so soon after the fire not until i read my papers for this hearing

00:58:22 hearing did brian martin at any stage say to you that he did not believe the latino house fire was of interest the department in terms of potential updates or changes to approve document b

00:58:33 approve document b no i didn't know that were you ever made aware precisely what materials were used in the external wall panels that were on lateral house not until after my report and probably some time after that

00:58:45 time after that are you aware that the bre never established definitively what materials were used in the external wall of manual not until i read the papers for this inquiry

00:58:56 inquiry are you aware that the bre did not comprehensively establish the fire performance of the exterior window infill panels apart from some 476 part 7 tests on the surface spread of flame no

00:59:09 tests on the surface spread of flame no not until this inquiry were you aware that david crowder gave evidence of the inquests the lachnal inquest to the effect that the core of the panels was some form of polyurethane

00:59:20 the panels was some form of polyurethane or similar material i don't recall that i probably did recall that i remember that at the time but that was very much in my transfer responsibilities from the chief fire rescue advisor and coming out of the

00:59:32 rescue advisor and coming out of the department although the inquest itself was certainly taking place during my the last part of my tenure of office did you ever ask for testing or other investigations to be carried out so the

00:59:44 investigations to be carried out so the precise fire performance the external wall materials at lachnal could be established definitively no i didn't why not

00:59:51 not because it was well beyond the period that i was asked to do this review and by then it had moved on to become a police-led investigation as i've described earlier

01:00:03 as i've described earlier with a with a senior police officer in charge of the investigation all the information was via that investigation were you ever aware that the downward fire spread at lachnal was regarded by the bre at least as unusual

01:00:17 the bre at least as unusual the downward fire spread yes in fast spread i agree it was unusual

01:00:25 did you ask during your time for investigations to be carried out to determine the extent to which the external window panels at grenfell promoted downward fire spread

01:00:36 promoted downward fire spread no i didn't can you help us as to why not well firstly because it was not um considered to be exceptional in that uh that it was the cause of that downwards fire spread

01:00:47 the cause of that downwards fire spread from the witnesses that saw it um and not least where they witnessed the burning debris coming out of the flat and blowing back into the flats below and you'll see it it's not a

01:00:59 below and you'll see it it's not a vertical if you see from the photographs it's not a vertical fire spread below it's actually quite diagonal and jumping flats so that was where i was unusual um

01:01:10 flats so that was where i was unusual um and causing difficulty with the operations but it did not cause me to see that the or hear that the cause of that fire spread were the spandrel panels

01:01:21 the spandrel panels thank you

01:01:22 thank you so this is probably a convenient point for a mid-afternoon break if it's convenient for you if it's your questioning does it it does good well we have a break midway through

01:01:33 good well we have a break midway through the morning in the afternoon in any events again so we'll take it now we'll come back at half past three or possibly just after

01:01:41 after and uh now you've started giving your evidence i have to ask you please not to talk to anyone about your evidence when you're out of the room all right thank you very much [Music]

01:01:57 thank you thank you mr kenya have a three

01:18:33 would you ask ken to come back in please thank you

01:18:44 thank you all right sir ken ready to carry on i am thank you thank you very much yes thanks sir now um you didn't ask for investigations to be carried out to determine the extent to

01:18:56 carried out to determine the extent to which external window panels promoted downward fire spread wasn't that something which ought to have been done

01:19:03 done because of the importance of identifying risks in other buildings

01:19:11 i no i didn't i didn't ask for that as i said earlier by then had been taken over by police investigation to examine both the cause and effect and

01:19:22 examine both the cause and effect and responsibility so i i had assumed that would then fall into the police remit rather than my own but i i didn't know but should you have done mindful of your role as chief fire

01:19:33 done mindful of your role as chief fire and rescue advisor and mindful of the purpose of your report into the emerging issues arising out of land well

01:19:42 people like me especially i've had to look through the lens of what we know now

01:19:46 now uh and what we did then and i think with looking through that lens yes of course that would have been really helpful too in light of today's discussion whether we knew how those panels had had

01:19:59 we knew how those panels had had burnt in the way that they might have but it wasn't seen to be like that at the time but i agree with you it is it is something we might have done now can i turn to a separate topic which

01:20:10 now can i turn to a separate topic which is compartmentation and gra 3.2 and for this purpose can we just look at the report which is a hom quadruple zero one zero nine two forward slash two five

01:20:23 one zero nine two forward slash two five which was the version which was on the right hand side of the screen

01:20:30 now uh under the heading we see roughly halfway down the page internal and external fire spread emerging issues the second and third paragraph said this and i quote

01:20:41 and i quote the principles of fire safety and fire fighting in the uk are based on containment of the fire within a compartment it is therefore important that there is a full understanding of how and why the

01:20:53 a full understanding of how and why the fire developed and spread to ensure that this principle remains sound it is anticipated that the outcome of the investigations will inform the question concerning the internal passive

01:21:04 question concerning the internal passive fire protection and external fire spread and will be used to provide appropriate guidance on modification and refurbishment of premises and to improve operational guidance for fire and rescue

01:21:16 operational guidance for fire and rescue services regarding firefighting procedures in such premises was your concern to understand how and why compartmentation had so significantly failed at that norm

01:21:28 significantly failed at that norm yes and this was the major failure in my recollection lacking how it was the complementation failure and the way the refurbishment had allowed that complementation to continue to fail and would the consequence be also the need

01:21:40 would the consequence be also the need to understand whether staple guidance remained viable and if not the extent to which it required modification can you just ask that question again yes and the consequence of that would also be to

01:21:51 consequence of that would also be to understand whether stay point guidance itself was viable in all circumstances or whether it required modification yes the assumption of stay put strategy is that the complementation remains

01:22:03 is that the complementation remains intact and if it doesn't then that does put at risk the complement the stable strategy working effectively now the passage i just read which is the third paragraph um said that the latin

01:22:15 paragraph um said that the latin investigation was being used to provide appropriate guidance on modification and refurbishment of premises and to improve operational guidance what additional guidance and

01:22:27 what additional guidance and improvements to existing guidance did you have in mind at this time well we we looked at the gra 3.2 to see what effect that this had on that guidance

01:22:39 that this had on that guidance and decided there was nothing new to add to 3.2 that needed to be added that wasn't there already can i just go on to say though it was recognized that it will be the

01:22:50 it was recognized that it will be the inquest as the next stage that might well find uh a need to update it although it was subsequently updated between

01:22:57 between this report and the outcome of the coroner's

01:23:01 coroner's findings for different reasons we'll come on to that in due course again but um for the moment you may have seen that in evidence of this inquiry senior officers of the lfb

01:23:12 this inquiry senior officers of the lfb has said that breach of compartmentation is was a common phenomenon and that a large proportion of the lfb's fire safety order enforcement activity concerned compartmentation

01:23:23 concerned compartmentation does that view accord with your own experience

01:23:30 i i'm not sure yes i had i was aware of the evidence so certainly uh i'm not sure i was aware of that it was widely as suggested and that is of course cause for concern

01:23:42 and that is of course cause for concern if that had been known it was widely a failing compartmentation and the summation that you had is therefore it does affect the assumption of stay put strategy but i didn't draw that from

01:23:53 strategy but i didn't draw that from this report now if we assume that compartmentation failure is relatively common event would it follow that the appropriateness of the staple

01:24:04 that the appropriateness of the staple principle would have to be regularly even routinely considered by incident commanders

01:24:12 just asked it again if compartmentation is a relatively common event would it follow that the appropriateness of stay put guidance would need to be regularly or even

01:24:23 would need to be regularly or even routinely

01:24:24 routinely considered by incident commanders not just by instant commanders but by the inspection raise the regime under the fire safety order and the other aspects that you'd expect under for

01:24:35 aspects that you'd expect under for example 72d to be aware of the premises that you might be fighting a fire in now if we can uh turn to

01:24:45 turn to stay in this document but go to page 28.

01:24:50 if we look at paragraph 1.1 which is under the heading fire safety management you address the fire safety aspects that flowed from the latin house fire and in the context of other

01:25:01 the context of other high-rise residential buildings and you explain that flats are designed to contain fires and that other residents need not evacuate now in the fourth line from the bottom of paragraph 1.1 you say this

01:25:14 of paragraph 1.1 you say this this is often described as a stay-put strategy on the rare occasion where it is found necessary to evacuate the residents of a block this is undertaken by the fire and rescue service now based

01:25:26 by the fire and rescue service now based on that passage at the time of the latino fire or its immediate aftermath was it your view that although rare fire and rescue services should be prepared to reverse statehood and

01:25:38 prepared to reverse statehood and evacuate residents where it's necessary and desirable to do so yes and it's my experience as being uh an operational fire officer did you at this stage or subsequently

01:25:49 did you at this stage or subsequently during your time as the chief fire and rescue advisor consider modifying gra 3.2 so that it explicitly and i underline the word explicitly

01:26:00 explicitly recognize the need for an instant commander to keep stay put advice under review during the course of an incident and be prepared when necessary to reverse it and carry out an emergency evacuation

01:26:11 evacuation no i didn't but my understanding was at that time that it was covered in the other

01:26:18 other guidance that was issued for example instant command guidance was there anything to be lost by including an explicit recognition of that uh prospect in gre3 no there

01:26:31 that uh prospect in gre3 no there wouldn't have been anything lost and possibly much to be gained by making it explicit i agree

01:26:40 were you aware that the secretary of state had assured the coroner that the review of gra 3.2 would include and i quote advice to incident commanders to inform decisions on evacuation should it become

01:26:53 decisions on evacuation should it become clear during an instant that the stay put principle is no longer terrible i think i was aware of that again that was at the tail end of my tenure of office but yes i think i was aware of them now mindful of that caveat

01:27:06 them now mindful of that caveat can you help us as to why the secretary of state had identified the need to prepare instant commanders to carry out evacuations of residential buildings that would stay put strategies but your report had not so identified

01:27:20 but your report had not so identified um

01:27:22 um well i think this report does identify it

01:27:25 it uh in that it's found necessary to evacuate the building residents the block as it says so there was a need to identify it and to evacuate on those occasions that the

01:27:36 to evacuate on those occasions that the the the strategy wouldn't work because of complementation breakdown but in this

01:27:42 in this report and i'm looking at the third line from the bottom of paragraph 1.1 the emphasis is on the rarity of that would you agree with that yes

01:27:52 yes and if the phenomenon of compartmentation failure is greater than you'd apprehended at the time i agree then it's underplaying the likelihood with which stay put will

01:28:03 the likelihood with which stay put will have to be reviewed by an instant commander yes if if it's it's wider than i felt at this time you're absolutely correct

01:28:11 correct could we go to page 33 in this document and look at the text under heading 5 operational guidance emerging issues now there you concluded this

01:28:23 now there you concluded this the chief fine rescue advisors team has conducted a preliminary review of the national operational guidance relating to high-rise buildings the instant command system and breathing apparatus procedures

01:28:34 procedures from this preliminary desktop review there appears to be no urgent or immediate requirements for current national operational guidance to be significantly changed however there are some indications that

01:28:47 however there are some indications that this guidance will need further clarification and additional information particularly in the areas of simultaneous multi-level fires fire behavior within high-rise buildings

01:28:59 fire behavior within high-rise buildings safe systems of work and systematic search procedures now

01:29:05 now i make the same point to you neither compartmentation nor stay put nor evacuations nor rescues are mentioned here why

01:29:18 i i don't know i can't i can't i can't uh answer your question on that i'm not sure

01:29:24 sure why they're not included here uh i can tell you of course that was later done following a further fire they were but just looking at your conclusions here you can't help us there's no call as to why those particular no i can't matters

01:29:37 why those particular no i can't matters were admitted can you help us to why uh changes and i suppose it's the implication from that or the inference be drawn from what you've just said

01:29:48 what you've just said why were changes to evacuation and stay put not urgent or immediate requirements because i believe that my recollection is they were

01:29:59 that my recollection is they were covered in other guidance as i've covered earlier on and you made the point wouldn't it be beneficial to be in this guidance as well and i've agreed with that now if we turn over the page page 34

01:30:12 turn over the page page 34 and we see a box there entitled in the left hand corner areas for consideration now the first bullet point said this considerations should be given to revising and refreshing current national

01:30:24 revising and refreshing current national operational guidance once the full operational findings are available this may require some additional research to ensure that the most appropriate information is used to inform the revision of the guidance

01:30:37 inform the revision of the guidance what additional research did you then have in mind well this this of course includes the fact that the operational findings weren't fully available because this was now distinct from the

01:30:48 distinct from the operational performance that london fire brigade were doing so i could no longer include it in this report and so it needed the outcome of the london fire brigade findings to have

01:31:00 london fire brigade findings to have input in this four-week report and the additional research was around some of those areas um including the fire spread and other aspects that are

01:31:11 fire spread and other aspects that are covered in this report itself but it couldn't be done within a 28-day timeline of a report of this kind so it's probably me sir ken i'm not clear

01:31:22 sir ken i'm not clear as to what precisely was the additional research you were thinking of there was it the work the lfb was doing and or something else principally the london fire brigade

01:31:33 principally the london fire brigade outcome of the operational their operational findings thank you can i now turn to a separate topic relating to lachnal and that's the report from sam webb yes now

01:31:46 report from sam webb yes now your final report was dated the 30th of july

01:31:49 july and if we can turn to hom trouble zero four six zero one three

01:31:58 we can see that two days before on the 28th of july 2009 you were sent a letter by sam webb who's a chartered architect attaching his report on the fire at

01:32:09 attaching his report on the fire at latin house now we understand that from mr webb that he produced his report on behalf of the tenants of latino house and that he sent his report to you at

01:32:20 and that he sent his report to you at the request of a southwark ward councillor called ian wingfield does that accord with your memory yes it does because i didn't have meetings with samweb but i did have them with council winfield

01:32:32 with council winfield now you've said in your witness statement that you don't recall the detail of this report however nonetheless i'd like to ask you some questions on matters arising from

01:32:43 some questions on matters arising from it

01:32:44 it um if we can go to the report that can be found at hom treble zero four six zero

01:32:50 zero one nine

01:32:54 we can see from the front page that it's marked for your personal attention

01:33:00 attention as well as the secretary of state and was dated the 25th of july 2009

01:33:08 2009 and if we turn over the page that

01:33:13 to give you an idea the report launches straight into an exploration of the various construction methods at lagnal now if we could turn to page 14 and looking in particular the issues of

01:33:25 and looking in particular the issues of cause of fire and its later spread we can see that mr webb wrote a paragraph 74 which is the very foot of this page

01:33:33 this page he said this it doesn't matter what caused the fire whether or not as reported it was a 10 year old faulty tv that's irrelevant it could have been a discarded cigarette

01:33:45 discarded cigarette an accident on a stove a carelessly left candle or anything else that could cause a fire including arson it is not what caused the fire but the way and speed with which it if we turn

01:33:57 way and speed with which it if we turn over the page developed that should be considered it took the fire brigade by complete surprise both in the way it went up and capitalized down the building

01:34:09 capitalized down the building para76 i believe three things were responsible for this and he then goes on to identify those matters paragraph 77 the materials used in the refurbishment of the facade

01:34:20 in the refurbishment of the facade 78 parts of the original design and materials used 79 the creation of a new false ceiling in the escape corridor to hide pipe work paragraph 80 the panels which form the

01:34:33 paragraph 80 the panels which form the new facade span from crosswall to crosswall and floor to ceiling they are of composite construction with powder coated metal frames what appears to be upvc frames and infill

01:34:45 upvc frames and infill these have been fitted to other blocks on the estate and these facades go down to ground level it is possible to inspect them at close quarters 81. the upvc aided the spread of the

01:34:57 81. the upvc aided the spread of the fire and in various videos including the 30 minute one it is possible to see the upvc burning i am surprised that such material was approved for use in such large

01:35:08 approved for use in such large quantities on the facade of a building the original spandrel panels were aluminium with a backing of plasterboard these would not support flame spread

01:35:19 these would not support flame spread now apologies for reading a lot out there

01:35:21 there and the question is comparatively brief why was that analysis of the cause of the fire spread not included in your final report of the

01:35:32 not included in your final report of the 30th of july uh well primarily of course because my report had been completed by this point you'll see the date of sound weber's report was when mine had actually been

01:35:43 report was when mine had actually been put to print and not published but it was the very same week if if you look at those days but actually the outcomes are broadly similar to mine

01:35:54 similar to mine in my report including the fact that it wasn't upvc windows it was aluminium windows so there was some some misunderstandings of some of the construction now

01:36:04 now when reading the web report did you consider the need to amend national operational guidance to reflect uh the risks flowing from external fire spread uh posed by

01:36:15 external fire spread uh posed by buildings which are built in identical or similar ways to mackinac well as i said in my statement i don't recall reading this at the time and that would have been because my

01:36:26 and that would have been because my report by then had been put to the secretary of state or at least in its final stages because it was a printed report and i'm not sure i'm unclear what

01:36:37 and i'm not sure i'm unclear what happened to this report whether it went on to be part of the police investigation or anywhere else i i've seen it since of course and studied it carefully

01:36:47 carefully but i'm not sure what happened after my report with this letter

01:36:54 are you able to assist the panel with any recollection of whether this was received and seen by you at the time and that you rejected it because

01:37:05 and that you rejected it because your report had gone off to be printed no i wouldn't have rejected it in those terms because it made some uh not unhelpful points very similar to mine indeed he makes the comment in there

01:37:17 indeed he makes the comment in there that whilst the panels uh may have uh caused some of the fire spread in his view

01:37:24 view even if they had been in different materials they wouldn't have stopped the fire on this on this occasion he makes some very helpful conversation conversation comments in this report but i don't i wouldn't have dismissed it in those terms but it wouldn't couldn't

01:37:35 those terms but it wouldn't couldn't have been part of my review because it was just received too late unfortunately because of the time scale of the first report is it the type of document that would have prompted you to have drafted a postscript for example to be uh

01:37:47 a postscript for example to be uh submitted to the secretary of state no i wouldn't it wouldn't have been that because it didn't materially change my report in any significant way but i i i would have um

01:38:01 but i i i would have um thought that it would have then gone on to those further investigations as added material to what is a professional view of sam webb now given um it seems to me that uh both

01:38:13 now given um it seems to me that uh both you

01:38:14 you mr crowder and mr webb agreed that there was unusual downward fire spread um did that unusual downward fire spread uh prompt you to consider whether there was a need to amend update or modify

01:38:27 was a need to amend update or modify existing national operational guidance to fire and rescue services no it didn't it was very much

01:38:35 very much it wasn't it wasn't unique but it was very much a one-off that downward fast spread

01:38:40 spread and

01:38:41 and i don't think we saw that as a necessity to amend on this occasion it was particularly the circumstances on that day with that wind direction with the

01:38:52 with that wind direction with the windows open that caused that downward fast spread now mr webb went on to summarize what he considered to be the relevant design flaws at lachnal principally a timber stair in its

01:39:03 principally a timber stair in its connection to the false ceiling and the full ceiling void if we turn over the page to page 16

01:39:11 uh we see from paragraph 85 onwards and 85's at the top of the page um he said this all of this amounted to an enormous fire load in a corridor which is the main fire escape for people in the building

01:39:23 fire escape for people in the building this is unacceptable in an escape route once the fire broke into the space above the ceiling in this corridor it would behave exactly like the fire under the escalator from the piccadilly line at

01:39:35 escalator from the piccadilly line at king's cross tube in 1987. it was hidden from view and the space's shape and length would cause it to act like a horizontal chimney at a certain point there would be what is termed flashover and a fireball would ensue

01:39:48 flashover and a fireball would ensue that happened at king's cross in 1987 and it happened in summerland in the island man in 1973. in that dreadful fire the fire raged in a void between external metal cladding

01:40:00 a void between external metal cladding and a flammable internal wall boarding which suddenly exploded in a fireball which killed 50 people and set fire to the

01:40:09 the oro glass walls and roof now given mr webb's description of these features of lachnal as major design flaws

01:40:17 flaws and given his comparison of the fire to historically significant fires at king's cross and summerland did you raise these particular issues with anyone else at dclg well the the

01:40:28 with anyone else at dclg well the the assumptions are not in his assumptions aren't entirely correct here it is through the fire loading in that's that central corridor that run the length of the building

01:40:40 the length of the building um had major flaws in compartmentation including the full ceiling he talks about and the way that was it was called a

01:40:47 a scissor construction block one floor flew over the other but actually that corridor unlike a single cord staircase was not the only means of escape so there was corrid there was

01:40:58 so there was corrid there was escape balconies on both sides of the building

01:41:01 building so that each flat had two quite separate means of escape that didn't need to use this central corridor so my recommendations did follow

01:41:12 so my recommendations did follow the effect of that in the advice to residents needs to be very clear and the advice on the incident by the instant commander and fire control needs to be clear which is

01:41:23 fire control needs to be clear which is one of the issues about

01:41:25 about the whole of leckenhall it wasn't about external wall in relation to mr webb's reasoning here was the analysis and the conclusions you've just set out analysis and conclusions which you reached at the

01:41:37 and conclusions which you reached at the time or are they you're off the event rationalization i suspect

01:41:44 i suspect those two blur slightly together because they're bound to over that passage of time and reading evidence but it was also the

01:41:51 also the broadly some of the evidence of the time because we did in my report raised the issue about advice to residents one of whom of course was advised to go back in from the escape balcony where

01:42:03 back in from the escape balcony where she might have escaped from into the flat where she subsequently died did you share this report with anyone else at dclg at the time sam webb's report yes that's what i'm unclear i i certainly

01:42:16 that's what i'm unclear i i certainly wouldn't have by nature just filed or had this report filed as though my report is completed and therefore his observations could not be considered they couldn't be considered

01:42:28 considered they couldn't be considered in the round of my report but i

01:42:33 but i my instinct now would have been that it would have gone either to the police investigation uh or indeed into the department itself so when you say instinct you mean assumption assumption yeah and what was

01:42:45 assumption assumption yeah and what was the basis for that assumption because it was it was information that added to i think it added to as well as added new information but it added information to my

01:42:57 information to my short notice report and he'd obviously considered some of the aspects carefully uh he is clearly was professional in his field and is worthy of consideration even if they

01:43:09 worthy of consideration even if they were identical to my own early findings could we stay with mr webb's report but goes page 27 and recommendation seven which is one of a number of recommendations he made now seven said

01:43:22 recommendations he made now seven said this residents in flats and maisonets above three stories are to be given instructions in means of escape and fire drills are to be carried out at least once a year by the local fire brigade

01:43:35 once a year by the local fire brigade depending on the height and risk in the building

01:43:39 building what was your assessment of the merits of that recommendation they don't have many merits because of course it was a staple strategy so it's inappropriate to have fire drills

01:43:51 inappropriate to have fire drills because to have fire drills you'd assume there was a fire alarm in order for people to respond to a stay put building you wouldn't have fire drills and it's not appropriate was that a view you reached at the time or

01:44:02 that a view you reached at the time or is that a view you've reached on further preparation for this view that i've had since i was a fire safety officer 40 years ago

01:44:15 didn't it prompt though the need to reflect upon the underlying issue that there would have to be circumstances using the language of your report

01:44:26 using the language of your report admittedly rare instances when fire and rescue services would have to evacuate a building can you ask that again it isn't the underlying point here though that it

01:44:37 underlying point here though that it should have prompted your reflection that there would be circumstances you say rare in which

01:44:44 in which residents would have to be evacuated guess what if you let me finish and ought it to have prompted that reconsideration on your part

01:44:55 your part well

01:44:55 well this is this is about instructions on means of escape presumably to the residents and fire drills to the residents the instructional means of escape are absolutely key and i reference that at the time

01:45:07 reference that at the time and to ensure that people understand a staple strategy and the signage in those buildings doesn't say it doesn't say either stay put even if you're at risk of fire and it doesn't

01:45:19 you're at risk of fire and it doesn't say evacuate even if you don't need to so there's very clear signage required and advice needs to residents in stable strategy buildings but it doesn't include that second part of fire drills

01:45:30 include that second part of fire drills nor to be carried out with a local fire brigade but evacuation is a separate matter you're asking me about now can i turn to a separate topic which is the letter that ron dobson sent you

01:45:41 is the letter that ron dobson sent you on the 14th of december 2009. now this is six months after uh the report

01:45:48 report near us near so and you were sent the letter by ron dobson and if we go to that letter which is lfb double zero one zero

01:45:56 zero four two nine one presumably you remember this letter i do now we've gone to this uh numerous times in evidence um but could i put particular passages and recommendations

01:46:08 particular passages and recommendations to you that mr dobson made and to seek your views on them the lesson the letter opens thus dear sir ken i'm writing to inform you that as part

01:46:19 i'm writing to inform you that as part of our investigation into the fire at lachnal house on the 3rd of july 2009 we have had tests carried out on the exterior wall panels of the building that those tests have given rise to

01:46:31 that those tests have given rise to concerns that which may well be relevant to other high-rise premises although our investigations are continuing and the matter is still to come before the coroner i feel that it is in the public interest

01:46:43 i feel that it is in the public interest to draw the issue to your attention so that the matter can be discussed within the department and any necessary advice can be given to owners and landlords of high-rise buildings and in the

01:46:54 high-rise buildings and in the paragraphs below commissioner dobson went on to summarize functional requirements b4 of the building regulations namely that a building's external walls should adequately resist the spread of

01:47:05 should adequately resist the spread of fire

01:47:06 fire as well as relevant provisions of approved document b now if we can turn over the page and look at the third paragraph down from the head of that page he said this

01:47:19 of that page he said this based on the tests conducted by the building research establishment it appears that there are external wall panels at latin house that do not have the necessary reaction to fire properties required for the location in

01:47:30 properties required for the location in which they have been used we have also become aware that this type of panel has been supplied by more than one company in the circumstances we believe it may

01:47:41 in the circumstances we believe it may be appropriate for a warning to be given to housing providers that it would be advisable to check the specifications for external wall panels in their high rise housing stock and check that what

01:47:52 rise housing stock and check that what has been installed meets the correct specification i.e that fire safety requirements of the building regulations were taken into account and include this in fire risk assessments for relevant

01:48:03 in fire risk assessments for relevant properties now mr dobson's concerns about the panels reflected mr webb's conclusion that he was surprised that the materials used had been approved for use in such

01:48:14 used had been approved for use in such large quantities on the facade of the building

01:48:17 building did you share commissioner dobson's concern and in particular his concern that the panels posed a risk of rapid external fire spread

01:48:28 external fire spread well i need to just clarify this letter it was received on the day and i assume therefore it's by email or by by hand on the very day that i was attending the strategic

01:48:41 attending the strategic oversight group chaired by the metropolitan police and the purpose of that group was to consider all the matters arising from the london fire investigation in fact the name if you go back to page

01:48:53 in fact the name if you go back to page one the name that you that's related to this

01:48:57 this letter in the second paragraph of detective inspector rick murphy sat on the police group to report back from the london fire brigade findings because london fire brigade were excluded from the

01:49:09 fire brigade were excluded from the group to avoid any suggestion of conflict of interest and transparency in subsequent investigations and findings by the police and hsc

01:49:21 police and hsc but it and and so i do recall this and i recall replying to it because one of the issues with the letter was it appeared by this time because we're well on by

01:49:33 by this time because we're well on by now it's does it december it is yeah the pr it talks about proof document b but it's somewhat technically flawed this letter because it doesn't tell you what version and although it talks about insulation

01:49:48 i'm sorry to interrupt you so ken i think we're drifting some way from the question

01:49:53 question now the context was helpful but i'd really would like to hear your views in answers of the question i asked that question was did you agree with the concern set out

01:50:04 did you agree with the concern set out by the commissioner here and in particular the concern that the panels pose a risk of rapid external fire spread can i have your views on that um

01:50:18 no i i didn't agree that that was evident you mean from the fire or from their investigation from what is set out in this lettuce again well i agree with his evidence

01:50:29 again well i agree with his evidence here that it wasn't the cause of external fire spread and i think you're asking me do i agree with the bre report so what i'm asking you if we can go back

01:50:40 what i'm asking you if we can go back can we go back to the letter i think it might be used if we go back to the letters ken can we go to the second page yep

01:50:47 can i ask you to re-read to yourself the paragraph which starts based on the test conducted and ending

01:50:58 and ending two paragraphs down with the words for relevant properties can i just ask you to read that to yourself so you know what i'm directing you to

01:51:07 yes have you read all of that so that so that is the bre report that's suggesting that the external war panels do not necessarily reaction to fire properties

01:51:19 necessarily reaction to fire properties so ken i think this has become more complicated than it need be the question here what it's what the commissioners raised here in the paragraph which starts words in the circumstances

01:51:30 in the circumstances we believe it may be appropriate for a warning to be given to housing providers that it would be advisable to check the specification for external wall panels in their high-rise housing stock and

01:51:41 in their high-rise housing stock and check that what has been installed meets the correct specification that fire safety requirements and building regulations were taken into account and include this in far risk assessments for relevant properties

01:51:53 assessments for relevant properties now let's take it stage by stage first of all did you agree with the proposal that a warning be given to housing providers

01:52:05 only within the constraints that this was a police investigation and they had to determine what was in the public interest that could be declared publicly about their investigation

01:52:18 about their investigation and so this this very matter was taken on the same day to the police investigation and disgust as to whether they were inappropriate panels or whether the panels were inappropriately fitted or inaudibly

01:52:30 inappropriately fitted or inaudibly specified and you will see that in the minutes of the metropolitan police meeting so i agree that in principle of course you will know that that's exactly what happened

01:52:41 know that that's exactly what happened by the department but not specifically talking about those panels but bringing to the attention of housing authorities and fire and rescue services such risks in high-rise buildings i suppose what

01:52:54 in high-rise buildings i suppose what the commissioner dobson's recommending here is a as an encouragement to housing providers to check that the specification of the wall panels meets the law

01:53:03 the law now

01:53:05 now what is the problem with that well i think that was the effect of the i agree and i think that was the effect of the notification that went out from the department from the director of housing from the

01:53:16 from the uh housing minister and indeed myself to all and and the director of resilience and fire rescue services to all fire and rescue service i think that was done but what we couldn't be is specifically site

01:53:28 what we couldn't be is specifically site failures of leckenhall in the middle of an inquiry that was being undertaken by the police no

01:53:36 hear what you say on that but that's not what the commission is saying there is is he he's putting it more broadly than that yes and and it was published broadly and look at the second element of his recommendation

01:53:47 the second element of his recommendation there

01:53:49 there to include that warning in far risk assessments for relevant properties did you agree with that

01:53:58 just include fire risk concept yes you did yes because that that was a matter at that time uh for housing authorities under the housing act housing health and safety

01:54:09 housing act housing health and safety rating system their risk assessment now

01:54:13 now mr dobson explained when he gave evidence

01:54:16 evidence that the lfb was concerned that a similar fire i won involving rapid external fire spread could occur at any number of buildings that may have been fitted with the same or similar panels

01:54:29 fitted with the same or similar panels my questions are narrow once again did you share that particular concern

01:54:35 uh yes yes if there was if there was widespread uh conversation but it was within the constraints of a police and hsc led review about what could be published in

01:54:47 about what could be published in specific terms rather than generic terms what did you

01:54:57 could we turn to a separate topic which is the the group you referred to earlier on which is the strategic investigation oversight group the acronym is it's psyog

01:55:09 the acronym is it's psyog probably uh meeting on the 14th of summer 2009 so as you said the same day this came in now can i take you to an email which you sent to sandy bishop

01:55:21 sent to sandy bishop on the 15th of december so the day after and we find that at clg trouble zero one nine one two zero

01:55:33 now that email starts

01:55:37 starts at the bottom or towards the bottom of page one just to identify the personnel involved sandy bishop was then the deputy director for fire policy in the department she was yes

01:55:49 department she was yes now the email was copied to ann kirkham anthony bird brian martin peter wise brian nash and david pratt is that right correct

01:56:00 correct you start by explaining that you'd attended the sag meeting on the 14th of december

01:56:05 december are you the same day that mr dobson wrote to you if we turn over the page um you said this at the top the mps outlined there

01:56:16 at the top the mps outlined there spawns correct the results of a recent building research establishment bre report

01:56:21 report which indicated that fire testing on the panels beneath the windows of the latino house flats were demonstrated to propagate flame and fail the required level of surface spread of flame to meet

01:56:33 level of surface spread of flame to meet the building regulations requirements the panels were installed in latin house as part of the 2007 refurbishment program

01:56:41 program the earlier assumptions arising from the bre tests are the panels enhanced the vertical spread of fire from the flat of origin

01:56:50 origin may have contributed to the downwards fire spread due to falling burning fragments

01:56:55 fragments on the panels now

01:56:59 now you then said at the meeting further down

01:57:02 down it was reported that el fifa offices had been aware of the bre results some two weeks ago and had expressed an intention to the mps to make the information public in the interest of wider public

01:57:14 public in the interest of wider public safety

01:57:15 safety this confirmed a telephone call to me from the el fiber commissioner that's mr dobson some two hours before the psyog meeting together with a subsequent letter that's sent by email

01:57:28 letter that's sent by email the mps expressed concern regarding early disclosure that might prejudice their investigation i agreed to discuss the matter with frd does that stand for the fire resilience

01:57:39 does that stand for the fire resilience directorate it does housing and building regs clg colleagues however expressed a view that it would be premature to advise other authorities or the public of a potential risk before

01:57:51 or the public of a potential risk before being aware of the facts and implications of the bre findings in particular were the panels expected to meet a minimum standard to conform with building regulations when installed in

01:58:02 building regulations when installed in latino house were the panels fitted in lachnal house specified to meet the required building regulation standard e.g was it a failure in specification or by an installing

01:58:13 in specification or by an installing contractor did the panel significantly contribute to the spread of fire from flat to flat in lachnal house as a result it was unclear what we what

01:58:24 as a result it was unclear what we what would be alerting housing authorities to or what action was inspected cps so the crown prosecution services agreed that the mps impact i've got that

01:58:35 agreed that the mps impact i've got that on my screen i apologize oh is it it's just coming cps agreed that the mps investigators should progress specific questions regarding the above with southwark borough council staff as cps felt that

01:58:48 borough council staff as cps felt that the overriding issue of public safety should take precedence in the disclosure test subject to the detail being limited to the essential information arising from the br re report

01:58:59 from the br re report now sikken apologies for reading out a lot to you but i sense you're quite keen to give this context i thought it was easier i think that's exactly the context yes i want to take you to contemporaneous documents

01:59:11 contemporaneous documents can i summarize the position and you shout if i've done so unfairly you were reluctant to alert housing providers in the way suggested by the commissioner

01:59:22 commissioner absent more detailed information about the precise role that external panels had played in the fire is that fair that's correct and you were particularly concerned to

01:59:33 and you were particularly concerned to understand whether the panels significantly contributed to the fire and also whether their non-compliance was due to a failure in specification or an installation that's correct

01:59:45 an installation that's correct now your email continued and it's the penultimate that we can see it's a penultimate from the bottom of the screen at the moment i agreed to speak to the london fire commissioner to discuss with him the difficulty of alerting london housing

01:59:57 difficulty of alerting london housing authorities to the limited information available which i did following the meeting

02:00:02 meeting the above position was agreed by the attendees at the psyog however it remains possible that such information becomes prematurely publicly available

02:00:12 available i suggest there will need to be early lines to take by building regs housing and a ministerial briefing submission not least as to date this incident has shown considerable media political and

02:00:23 shown considerable media political and public interest if i could emphasize the following my guess would be the above will need a building regulations interpretation of the bre report and if necessary a

02:00:34 the bre report and if necessary a subsequent alert to housing authorities if

02:00:38 if you underline the suggested risk is considered to be replicated elsewhere now that

02:00:45 now that final section suggests that you're only intending to adopt mr dobson's suggestion of writing to the housing authorities if

02:00:53 if this particular risk existed elsewhere is that a fair reading of what your email is saying um partly i think what i was saying i would be wary about talking about a specific

02:01:05 be wary about talking about a specific risk before we knew specifically what would happened at la canal but i was in favor of a generic alert to housing authorities fire authorities

02:01:16 to housing authorities fire authorities and so on

02:01:17 and so on and of course one thing which comes out of this email that the cps was mindful under the public interest test of communicating facts and matters which impinged upon

02:01:28 facts and matters which impinged upon public safety particularly fire safety if it was necessary to do so correct yes and so

02:01:34 and so if necessary further detail could be provided to housing authorities with the approval of the cps correct and so the attendees would have been rick murphy who was referenced as the liaison with london fire brigade in

02:01:47 the liaison with london fire brigade in ron dobson's letter the chair from metropolitan police that chaired that group the health and safety executive uh the cps

02:01:55 the cps and

02:01:57 and me i suspect and is it fair to say the public interest in communicating public safety was of considerable if not paramount importance absolutely can you help us mindful of that what

02:02:09 can you help us mindful of that what work was undertaken to assess whether the risk was indeed replicated elsewhere um

02:02:16 um well that this this therefore uh went as as this suggests back into the department uh of which i was part

02:02:26 was part for both those the expertise in building regulations and um local authority housing to take the matter up for information as necessary

02:02:39 information as necessary including the directors of housing and the directors of resilience and fire thank you um if we can stay in this uh email chair and go back to page one where hopefully we find a response from

02:02:51 where hopefully we find a response from ann kirkham yep um can you help what was ann kirkham's position at the time um

02:03:00 terry alifatt was the housing director but whether anne preceded her or worked in that area i can't recall

02:03:11 can't recall don't worry looking at her response sandy can this is critical information in housing terms we would need to assess what is made public is it a product issue or an insulation

02:03:22 is it a product issue or an insulation issue

02:03:23 issue from a quick read of the results it would appear to be the product however are there issues arising from the way the product was installed we need to be clear on these two facts before going public

02:03:33 public and then

02:03:34 and then we see that sandy bishop responded minutes later further up the page and thanks i've just discussed with kelly fairman and ken's office your chief of staff and

02:03:45 and ken's office your chief of staff and have agreed that a meeting between key parts of the department is needed to discuss and agree next steps ken's office are calling the meeting invite will issue this morning can you remember whether that meeting

02:03:57 can you remember whether that meeting took place i don't i i know i know that it

02:04:01 it raised the appropriate concern and necessity to want to look in a cross departmental way as to how this information was imparted to those that concerned

02:04:13 imparted to those that concerned can you remember whether this a decision emerged from those discussions no i don't i'm just looking at the ccs in there

02:04:24 in there i could see it it was fairly broad but i don't know

02:04:32 can you remember really what concrete steps were taken just going slightly back to your email in this chain what concrete steps were taken um

02:04:43 taken um to see if the risk identified or thought to be identified that latino was replicated elsewhere no i don't um and it wouldn't have fallen to my role to do so because my

02:04:57 fallen to my role to do so because my role on sitting on the street group was to be the contact point between that in that strategic group led by the met and the department so to take the matters of rising there back into the

02:05:08 matters of rising there back into the department um and

02:05:11 um and this was my role undertaking that i do know the outcome of this which is not what you asked me yet what was the outcome letters were sent to all housing authorities fire authorities uh about the

02:05:23 uh about the generic risk of that fire and reminding of their responsibilities under the housing act and fire authorities under the fire safety order now can we turn to another email thread

02:05:34 now can we turn to another email thread arising out of your summary of the sag meeting we can find that at clg one trouble thousand four one nine four four three

02:05:48 thank you and we can see

02:05:52 at the bottom of page three and kirkham's email to you regarding the need to differentiate between a product or installation issue and immediately above her email we see

02:06:04 and immediately above her email we see an email from anthony bird who replied roughly quarter of an hour later that morning and said this i suggest we need to be very careful here clearly we need to understand what

02:06:15 clearly we need to understand what actually happened and discussions with building control the specifier the installer and others should assist but we don't want to start any hairs running we also don't want to prejudice the investigations underway therefore a very

02:06:28 investigations underway therefore a very broad message perhaps there's a follow-up to our early one in the year immediately following the fire and the much earlier letter following the select committee investigation in relation to external cladding reminding landlords of their duties and

02:06:40 reminding landlords of their duties and where good guidance on fire safety generally in relation to fire stopping and fire spread etc can be found maybe the best option now did you share

02:06:51 now did you share the view that writing to housing authorities advising them to check the specification of their external wall would to quote set has running close quotes

02:07:01 quotes no i don't i don't think i would have had a view on on that um i was pleased that the support for writing to a range of

02:07:12 support for writing to a range of housing authorities who are responsible for the housing act would have been appropriate but

02:07:18 but i don't recall the detail of that paragraph at all now can i turn to a separate issue which is your response to commissioner dobson which you sent on the 22nd of december

02:07:30 which you sent on the 22nd of december 2009 so eight days after and that can be found hom trouble zero four six zero one eight

02:07:45 and we can see that in the opening paragraphs you explain that you attended the psyog meeting where the matters raised in mr dobson's letter were discussed and in the fourth paragraph

02:07:57 discussed and in the fourth paragraph down you wrote this members of psyog did recognize that the information arising from the bre report has potential implications for meeting the expectations of certain aspects of

02:08:08 the expectations of certain aspects of approved document b of shuttle 1 to the building regulations 2000

02:08:13 2000 but it was felt that at this time there is insufficient information to warrant alerting housing authorities and or property owners to the specific matters raised not least as one

02:08:26 raised not least as one the investigation has not yet determined if the surface spread of flame properties of the panels fitted in latin or house was specified by the housing authority

02:08:35 authority two

02:08:36 two the investigation has not yet determined if the surface spread of flame properties of the panels fit in the lateral house were differently specified to those subsequently fitted

02:08:47 to those subsequently fitted now

02:08:49 now those two issues were different to those highlighted in cyag which appeared to be whether the panels significantly contributed to the fire and whether their non-compliance was due to a

02:09:00 their non-compliance was due to a failure in specification or an installation issue and first of all do you accept there was such a difference if so can you explain it um

02:09:11 um i can't i can't explain a difference no um but do you accept there it does appear to be a different there appears to be a nuanced difference yes

02:09:22 now the second paragraph of your letter refers the fact that approved document b provides recommendations rather than mandatory requirements was that a particular factor that

02:09:33 was that a particular factor that weighed in your consideration of the response to mr dobson um i i think it weighed because the letter the letter from rom dobson um

02:09:47 seemed to weigh itself against in a particular approved document not not the one that like in our house would refurbish to but i was more particularly making this point that i'm probably trying to go as

02:09:59 point that i'm probably trying to go as far as i could from the conversations in the police investigation that it wasn't the recommendations that would lead them to their conclusions in

02:10:10 would lead them to their conclusions in the cps it was the building regulations and there were recommendations that were talking about in in approved documents in any case but the approved document

02:10:22 the approved document in rondos letter was not the 2002 approved document any case my difficulty in replying to this is that it was circumnavigating the previously agreed procedures that all the matters would go

02:10:34 procedures that all the matters would go via the police into that group and so i was just trying to bring this back into that group again before we got degree procedures in place thank you

02:10:44 thank you um sir it is i think 27 minutes past four yes um i was just looking there see whether the next section could be done in three minutes or so i don't think it'd be fair to say ken to uh rush it so

02:10:57 it'd be fair to say ken to uh rush it so um i'd ask that we rise now that's a very point to stop it is yes well there was again we get three minutes earlier um

02:11:07 um we'll stop there i have to ask you to come back tomorrow for some more questions but you were ready for that i think weren't you i wasn't yes so we'll resume please at 10 o'clock

02:11:18 so we'll resume please at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning and as i said to you earlier please don't talk about your evidence or anything relating to it while you're away from the room thank you so much all right thank you very much see you tomorrow morning

02:11:35 thank you very much mr can hear thanks sir ten o'clock tomorrow thank you