Jason Allday, network engineer for Cadent Gas, describes the 24-hour operation to isolate gas supplies to Grenfell Tower on June 14th 2017. He details the challenges of working under falling debris, excavating mains at three isolation points, and discovering an unexpected 15-inch pipe where maps showed 12-inch.
00:11:44 good morning ladies and gentlemen welcome to today's hearing in which we're going to hear evidence from a witness who was concerned with dealing with the gas supply to the tower on the
00:11:56 with the gas supply to the tower on the night in question it's good morning with the tram
00:11:59 the tram yes I ask that mr. Jason all day is born in Queens
00:12:16 I swear by Almighty God thank you very
00:12:31 I swear by Almighty God thank you very much for truly sit down make yourself comes with that yes thank you very much for attending today to give evidence it's very much appreciated and if you
00:12:43 it's very much appreciated and if you have any difficulty understanding anything I'm asking in the course of my questions please ask me to repeat the question I'll put it in a different way and if you feel you need a break at any point please let us know okay also just
00:12:55 point please let us know okay also just try and keep your voice up so that the transcribers can hear you clearly okay thank you so can you give the enquiry your full name is Jason Matthew all day and you've made to witness statements
00:13:07 and you've made to witness statements can I please take you to them they're in the folder on your desk in front of you and they will appear on the screen the first is dated the 6th of November 2017
00:13:19 first is dated the 6th of November 2017 and that's met em et triple 0 1 2 7 1 oh that's at the first tab in the folder in front of you and the second is dated the
00:13:34 front of you and the second is dated the 6th of November 2018 that's the reference is CA D quadruple 0 301 8 and that should be in the 3rd tab in the
00:13:46 that should be in the 3rd tab in the folder in front of you the pink tab can I take have you read each of those statements recently I have yes and can you confirm that the contents of both are true I oh yes and have you discussed
00:13:58 are true I oh yes and have you discussed those statements all your evidence with anybody before coming today I haven't loved thank you and you also have the following exhibits which I'm now just going to read into the record that's exhibit JMA 1 - your first
00:14:11 that's exhibit JMA 1 - your first statement that's met triple zero one two nine one four that's a map of the local area and the gas mains that supply the tower we'll come back to that map into
00:14:23 tower we'll come back to that map into your course in your evidence also there are exhibits to your second statement that's JMA one maps of the area and gas mains that CA D quadruple zero three
00:14:34 mains that CA D quadruple zero three zero one five j ma - that's emails and attached maps that CA D quadruple zero 301 seven and then J ma three - Jo Mae
00:14:49 301 seven and then J ma three - Jo Mae five inclusive they're maps relating to some gas governor's in the area and that's CA D quadruple zero 301 - CA d quadruple zero 301 six and C ad
00:15:03 quadruple zero 301 six and C ad quadruple zero 301 four I've listed all of those out so they're formally added to the record so I want to start then with cadence operations
00:15:15 to start then with cadence operations you work for cadent Gas Limited is that right I do yes and you were part of their emergency response and repair team who attended Grenville tower during the fire on the 14th of June that's correct
00:15:27 fire on the 14th of June that's correct and can you confirm that Caden is a gas transporter and that means that it owns and operates certain national gas networks that's correct yes and in
00:15:38 networks that's correct yes and in particular does that mean that it owns and operates the gas pipes and the apparatus that supplies the gas that's correct and is it right that cadent used to be called National Grid it did yes
00:15:51 to be called National Grid it did yes and is it also right that there are a number of different gas distribution networks covering different regions in England Wales and Scotland and that Caden operates the gas distribution network for North London that's correct
00:16:04 network for North London that's correct and is it right that Caden also operates something called the gas emergency call center we do yes and does that mean that Caden receives all the calls from anyone in the UK that need help with the gas
00:16:15 in the UK that need help with the gas supply that's correct great now in terms of your own experience is it right that in around 1997 you joined the National Grid as a
00:16:26 1997 you joined the National Grid as a gas engineer that's correct and since then you've worked on gas networks for around 20 years mostly as a repair engineer is that correct mostly in repair yes thumb replacement workers
00:16:38 in repair yes thumb replacement workers well mostly in repair yeah can you explain briefly what your role is a repair engineer typically involves so network engineer for repair
00:16:49 involves so network engineer for repair that involves looking after an area in West London which is Fulham which covers the west of London I have free network supervisor which report to me who each
00:17:00 supervisor which report to me who each have nine to ten repair teams which then report to them we basically respond to gas leak which report by the public so we attend
00:17:11 report by the public so we attend excavate and replace or fix the leaks which have been reported so you're effectively repairing gas pipes and then
00:17:22 effectively repairing gas pipes and then shutting off the supply where you need to correct yeah now you have explained in your statement that's shortly before the fire you attended some training with the fire
00:17:34 attended some training with the fire service college about how to manage an incident on-site does that correct I did yeah can you just tell us a little bit more about what that course involved so the course involved working in scenarios
00:17:48 the course involved working in scenarios with the London Fire but or the Fire Brigades police ambulance so you went through scenarios of attending the incidents so it could be a building
00:17:59 incidents so it could be a building collapse it could be a major crash where they've crashing some operators with gas a major leak so we work with the Fire Brigades and worked how to work alongside them how to introduce how to
00:18:10 alongside them how to introduce how to get involved with their communications who to be kept informed and how to sort of like manage the works or the Olympics on a big incident yeah so it was about
00:18:23 on a big incident yeah so it was about working with other agencies yes yeah yeah and you say in your statement that you think you put this put you in a strong position and help you understand what your role was as a category-2
00:18:35 what your role was as a category-2 responder in an instant like grandfather is that right he did yeah because when you turn up to something like that there's so many fire engines ambulances police you you've got a job to do there as well as
00:18:47 you've got a job to do there as well as you need to know how to communicate with them understand what they want you to do and also it's about taking notes and making evidence with your key decisions
00:18:58 making evidence with your key decisions and what you did and why you did them and when you did them were there are only particular things that stood out for you about communication with the NFB in an instant like that for for Greenville based on your training at the
00:19:10 Greenville based on your training at the college were there any particular things about communication with the lfb that you learned yes obviously get there be assertive with them make sure they understand you know who you are what
00:19:22 understand you know who you are what you're there for so they can help you to get to where you need to get to so you can agree on a plan of work so because normally they're dealing with much other bigger things that there's ever seen so
00:19:33 bigger things that there's ever seen so we're dealing with just on isolating the gas so it's obviously understanding what they need you to do and when they needed to do it yeah and can you recall roughly when you did that training how long before the fire at ground floor it was a
00:19:47 before the fire at ground floor it was a few months a couple of months beforehand quite recently moving on that to your role at cadent so you're in the operations team at Caden is that right I
00:20:00 operations team at Caden is that right I am yes and you've explained that the operation teams has two branches first it has an emergency response branch and then it has a repair branch is that
00:20:11 then it has a repair branch is that correct yes and on the 14th of June your job title was a network engineer in the repair branch the second branch that correct that's correct yeah so if there
00:20:22 correct that's correct yeah so if there was a gas emergency was it your team that was called first who normally any gas emergency would be for the first if she I used to go out first they would go there is the first
00:20:34 first they would go there is the first responder for for Caden they would then classify whether if it would be on internal pipe work external quite work if it was an internal they could isolate and pipe and make it safe and obviously
00:20:45 and pipe and make it safe and obviously the customers that have to deal with their internal point work if it's external which is cadence pipe which we transport and maintain then they would call for a repair time for us to go out to attend to
00:20:56 time for us to go out to attend to return to the leek yep so you talked about an FC oh there is that right that's a first call operator so that's somebody from the emergency response that's correct okay sounds yes
00:21:08 response that's correct okay sounds yes and they as you say they inspect the situation and work out if they can make the situation safe is it right that they only work inside a building they don't do anything external well they still
00:21:20 do anything external well they still they still have to carry out activities outside to ice to identify whether the leak is coming from outside or inside but they don't actually carry out any physical repair work they just do there
00:21:32 physical repair work they just do there it's an awesome survey they they do a survey to establish whether it's inside outside and where the leak needs to be attended to yeah so if the mains needs shutting off is that your team it would be repair yes
00:21:45 is that your team it would be repair yes yeah and on the night of the fire can we just establish who was the FCO the first call operative Jason Knightley was the first one to be call to the and turning
00:22:00 first one to be call to the and turning back to your role your what's called a level level seven engineer in repair is that a senior operations role it's a
00:22:11 that a senior operations role it's a management role so I said I have Network supervisors report to me and then they have teams report in to them but then I report up to my Bansi manager who they
00:22:22 report up to my Bansi manager who they report up again to it to a Bambi manager so yeah so you report to someone is it called the head of operations I report to a network manager right and then the network manager reports to the head of
00:22:34 network manager reports to the head of operations and on the night of the fire the network manager who was then it's holy day yeah and can you just explain a difference between your role and mr. day's rolled so my role would be more of
00:22:48 day's rolled so my role would be more of a delivery so make sure the work is delivered complete safely I'm looking after the teams the supervisors looking after the patch whereas Tony days the next step up so he would have three of
00:23:00 next step up so he would have three of me three network engineers to deliver on a wider patch so he would be responsible for the whole of London yep and I think we just talked about the Director of Operations and
00:23:11 about the Director of Operations and that is that who Tony day reports - yes and who was that at the time of the ground floor fire that was James Harrison yep
00:23:20 and it's you just said beneath you you have something called a network supervisor right and on the night of the fire who was that wife three who whose
00:23:31 fire who was that wife three who whose air who looks after that area was Neil Milam that's his area which he manages a day-to-day basis where the tower is situated and again can you tell us
00:23:42 situated and again can you tell us what's the difference between your role and mr. Mullens role as a network supervisor so against all I'm responsible for three Network supervisors each Network supervisor has their own area which they manage and
00:23:54 their own area which they manage and they manage the teams which work on that patch so the jobs would be dispatched to the teams and the network supervisor would be there to look after the team support the teams anything they need
00:24:05 support the teams anything they need make sure that their performance is up to speed and make sure they leave anything of a need they would support them like that yep so as you said there are repair teams that report into mr.
00:24:16 are repair teams that report into mr. Milam and is it right that like emergency teams those repair teams are on-call overnight yes they do they do a call-out shift as well yes and so they deal with situations which
00:24:27 and so they deal with situations which are beyond the scope of an emergency FC Oh an emergency first call operative saw inside their game so those repair teams they deal with situations which are beyond the remit of
00:24:39 situations which are beyond the remit of an FCA yes they're different they take out different roles yeah yeah well if I've understood you correctly the SCO really goes to see what the problem is correct yeah he goes he identifies the
00:24:50 correct yeah he goes he identifies the problem which might be interior or exterior yeah and then depending on what he finds he calls in relevant people sucking from the exterior problem that's right one of you or so they're like
00:25:02 right one of you or so they're like trust enjoys like you say they like classifies whoever it needs to be attended by a team or whether it can be its own internal pipe work which the customer oh so that would be so as an example if you've got to you when your
00:25:14 example if you've got to you when your guest leader is pipe comes in and it goes through them so he goes out the other side that's the customers they own that quite work so the leaks on that side that's for them so you have to get qualified personally
00:25:26 so you have to get qualified personally but if it's beforehand it's different cadence and just to get me to complete the picture if the APO finds it's a leak internally is he the man who turns off the supply
00:25:37 is he the man who turns off the supply outside the house no so if it be inside he would there be an isolation valve mixing with a meter so he was entirely off there and then cap it and then that would be made safe inside so there'd be no guests
00:25:48 no guests it goes into the meter so that would be made safe like that yes and during the night of the fire is it right that you
00:26:00 night of the fire is it right that you ran all the operations and you briefed all the repair teams and you were the main point of contact for the NFB race and on that night you take all the major
00:26:12 and on that night you take all the major decisions in conjunction with your manager Tony day yeah we discussed with the decisions make time with James Harrison as well but predominantly I was feeding Tony day and sorry they were
00:26:24 feeding Tony day and sorry they were then feeding James so let's come to the night of the fire now you've explained in your witness statement that you were not actually on standby that night the 13th 14th of June
00:26:37 standby that night the 13th 14th of June and that you would not have expected to be contacted about the incident is that right out of hours that's correct yes because I was under stand by for that night once the call-out starts and it
00:26:51 night once the call-out starts and it finishes at 8 o'clock in the morning so after that time but because I was responsible for that area I would have been told about it but not until all that time and you'll colleague Robert been with the person on standby
00:27:02 been with the person on standby he was yes and you understand that he was notified by aided dispatch and he was yes and you say that on the 14th you were supposed to go to a training course
00:27:13 were supposed to go to a training course with your manager that you woke around 5:30 and saw the news about the fire is that correct well it wasn't a training course it was thought it was a planning meeting yeah yeah are you meant to be somebody's yeah yeah
00:27:26 are you meant to be somebody's yeah yeah and and you won't you saw the news of the fire and then you called Tony day I did yes
00:27:32 did yes and is it right that you both agreed that you would go to the tower that's correct
00:27:37 correct even though you weren't on standby why did you decide to go we was actually working in the area we have a large job going on quite close to the tower and we
00:27:51 going on quite close to the tower and we knew that there was some local experience we knew that there was gas present around the area so again from my experience of attending the training course at Morton on the March with a fire brigades I was pretty confident
00:28:03 fire brigades I was pretty confident there be needing our assistance so I just thought the quicker we could get there we could get players in place as quick as we could you talk about your knowledge of the area and what were the
00:28:14 knowledge of the area and what were the specific works that you'd had going on in that area we was currently dealing with a medium pressure leak which was a 36-inch made which is which was fractured which isn't uncommon we do get
00:28:26 fractured which isn't uncommon we do get fractured pipes and we have to do we have to fix them so we was currently working on a 36-inch medium pressure fractured main in Bromley Road which was quite close to the tower we actually had
00:28:39 quite close to the tower we actually had the road closed at the time because it was right in the middle a road so it was quite some engineering works going on there at that poison yeah but that meant you knew the area well right the idea
00:28:50 you knew the area well right the idea because we had us a road closure we had a diversion in place as well so I'd walked the dye version a couple of times so I thought I understood it with traffic management company so and it did take us around near to the tower
00:29:02 take us around near to the tower yep now in terms of your knowledge of what happened before you arrived you say that between 5:30 or 6:00 he spoke to mr. Milan is that right
00:29:15 mr. Milan is that right yes I did yeah and you say that he says he'd already been contacted and he was heading off to the tower and he'd arranged to a repair team to attend as that rise yeah the the dispatch center I
00:29:27 that rise yeah the the dispatch center I had already dispatched the job to a repair team and also spoken to me oh my as well he was aware of that too mr. Milam say anything else to you at that time when you spoke to him regarding
00:29:38 time when you spoke to him regarding just the incident or what was dealing with not really no look only that it was a large fire and that we both be headed to site and you say you left your house
00:29:49 to site and you say you left your house around 6:15 a.m. is that right correct yeah and that on the way you've called Dave Edwards is he was already on sites that might yes because Dave Edwards was the level seven network engineer for the
00:30:02 the level seven network engineer for the FCO side that night so he had operatives on site he also I also do speak to him he knew he was on site and to get some information off of David yeah and is it
00:30:16 information off of David yeah and is it right he's in the Emergency Response branch that's crisis teams yeah so he's not the memory image yeah can we just look at what you say about that core with mr. Edwards
00:30:27 with mr. Edwards can we call up on the screen please your first statement that's a meaty triple zero one two seven 100 at page four paragraph 18
00:30:44 so just picking that up three lines down you say Dave explained that the whole block of flats was on fire and that there were multiple emergency services on site he told me that a repair team
00:30:56 on site he told me that a repair team was already on site and explained that he had been to the lfb command unit to confirm our presence on-site at around 4:45 a.m. the command unit was located on Bromley Road near Granville Tower I
00:31:09 on Bromley Road near Granville Tower I understand that the lfb coordinated their rescue operation from this command unit the fire officers inside the command unit had asked Dave Edwards and the team to stand by in the local area
00:31:21 the team to stand by in the local area and await further instructions that's correct that's what you say that's correct yeah do you know if mr. Edwards was given a reason by the NFB to stand
00:31:32 was given a reason by the NFB to stand by when he spoke to them at that time he didn't give me a reason he just said that he'd been in to make contact to inform them that we Cayden were on site and there at their disposal if they will
00:31:46 and there at their disposal if they will have to actually think but he was told just to stand by at that point now mr. Edwards says in his statement that at that time he spoke to a lady who he believes to be the elephant the
00:31:57 believes to be the elephant the Commissioner Danny cotton and that he asked if there was anything and I've been needed did he tell you he had spoken to the Commissioner Danny cotton he didn't mention a name to me he just
00:32:08 he didn't mention a name to me he just said that he's been to the command unit now before your arrival I think you mentioned this earlier the FCO the first call operative was also on the site is that right that's mr. knightley yes
00:32:20 that right that's mr. knightley yes in his statement mr. Knightly explains that he'd been called at 3:22 and he arrived at site around 3 48 is that your understanding from what I've seen that's
00:32:33 understanding from what I've seen that's correct yes and he says that he gave his contact details to two Farman and asked them to pass those on to the command unit is that again is that your understanding of what he'd done
00:32:44 understanding of what he'd done that's what I was told yes yes and he also says that around 4:30 5 o'clock in the morning he reported to the incident unit on Bramley Road
00:32:55 unit on Bramley Road he gave his name and number and again was told to stand by is that your understanding of what happened not correct yes again do you know if mr. Knightley was given a reason at that
00:33:06 Knightley was given a reason at that time why he should stand by I wasn't aware of any reason though would mr. Knightley or mr. Edwards have been able
00:33:18 Knightley or mr. Edwards have been able to approach or access the tower including the basement without an instruction from the NFB at that time I was on site so I wouldn't know but what
00:33:29 was on site so I wouldn't know but what I do know is when I got to site they wouldn't have got to because of the Corden's that was set up they wouldn't have been able to get near enough to the tower to access it and you don't think it was would have been possible to get through the cordons or if they spoke and
00:33:42 through the cordons or if they spoke and if they if they spoke to the police and the NFP on the cordon say they may have been but what they was going to do I'm not sure because obviously the severity of the fire
00:33:54 now you also say that although you were familiar with the local area around the tower you didn't have any knowledge of internal gas pipe work in the tower and therefore you called Patrick Kelly who
00:34:07 therefore you called Patrick Kelly who works in the contract management team at Cayden is that that's correct yes and why did you call him so I spoke to practice Pat is he's the contract
00:34:21 practice Pat is he's the contract specialist for mobs which is multi occupancy buildings and I was aware that there were some works going on in the area I didn't know at that time it was grenfell but I was aware there was some repair riser works which is carried out
00:34:34 repair riser works which is carried out by our contract partner at that time so I just found Pat to see if he was aware of the building and if he knew of the supplies into the building which he did and he informed me that there was some
00:34:47 and he informed me that there was some works going on and that there was internal rises in Greenville tower did he tell you that they've been a gas riser replacement going on he did inform you that one of them there was one
00:34:59 you that one of them there was one currently being replaced yes can you just briefly explain what a gas riser is so against Roy's at ease it's the main gas pipe which will come into a building so our high-rise
00:35:10 into a building so our high-rise building it could be one two three four different if you are building a square building near each corner or it could be one going up the middle of a city it's the main riser pipe which comes in from
00:35:22 the main riser pipe which comes in from underground goes through the building and then we'll tee off in in laterals into each flat who has gas can we just
00:35:33 into each flat who has gas can we just look at paragraph 19 of your statement now go into that it's on the same page and you say this about what Patrick Kelly told you in the last part of that
00:35:45 Kelly told you in the last part of that paragraph you say Patrick Kelly's last three lines Patrick Kelly confirmed to me that there was gas supplied within the building via four internal gas Rises and that there were valves on the risers
00:35:58 and that there were valves on the risers in the sub-basement of the building albeit that they were at a high level so you knew at that point that there were these rises in the basement but at high level arrests yes and did you have any
00:36:11 level arrests yes and did you have any discussion at that time with mr. Kenney about the options that might be available to you for isolating the gas supply to the tower we discussed we did discuss they were fouls internally in
00:36:25 discuss they were fouls internally in the sub-basement this was one well on my way to so I was enroute so I'd seemed on the telly what I'd seen and then obviously once I got closer and closer I
00:36:36 obviously once I got closer and closer I didn't think that there was going to be an option to get in and Pat said if you can get in they're going to be high level so you'll probably more than likely mainly ladder or something to get
00:36:47 likely mainly ladder or something to get out to them but I didn't think that we'd be going into that basement because of the severity of the fire
00:36:58 now in terms of your arrival and you're approaching the tower you say that you arrived around 7:20 a.m. is that right it's correct and this is recorded in a
00:37:09 it's correct and this is recorded in a cadent timeline that we have for the night if we just bring that up on the screen that see a d7 zeroes - we can
00:37:22 screen that see a d7 zeroes - we can just zoom in the entry 87 on that page is just beyond the halfway point that's it
00:37:31 it do you know whether this timeline was prepared contemporaneously or has been created after the event this has been I believe created after the event right
00:37:43 believe created after the event right so the time the times would have been taken from I believe statements from other witnesses on site but it's been put together as one afterwards okay so
00:37:55 put together as one afterwards okay so this isn't the same as the dispatch center incident log it could have been taken from it by may have been added to as well I see have you had a chance to
00:38:07 as well I see have you had a chance to look at this log I hope you check its accuracy yes I have yeah and do you consider the timings to be accurate in it for for the entries for myself I believe so yes
00:38:18 believe so yes and did you have this timeline when you were preparing your statement it sounds like you might not have done from what you just said no I didn't I have my own timelines of most like I said I had my
00:38:31 timelines of most like I said I had my Diaries my key decisions in and I made times against them as for instance when I arrived on site when I went to the command units etc etcetera I made notes of my own times and you check those
00:38:43 of my own times and you check those before you rate you're saying yes yes now you say you approach from Oxford Gardens which is northwest of the tower is that right screw it can we just go
00:38:54 is that right screw it can we just go back to your statement then so if we can go back to met em et triple zero one two seven one Oh on page four paragraph 20
00:39:08 we can zoom in on that yeah so picking it up in the second line you say as I was driving from hanger Lane I could see the smoke I had never seen such a
00:39:20 the smoke I had never seen such a devastating fire when I first pulled up I could only see the top third of the building which was on fire with debris coming off it I could not believe what I was seeing and spent the first couple of minutes after I had arrived just looking
00:39:33 minutes after I had arrived just looking at the scenes around me and I I also want to go to what you say two paragraphs later at paragraph 23 on page five please we can zoom in on that so
00:39:50 five please we can zoom in on that so you say I knew that there was gas being supplied into the tower and as soon as I saw the fire I realized that we would need to turn off the supply of gas as soon as possible when I arrived on site we could
00:40:01 possible when I arrived on site we could not get anywhere near the tower the flames were still burning debris from the building was falling to the floor and the police were keeping everyone away from the tower as soon as I saw the fire it was clear to me that we would
00:40:12 fire it was clear to me that we would not be able to approach the tower to operate any service isolation valves and that we would therefore need to disconnect the supply of gas by isolating the mains in the network now
00:40:24 isolating the mains in the network now just pausing there I want to ask you a few questions about those paragraphs you say that you realized you had to turn the gas off as soon as possible why exactly was that I think from previous
00:40:38 exactly was that I think from previous experience in previous fires I've been to big warehouses other big blocks of baby rows of houses where you just can't
00:40:51 baby rows of houses where you just can't get close enough to isolate the supply so basically then your next step back is to isolate the main which feeds the services so you're isolating a bigger section knowing that there's gas in the
00:41:02 section knowing that there's gas in the building eventually at some point that gas pipe could potentially rupture therefore with a fire it's going to now add fuel to that fire and with gas
00:41:14 add fuel to that fire and with gas obviously
00:41:16 obviously if the fiber gauges keep your night putting the gas out then you've got gas just releasing from an open-ended pipe perhaps which then you got even more
00:41:27 perhaps which then you got even more potential an explosion or something like that so it was just from previous experience knowing that the safest thing to do would be to isolate the gas from the building yeah did you form of you at
00:41:40 the building yeah did you form of you at that time as to whether there are any gas fires burning in the tower not at that time no that's why I didn't know because it was like I said I could only
00:41:51 because it was like I said I could only see that when I pulled up my last burrow station I could really look him over the stage but I could really only see the top third in the building which was smoldering but still alight so I couldn't say that I could see gas fires
00:42:03 couldn't say that I could see gas fires inside the pillar at that point and you just mentioned that you say you couldn't get close to the tower why was that at that time there was cordons everywhere
00:42:14 that time there was cordons everywhere there was lots of people everywhere at that time I wasn't sure who I was gonna be speaking to who's gonna let me through so it was just really a initial sort of sight assessment of where we
00:42:27 sort of sight assessment of where we were what was there and how he was going to get around these obstacles was anybody actually preventing you from approaching the tower
00:42:39 not exactly but wouldn't he just want to go and approach the tower read closely so I knew what I was doing don't say there was cordons there if we just said to the Emoji services that we were the
00:42:51 to the Emoji services that we were the guests they're coming to isolate then I'm sure they would have stopped us but then again it was such a big fire and there were stuff coming off of it I didn't want to put anybody at danger by just approaching the tower without having some kind of plan in place now
00:43:04 having some kind of plan in place now you say what you did was that you went to something called a cadent muster point which mr. Edwards had established can you just explain it might sound obvious but what a muster point is so for us it's a muster point where
00:43:15 for us it's a muster point where everybody on site is aware of where that location is should there be any emergency should there be anything happening it's one would be told to get back to the same area so we can check
00:43:26 back to the same area so we can check everybody was safe and everybody was and was that muster point at Dover house on da field way that's correct yes we can have a look at that so if we
00:43:37 yes we can have a look at that so if we go to an exhibit of mr. Dave Edwards if we go to met Energy triple zero one two nine one two so that is a map of the
00:43:54 nine one two so that is a map of the area that was marked up by mr. Edwards it's not it's not very clear on the screen it's a very big writing but am i right so in the middle of that we have
00:44:05 right so in the middle of that we have that's it there we have a red marker that's the tower that's right and then we can see various red lines coming off it we're gonna look at those in in more
00:44:17 it we're gonna look at those in in more detail in a little while but those are gas mains is that right yep those red points and we can if we already entail ourselves we have station
00:44:28 already entail ourselves we have station walk then down the left-hand side down the west side running down there and we have Bromley Road that goes up then to the north yeah if we go up to the top
00:44:41 the north yeah if we go up to the top left we can see Dhar field way and is it right I think mr. Edwards says it's point nine which is the muster point so I think
00:44:54 which is the muster point so I think actually we've got the wrong yeah Oh point nine exactly the little black dots negged our field way yeah you'll muster point was up in that top
00:45:07 muster point was up in that top left-hand corner but that looks correct yes that's where that's where the over house was that's where we were there's a reason why David house was chosen if you can see from that map we sort of Ace
00:45:20 can see from that map we sort of Ace West away from that and that we was up we wanted to find a place where because there was lots of people milling around so we need to find a place where he was out of the way so that we could communicate between ourselves and put a
00:45:31 communicate between ourselves and put a plan in place and where it was accessible for us to get our vehicles bits and pieces nearby so we chose that because it was just tucked out the way a little bit as well now well we've got
00:45:44 little bit as well now well we've got that map open mr. Edwards has marked the location of the lfb command unit that he was aware of that's at point 10 so that's down yeah exactly down there
00:45:57 that's down yeah exactly down there towards the bottom John Bromley Road again does that accord with your recollection as to command unit that was a command unit yet it wasn't the one
00:46:08 a command unit yet it wasn't the one which I eventually was the one I was going to but that was the first one I went to yes okay yep so I just want to turn now briefly to your role as a
00:46:19 turn now briefly to your role as a category 2 responder we've touched on this a little earlier you mentioned that shortly before the fire you'd had this training about working with other agencies can you explain what cadence
00:46:30 agencies can you explain what cadence role was on the night in the particular circumstances you faced as a category 2 responder so he was there as as a
00:46:42 responder so he was there as as a request for the emergency services to support them with our isolate and gas if required and what was your role in contrast with the lfb role so I've got
00:46:54 contrast with the lfb role so I've got salt so they were category one respondent yes yeah how would you describe the difference between what you were there to do and what they were doing so they're there blue light responders that they're there emergency
00:47:05 responders that they're there emergency they get there really quick after obviously deal with the fire the people everything that's on site we're just there to deal with the gas that that's what we deal with and who has the
00:47:16 what we deal with and who has the primacy on-site in that situation circuitry was upon us other five of the emergency services and is it right that you don't act unless you're ordered to do so correct
00:47:27 do so correct so you've said that after your arrival on site at 7:45 you went to the NFB command unit you just explain that in a moment a moment ago is that point 10 on
00:47:40 moment a moment ago is that point 10 on this
00:47:40 this we say wait - that's the first one I went - yes yeah I was told to go from now to the other main ones which I don't think a marked in this method but that's
00:47:53 think a marked in this method but that's where I was told to go from there - to where thee there was other two or three parts up round by where Lancaster Greene is there there was parts up around there that's where I went round - yep so you
00:48:04 that's where I went round - yep so you arrived on site at 7:20 get to the command unit until 7:45 can you just recall what you were doing in between just misc assessing this the
00:48:16 in between just misc assessing this the area trying to find out who was on site who was on their way to site what what resource we had available looking at the maps to see what what gas mains were there
00:48:26 there troilus off put a plan in place that when I went to the command unit I had a plan to give them it should they want it rather them just go there and then go
00:48:37 rather them just go there and then go away and then make a plan I wanted to have some information prepared for them that's what I thought would be a plan of action to take so I say the gas yeah let's look at your statement again so
00:48:51 let's look at your statement again so this is M et triple zero one two seven one Oh page five paragraph 24 and again
00:49:02 one Oh page five paragraph 24 and again picking it up just over halfway down you say however I decided to go to the LF be command unit to speak with the fire officers to ask whether they wanted us to disconnect the supply of gas at
00:49:14 to disconnect the supply of gas at approximately 7:45 a.m. I went to introduce myself to one of the lfb fire officers who I think was called Julien in the command unit and asked whether they wanted us to disconnect the supply
00:49:25 they wanted us to disconnect the supply of gas he confirmed that they did at that stage the incident commander was aware that cadent had not started the operation to disconnect the supplies of gas to the building so that's your
00:49:37 gas to the building so that's your evidence is about that so as far as you are aware was this the first time that the LF be confirmed to Cayden that they wanted the gas supply shut off I believe so yes because when I went to the
00:49:49 so yes because when I went to the command unit it was again it was really difficult to actually someone's attention to who I was there was so much going on in there there was conversations going everywhere so I
00:50:00 conversations going everywhere so I actually know made it quite clear who I was and what I was there for and I don't think that anybody at that point had made that decision so I said I guess so that was the first point that they they
00:50:11 that was the first point that they they basically said to us yeah we want it we wanted to be isolated and was X any explanation given to you as to why they were giving you the go-ahead at that point at that time
00:50:25 no it's no real it's relation other than that I would assume again that the experience says that in a building which is on fire that much fire we have our potential ignition source in there we've
00:50:36 potential ignition source in there we've we've gassed then it was the procedure to make sure that Ben was isolated to take away that potential further fuel but in the fire you refer in that
00:50:47 but in the fire you refer in that paragraph to NFB far off so he you think was called Julian do you think that might have been duty and Spooner did you know his name on the night I gained a
00:50:58 know his name on the night I gained a little bit disappointing myself because from my training I was always told to get names but I just I was on a bus and I was first names only I was right writing names down our list you could remember his surname was no okay so I
00:51:11 remember his surname was no okay so I now want to turn to the different options you had available to you for shutting off the gas so as we saw just a
00:51:22 shutting off the gas so as we saw just a moment ago with reference to paragraph 23 of your statement you said that from the moment you saw the fire it was clear that you would not be able to approach the tower to operate any service
00:51:33 the tower to operate any service isolation valves is that right correct now are these service isolation valves also sometimes called pipeline isolation valves or PIV correct yeah so there could be s IVs or POV occurred yes so
00:51:47 could be s IVs or POV occurred yes so can you explain how you would normally isolate the gas supply using those valves
00:51:52 valves so if the well was accessible they're normally within one to two meters of the building and the pipeline isolation valve
00:52:02 valve they're normally recognized by a box on the floor I could be yellow could be black could be metal could be plastic and it will say guess of some sort on
00:52:13 and it will say guess of some sort on that and they're normally in line with where the supplies go into the to the buildings so if the fire was around the back of the building and it wasn't
00:52:24 back of the building and it wasn't affecting us you could go to that isolation valve lead up as long as it's clear and you turn off however you wouldn't just leave that valtor nothing to do after doing physical isolation
00:52:35 to do after doing physical isolation behind because these valves although they could turn off there's a obviously it's a valve and they're not it's always potentially the gas could see past that valve at some point so you always our
00:52:46 valve at some point so you always our procedures are that we do a physical isolation behind the veil so incident off and then you still do an excavation behind to isolate yeah so you would always expect to find these close to a
00:52:58 always expect to find these close to a building yes you'd expect them to be there but it's not uncommon for them not to be identifiable due to refurbishment of the pavements slab in curved smooth
00:53:12 of the pavements slab in curved smooth parking spaces get put in sometimes get time act over you know they should be there but they're not always 100% identifiable okay yeah and if they are
00:53:23 identifiable okay yeah and if they are covered over what would normally happen so if they was covered over and we don't know exactly where they were we would then try and identify by equipment to
00:53:35 then try and identify by equipment to trace the pipe out from where it comes out from the building and then do an excavation to isolate supply would you expect to have plans available to you to be able to work out their location or
00:53:47 be able to work out their location or services into buildings not all services are digitized into buildings the mains which surround the area there everything there's on our maps but not all supplies
00:53:58 there's on our maps but not all supplies are digitized onto our maps in terms of your maps and the mains coming in would you expect the the locations of these isolation valves to be on those
00:54:11 isolation valves to be on those for welfare warden any building if they if they want the map them they would be in the what location because the building is always been there so when
00:54:22 building is always been there so when they actually plot that it should be within that area of where they've put the valve to be yes at groennfell do you know if those were accessible the valves
00:54:33 know if those were accessible the valves yep oh no completely not because there was so much debris on the floor there was no way to get to them valves at all well come to that in a moment but do you know whether they had been covered over
00:54:44 know whether they had been covered over at all I don't because I hadn't walked around the building prior to the fire so I wouldn't be able to confirm or deny that if they were there so turning to
00:54:57 that if they were there so turning to approaching the tower to turn off the valves can you explain why you didn't do that on the night what goes to the valves try and access those those valves yeah try and find the locations so what
00:55:11 yeah try and find the locations so what were the difficulties well they just doing that looking but being able to get close enough to the building because they were still burning debris falling from the building so we knew from the map whether showed the vowels but that
00:55:23 map whether showed the vowels but that was on the the self soil I believe of the building and that was just completely not accessible to get anywhere near that to even look for them because it was just too dangerous the
00:55:36 second option is internal shutoff so is it right that you can also shut off the gas by isolating the valves on the the rises in the building is that right yes
00:55:49 rises in the building is that right yes so not all buildings are the same but this particular particular building had a sub-basement where they brought the pipes into so they would have had potentially had valves in soil from Pat
00:56:01 potentially had valves in soil from Pat Kelly's knowledge he told me that they did so there was valves inside there their construction valves but they can also act as patro isolation valves as well they could be used to saying - shut
00:56:13 well they could be used to saying - shut the supply off but as I say you'd still have to do a physical isolation outside to make sure that pipes completely isolated from entering the building they sometimes known as branch or rise
00:56:26 they sometimes known as branch or rise isolation valves correct so when you were formulating your plan for isolating the gas supply at Granville did you
00:56:37 the gas supply at Granville did you think about accessing the basement at that time no why not because the building was it just looked like it was a big fire boys completely a lie and
00:56:48 a big fire boys completely a lie and although I'd seen some fire officers go in and out I just didn't think that we'd be able to access that baseball at all
00:56:59 be able to access that baseball at all so that you didn't think that was an option for you at that time at that time though so I want to turn to another method of shutting off the gas supply which is to deal with something
00:57:11 supply which is to deal with something called governor's gas governor's so you've explained in your statement that it's sometimes possible in some circumstances to use these governor's to shut off the gas supply is it right that
00:57:24 shut off the gas supply is it right that governors are a mechanism in a gas network that reduces medium pressure to low pressure yeah and can we just have a look at a map of the governor's in the area of grandfa tower so if we go to
00:57:37 area of grandfa tower so if we go to your exhibit JMA 3 to your second statement that's CA D quadruple 0 301 -
00:57:50 it's not hugely clear on this screen but is it right that there are little brown arrows dotted around this screen are
00:58:02 arrows dotted around this screen are they
00:58:03 they governor's yeah they're governor's or another way of question adducing stations or systems that's what we call the pressure reducing station yes yeah and is it right again it's very hard to
00:58:15 and is it right again it's very hard to read on this map but Grenville tower and then occasion of ground fluids right in the bottom left hand corner of this map it's not the bottom - it's up the next one up it's just there that's it yeah
00:58:28 one up it's just there that's it yeah yeah great
00:58:33 now can you explain to us where the shutting off the governor's was an option at Granville tower an option but not a viable one can you explain why
00:58:44 not a viable one can you explain why because as you can see there's it would have to shut one two three four five six seven eight nine ten at least ten might be another one there thought so
00:58:56 be another one there thought so basically if we shut the one that Grenfell all the other Brown arrows they would just force gas back to that location
00:59:04 location so you'd have to shut all of them Gardner's off to be off to close the gas supply off to the tower yep to be fair to you I think this might get clearer can we look at JMA for which is it CA D
00:59:17 can we look at JMA for which is it CA D triples at quadruple zero three zero one six now can you explain to us what that
00:59:29 six now can you explain to us what that map that different colored map is showing there so again grenfell is is just up about two-thirds a way down from the top is the red so basically the
00:59:42 the top is the red so basically the Latimer Road Gardner is the main pressure reducing system feed in that area so that's where the major that little that little red network that we've got on the bottom layer yeah
00:59:54 we've got on the bottom layer yeah that's the Latimer Road network that's served by that correct yeah so that's where Grand Vitara that's correct you can there is it is written on here but it's very hard to see if you to turn
01:00:05 it's very hard to see if you to turn that one off basically then if you go to the next newest well I think it's Kendall Green which is just up to the north which is all the blue that would
01:00:17 north which is all the blue that would then work harder and then that would push gas back into the system that way these governors in effect like taps if you turn one off another one won't open further in order to correct
01:00:30 further in order to correct pressure that's absolutely right yeah so basically it's you turn what and the next one will just work harder and so forth and so on so obviously you know if you turn them all off eventually the pressure would start to drop because one
01:00:41 pressure would start to drop because one wouldn't be after the demand of one wouldn't be able to feed the whole lot be with not isolate the supplies and if you had to turned all of them governor's off as you can see all that pipe work
01:00:52 off as you can see all that pipe work that's all going to be holding gas and with the time of year and the amount of it was really hot so not a lot of demand on there would take a hell of a long time to burn all that gas off in that
01:01:04 time to burn all that gas off in that system I see so even once you've isolated the governor's or turn them down you've then got the difficulty you've got the existing gas in the pipe have to dissipate yeah and you say that in order
01:01:18 dissipate yeah and you say that in order to guarantee cutting off the gas supply you'd also have to cut the mains as well why is that again they're all on valves which valves are you know some valves
01:01:29 which valves are you know some valves have been in there many many years that they make Micah seal but again they could be a slight let by so you don't again physically drop down behind them and do an isolation on them some of the
01:01:41 and do an isolation on them some of the vowels are newer which which are triple fire thicker fire files which they're newer valve we allowed to turn them off and just put a blank behind them but you still have to physically drop down and do them works you just can't leave
01:01:54 do them works you just can't leave valves turned off I understand if you're going to do a physical shut off behind the valve does any of of cutting the pipe if it does say yes it so basically
01:02:05 pipe if it does say yes it so basically yes sir excavations and then we have flow stopping equipment which we have to insert into into the pipes do a physical cut cut a section out and then put caps on we're going to come back to that kind
01:02:16 on we're going to come back to that kind of operation in a moment so you have said and shortly in your later statement that shutting down the governor's would have been a much more complex operation than the one you actually undertook at
01:02:27 than the one you actually undertook at Granville which we'll come to in a moment
01:02:29 moment is that right I believe so yes yeah definitely did it even enter your mind to think about shutting the governor's down we had a conversation about it we did so looking at this
01:02:42 about it we did so looking at this picture this is what we use for what we call network analysis so we can understand how the whole system's configurated so we had a quick look and we're on network analysis we looked how many governments they would be required
01:02:53 many governments they would be required to be shut down and the time it took site was it was it was in our thought process it was an option of it got dismissed quite quickly I think you've answered this already so how long does
01:03:06 answered this already so how long does it typically take to reduce the amount of gas being supplied by isolating the governors does that depend on how much gas is in the system yeah absolutely
01:03:18 gas is in the system yeah absolutely what the demand ease oh there's all sorts of factors into that yeah
01:03:32 let's determine that is a convenient moment because I'm about to get to some detail questions about the the option that they did pursue on the night and and the sequence of questions I'd like
01:03:43 and the sequence of questions I'd like to be as I could have a break now that would be convenient well mister all day we have a break roughly once an hour because I think most people find giving evidence is quite so we'll stop now for ten minutes
01:03:56 quite so we'll stop now for ten minutes I get ask you not to talk about your evidence to anyone once you leave the room and we will resume at five past eleven I'll take this is more questions okay now to go to the Usher
01:04:19 five foster London please
01:11:04 you
01:16:48 right and school they help you think you carry on yes it was great yes thank you so I want to turn then to the option that you did decide to pursue on the night and in the event you decided that the option of cutting off the mains at
01:17:01 the option of cutting off the mains at three identified points in streets nearby to grandfa was the appropriate option can you just briefly explain why you thought that was the best option you had so the gas mains going towards
01:17:14 had so the gas mains going towards groennfell tower there was three feeds going towards it so you'd have to isolate everyone to get a physical isolation so the locations were near
01:17:27 isolation so the locations were near enough to isolate but safe enough for us to work out at the time so that's why we chose their locations yeah and you say that in order to decide what to do you
01:17:38 that in order to decide what to do you looked at some plans of the mains is that right correct yes and you've now exhibited the maps that you say were available on the night and we're going to come back to those in a moment is it
01:17:49 to come back to those in a moment is it right that these maps come from laptops or something called go books if so the field force engineers the guys working out on the site they have a mobile device it's called go but Toughbook this
01:18:01 device it's called go but Toughbook this is like a small app laptop and they have maps pre-loaded onto their systems so they can access them to have a look where they're where the mains are located in the highways and the
01:18:12 located in the highways and the footpaths and did you use a go book to be the gas mains Maps when you were first deciding your plan I did yes cuz David Edwards was there and he had some
01:18:23 David Edwards was there and he had some resource there some of ratios and I asked to use one of those so I can get the maps that tablet for myself he said you also had an hard copy and of
01:18:37 he said you also had an hard copy and of these maps and how did you obtain those hard copies so there was - so David M was manage to go to a shop but managed to get them printed from a shop for us and also Neil Milam went to the depot on
01:18:50 and also Neil Milam went to the depot on route into Fulham and grabbed some drawings and maps from there as well and you've said that you arranged for more paper copies to be printed during the day why why did you need those again it was just to either get some
01:19:04 again it was just to either get some black lights and blown-up versions or some zoomed in version so we could see how the network was configurating yeah so the purpose of getting those hard copies was it to try and make some of it
01:19:15 copies was it to try and make some of it a bit clearer correct yeah I think now using those Maps you say that you thought it was best to cut and cap the mains at three points in the network
01:19:26 mains at three points in the network away from the tower did Tony day also think that was the best option when I presented it to him yeah we discussed it it was agreed that would be the best option yeah and did your recent
01:19:38 option yeah and did your recent knowledge of the area help you in making that decision it did yes how again now in the configuration where the mains were it was and the maps and knowing
01:19:51 were it was and the maps and knowing whether what the air we were working in that that would be the best place to do the isolations where any of the we're gonna look at them just now but where any of the locations unclear on the maps you were looking at would you be in the
01:20:05 you were looking at would you be in the locations like the isolation point locations were any of them unclear well remember that was going on it was it was quite hard to actually physically identify where they were because of
01:20:16 identify where they were because of where the Corden's were so we had to actually go and find them first where we was gonna go and do the isolation so once we found them they wasn't unclear but we had to find them first
01:20:27 but we had to find them first yeah so let's go now and I want to start with your exhibit JMA one to your first statement that's at met MIT triple zero one two nine one four yes now is it
01:20:45 one two nine one four yes now is it right that this is a diagram that was made after the fire correct and I think you say in your second statement you didn't use it on the night but it was produced for the purposes of preparing
01:20:57 produced for the purposes of preparing your police statement is that right that's right yeah yeah now given that you've marked this one I just want to start by using this one I'm gonna go to some other maps in a moment now you decided to cut the gas at three
01:21:10 now you decided to cut the gas at three points
01:21:11 points and point three of this diagram on the right we see grenfell road is that right that that was one of the isolation points there correct and is it right
01:21:25 points there correct and is it right that that was a point that was a hundred and eighty millimeter gas pipe yeah because the the old metallic system is metric or Imperial and the new plastic
01:21:36 metric or Imperial and the new plastic is metric so it was that was 180 min the more plastic that might yeah yep so that was the first point then point four of that map in the middle that is testet in
01:21:50 that map in the middle that is testet in road is that right yes and that was a four inch gas pipe is that correct yeah that was four inch steel yes yep and do those two marks there the three and four
01:22:01 those two marks there the three and four correctly show the the position of the isolation point as far as you can recall well they're there they're in that load they're in that facility they're not
01:22:12 they're in that facility they're not accurate but that's quite close to where they were yes okay then point five of that map along and keep going exactly to the to the left that's on station walk
01:22:24 the to the left that's on station walk is that right correct you decided to cut that one as well and is it right that the isolation point there was further northeast than both
01:22:36 there was further northeast than both Lattimer Road station and where station walk meets Bromley Road so was it up station walk back towards where station walk says yeah back back our sites will
01:22:49 walk says yeah back back our sites will be self a little bit yes so do you think it was a little bit south of where five is on this mat correct yeah South down station walk back towards the tube station refuses take the s from the
01:23:01 station refuses take the s from the station just yourself of that okay so if the little dot covers on the s4 station no no no the other one yeah
01:23:13 yeah so that's what you just about here okay that's helpful can you just explain briefly the reasons why you chose those
01:23:24 briefly the reasons why you chose those particular isolation points so once I made contact with the NFB I I've had these sort of they were there about
01:23:36 these sort of they were there about cease isolation points in my head that's where I wanted to do them and then once well that the actual fact I wanted to do a little bit nearer the tower the isolations originally but when we went
01:23:48 isolations originally but when we went the fire brigade took me through it's all well the points where it just wasn't going to be physical to a get get them in safe enough and close enough to do them there with what was going on and
01:23:59 them there with what was going on and there was far too much there was firing but that pumps aerial platforms there was so much other stuff down there that we wouldn't have been asked to excavate there because of what was going on so we actually pulled everything back a little
01:24:10 actually pulled everything back a little bit from the original points same mains but just literally pulled them back a little bit to big locations where we could work safely without getting in the
01:24:22 could work safely without getting in the way with anybody else and do it safely yep and is it right that certainly four three and four they're actually quite close to the tower perhaps within 30 meters yeah three three three was
01:24:34 meters yeah three three three was probably thirty four was probably less than twenty or say forty twenty meters from the tower quite close yeah and is it right that you needed to cut all three in order to stop the correct line
01:24:47 three in order to stop the correct line and how do you try to do it further away might you have had to cut more points yeah so if you is just as an example take three go back self up two more
01:24:59 take three go back self up two more towards where bond more Rody's as you can see there's other supplies and coming in into that which would then have fed back into the tower so
01:25:10 correct yes so that if you if I was self of that broad and obviously that would have fed in you know so if the further back you come the more isolations we'd have to have taken out to get a physical
01:25:22 have to have taken out to get a physical isolation yep now I want to focus now for a little while on point five on station walk that we just talked about which is a little bit further down
01:25:33 which is a little bit further down station walk than on that map now you say you only discovered that that main on station walk was a 15-inch main as opposed to a 12-inch main when your team
01:25:44 opposed to a 12-inch main when your team actually managed to excavate it later on in the evening of the 14th is that correct that's correct yeah now when you first identify the station walk as the the isolation point you wanted to use
01:25:55 the isolation point you wanted to use what did you understand the diameter of that pipe to be as per the map so I understood it to be a 12 inch we're going to come to the map in a moment and just have a look at that yeah and was
01:26:07 just have a look at that yeah and was that
01:26:08 that did you reach that view been looking at your go book map or a hardcopy map I think it's been about looked on the originally on the Gobert maps and then the hardcopy maps that came out to site shortly after so let's turn then and to
01:26:25 shortly after so let's turn then and to so I think we this is the map I want to yes that's just stick with this map for a moment and let's just trace that main
01:26:36 a moment and let's just trace that main so station walk has a 12 diameter little label on it is that correct towards the top of station walk before it does the turn back towards the tower
01:26:47 it does the turn back towards the tower just yep that's correct twelve inch di which stands for ductile iron but there's a black mark here it's under 20 just under the number 23 that says 15
01:26:59 just under the number 23 that says 15 inch isolation point is it right that you mark that at the time you prepared your police statement no that mark is a symbol which would be a part of our
01:27:12 symbol which would be a part of our mapping system with a map that mark you talking about the arrow there I wasn't talking about the era come to the air in just one second so you've written somebody's written 15 isolationpoint I was yeah
01:27:26 isolationpoint I was yeah now is that a mark that was done at the time of your police statement correct that was after the event yeah yeah and you've told us just now that in fact the isolation point you think was further south in there yeah it was plotted it
01:27:39 south in there yeah it was plotted it was there baby was that like I say it was further back yeah now you wanted to draw attention to the little arrow we see it more clearly in another map in a moment on the corner of
01:27:50 another map in a moment on the corner of that Cape in the pipe yeah can you just explain what that arrow means to you that that means to me it's over a change of size of pipe change of diameter or
01:28:02 of size of pipe change of diameter or change of material okay and then coming back down towards the tower we can see it's got 15 written there yeah so let's
01:28:15 it's got 15 written there yeah so let's just go then to the maps that you say you were using on the night which is slightly less clear than this one but let's go to those so these are exhibited to your second statement ja1 can we pull
01:28:29 to your second statement ja1 can we pull up see ad quadruple zero 301 five yeah and we want just page 1 of that yeah
01:28:42 and we want just page 1 of that yeah that's great now this is hard to read but we need to just tick with that at the moment so this shows the whole area
01:28:54 the moment so this shows the whole area and we've got Graham full tower in the top middle where the big X is that right that's correct and we can see we've got a main that runs to the east of Graham
01:29:05 a main that runs to the east of Graham felt our down the right-hand side yes yes and I think we can just about read that it says 15-inch died on that yes so
01:29:23 that it says 15-inch died on that yes so it looks from that map that the the main that's running immediately to the east of Grand Hotel is a 15 inch main correct yeah
01:29:32 yeah and was that your understanding on the night again I was up looking to do any isolations that close to the building no but did you have a look at what the - yeah location yeah
01:29:45 yeah location yeah so then in terms of the isolation point that you used on station walk again the strip that the bit where concern where this the the stretch that goes down station walk diagonal down this page
01:29:58 station walk diagonal down this page from the top you've got a little triangle at the top again at the corner point 75 degree annual point again what
01:30:11 point 75 degree annual point again what does that symbol tell you is it the same as what you just said yes it's a change of diameter of pipe or material change of diameter all material yes it's not
01:30:22 of diameter all material yes it's not telling you definitely it's change of diameter something's happened at that point it's a change of pipe size or change of quite material yeah and then it heads down can we don't again go we have a zoomed
01:30:35 can we don't again go we have a zoomed in part of station walk that's the second page of this exhibit we can just go to that
01:30:54 yeah that's it so what we seem to be looking at now is write down the kind of bottom of station walk towards Latimer Road and it as I understand it the
01:31:05 Road and it as I understand it the station walk main is is heading up the middle of this that's correct the top yeah and then we see Latimer right there there's a label in black 12-inch died
01:31:16 there's a label in black 12-inch died yeah what is that telling you if anything about the station walk that's telling me that that SATs 12-inch that's
01:31:27 telling me that that SATs 12-inch that's all I made that is a little branch off the main that you actually isolated yeah so is that telling you anything about the station walk name
01:31:39 the station walk name so from this map you wouldn't be able to tell but when I look when you look at these maps when you hover over the map it highlights the whole asset so every asset is split into what they call a pod
01:31:50 asset is split into what they call a pod which is the number of that main so it'll highlight the start and the finish of that that section of main so if used to hover that you're correct in what you're saying is that little
01:32:01 in what you're saying is that little stub would be 12 but if I was to have for the main which goes up towards the tower that would also tell me the size of that main and the asset asset ID of that main which was confirmed to be a
01:32:12 that main which was confirmed to be a twelve-inch so do you remember hovering over that main route and seeing 12-inch did you personally do that ID'd yet
01:32:27 okay I'm interested as to why I mean these were maps that you actually emailed we can see that from your second statement you were emailing these maps to others for printing purposes so we
01:32:39 to others for printing purposes so we know these were the maps she used why wasn't there as a screenshot closer to where your isolation point was further art station walk do you know why this
01:32:50 art station walk do you know why this screenshot was the one that was chosen this one here was chosen as well for a couple reasons one it shows again like you say if you hovered over it would tell you that it's a 12 and secondly
01:33:01 tell you that it's a 12 and secondly that's that less of a row station that's actually this that's the name of the governor station right so that if you can see the blue goes into the red and that is where the pressure is reduced so
01:33:13 that is where the pressure is reduced so this is actually the governor station which we highlight that's why we highlight it on that why would you be highlighting the governor station because that there would give us a really indication of where the main was because it's all there's boxes on the
01:33:25 because it's all there's boxes on the floor and that is quite a large area of where the in-ground pit is so we know that's where the mains come out from the producing system for us for indication of where to start excavating
01:33:37 of where to start excavating looking for the money this is a useful kind of point to locate yourself correct zoomed in a bit of the map absolutely yeah so again these you know we could
01:33:48 yeah so again these you know we could have looked for the twelve slightly south where it says sixty-three we could look for it there but we wouldn't have isolated because of obviously he's coming out of the governor station so
01:33:59 coming out of the governor station so that's why we got there and that was on route to come out back up towards the tower so you say you knew that the the
01:34:10 tower so you say you knew that the the main that we looked at immediately east of brimful towers a 15 inch main yeah you were hovering over this and seeing a 12 inch main is it normal for pipes to go from narrower to broader as they go
01:34:23 go from narrower to broader as they go into a building or would you have expected the opposite it's not uncommon but again it's not that uncommon either
01:34:34 but again it's not that uncommon either it's the configuration things change over the years that so if you look to the east of the building the feet coming in there was only one while 80 mill that pipe
01:34:45 only one while 80 mill that pipe beforehand I haven't got access to them drawings with that pipe beforehand could have been a 15 coming in from that way so the 15 more I've been coming in from that way and reducing back to the 12
01:34:56 that way and reducing back to the 12 that way I don't know what the configuration of their maps were before that replacement happened so it wouldn't set any alarm bells ringing for you that on station walk you've got a 12 you
01:35:08 on station walk you've got a 12 you think you've got a 12 inch main but then you know that by the time you're coming back round the tower it's a 15 inch mean if there hadn't been replaced with the other side I'd maybe think about that because I said there had been
01:35:19 because I said there had been replacement then it didn't didn't really ring any alarm bells if anything because it was a 12 inch coming out of the Gulf now you know I would have thought the opposite that that would potentially be
01:35:31 opposite that that would potentially be a mistake on maps that's been into wrong as a 15 it should have been a 12 yeah just pausing now how I mean how accurate are these maps when you're using them they're pretty accurate we do we do find
01:35:44 they're pretty accurate we do we do find some sometimes somes that are not quite so accurate and when we do find things that are like we follow are what's called RDR for process so that we basically we log that so the mapping
01:35:56 basically we log that so the mapping systems can get updated so we have to go and do trial olds would confirm sighs pipes location if they are in the road with them in the path what material 'yes and then we update our systems
01:36:08 and then we update our systems accordingly so these maps go back many many years from years ago from the initial database just for completeness I am going to take you to some exhibits to
01:36:23 am going to take you to some exhibits to James Harrison statement so he gave a statement to the Met Police on the 29th of June can we just start by looking at JH 10 which is met triple zero one eight
01:36:36 JH 10 which is met triple zero one eight three zero two
01:36:55 yes now he says in this his statement that this was a copy of the map this one that the cadent engineer's had on the night and just to make my point good to the east of Graham thought our we can
01:37:06 the east of Graham thought our we can see a 15 inch diameter pipe very clearly marked is that right correct yeah yeah and there's also a 12 inch to the self there as well yeah yep yep so you've got
01:37:21 there as well yeah yep yep so you've got a 12 inch feeding into a 15 inch around the face so that that where that is indeed sorry yeah this port here that's
01:37:32 indeed sorry yeah this port here that's well there's nothing to say that years ago that didn't go backgrounds to where that 12 was that that could have been abandoned that sample with it why there's a cap in there it could be all sorts of fun questions and answers as to
01:37:44 sorts of fun questions and answers as to why they use so that's a 12 there or 15 there are 12 background Mary it's all a little bit you know you it could it could be an error on that on the maps or
01:37:56 could be an error on that on the maps or it could be that there's been something changed there over the years yes I mean we see the 15 inch diameter part going up the east side along the north and
01:38:07 up the east side along the north and then coming off and I think it remains it's hard to read but a 15 inch on that little red exactly writing yeah so we know that at least that branch there is coming off as a 15 inch corrects well we
01:38:20 coming off as a 15 inch corrects well we never actually it's goodbye head around that part of the building so so we still don't know if at all rings yeah if we then look at JH 1 which is met triple 0
01:38:32 then look at JH 1 which is met triple 0 1 8 3 1 1
01:38:43 now to be clear mr. Harrison has said that this shows the mains and supply pipes as at the 14th that wasn't in fact available on the night he says it was
01:38:55 available on the night he says it was produced for the purposes of his police statement now we see there we've got 15 inch diameter coming up round Grenville tower up there and then down but from
01:39:07 tower up there and then down but from your recollection is that how it was marked on the night no that's not I've never seen that or not any mapping system marked as a 15 inch from all the maps I looked at on the different
01:39:20 maps I looked at on the different devices on the ninth definitely not at that time when you were planning the operations did you consider the possibility that this was a 15 inch main
01:39:32 possibility that this was a 15 inch main again I chose the location all on the 12 for the reason being that we could work on that 12 of a half without having to call in especially as contractors because once we go over a 12 inch we
01:39:45 because once we go over a 12 inch we have to use Bish's contractors to do a flow stop operation so that's why I chose to work on the 12 whiteboy where the governor was because if it's where
01:39:58 the governor was because if it's where the gulf divisions think that would be so did it occur to you at that time or that might be a 15 inch just finally on
01:40:11 that might be a 15 inch just finally on this topic and then we'll move on on the cadent timeline that we looked at earlier if we can bring that up that's C ad seven zeros too
01:40:32 at item 102 850 and I think that's sorry page 4 of that exhibit sorry
01:40:50 yeah if you can just highlight the very top box on that page item 102 that's it so if this says 850 Jason Lord that
01:41:01 so if this says 850 Jason Lord that explains the isolation plan to the NFB we'll come to that in a moment it describes to the isolation points that says the third was at the rear of legend and Street 12-inch 15 inch gas
01:41:14 legend and Street 12-inch 15 inch gas main so at the time were you saying it was a 12 inch 15 inch gas this was put together after okay for doing the police statement so long after the event okay
01:41:26 statement so long after the event okay so look let's go back to the events of the fourteenth of gene and you say as per this timeline so 850 that you went to the lfb to discuss your plan to
01:41:38 to the lfb to discuss your plan to isolate the three mains when you just explain to us why it took until 852 to put that plan together what you had to do to formulate that plan it was the
01:41:49 do to formulate that plan it was the sheer time it took to get round the site as I call it to find each location to get through to talk to the safety officers for the lfb to make sure they
01:42:01 officers for the lfb to make sure they was happy with where we was going to work so identify how to get move our vehicles plant equipment near enough for us to work safely at three locations the
01:42:13 us to work safely at three locations the the one on station walk there was it was actually a sterile area which the London Ambulance Service we use in which I'd asked him so if they could move it slightly for us so that we could get in there again otherwise we would have to
01:42:25 there again otherwise we would have to come back further which would mean more cotton cap so there was lots of communication and planning to put into place before we confirmed with the NFB what our action plan was and were you
01:42:39 what our action plan was and were you satisfied at that point that the Cayden personnel that had been on site since before your arrival had done everything they could have been expected to do up to that point yes so you deal with this
01:42:53 to that point yes so you deal with this in your your witness statement and the formulating of the plan and presenting it to the LF B can we go to that that's met triple zero one two seven 100 at
01:43:05 met triple zero one two seven 100 at paragraph 38 on page eight yes so you
01:43:16 paragraph 38 on page eight yes so you say around 8:50 a.m. I went to speak with the lfb again to discuss our proposed plan it was difficult to speak with the lfb when we first arrived on site it was clear that the focus was not
01:43:28 site it was clear that the focus was not on cadent and that we were not understandably an immediate priority for them I went through the proposed plan with the lfb and showed them the proposed isolation points on a map they
01:43:39 proposed isolation points on a map they confirmed that they were happy for us to carry out excavations in the proposed locations early age with the lfb safety officers at each of the proposed isolation points and communicated with the LF be constantly whilst monitoring
01:43:51 the LF be constantly whilst monitoring each of the proposed isolation points now just pausing there and looking at that paragraph you say that turning off the gas had not been a priority for the lfb up to that point and that that was
01:44:03 lfb up to that point and that that was understandable can you just explain why you thought that was understandable at the time
01:44:09 the time there was there was so many things going on but they was having meetings in the command units there was talking about all sorts of stuff I don't think they thought that getting the gas off at that
01:44:21 thought that getting the gas off at that exact moment was their poro so there was obviously still at dealing with the fire potentially getting people at the building you know I didn't discuss any of that with them but it was that was
01:44:32 of that with them but it was that was their focus of putting their own plans in place rather than us doing the isolations that's why I went to them I'm not waiting for them to come to us because again I knew what that gas would have to go off well you at this state
01:44:45 have to go off well you at this state made aware of any frustrations on the part of firefighters about the gas not having been isolated know with anything said to you about the possibility of gas
01:44:56 said to you about the possibility of gas fueling or reigniting sections of the tower at this time Oh what about any later stage did you ever have any conversations with any firefighters
01:45:07 conversations with any firefighters where they were expressing concern about the gas fueling the fire absolutely later in the day I was informed a couple of times that they could hear potential mini explosions
01:45:19 could hear potential mini explosions which could be the meters getting to a point where they got the gas in them which is combusted there was flames still coming in certain areas which where the rises went up in the building
01:45:30 where the rises went up in the building look like they could be potentially burning gas and at some point late from the day when it really got a little bit later you can see the orange flames and the gas flames in the flats that was what was fueling the fire
01:45:42 what was fueling the fire can you remember first of all you say you had a couple of conversations with firefighters to that effect can you give us any idea what time you were having those conversations in the day I think is in my statement to be fair you might
01:45:57 is in my statement to be fair you might come but can you recall now when they was first being concerned about the gas being the law so you said later in the day you say not at that point yeah no
01:46:09 day you say not at that point yeah no one was talking to you about concerns about gas fires burning but later in the day
01:46:13 day you said they were I think you remember when three o'clock onwards it started to become more of a conversation with the lfb of progress yep now you've explained
01:46:28 lfb of progress yep now you've explained that the NFB agreed your plan and that between 8:50 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. you did a number of things first you say you walk the area with the level 60 Network
01:46:39 walk the area with the level 60 Network supervisor Peter Beinart yeah and you found all these out three isolation points so were you walking the area again that's maybe sort of come a bit
01:46:53 again that's maybe sort of come a bit out of order yeah we did between that first
01:46:58 first so once you've presented your plan to the NFB what did you do next so once we obviously identify where we was gonna do
01:47:10 obviously identify where we was gonna do the isolations I've been that to look at all the resources hand available I've got everybody back to the muster point and then divided the people up into teams so there I had prepared teams
01:47:23 teams so there I had prepared teams there I had Jace be drivers there I had vacuum excavator plant there I mean the excavators I had lots of options got them all there ready so it was putting them all into teams to work
01:47:35 was putting them all into teams to work in the relevant locations and then trying to get them to the end points bearing in mind that was fire engines ambulances and all sorts of other vehicle obstructing us from getting to where these isolations were yeah we're
01:47:47 where these isolations were yeah we're going to come to that little briefing that you did in a moment you say that you requested something called a network analysis can you explain what that is yes or network analysis is similar to
01:47:58 yes or network analysis is similar to what we've seen we've all domains in the whole area it just it's a formality of procedure that if you're going to isolate sections of mine you need to know what impact that will have on the
01:48:10 know what impact that will have on the network so it's just a formality that you do when you do any procedure of flow stopping major overs over an eight inch and above you have to do that as part of our procedures so it's basically just
01:48:22 our procedures so it's basically just telling us what the impact will be on the network and if there was no impact I say their mains other than new supply it's a great affair which is what we wanted you say that around midday you
01:48:34 wanted you say that around midday you return to the command unit to say that you thought the cutoff was going to take until 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. that evening can you explain how you made that estimation
01:48:45 you explain how you made that estimation as to how long it was going to take so we've got physically excavate ground enough ground to be able to do these operations in so you're looking at holes
01:48:56 operations in so you're looking at holes that could be sort of like three four five six meters long down to a meter meter and a half deep with other plant cables utilities in the way we have to
01:49:07 cables utilities in the way we have to excavate that some by hand some by machines so generally if we were to go into an isolation on the main it would take you pretty much all day just to get the excavations done so in previous
01:49:18 the excavations done so in previous experience I just knew that we're doing we're going to do three excavations in one day so I was just trying to give an indicative time as to what sort of how long it would take to get them prepared
01:49:29 long it would take to get them prepared yep you've said in your statement the lfb obviously wanted the supply of gas to be disconnected as soon as possible but they understood that we were going to do our best to isolate it
01:49:41 were going to do our best to isolate it as quickly and safely as we could is that right again it's explaining to them what what we have to do to unfortunately it's not just like turn available if it's actually isolating
01:49:52 available if it's actually isolating excavating isolate flow stopping and they understood that once I explained it to them that's why they would take the time it would take what was their reaction when you first said it's gonna
01:50:03 reaction when you first said it's gonna take till 7:00 or 8:00 in the evening if you can do it quicker then great awesome Rob I've got the resources here you know we'll go as quick as we can but we can only work as quickly as you know in a safe manner as we can and at that stage
01:50:14 safe manner as we can and at that stage did the NF DB give you any explanation as to why they were wanting it quicker were there any particular concerns they had about gas at that stage what we started so this is you go back to the
01:50:25 started so this is you go back to the command unit around midday and you tell them it's gonna have being not cut off till the evening can you remember whether they said anything to you about particular concerns they had at that stage about
01:50:37 concerns they had at that stage about the gas I just think they mentioned that there was still fires going on the higher floor so they said that they don't that we have that to gas or not at that time so it's just it's just to take that out of the equation to get the old
01:50:48 that out of the equation to get the old gas isolated yeah so turning then to the briefing you say what you did was you pulled everybody back to the muster point at 12:30 and you gave them a briefing and Peter Beinart describes
01:51:02 briefing and Peter Beinart describes your briefing as inspirational in in his statement what did you say I mean what did you have to say to them at that point well again I think it's been at that training from Morton on the marsh
01:51:15 that training from Morton on the marsh with the fire brigade it was it was made quite clear to me there that when you go to an incident you might see things you may hear things you may be working in situations where you might see things
01:51:26 situations where you might see things you might not want to see and your was only there to deal with the gas and that's all you're there for that's our priority safeguard life and property so I had walked round I've seen some things
01:51:38 I had walked round I've seen some things which weren't very nice I'd seen that the whole entirety of what was going on it
01:51:45 it you know nothing I've ever seen before so I just wanted to really prepare the guys that were gonna go to work at these locations to make sure they weren't gonna see any hidden surprise they they
01:51:56 gonna see any hidden surprise they they knew what I was up against but at the same time I was there to support them with whatever they needed and you say at that point you then deployed the teams to each of the three isolation points
01:52:07 to each of the three isolation points and you say in your statement that you deployed to repair teams to each of the three points and then you've also said each team consisted of eight to ten individuals does that mean eight to ten
01:52:19 individuals does that mean eight to ten individuals at each of the three points correct yes so I had repair team leaders I had six maybe seven there so two on each repair team is which consists of
01:52:31 each repair team is which consists of two-man teams and then I had additional resource which I could use to do whatever we needed them to do basically so there's repair team leaders at each location experienced guys and then the
01:52:43 location experienced guys and then the guys their support the support workers as well working underneath them and what was your role once you've deployed the teams to each of the three points what
01:52:54 teams to each of the three points what were you then having to do I was just over watching all of them keeping the fire brigade update ease of communication feeding back into Tony's day you know making sure that the guys
01:53:05 day you know making sure that the guys were okay
01:53:08 were okay having brakes getting water getting food getting everything they needed to make sure they can work comfortably any anything they needed make sure we could get it there for them and we touched on this earlier can you just describe in
01:53:19 this earlier can you just describe in simple terms what each isolation had to involve so we start with the 180 meal so that's that's Plast that's plastic polyethylene so with that one
01:53:31 polyethylene so with that one we had to excavate enough pipe so that we could put we don't have to put inflatable bags and then we squeeze the plastic we've what we call squeeze offs they're clamps so they squeeze the
01:53:42 they're clamps so they squeeze the plastic and then we can cut a section out and then put two caps on and that basically was the plastic he's the plastic isolation is that so you've got a squeeze up is that like a
01:53:53 you've got a squeeze up is that like a tool it's the big tool year which is a hydraulic jack in essence which pumps two clubs together and it clamps the plastic together and that stops the flow of lower gas so you have to do one each
01:54:04 of lower gas so you have to do one each way and one slim cap so then once they're squeezed off we check the pressures and then we can put cap it doesn't split or deform when you're doing the way this Mike now it's been designed and tested to do to be able to
01:54:15 designed and tested to do to be able to do that yeah and for the other mains that aren't polyethylene plastic so you have to again excavate get right the way
01:54:28 have to again excavate get right the way around them and then we have a system which called a 312 backing off system which basically this is three inch to 12 inch mains we have to put three drillings either side of the cup and
01:54:41 drillings either side of the cup and then we insert bag in and we you blow the bag up with air which then obviously seals inside the main and that again stops the flow of gas so you have to do six trillions to two bags each side of a
01:54:54 six trillions to two bags each side of a cup and then once the bags Irena know you've got a good seal we can cut the main and then we can put caps on basically like inflating a balloon inside the pipe yeah so that Valene
01:55:06 inside the pipe yeah so that Valene stops the gas yes right now a special bag it's a balloon inside like a material bag which is especially for the gas which seals inside when you put three either side of the coat two bags
01:55:18 three either side of the coat two bags either sides of a carton and then another drill in which is basically a what they call it a bypass over the top so that we can monitor the gas either side of the cuts as well in terms of the
01:55:31 side of the cuts as well in terms of the hundred eighty mil point on gravel road and the four inch main a test and walk and we just look at your statement again so if we go to met zero zero zero one
01:55:43 so if we go to met zero zero zero one two seven one Oh at page 10 paragraphs 47 and 48 can we zoom in on those so
01:55:54 47 and 48 can we zoom in on those so picking it up in the second line down at 47 you say we face further delays reaching the 180 millimeter main and the four inch main sights that's points
01:56:05 four inch main sights that's points three and four on the maps because of the restrictions both of these sites were situated within the inner exclusion say
01:56:11 say Gordon unfortunately the keys to one of the fire engines which had to be moved so our machines could reach the isolation point had been taken back to the Depot when the fire officers were changing shifts I asked elated this to a
01:56:23 changing shifts I asked elated this to a male lfb incident controller at around 1350 and he arranged for the keys to be returned to the site so that the fire engine could be moved and then you also say excavations on the 180 millimeter
01:56:36 say excavations on the 180 millimeter main and the four inch main commenced at approximately so it's 2:30 in the afternoon despite our best efforts none of our machinery could reach the site where the four inch main was located and the team therefore had to
01:56:48 located and the team therefore had to hand dig the ground to locate this main the team working on the 180 millimeter main had to start the excavations by hand because there were other cables identified in the network
01:56:59 identified in the network however they were able to introduce a JCB to complete the excavations so it sounds something like you've faced a number of challenges with the excavation is that correct yeah we did it was
01:57:13 is that correct yeah we did it was getting access I'd say close enough there was a lfb pump box right amid a week we did get quite a few moved but this particular one we they couldn't find the keys for so we had to wait for
01:57:26 find the keys for so we had to wait for them keys to arrive before we could get off it vans past and it's all of our safety equipments on there so these start carrying stuff now by hand they're making a start but we use breakers which
01:57:37 making a start but we use breakers which pneumatic were to run by air which is fed from the van so we have to get the fans close enough to get them breakers going and then the pumps were feeding that the water pumps so we had to get
01:57:50 that the water pumps so we had to get ramps made to get home for the pumps that we weren't stopping the water from getting up to the widow obviously putting the fire out so we are lots of challenges just to get started in terms
01:58:01 challenges just to get started in terms of that 180 millimeter main in Granville Road you say in your state that the excavation commenced at 2:30 p.m. in the afternoon you completed at about 8 p.m. is that right correct yeah and did you
01:58:14 is that right correct yeah and did you have any problems actually locating the main when you were which one sorry that the 180 mm and ever and then in terms of the four inch main a test certain walk this also
01:58:27 inch main a test certain walk this also began you say the excavation at 2:30 in the afternoon and also completed about 8 p.m. is that right that is correct yeah bearing in one week we had to retreat a couple of times
01:58:38 couple of times away from the excavations I'm going to come to that yeah yeah and you've said that that had to be hand dug how much additional time do you think that hand digging added again I Perdition a
01:58:50 digging added again I Perdition a resource on to that excavation so we did votation so I wouldn't have said a lot to be fair though they worked really hard the lads in excavating that way they didn't stop so we have plenty of
01:59:02 they didn't stop so we have plenty of resource there to keep working on it in terms of the the the main station walk you say that you deployed a team to that so the excavation started at about 1:30
01:59:15 so the excavation started at about 1:30 p.m. but you the team struggled to trace the pipe and had to carry out five excavations before locating it is that right that's correct because we started the excavations from the governor with
01:59:29 the excavations from the governor with looking from where that because we knew that maybe coming out from that point so we thought that's going to be a great place but the drawings were slightly different to how the configuration of the pipe came out so we couldn't get a section long enough on the pipe to do a
01:59:42 section long enough on the pipe to do a flow stop so we decided to jump over and go down a little bit further at our station well that's why I think that the locations are slightly out where we did the isolation so we looked in one place
01:59:54 the isolation so we looked in one place so we two or three excavations by the governor to look for him couldn't find enough pipe there so then we thought he was underneath the wall which we thought would be unsafe to dig where the wall was
02:00:04 was and then we move further down before we actually found the top of the main so we did spend a couple of hours excavating looking for these so might that explain why we saw the zoomed in map near the
02:00:17 why we saw the zoomed in map near the governor because actually you were originally planning on excavating quite close to that yeah but you had to get pushed up station wall correct because it didn't come out the government as the drawing shows unfortunately
02:00:29 drawing shows unfortunately yeah did you use any any equipment such as radio signal detection to locate the cave the cable the cave the main gas box sorry to locate the main we did again
02:00:43 sorry to locate the main we did again it's it's very hard sometimes you can get a direct connection on to the actual piece of equipment you try to trace because there's lots of other plant and
02:00:54 because there's lots of other plant and utilities in the ground now and unfortunately they lay a lot of it over the gas so sometimes you pick up a signal which you think it's a really good signal for the gas when you drop down you might find that it's a cable that's been put in or some other part of
02:01:07 that's been put in or some other part of so our utility so we did use our can Jenny tracing equipment and can that does that equipment go into a more sensitive mode or their different kind of modes you can use you can get a
02:01:18 of modes you can use you can get a direct connection on yep and you also say that the pipe was deeper within the ground and you had anticipated you've
02:01:30 ground and you had anticipated you've said 1.2 to 1.5 meters is that how deep it ended up being that's correct yeah most most normally you expect it to be in between 600 and a meter as a average
02:01:41 in between 600 and a meter as a average depth of points but they all vary so much ground buildup people everything changes so sometimes the building up the ground makes the asset become deeper in the ground so it was at about 1.2 to 1.5
02:01:53 the ground so it was at about 1.2 to 1.5 and you went deeper but you said you decided to proceed without shoring up the sides of the excavation as you you didn't think there was going to be a collapse and you were keen to save time
02:02:05 collapse and you were keen to save time is that right yeah standard procedure again he's anything 1.2 to install trench support unless down to 1.5 the ground is self-supporting and its looks
02:02:18 ground is self-supporting and its looks look stable then we can still live show ourselves a permit to carry on excavation but we know that we're working at a depth where we could we need to make sure that we always check in any any excavation if it's unstable
02:02:29 in any any excavation if it's unstable ground who needs to shore it and support it there's the fact that the mains were deeper suggests this was an older pipe necessarily right and then your team
02:02:42 necessarily right and then your team used a mini digger to excavate the ground as you weren't able to use something called a vacuum excavator that you normally use is that right yes so can you explain the difference so a mini
02:02:53 can you explain the difference so a mini excavator is a small machine with a smaller arm a small bucket which which takes out grounds steadily a vacuum excavators that are new innovation
02:03:04 excavators that are new innovation equipment to be using now which actually is like a big Hoover so that a big pipe comes over and we have a funcle' an air of air Lords which fires high pressured air into the ground which loosens the
02:03:16 air into the ground which loosens the ground and then this actually sucks the ground out so it's a safe and reason we don't get other plan cables and we can excavate lot quicker with that and we can weave by hand so unfortunately I
02:03:27 can weave by hand so unfortunately I couldn't get that machine close enough due to other restrictions was it was it slower using the mini digger than it would have been with me it was a little
02:03:38 would have been with me it was a little bit slower but what we did was once we start in a month you're identifying a depth of it we pulled a JC bean which is a bigger digger and it can excavate ground quicker yep so I'm about to turn
02:03:50 ground quicker yep so I'm about to turn to a different topic which is about entry into the basement and I think if we have a break now there is a good chance I can finish this morning well you take whatever time so I think I
02:04:01 you take whatever time so I think I think a 10-minute break now so just think those trolls they might like a bit of a break now we'll have another short break mister all day okay no discussing your evidence pleases anyone else well you're out the room we'll start the unit back on strong okay thank you very
02:04:13 unit back on strong okay thank you very much
02:04:25 good 5 plus 12
02:15:21 right brilliant carry on okay yes thank you mister all day so while these excavations were happening to the three isolation points the lfb asked you to go
02:15:33 isolation points the lfb asked you to go into the basement of the tower to see if your teams could turn off the gas from there that's right isn't it correct yeah and you say that they asked you around 2 p.m. in the afternoon around that time
02:15:44 p.m. in the afternoon around that time yet was this the first time you were asked to go in it was yeah and was it the first time you were asked to get close to the tower at all yes and you
02:15:57 close to the tower at all yes and you say in your statement that it was the first real push you had from the NFP to get the gas off you say that in paragraph 54 of your statement can you explain what you mean by that
02:16:08 explain what you mean by that I could feel one from the conversation that they they wanted to get the gas isolated as quick as they can I think they'd identified that the gas was burning in some of the floors so
02:16:20 was burning in some of the floors so they said he's doing him quick away and we discussed that there is valves in a basement so they asked it's possible to go in to see if we could isolate the valves within the basement that arises
02:16:31 valves within the basement that arises and was that the first time that you considered going into the basement yes and is there a reason you didn't ask to go in any earlier so during that morning
02:16:42 go in any earlier so during that morning while you were planning the other operations yeah when I was walking around again we could see that there Bri which was falling from the building all
02:16:53 which was falling from the building all around the side where the gas was does the gas was badami on the on this side of the building beyond this self on the self side he's on the south side so if you're looking at the building from from the front entrance we was this side
02:17:05 the front entrance we was this side right yeah yeah so and the sub there's the sub-basement door was on the east side yes so that was there was so much
02:17:17 side yes so that was there was so much debris like a good couple of three-foot debris on the floor which was falling down so and it was still falling so the answer the question is no we hadn't a thought going in because of what was going on yeah can we just look at what
02:17:29 going on yeah can we just look at what your
02:17:30 your your statement about this so if we can go to your statement that's met triple 0 1 2 7 1 o paragraph 53 on page 11 so you
02:17:44 1 2 7 1 o paragraph 53 on page 11 so you say the fire was still burning at this point and I believed that the lfb thought that the gas may be feeding some of the fire inside the building the lfb were becoming increasingly concerned about the structure of the building I
02:17:56 about the structure of the building I asked Andy if it was safe to enter the tower and told him that if his offices were prepared to go in that I would follow them to assess the situation I was not prepared to send my men into the
02:18:08 was not prepared to send my men into the tower until I had carried out a risk assessment and he understood that decision now when you refer there to Andy do you know who that Andy is that you're referring to
02:18:19 you're referring to okay or Cartman was so named and when you say you believe that the lfb thought the fires were still feeding the fire inside the building did they
02:18:30 inside the building did they specifically say that to you we think there are gas burns yes feeding the fire in the building yes so that wasn't just your assumption that although they said yeah and you say that you agreed to go
02:18:43 yeah and you say that you agreed to go in and the purpose was to check if it was safe for your team to go in is that right yeah I wouldn't have said everybody in I just wanted to see if it meseta said a couple of guys down to
02:18:54 meseta said a couple of guys down to isolate these fight these valves in the sub-basement yeah and you've said that access to the basement was delayed because the LFP had to get a key to the basement did you think that it was
02:19:06 basement did you think that it was cadance responsibility to try and get access to that basement any earlier no and did you consider it necessary to try and obtain plans for the basement before
02:19:18 and obtain plans for the basement before you went in no because I spoke to Pat Kelly who told me it already informed me where the gas Wiser's were within so you didn't feel there was any need for you to have a plan was that because
02:19:30 for you to have a plan was that because you thought you could I knew where they were and secondly because I didn't think I'd ever be going in there to be honest yeah when you say you knew where they were where was that exactly in the basement yes in the corners that's where
02:19:41 basement yes in the corners that's where the full risers were right so you need to look in the corners yeah so you weren't concerned about the layout of the basement or identifying them before
02:19:52 the basement or identifying them before you went in again Pat Kelly was on site with me and he was quite confident he knew where they were cause he'd been in there so there was no concern for that
02:20:03 there so there was no concern for that now you say you actually entered the basement at about 3:30 p.m. that afternoon on the 14th so that was nearly two hours of after being asked to do so by the lfb what
02:20:15 being asked to do so by the lfb what were the reasons for the delays in getting in you've talked already about the key was there anything else that needed to happen before you enter so the
02:20:26 needed to happen before you enter so the key with the key was quite a timely delay and secondly it was again formulating a bit of a risk assessment I'm putting things into place and agree in that with the fire brigade about how
02:20:38 in that with the fire brigade about how we was going to enter because there was stuff still falling from the building you talk about doing a dynamic risk assessment so you actually formally did a risk assessment before you enter into do not wrote down in my head yes
02:20:50 do not wrote down in my head yes yeah and how long do you think it took you to do that risk assessment 15 20 minutes yeah and you went in with Patrick Kelly from cadent is that right
02:21:02 Patrick Kelly from cadent is that right yeah wasn't first aware that Patrick was coming in with me it's what surveillance saw that he was there yeah and three NFB offices is that right maybe four right
02:21:14 offices is that right maybe four right okay because they were holding white shields above our heads to get to the door I was about to ask you about that so in order to get to the basement you
02:21:25 so in order to get to the basement you had to be shielded from the falling debris correct yes by policemen with riot shields or it was for it was a year I think the same was wrong there it says police but it was the NFB and you say
02:21:37 police but it was the NFB and you say you used a side entrance which do you mean I think you said you thought it was on the east side east side was the only door going into the sub-basement now as
02:21:48 door going into the sub-basement now as to the conditions in that basement can you just describe for us what it was like down there when you got down so it was quite dark at first there was natural light coming from behind us there was a lot of water going in gone
02:22:02 there was a lot of water going in gone onto the tower the couple of the firefighters went in first that they stepped down and I could see that there was water so what was
02:22:14 see that there was water so what was just gazed by how big they were off the world I had my ankle boots and PPE on like trousers but I stepped in it came up to about my major to blow my knee and
02:22:26 up to about my major to blow my knee and then we started soon as I turned around the corner I could see the first riser in the corner and then we started to walk around and then I noticed that
02:22:37 walk around and then I noticed that there was like power units with light still on so me straightaway the electric was on in the building yeah and I asked the fire game if it been isolated and they said I'd said no I said was a
02:22:48 they said I'd said no I said was a really good mix uh stirred in his water with all that electric in there so at that point my dad died sad visually made contact with a couple of the risers but
02:23:00 contact with a couple of the risers but I heard overheard on the radio a command from the command unit I'm just assuming that the building was declared unsafe of everybody to get out so we got out right
02:23:12 everybody to get out so we got out right away okay yeah so you said you realize when you were down there that the electricity was on did the LFP have torches as well they did yes yeah did that help you identify the gas Rises
02:23:23 did that help you identify the gas Rises because we looked at we was always looking up because it's high it's like 10 12 foot high and in the base of weather where the risers come in you've also said that the gas boiler lights were on
02:23:33 were on does that mean that the boilers were still on not necessarily because there was a large supply going into the on the maps as a ten-inch goes in which was for the communal heating and hot
02:23:47 was for the communal heating and hot water then there was the voices were for cooking or whatever so they were there was a big boiler in the base book I believe which fed all of the hot water and heating to the tower and the three fingers which came away from it as well
02:23:58 fingers which came away from it as well yep now you also say that you couldn't see any spindles to turn these risers off as you looked at obviously the valves
02:24:06 valves yeah the handles so can you just explain the difference so the valve is a in-line in the pipe and it have a little spindle sticking up and that's that what
02:24:17 sticking up and that's that what operates to open and close the valve that turns and so there's different types of key that could set off there it could be a wheel which sits on it which
02:24:28 could be a wheel which sits on it which you just turn a wheel there could be a spindle which come off which is you can turn that by hand from higher or lower down depends now the valves installs or you can use a pair of grips basically to
02:24:39 you can use a pair of grips basically to turn off if all else fails so that's what the valves how the valves made up and that's how you want it C valves but not spindles I can see the valves or can see the spindles on the top but there wasn't a
02:24:50 spindles on the top but there wasn't a wheel alternate with in the basement on the tool I saw so does that mean let's suppose you could have got up there with a ladder and started how would you have had to do it in those circumstances I
02:25:01 had to do it in those circumstances I would have asked the lads on site if they've had a weed in their fan uh uh they called chip in five hours if you name had a will to use if not we would use grips so it's all just a squirt head it's been just a square and it's Bend
02:25:12 it's been just a square and it's Bend also yeah so you were actually equipped to operate the valve if only by the use of some grips correct but the bigger valve for the 10 inch that that one was
02:25:25 valve for the 10 inch that that one was quite so accessible now you said just a moment ago that at that point you got a call from the lfb that everyone had to get out and evacuate I'm gonna read a passage from
02:25:38 evacuate I'm gonna read a passage from your statement in a moment about that but before that happened how long do you think you'd been in the basement for before you were told to get out only a few minutes yeah three four minutes my
02:25:51 few minutes yeah three four minutes my five
02:25:53 five select sorry saying could you mind if I just follow you said the valve on the 10 inch was not so accessible was there a separate valve on the
02:26:04 was there a separate valve on the incoming 10 inch pipe which if closed would shut off the gas to everything in the building no because the 10 inch was an independent supply which was feeds in the commune you know it's just for the
02:26:15 the commune you know it's just for the Union stuff that the the smaller ones were covered in which were the risers which were going up through the building and they were independent correct it's this is an important point so - I need the rises that go up gas for cooking
02:26:27 the rises that go up gas for cooking purposes
02:26:29 purposes I don't know the builders inside there may have been some that are used for heating separately but they did have communal hot water heating from that lame board downstairs and there are boilers both in that building another
02:26:40 boilers both in that building another building that we've served by different gas system yeah we're gonna come to that in a moment actually and so if we can go back to your statement that's met zero
02:26:51 back to your statement that's met zero zero zero one two seven and one Oh at paragraph 56 which is on page 12
02:27:05 and you thank you and you say this so about halfway down before I could look
02:27:16 about halfway down before I could look any further the lfv officers received a message via their radio control instructing us to retreat from the basement I overheard the command all out all out all out and confirm with the NFB officer that this
02:27:28 confirm with the NFB officer that this meant that we had to evacuate the building
02:27:30 building as I was coming out of the basement I saw other lfb officers leaving the building and saw the third 2 inch riser and the gas supply to the communal boiler I also saw that the electricity
02:27:43 boiler I also saw that the electricity in the basement was still alive and immediately retreated from the building because they were concerned that the building would collapse all the fire officers who were in the tower at the time had to retreat from the building so
02:27:55 time had to retreat from the building so just hovering on that for a moment so as you exited you saw that fir'd 2 inch riser is that right yes so you identified three of the four while you were in there yes and again was that at
02:28:07 were in there yes and again was that at high level it was with the other two and you also say this is a point we were just on that you could see the gas supply to the communal boilers and again was that at low level no it was high
02:28:19 was that at low level no it was high level as well yeah and just to clarify if you turned off the supply to the communal boilers would that have helped turn off the gas to the riding log so
02:28:31 turn off the gas to the riding log so you had to do both things you'd gonna turn it off yeah and you also say this a paragraph 57 is on the same page
02:28:47 yeah if we were to have isolated the supplies in the basement we would have had to take ladders down to the basement for the team to reach the valves and disconnect the supply of gas through the Rises
02:28:57 Rises unfortunately turning off the valves on the risers was not something that I could have done during the short period of time that I was inside the building I estimate that it would have taken a team of approximately four men working inside
02:29:09 of approximately four men working inside the basement with someone from the NFB to accompany the team up to an hour to turn off the valves on the risers regardless of this the live electricity and water in the basement was a real risk to life and I was not prepared to
02:29:20 risk to life and I was not prepared to send any engineers back into the basement now again just pausing now on that is it your your experience in your experience is it normal for the
02:29:32 experience is it normal for the isolation points on these kind of gas Rises these riser branches to be so hard to access it's the way the building was
02:29:44 to access it's the way the building was made up the sub-basement went down and supplies come in at high level because in the ground so they're not I wouldn't say that they was the actual isolation
02:29:55 say that they was the actual isolation valves there'd be more of an inline valve from construction purposes the actual isolation valve would have been just outside the building that's what we would always would have gone for first you'd normally go as we established
02:30:06 you'd normally go as we established earlier for the the PIV pipeline isolation valves outside the tower just outside the perimeter yes these aren't the ones you're normally expecting to use correct and that they
02:30:18 expecting to use correct and that they was not accessible well I've been to quite a few fires I've been there for two or four the responsive gas and I live I've ever been into a building before to even go and looking for them
02:30:29 before to even go and looking for them it was something that we made that season because of what was going on that we fought there that could be a good decision to make but so we wouldn't even normally go in look for them valves in a building that's on fire and after you
02:30:41 building that's on fire and after you came out you say in your statement you were told by a structural engineer that there had been some unacceptable movement in the building is that right correct and did you speak to that engineer directly I did yes did you have
02:30:54 engineer directly I did yes did you have any kind of conversation with him about with sorry was it him he wasn't here I don't recall his name but I were calling telling me aired lasers on it and there was movement on the building did you discuss with him whether it might be
02:31:05 discuss with him whether it might be possible to get back in the basement the structure engineer though at 8:15 p.m. that evening the NFB asked you if you
02:31:16 that evening the NFB asked you if you would go back into the basement to shut the gas off again now at that point you say you didn't think it was safe for your teams is that right yeah it was the safe at all to go in there and is that
02:31:28 safe at all to go in there and is that because of structural instability in the tower it was a number of things destruction of building the the water in the base when the electric was still on there was a number of factors there
02:31:39 there was a number of factors there which outweighed us being I was going there safely now II need a your line manager says in his statement that he instructed you not to go back in the basement because the electricity hadn't
02:31:50 basement because the electricity hadn't been isolated was it his instruction or was it your decision not to go back in so that the the NFB requested obviously I didn't feel comfortable with it so I had
02:32:02 feel comfortable with it so I had hierarchy there which I used twice about the time you know he said no basically he made the decision before us at any point did you consider whether it be worth discussing the risk with a
02:32:13 worth discussing the risk with a structural engineer no or discussing whether the electricity could be turned up we asked if direction was going to be turned off and we was told it was in progress but I never found that before that but we was more concentrating now
02:32:28 that but we was more concentrating now on we went into our isolations to get these done so do you think that any of that was a practical option for you to go back in yeah I think so no had your
02:32:41 go back in yeah I think so no had your team been able to get into the basement earlier in the day do you think you might have been able to turn the gas off quicker again I would have requested for their lipstick to be isolated again once I knew that was all I would have
02:32:52 I knew that was all I would have requested them I don't know how long taking them to turn that electric off yeah so I wasn't reading to wait for that on an unknown or driver continues with our isolation process which the
02:33:03 with our isolation process which the decision we made them start to I've now got some questions about you're working inside the inner cordon so shortly after you exited the basement the inner safety
02:33:16 you exited the basement the inner safety cordon was moved and you said it was extended so that it covered a wider area is that right correct and you say the effect of that was that the isolation points at test Aten Road and Grenville
02:33:27 points at test Aten Road and Grenville Road were now inside the inner cordon they were yes and so is it right that you decided at that point that you pulled the teens out at that point we was asked to get them away from
02:33:40 was asked to get them away from excavations at that point by the NFB you say that at 4:30 that you Tony day and James Harrison went to see the NFB and you asked if your operatives could return to the testin road and Grenville
02:33:53 return to the testin road and Grenville Road points because you wanted to agree a safe way of working is that right right yeah and you say that you eventually agreed that your team could return with lfb spotters watching for
02:34:05 return with lfb spotters watching for signs that the tower was structurally unsafe is that right that's correct how finely balanced do you think that decision was in terms of allowing you back in to keep going okay it was
02:34:17 back in to keep going okay it was communication with the NFB because at first they said you work under your own safety systems but we wasn't prepared to work there because we were in there that they were the primary responders there's
02:34:30 they were the primary responders there's always working under their exclusion zone inside there so we came up with a plan of having a radio contact so everyone could see where we was working
02:34:42 everyone could see where we was working and if there was any signs of collapse or anything like that then we actually had fire officers too white next to us and then some a few meters away and a few meters away so there was actually
02:34:53 few meters away so there was actually watching us or maybe watching the building give us a little bit of support if anything was happening to get us out there quickly yeah and you say that at 5:20 that afternoon your
02:35:05 say that at 5:20 that afternoon your repair teams began working again on tests and road and gravel road but then at 20 past 6:00 the lfb again said the building was unsafe and told you to retreat is that right correct
02:35:16 right correct and you say in your statement you wouldn't pull out at that point is that right you say you say that you wouldn't
02:35:32 right you say you say that you wouldn't pull out because you didn't want to stop so that you did a dynamic risk assessment and we decided that I think we agreed to continue to work between ourselves and the you know we was that
02:35:44 ourselves and the you know we was that close to pull out again for a duration of time was gonna only gonna delay the isolation so you know if I was told I had to go in we would have gone but we was that that involved that engrossing
02:35:56 was that that involved that engrossing and getting the isolations complete we agreed in a way of continuing to work under the same system a work that was already put in place yes I think it's so it's paragraph 62 of your witness statement so it's on page 13 if we can
02:36:13 statement so it's on page 13 if we can just zoom in on that
02:36:20 so there you receive the information that the building was unsafe and the teams had to retreat from the excavation site again you say I was feeling the pressure to isolate the gas quickly and knew that we needed to continue with the
02:36:31 knew that we needed to continue with the excavations to locate the mains I discussed the situation with Tony day Tony could see that we were close to finishing the excavations with approximately an hour's work left to complete and agreed that we could continue with the work the lfb was
02:36:43 continue with the work the lfb was satisfied with this decision and we kept them updated with our progress an ongoing dynamic risk assessment yeah so it wasn't that I just said I wasn't going to pull out I wanted to be strong and continue to work and get it
02:36:54 and continue to work and get it completed yeah it sounds like these were quite tense moments on site in terms of whether you were going to be carrying on working is that right this was very tense yeah turning into the completion
02:37:09 tense yeah turning into the completion of the isolations at 8:00 p.m. the mains at both test and Road and Grenville robo cotton capped we talked about that earlier but the gas was still not cut on station walk and as to that that in
02:37:23 station walk and as to that that in terms of the timings you said that your team exposed the pipe at 9:30 p.m. but then discovered that the pipe was a 15 inch not a 12 inch main you say that
02:37:34 inch not a 12 inch main you say that isolating a 15 inch pipe you mention this earlier isn't a non routine operation and that you would ordinarily require the attendance of your pipeline maintenance center yeah so they're
02:37:46 maintenance center yeah so they're called PMC so why are they needed for a 15 inch main so as I explained earlier our flow stopping equipment is 3 12 3
02:37:57 our flow stopping equipment is 3 12 3 inch to 12 inch that's the standard sizes after a 12 meter so 12 inch is a routine operation which we can carry out ourselves anything that's over a 12 inch
02:38:08 ourselves anything that's over a 12 inch is a non routine operation and therefore it has slightly different equipment to be used to do the isolations so that's why we use a contractor to do that and
02:38:22 why we use a contractor to do that and it's a slightly to the skill set so we're trained out to do anything up to 12 inch there and then and then you know anything bigger than that we have we do have to get especially Factory so it's a more complex operation 415 it's it works on the same basically
02:38:37 415 it's it works on the same basically it works it's the same method but it's it's larger bags we put nitrogen in the bags rather than air because of the size of the bags so we're not getting an air gas mixture to boil the bags deflate or
02:38:52 gas mixture to boil the bags deflate or or burst inside the main so there it's a little bit more safety conscious we're doing bigger mains the cutting equipment slightly different just we jump up above 12 it's a little bit more ease core more
02:39:04 12 it's a little bit more ease core more complex is it more dangerous it's not anymore don't when you work against it's got be safe it's got people all right anyways the risks are exactly the same the hazard so but we we do that is our
02:39:17 the hazard so but we we do that is our perceives that is our policies that we've always worked to National Grid Cayden yeah now you say that to get your pipeline maintenance center out they normally require six hours notice under
02:39:28 normally require six hours notice under the agreement that you have with them is that right there SLA is to attend any emergency within six hours there anymore
02:39:39 emergency within six hours there anymore in that we would still do the excavation work for them we would get the point prepared we would get all the ground out so that excels gives us ample time to get the excavation complete so when they arrive they can set to work quite
02:39:50 arrive they can set to work quite quickly yeah now the timeline shows that Caden that you called for PMC at 10:30 p.m. can you explain why it took an hour after after discovering at 9:30 that it
02:40:03 after after discovering at 9:30 that it was a 15 inch main why would it have taken an hour to call PMC because what we did was we had a discussion on saw it myself near morning and a couple of the
02:40:15 myself near morning and a couple of the teams if there was another option that we could potentially do in a temporary isolation to isolate the supply go into the tower so we spent a little bit of
02:40:28 the tower so we spent a little bit of time talking about that first and we came up with an idea on a solution which we did and as soon as we did this but once we've we've done that we've thought with that that's when I I'll contact
02:40:39 with that that's when I I'll contact them straight away then to mobilize when skipping Society yeah you say that had you known earlier that it was a 15-inch diameter pipe that you could have called PMC earlier is that
02:40:51 could have called PMC earlier is that right
02:40:52 right of course yeah and just going back to up to what you said earlier you said to us earlier that you deliberately chose the 12 inch sight because that was something
02:41:05 12 inch sight because that was something you could do within a routine operation that that it didn't occur to you that it was a 15 inch sight to that time but given that maps can be wrong sometimes a
02:41:16 given that maps can be wrong sometimes a given that changes in diameter can occur as we saw from some of the maps do you think you ought to have considered the possibility that it was a 15 inch made earlier I don't think so no because the
02:41:28 earlier I don't think so no because the maps that we've seen that shows the 12 inch coming out the company shows the 12 inch coming out of there you know we picked a location where there was 12 each point we'd had while the teams
02:41:40 each point we'd had while the teams worked on the 12 inch further back and confirmed it was a 12 inch so that at the time there was nothing to indicate to me the section apart we were working on was a 15 when that that distance from
02:41:51 on was a 15 when that that distance from the government that's where it shows a 15 you're talking 100 200 20 meters away so it's showing that much 12 inch pipe in the ground there's nothing for me to believe or maybe you understand that that could have been any bigger so no
02:42:03 that could have been any bigger so no and just one more question on this do you think that in any event it might have been prudent to contact PMC earlier just because of the possibility that it might not be that diameter and it might
02:42:15 might not be that diameter and it might be a bigger one it didn't come from I might not so again just ask you you said one of the team had worked on the pipe further back and confirmed it was a 12
02:42:27 further back and confirmed it was a 12 inch James in Bradley Road so where in the cup where it came out of the governor you know that France which you spoke about earlier where it said the 12 inch that's why we turns and went down Bromley roads and someone worked on it
02:42:39 Bromley roads and someone worked on it and proved it was a 12 inch in Bromley Road
02:42:41 Road right thank you do you want to go back to that map yeah we don't do that so it's care that see ad quadruple zero
02:42:52 it's care that see ad quadruple zero three zero one five a page two is the zoomed in version
02:43:07 so this you know this goes down and goes down into the Bramley road so this that's baroque runs into Bramley road so this is the twelfth that's the twelve each day and that continues down
02:43:19 twelve each day and that continues down into Bramley road note then that had been worked on and confirmed as a twelve inch so in the event as you said you and
02:43:34 inch so in the event as you said you and Tony day in conjunction with their with James Harrison you took the decision to over inflate a 12-inch bag in an attempt to block the 15 inch pipe is that
02:43:45 to block the 15 inch pipe is that correct yes and is this one of the decisions that you refer to you say in your statement in general that there were a number of decisions you took on the night which were contrary to your standard practice is this one of them
02:43:57 standard practice is this one of them that would be contrary to to what you would normally do it's not a standard procedure but again it was in there in the scenario in a situation that we were in it was what could we do we would
02:44:09 in it was what could we do we would never have cut the pipe behind the bag it was a temporary isolation we calculated it we blew it up we put calipers around the bag just to work out
02:44:20 calipers around the bag just to work out the size it would seal and we worked out that the size of the 15 and what the point would be inside whether that would make a seal and we gave it go we've done
02:44:33 make a seal and we gave it go we've done it before I'm not over inflated a bag into her into a mine no and we had other bags ready to go blow ready to go should that one have failed we have another one a monitoring a situation all the time
02:44:46 a monitoring a situation all the time until the PMC's arrived so it held really it was a really good seal in the main until EMTs arrived to do their the flow stop with our routine operation and
02:44:59 flow stop with our routine operation and just to be clear I think you may make clear in your statement the the diameter of the private 15 inches is is round the outside solid metallic pipe so the diameter on the inside of the pipe is
02:45:10 diameter on the inside of the pipe is often smaller it's roughly an inch yeah thick the point the way
02:45:16 yeah which is why even though the bag wasn't quite 15 inches you thought it could work yeah when we measured it was about fourteen fourteen and a half four
02:45:27 fourteen fourteen and a half four leagues filly we even counted the amount of pumps we got to go there before it but so we news it was a bit it was calculated did you put in just one of those or did you put in we only put in
02:45:38 those or did you put in we only put in one we had we had another one on standby three if we should leave one if you'd inserted it and it failed what would have happened what do you mean on the
02:45:51 have happened what do you mean on the original initial time we did it we didn't get a seal yeah just wait PMC's to arrive you and you say that the
02:46:02 to arrive you and you say that the supply the gas supply via that 15 inch main was eventually stopped at 11:40 p.m. in the evening was that correct yes James Harrison said in his first statement that the discovery at 9:30
02:46:14 statement that the discovery at 9:30 p.m. that it was a 15 inch main did delay progress but he estimates he estimates only by an hour would you agree with that estimation from 5 to 8
02:46:28 agree with that estimation from 5 to 8 was 12 to isolate as a 15 finding it was a 15 at 9:30 isolating he says he thinks it caused you about an hour's delay that would be about ROI as delay of
02:46:39 would be about ROI as delay of contacting PLC that was that our thought process and thinking I know I want to turn back to your your main statement that's met triple 0 1 2 7 1 o on page 15
02:46:54 that's met triple 0 1 2 7 1 o on page 15 and if you go to paragraph 72 you say there the 12 inch flows the turbines flow stopping bags worked and we
02:47:06 flow stopping bags worked and we temporarily stopped the flow of gas to the building at 23 40 we watched the fire flames inside the tower diminish almost immediately and there was a huge sense of relief
02:47:17 sense of relief the lfb were incredibly grateful and sangai the officer I had been working with gave me a hug and thanked me he told me that he could see the pressure that we'd been under but we had done a great job so again just
02:47:31 we had done a great job so again just picking up on that do you think it was clear from the fact that the fire flames diminished at that point that the gas had been contributing to the fire at that stage yeah it was it was really
02:47:44 that stage yeah it was it was really surreal actually that we was where we was in station wok and we could see 70% of the tower and it was like someone at
02:47:56 of the tower and it was like someone at the top particular light switched off as the flames were going out and she proved that the gas was the light in the building and that that had made the isolation the seal and it stopped any
02:48:08 isolation the seal and it stopped any fuel getting into that building had you formed a view at any point earlier about where the gas was contributing to fires in the tower
02:48:19 in the tower my personal view yeah at some point I was quite confident year that it was surely before yes at what point did you form that view I think when it started
02:48:30 form that view I think when it started to get to a bit later of the day when you could talk I said early you could see into the flats and you could see instead of flats there was a flame that the building was pretty much burnt out
02:48:41 the building was pretty much burnt out what was it that you could see in the flats just in the flames like a gas fire was it a different color there were orange flames I mean with what was burnt
02:48:54 orange flames I mean with what was burnt in the building you know it wasn't nothing to sort of saying it was differently gasp it was it was flames that looked like it was gas burning from previous experience seeing gas fires
02:49:05 James Harrison says in his first statement that when he arrived on site at 4:30 p.m. on the 14th of June he concluded that gas was on fire within
02:49:16 concluded that gas was on fire within the building because of the nature of the flames that he could see and also based on his experience would you agree that at 4:30 p.m. there were gas fires burning again I was really concentrated
02:49:27 burning again I was really concentrated on really close to the building at that sort of time around to the four inch and a 180 so I couldn't see into the building I was in the foot of it so I'm not looking into it at the same time as James is on the outside so I'm sort of
02:49:39 James is on the outside so I'm sort of going on what the fire game and I'm sort of dealing with the isolations I wasn't a position probably then to look into the building from afar and I just want to look at two pieces of
02:49:52 and I just want to look at two pieces of evidence which you may not have seen before
02:49:55 before that are relevant to this topic just to ask for your view and and whether it triggers any recollection I want to look first at a statement of a walkways
02:50:06 first at a statement of a walkways resident nina Morrow her witness statement is iws five zeros seven nine two and that's a paragraph ten
02:50:27 yeah if we can zoom in so just to give you some context she said that little bit earlier in her statement that it was a sometime after 1:10 a.m. so at the
02:50:40 a sometime after 1:10 a.m. so at the very early stages of the fire that her and her daughter started looking it's not clear precisely when this was but she says this she says my daughter pointed out blue flames at the top of the tower I saw them too but at first I
02:50:53 the tower I saw them too but at first I did not understand the significance there my daughter explained it mum those blue flames that means there's gas the blue flames were moving and rippling like a waterfall but they were contained in the top of the building and were not
02:51:05 in the top of the building and were not moving further down now I appreciate you won't have seen that before today but while you were on site did you ever see blue flames at the top of the tower
02:51:17 blue flames at the top of the tower moving and rippling
02:51:26 I now want to ask you about a firefighter statement this is a statement from somebody called Julian Spooner and if we can get his witness statement up that's met quadruple zero
02:51:38 statement up that's met quadruple zero eight six zero one seven three eight six zero seven one and if we go at paragraph
02:51:52 zero seven one and if we go at paragraph so it says one nine one
02:52:10 so he basically says that there were a lot of gas fires burning in the building at 10:00 a.m. on the 14th of June sorry
02:52:23 at 10:00 a.m. on the 14th of June sorry I'd look unfortunately I hadn't got the reference to my reference is wrong to that Pacific did did he you talked about as a firefighter
02:52:34 you talked about as a firefighter Webster called Julian earlier in your evidence and this may have been Julian's did he ever communicate to you that there were a lot of gas fires
02:52:45 that there were a lot of gas fires burning at 10 a.m. 14th of June no not to me now after you
02:52:58 14th of June no not to me now after you had successfully isolated the gas you stayed to monitor the station walk main is that right I did yes why did you stay and monitor it so the
02:53:10 why did you stay and monitor it so the it was non routine operation you have to have on site a recognized competent person which was me at that time you
02:53:23 person which was me at that time you have to have what skill sets to be able to do that I was the only person on site at that time who had that and obviously you have to have an authorized an engineer but the authorized an engineer
02:53:34 engineer but the authorized an engineer was away from sight he doesn't need to be on site so I was a comfortable person and I just think as well I'd been there for that time I just want to make sure that the job was completed and done safely and satisfactory and you say that
02:53:50 safely and satisfactory and you say that PMC arrived at about 3:30 a.m. is that correct sounds about right yeah and at that point there was a permanent cut and captain of the station
02:54:01 permanent cut and captain of the station walk main if there was and that you left at 7:15 the following morning is that right that's correct yeah so in total you were there for 24 hours hours yes
02:54:13 you were there for 24 hours hours yes sir for your reference it's page 5 of Julian Spooner statement where he talks about gas fires burning to go back to that well all he says is
02:54:28 to go back to that well all he says is so we're gas fires burning at 10:00 a.m. so it's page 5 just one more question at this stage and would you have been made
02:54:41 this stage and would you have been made aware in your role of any complaints about gas installations or gas pipes at groennfell tower before your involvement that night unless we've been there to a
02:54:53 that night unless we've been there to a repair no and were you aware no is there anything else that you would like to add
02:55:04 anything else that you would like to add to your evidence I have to pause in a moment and find out if there are any additional questions but there's anything else at this stage that you would like to add it was just one of the
02:55:15 would like to add it was just one of the most challenging situations have been so and being there 24 hours and having to make decisions to do what we did and going against our procedures a bit I had
02:55:27 going against our procedures a bit I had a great team above me and I really could see below me and together we either made either a week's working in 24 hours what we did down there and really challenging
02:55:38 we did down there and really challenging conditions so I was quite proud to be part of that not not to be because of what it was but because what we did and how quickly we did it I'm proud to have occasion and delivery what we did on
02:55:49 occasion and delivery what we did on that door so that's a convenient moment just take a short break well sometimes council finds other questions that all have been asked been overlooked so they will have five
02:56:01 been overlooked so they will have five minute break knows that the screams to take stock and back a ten-to-one see whether there are more questions for you okay would you like to give the actual piece
02:56:21 with 10 to 1 in please
03:03:05 further up his page very brief question so if we can go back to your main state and that's Mitch triple zero one two seven one Oh at page 15 and if we can
03:03:22 seven one Oh at page 15 and if we can zoom in on paragraph 72 you say there that the 12 inch flow stopping bags
03:03:33 that the 12 inch flow stopping bags worked and we temporarily temporarily stop the flow of gas to the building at 23 40 now you've used bags in the plural their bag
03:03:43 their bag whereas early exactly earlier in your evidence you said bag and we just wanted to clarify what you so that's probably in create ought to say the 12 inch blue
03:03:55 in create ought to say the 12 inch blue something bag yeah we had one in the main and a couple ready next to us so I'll just use as we had the bags to use and we used one I think you confirmed
03:04:06 and we used one I think you confirmed that yes and and the three to 12-inch system that you talked about in terms of flow stoppage is that the alh system no
03:04:20 flow stoppage is that the alh system no it's a wash system wask system we use that a l8 system is used on the larger sizes on the on the non routine stuff okay I think somebody behind me
03:04:31 okay I think somebody behind me understands the significance of that question at least I hope they do and thank you mister all day and I have no further questions from you I just like to thank you for coming today and helping us yes I'd like to add my thanks
03:04:44 helping us yes I'd like to add my thanks to that I found it very interesting learning about these things you obviously did a tremendous job over a very long period of time very helpful to hear
03:04:55 hear thank you very much for coming to give your evidence so thank you thank you thank you I should thank you
03:05:11 good thank you yes sir I just have one small task to finish which is I want to read into the record a schedule of witness statements and exhibits from other cadent witnesses you deal with
03:05:24 other cadent witnesses you deal with isolating the gas supply on the night and if I can just bring that up on the screen that's inq five zeros five to nine
03:05:43 so this is a list that's been circulated prior to this to call participants it's a list of witness statements and exhibits of gas operatives who attended the scene on the night and I would ask
03:05:55 the scene on the night and I would ask that this shed jewel of material is now formally read into the inquiry record just one page yes yes thank you very much and then I'm just to announce that
03:06:07 much and then I'm just to announce that this afternoon there will be more reading in of BS our witness statements for the afternoon yes well I think it right in view of reading in all these
03:06:19 right in view of reading in all these statements in the compendious way that you've done it that I thank those who made all these statements I'm sure they'll be very useful and because they're part of the evidence before the
03:06:31 they're part of the evidence before the inquiry good thank you so that's a convenient moment well we will break at that point then thank you and resume at two o'clock thank you very much
03:06:43 thank you very much [Music]