Evidence from control room officers who handled emergency calls on the night of the Grenfell Tower fire, examining the advice given and decisions made.
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00:15:00 Good morning, everyone. Welcome to today's hearing. Today we're going to hear further
00:15:17 evidence from various control room officers.
00:15:20 Good morning, Mr Chairman.
00:15:21 Yes, Mr President.
00:15:22 Good morning. Yes, that's right. And our next witness is a London Fire Brigade control
00:15:26 room officer, Sarah Russell. Can I please call Sarah Russell?
00:15:31 Thank you.
00:15:32 Please repeat after me. I do solemnly, sincerely and truly thank you for your attention.
00:15:55 I do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give
00:16:02 shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
00:16:11 Good. Thank you very much indeed. Sit down and make yourself comfortable.
00:16:14 Yes, Mr Millett.
00:16:17 Ms Russell, good morning.
00:16:18 Good morning.
00:16:19 Can I start please by asking you to give the Chairman your full name, please?
00:16:22 Sarah Jane Russell.
00:16:24 I'm going to begin by thanking you very much for coming to the inquiry and assisting us
00:16:30 with our investigations. It is enormously helpful for us to be able to hear from you
00:16:35 and say we are extremely grateful, so thank you. If at any time you need a break during
00:16:40 my questions, then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there
00:16:44 are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to sit and
00:16:48 ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need
00:16:54 to sit to break before that, we can do that. Can I just also say that sometimes my questions,
00:17:01 which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, and so
00:17:04 if you want me to repeat the question, we'll put it in a different way. I'm very happy
00:17:08 to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about
00:17:14 your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control room
00:17:21 officer, as at today, with the London Fire Brigade. Yes. You are. And as at the date
00:17:26 of your statement, which I'll show you, you had that role for some nine months. Yeah,
00:17:32 roughly nine months at the time. Now, you've given us a witness statement, which was, I
00:17:37 think, done for the Metropolitan Police, dated the 10th of October 2017, and that's MET
00:17:43 C, quadruple zero, seven, six, nine, eight. First of all, is that the first page of your
00:17:51 police witness statement? Yes, yes. And have you read it recently? Yes. Can you confirm
00:18:02 for us that the contents are true? Yes. Thank you. Now, you had been, at the date of your
00:18:11 statement, I think, in the position of a control room officer at the LFB for about
00:18:16 nine months. Nine months in total with training as well. Right. And you started your training
00:18:23 when? September 2016. Right. In terms of your training, do you remember getting any training
00:18:31 on policy number 790, which is about fire survival guidance? Yes, there was a day of
00:18:38 training for fire survival guidance. Right. And can you tell us briefly what that training
00:18:44 involved? It was outlining practices. We had some example calls played to us, how to handle
00:18:53 it, that sort of content. Right. And do you remember receiving training on emergency call
00:19:01 management policy 539? In regards to FSG as well? Yes. Yes, when they played the samples,
00:19:11 they talked through how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Right. Before
00:19:19 Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training or of any kind focused
00:19:27 on lessons learned from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lackinall House?
00:19:33 I remember Lackinall being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG,
00:19:42 but nothing since then. Right. It was mentioned, was it? Was there anything, was any other
00:19:50 training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learned at Lackinall?
00:19:56 I don't remember any specific training based off of that. I just remember it being mentioned.
00:20:01 You referred to it in your last answer, but one, as a hard example of FSG. Why do you say that?
00:20:09 Just that all FSGs aren't, they don't have happy endings, that incident didn't. During your
00:20:21 training, did you get specific training on how to handle calls coming from high rise
00:20:26 residential buildings? We had training about the mobilisation, got questions to ask how many
00:20:34 floors categorised the high rise, but nothing in particular for FSGs. Right. Did you get any
00:20:45 training on how to help a resident of a high rise residential building assess the safety of an
00:20:52 escape route? Not in specific to high rise, just in the general, assessing the situation, is it
00:21:02 safe to stay or to leave in the general sense, but not in specific to high rise buildings. In the
00:21:10 general sense, what was the training which you had about how to go about assisting a caller assess
00:21:16 the safety of an escape route? Just ask questions, find out if there's smoke, little hints that there
00:21:25 might be a fire outside the door, like heat, popping noises, just little things that, you know, if
00:21:31 they say there's popping noises at the door, don't tell them to go outside, there could be a fire
00:21:35 outside, things like that. And did you have any experience prior to the night of the fire of any
00:21:47 FSG? No, that was my first FSG. Right. And what about 999 calls from high rise buildings, did you
00:22:00 ever have any experience of taking those? Yes, I would have had probably quite a few, it's quite
00:22:04 common to have calls from high rises in London. Right. And did any of those, I'm assuming none of
00:22:13 those turned into an FSG call? No. Did you get any training about how a control room would go about
00:22:26 handling multiple FSG calls if it was faced with that situation? To my understanding, not on that
00:22:34 scale, I don't remember anything being mentioned, it wasn't expected, it was completely different from
00:22:46 what you normally expect with FSG calls. Did you have any training on multiple FSG calls to a lesser
00:22:55 extent than you experienced at Granville? Not multiple, just the standard, you're on an FSG call,
00:23:05 but nothing about, you know, and there's multiple calls coming in and they're all FSGs, nothing like
00:23:10 that. I see. I want to move to explore your understanding and application of what we've come to
00:23:20 call the stay put policy, whether that's the accurate expression or not, we'll find out. First of all,
00:23:28 can I ask you, are you familiar with policy 539? Yes. You are. So let's look at that, it's LFB
00:23:36 quintuple 0737 and for those who have still held on to their policy bundles, it's a tab 5 of the LFB
00:23:49 policy bundle. We have it there on the screen. And I think tab 3 of the policy bundle. And can I ask
00:24:06 you please to turn to appendix 3 in that, which is on page 16. Now, the third paragraph, well I'll just
00:24:27 give you the first paragraph by way of context. It says the London Fire Brigade define a fire survival
00:24:33 guidance call as being a call to a brigade control where the caller believes that they are unable to
00:24:41 leave their premises due to the effects of fire and where the control room officer remains on the line
00:24:46 providing appropriate advice until either the caller is able to leave by their own means, is rescued by
00:24:52 the fire brigade or the line is cleared. And then, so that's the context, and then it says in the third
00:25:00 paragraph down, brigade control advise callers to get out and stay out. However, if a call is received
00:25:08 from a high rise building where fire, heat and smoke are not affecting the caller, LFB would advise that.
00:25:14 And then it says, you are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire, heat or smoke.
00:25:20 If the situation changes, you should leave your premises and dial 999 if you need further assistance.
00:25:27 My first question, Ms Russell, is does that accord with your understanding of the stay put policy?
00:25:34 Yes.
00:25:35 Right. Now, looking at the text, it says in that last paragraph I read out to you, you are usually
00:25:46 safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. I just want to concentrate with
00:25:52 you on the word affected. As at the night of Grenfell, what did you understand by the word affected?
00:25:59 That there is smoke in their property or heat from fire, so they would have to be directly affected by
00:26:07 the fire to make them leave.
00:26:09 Right. In your training or in your experience as you had to that date, what information would you expect
00:26:18 or did you expect to use to make your assessment of whether or not those premises were affected in the way you described?
00:26:25 Smoke is normally the biggest indicator. If there is smoke coming into their property, that means the fire
00:26:31 would be normally close by. Heat source would mean it is obviously very close. Just general cues, the callers
00:26:41 are normally quite forthcoming with any information that would give away that the fire is affecting them.
00:26:48 When making that assessment about whether premises are affected, were you trained to or did you have
00:26:55 experience of relying on messages from the incident ground or were you completely reliant on information
00:27:03 given to you by the caller?
00:27:05 On that night.
00:27:07 In general, prior to that night, what would be your expectation?
00:27:10 In general, you would expect someone to be sat with you. When you are on an FS call, it is quiet.
00:27:16 It is all you are focused on really. You are very into that. When you are on an FSG, normally you would have
00:27:23 someone sat next to you, involved still keeping you, involved in the room, reminding you of things.
00:27:28 So you would expect to have some kind of input as to what was going on in the building.
00:27:36 In terms of whether they are out, you would normally expect a message back saying all persons accounted for
00:27:42 some acknowledgement that you knew what was going on.
00:27:46 Right. Now, you have answered that question as if the call was already an FSG call. Is it right that in fact
00:27:54 before a call, and we will come to this in a minute, but before a call becomes an FSG call, there are some stages
00:28:01 you have got to go through. So if a caller is affected by fire or smoke but can leave, then it is not yet an FSG call.
00:28:11 No.
00:28:12 Have I got that right?
00:28:13 Yes, if the caller can leave in any way, it is not FSG.
00:28:16 At the time when you are making the assessment as to whether the caller is affected by fire, heat or smoke,
00:28:22 to what extent would you expect to rely solely on the information from the caller, or would you rely also on
00:28:29 information from the incident ground?
00:28:31 From my understanding, normally at that time the crews would be very early on the scene. If not already, if not,
00:28:39 they might not be there yet. They might still be on the way. So you wouldn't have anything coming back from the
00:28:44 crews anyway. It would just be what the caller is telling you. That is what you go by on calls because you can't see
00:28:51 what they are seeing.
00:28:54 Now, can I ask you to look at your witness statement, which we have had up on the screen in front of you,
00:29:02 and go please to page 3. And you say on page 3, and it is the third paragraph down, you say an FSG becomes
00:29:16 active at the point the caller says that they cannot get out of their property and they are affected by smoke.
00:29:28 In your training or experience, and I think we are looking at training rather than experience because you say you
00:29:33 haven't experienced an FSG call, as at the night of Greenford, but in your training, how would you go about
00:29:42 assessing what a caller was telling you meant that they were trapped?
00:29:51 Just that their inability to leave the building, if they tell you they can't leave, is the biggest indicator.
00:30:00 Most of the time if you say to someone, can you get out, in my experience of calls since and before they say yes and they
00:30:09 start leaving, there is obviously a reason for them to say, no, I can't leave.
00:30:15 And do you explore that reason with them or do you take them at face value?
00:30:19 Yes, you would ask what is the situation like, try and get them to infer a bit of what they are seeing.
00:30:27 Now, can I ask you, in light of that last answer you gave me, to look at policy 790. That is at tab 5 of our policies
00:30:36 bundle and it is LFB quadruple 01257.
00:30:46 And I would like to show you paragraph 2.1 on page 2.
00:30:51 And it is on the screen there, Mr Russell, for you to see.
00:30:58 And it says, an FSG call is a call received into control where the caller believes that they are unable to leave their premises
00:31:07 due to the effects of fire and, and this is bold, where the control officer remains on the line providing appropriate advice.
00:31:15 Now, you said in your statement, as we have just looked at, that it is where they are affected by smoke.
00:31:25 Is there a reason why you categorise the calls as FSG if they are trapped by smoke?
00:31:32 Fire survival guidance. So you mean smoke in relation to just generally a fire where they can't leave.
00:31:47 So looking at the policy where it says due to the effects of fire, did you or were you trained to understand that as the effects of fire, including heat and smoke?
00:31:58 Yes, yes, I have signs of fire, yes.
00:32:01 I see. In general terms, did you ever get any training on how to prioritise FSG calls among themselves?
00:32:13 So if you've got three FSG calls, for example, you would assign a priority, one, two, three, to each of them?
00:32:21 No, I don't remember any specific training like that.
00:32:26 Did you receive any training on giving particular priority or treatment to callers from flats where they were affected by fire, heat or smoke, where the caller was in some way a child or disabled or an elderly person?
00:32:45 No, same again. I don't remember any training about prioritising just that the information is passed over and the crews would then decide what to prioritise.
00:32:56 Right. Now sticking with policy 790, can I ask you please to go to paragraph 5.1, which is at the bottom of the same page of the policy we're on.
00:33:05 Heading there, and this rattle is, information transferred to the incident and it says, as soon as controllers confirmed that an FSG call is in progress, they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details.
00:33:19 At this stage it is likely to be basic information relating to the number of persons involved and their location within the property.
00:33:26 Is that your understanding of what information would be transferred?
00:33:32 Yes, possibly why they can't leave the condition if there's smoke or heat.
00:33:42 And what sort of details would you try to get out of the caller to pass onto the incident ground?
00:33:50 The location, what floor, the flat number, what room they're in, how they're being affected, just information like that.
00:34:00 Right. Now, and I'm sorry to make you jump from policy to policy, can I ask you to go back to policy 539, emergency call management, LFB quintuple 0737.
00:34:14 It's back to tab 3 of our policies bundle for those who have it.
00:34:22 And please turn in that to page 16.
00:34:28 Again, appendix 3.
00:34:32 And from the middle of the page down to the bottom of the page, it says, the control room officer will ascertain, this is three paragraphs down from the block of text we've got on the screen.
00:34:46 The control room officer will ascertain through initial questioning the type of premises the caller is in and use the link on the reference information file, fire survival guidance, to take them to the appropriate area of information to use to assist the caller.
00:34:58 And the first of those, if you can see it, is assisting the caller, this is two paragraphs on, assisting the caller to help identify a safe alternative escape route for them to leave their premises.
00:35:13 And you see the word escape in bold capital letters there.
00:35:19 Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route?
00:35:29 I remember brief training about asking if they were low enough, was there a balcony or another roof they could get onto?
00:35:36 Was there an alternative staircase?
00:35:39 Just an alternate route out if one was blocked by smoke or fire.
00:35:46 Did that, you say brief training, what did that training involve?
00:35:51 I just remember the one day in particular for FSG training and it covered a few different things on that one day, so the management of the call, questions to ask, listening to the calls, so everything had a brief time in that day.
00:36:06 Right. Did that training involve assessment of the length, nature and shape of the escape route?
00:36:14 I don't remember that in particular.
00:36:17 Okay. What about assessment of smoke density in this or fire in the escape route?
00:36:24 I have a recollection about asking how bad the smoke is.
00:36:37 And then the second item down on that page is assessing the situation by asking the caller direct questions.
00:36:47 And you can see examples of those direct questions.
00:36:54 Do you know where the fire is? What room are you in? Is anyone with you?
00:36:58 Did you get specific training on how to go about making that assessment?
00:37:07 Just asking the questions to the caller and getting their response was all the training I remember really.
00:37:19 And in your understanding, would it be you leaving it to the caller to assess the situation or would you then make the assessment as it were for them and then give clear advice based on your assessment?
00:37:40 I think I would rely on both. The caller would be telling you things, assessing the situation there.
00:37:46 But we have a bit more training on how to deal with those situations so we can give inputs as if what I think would be best in this situation.
00:37:57 But it's only guidance because we can't see. We're basing it on what they're telling us.
00:38:08 And in that training, doing that assessment, was any part of that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident command or the command unit?
00:38:22 No, I don't remember any training like that.
00:38:24 Right. Okay.
00:38:35 Now, I want to turn to the night of the fire.
00:38:40 And you say on page five of your witness statement, if I can take you to that please, in the last paragraph on that page,
00:38:53 I say that in the third line from the start of that paragraph, I was posted as radio operator monitoring channel two, South London, with Sharon Darby who was operating channel four, North London.
00:39:11 Now, I want just to get a feel for where it was you were sitting in the control room on the night.
00:39:15 Can I ask you please to be shown the LFB's control report?
00:39:19 And this is LFB quadruple zero, 4790, at page 175.
00:39:30 Now, if we can have that photograph expanded, please. Thank you.
00:39:36 So is that a photograph of the control room at Stratford, to the best of your recollection, as it was organised on the night of the fire?
00:39:43 Yes.
00:39:45 Can you tell us where were you sitting?
00:39:47 So, if that was the supervisor position on the far right, I was sitting opposite on this position on the left-hand side, just behind the first computer you can see.
00:40:00 Right. It might help if you would be able to get up and point to that.
00:40:04 We have got a red dot system, but it's probably slower than...
00:40:08 This position here.
00:40:09 So the witness is pointing, and we've got the red dot there, to the black computer, just a second from the left-hand side of the picture, facing towards the camera.
00:40:19 Yep.
00:40:21 Yes. Okay, thank you. And who was sitting to your immediate left?
00:40:25 That would have been Angie Gotts.
00:40:28 Okay. And was anybody sitting to your immediate right, or were you on the end?
00:40:32 No, I was the end of that position, the desk in front. I may have been Christine Helson, but I'm not 100% sure.
00:40:40 Okay. And was that a position from which you operated the radio, or did you have to move positions, because we know you stopped operating the radio?
00:40:54 No, that was where I was all night.
00:40:57 All night?
00:40:58 Yep.
00:40:59 And would your position in the control room vary depending on incident or shift, or was it random?
00:41:06 It would vary on shift. On the start of a tour, you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour every time you're in.
00:41:19 Right. And do you know how the allocation of positions would be done?
00:41:28 It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else.
00:41:39 Right. Was there a system whereby the most junior was sat next to one of the most more experienced control room officers, or?
00:41:47 To begin with, you're sat with someone, but once you're on your own, as far as I know, there's no system like that.
00:41:54 When you say to begin with, do you mean during your probationary period?
00:41:57 Yes.
00:41:58 Okay. And when you're on your own, it means once that probationary period is finished.
00:42:01 Yeah.
00:42:02 Okay. Now, going to your witness statement, can I ask you please to look at page six. At the top of that page you say, the number of calls began stacking up and up.
00:42:17 I asked Sharon if she would mind combining both channel two and channel four on the radio. My channel was silent, so I thought I could help better by answering calls.
00:42:27 I did not want to sit doing nothing while everyone else was busy. Sharon agreed, so I demonetred my channel and moved back to call handling.
00:42:37 Now, we'll come on to the first call that you took in a moment, but before we do, at the point when the control room started to take 999 calls from Granfell Tower on the night of the fire, do you remember what the system in general was for handing information to the incident, or passing information to the incident ground?
00:42:59 So, once someone takes a call that has information from it, you would generate a service request, head it to the radio channel that that incident was on, complete it, then it goes out so everyone can see it. The radio operator would then pick that up, call up the call sign that's relevant, and pass that information over.
00:43:19 Right. And you would generate that service request from your computer monitor at your desk?
00:43:23 Yeah.
00:43:24 Yes.
00:43:27 And would you speak to the radio operator, or would you rely entirely on the messaging system within the computer system in the control room?
00:43:36 You would make the radio operator aware that you'd sent a message out. You would shout out message on channel two or four.
00:43:45 And when you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard, or something you saw on your monitor?
00:43:52 Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing actually in Stratford now that I think of it because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well.
00:44:11 Yeah.
00:44:16 And so South London was quiet so you moved to calls.
00:44:20 Yes.
00:44:22 And now, on page six in the second main paragraph you say the first call I took was about an hour long. And after the rest of that page you describe a long call that started at 012948.
00:44:45 And we've got a record of that call and we'll come to it. Just to identify it, is that the call which starts with a call from BT with a phone number?
00:44:56 Yes, I've since found out that wasn't my first call. I didn't remember that I had a call from someone outside of the building.
00:45:02 Yes.
00:45:03 But the hour long call was a deadline from BT. There was no one on the line.
00:45:11 And I think you called the number back that BT had given you.
00:45:18 Now, we've got the transcript for that and we're going to look at it in a moment.
00:45:23 But just so it's primed and ready to go, it's LFB quintuple 0507 and it's 70 pages long.
00:45:34 Before I ask you some questions about that, first, when you took that call, were you aware of the messages that were starting to come in about the incident?
00:45:47 I was aware of the make-up messages coming in of the incident.
00:45:53 Okay. Now, just to see if I can pin those down. Can I ask you please to be shown the short incident log, which is MET00013830.
00:46:08 Turn please to page 17.
00:46:20 And on that page, at 0116, you can see an informative message, first of all.
00:46:41 Far on the fourth floor, 75% are light blocker flats of 20 floors. Do you remember seeing that or being aware of it?
00:46:49 Yes, I remember being aware of it.
00:46:51 Right. And then at 119, it goes, and we can skip out six, it goes to make pumps eight. Were you aware of that?
00:47:03 Yes.
00:47:04 And then over the page on page 17, it goes to 10 pumps at 0126.
00:47:18 Were you aware of that?
00:47:20 Yes, yeah.
00:47:22 And then 012641. And then at 012759, you can see it goes to 15 pumps. Were you aware of that?
00:47:36 There's a point where the make-ups are very quick, and I just remember seeing it escalate quite quickly while I was on the phone.
00:47:44 Right. And then at 0128, page 18, if I can just take you to that, top of the page, 012840, there's a message or service request from Sharon Darby, persons reported. What did that mean to you?
00:48:01 That there are persons inside the building that can't leave.
00:48:05 That can't leave. Right. So does that mean that at that point you became aware that fire survival guidance calls either were in progress or were about to be in progress?
00:48:17 Yes.
00:48:18 Okay. And then at 012941, page 18, again, you can see that there's a message PM, I think it's Peter May, 10 pump fire. So it had gone, I'm so sorry, wrong time, 012941, 10 pump fire.
00:48:43 And then at 013148, SAD, halfway down the page, puts in a message or a service request, make pumps 25. Now, did you see or hear the make pumps 25 message before you started the long call, do you think?
00:49:09 I remember being on the call and trying to reassure the caller saying that there were 25 pumps below. And I remember it went up to a 40 at some point, but I'm not too sure of the timeline along it.
00:49:27 At that point, the beginning of your call, the long call, did you have any thoughts about this fire and how it was developing having heard or been aware of that escalation?
00:49:41 Around the 1525 mark, 25 was an indication that this is a big fire. When it went to 40, I never had any experience of that. I didn't really know what we were dealing with. We hadn't seen it.
00:50:01 At that stage, had you heard or seen any messages about which floor it was on?
00:50:08 The fire started on the fourth floor in my memory.
00:50:15 I'm sorry, I should have reminded you, of course, we've seen on page 17 the informative message saying it was on the fourth floor. So my question should have been, having seen it was on the fourth floor at 116, did you see or hear any further information to lead you to think that it was still on the fourth floor or whether it had started to move from the fourth floor?
00:50:37 I don't recall being made specifically aware that it had spread the way it had.
00:50:44 At that point, when it was made up to 25 pumps, did you have any reason to think or did you think that it was still on the fourth floor?
00:50:52 I would have thought that it had maybe spread to flats around it, but definitely not that it had travelled up the building and spread to more floors.
00:51:01 Right.
00:51:12 Prior to the start of this call, did you hear Sharon Darby or see Sharon Darby passing messages over the radio to the command unit then on scene?
00:51:25 I did hear messages going on. It was quite noisy in the room and I would have been dealing with calls, so you're not always 100% aware of what people are saying, but you do have a general idea of what's going on.
00:51:36 Right. More specifically, if I could just ask you to look at page 18 in the middle there, against the time mark of 01 31 38, you can see a service request, and this is just above the make-up request for 25, so this is still at the time when pumps are 20.
00:51:56 RT 4 to G271, further call to say fire on 20th floor, also people trapped. Were you aware of that message at the time it was sent, do you think?
00:52:09 I knew we had calls coming in from all over the building, but I believe that at the time people were affected by smoke and have an indication that the fire was as bad as what it was.
00:52:25 Right. So would it be right to think that at the time that long call started you had heard that message or seen that message?
00:52:36 I may have done, but I can't remember.
00:52:39 Okay. Now, Ms. Darby, I've got, Ms. Russell, I've got one or two more questions before we have a break. On page 6 of your statement, if you can get back to that please, you say in the second line of the second main paragraph, I tried to find out basic information from her, such as the flat number and the floor number and how many people were inside with her.
00:53:07 She told me that she lived on the 20th floor, but had gone higher to the 22nd. Now, first, can I just ask you this, when you made this statement to the police in October 2017 and you gave your account of that call, had you seen the transcript of that call?
00:53:25 No, that was all based off of memory.
00:53:27 Okay. And we'll see from, as we will in a moment, probably after the break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 22nd?
00:53:38 Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy.
00:53:45 Okay. Mr. Chairman, we've been going for just under 45 minutes.
00:53:50 Yes.
00:53:51 I wonder, we're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break.
00:53:54 Could I point out a break?
00:53:56 Yes. Ms. Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I'm going to start to not talk to anyone about your evidence while they're out of the room, please.
00:54:10 And we'll start again at five for 211.
00:54:12 Okay.
00:54:13 All right. Would you like to give us the action, please?
00:54:24 All right. Five to 11, please.
00:54:54 Okay.
00:55:24 Okay.
00:55:54 Okay.
00:56:24 Okay.
00:56:54 Okay.
00:57:24 Okay.
00:57:54 Okay.
00:58:24 Okay.
00:58:54 Okay.
00:59:24 Okay.
00:59:54 Okay.
01:00:24 Okay.
01:00:54 Okay.
01:01:24 Okay.
01:01:54 Okay.
01:02:24 Okay.
01:02:54 Okay.
01:03:24 Okay.
01:03:54 Okay.
01:04:24 Okay.
01:04:54 Okay.
01:05:24 Okay.
01:05:54 Okay.
01:06:24 Okay.
01:06:54 Okay.
01:07:24 Okay.
01:07:54 Okay.
01:07:59 Okay.
01:08:04 Okay.
01:08:09 Okay.
01:08:14 Okay.
01:08:19 Okay.
01:08:24 Okay.
01:08:29 Okay.
01:08:34 Okay.
01:08:39 Okay.
01:08:44 Okay.
01:08:49 Okay.
01:08:54 Okay.
01:08:59 Okay.
01:09:04 If I can ask you to look at page two, you can see that shortly into the call in the middle of the page, she says to you in answer to your question, what floor are you in in Grenfell Tower, she says 23.
01:09:26 You say sorry, the top floor 23, please can you hurry up the top floor and you repeat the top floor 23, we're already there.
01:09:35 It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not?
01:09:41 I remember the start of the call being quite, there's a lot of commotion in the background. There was something going on. She was quite distressed.
01:09:50 And I didn't feel like I could get information clearly if she was panicking. So I wanted to try and calm it down first.
01:09:57 Right. Now you could tell straight away. Well, could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person?
01:10:03 Yeah, relatively a voice sounded quite young and by calling mom as well.
01:10:09 Yeah. Now, turning to page four of the transcript.
01:10:17 Well, it's turning to page three of the transcript to start with, in fact, picking up something on that page, page three.
01:10:24 You she says at the top of the page, are they downstairs? And you say the fires on the fourth floor.
01:10:31 They're there at the moment fighting it. OK. Now, just at that stage, very early on in the call.
01:10:36 So we're at about one thirty. Did you think the fire was still on the fourth floor or did you think the fire might have moved?
01:10:44 It may have. I would have thought it may have moved, but I wouldn't have thought it would have been anywhere near where she was.
01:10:50 And then on page four, if we can now go to that, she says at the top of page four, there's a there's fire in the house.
01:11:00 Please hurry up. And then on the same page, she says just a little bit lower down. Yes, there's a fire in the house.
01:11:10 And you ask, is there OK, is there any smoke coming in? Yes, there's a lot of everything, she says.
01:11:16 And then moving to page five, a third of the way down, she says, quarter of the way down, she says, I can't.
01:11:27 My whole house is on fire. You see where you see that there.
01:11:32 And you say, can you can you block the door? Are there any clothes you can put underneath it?
01:11:38 And then inaudible close the door.
01:11:43 Now, at that point, it's still quite early on in the call.
01:11:48 Did you understand that she was being affected by smoke and possibly fire?
01:11:56 Smoke, she said, there's smoke coming in.
01:11:58 But when she was talking about fire, my understanding of that there was a fire in that room because of where I thought the fire was.
01:12:08 I wanted to investigate that more.
01:12:13 And I'll come back to smoke in a minute.
01:12:15 But as we can see, you then say towards the bottom of the page, they can't come up to you yet.
01:12:22 The fire's below you. It's on the fourth floor. OK.
01:12:27 And she says already that's too far.
01:12:31 What did you get from that answer?
01:12:34 I thought she meant they're far away. They're too far below her.
01:12:39 The fire brigade was too far away.
01:12:41 Yes.
01:12:42 Right.
01:12:44 And then over the page, at page six, you ask her just below the top of the page, have you stopped the smoke coming in?
01:12:55 And she says, no, there's too much smoke.
01:12:58 And you ask, whereabouts are you? What room are you in?
01:13:02 We're in the front doors, but there's a fire at the back.
01:13:04 There's a fire. Is it actually in your property? Is it in there with you?
01:13:07 Or and then she says, no, it's not in my property.
01:13:11 Just pausing there.
01:13:13 Yeah.
01:13:14 She's given you the information about the smoke, but the fire wasn't in her property.
01:13:21 At that stage, why did you not move to the first phase of FSG guidance?
01:13:29 What do you mean by?
01:13:32 So you know that she's affected by smoke.
01:13:36 So at that stage,
01:13:38 is there a reason why you didn't then move to exploring a safe exit with her?
01:13:44 Well, at the time, I still didn't know the information, who she was with, what flat number she was in.
01:13:51 As I said, it was quite panicky at the start of the call.
01:13:57 So as we moved on, I gradually got more information from her.
01:14:01 So I just find it quite difficult to start with, with getting the information I needed.
01:14:06 At this stage in the call, you know she's affected by smoke.
01:14:11 The fire isn't in the property.
01:14:13 But did you think she was trapped and couldn't get out at that stage?
01:14:17 Yes, she told me during that call that someone had tried to leave and they had come back inside the building.
01:14:26 And I did want to talk to that person because they were an adult.
01:14:30 At some point in the call, I tried to get, I think a couple of times I tried to get her to pass the phone over.
01:14:35 I was mindful that I was talking to a 12-year-old and I wanted to speak to the adult who had been out in the corridor
01:14:42 that could tell me what it was like out there.
01:14:44 But I never managed to get her to give the phone over.
01:14:48 Now just going back a page to page five, you say three entries up from all three lines up from the bottom of the page,
01:14:56 they can't come up to you yet, the fire's below you, it's on the fourth floor, okay.
01:15:01 When you said they can't come up to you yet, were you referring to the fire brigade?
01:15:05 Yes.
01:15:06 What made you think that the fire brigade weren't able to come up to the top floor?
01:15:11 That they weren't already there.
01:15:13 I mean, at this moment, they wouldn't have been able to come up to her.
01:15:17 They weren't there because they were fighting their way through that fire.
01:15:21 Right, did you have any information from the incident ground to lead you to say that the fire brigade couldn't come up to you yet?
01:15:27 No specific information.
01:15:29 It was based off of what I would expect to happen and trying to reassure that they are there, they are coming, but they're not there yet.
01:15:39 And now going back to page six, Ms Russell, if I could just ask you to look at that two thirds of the way down.
01:15:46 You've established that the smoke is there, the fire isn't.
01:15:51 Then you ask her there again.
01:15:53 And whereabouts are you in the building then?
01:15:56 Are you still on the top floor?
01:15:58 Yeah, we're on the top floor, round the back of someone's house.
01:16:03 Why did you ask her that question again, given what she'd already told you about where they were?
01:16:10 I was coming back to the flat number to get more information about where she was, any additional information that I hadn't already got at the start of the call.
01:16:18 Right. Could you tell by this point in the call that she was a child or a young person?
01:16:25 I had an idea that she was young, but I didn't know how young.
01:16:31 Is there a reason why you didn't ask her to pass the phone to an adult, if there was one, at this point?
01:16:39 At that point I was still talking to her, still trying to get any information from her.
01:16:46 I think it was shortly after or at some point after that I did start saying, can I speak to someone else?
01:16:53 Part of the role was also to try and calm people down, keep them calm.
01:16:57 And I felt that I still needed to talk to her for that little bit of time.
01:17:01 And then at the foot of the page, just below the question and answer we've just looked at, she says, there's four fires downstairs.
01:17:09 And you then over the top of page seven say, listen, and Jessica says, they're coming up, please tell them to hurry up.
01:17:16 When she said there's four fires downstairs, what did you make of that?
01:17:25 Just really I heard from her that there was a fire downstairs.
01:17:29 I thought it was a 12-year-old panicking.
01:17:34 I did wonder what she was basing the four fires off of because she wasn't downstairs.
01:17:39 What was she seeing?
01:17:41 Because she said the fire wasn't in her house.
01:17:44 So I just inferred that the fire is downstairs.
01:17:47 Right, but not how far down it was?
01:17:49 No.
01:17:50 OK.
01:17:53 And it does look as though you didn't explore this question about four fires downstairs with her.
01:17:59 Is there a reason why you didn't do that?
01:18:03 It's probably an overlooked comment that I didn't at the time see any, I thought it meant something different.
01:18:10 Now, if I can ask you to move forward or be shown page 11 in the transcript, you say to her, and the run-up to this is you're giving her advice to stop the smoke coming in.
01:18:25 And you're asking her about shutting the window.
01:18:28 And then at the top of the page, at page 11, you say, they are coming for you, but you need to keep yourself safe until they get there.
01:18:37 Hello.
01:18:38 Now, at this stage, had this become a full-blown fire survival guidance call?
01:18:46 Yeah, I'd say it was at that point.
01:18:49 At this stage, what had you done in your own mind to help her assess whether or not she could leave safely?
01:18:58 At that point, I had the information that they tried to move away from the smoke, that they were trying to keep the smoke out.
01:19:08 And from that point on, I then started to try to talk to the person that had left to then establish whether any other, you know, could they get out, how bad it was outside.
01:19:20 Right.
01:19:21 Now, when you said they're coming for you, do you recall receiving or having received any information from the incident ground that crews were coming up or going to be able to get up to the 23rd floor to carry out rescues?
01:19:39 No, we had no specific information that crews were on any floors who they were attempting to rescue.
01:19:46 It was just based off of, you'd expect it. That's what always happens. They're always going to get there.
01:19:53 I see. So do we take it from that, Ms Russell, that you didn't have any positive information that crews were actually coming?
01:20:01 This was your expectation that they would come?
01:20:03 Yeah, it was expectation, yeah.
01:20:04 I see.
01:20:05 Did it occur to you that telling her that crews were coming might then discourage her and those in the flat who she was speaking to from making an effort to escape?
01:20:20 It may well have, but at the time that was what I believed was happening. That was what the firefighters were trying to do. I had nothing to suggest otherwise to that.
01:20:32 And then at page 14 of the transcript, it's the same again.
01:20:39 Again, she tells you in the middle of that page, there's the door on the room is going to explode soon. Please can you hurry up?
01:20:55 And then you go to the question of numbers. I'm so sorry, page 13. You say, I'm so sorry, it's my fault, but I've gone ahead too far in the transcript.
01:21:08 Page 13, two thirds of the way down, you ask her, hello, you need to explain to me what's going on. And she says, there's the door on the room is going to explode soon. Please can you hurry up?
01:21:21 And you go back to the question of numbers. When she said the door on the room is going to explode soon, did that tell you anything about whether or not she could now safely leave?
01:21:32 It would possibly have said that there may have been heat on the other side. I was still trying to gain information about numbers in the room.
01:21:41 The call did go back and forth between the situation in the room and me trying to get information from her as well.
01:21:48 And then at page 14, just above halfway down, you say they are hurrying up. They're trying to get to you, okay. Is there another room that you can go into?
01:22:05 And she says, no, can you hurry up? Please, I'm begging you. And you say they are, they're right below you, but you do, you need to keep yourself safe.
01:22:14 And then she says, what floor are you on? What floor are you on? Just at that point, do you remember whether she was speaking to somebody else in the room?
01:22:26 It was my memory of it is quite hard to tell who she was talking to at points, whether she had gone off for another conversation or whether she was talking to me.
01:22:35 And I think a few times something was going on in the background that I couldn't, wasn't wasn't aware of. But she wasn't very forthcoming with what was going on.
01:22:45 And then just below that, you say they're down below you. They're fighting the fire from below you, okay. They're making their way up.
01:22:54 Now, again, we've seen on that page that you're essentially telling her three times that they're coming up and trying to get to you.
01:23:04 It's the same question I asked you before. Did you have any information from the incident incident ground that enabled you to tell her that crews were making their way up?
01:23:15 No, at that point, it was more about reassuring her, trying to get her to to keep, you know, to keep going rather than panicking.
01:23:24 So it was just acknowledging that we were there. We were below them. They were trying.
01:23:30 It was a reassurance that because she was at that point talking to someone else again, I think just trying to keep her calm.
01:23:37 At this point in the call, I know it's difficult to remember exactly because it was a long call.
01:23:42 Had you do you think formed the view that you had adequately assessed with the caller the safety of the escape route?
01:23:51 Not yet. No, no. That's why I wanted to talk to the person who'd been outside, someone that was older.
01:24:00 It did sound like she was panicking. One of the reasons other than her age was why I wanted to talk to someone else.
01:24:08 Yeah. Did it occur to you that given that you hadn't yet assessed the security of the escape route, telling her that the crews were coming up without having solid information to back that up meant that you might be lulling her into a false sense of security?
01:24:28 At the time, no. As I've said, it was based on what I would expect to happen, what should happen.
01:24:39 And as I said, it was more about it was comforting her and trying to get her through that situation and to get the information.
01:24:48 Going back to your training, looking back on it, was it clear to you from the training that this reassurance advice should be given at any particular point either before or after you'd thoroughly exhausted the assessment of the safety of the exit route?
01:25:06 I remember from the training saying that every call is different, every caller is different how you handle them.
01:25:12 Some people need more reassurance than others. Some people will just give you the information and you can get straight down to the facts. Other people need a bit more persuasion and comfort.
01:25:23 So it varies. The training was just saying that it varies caller to caller, that you have to assess that and get the information.
01:25:32 But working with the caller that you have.
01:25:36 Just to focus a little bit more closely on that, did your training tell you that you should exhaust the possibilities of assessment of the safety of the exit route before moving to the reassurance phase?
01:25:52 I don't remember it in that specific order.
01:25:55 My memory is that it's a fluid process of you reassure when needed and that could be before or after.
01:26:02 Were you ever trained to understand that there was a possibility that if you moved too quickly to the reassurance phase and gave a call of the kinds of advice to say they're coming to get you before exhausting the assessment about the safety of exit,
01:26:18 that you might unwittingly lull a caller into a false sense of security so they might stay where otherwise they might be able to leave safely?
01:26:27 No, I don't remember anything like that in training.
01:26:30 Thank you.
01:26:37 Is there a reason at this stage, given that we can tell she's panicking and that there is smoke in the flat, why you didn't say to her, you must leave?
01:26:50 At that point, we don't tell people to go out into smoke when you don't know what's there.
01:26:58 If she was contained in that flat, then there was smoke, but I didn't know how bad it was outside, whether it was worse sending her into more smoke or a fire.
01:27:09 I hadn't established that yet.
01:27:19 And is there a reason why you didn't push for that information so you could make that assessment?
01:27:25 I felt that I couldn't push her too much because of the way she was panicking.
01:27:29 For some of it, I felt that she wasn't necessarily listening, so it took a while.
01:27:34 I felt that I had to calm it down to be able to get more information out of her.
01:27:40 So I think I was quite reassuring and soft rather than hard and give me the answers.
01:27:52 Moving on in the transcript to page 16, at the bottom of the page, after the automated voice saying you've been placed on hold,
01:28:07 she comes back and she says, yeah, we're inside another room.
01:28:13 And you ask her whether it's a bedroom or a bathroom.
01:28:18 At that stage, did you think that they'd moved rooms?
01:28:23 Yes.
01:28:24 And what did that tell you about the conditions inside the flat?
01:28:31 I hadn't really established much at that point, but I would have thought that the room that they were in was possibly too smoky to stay in.
01:28:42 And so do we take it that at this stage there can be no question that you understood that this was a flat affected by smoke at the very least?
01:28:51 Yes.
01:28:55 And again, it looks as if you're not assessing with her the ability to escape.
01:29:00 Is that because, again, of the reasons you gave us before, you felt you couldn't push her too hard or is there another reason?
01:29:06 Yeah, I hadn't yet got to the point of asking to speak to the other person.
01:29:12 Moving on to page 23 of the transcript, at the top of the page, and the context for this is you're asking who's in the flat and the numbers and ages.
01:29:29 And she tells you she's the youngest person, apart from a baby.
01:29:34 And at the bottom, the previous page, she says, can you hurry up?
01:29:39 Top of page 23, which is what we're on, she says, you say, oh, we are hurrying.
01:29:45 They're right below you, the fire engines.
01:29:48 Listen to me.
01:29:50 They're fighting the fire from below you.
01:29:51 So it's going to take them a little while to get to you.
01:29:54 There are 23 floors on the building.
01:29:55 The fire was on the fourth floor and it's spreading up.
01:29:58 But they're on their way up to you.
01:30:00 They'll fight the fire.
01:30:01 They'll get to you really soon, OK?
01:30:03 OK, so tell me how everyone else is doing in there.
01:30:08 Same question as I asked you before, Ms Russell, I'm afraid.
01:30:11 But at this point in the call, and we're about a third of the way through it, so about 20 minutes or so into the call, or so, roughly.
01:30:19 At that point, do you think you had any solid information on the basis of which to tell her that the fire engines are there and they're fighting the fire from below?
01:30:31 Again, same reasons as before.
01:30:33 No messages back, just the same as before.
01:30:40 And then moving on to page 24, you say at the top of the page there, OK, I'm just sending a message to the crews now so they know where you are.
01:30:55 So there's 11 of you on the 23rd floor.
01:30:57 Do you know which side of the building you're on, the front or the back?
01:31:00 Now, can I ask you to keep that on the screen there and to go to the document we looked at before, which is the short incident log.
01:31:16 Which is MET 00013830.
01:31:21 And please turn in it to page 19.
01:31:27 And I'd like you to look at the timestamp of 014545.
01:31:38 At the very bottom of that page, we can see, we just have that highlighted, the very bottom of the block that's on the monitor, 014545SR.
01:31:55 That's you.
01:31:57 Take it from me that that's you there.
01:32:00 You created a service request, RT4G271, 11 people in bedroom of flat on 23rd floor.
01:32:09 Just my first question as a formal one, can you confirm that that's your message?
01:32:13 Yeah.
01:32:15 And again, does this accord with your recollection of the time that you created that service request?
01:32:22 I don't really remember the times of anything. It was all very fuzzy.
01:32:26 Before this moment, so this is about 15 minutes into the call, did you pass any other information on about the call to anyone in the control room or on the incident ground?
01:32:38 In the control room, a few times people came over and were asking questions about what call you were on.
01:32:47 So I don't remember who it was, but I remember a couple of people coming over and saying the information I'd got from the call.
01:32:56 And that was before this point, was it? Before 014545?
01:32:59 I believe it was.
01:33:01 So before 15 minutes into the call.
01:33:03 Yeah.
01:33:04 Do you remember who came over to you?
01:33:06 No, I don't remember. I remember Peter May coming over.
01:33:12 I don't think it was him I told the information to.
01:33:16 I remember him being more concerned about that if we needed to, we could stay with a caller, but him saying you need to keep taking calls because of the number that was coming in.
01:33:32 So was he trying to, as it were, get you off the call onto another one?
01:33:37 He was making us aware that if everyone had stayed on the call they were on, that there would have potentially been a large number of people in that building that we would never have spoke to.
01:33:48 Did you pay attention to what he was saying?
01:33:50 Yes.
01:33:51 But we can see you stayed on the call for another 45 minutes or so.
01:33:56 I did say to him, are we staying or do I have to leave, words to that sense. And he said if you need to stay.
01:34:05 So he left it to your judgment to stay on the call.
01:34:07 Yeah.
01:34:08 Now, given what you had found out in the 15 or so minutes, perhaps 16 minutes before this point in the call, is there a reason why you made this service request only at this point?
01:34:21 I don't remember the specifics. It could be that I passed it verbally and that that was a message with additional information or that it would have gone out verbally anyway to the people that were coming around.
01:34:43 Is it fair to say that this was around about the time representing the first point in the call when you knew reliably there were 11 people in that flat?
01:34:52 Yes, I'd say it took me a long time to be able to get enough information to pass over.
01:35:03 Now, you say in your statement, and indeed it's clear from the transcript, that the caller lived on the 20th floor but had moved to the top of the building, the 23rd floor. Did you think of putting that information into the service request?
01:35:19 No, I think at the time I didn't think that was relevant. It didn't matter to me where she came from, it was where she was, because no message had been sent prior to that. It hadn't been a movement. They hadn't been informed where she was originally, so I didn't need to update them where she had moved to.
01:35:39 Might it have been helpful for the crews at the incident ground to know that a caller had fled a flat on the 20th floor and had moved up three floors?
01:35:49 Not to my knowledge or understanding, from my point of view they would need to know where a caller is. They don't have numbers of where people are prior to any information passed to them.
01:36:01 Does that tell us that in fact in your training you weren't trained to look out for patterns of fire spread in a building and be able to pass that information to the incident ground?
01:36:10 No.
01:36:11 No.
01:36:12 No, okay. At this point would you have said that this was by now a full-blown fire survival guidance call?
01:36:20 Yes, yeah.
01:36:22 Did you try to ask for help at this stage from Alex Norman or Debbie Riel?
01:36:26 I looked up for help right at the start of the call because I had never taken an FSG and you should have people sitting with you. It's a lot for one person to do.
01:36:36 Everyone was busy, everyone was on calls, looking around the room, but there was no one free.
01:36:43 Right.
01:36:46 Now, at page 26, if I can just take you forward to that, you say at the bottom of that page, again, they're coming up to you, okay?
01:37:02 I know it's scary, but they're coming for you, okay? And it seems like forever. Minutes seem like hours, I know, but they're right below you, okay?
01:37:10 They're making their way up, I promise. This is over the page. Just pausing there. Again, is that the same sort of reassurance without backed up by information as before?
01:37:22 Yeah, just based on what I expect to happen, what normally happens.
01:37:28 And then you ask her her name, as we can see at the top of page 27, and she says Jessica. Is there a reason why you asked for her name?
01:37:36 The length of the call, and I thought that having a name would help get her back to the call when she wandered off talking to people.
01:37:44 Right. Okay. And then it looks as if you then talk about her age, and then you go on to page 28. If you can just go to page 28.
01:38:01 There's some discussion at the foot of the page about flat number. You ask her, is there anyone there at the moment that might know what flat number you're in?
01:38:11 Anyone? And she says, which is the flat number? And then as a caller two, we're on 201.
01:38:19 And at that point, do you remember whether somebody else came on the phone?
01:38:23 I remember hearing a voice in the background, but I'd heard voices in the background quite a few times. I think that was the clearest one I'd heard.
01:38:33 But it didn't make me aware that I was talking to someone else. I thought they may have just said it out loud.
01:38:40 Right. And then she says, 2-1-2-1, and then it's clarified during the course of the next page, 201.
01:38:49 Is there a reason why you didn't get the flat number from her at an earlier stage?
01:38:55 I thought that she didn't know the flat number to begin with because she had gone up.
01:39:05 And I got it later on by going back to it and asking, and she got it from the person who she was with.
01:39:15 Should you have got that information from her earlier in the call?
01:39:19 The earlier it came would have been better. But as I said, it found it quite hard to gauge her and get all the information that I needed.
01:39:30 And then at page 31 of the transcript, just moving to that, you say, two thirds of the way down the page, having established the flat number,
01:39:39 you say, OK, I'll send them that message so they know exactly where you are, yeah.
01:39:45 Is there anyone else in there that's someone older? And there's some discussion after that about whether you can speak to them.
01:39:52 Now, I just want to see if we can pin this down to a time.
01:39:56 If you can look back again, please, at the short incident log, that's MET 00013830, page 21.
01:40:10 And go, please, to the time mark of 015644, which is the top of page 21.
01:40:20 We can see 015848, in fact, 015848SR.
01:40:38 You see that?
01:40:40 Yeah.
01:40:42 Service request, 11 persons and a baby in flat 201, and that's next to your initial. Is that when you sent that service request?
01:40:52 Yeah, if it's on the log, that's what it would have been.
01:40:59 Now, so we can put a time on that.
01:41:04 Now, if we can just look at a picture, this is MET 00016912.
01:41:14 We've had some evidence, Ms Russell, about what this is, and this is one of two whiteboards in the control room maintained by the officer, Olyph, Jason Olyph.
01:41:32 We can see on this one that it says, the third item down from the top, 201, 23rd floor, two-year-old, 11 people, now unconscious.
01:41:45 To the best of your recollection, does that reflect a message that you passed to Mr Olyph on the night?
01:41:57 I don't remember the unconscious part, but the 11 people, I don't know whether that was based off of my message or what someone else had given in.
01:42:10 Do you have any recollection of specifically passing a message to Jason Olyph at and around this point?
01:42:19 We were writing down flat numbers, floors, additional information, and that was then taken off by a collection of different people.
01:42:28 How were you sending those over? You were writing them down on a piece of paper and then giving them to other control room staff or somebody else?
01:42:39 I remember a few times I think the officer of the day himself may have come over and taken them.
01:42:45 I think Joanne took a few, I think Yvonne Adams may have taken a few as well, so it was a few different people.
01:42:54 At this point, we've got the time here on this page 158.48, so very near 2 o'clock in the morning.
01:43:10 Do you remember whether you were getting any information back from the incident ground?
01:43:15 No, I don't really remember any information coming back in.
01:43:19 Did that cause you any difficulties in being able to give clear advice to this caller?
01:43:28 Yes, I wasn't really aware of what was going on inside that building.
01:43:33 Okay, now is there a reason why you didn't ask your senior officers in the control room to push the command unit to give you a clear picture of what was going on?
01:43:50 I would believe that they would have been doing that themselves. They would want a clear picture of what was going on as well.
01:43:58 Now, I've come to the end of the transcript I want to show you, Ms Russell.
01:44:04 I just want to ask you a general question. It's clear that during this call you were dealing with a young person.
01:44:09 Looking back on it, is there anything in your training that you would have liked to have had which would have prepared you to handle this call?
01:44:18 More experience with dealing with it, with FSG calls. I hadn't had any training since that one day in training and that was eight to nine months later.
01:44:34 Training with high rise and the multiple calls as well. When that volume of calls comes in, what do you prioritise the caller you're with or taking more calls? Just a set procedure to follow.
01:44:54 Just going back to the training and opening up the questions we looked at earlier in the morning this morning. When you did FSG training, was there any role play where callers were actors pretending to be trapped?
01:45:08 No, I've heard of that happening but on that call we didn't do that. We had examples played but there was no role play.
01:45:16 You say you've heard of that happening. Is that in the LFB or other fire and rescue services?
01:45:22 In the LFB there are FSG training days where command units come in and they act out that way but I hadn't been a part of one of those.
01:45:30 Were those training days before Grenfell or after?
01:45:34 I'm not sure.
01:45:39 I'm going to ask you about one or two other calls very briefly. First of all flat 173 and this is a call at 226 48. I'll do this by reference to the control report if I can please which is at page 81 and the control room report.
01:46:09 Go to that page 81. That's LFB quadruple 04790.
01:46:27 There's a related transcript which I don't think I need to take you to which is LFB quintuple 0355. I'll take you to this on this page because it's a summary.
01:46:39 It's a call from a female caller at the bottom of the page 226 48 reporting that she's inside Grenfell Tower in flat 173 on the 20th floor in her living room with her mum.
01:46:52 Control room officer Russell checks if there's smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke.
01:46:57 Control room Russell advises they have two choices. If it's safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she's too high to leave.
01:47:05 The caller explains she's opened the front door and it's very smoky outside.
01:47:10 CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces.
01:47:20 CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the brigade is in attendance and she will pass the information on to the crews.
01:47:26 She ends the call by saying if anything changes they should call back.
01:47:30 First of all do you recall receiving this call, taking it?
01:47:36 Yes, I think I remember that one.
01:47:39 Now you can see from the text of the summary I've shown you that the caller told you that it was very smoky outside the front door.
01:47:46 Is there a reason why you didn't explore with the caller any way in which this caller could leave?
01:47:53 No, I think that I was pressing on through calls then, aware of just getting information, wanting to get to as many callers as possible.
01:48:08 She told me it was smoky, very smoky outside the flat.
01:48:13 I didn't want to send her into a possibly worse situation than she was already in.
01:48:19 Did you think to yourself, she says it's smoky but I need to know how smoky, she might be assessing it as actually more dangerous than it was or do you just take her at face value?
01:48:31 I took it at face value.
01:48:33 Do you remember whether you relayed the details of this call to the incident ground?
01:48:42 That I believe was put on paper.
01:48:45 I'm not 100% sure but I think that was put on a paper note that was then taken off and put up on the board.
01:48:51 Looking back on the night, was that your practice at about this time?
01:48:57 That was the standard thing, we were writing down the information, it was all being relayed to the boards and then passed over from one person on the command unit.
01:49:08 Do you have any particular recollection of any call that you took where you didn't record the details of the call on a piece of paper and then hand it up to the people running the whiteboards?
01:49:19 I don't have any recollection of not passing it over.
01:49:22 I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over and they were ticked off.
01:49:32 But there would have been any updates if someone was unconscious, she'd write unconscious next to it.
01:49:41 I'd like to ask you about another call.
01:49:44 It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41.
01:49:57 I'm going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB 360, LFB quintuple 0360.
01:50:15 Is it okay if we have a quick toilet break?
01:50:27 Yes, of course.
01:50:29 Probably due for a break anyway, aren't we?
01:50:32 Yes, Mr Chairman, we're doing quite well.
01:50:34 We'll come back in 10 minutes.
01:50:37 Thank you.
01:50:38 10 to 12.
01:50:45 Yes, 10 to 12.
01:51:15 Thank you.
01:51:45 Thank you.
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02:00:45 Thank you.
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02:01:45 Thank you.
02:02:15 Thank you.
02:02:45 Thank you.
02:03:15 Thank you.
02:03:25 All right, Ms. Russell?
02:03:27 Yes.
02:03:28 Thank you.
02:03:30 Thank you.
02:03:32 Ms. Russell, thanks for coming back to us.
02:03:34 I'm going to ask you about a call, and I'll direct from the transcript, because I think it's quicker.
02:03:38 This comes from flat 82, and it's at 02-32-41, and this is LFB quintuple 0360.
02:03:44 We can see the time from the blue strap of numbers on the top of the page, and it's the second from the right, which tells us that this is 02-32-41.
02:03:53 And we know it's flat 82 from page two.
02:03:58 I just want to take you straight to page three of this call.
02:04:01 At the top of that page, the caller says, it's the fire.
02:04:05 It's okay at the moment, but the fire seems to be spreading, and it's blocking past the windows.
02:04:11 And you say, spreading.
02:04:13 Okay, so do you think it's safer for you than this over speaking?
02:04:16 I can't see, because obviously I'm inside, huh?
02:04:19 And then you say, do you think it's safer for you to stay or to try to leave?
02:04:24 Now, why did you ask her that question?
02:04:28 I was trying to gauge what he thought of the situation, if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in.
02:04:37 Right.
02:04:38 And does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment?
02:04:46 As I said before, we're not there.
02:04:49 What we give is guidance.
02:04:51 We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing.
02:04:57 So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide what is safer for them to do.
02:05:09 They were there. They could see I couldn't.
02:05:13 Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller make that assessment jointly with you?
02:05:21 I would just say the volume of calls coming in again, at that point we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information.
02:05:32 There were so many calls.
02:05:34 And for the lack of people we had in the room, making sure we did have all the people that were in there.
02:05:41 Now, at this point in time, this is just after 2.30,
02:05:47 we know that your call with Jessica had ended.
02:05:54 Is there a reason why the information that you got on that call didn't tell you to tell this caller to get out, come what may?
02:06:05 I hadn't been told.
02:06:08 When I was told to tell people to get out,
02:06:15 that's when I started telling them to cover themselves with the towels and blankets to get down,
02:06:22 and that they needed to try and leave.
02:06:25 But I didn't feel you could force people to do that.
02:06:30 Does that mean that what you learnt on the call with Jessica didn't then feed into the advice you were giving to this caller?
02:06:38 Not necessarily, because they were on a different floor, in a different flat.
02:06:45 It was a different situation.
02:06:47 But you'd learnt from the Jessica call that the smoke at least had travelled, in the end, fatally, as we know, to the top floor.
02:06:56 Is there a reason why learning that didn't then prompt you to tell this caller from flat 82 on the 11th floor to get out, come what may?
02:07:05 Just again, I didn't know how bad it was in the stairwell.
02:07:09 I didn't know what I was sending them into.
02:07:11 So to force someone to leave could have been worse than them staying.
02:07:17 Just going back to the Jessica call, do you think you would have been assisted on that call by having a more senior or experienced control room officer sitting next to you and monitoring you?
02:07:28 Yes.
02:07:30 Were you aware during that call, I know it was an hour long, but were you aware that during that call there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat?
02:07:42 No, not at the time I was in. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another brigade, I think.
02:07:49 But nobody, is this right, that nobody in the control room came up to you during that period and said you should know there's another call in progress?
02:07:56 No, I wasn't aware at the time.
02:07:58 Okay. Now, you touched on just a moment ago the change in the state put advice.
02:08:08 Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7?
02:08:13 You say in the second paragraph on that page, not long after the call finished I became aware that the advice we were giving to callers to stay where they were had changed to try and make attempts to leave via the stairwell.
02:08:35 I think this was about an hour or two into the incident.
02:08:38 I was told by Joanne, the senior operations manager, and I think someone else too.
02:08:43 Now, first of all, you say not long after the call finished. Can we be a bit more specific about that?
02:08:55 Again, my memory of the times weren't very good. My recollection of not long after may have been quite some time after.
02:09:07 At any rate, not by 232, which was the flat 82 call we just looked at, you think?
02:09:15 Possibly, I'm not sure.
02:09:19 Now, looking at your statement and what you say there, first of all, how did Joanne relay this information to you?
02:09:27 She came around and verbally passed it on.
02:09:31 Right. Did she tell you about what you should now be saying to callers?
02:09:36 To cover themselves, to not bring in the smoke, and to make their way down the stairs.
02:09:42 At that stage, did you think that the fire brigade would no longer be able to rescue people, or did you think there was still a possibility they might?
02:09:50 I didn't think there was a chance, but I had never heard of the advice changing to that, so it was something entirely different from what had ever happened before.
02:10:02 Did Joanne Smith tell you in what terms or with what tone to give this new advice to callers?
02:10:13 No, I don't recall that.
02:10:16 Right. Having had that instruction from her, did you then start applying the new advice straight away to the next call you got?
02:10:26 I don't recall. I guess I would have, but I don't recall.
02:10:32 You don't recall?
02:10:40 Let's see if we can pin this down.
02:10:42 Transcript LFB quintuple 0368.
02:10:47 This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204.
02:10:53 And we can see from the transcript group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02-3607.
02:11:02 Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript?
02:11:07 Do you say, quarter of the way down the page, OK, listen, the fire is getting quite bad.
02:11:16 Do you think it would be better if you covered yourself with a wet towel and tried to make your way down the building?
02:11:22 Caller says, I can't see outside my door. He says it a number of times.
02:11:26 Given that that was the advice you were giving at that point in the call, do you think you've had the instruction from Jo Smith at this point?
02:11:35 Yeah, I would say so.
02:11:37 So was it your understanding that that was, the advice you were giving there was, get out as opposed to stay put?
02:11:44 Yes, yeah, but saying the best option would be to leave.
02:11:49 Right.
02:11:51 Now, can I ask you to look at another call, which is 02-5109.
02:12:01 It's LFB quintuple 0386 and this is flat 193.
02:12:21 And again, we can see from the numbers second from the right that this is at 02-5109.
02:12:29 So again now after the time at which you'd given, you'd been given that instruction.
02:12:35 And this is a call from, as I say, flat 193.
02:12:40 And at page three of the transcript you say, okay, listen, you can do one of two things.
02:12:52 You can either make your way into a room and shut the door, keep the smoke out and stay low, or you can try and make your way out of the building.
02:12:59 You have to decide which is safer, okay?
02:13:01 If you're going to make your way out of the building, and then it turns into a discussion about not going downstairs.
02:13:09 It looks from the transcript, Mr. Russell, that in this call you were giving the caller a choice as to whether to leave or not.
02:13:16 Is that fair?
02:13:18 Yes, yeah.
02:13:20 Why was that at this point?
02:13:22 Again, I was making them aware that they needed to leave and how, but again, if you send them out into fire, bad smoke,
02:13:33 I could be potentially sending them out to a death where if they waited they may have been rescued.
02:13:39 Does that tell us that in your understanding what Joe Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit?
02:13:52 No, I was at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying.
02:14:02 I was aware that we were now saying that making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could have been worse than staying in.
02:14:16 So for me I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside.
02:14:26 To your understanding, did Joe Smith say that you've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs?
02:14:36 I don't remember the wording of it.
02:14:39 Did you? Sorry.
02:14:41 I don't remember the wording of it.
02:14:44 The specific wording of it, I just remember saying that, you know, to get getting out and the towels and making the way out.
02:14:53 Right. I'm just trying to get a feel for how clear and firm and black and white the advice you understood you had to give was to be.
02:15:04 So the question really is, when Joanne Smith came round and gave you the change in advice, did you understand her to be telling you, you've got to get these callers to get out come what may?
02:15:16 Or did you still think there was an element of assessment, judgement, decision about it?
02:15:21 I think there would always be an assessment, an element of assessing and judgement.
02:15:26 Some people stayed with callers down the stairs. At that point they would have still been assessing as well.
02:15:33 Turning to page 8 of the transcript, you say there, a third of the way down, having given some advice about what people should put over them and cover themselves, you say there's a lot of people inside and the firefighters are struggling to get to everyone okay.
02:15:54 So your best bet is to try and make your way out the building.
02:15:57 And then in the next section where you're speaking, you say 22nd floor, I know, I know, but your best bet is to try and get out.
02:16:05 And then you say that again, you use that expression a third time. Okay, your best bet is to try to leave and get outside.
02:16:12 When you were using the expression your best bet, what were you trying to tell the caller?
02:16:17 What I give is guidance that the choice, I'm advising on the choice to make that the best bet was to leave.
02:16:30 No choice was 100% safe, but that was the best one I was offering.
02:16:37 Right, and do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Joe Smith?
02:16:42 Yes.
02:16:43 I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave.
02:16:50 I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking.
02:16:54 He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious.
02:17:01 Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice?
02:17:11 Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that.
02:17:18 Right. It looks as if by using the expression best bet that actually you were still giving the caller an element of choice about it.
02:17:29 Is that how you understood your role at this point?
02:17:32 I don't really remember.
02:17:37 Now, I just want to ask you about callbacks.
02:17:52 You say in your statement on page seven, halfway down the page, there was still a stack of calls that needed to be answered and we began telling them the new advice.
02:18:10 We were able to tell on our screens from the numbers if the caller had called previously.
02:18:18 There were quite a few that I spoke to on more than one occasion.
02:18:21 We were relentless, call after call after call.
02:18:23 I do not remember ringing anyone back or even having the chance, just updating the callers with the new advice.
02:18:29 We kept asking them that if their situation changed to keep calling us back, which a number of them did.
02:18:36 Did you understand whether there were facilities to be able to call people back in the Stratford control room?
02:18:43 We can always call people back, but on that night there were so many calls and so few people.
02:18:50 We were struggling just to answer the calls coming in, let alone call anyone back.
02:18:55 Did you know whether there was a policy on not calling people back?
02:18:59 We don't call back landlines. It's viewed that if you call back a landline, you're encouraging someone to go back into a fire.
02:19:08 Were most of the calls you could see on your system from landlines or from mobiles?
02:19:12 I remember seeing a large number of mobile numbers, but I wouldn't know the make-up of them.
02:19:20 Given that there were a large number of mobile numbers, does that mean that the policy of not calling them back wouldn't apply to them, so you could have called them back had you had the chance?
02:19:31 No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us other than the volume of calls coming in.
02:19:40 On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph,
02:19:50 the control room uses computers as a strategic resource, and then you say often a TV is on, usually showing the news so we know what is going on.
02:20:00 We're allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work, but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them.
02:20:06 Now, do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call?
02:20:17 I have never really found it that helpful, because other than Grenfell, I haven't been involved in the major incident that has been filmed on the news while you're on the phone to callers.
02:20:34 So prior to the night of the call, you had no experience of whether or not having the TV on would have assisted you or not?
02:20:41 No, I don't recall being in a situation where seeing it would have been relevant.
02:20:46 Right. And then on page 8 of your witness statement, you say at the second paragraph, three lines up from the end,
02:21:03 we had no TV on, at the end of the line it says we had no TV in the control room.
02:21:13 So first paragraph on the screen there, three lines up, we had no TV on the control room, so I had a look on the phone and then saw the extent of the blaze.
02:21:22 I remember someone saying, oh my God, how is anyone still calling us? The whole building was on fire.
02:21:28 Roughly, and I know it's difficult to estimate times during the night, but roughly what time of the night do you think that was?
02:21:34 It would have been quite late on into the incident when it had quietened down enough to be able to look at social media and the internet news.
02:21:45 I can't guess the time, but it would have been quite late on.
02:21:51 Do you remember whether you took any further 999 calls from anybody in the building after that time?
02:21:58 I don't recall. I know I went back onto channel two when it had quietened down enough for me to take the channel back again.
02:22:07 Did seeing for the first time the image of this building on fire affect or change the advice that you'd been giving to callers up to that point?
02:22:18 It's hard to say. It may have, because before that I didn't know what I was dealing with.
02:22:26 So it may have, but I can't say that for sure.
02:22:31 Now, slightly different subject. Are you aware of the facility in the control room called the Helly Telly Downlink?
02:22:41 I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember.
02:22:47 Right. So does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would have helped you if you'd had it operating on the night?
02:22:56 I wouldn't know. I've never had any experience with it.
02:23:01 Now, turning to a different subject, if you had known that many callers, or a number of callers at least, were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way?
02:23:29 Yes, because that would have meant that the units weren't contained, they weren't fireproof for the amount of time that they should have been, or may have not been contained.
02:23:41 And what advice, knowing that information, what advice would you then have given?
02:23:48 I would have known that there would have been a lot less time they had in that, in where they were.
02:23:56 So I probably would have emphasised more at the start, knowing that they didn't have as much time as what you'd think they would have to leave, rather than to wait for rescue.
02:24:11 Ms Russell, thank you very much. I've come to the end of the questions I have for you, so I'm extremely grateful to you. I normally ask the Chairman to rise for a few minutes just to see whether there are any further questions I need to ask you. So I'm going to ask him to do that if I may.
02:24:24 Well, there may be a few questions that the Council has forgotten about. So I'm going to rise for five minutes just to let him take stock.
02:24:32 So don't talk to anyone about your evidence when you're out of the room. If you go with the archer, we'll resume in about five minutes.
02:24:39 Thank you.
02:24:54 Right, Mr Millit, I'm going to say 20 past. It's a slightly generous five minutes.
02:24:58 If I can get you back in earlier than that, Mr Chairman, I will do that.
02:25:02 Yes, very well. Thank you.
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02:39:28 Thank you.
02:39:30 Thank you.
02:39:58 Thank you.
02:40:28 Thank you.
02:40:30 Thank you.
02:40:58 Thank you.
02:41:00 Thank you.
02:41:01 Thank you.
02:41:28 Thank you.
02:41:58 If they are in a property fire you ask if they can get out, but normally if a caller
02:42:03 has a disability or can't get out they normally do inform you quite early on in the call.
02:42:10 Presumably Kent has written policies on how to handle 999 calls and FSG calls, is that
02:42:15 right?
02:42:16 Yes.
02:42:17 And is there a specific policy for the handling of FSG calls?
02:42:22 I don't know.
02:42:25 Now could I turn to the topic of stay put?
02:42:29 Now again it's in your statement, we don't need to go to it.
02:42:33 You say there at page 2 of the last paragraph, my understanding of the stay put policy within
02:42:39 buildings is that every building is different and have different policies.
02:42:43 Some have stay put policies which are put in place by the building management team and
02:42:47 others do not.
02:42:48 Personally I would ask each caller what the policy is for their building and then be guided
02:42:53 by them.
02:42:54 If a stay put policy is in place and the individual is unable to get out we would enact the fire
02:42:59 survival guidance.
02:43:01 Now when you say that you would ask the caller whether there is a stay put policy in place,
02:43:07 does that mean you wouldn't usually have that information in front of you?
02:43:11 No, we don't have information.
02:43:14 What happens if a caller doesn't know whether there is a stay put policy in place?
02:43:19 If no other calls had come in from the same building we would then start fire survival
02:43:24 guidance.
02:43:25 Immediately?
02:43:26 Yes, if they couldn't get out.
02:43:30 Now what other information would you try to be gathering from a caller who is calling
02:43:35 from a building that has a stay put policy?
02:43:38 Could you take us through the type of information you would be after?
02:43:41 Obviously you would get their address, so normally stay put policy is in a block of
02:43:47 flats for example, so you would get the flat number, what floor they were on, determine
02:43:52 what room they were in.
02:43:55 I always try and get the route so if we were to enter via the front door would our firefighters
02:44:00 turn left or right, the routing to find them in that specific room.
02:44:04 Would you ask them about the extent to which their flat had been affected by heat or smoke?
02:44:08 Yes, if smoke was coming in we would ask them to put stuff at the bottom of the door.
02:44:14 Can you explain in what circumstances you would advise a person within the building
02:44:19 that is governed by a stay put policy to leave?
02:44:22 Well unless we have been told that a stay put policy isn't relevant, but I have never
02:44:29 been in the situation to have to do that, so I can't answer that.
02:44:32 Can I turn next to fire survival guidance itself?
02:44:36 Now again at page 2 of your witness statement, and it is the second paragraph from the bottom
02:44:40 for reference, you explain that fire survival guidance relates to calls in which the caller
02:44:45 tells us they are stuck within a premises and are unable to get out.
02:44:49 How do you go about finding out that the resident is in fact stuck?
02:44:56 If smoke is coming through the door of the bedroom or the room that they are in, and
02:45:03 it is too dangerous for them to exit that door and it is safer for them to stay in the
02:45:07 room they are in, that is when you would give fire survival.
02:45:13 You also say in your statement that you stay on the phone to those callers to make sure
02:45:17 they are rescued.
02:45:19 Would you also expect to receive updates from the incident ground as to how a particular
02:45:22 rescue is progressing?
02:45:25 Yes, when the crews get there they will put back messages via the radio.
02:45:32 Normally if they know someone is in it is maybe a swift rescue, so I just normally stay
02:45:39 on the phone to the caller and see if they can hear anybody shouting or if they can see
02:45:44 the fire service outside.
02:45:46 Would you get any specific updates from the incident ground saying we have deployed a
02:45:50 crew, crew have located the flat, crew have rescued the residents, mission completed,
02:45:56 something along those lines?
02:45:57 Yes, they will always update with radio messages throughout the incident.
02:46:01 Can I now talk to calls from other brigades?
02:46:04 Now page 3 of your witness statement, and again we don't need to go to it unless you
02:46:08 want to but it is the first big paragraph on that page, you say this, in the event that
02:46:13 we take calls from other brigades the protocol would be to keep the caller on the line and
02:46:18 call the other brigade simultaneously and introduce the caller to that brigade having
02:46:22 told them what was being reported.
02:46:24 For a brigade like London we have them on speed dial.
02:46:27 If we do not receive any answer we would take ownership of the call and continue to
02:46:31 take all relevant information whilst continuing to try and contact the necessary brigade.
02:46:37 Now you refer there to protocol, is that protocol contained within a formalised document or
02:46:43 not?
02:46:44 I'm unsure.
02:46:45 Have you received any training on what the arrangements are when you take calls in relation
02:46:49 to incidents covered by other brigades?
02:46:52 Yes.
02:46:53 Can you give us a help, what type of training have you provided, have you been given in
02:46:57 respect to that?
02:46:58 It's just how to handle the call, what information we should take.
02:47:01 We then ask the caller to stay on the line, we then do the short dial to whichever brigade,
02:47:07 introduce the caller, pass over a mobile number in case we lose them and then we just transfer
02:47:11 the caller through.
02:47:13 And do you have phone lines which are dedicated for that purpose?
02:47:18 Well we have short dials, we don't have to pick a phone that is for London Fire but we
02:47:24 have short dials on our telephone.
02:47:27 And in your previous experience of dealing with London, do those calls go straight through
02:47:31 to a crow or do they go through to a supervisor within the brigade control in London?
02:47:36 It goes through to an operator.
02:47:40 Apart from London, do you know which other brigade Kent is able to take calls for?
02:47:45 Essex, we take calls for East Sussex and Surrey.
02:47:49 And they're your buddy fire and rescue services?
02:47:52 We don't have a buddy fire and rescue, they're our neighbouring services.
02:47:55 Now, on the night of the 14th of June, we noticed a BT operator called and asked if
02:48:01 Kent was able to take calls on behalf of the LFB.
02:48:05 Is that how usually the system works?
02:48:07 You get contacted by BT first?
02:48:13 For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone
02:48:17 master's picked it up so it comes through to us.
02:48:19 If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's
02:48:25 when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help with overflow of calls.
02:48:30 And in your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from
02:48:34 London to other areas?
02:48:37 The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to.
02:48:41 We would then double check with our senior management and then we will call BT back and
02:48:44 say yes or no, you know, we were able to assist.
02:48:48 And when you say you check with senior management, what rank are we talking about that you'd
02:48:52 contact?
02:48:53 It will be our duty control manager.
02:48:58 And on the 14th of June, can you remember who your duty control manager was on that
02:49:01 night?
02:49:02 It was station manager Gill.
02:49:06 When you've taken ownership of a call, is there a means of getting information about
02:49:10 the details of the incident?
02:49:16 When you accept calls from another brigade's area, is there a means by which you can contact
02:49:23 that brigade to get more details about the particular incident that you're about to start
02:49:27 receiving 999 calls from?
02:49:31 To be honest, it doesn't happen often that we get overflow of calls from another brigade.
02:49:36 That's the first time that I've experienced it.
02:49:42 Do you know if in the event that you do need more detail than you're getting from the 999
02:49:48 call itself, has your training given you any number that you can contact to get more detail
02:49:53 about an incident from the, if I can call it the home brigade?
02:49:56 It will be just the short dial number.
02:49:58 And again, that could go through to the operator.
02:50:08 Is there a way of passing on relevant information that the caller gives you directly to the
02:50:12 incident ground?
02:50:15 From another brigade?
02:50:16 Yes.
02:50:17 No.
02:50:18 So we would tell the relevant control room and they will speak to their ground.
02:50:21 We don't have contact with other brigades on the incident ground.
02:50:26 Have you heard, you told us you haven't had previous experience, but have you heard people
02:50:29 using an airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered
02:50:36 by another brigade?
02:50:37 We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade.
02:50:42 Should I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin?
02:50:45 Now just to get this right, as I understand it, you were in overall charge of the control
02:50:49 room, is that right?
02:50:50 Yes.
02:50:51 And with you was Mitch Sampson, who was a crew manager.
02:50:53 Yeah.
02:50:54 Paul Stables, who's a radio operator and Jade Milson was a phone operator.
02:50:59 Now in your statement, you refer to Chris Else as the senior manager.
02:51:06 Can you help us?
02:51:07 Where does he lie in your chain of command?
02:51:08 He would have been our duty group manager for that night.
02:51:12 And so he would be above Linda Gill?
02:51:15 Yes.
02:51:16 And again, you've set out that your duty control manager was Linda Gill.
02:51:21 Was she within the control chain of command or does she have any operational experience?
02:51:26 She used to work in the control room.
02:51:30 She's now a station manager.
02:51:32 Will you have access, do you need access in the control room to someone who has operational
02:51:36 experience?
02:51:37 Normally, all of our senior managers have operational experience.
02:51:45 And do you have operational experience?
02:51:46 No.
02:51:47 So you an exception to the rule?
02:51:51 Most people in the control room do not.
02:51:53 There's some part-time firefighters, but normally us in the control room are.
02:51:59 We don't have operational experience.
02:52:02 Now if I could ask you to turn to page three of your witness statement.
02:52:06 If you look at the fourth paragraph on that page, five lines down, you say this.
02:52:13 At some point in the night, I cannot be sure of any times, we received a phone call from
02:52:17 BT asking whether we would be prepared to take calls on behalf of the London Fire Brigade.
02:52:23 Now we can go to it if you want to, but we have an entry in the brigade control report
02:52:28 at 0147, and that's at page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining
02:52:35 that BT had been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the
02:52:41 incident, including the address, and Crowe Howson explains it's a 25-pump fire with persons
02:52:46 reported.
02:52:48 Does 0147 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT?
02:52:53 It sounds correct, yeah.
02:52:57 Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent?
02:53:01 It would have been Paul who was on the radio.
02:53:07 I asked him to be my go-to.
02:53:11 As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that
02:53:14 time so I asked him to be our liaison.
02:53:17 And that's Paul Stables who we referred to earlier?
02:53:19 Yes.
02:53:20 At that time, were you made aware that it was a 25-pump fire?
02:53:26 I can't remember.
02:53:27 Can you remember whether you were informed as to the number of pumps being escalated
02:53:31 during the course of the night?
02:53:33 I can't remember.
02:53:38 At that stage, did you know what advice in relation to stay put was being given to residents?
02:53:43 I knew that it was a stay put policy.
02:53:48 And can you remember whether you were told that at 0147 or later on in the evening?
02:53:53 That it was a stay put policy?
02:53:56 We knew that.
02:53:57 You knew that anyway?
02:53:58 Yeah, we were told that.
02:54:01 Did you discuss at this initial stage what advice your team should be giving to residents
02:54:07 phoning from the tower?
02:54:10 When we found out we were taking calls for London, I looked on the news, saw the incident
02:54:15 and I told my team that we may be receiving very difficult calls.
02:54:20 Now, you say, that flows into my next question, you say, same page, on the fourth paragraph
02:54:28 on page three, four lines on the bottom, that you were prompted to look at the news, which
02:54:31 you just said.
02:54:32 Do you remember how soon after the initial call from BT that was?
02:54:37 Yeah.
02:54:38 Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached
02:54:43 or not?
02:54:44 I don't understand the question.
02:54:46 Do you understand, you're aware of the principle of compartmentation?
02:54:50 No.
02:54:51 That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment.
02:54:57 Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good?
02:55:01 No.
02:55:02 No.
02:55:03 When you looked at the footage that was being broadcast on the television, what crossed your
02:55:10 mind as to the particular advice that would require to be given to those calling in relation
02:55:15 to the fire?
02:55:17 I just informed the team that fire survival guidance will be the advice that will be given
02:55:23 out.
02:55:25 Now we know from your statement that Kent had access to images from the helicam.
02:55:30 Was the helicam footage available as soon as you were notified of the incident?
02:55:35 We automatically on our screen, you can open up the CCTV.
02:55:40 I always do it when I start shift as a manager in the control room that covers the whole
02:55:45 of Kent and there is a screen that is the helicam.
02:55:49 I don't think it was on at the beginning, but that is something that the police helicopter
02:55:53 had to turn on.
02:55:54 So you are dependent upon them?
02:55:56 Yes, they have to switch the switch to turn it on.
02:55:59 Does it help having footage from the helicam when giving advice and thinking what the appropriate
02:56:04 advice is to give to those?
02:56:06 Not that night, no.
02:56:07 Why do you say that?
02:56:09 It was on the heat camera as it were, so the whole building was obviously glowing, so you
02:56:14 couldn't really determine flaws and stuff.
02:56:17 It would have made no difference to the advice we gave.
02:56:21 Does the same drawback apply to the footage you saw being broadcast on the telly?
02:56:25 Yes.
02:56:26 You also say in that paragraph on page 3 that for a few hours you received nothing.
02:56:35 Did that surprise you?
02:56:36 Yes.
02:56:37 Did you try and make contact with LFB control to find out what was happening?
02:56:41 No, because I knew that they would be extremely busy.
02:56:43 So you just waited, prepared for any calls that may come your way?
02:56:48 Yes.
02:56:50 We don't need to go to it unless it would help you, but we have a record in the Brigade
02:56:53 Control Report of a call from a Kent crow at 0 to 18, in which the Kent crow asked LFB
02:57:00 control for the reference number of the incident.
02:57:03 Can you help us?
02:57:04 Why would the incident number be required by Kent?
02:57:07 Because we will make an instant R-end if we took any calls, and it's just for cross-referencing.
02:57:13 If we needed to ring London at a later date, we have their incident number.
02:57:19 The next topic I'd like to discuss with you is the change in stay-put advice that happened
02:57:23 on the night.
02:57:26 I think probably by the time you took your first call at 0322, the advice had already
02:57:31 changed.
02:57:33 Again, we can go to the Brigade Control Report if it helps, but I'll just give you some background
02:57:39 before I ask you some questions, if that's all right, Miss Martin.
02:57:42 There was a call taken by a Kent crow at 0257 from a caller in flat 73 on the 10th floor.
02:57:50 And then we see at 0259, so roughly two minutes later, a record of Crowe Gotts at LFB control
02:57:57 taking a call from someone in Kent, explaining that they have a caller from flat 73 on the
02:58:02 line, and Crowe Gotts confirms that the current advice is to leave the building.
02:58:07 Now, I can take you to that summary, but if it helps, from the Brigade Control Report,
02:58:12 but you're content to rely on the information I've given you?
02:58:14 Yes.
02:58:15 Okay.
02:58:16 Now, if I can ask you to go to page four of your witness statement, and it's really the
02:58:20 bottom paragraph at the end of the first line, you say this, I'd been in touch with London
02:58:26 regarding the stay-put policy, and we were advised that the policy had been withdrawn.
02:58:31 Do you think this call recorded with Crowe Gotts at 0259 was you?
02:58:36 No.
02:58:37 No.
02:58:38 Who do you think it could have been from Kent making that call?
02:58:42 It would have been Paul Stables, I believe.
02:58:44 Okay.
02:58:45 Apologies, it's always difficult asking questions about timing.
02:58:51 Mm-hm.
02:58:52 Do you think the timing that we have, 0257, is about right?
02:58:56 I can't remember.
02:58:57 Okay.
02:58:58 Roughly an hour after the first notification from BT.
02:59:02 About that, but I can't remember.
02:59:05 Sorry.
02:59:06 Was this the...
02:59:07 Can you remember Paul feeding back this information to you after it...
02:59:11 Yes.
02:59:12 Yes.
02:59:13 And was that the first time you'd been made aware that LFB Control were telling people
02:59:17 to leave rather than stay-put?
02:59:18 Yeah.
02:59:19 I asked Paul to contact LFB to see if the stay-put policy was still in place, and what
02:59:25 information they were giving their callers that we, you know, carried on the same.
02:59:28 And what prompted you to make that call?
02:59:31 Was it looking at the TV footage?
02:59:33 No, just the other call that was coming into our control room was a lengthy call, so I
02:59:39 asked Paul just to double-check with London if they had changed any of their policies,
02:59:43 just so that it was consistent between all control rooms.
02:59:48 And once the information had come back from Crowe Gotts, presumably you notified the rest
02:59:52 of the Kent team of the change in the...
02:59:54 It was just the four of us in there, and I did let them know, yeah.
03:00:00 Can you remember, again, apologies, it's difficult with this passing of time, can you remember
03:00:05 the words you used or the gist of the words you used in communicating the change of advice
03:00:10 to your team?
03:00:11 There's only four of us in the room, it's not a large room, so I just said to them all
03:00:17 just to let you know, you know, the stay-put policy is no more, so...
03:00:21 And they were to get out?
03:00:23 Well, I said if you do receive any calls, you know, see if they can get out.
03:00:26 Okay.
03:00:28 Can you remember any later discussions with LFB control about what advice to give to callers?
03:00:34 I can't remember.
03:00:38 Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly
03:00:42 on the stairwells and on lobbies?
03:00:45 No, I can't remember.
03:00:47 Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night,
03:00:53 if that's okay.
03:00:54 And again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so.
03:00:58 Now, the first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73, and that was
03:01:03 a flat on the 10th floor, and the caller was a lady called Anne Chance.
03:01:08 Now, going back to the call from the Kent crow at 02.57, which I think we think is Paul
03:01:14 Stables.
03:01:16 Mitch Sampson in his witness statement says he took a call from, in relation to flat 73.
03:01:23 Do you remember Mitch taking that call?
03:01:25 Yes.
03:01:26 Yes.
03:01:27 How close to Mitch were you when he took that call?
03:01:29 He sits next to me.
03:01:31 Were you able to overhear the entire conversation?
03:01:33 I could hear what he was saying.
03:01:36 We don't monitor him as a crew manager, so I couldn't hear what she was saying back,
03:01:41 but I could hear the conversation he was having.
03:01:43 And can you remember what advice he gave, if any, about staying put or leaving?
03:01:48 I can't remember.
03:01:50 Okay.
03:01:51 Now, obviously the call with Crowe-Gots was at 02.59, and that would be two minutes after
03:01:56 Mr Sampson gets on the line to flat 73.
03:02:01 Can you remember whether, after you'd received the call from Crowe-Gots, you told Mr Sampson
03:02:07 to phone flat 73 back?
03:02:09 He was already on the phone to them, I believe.
03:02:12 Okay.
03:02:13 Did you hear him change the advice he gave to the caller?
03:02:16 I heard him say to them if they can get out, and I know they did try a few times to get
03:02:21 out, but they couldn't.
03:02:25 Would it be possible to bring up the control report itself, which is LFB quadruple 04790
03:02:34 at page 110?
03:02:39 And you'll see there, in respect to the call at 02.5732, there's a chunk of text.
03:02:45 Might I ask you just to briefly read that to yourself, just so that you're familiar
03:02:49 with what it says, and then I'll ask you a few questions about it.
03:03:39 Now, you'll see roughly 11 lines down.
03:04:01 The text says, the caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them
03:04:05 to stay, and on the other line, they have been told to evacuate.
03:04:08 The crow says that if it's safe to evacuate them, they should, but the caller says it
03:04:13 isn't safe.
03:04:16 By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller, you
03:04:21 need to get out?
03:04:22 How do you assess whether to make that decision or not?
03:04:26 It all depends what's happening outside their door.
03:04:29 If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot, you're determined by what
03:04:34 the caller tells you.
03:04:39 Can you remember whether you pressed Mr Sampson to give advice to the caller to get out?
03:04:45 I just informed him what the policy had changed for London for our brigade, and I left him
03:04:51 to deal with the call.
03:04:54 Do you know what feedback Mr Sampson gave to London about what he'd been reported to
03:05:01 him by the caller?
03:05:02 All of the information was put on an incident log.
03:05:05 That incident log was then Paul Stables.
03:05:08 As I asked him to speak to London, I believe Paul would then have rang London to update
03:05:13 them on the information.
03:05:15 I suppose my question was more directed at the substance of what Mr Sampson may have
03:05:19 told London.
03:05:20 Can you remember what he said next to him when he updated London?
03:05:25 I can't remember what he said.
03:05:28 The next call I'd like to discuss with you is in relation to flat 194, which is on the
03:05:33 22nd floor, and the resident was a man called Mr Anthony Disson.
03:05:38 As I understand it, you took the calls in relation to Mr Disson from his daughter-in-law,
03:05:45 is that right?
03:05:46 It was his wife.
03:05:47 His wife.
03:05:48 Now, the first of these calls is at 03 22 51, and if I could ask for us to go to page
03:05:57 129 in the control report, and if I could just ask you to refresh your memory, you may
03:06:08 need to go onto the other page, 129, just to refresh your memory before I ask you a
03:06:17 question.
03:06:19 And if you go onto the next page, please.
03:06:38 Now, we have the wife of the resident calling you from Kent where she was on holiday.
03:06:44 The call was put through to you via an operator in Dundee.
03:06:47 Do you know why the call came via Dundee, of all places?
03:06:50 It just did.
03:06:51 Yeah, it's just where the BTU operators are based.
03:06:54 Now, if Ralph could put down the control report and put up the transcript of the call, which
03:07:01 can be found at LFB, quintuple 0659.
03:07:07 And if I could ask you to turn to page 2.
03:07:14 And if I could ask you just to have a quick read of that page before I ask you questions.
03:07:26 Can you see it clearly enough?
03:07:27 Yeah, yeah.
03:07:28 So, thank you.
03:07:37 And if we could turn over the page to page 3, just so you can familiarise yourself with
03:07:42 it.
03:07:43 Now, as we've seen, at the bottom third of page 2 of the transcript, the caller says,
03:08:06 first of all, the fire brigade kept saying to him, stay put, stay put.
03:08:10 Now, no one ain't going to see him.
03:08:12 Ain't going to him.
03:08:13 He's been entrapped in there for over an hour.
03:08:15 And then as we see on page 3, you say, okay, we're going to give him the best advice that
03:08:19 we can, that we've been given from London Fire.
03:08:22 Okay, so I'll give him a call.
03:08:24 Now, in your witness statement on page 4, we can go to it if we need to, you say, I
03:08:29 advise what I normally would for fire survival guidance, but also assured her that I would
03:08:34 personally phone him as well.
03:08:35 Now, at that stage, was there a reason why you didn't tell her that the advice had changed
03:08:42 to get out effectively?
03:08:44 No.
03:08:47 Can you give us a reason why you wouldn't have said that to her?
03:08:51 Obviously, she's going to be in shock.
03:08:54 So I just didn't want to share that advice with her.
03:08:58 That's why I said that I would call him myself and give the advice.
03:09:04 Would there be something to be said, you've got to balance a number of considerations.
03:09:07 On the one hand, you don't want to cause unnecessary distress to the caller, but equally, you know
03:09:14 that the resident is calling his wife who's calling you.
03:09:19 Is there something to be said for telling her that the advice has changed in case the
03:09:24 resident contacts his wife again so he knows what the advice has been given by the LFB
03:09:29 to get out?
03:09:30 I didn't think about it.
03:09:33 Thank you.
03:09:35 Can I now turn to the second call you received in relation to this flat?
03:09:40 And if I could ask Ralph to go back to the control report, so LFB quadruple 04790.
03:09:52 And if I could ask you to go to page 136 within that document.
03:10:03 And then we see it's 033123.
03:10:08 At the top of that page, it says Kent F.R.S. make a call to a resident believed to be Anthony
03:10:14 Disson, who explains that he is on the stairs.
03:10:17 The Kent crow asks if he knows what floor he's on, and the line goes dead.
03:10:21 Now, if I could ask you to, Ralph, let's go to the transcript, and that's LFB quintuple
03:10:28 0660.
03:10:31 And if I could ask you just to read to yourself the first page of that.
03:10:38 Now, you'll see roughly the third entry from the bottom, you say, are your doors closed?
03:11:00 At that stage in the conversation, you appear to have thought he was still within the flat.
03:11:07 Was that simply, you assumed he was still in the flat, because he hadn't told you otherwise
03:11:12 at that stage?
03:11:13 Yeah.
03:11:14 Do you remember why you were asking whether the doors were closed or not?
03:11:21 As far as survival, you always make sure the door is closed to the fire.
03:11:26 Do you remember once you'd finished the call with the gentleman, do you remember calling
03:11:33 back London to give them an update as to what his position was?
03:11:36 I wouldn't have called back, but...
03:11:38 Paul would have done.
03:11:39 Paul would have done, yeah.
03:11:40 And so in terms, so we get an understanding of the information that's been reported back,
03:11:45 can you remember the best you can, what you told Paul to report back to London?
03:11:50 No, I can't, but it would have been confirming the flat number and the floor, definitely,
03:11:55 and maybe where his location was, but I can't really remember.
03:11:59 The fact that he was on the stairs is obviously quite a vital bit of information.
03:12:03 Can you remember, don't speculate if you can't remember, can you remember whether you identified
03:12:08 the stairs or not?
03:12:09 I can't remember.
03:12:10 So I just want, maybe there's one third final question, but I'm going to ask you to answer
03:12:15 it.
03:12:16 So I just want, maybe there's one third final call that it may be best to deal with before
03:12:22 we adjourn, if that's all right for you and obviously convenient for the witness.
03:12:27 Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin to share evidence?
03:12:33 To finish my questions, no more than ten minutes.
03:12:36 I imagine you prefer to finish your evidence before lunch, if you can remember.
03:12:41 If possible, yes.
03:12:42 All right, well on against.
03:12:43 Thank you.
03:12:44 If you want a break, please share.
03:12:45 No, yeah, that's fine, thank you.
03:12:47 Now if we can go to the third call, which I think is with Mr Disson's wife, and that
03:12:52 was at 034642, and Ralph, would you mind putting up on the screen the control report, LFB quadruple
03:12:59 zero 4790 at page 139?
03:13:04 And we see 034642, so roughly a middle way down the page.
03:13:12 I'll just let you refresh your memory of that.
03:13:15 Okay.
03:13:31 Now if we can go to the transcript, which is LFB quintuple zero 661, and page two of
03:13:39 that transcript.
03:13:42 I'll just let you refresh your memory, Ms Martin.
03:14:01 Now looking at page two, it seems that you explained to her that you tried to call Mr
03:14:06 Disson back.
03:14:07 Is that a fair summary?
03:14:08 Yeah.
03:14:09 Is it standard practice in Kent control to try to call someone back where the line goes
03:14:13 dead?
03:14:14 In that case, yeah.
03:14:17 In your view, would it be practical to call someone back if things had changed since you
03:14:21 last spoke to them, for example, if advice as to whether to leave?
03:14:24 It depends on the number of calls you were getting, and if you could start to call people
03:14:29 back.
03:14:32 Now, penultimate topic I'd like to discuss with you, and that's the question of door
03:14:37 closers.
03:14:38 Were you ever made aware during the course of a night that there was an issue in the
03:14:42 building concerning malfunctioning of self-closing front flat entrance doors?
03:14:47 If you had been aware of any issue regarding door closers, the flat entrance doors, would
03:14:51 that have affected the advice you gave to callers coming through to Kent?
03:14:56 In regards to their own domestic front doors.
03:14:59 Yes, the flat front entrance.
03:15:03 It depends what room they're in.
03:15:04 If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door.
03:15:07 The final question I'd like to talk to you, and it may be that you can't assist us on
03:15:12 this, but you're here, so we take the advantage.
03:15:15 Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue
03:15:20 Services could have offered to London to assist?
03:15:22 To offer?
03:15:23 If they were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have.
03:15:28 If they would have called us for assistance with appliances, then yes, we would have offered
03:15:32 them to them.
03:15:33 But as it stands, the people in charge of their control room know that we have resources
03:15:39 that they can use if they need to, so we will just wait until.
03:15:43 If a request had come from London, would you then communicate that request, say, to your
03:15:48 duty manager, who would then refer it up to senior management?
03:15:51 Yes, if they had requested our appliances, we do send them straight away.
03:15:56 You have the authority to do that.
03:16:00 Can you help us finally with this question?
03:16:02 What number of appliances would you usually deploy to a high-rise fire within Kent on
03:16:07 your predetermined deployment?
03:16:09 Every building has its own predetermined attendance, so it could change depending on
03:16:16 the number of floors.
03:16:17 But for high-rise buildings, is there a base minimum of appliances that would be...
03:16:21 I believe it's four pumps and a height vehicle.
03:16:23 Okay.
03:16:26 Ms Martin, those are all the questions that I have.
03:16:29 The custom is that the chairman allows me a break just to check that I've covered everything.
03:16:34 So if you wouldn't mind allowing me five minutes...
03:16:37 Yes, if you don't take very long.
03:16:39 If I say ten past one or sooner, if you're ready, sooner.
03:16:44 Thank you, sir.
03:16:45 All right.
03:16:46 We're going to have a break for five minutes.
03:16:47 I have to ask you please not to talk to anyone about your evidence when you're out of the room.
03:16:50 All right?
03:16:51 Thank you very much.
03:16:52 I'm sure she'll look after you.
03:16:53 Thank you.
03:16:54 Thank you very much.
03:17:03 Right.
03:17:04 Ten past one or sooner, if you're ready, sooner.
03:17:06 Thanks, sir.
03:17:07 Thank you.
03:17:22 Okay.
03:17:52 Okay.
03:18:22 Okay.
03:18:52 Okay.
03:19:22 Okay.
03:19:52 Okay.
03:20:22 Hello, Mr. Cleo.
03:20:40 Did you find some questions?
03:20:41 I have.
03:20:42 Yeah.
03:20:43 Right.
03:20:44 Could you ask the witness to come back in, please?
03:20:51 I think there are one or two questions.
03:21:04 Yeah.
03:21:05 I hope not too many.
03:21:06 Yes.
03:21:07 Mr. Martin, thank you very much for your time.
03:21:08 Just a few more questions.
03:21:10 First of all, a question about resourcing of the control room at Kent.
03:21:14 If asked, could you have supplied more operator services on the night, for example, by calling
03:21:18 in off-duty operators?
03:21:20 We do have that facility, but we didn't have that many calls, so we didn't need to do that.
03:21:27 How many, what's the maximum number of people you can call in should the need arise?
03:21:32 Well, we have six desks.
03:21:35 And that defines the number of people.
03:21:37 Okay.
03:21:38 Yeah.
03:21:39 Okay.
03:21:40 Next question is in relation to your calls with Mr. Dyson.
03:21:49 His wife has recalled that she was informed by a crow, and she can't remember whether
03:21:55 it's Kent or London, to stay off the line whilst they were trying to get through.
03:22:00 Can you remember, would you have said that to her?
03:22:04 I can't remember.
03:22:05 But if I was trying to call the husband, I'd have asked her to try not to call him,
03:22:10 just so that we could give the best advice we could.
03:22:13 Is that sort of standard practice, or is it something you decided was appropriate because
03:22:17 of the particular circumstances?
03:22:18 Because of the circumstances.
03:22:21 Final topic is the footage from the helicam.
03:22:25 Yeah.
03:22:26 Were you aware that you could see images of individuals and where they were located?
03:22:31 No.
03:22:32 No.
03:22:33 You could just see the outline of the building, because it was on the heat camera.
03:22:37 So the outline of the building, and you just saw that it was hot, for example.
03:22:41 You couldn't see anything else.
03:22:42 Presumably you would have found it helpful to have had imagery which identified, first
03:22:47 of all, where individuals were, or individuals were in the building and their location.
03:22:55 Not necessarily.
03:22:56 I don't think it would have changed the advice or anything that we would have done in Kent, no.
03:23:02 Were you aware that you could hear the commentary of the helicopter pilots?
03:23:06 We don't have any.
03:23:07 You can't hear anything from the CCTV.
03:23:13 Ms Martin, those are all my questions.
03:23:15 Thank you very much for coming on to give evidence today.
03:23:17 We're very grateful.
03:23:18 Thank you very much.
03:23:19 Yes, I'd add my thanks to those of Mr Kinnear.
03:23:21 I'm sorry, by the way, if we've kept you waiting all morning to give your evidence,
03:23:25 but I'm afraid that's how it works sometimes.
03:23:27 Anyway, it's very helpful to us to hear what was going on in your contribution to taking
03:23:32 calls and thank you very much for coming to tell us about it.
03:23:34 Thank you very much.
03:23:35 And now you're free to go.
03:23:36 Thank you very much.
03:23:39 Thank you very much.
03:23:49 Well, that, as they say, Mr Kinnear, is probably a convenient point.
03:23:52 It is, and when we come back we will have crew commander Rob Brown.
03:23:56 Very good.
03:23:57 Right, well then we'll resume at 2.15, please.
03:23:59 Thanks, sir.
03:24:00 Thank you very much.
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04:26:56 The meeting is over.
04:26:57 We are about to start shortly.
04:26:58 Thank you.
04:27:26 Thank you.
04:27:57 Could I have an I spicicum down, please?
04:28:19 I do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give
04:28:43 shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
04:28:49 Thank you very much, Mr. Runs. Sit down and make yourself comfortable.
04:28:53 Yes, Mr. Cunha.
04:28:54 Good afternoon. Would you first confirm your name for the record?
04:28:57 Robert Edward Brown.
04:28:58 Thank you. And in front of you, you should have a blue folder.
04:29:02 And behind the first tab, or directly in front of you, should be two witness statements,
04:29:08 both dated the 29th of January.
04:29:10 Yep, yes, there is.
04:29:12 And behind a blue tab, you should find an exhibit, which is notes you made on the night.
04:29:20 Yes.
04:29:21 And have you read those documents recently?
04:29:23 Yes, I have.
04:29:24 And you confirm their contents are true?
04:29:26 Yes.
04:29:27 And you're content for those documents to stand as your evidence for this inquiry?
04:29:30 Yes.
04:29:31 Thank you. Now, Mr. Brown, thank you very much for attending today.
04:29:34 If at any time you want to break, please say so. That's not a problem.
04:29:38 And if at any time any of my questions are unclear, please say so, and I'll try and make them clear for you.
04:29:43 Thank you.
04:29:44 Now, if I could just deal with some background points first of all.
04:29:47 You're currently a crew commander at Surrey Fire and Rescue Service based in the control room, is that right?
04:29:52 Yes, I am.
04:29:53 And you've worked for Surrey for over 14 years?
04:29:56 Yeah, 13 years and 9 months at the time, I think it was.
04:30:01 But now, obviously, 14 years.
04:30:02 Oh, 15 years now.
04:30:03 Yeah.
04:30:04 And you've been a crew commander, I think, since March 2017, is that correct?
04:30:08 I'm classed as competent a crew commander as of March 2017.
04:30:12 And on the night, you were on duty with Officer in Charge Claire Stambridge, is that right?
04:30:18 Yes.
04:30:19 And is she senior to you?
04:30:20 Yes.
04:30:21 And just looking at who else was on duty that night, Kayleigh Anderson?
04:30:25 Yes.
04:30:26 And is it right that she's also known as Kayleigh Beckham?
04:30:28 Now she is, yes.
04:30:29 Now she is. And she was a call taker?
04:30:32 Yes.
04:30:33 And there was also Laura Waters, who was also a call taker, is that right?
04:30:37 Yes.
04:30:38 Was anyone else involved?
04:30:40 We're taking calls from the tower on the night.
04:30:44 Now you say in your witness statement, we don't need to go to it, that part of your role as the crew commander is to be one of the supervisors, is that right?
04:30:51 That's correct.
04:30:52 And on page three of your witness statement, it's the second line from the top, you provide further detail of your job, and it's described as, quotes,
04:31:01 to monitor and supervise where necessary, the calls that come in and ensure they're handled appropriately by the call handlers.
04:31:08 Can you give us a bit more flavour?
04:31:11 How do you monitor and supervise the call takers?
04:31:14 So there's a function within the, so when a call taker has taken a call, I have the ability to monitor them and where need to be prompt them,
04:31:26 if they need assistance in gaining the correct address or inputting it correctly into the system.
04:31:33 Also that can be to offer guidance on anything really.
04:31:38 Now in relation to the training you yourself received, as part of your initial training, which I think was another six week module training course,
04:31:48 what training did you have in relation to fires in high rise buildings?
04:31:53 Well, nothing specific with regards to high rise buildings, but an awareness of the different factors in comparison to a domestic house or a factory or warehouse, those kind of things.
04:32:12 Did that initial training deal with stay put and the advice you're to give to...
04:32:17 The initial six week training?
04:32:18 Yes.
04:32:19 No.
04:32:20 In the subsequent professional training you've received during your time with Surrey, have you received any specific training on stay put and the circumstances in which it's appropriate to change the advice?
04:32:31 Yes.
04:32:33 And before the fire itself, when was the most recent time you'd received training?
04:32:38 It was very recently before that because I think it was from the lessons learnt from the, I think from Lacanore House.
04:32:48 Yes, so very recently before it.
04:32:50 Are you able to remember what training you were given on the circumstances in which it's appropriate to change advice from stay put to leave?
04:32:58 We weren't...
04:33:00 Okay, so it would be to stay put unless a fire or smoke or other fumes are directly affecting the person trapped or not even trapped, directly affecting the person, in which case it would be safer relatively to attempt an escape.
04:33:20 And as part of your ongoing professional training, has that covered fire survival guidance?
04:33:27 Sorry, can I repeat the question?
04:33:29 Yes, as part of your continuing professional training, have you received any specific training on fire survival guidance?
04:33:36 Yes, that happens on quite a regular basis.
04:33:40 Could I ask you how regular is regular?
04:33:43 We have monthly watch training within our control room and that can encompass a whole manner of different things, but fire survival guidance is one of them.
04:33:54 Could we come on to discuss the first substantive topic with you, which is stay put and FSG?
04:33:59 And on page two of your statement you discuss the stay put policy.
04:34:04 Presumably you're familiar with advising callers on stay put.
04:34:10 Is that a fair assumption I should ask?
04:34:12 Yes, I understand the concepts of stay put and how it would relate to a caller.
04:34:18 And how do you know if a caller's building has a stay put policy or not?
04:34:24 Some buildings within our mobilizing system have associated notes with it.
04:34:33 They would say on that note that it had a stay put policy.
04:34:38 That doesn't necessarily cover each and every building.
04:34:43 What do you do if you have no notes and the caller doesn't know whether there's a stay put policy in place?
04:34:49 How do you advise them?
04:34:51 So I think it goes back to that original concept that if the fire is not directly affecting,
04:34:59 fire smoke or fumes or whatever are not directly affecting the person involved,
04:35:06 the person calling the fire service, then the advice would be to not move towards it or move away from it.
04:35:17 Not to move, not to change anything.
04:35:20 So stay put is a policy or theory which relies on two things.
04:35:28 It's the premise that buildings can be and should be designed to prevent fire or inhibit the spread of fire.
04:35:39 And the second is to stop the person involved from potentially leaving a place of relative safety
04:35:49 and putting them into a much more dangerous place.
04:35:54 Could you help us? Say if someone calls you, there's a fire, they live in a high rise building,
04:36:00 there's a fire affecting that building.
04:36:03 What information do you try and get from the caller to assist you decide how best to respond and what advice to give?
04:36:11 So if...
04:36:13 Will you ask for their name first of all?
04:36:16 Not necessarily.
04:36:18 Will you ask for their address?
04:36:19 Yes.
04:36:20 Will you ask for where their flat is for example, what floor it's on of the high rise building?
04:36:24 Yes.
04:36:25 Will you ask them to what extent their flat's affected by fire or heat?
04:36:31 Yes.
04:36:32 Are there any other details you try and extract from them during the course of the call?
04:36:37 If they were able to get out or if they've already stated that they're trapped, then to offer some form of fire survival advice.
04:36:49 I don't know whether you've heard Ms Martin's evidence before, but she said in her experience,
04:36:53 callers tended to offer up the information that they were trapped.
04:36:57 Does that reflect your professional experience as well?
04:37:00 Yeah, because it would be probably the most pressing thing in their mind to say.
04:37:07 When you have a caller who says they're trapped, is it your practice in Surrey to stay on the phone until the individual caller is rescued by the fire brigade?
04:37:18 Yeah, because it's a constantly changing environment.
04:37:21 The person could be potentially getting in an increasingly dangerous situation with the fire approaching or smoke.
04:37:30 There's a number of different factors which could change, so yeah, we'd stay on the phone.
04:37:35 Also, to gain more information for the crews proceeding.
04:37:39 So, if, you know, as to whereabouts in the property they are, so if it's a house or they're at the back of the house or the front of the house, which floor, that kind of thing.
04:37:52 Is there a policy requirement at Surrey to ask callers whether they have mobility issues or anything of that nature, which may affect the extent to which the brigade are able to rescue them?
04:38:02 No, but again, that's something which would be most probably offered in a way that they would say, I can't get out because I'm wheelchair bound or bedridden or so on and so forth.
04:38:20 And similarly, if they're elderly or there are a number of children in the property, is that a detail that's offered up rather than it being a requirement of policy to ask?
04:38:27 Yes, yeah.
04:38:29 Can I ask next about overflow call arrangements?
04:38:33 Now, in the fourth paragraph on page two of your statement, you say that, and quote, in the event of large-scale incidents, we have a procedure in place for the overflow of calls to be diverted to a different brigade.
04:38:45 This happens nationally amongst brigades and is known as a buddy system.
04:38:50 You then say that Surrey's buddy is Merseyside, and in relation to Grenfell Tower, you were, quote, not acting on behalf of London and were not taking that overflow.
04:39:00 The caller was calling from within our area, hence why we took the calls, close quotes.
04:39:05 Now, we'll come on to the specific calls later, but can you please help us first with whether it's a common occurrence for you to receive calls in Surrey that relate to London?
04:39:16 It's not a current.
04:39:19 Is it common?
04:39:21 Is it common?
04:39:22 Yeah.
04:39:23 Not normally. I think the last instance that I had personally of that was the August riots and whatnot.
04:39:32 In 2011 or whenever?
04:39:34 Yeah, in which case we did take a couple of overflow calls, well, a couple, a few overflow calls of that. Yeah.
04:39:42 And do you know what arrangements are in place to allow Surrey to communicate directly with London in the event of receiving London calls?
04:39:50 So if we receive their calls, we would attempt to pass them back, pass these calls back to them.
04:39:57 We have no facility at present to mobilise any of their appliances or assets.
04:40:03 In terms of contacting London, Miss Martin talked about having a short dial system with London.
04:40:09 Is that something that Surrey has with London?
04:40:11 A direct line.
04:40:12 Straight through?
04:40:13 Yes.
04:40:14 Yes.
04:40:15 Okay.
04:40:22 Do you have the technology to pass a call directly to London or would you take the information and then pass that information on to London?
04:40:31 We have to take the information and pass it on.
04:40:34 I'm unsure of whether we could essentially transfer the call.
04:40:40 I think it would be bad practice to do that.
04:40:44 Can you explain why it would be bad practice?
04:40:46 Yeah, we take the details and then we pass those details on to London.
04:40:52 Can I ask you about one point which Kayleigh Beckham raised in her witness statement and we can go to it if necessary, but I don't think we do.
04:41:02 On page three, she recalls receiving the first call from a lady who was calling about her father-in-law trapped in Grenfell Tower.
04:41:10 Kayleigh Beckham says this, quotes, I checked BBC News and Twitter and then saw the scale they were talking about, 200 firefighters.
04:41:19 It was horrifying.
04:41:20 I'd never seen anything like it and was actually quite surprised that we had not been made aware by London of the scale and that we may receive overflow calls.
04:41:30 Would you have expected the fire and rescue service which has responsibility for that incident to phone round neighbouring fire and rescue services to alert them to the incident?
04:41:40 No, they'd be tied up with the actual incident itself.
04:41:44 And in relation to previous major incidents, have you ever received a call by way of early notice that you may be asked to take overflow?
04:41:56 Possibly within spate conditions, spate conditions being heavy rainfall, storm-like conditions, which again happened to London a few years ago actually.
04:42:10 They were taking quite a few flooding calls and we received a couple of calls for that as well.
04:42:17 Would you have expected say in this case London to have contacted you to give you a briefing as to what advice they were giving to callers as to stay put, whether to leave etc.
04:42:28 Would you have expected to have received that type of call?
04:42:31 I, well we wouldn't have expected to, they wouldn't have known necessarily that we were receiving calls, so therefore they wouldn't necessarily give us informational guidance to pass on to.
04:42:48 Yes, they wouldn't have contacted us in the first place.
04:42:51 Is there any means available to Surrey crows to receive updates in real time, say from an instance in London, to receive updates from either London Brigade Control or the fire ground as to what's happening?
04:43:06 And to inform what advice they gave to callers?
04:43:14 At the moment there's nothing utilised to that effect.
04:43:18 Thank you, Miss Barron. Can I turn to the events on the night itself?
04:43:22 And the first issue I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Disson's, I think you think daughter-in-law?
04:43:29 Yeah, I didn't take the call, but yeah.
04:43:33 Now you say on page 3 of your witness statement that about 0 to 30 hours our control received a call from a distressed female.
04:43:41 Kayleigh Anderson answered the call and you monitored from the supervisor's desk. Is that a fair summary of your evidence?
04:43:47 Correct.
04:43:48 Now can you help us with one document? And Ralph, if you could bring this up, it's LFB quadruple 03629.
04:44:12 Now have you seen this before?
04:44:15 Yes, it's an instant log from our vision mobilising system.
04:44:19 So this is the Surrey log and the first entry just below halfway is 0 to 28.13.
04:44:30 Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier?
04:44:36 I believe so, yes.
04:44:38 Yeah, that's timestamps as the time when it would come in.
04:44:43 Now going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you,
04:44:49 quote, stopped monitoring Kayleigh's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade control room to pass on the information as it was time critical.
04:44:57 Now we know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 0 to 30 control room officer Russell was in the room.
04:45:06 That's right.
04:45:07 So in the LFB control room officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor.
04:45:15 Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London?
04:45:22 Yes.
04:45:24 Now when you contacted the LFB, did you know a specific person to contact or did you just call through and simply take...
04:45:35 No, so it's a direct line number. So we just press that and it goes through to London and presumably one of their operators picks it up.
04:45:45 And so it's not a line specific to a supervisor, it's a line which goes into the control room and may be picked up by any of the operators.
04:45:52 I don't know how their system looks at their end, but that's what I presume to be the case.
04:45:58 When you phoned through to the LFB, did you try and find out more detail about the incident at Grenfell Tower itself?
04:46:04 Well, the address which we had originally was Renfield. So obviously we've got clarification on that, that it was Grenfell.
04:46:14 And my memory serves me right, they said it was a large incident, they were aware of it and dealing with it.
04:46:23 And did they give you any steer on what advice was being given by LFB brigade control to callers?
04:46:30 I can't remember.
04:46:32 Did you ask, can you remember that?
04:46:34 I can't remember.
04:46:36 Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information?
04:46:45 I can't remember.
04:46:47 Can you remember asking for that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room?
04:46:53 No, so they just gave us the, from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it.
04:47:05 Yeah, that's all we've got.
04:47:12 Now, conveniently the Surrey log is still on the screen.
04:47:15 And Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page two of that log?
04:47:23 And if you could identify the entry at 023415.
04:47:34 Now, Mr. Brown, are you able to help us to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Kayleigh Anderson and the female caller?
04:47:48 Yes.
04:47:51 Thank you.
04:47:52 And Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document which is a transcript, which is LFB quintuple 0650.
04:48:10 If I could just ask you to read page one and then shout when you finish page one and then just, we can turn over to page two, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.
04:48:34 Yep, about that.
04:48:36 And turn over to page two, please, Ralph.
04:49:00 Okay, yeah.
04:49:01 Okay, this is the transcript of a second call from the same caller.
04:49:05 Yes.
04:49:06 And it's at 02-4545.
04:49:09 And you'll see at the bottom of page two, which is the page on the screen, the crow has taken the number and then said, quotes, no problem.
04:49:17 We will pass through to London and see if someone's able to give him a call from there, okay, to reassure him all right.
04:49:25 Now, I know it's not you who was there taking the call, sorry, but did you know that this was something that London would do, i.e. call the individual back to provide reassurance?
04:49:37 I didn't know that was something that they were going to do, but I was going to pass that number through to London so that they could contact them with regards to rescue.
04:49:51 Okay.
04:49:52 Now, at 02-4849, Kayleigh Anderson contacted the LFB to ask them to do this, and she speaks to CRO Gotts to pass on the details.
04:50:03 And for everyone's reference, that's page 102 of the control report, and we don't need to go to that unless you want to.
04:50:10 But my question is this.
04:50:12 In Kayleigh Anderson's witness statement, she says that when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB crow, she said, quotes, London sounded really busy, and I had to try and force her to take the details down, close quotes.
04:50:25 Now, was that your experience when you tried to contact London?
04:50:32 Not that I can, I can't remember to be honest.
04:50:37 Do you have any recollection of how the crow on the receiving end at London dealt with your call?
04:50:42 Did they sound stressed? Were they rushed? Did you have to, as Miss Anderson said, force them to take the details down?
04:50:47 I'll assume, okay. Yeah, they sounded busy.
04:50:53 But receptive.
04:50:54 They sounded busy, yeah.
04:50:56 Now, if I could ask Ralph to put up another transcript, and it's of that particular call made by Kayleigh Anderson, and it can be found at LFB quintuple 0544.
04:51:11 And if we could go to page three of that transcript, and the second entry from operator two, and CRO Gotts says that they've had so many calls from that floor.
04:51:25 And when taking the mobile number, she says, I've got lots of calls waiting.
04:51:31 And turning over, so looking at that answer, do you think at that stage it was essential to ascertain from the LFB that someone was going to call back Mr. Disson to tell him to evacuate?
04:51:46 Whether Surrey or London.
04:51:48 It wasn't necessary to tell him to evacuate.
04:51:51 And why do you say that?
04:51:52 Because on the initial call, we knew that he was trapped.
04:51:57 So at that stage, we were asking them to contact him to aid in a rescue operation.
04:52:04 Do you think at that stage they would have given that's what you knew?
04:52:10 Was there any benefit in Surrey contacting Mr. Disson directly?
04:52:15 No.
04:52:16 And why do you say that?
04:52:18 Because that would have possibly impinged on any rescue operation going ahead with London, as it being their ground and their resources and tendons.
04:52:28 Could that risk have been mitigated if you'd asked London for an update as to the attempts to rescue Mr. Disson?
04:52:44 Could it be, sorry, could you repeat the question again?
04:52:45 Could you have dealt with that problem by asking London what's the state of play in terms of rescuing this gentleman?
04:52:52 Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way, something along those lines?
04:53:01 Possibly.
04:53:02 Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember?
04:53:08 Possibly. I can't remember.
04:53:12 Now the next topic I'd like to come to is the change in state put advice on the evening.
04:53:18 Now if we could stay with this transcript but go to page two and operator two says,
04:53:29 No, well, we've just been told to tell people to put a wet towel over their heads and try to get out.
04:53:36 And that's the penultimate entry at the bottom of the page.
04:53:42 At the time, did you take that to mean that state put had been withdrawn?
04:53:47 At no point did we know that we had no idea or inkling of if there was state put in place on that property.
04:54:02 So this is the first advice that we've had from London Fire stating that this is what their guidance is to exit the property with a wet towel.
04:54:14 Did you understand that at the time to mean that people were being told to evacuate, to leave?
04:54:22 The gentleman was initially trapped in his property.
04:54:28 We had no idea of any kind of state put policy in place.
04:54:36 It being London's grounds, we were reliant on them providing guidance as to what they were going to do.
04:54:45 Bear in mind, it was assumed to be a rescue operation and we weren't told otherwise.
04:54:53 Once you'd received that information from London, did you try and call Mr. Disson's daughter-in-law to give her advice?
04:55:03 Yes, we contacted the...
04:55:07 Now, if I could ask you to turn back to your witness statement, at page 5, at the very top of that page, you say you received another call at 0307.
04:55:17 And this was from the same lady who'd called previously.
04:55:20 And as before, Kayleigh Anderson took the call and you monitored it. Is that right?
04:55:25 Yes.
04:55:27 And is your recollection that it was during the course of that call that you provided the caller with an update as to the advice from London?
04:55:36 Okay, so it must have been on that call rather than us contacting her back.
04:55:41 Now, you also say in your witness statement, at page 5, and it's the third line down, the female sounded more distressed during this call.
04:55:50 She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat.
04:55:55 On hearing this, I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there.
04:56:01 Now, at that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr. Disson would be rescued?
04:56:11 No.
04:56:13 And so, in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller?
04:56:32 I'm just referring to my statement.
04:56:38 Would it help if we went to the transcript?
04:56:41 Of course, yeah.
04:56:42 Ralph, could you put up LFB quintuple 0651 and particularly go to page 2 of the transcript?
04:56:56 And I'll just let you refresh your memory.
04:57:12 And I think it's that middle section on page 2 which I think is your recollection of the advice you gave.
04:57:40 And then at the bottom of that page, the caller says, yeah, he knows that, operator, and turning over the page,
04:57:46 and stay low to the floor and over speaking flat and we'll pass it through to London again.
04:57:53 Now, looking at that transcript, it doesn't look as if Kayleigh Anderson is giving express advice to get out.
04:58:00 Is that a fair summary of the advice that was given during the course of that call?
04:58:06 No.
04:58:10 Is that? Yeah, no.
04:58:12 And are you able to give us, from your perspective, an explanation as to why that advice wasn't given?
04:58:20 Was it because you knew he was trapped and you were relying upon the previous information he'd given you?
04:58:28 What's the next page of this? Sorry?
04:58:30 Ralph, could you turn over the page, please?
04:58:36 Okay, sorry, can you repeat the question?
04:58:48 Now, looking at the transcript, it doesn't look as if Kayleigh Anderson gave express advice to get out.
04:58:56 Are you able to help us as to why that advice wasn't given?
04:59:00 I don't know why that advice wasn't given.
04:59:06 From your perspective, were you sat next to Kayleigh whilst she was on the call to the lady?
04:59:13 I wouldn't be sat next to Kayleigh in the control room, but I was a different position.
04:59:23 Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would have given in the circumstances, given the information that Kayleigh had?
04:59:31 I would have passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on.
04:59:41 Okay, that's useful.
04:59:43 Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript, which is LFB quintuple 0685.
04:59:51 Now, this is a call 0306 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call.
05:00:01 If I could ask Ralph to take you to page two of the transcript, and you'll see from the fifth line down,
05:00:12 Operator 1 says, yeah, so flat 194, we're getting a further call saying that the gentleman says there's fire in his flat now.
05:00:21 Operator 2, right, now we're doing now, we've changed our advice, we're going to ring you.
05:00:27 So you need to just tell them whatever they can, get something damp, cover it over them and leave the building.
05:00:34 Operator 1, right, okay.
05:00:36 So we're telling them to self-rescue, like just get out as quickly as they can.
05:00:40 Operator 2, yeah, yeah, do it now, put something over your body, put something over your mouth and leave.
05:00:47 Operator 1, and just go. Okay, brilliant, okay, thank you very much.
05:00:54 Now, is that the first time you've had clear express advice from London that the advice is to evacuate?
05:01:06 Yes.
05:01:11 Now, if I could turn back to page five of your witness statement, and we don't need to turn it up unless you'd like to see it.
05:01:17 You say that, and I quote, at 0311 hours Kayleigh Anderson called the female caller back and relayed the information London had passed on to me.
05:01:26 And we have a record of that call and subsequent calls 309 and 31026 in the control report.
05:01:33 Now, at this time, bearing in mind those additional calls that were made, can you help us to why Kayleigh's not calling Mr. Disson directly instead of going via a relative?
05:01:46 The gentleman was in contact, he was speaking to the family, and we were, and as Kayleigh had spoken to the female caller already, she contacted her back.
05:02:07 We did have the telephone number for Mr. Disson, but we didn't use it.
05:02:14 Can you explain why in more detail? Just looking at it objectively, it seems easier.
05:02:22 Because possibly, if London were attempting to any rescue operations, then they possibly would be contacting that number back.
05:02:31 However, at that point now, where they're saying that's the advice they're giving to just leave the property.
05:02:41 But there doesn't appear to be a practical reason to stop Surrey phoning Mr. Disson directly. Is that a fair comment?
05:02:52 Now, at the end of page five of your witness statement, you say this, and I quote,
05:02:57 We didn't have that much control over the calls we received, especially around giving advice to the caller, as it was not our incident, and London didn't pass any advice until we received our third call.
05:03:07 Now, what would you have expected to have been told by the LFB above and beyond what is set out in the transcript of that call at 0306?
05:03:21 The expectation up until the point where they said that the person should self-rescue was that rescue operations were in place, as they should be, with the five persons reported.
05:03:40 So anything other than that?
05:03:50 Yeah, anything other than that wasn't the case.
05:03:56 Was.
05:03:59 Sorry, can you?
05:04:00 Sorry.
05:04:01 Yeah.
05:04:02 I was waiting to finish your sentence, Mr. Brown.
05:04:05 You've got the advice there in the call of 0306.
05:04:11 What more, if anything, would you have expected to have been told by the LFB?
05:04:30 I don't know.
05:04:33 At the time, did you consider that sufficient to enable you to provide advice to any subsequent callers?
05:04:39 We were working under the belief that they were attempting to be rescued.
05:04:48 Can I ask you what was the basis of that belief?
05:04:51 Because it's a five persons reported and we hadn't been told otherwise, that's a standard procedure.
05:04:58 Now, can I turn to a separate topic, which is calling other fire and rescue services?
05:05:02 And on page five of your witness statement, you say that you spoke to Kent Fire and Rescue Service, and I quote, passing on the information from London that people were to wrap themselves in something wet and try to get out.
05:05:13 And then you spoke to Essex to tell them the same thing.
05:05:16 Was this as a result of a specific request from London to update surrounding fire and rescue services?
05:05:22 Yeah, they said to contact Kent and Essex specifically because they were taking overflow calls.
05:05:31 Did it cross your mind whether other fire and rescue service control rooms might be dealing with the incident other than Kent and Essex and they should be contacted as well?
05:05:42 Yes, it did potentially, but there's 49 control rooms within the UK.
05:05:50 And you called the ones it was specifically told?
05:05:52 Yeah.
05:05:53 Now, if I can turn to a separate topic and that's other available sources of information.
05:06:00 Now, you refer in your witness statement, it's page four and it's the last paragraph, we don't need to go to it.
05:06:07 You mentioned that you had Sky News on in the control room, is that right?
05:06:12 Correct.
05:06:13 You describe having access to the television footage as a tool to assist you, quote, build a picture of an incident.
05:06:19 Again, is that a fair summary of your evidence?
05:06:21 Correct.
05:06:22 Now, when you are faced with a major fire, would you ordinarily turn to see whether there was footage on the TV news to assist the advice you give to callers?
05:06:32 I would.
05:06:34 There's also access to other kind of ranges of information in which you can get, highways, cameras, and et cetera.
05:06:42 But yeah, you want to attempt to get as much information as possible.
05:06:46 And presumably you'd have access in Surrey to Surrey CCTV, is that right?
05:06:50 Not to Surrey CCTV.
05:06:53 Right.
05:06:54 So you don't...
05:06:55 Are you talking about like town centres, CCTV?
05:06:57 No.
05:06:58 Is there any mechanism to do that?
05:07:01 Possibly.
05:07:02 But you're not aware of it?
05:07:03 Yeah.
05:07:04 And you've never had to use it?
05:07:05 We haven't got it at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it.
05:07:08 Now, Ms Martin said in her evidence this morning that Kent has access to the MPS's HeliTele Live Link, including the heat camera mode.
05:07:18 Now, do you have the technology to access that?
05:07:21 We have access to police helicopters, MPAS 15, I think it's called.
05:07:26 I don't know what the extent...
05:07:29 I don't know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it.
05:07:32 Did you use it on the night, access to that footage?
05:07:37 It's a Surrey police...
05:07:39 My question was for the MPAS, do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage?
05:07:44 No.
05:07:45 No.
05:07:46 No.
05:07:47 Okay.
05:07:48 Now, can I next talk about the callback system and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice?
05:07:56 Now, does Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers?
05:08:04 Not automatically.
05:08:06 Okay.
05:08:07 In what circumstances are they recorded?
05:08:09 So at the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90% of the time.
05:08:20 Okay.
05:08:21 And in the other percentage of the time, which they don't, then you stay on the line to get the number from the operator.
05:08:28 Have you previously encountered circumstances in which state put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who've made 999 calls?
05:08:38 I haven't personally encountered that.
05:08:43 Will you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation is deteriorated or not, and if so, to what extent?
05:08:57 In real world practicality, I don't think it would depend on operational business within the control room as to whether you'd be able to contact back however many callers.
05:09:10 If it's one, two callers, it could be 10, 20.
05:09:14 Yeah, it really does depend on a number of different factors.
05:09:17 Okay.
05:09:18 And on the night, did you discuss calling back Mr. Disson, for example, or Mr. Disson's daughter-in-law after the calls we've discussed in evidence today?
05:09:29 No.
05:09:30 Okay.
05:09:33 Could I ask you one final topic?
05:09:35 It's about resources, and please say if you're not able to assist us with this, but would it have been part of your job to have been responsible for contacting the LFB to us whether they required more resources from Surrey?
05:09:46 Typically, any requests for additional resources would come from the host brigade.
05:09:55 They would identify that there is a deficiency and therefore look to resolve that.
05:10:02 Did you handle any additional requests from London on the night for additional resources?
05:10:06 No.
05:10:07 Were you involved in the decision to deploy Surrey's ALP, the 42-metre ALP, to London?
05:10:12 No.
05:10:13 Okay.
05:10:17 Mr. Brown, thank you very much.
05:10:18 Those are all the questions I have for now, and what we tend to do is the Chairman grants me a short piece of time at the end of each evidence to check that I've covered everything off, and so I'd be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now.
05:10:31 Yes.
05:10:32 Well, as you've heard Mr. Brown, Council sometimes need a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now, no more than five minutes or so.
05:10:42 Okay.
05:10:43 Let him do that. You're going to go with the one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence when they're out of the room.
05:10:49 Of course not.
05:10:50 And we'll get back at five past three.
05:10:52 Thank you.
05:10:53 I'm not sure if that's possible.
05:11:06 Five past three or before then if you're ready.
05:11:36 Okay.
05:12:06 Okay.
05:12:36 Okay.
05:13:06 Okay.
05:13:36 Okay.
05:14:06 Okay.
05:14:21 Just to.
05:14:43 Okay.
05:14:46 Yes, Mr. Brown. Thank you for your patience. Just two questions. First of all, if asked how many operators could Surrey have mustered on the night to help with any London overflow.
05:14:56 We have foreign duty.
05:14:58 And how many were off duty that you could have called in should the need have arisen.
05:15:02 I don't know the exact number, but probably be 20 of the off duty.
05:15:11 And how many desks do you have in the control room at which individuals could be sat.
05:15:21 What?
05:15:22 So how many positions in the control room do you have?
05:15:27 Ten positions.
05:15:28 Okay. Thank you.
05:15:29 Finally, were you involved at all in the decision to acquire the 42 meter.
05:15:35 Errol ladder platform by Surrey FRS to acquire it to buy it.
05:15:40 No.
05:15:41 Good. Thank you.
05:15:42 No.
05:15:43 That concludes that question.
05:15:44 Would have been a surprise.
05:15:45 Okay.
05:15:46 It wasn't a trick question.
05:15:47 Okay.
05:15:48 Mr. Brown. Thank you very much for coming along to assist today. It's very welcome. Thank you.
05:15:52 Thank you.
05:15:53 Well, I'll add my thanks to Mr. Brown. It's very helpful to us to hear from different parts of the story.
05:15:59 And since Surrey was involved, albeit in a fairly peripheral respect, it's useful to know what was going on.
05:16:06 So thank you very much for coming to give us your evidence.
05:16:08 That's right. Thank you.
05:16:09 Right. Now you're free to go.
05:16:17 Yes, Mr. Keir.
05:16:18 Sir, the next witness is Group Manager Nigel Dilley from Essex County Fire and Rescue.
05:16:23 No changes needed in the furniture. So just the folder.
05:16:28 Yes.
05:16:29 Thank you.
05:16:30 I'll sit here for a couple of minutes while you get organized.
05:16:48 Okay.
05:17:18 Thank you very much.
05:17:37 Yes, Mr. Keir.
05:17:38 No.
05:17:39 I think Mr. Dilley is about to be retrieved.
05:18:09 Okay.
05:18:39 I swear by Almighty God.
05:18:41 I swear by Almighty God.
05:18:42 That the evidence I shall give.
05:18:44 That the evidence I shall give.
05:18:45 Shall be the truth.
05:18:46 Shall be the truth.
05:18:47 The whole truth.
05:18:48 The whole truth.
05:18:49 And nothing but the truth.
05:18:50 And nothing but the truth.
05:18:51 Thank you very much. Would you like to sit down and make yourself comfortable?
05:18:54 Sir, in red.
05:18:56 Yes, Mr. Keir.
05:18:57 Thanks, sir. First of all, would you please confirm your name for the record?
05:19:00 Nigel Dilley.
05:19:01 Thank you, Mr. Dilley. Thank you very much for coming on today. It's much appreciated.
05:19:05 In front of you there is a blue folder and hopefully if you open it you will find a copy of your statement of the 19th of October 2018. Is that right?
05:19:14 Yes, that's correct.
05:19:15 And have you read that document recently?
05:19:17 Yes, I have.
05:19:18 Are its contents true?
05:19:20 Yes, apart from 3B where there's an extract from the National Incident Command System, third line says to reduce risk and safety resolve. It should be safely resolved.
05:19:38 Yes, safely resolved. Thank you.
05:19:40 And say for that typographical error the contents are true?
05:19:44 Yes, they are.
05:19:45 Thank you very much. And your content for the statement stand is your evidence of the inquiry?
05:19:48 Yes.
05:19:49 Thank you. Now just to deal with some background information first of all. At the time of the fire what was your position?
05:19:56 My position was the duty NILO, National Interagency Liaison Officer for Essex Fire and Rescue Service.
05:20:05 Now you say in your witness statement that you're a group manager for operational policy for Essex County Fire and Rescue Service. How long have you been in that role?
05:20:14 I've been in that role since September 2017.
05:20:19 Could you just pause a little? Yes, I think it's going to be moving a bit slightly.
05:20:23 Okay, thanks.
05:20:24 That's fine. Thank you very much.
05:20:26 Thank you.
05:20:27 And what does that particular job involve, group manager for operational policy?
05:20:32 So I'm involved in really organising anything to do with operational policies, procedures, mobilising of appliances, new equipment on appliances, a little bit with control to do with the flexi-rotor system, risk information,
05:20:57 a whole raft of areas for my job.
05:21:04 Thank you. Now in page one of your statement you say that on the night you were, quote, one of two level three incident commanders on duty for Essex and you're also carrying out the role of duty NILO, which you adverted to earlier on.
05:21:17 Now dealing with each of those jobs that you had on the night, what is a level three incident commander?
05:21:24 So a level three incident commander in line with the national incident command system, I would be called on to deal with incidents of nine pumps and over.
05:21:36 We have three levels in Essex, level one for crew and watch manager, level two for station managers and then over nine pumps for myself as a level three incident commander.
05:21:48 And what are the functions and responsibilities of a level three incident commander?
05:21:52 So I would take over command at the incident ground for any large scale incidents.
05:22:01 So it's an operational role within the structure of the incident command system.
05:22:07 Thank you. Now you've already helpfully taken our attention to the definition of the role of a NILO on page one of your witness statement.
05:22:15 Now, can you help us with some form of background here?
05:22:18 What types of incident would usually engage the interest of a duty NILO?
05:22:23 So I would deal with anything which supporting the incident command structure.
05:22:31 So where any anything is outside of policy and procedure, whether any questions, any queries, for example, with control, I could give advice.
05:22:42 I also work with partner agencies such as police and ambulance for any instance they are dealing with to offer support from fire and for those types of incidents.
05:22:54 And is the advice and support for incident command given to incident command within Essex or as here, would it be advice and support to the incident commander at the fire ground itself, even though it's outside your area?
05:23:06 So it would be just for Essex.
05:23:11 As a major incident is unfolding, who usually contacts you as the duty NILO to seek your advice?
05:23:17 Would it be the incident commander himself if the instance within Essex?
05:23:20 No, it would be control.
05:23:25 Could you help us? When you're the duty NILO in Essex, how do you assist with an incident that's in London?
05:23:31 This is the first time that I've been asked for advice.
05:23:37 In this particular case, it was the passage of information from Essex control to LFB control.
05:23:47 So this was the first time this has happened.
05:23:52 Now bearing in mind that answer, what's been your experience of the knowledge of other agencies about the nature and extent of the NILO's functions and responsibilities?
05:24:05 Within Essex.
05:24:07 Within Essex.
05:24:09 We train on a regular basis with police and ambulance.
05:24:13 For some of my other roles within the NILO cadre, for example, our marauding terrorist firearm type incidents, we work closely with police and ambulance.
05:24:27 So we've got a very good working relationship within the county boundary and also within partner agencies in Suffolk and Norfolk.
05:24:37 And will you have counterpart NILO's in Essex police and Essex ambulance, for example, and in Suffolk and elsewhere that you have arrangements with?
05:24:45 Yes, definitely very close relationships with ambulance.
05:24:50 With police, my contact is mainly through force control room.
05:24:57 And have you had any dealings as NILO, whether training or otherwise with the LFB?
05:25:04 No.
05:25:08 No.
05:25:12 Have you, in terms of your NILO experience, have you identified any difference between the regions with which you have dealings in relation to the knowledge of and approach to the effective deployment of NILO's to respond to major incidents?
05:25:25 We've had CPD, continuous professional development days, with NILO's in Manchester following the Gerslake incident.
05:25:38 And regionally I've worked with NILO's.
05:25:43 My understanding of the London NILO's is we work very similar, very similar way.
05:25:53 Sorry, I cut across, I apologise. Was that understanding gathered as a result of practical experience or just as a result of discussions, training and continuous professional development?
05:26:03 Just practically within the region, just through CPD with London.
05:26:10 In relation to the responsibilities you have about dealing with control, have you had any training as to how to liaise with other brigades when Essex is receiving overflow calls via the BT system?
05:26:22 No.
05:26:23 Are you familiar in your role, whether as level 3 incident commander or as NILO, with stay put guidance and fire survival guidance?
05:26:33 Yes.
05:26:34 What's your understanding of first of all stay put?
05:26:38 So stay put predominantly for high rise is something which we have in Essex for high rise properties.
05:26:50 So we would advise, in fact we do give advice for residents to stay put.
05:26:56 We have been doing that operationally, we're dealing with fires in high rise.
05:27:02 That has proved to be the policy we've had for some time as the best policy.
05:27:09 And we continue to adopt that policy. However it can be changed.
05:27:16 In relation to that, in your practical experience, have you ever had to withdraw stay put and advise callers to evacuate a high rise building for example?
05:27:24 No I haven't.
05:27:25 Can I next turn to the topic of overflow arrangements?
05:27:30 Now at the bottom of page 1 of your statement and the top of page 2 you deal with overflow arrangements.
05:27:36 And you've quoted there Mr Peter Suarez who's the group fire control officer at Essex.
05:27:41 First of all, what's his role first of all and how does it fit in with yours?
05:27:47 So Peter is really in charge of control in Essex.
05:27:52 And those questions I felt were more related to Peter's sphere of operations.
05:28:02 So I felt it was important to get the stock answer from Peter.
05:28:07 I did understand the procedure myself but I just wanted from a professional point of view the correct wording.
05:28:16 Thank you.
05:28:17 Now at the top of page 2 of your witness statement you say, quoting Mr Suarez, that quotes there are no specific overflow arrangements between Essex and the LFB.
05:28:27 But a national arrangement is in place between BT and all fire services.
05:28:31 First of all, can you help us? Are these arrangements contained and formalised in a document?
05:28:36 I'm not aware.
05:28:38 When you say you're not aware, have you ever seen one?
05:28:41 No.
05:28:42 No.
05:28:43 Do you know what criteria are applied by BT for example that trigger the overflow arrangements?
05:28:50 So my understanding is if the host brigade cannot take the volume of calls, then that's passed on to a second control, which I understand is North West Fire Control for LFB.
05:29:06 Should they be in a position where they can't take the calls, then BT will pass the call to surrounding brigades.
05:29:15 And so the decision is made by the Home Fire Brigade Control rather than BT. Is that a fair summary of your understanding?
05:29:23 I understand it's BT because BT initially take those calls and pass them to the host brigade.
05:29:30 And do you know who at BT will take that decision to activate the overflow arrangements?
05:29:35 No.
05:29:36 No. Thank you.
05:29:38 Now, at Para 6 on page 2 of your statement, you say that Essex would obtain information by phone or email from the LFB about an incident.
05:29:47 Is that an arrangement you've had previous experience of?
05:29:51 No, I haven't.
05:29:53 Have you had any training on the arrangements as between these overflow arrangements, their practice?
05:29:59 No, I haven't.
05:30:04 This limits the extent to which you'll probably be able to give answers to these questions.
05:30:07 But would you expect LFB control to make a preemptive phone call to you to warn you that overflow calls may be directed towards Essex?
05:30:17 Probably a difficult question to answer.
05:30:20 But my understanding is that if LFB were in a situation where they couldn't handle the incoming calls, it would be quite difficult to pass that information on to surrounding brigades.
05:30:35 Now, at paragraph 7 on page 2, you explain that Essex would communicate information to the LFB by phone or, if necessary, by email.
05:30:46 Now, looking at how this could possibly work in practice, do you have a point person at the LFB that Essex can contact with the information?
05:30:58 My understanding is there is a direct line. In fact, there are two lines, a direct line and an admin line, direct to LFB, so no one in particular.
05:31:11 Now, you made reference in your witness statement to contact by email. Is there an email address, for example, that you're given that you know to use in these circumstances?
05:31:21 Not personally, but my colleague I referred to has stated that there is an email, although phone is preferred.
05:31:32 And for obvious reasons, presumably.
05:31:34 Yes.
05:31:35 Are Essex officers given any training as to the type and level of detail information they're required to pass on to London in the event that overflow arrangements are activated?
05:31:50 Essex in control or?
05:31:54 Yes.
05:31:55 Yes, my understanding is they are. They pass on the details, which they would ordinarily take from a call if it was in Essex.
05:32:05 And looking at the Essex specific context, if an Essex crow is taking an FSG call, would the crow be expected to stay on the line with the caller or just pass the details and or the call over to the LFB?
05:32:20 So my understanding is they would pass the information over, but I'm not 100% sure in this case what actually happened.
05:32:32 Does Essex have the technology to patch through calls from Essex to the LFB brigade control?
05:32:38 No, they don't. They will take the information, then call LFB control.
05:32:43 Mr. Dilley, thank you. I'm now turning on to events of the night.
05:32:47 And I think it is it safe to assume that before the 14th of June you had no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower?
05:32:53 That's correct.
05:32:54 Now you say on page one at paragraph 3A that you are the duty NILO for a 24 hour period, starting at 0900 hours on the 13th of June.
05:33:04 Where were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters?
05:33:08 So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day from 9am to 5pm and then from my home address for the rest of the period.
05:33:20 And when you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile?
05:33:24 Via Pager.
05:33:26 Pager. Now at page two of your witness statement at paragraph 10, you say that you were, quote,
05:33:32 page just before 0200 hours and informed that ECFRS had received a number of calls from residents about a fire and a tower block in West London.
05:33:41 And ECFRS control were having difficulties in passing these calls through to the LFB.
05:33:47 First of all, had you heard anything about the incident at Grenfell Tower before you were paged?
05:33:53 No, nothing.
05:33:54 Would you have expected to have been paged earlier in the evening as the incident unfolded, i.e. at the moment that the overflow arrangements were activated?
05:34:03 No, this was a London incident, so ordinarily I wouldn't be paged at all for this.
05:34:09 It's always difficult answering these questions about detail and timings.
05:34:14 But when you were initially paged, can you remember what the paging message told you?
05:34:20 We don't have a specific message, the pages to contact Essex control.
05:34:27 And you contacted Essex control and what did they tell you about the incident?
05:34:32 There was a large fire in a tower block in West London and that we'd received a call from a resident
05:34:43 and they were having problems passing that information on to LFB control.
05:34:50 Were you given any detail on the difficulties that were encountered, i.e. you just couldn't get through or the line kept on being cut, were you given any further detail?
05:34:57 They were just having problems getting the information through.
05:35:01 Did it surprise you that there were difficulties getting through?
05:35:05 It's the first time this has actually happened, but for example if we have a car fire on the M25 on a Saturday afternoon,
05:35:18 we might receive up to 50 to 60 calls for that one particular incident.
05:35:23 So no, it didn't trigger any concerns, especially knowing what the final outcome was and the enormity of this.
05:35:36 Are there any work around solutions that you can use to try and get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving you any direct contact?
05:35:45 We've got nothing in policy and procedures, but my thought process was either through Airwave or through police,
05:35:56 which I eventually managed to get through to Met Police to try to pass the information on.
05:36:04 That's good. We'll come on to those particular contacts later.
05:36:07 If we can now look at the detail of timings on the night, first of all just so that you can orientate yourself and have a fixed point from when your involvement started.
05:36:16 Ralph, if I could ask you to put up LFB document quadruple 03625.
05:36:25 Mr. Dilley, have you seen this document before?
05:36:31 Yes, I have, yes.
05:36:33 Is that the Essex incident log of their involvement on the night?
05:36:37 Yes, it is.
05:36:38 Now, at page four, and this is slightly difficult to make out, 0158, which is just below the halfway point on that page,
05:36:49 it appears to say that Dio Dilley Nilo Page to Inform have tried ringing LFB direct line, but there is no answer.
05:37:00 We are aware that they have a major high rise fire, as BT Glasgow asked if we could take some of the overflow calls, as there were too many for their fallback service.
05:37:09 BT stated if this became a problem for ECFRS, then to ring them back on the secure number and they would stop the calls.
05:37:17 Doing the best you can now, is it likely that you were paged at or about 0158?
05:37:23 Yes, that's correct.
05:37:26 Now, if I could ask Ralph to zoom out and then to zoom back in on 0204, where you were recorded saying Dio Dilley informed and situation explained, he will try and make contact.
05:37:43 He suggested if we get further calls from residents to use the stay put policy until we can clarify what advice should be given.
05:37:51 He also asked that we continue to try to contact LFB regarding caller on 22nd floor, no answer from LFB via direct line.
05:38:04 Now, would this be the first time where you spoke to someone at Essex regarding the advice that Essex control ought to be given to callers directed to them?
05:38:13 Yes, it was, although the timing was when that information was inputted on the system.
05:38:21 Looking back at my own call log, I actually started the call at 0158.
05:38:30 I think it lasted for about three, three and a half minutes.
05:38:35 So that would be the time when we'd finished the conversation and that information was actually recorded.
05:38:43 Could you help us? You obviously gave an instruction that stay put advice was to be given until clarified.
05:38:52 Can you help us? Why did you give that instruction? What was your reason?
05:38:56 This was following a conversation with the control operator from Essex where we had information from the caller, but we didn't have any information from London Fire Brigade.
05:39:12 As such, it was agreed that we should continue to give the advice we would normally give until we heard differently from LFB.
05:39:25 I think one of the worst situations would be if we gave advice which was contrary to LFB to tell people to get out when we didn't have any awareness of the incident and what was happening.
05:39:38 So ordinarily we would give stay put policy unless we had information from the fire ground that it would be changed.
05:39:46 In this case, we had no further information.
05:39:49 It would help us to understand at this very outset of your involvement with the response of the incident what precisely you knew about the scale of the fire itself, not very much from the sound of it.
05:40:03 That's correct.
05:40:05 Did you have any idea of the extent of the floors that were affected by fire or that level of detail?
05:40:10 No. The information we had was there was a caller on the 22nd floor.
05:40:16 So all intents and purposes the fire could have been on that floor, the floor below, obviously not knowing the enormity of it at the time.
05:40:27 Thank you.
05:40:28 Now looking at the top of page three of your witness statement, thank you Ralph, you can take that down now.
05:40:35 At the top page three you say, quote, my normal cause of action would be to contact the LFB duty NILO via LFB control.
05:40:42 First of all, how do you get in contact with the LFB duty NILO? What's the means of communication?
05:40:48 So I would normally do that via control for them to contact LFB control to ask their duty NILO to be paged, to contact me direct or to get the number of the duty NILO.
05:41:06 But clearly on the night, knowing that Essex fire control couldn't get through to LFB control, I realised that this probably wasn't going to happen.
05:41:18 And that's why you tried as the first next option Airwave, is that right?
05:41:22 Yes, that's correct.
05:41:23 Now why did you think Airwave was a sensible means of trying to contact the duty NILO?
05:41:33 It would have been a very, how can I say, quick and easy way to talk to the duty NILO.
05:41:41 Is there a dedicated duty NILO channel?
05:41:43 We have dedicated NILO channels, but likewise if LFB tried to contact myself as duty NILO in the middle of the night, there'd be no response.
05:41:55 So that was an option which I decided to try first before attempting the longer route via police.
05:42:05 And when you tried it, what contact did you make, if any?
05:42:10 None at all, there was no response.
05:42:13 Was the line operative?
05:42:15 That I don't know because I just dialed into the channel and then tried to call up the London NILO.
05:42:24 It was no surprise, there was no response, but it was something I could do very quickly and just trying to get that information through.
05:42:35 Did you hear any other activity on the channel or could you hear anything?
05:42:38 No.
05:42:39 Okay.
05:42:44 Now if I could ask to go back to the Essex incident logs, that's LFB quadruple 03625 and page 3.
05:42:58 And looking at the entry for 0216.
05:43:09 I'll just let you read that Mr. Dilley.
05:43:12 It says DO Dilley has tried all the talk groups and has not got a response.
05:43:16 Now first of all, does that timestamp of 0216 record your attempt to contact your LFB counterpart duty NILO?
05:43:26 So it was probably before that, it was probably 0 to 10 around about that time.
05:43:34 So having tried to contact duty NILO, then I spoke to Essex fire control again to say I've had no luck getting through just to get an update as well.
05:43:48 Just to see if that information had been passed through.
05:43:51 Now can you help us? You say DO Dilley has tried all the talk groups. What's a talk group?
05:43:56 That's a channel basically.
05:44:02 And so when you say you've tried all the talk groups, you've obviously explained to us that you use the duty NILO channel.
05:44:09 What other talk groups did you try that you're referring to here at the timestamp of 0216?
05:44:16 There are a couple of NILO dedicated channels which I tried but no other channels. So that was for LFB.
05:44:24 And you would have tried those between 0 to 10 when you made your initial attempt on the airwave and 0 to 16 when?
05:44:31 Probably two or three minutes maximum.
05:44:36 Are there any other systems that are available to you to allow instant communication between duty NILOs across the country?
05:44:43 We have the National Talk Group. This would be set up prior to major exercises or set up for a major incident.
05:44:54 But that would be set up by the host brigade. So it would be invited into that talk group.
05:45:00 Can you remember such a talk group being set up at Grenfell?
05:45:03 No.
05:45:04 Is it that you don't remember it or one wasn't set up?
05:45:08 I wasn't informed that this talk group had been set up.
05:45:13 Okay. You had said it earlier on and maybe I should have asked you a question about it earlier on.
05:45:18 But how do talk groups function at night? Are the duty officers expected to have all the means of communication available to them?
05:45:26 So I would be paged to be informed of the incident that a National Talk Group had been set up.
05:45:34 So then I could dial into that National Talk Group in order to communicate with colleagues in police, fire and ambulance.
05:45:42 Thank you. Now staying with the Essex instant log and looking at the timestamp 0 to 21, which is six or seven lines down from the top.
05:45:56 It says, have spoken to LFB. They want to know how many people, flat number, floor number and if fire is affecting their flat.
05:46:02 Were you aware that Essex appeared to have spoken to the LFB at this stage?
05:46:06 No, not at this stage.
05:46:09 Are you able to clarify any background information to that call that's recorded there?
05:46:19 No.
05:46:20 Mr. Dilley, I'm going to ask you to see whether you can help us with this call.
05:46:26 First of all, I'm going to ask a transcript to be put up on the screen.
05:46:32 It is LFB quadruple 04790 underscore 0076. Apologies, it's not the transcript first of all.
05:46:45 It's just the brigade control report entry.
05:46:56 It's LFB quadruple 04790 underscore 0076.
05:47:06 And it's the call at 0 to 1855.
05:47:21 So the second entry.
05:47:24 I'll just let you read that.
05:47:28 Okay.
05:47:33 Now, if I could ask Ralph to put that document down and put up LFB document quintuple 04790
05:47:56 LFB document quintuple 0325.
05:48:11 Now, if we can turn over the page.
05:48:17 Now, this is a call at 0148 in respect of a flat on the 22nd floor.
05:48:25 And you'll see roughly halfway down the page, the caller says, and it's getting very smoky inside the house.
05:48:37 And then just bearing that in mind, if we put that document down and Ralph, if we could go back to LFB quadruple 04790 underscore 0076
05:48:53 and go back to 0 to 1855.
05:49:02 On the fourth line, C.R. Adams asks about conditions like smoke in a flat and the Essex Query says that the caller seems okay.
05:49:11 And it goes on to say two lines down, the caller has reported that it started to get smoky.
05:49:17 Now, what seemed striking was that the caller, as recorded in the transcript at 0148, was saying it was very smoky.
05:49:28 And looking at how it's been summarized there, would you agree that the full import of the smoke description given by the caller
05:49:37 hasn't been fully conveyed here by the Essex Query phoning through to London?
05:49:45 It's the first time I've seen this documentation. It was something that I wasn't involved in, very much of an opinionated.
05:49:58 So I'm really not too sure I can.
05:50:00 No. You're being asked to tell us what you think the document means, aren't you? Which isn't a very fair question.
05:50:06 We shouldn't. It's counseled. Yeah. If you can't help us any further, I won't push my luck.
05:50:14 Do you remember at any stage during the communications between the LFB and Essex,
05:50:20 whether there was any concern expressed by Essex regarding state put and whether it should be pulled or not?
05:50:25 Do you remember being involved in any discussions along those lines?
05:50:28 No. The conversations I had with Essex originally was regarding a query over the state put policy.
05:50:37 And then further on, as we'll probably come on to, is my information from Met Police with regards to advice given for people to exit.
05:50:46 But for that first half hour, I wasn't aware of it. Well, originally we couldn't get through to LFB control.
05:50:56 That's helpful. And that contact with the Met Police, I want to ask you about now.
05:51:01 And going back to page three of your witness statement, it's really five lines down from the top.
05:51:05 You say this, and I quote, I decided the next best option was to contact Met Police Control with a view of getting them to pass the call of details I had via police directly to the LFB command team at the incident.
05:51:17 Now, summarizing your evidence, is it fair to say that all other options having failed, the last practical option was contacting the police?
05:51:28 I had spoken to control about them trying to get in touch with Northwest Fire Control.
05:51:37 So then for me, it was looking at other options, which other ways of getting that information.
05:51:45 And with my close working relationships with Essex Police and the information which we share, I felt through police that might be a very good way of getting information.
05:51:59 Knowing the type of incident it was, I would have thought police would be present on the incident ground.
05:52:07 So that information could be passed to the command unit directly via police.
05:52:13 Thank you. Now, Ralph, if you could put up on the screen document INQ, quadruple zero, 0284, which hopefully is a transcript of a call that you made at 022640 to the Met.
05:52:31 And if I let you just read that and then ask you to confirm that that is indeed a transcript of that call.
05:52:39 Yes, it is.
05:52:40 And we see in relation to that call, the first complete box at the top of page two.
05:52:45 So Ralph, if you could turn the page over and amplify the first complete box at the top.
05:52:57 Miss Dilley, you're recorded there as saying, have you, unless you've got anybody in the scene that can pass that message to the silver silver on scene to get that message to London Fire Brigade.
05:53:07 Now, the silver you're referring to there, is that the Met or the LFB?
05:53:12 So that would be the LFB through the incident command structure.
05:53:20 So it was terminology which I felt that the LFB, the Met police would be familiar with.
05:53:28 So through the command structure on the incident ground.
05:53:32 Thank you. And we don't need to go through it, but you pass on the information that had come through in relation to flats 193 and 82.
05:53:41 How did you get the information with respect to those two flats?
05:53:44 So that was from control. So the first call I had was for the 22nd floor flat on the 22nd floor, which I believe was 193.
05:53:57 And then on my conversation with control around about quarter past two, they gave me information about a second call, which I believe was on the 11th floor.
05:54:11 So that information I passed to Met police.
05:54:17 Thank you. And if we can remove the amplification.
05:54:23 And about halfway down page two, you record as saying this.
05:54:27 No, I haven't got any further details, but I can get them.
05:54:31 Did you follow that up and try and obtain further details from Essex control?
05:54:36 So what I'm following on from that conversation, I actually got the CAD number and then spoke to Essex control and gave them the information,
05:54:50 I believe that if I was leaving, actually it would be better for them to contact Met police directly rather than me as a third party.
05:54:57 So I'd made those contacts. So I passed that number back to Essex control.
05:55:06 And when you when you ended the call, what did you expect would be done with the message, the information you'd conveyed in respects of flats 193 and 82?
05:55:14 So two things I'd requested. First was for the information to be passed on to the fire ground.
05:55:22 And secondly, to see if Met police had another contact number to get in touch with LFB control, which we could use.
05:55:29 So looking at almost like a third option, a third line of communication.
05:55:35 And in relation to the last, did you ever get that number?
05:55:40 Not that I'm aware of. I wasn't given that number, but I gave the information to Essex fire control.
05:55:48 But having spoken then to Essex fire control with that information, I was told we had finally got through to LFB control.
05:55:58 So the information had been passed. So I was trying to triangulate the communications.
05:56:06 Knowing the information had been passed direct from Essex fire control to LFB control, then for me, the information had got through.
05:56:16 So it wasn't something which I needed to chase up. Thank you.
05:56:20 And if we go back and look at the end, Essex incident log, which is LFB quadruple zero three six two five and look at timestamp zero two thirty six.
05:56:36 Go on to page three.
05:56:44 Two.
05:56:54 Zero two thirty six we're looking for.
05:57:04 Page two.
05:57:12 Right. And you'll see the very last entry at the bottom of that page.
05:57:18 Zero two thirty six. Dio Dilli has spoken to the police.
05:57:23 And now could we go to page three?
05:57:28 And the top, if you can highlight that control in Hendon, they are trying to get a number for us.
05:57:34 Their number is XCAD eight zero eight zero one.
05:57:38 In case we need it to control informed Dio Dilli that we have spoken to LFB control now.
05:57:45 And does that give us a relatively accurate time point of the conversation you had?
05:57:50 Yes, it does. When I went back to Essex, I should say.
05:57:53 Yes, when I was in conversation with with Met Police at Hendon, I was paged again by Essex Fire Control,
05:58:03 which is when I then spoke since I finished the conversation and I spoke to Essex Fire Control.
05:58:11 And that would that would equate to the timelines there.
05:58:14 After this particular call, this record, you updating Essex control at zero two thirty six.
05:58:20 Were you aware of any later nine nine nine calls that were directed towards Essex?
05:58:28 I was aware. I think I will.
05:58:32 In fact, I spoke to Essex Fire Control just after that with regards to a message which I got from Hendon
05:58:41 regarding asking residents to evacuate the building.
05:58:45 And then I think I was paged after that, just after three o'clock.
05:58:50 But by that time, Essex were talking to LFB control.
05:58:55 And were you aware of any further communication difficulties between Essex and the LFB that night?
05:59:01 No, I think my last conversation with with control was just after was about quarter past three.
05:59:09 Now, thank you very much for that, Mr. Dilley.
05:59:12 Now to move topic and to change of the state put advice, which you'd better do there in your answer.
05:59:17 And just to give you some context, at paragraph 14 on page three of your statement,
05:59:22 you say that you did become aware that the LFB had changed the state policy during the night.
05:59:26 Quotes when talking to the Met Police Control operator, close quotes.
05:59:30 Is that a fair summary of your evidence?
05:59:34 It was, but that was my understanding when I submitted my evidence in October this year.
05:59:43 However, it wasn't when I was talking to the Met Police Operator.
05:59:48 It was actually I received a text message to say that they were advising residents to evacuate.
05:59:57 OK, could I just sort of bottom out this point if I could ask Nigel to sorry,
06:00:02 if I could ask Ralph to put up Inc. Quadruple 00284.
06:00:13 And if we go to page two, that's the transcript of the call we were looking at earlier.
06:00:18 If you go to page two, so I go to the end.
06:00:30 Go to the end, please.
06:00:32 Right, if you could amplify the box at the bottom of page three.
06:00:37 You mentioned a text message earlier on.
06:00:40 This appears to be a voicemail message left for you at 02-32-31.
06:00:50 Is that the message you're referring to?
06:00:52 Yes, sorry.
06:00:53 So it's a voicemail as opposed to a text?
06:00:55 A voicemail, yes.
06:00:56 And the reason they couldn't get through it because at the time I was talking to Essex Fire Control.
06:01:03 So that would equate to the timings.
06:01:05 Thank you.
06:01:06 And if we could just tie this document chain together.
06:01:08 Ralph, if we go back to LFB Quadruple 03625 and page two.
06:01:21 And if you go timestamp 02-40, so second entry up from the bottom of the page.
06:01:32 Dio Dilley has called the contact number from that police.
06:01:35 The message they are giving to residents from LFB is that they are to make their way to a fire exit if safe to do so.
06:01:41 And I think that's the phone message you were referring to earlier on as to how you communicated the contents of the voicemail message back to Essex Control.
06:01:50 Is that right?
06:01:51 And that's why there were two calls to Essex Fire Control within three or four minutes.
06:01:56 So my first message was to pass the information on regarding Hendon and the second with this change which had been communicated via Met Police.
06:02:10 Do you know the identity of the person to whom you spoke at the Essex Control room when you communicated this information?
06:02:16 I believe it was Russ White.
06:02:21 Yes.
06:02:25 Now Mr. White in his witness statement, and I can bring up the reference but I don't think it's necessary but please shout if you'd like to see it.
06:02:32 He says in his witness statement, and I quote, at 02-36 I spoke to Nigel Dilley.
06:02:38 Message from LFB via the Metropolitan Police Control room is to advise all residents to make their way to the fire escape exit.
06:02:45 I informed ND Nigel Dilley that London had confirmed when speaking with the last that the advice was to stay put.
06:02:53 Although this may have changed depending on how the incident was dealt with, ND again passed me the Metropolitan Police number to get an update.
06:03:00 Does that recollection of the content of your phone conversation with Mr. White, does that coincide with your recollection of that conversation?
06:03:10 Yes it does.
06:03:13 And just to clarify, I needed Russ to speak to Hendon just to clarify the information which I'd been given via the voicemail was correct because obviously a change to the stay put policy is something we needed to clarify.
06:03:31 Okay. Now if I can deal with some individual calls and if you don't know anything about them please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us.
06:03:42 Now there's a call in relation to flat 153, 153 which is on the 18th floor.
06:03:48 And if I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report which is LFB quadruple 04790 at page 105.
06:04:09 And if I could ask Ralph to amplify 0251 the first entry at that time there.
06:04:20 I'll just let you read that Mr. Dilley to yourself.
06:04:36 Okay.
06:04:37 Were you familiar with that call or were you aware of that call on the night?
06:04:40 No I wasn't.
06:04:42 I won't ask you to comment on the contents of the transcript then.
06:04:47 We won't assist us any further.
06:04:50 Now can I move to a separate topic which is a topic of callbacks.
06:04:56 And if I could ask Ralph to take us back to the Essex incident log which is LFB quadruple 03625 and the time entry at 0303 which is on page one of that log.
06:05:18 And the timestamp 0303 which is the third entry or second from the bottom.
06:05:28 I'll just let you read that to yourself Mr. Dilley.
06:05:38 Okay.
06:05:39 Now that essentially records a call of being recontacted and advised to leave.
06:05:44 Is this the practice that would normally be adopted in relation to calling back residents who are trapped within the flat and advising them of change of advice?
06:05:55 Not normally.
06:05:58 We wouldn't call back definitely a landline on the basis that the caller may be outside and then return to pick up the call.
06:06:11 My understanding is from this with the change to advice given and Russ having the time to be able to do this.
06:06:22 I understand that he decided to recontact the caller.
06:06:28 Thank you very much.
06:06:29 Could you remove the amplification please Ralph and go to timestamp 310.
06:06:40 And it says there Dio Dilley informed as duty Nilo.
06:06:46 Now does that confirm the advice that was given in relation to the call we looked at at 0303?
06:06:58 Yes, that would be that would be correct.
06:07:01 Although the conversation at that time my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time.
06:07:14 And I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed.
06:07:23 Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined classified the incident as a major incident?
06:07:31 That was I believe at that time.
06:07:33 So around 310.
06:07:35 What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities of the duty Nilo at Essex?
06:07:42 So a major incident within London Fire Brigade unless it was close to the Essex border wouldn't normally trigger duty Nilo being informed.
06:07:54 As you can appreciate London have resources to deal with ordinarily incidents themselves without requesting advice or assistance from Essex.
06:08:05 The penultimate question I'd like to ask you is going back to the Nilo system itself and having gone through the nature of your involvement over the night with the incident.
06:08:17 Looking at what happened on the night do you think the Nilo system functioned as intended given the communication difficulties you encountered?
06:08:25 The Nilo function is an option that could be used.
06:08:35 I think with the type of incident it just wasn't put into action at the time.
06:08:45 My final question is one of resources.
06:08:48 Would it form part of your job to try and contact London to see whether they needed more resources from Essex?
06:08:55 No, that's the host brigade contacting Essex to request additional resources.
06:09:02 Thank you.
06:09:03 Mr. Dilley, I have no further questions at the moment.
06:09:06 As we've said to other witnesses, the chairman allows me five minutes to review my notes to see if there are any further matters.
06:09:12 I'd be grateful for that indulgence now but you may feel slightly longer, maybe permissible.
06:09:19 Maybe seven?
06:09:20 Yes.
06:09:21 Or eight.
06:09:22 Mr. Dilley, we're going to have a short break now so the council can check if there are any questions that should have been asked but haven't been.
06:09:28 We're going to rise for just over five minutes.
06:09:31 I'm going to ask you please not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room.
06:09:35 If you'd like to go with the usher, shall I go?
06:09:37 Thanks.
06:09:38 Thank you.
06:09:42 I'll say five past four.
06:09:52 Thanks, sir.
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