Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Evidence from Control Room Officers (23 November 2018 Pt 2 of 2)
00:00:30 you
00:01:47 yes mr. Miller mr. Chairman I now call control room officer Christine house and please thank you very much
00:02:16 it's really after me I do solemnly sincerely and truly I do solemnly sincerely and truly declare and affirm declare and affirm that the evidence I
00:02:27 declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth thank you thank you very much yes sir good
00:02:39 thank you very much yes sir good afternoon miss Hassan can I ask you please to give the Chairman your full name Christine and Nelson I'm going to start by thanking you very much for coming here today and giving evidence to the inquiry and
00:02:50 giving evidence to the inquiry and assisting us with our investigations we very much appreciated it's sometimes difficult for witnesses to come and relive the events of that night and say at any time you really need a break you
00:03:02 at any time you really need a break you need only indicate and we can take a break we try and sit for milla more than an hour we went sit ask and ask questions for more than an hour but if you need a break before that we can did
00:03:13 you need a break before that we can did we can take a break earlier sometimes my questions are not as short and simple as they're supposed to be so if you want me to ask the question in a different way or to repeat it I'm very happy to do so okay okay now you've given a witness
00:03:26 okay okay now you've given a witness statement to the Metropolitan Police dated the 27th of October 2017 and that is of m80 quadruple zero seven seven six three it should appear on the monitor on
00:03:37 three it should appear on the monitor on the desk to your right or on the screen behind you it's also in a paper form in a blue phone in front of you if you wish to use that it's the matter for you do you recognize that as your witness statement you gave to the police last
00:03:49 statement you gave to the police last year yeah you do have you read it recently I have yeah and can you confirm that its contents are true okay yeah you can now I want to turn to your role in
00:04:01 can now I want to turn to your role in the lfb and your training I think it's right that you work for the lfb since 2004 is that right that's correct you in your role as a control room operator yes yes
00:04:13 room operator yes yes when you after you joined and had your initial training did you receive any refresher or additional training after that
00:04:24 that from its initial training yes yeah over the years I've had digital training when was the most recent additional training prior to June 2017 it would have been in
00:04:38 prior to June 2017 it would have been in January 2017 can you tell us what that training involved and that was fsj training and with the command units and I don't know whether you were present or heard
00:04:50 whether you were present or heard Devon atoms giving evidence she explained that there was a training session involving a command unit but is that the same training - Semite Leal's on the same china sea or on the same timing
00:05:01 apart from that training session did your training prior to the fire at Grenville tower involve training or familiarization with policy five three
00:05:14 familiarization with policy five three nine emergency call management not specifically emergency call manager I've had other fsj training sessions
00:05:25 I've had other fsj training sessions right 2016 2014 on the in those sessions was there any role play that you did actors play the role of callers no the
00:05:37 actors play the role of callers no the only time we did any role play was the one with the commands it wasn't it okay and at those sessions did you did the training involve FS cheese from high-rise residential blocks we did a
00:05:48 high-rise residential blocks we did a session I think it must have been 2014 again a command unit did come to control right we didn't do any scenarios but we
00:06:00 right we didn't do any scenarios but we kind of explained what we do in high-rise and they can't explained what they do right so there's just an exchange of information really right did it involve an exchange of information about what would happen in
00:06:11 information about what would happen in the control room if multiple FS cheese were under we're in play at the same time underway at the same time not specifically multiple FS J's
00:06:22 specifically multiple FS J's it always really just assumed there would be one or a few right not multiple ones right you say a few how many maybe two or three right was any of your
00:06:35 two or three right was any of your training 2014 or 16 taking that time frame focused on matters arising or lessons learned from the lack little house fire in 2009 not specifically I
00:06:52 house fire in 2009 not specifically I think there were changes there was introduction of the form after that canal when you say the form is that the control information form yes yeah four
00:07:04 control information form yes yeah four FS Jake calls right the use of thugs did you use those in the control room did you ever observe them being used in the control room in response to an FSG call
00:07:16 control room in response to an FSG call no right so they're introduced but never used I personally have not used senator now in your statement to page three if I can ask you to turn to that please and you're in the second paragraph you say
00:07:31 you're in the second paragraph you say it four lines down from the start of that paragraph I have dealt with quite a few of these calls over the years and you're referring to FSG calls yeah but they are quite rare I just want
00:07:43 yeah but they are quite rare I just want to get a feel for the experience and if you had all of those calls first of all were any of the calls FSG calls that you handled over the years high rise calls knock remember did any
00:07:58 high rise calls knock remember did any of those incidents involve multiple FSG calls no doing the best you can to recall how many FSG calls prior to the night of grenfell do you think you handled
00:08:11 maybe 2020 yeah right can I ask you to look at policy 539 that's tab 3 of our policies bundle please and turn in that
00:08:24 policies bundle please and turn in that to appendix 3 on page 16 just to be clear no one's expecting you to read
00:08:35 clear no one's expecting you to read that no just to be just to be clear if you could please be shown the first page well that this will do appendix 3 first survival guidance are you familiar with
00:08:46 survival guidance are you familiar with with this with what we see on the screen appendix 3 - policy 539 emergency call management yeah I'm familiar with the
00:08:59 management yeah I'm familiar with the fire survival guidance right now I want to ask you one or two questions about this first of all if you look on this page a paragraph at the the fourth paragraph let's stop with the third
00:09:14 paragraph let's stop with the third Brigade control advise callers to get out and stay out however if a call has received from a high-rise building where fire heat and smoke are not affecting the caller lfp would advise that and then here's
00:09:25 lfp would advise that and then here's the advice you are usually safest to remain in your premises are less affected by fire heat or smoke if the situation changes you should leave your premises and are nine nine nine if you need further assistance and then it goes
00:09:39 need further assistance and then it goes on to tell you what that should happen if the caller should be unable to escape now just looking at that that paragraph that we've just looked at above that you are usually safest to remain in your
00:09:50 are usually safest to remain in your premises
00:09:51 premises does that accord with your understanding of this verse they put policy yes okay when you are looking at it it says
00:10:06 when you are looking at it it says you're usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire heat or smoke
00:10:12 smoke can you explain what information you would use as control an officer to make the assessment as to whether a callers premises are affected by fire heat or smoke well I would try to ascertain if
00:10:27 smoke well I would try to ascertain if the fire was actually in their flat if it was in their flat then I would give them advice on getting out of the flat if it's not I would think if it's not I
00:10:43 if it's not I would think if it's not I would work on a premise that they were safer where they were that's fine what about smoke smoke well we work to keep
00:10:56 about smoke smoke well we work to keep the smoke out of their flat to keep them safe until they're rescued right if smoke was coming into a call as flat
00:11:07 smoke was coming into a call as flat would you tell them to stay in their premises if it was coming into the flat my my advice would be I would give them
00:11:18 my my advice would be I would give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat right say at the point at which the mix it would be clear about this at the point at which a caller
00:11:29 this at the point at which a caller tells you that there are that smoke is coming in would you say that they are affected by fire heat or smoke if smoke is coming in from outside yet either through the other through the door of
00:11:41 through the other through the door of their flat or through the window of their flat know at that point I wouldn't and I would be advising them on what to do to stop the smoke coming in okay would you still think that they were safest to remain in their flat yes so
00:11:54 safest to remain in their flat yes so when you go back to the wording of the advice which says you are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by a fire heat or smoke you would essentially delete smoke and say
00:12:07 would essentially delete smoke and say it's safest to remain unless affected by fire or heat not ignore smoke but hi I would assume that the smoke was coming if the fire
00:12:18 that the smoke was coming if the fire wasn't in there flat I would assume that smoke was coming into their flat from outside so I would be doing everything to assure that they stop that right
00:12:31 would you not start though to explore with the caller whether they could safely leave to get away from the smoke that was coming into their flat
00:12:46 initially now wouldn't you would start if the fire wasn't in their flat it depended if it was obviously the first coal then yes I would but if we we are
00:13:00 coal then yes I would but if we we are dealing with a call already in the building then no I would keep try to keep them safe in their flats awaiting rescue right that is what I would do
00:13:13 rescue right that is what I would do so if is this right look for you the big difference is fire yes right and at that point is this right your understanding is that it's at that point but not before fire that you start to explore
00:13:25 before fire that you start to explore means of exit means of exit yes now moving on to far survival guidance as per as set out in this appendix you in
00:13:42 per as set out in this appendix you in your statement if I could take you back to that you say on page three in the second paragraph which we're still on you say some callers may become fast survival guidance calls which I will now
00:13:54 survival guidance calls which I will now talk about in more depth its summary if there is a fire and a person cannot leave a property because of that fire the procedure is to make it a fire survival guidance call this creates a new procedure from a control room
00:14:05 new procedure from a control room officers perspective now and then you go on to say what that that that is and you say I would raise my hand and a supinated former supervisor who may come to me or listen in on the call I would
00:14:17 to me or listen in on the call I would take details from the caller asking if they can get out and other questions to establish the circumstances and whereabouts now you say there in your statement if there is a fire and a
00:14:30 statement if there is a fire and a person cannot leave because of that fire it's it's an FSG call how do you go about establishing whether a person cannot leave a property once there is a fire well just by asking them if they
00:14:47 fire well just by asking them if they can leave or not you ask them and they say I can't leave do you take it at face value or do you say well hold on let's just explore the exit routes together tell me what's happening outside your flat do you do that or do you just take
00:14:59 flat do you do that or do you just take it at face value no I would ask them why they can't leave right how far do you push it you know I would just accept
00:15:10 push it you know I would just accept that they can't leave right so who is the judge of whether or not they can leave do you leave it to the caller or do you bring your judgment and experience to bear on that question no I mean not you know I would know the call
00:15:25 mean not you know I would know the call is judgment yes because I'm not there I don't know it's just so you know so I have to be guided by what the call is telling me yeah I can't tell the caller
00:15:38 telling me yeah I can't tell the caller okay what's happening out in there flat-looking if I could take you them to another policy which is FSG policy 790 which
00:15:51 policy which is FSG policy 790 which we've got at at five of our policy bundle can I ask you please vessel to look at the first page of that so we can just make sure you're familiar with it this is policy 790 fire survival
00:16:04 this is policy 790 fire survival guidance calls reviewed as current at April 2014 and if you turn please to page two of that you can see section for
00:16:17 page two of that you can see section for prioritizing calls for one occasionally control receives multiple FSGS at an incident all FSGS received by control are treated with the same level of
00:16:28 are treated with the same level of urgency however in certain circumstances the officer in charge of control may direct call handles that our call to answer another is that something you're familiar with ever having done sorry that's a very vague
00:16:42 having done sorry that's a very vague question cuz I let me break it down are you in your experience have you ever been in a situation where the control room has received multiple FS geez I have i-i've not personally been told to
00:16:58 have i-i've not personally been told to terminate a call right but I have been in the control room where someone's been told like to end a call what were the circumstances remember specifically but
00:17:11 circumstances remember specifically but I think we had like you know we had calls coming in that needed to be taken right and I can only assume that it was they would deem safe the call the
00:17:24 they would deem safe the call the callers were deemed to be in a safe position and other calls needed to be taken do you remember that incident
00:17:34 remember when it might have been a long time ago no totally the only time I can really remember it I needn't like that prior to like grenfell was it prior to laughing all house do you think 2009 oh
00:17:46 laughing all house do you think 2009 oh yeah I think it probably would have been was it a high-rise residential block I can't mean I can't remember okay but okay I only remember it because it was
00:17:59 okay I only remember it because it was unusual for someone to be told to enter call right now looking at st. page paragraph five one information transfer to the incident what would be the usual
00:18:10 to the incident what would be the usual method in your experience that you would adopt for passing information from a far survival guidance call to the incident ground in the normal course of events it would like be like a service request
00:18:22 would like be like a service request form right find a radio and so you would make that on vision so the officer could then radio the radio officer I don't do is send it yeah so it would be radio by the radio officer yeah you wouldn't call
00:18:35 the radio officer yeah you wouldn't call the Instagram yourself mate no okay unless you're unless you were on the radio yeah just a radio operator okay now can I ask you to turn the page please to be paid paragraph five point
00:18:47 please to be paid paragraph five point five in this policy and it says control will attempt to gather all the information on the controller information form which we discussed and relay this information to the incident as and when it becomes available then
00:18:58 as and when it becomes available then then you see underneath that a list of bullet points which have to be which is the subject of that information in your experience is it possible to obtain all
00:19:10 experience is it possible to obtain all of that information from callers yeah yeah I mean is it something that you would usually do go through each and
00:19:22 would usually do go through each and every head of information asking for that detail yeah you would attempt to get all that information you wouldn't you know not every situation you would be able to get all of it but you know to
00:19:33 be able to get all of it but you know to get that now this information is in a paragraph in a policy the title of which is fast survival guidance my question is do you as a control room officer
00:19:45 do you as a control room officer normally try and get all that information for all calls where a person is calling from a high-rise building or only those which are far survivable
00:19:56 only those which are far survivable guidance in other words where they're trapped and can't get out and in your in your way of thinking there is a fire no I think you all of
00:20:09 there is a fire no I think you all of that information would only be pertinent really to a fire survival call right so it is this right that it's not until it becomes a far survival guidance call in your mind that you start asking this for
00:20:20 your mind that you start asking this for the specific information yeah I mean there's information there that you would ask for for any type of call right but yeah fire survival you would be looking
00:20:32 yeah fire survival you would be looking to ya get most of that information or as much information as you could really anything that it's gonna help ya are we looking at in flat number of flat house is that information that you would ask
00:20:43 is that information that you would ask for only on a fire survival guidance call or for any call any comp right what about the next one number of persons fire survival garden or any cool not number of persons I mean
00:20:55 or any cool not number of persons I mean if there was a fire you would ask if anyone's inside the building or they believe anyone's inside or might be inside right so just looking at this
00:21:08 inside right so just looking at this list what information wouldn't you ask for if the call was not all not yet a fire survival guidance call
00:21:23 well locations are calling within the premises an access point if it wasn't a fire survival you wouldn't need that right condition of the location you would be you would be looking for that
00:21:35 would be you would be looking for that information on any course proximity to fire if known presumably that's the person you're speaking to if it's not
00:21:47 person you're speaking to if it's not fire survival you may or may not be looking for that information
00:21:53 yeah really right so in a is this ro that in a call that has not in your mind yet become a faster viable guidance call you would only ask for the number of flat of the house and was this right
00:22:09 flat of the house and was this right that sometimes the condition of their location yeah I mean if it's not the fire survival if it's a fire call yes we're basically looking for an address
00:22:25 the type of instant it is right it was that to in order to mobilize okay does that mean that where the caller is calling from a flat that is has got
00:22:36 calling from a flat that is has got smoke coming in but it's not in your mind of our survival guidance call you wouldn't seek to establishing stablish things like for example proximity to
00:22:49 things like for example proximity to fire if known latest advice number of persons involved well if they've got smoke coming in but you speaking specifically about a high-rise or just yes yeah so if they've got smoke coming
00:23:02 yes yeah so if they've got smoke coming in and no I would collect more information to pass to the crews on scene right let them know that there are people there so that they can then go
00:23:17 people there so that they can then go and make sure that they're okay in the flat right what if it was a smoke call if I can put it that way no fire yet smoke coming into the flat what information would you offer in that list
00:23:28 information would you offer in that list I think it was important together
00:23:36 yeah well people probably yeah most of it really right okay so I'll just try to get a feel for where the line is drawn when it's not an FSG call what
00:23:52 when it's not an FSG call what information you would know it's when it comes to high-rise service kind of it is different because of the stay-put policy
00:24:03 different because of the stay-put policy it's we do will I - I do deal with it differently because if they're not directly affected by the fire they're
00:24:16 directly affected by the fire they're within the building and not affected by the fire I my experience and the training that I've had I am working on
00:24:27 training that I've had I am working on the assumption that they are in a safe place
00:24:29 place right I mean obviously green fields change that but the assumption would always be and in my experience there's
00:24:40 always be and in my experience there's always turned out to be that they are safe if they're not directly affected by the fire so so I would I would take the
00:24:52 the fire so so I would I would take the information make the crews aware that someone is in that flat they're concerned about situation you know and
00:25:04 concerned about situation you know and they need to be visited and reassured but I
00:25:11 our words my assumption would be that they are in a safe place is that so even if there's smoke coming into their flat yeah I mean it does
00:25:23 into their flat yeah I mean it does happen I mean you know we get fires and they'll be sort of in the shoe or something and someone needs to shoot open and it creates a lot of smoke in a communal area obviously that's not what
00:25:36 communal area obviously that's not what happened
00:25:36 happened in this instance but that's what can happen and it can create a lot of smoke there's no immediate danger we might know that it is actually the shoot
00:25:48 know that it is actually the shoot that's an ayat which is protected the shooter and so we just need to make sure that their kids self say keep the smoke
00:25:59 that their kids self say keep the smoke out and that it will be dealt with and they are in a safe place right
00:26:11 does that mean that in the this that kind of call you wouldn't take for example details like the number of persons in the in the flat or disability
00:26:24 persons in the in the flat or disability whether any disabilities or the age of the occupants it would depend I mean it depends how much information we've already got you know if I knew that was
00:26:37 already got you know if I knew that was that was the situation I've just explained
00:26:39 explained I wouldn't necessarily take any more information than that other than that there there was someone there it was concerned if I wasn't sure what was going on then obviously I would take
00:26:51 was going on then obviously I would take more information just try and gauge it on what information we had what was going on to take an example which we may not come to but supposing you were happy
00:27:02 not come to but supposing you were happy got a caller who is complaining about smoke coming in wasn't an FSG call in your mind you wouldn't know unless you ask them whether for example they had some kind of bronchial or respiratory
00:27:14 some kind of bronchial or respiratory problem like a snore or or some other difficulty no I wouldn't would you ask them for that information no seriously why is that I mean the only
00:27:25 no seriously why is that I mean the only I would ask them if they were coughing I would ask them why they were coughing what was happening you know what was causing him to cough things like that but if they were you know if they were
00:27:38 but if they were you know if they were just talking normally right it just depends on how they're reacting really and what about mobility difficulties was that sort of information that you would
00:27:49 that sort of information that you would seek to get from them if this call wasn't a full-blown fire Survival Guide in this call not if it wasn't for FSG columnar right what about where it had
00:28:02 columnar right what about where it had become a full-blown fire survival guidance call so in your mind fire affecting the flap they need to leave would you ask it that in that situation I mean you know stop questioning about you know are you able
00:28:13 questioning about you know are you able to are you able to leave no it's not why
00:28:18 you know people people have got mobility issues they do tend to tell you now turning to the night of the fire we know
00:28:30 turning to the night of the fire we know you were based in the Stratford control room and you say in your statement we don't need to go to it that it's a small room yeah probably better because you can hear and know what's going on but you can you also say it gets very noisy
00:28:42 you can you also say it gets very noisy yeah which can make it difficult to hear callers first of all can you tell us by reference to a photograph where you were sitting
00:28:50 sitting can the witness please be shown lfb quadruple zero four seven nine zero page 175
00:29:06 and this hassle can you identify where you were sitting oh they're there and I see so you're sitting it to the on the left hand chair yep
00:29:16 yep just remind me who if nobody else who was sitting in the right hand chair on that's great now that was empty was it as empty so did you have a clear line of sight to your right to Yvonne Adams and
00:29:28 sight to your right to Yvonne Adams and Pam Jones I did you very good okay and just to remind me again who was immediately opposite you sitting in the ER Sarah so anybody else I think it was
00:29:41 ER Sarah so anybody else I think it was I think it was Angie Sharon yes now when you say in your statement that Stratford is better because you can hear each other does that mean that you can
00:29:52 each other does that mean that you can hear the advice being given by other CIOs yeah you you've got an awareness we've got more of an away in this right of the type of calls that coming in right could you hear in detail what the
00:30:05 right could you hear in detail what the CRS was saying to callers I could hear the address right so I knew we were getting multiple calls to the same address you speak of the noise in the
00:30:17 address you speak of the noise in the control room which can make it difficult to hear callers did you find during the incident that you did have difficulty hearing the callers because of the noise in the control room as things escalated you did get organizing okay did did get
00:30:30 you did get organizing okay did did get noisy
00:30:30 noisy did you did you find that it obscured your hearing of what the callers were telling you it became more difficult to hear I mean oh I was this is at the
00:30:41 hear I mean oh I was this is at the corner of the room yeah so if I was struggling I stood up and I walked back into the corner of the room do I get myself you know just a bit spice between me and the room really
00:30:52 spice between me and the room really okay what was your headset on yeah with the headset on yeah yeah no you in your in your witness statement page four in the second paragraph you refer to the
00:31:04 the second paragraph you refer to the makeups there you say eight ten twelve twenty pumps and we've
00:31:17 eight ten twelve twenty pumps and we've got time marks for each of each of these and particularly for make pumps 20 of 120 946 I can show you that if you need to and then put 25 pumps at 130 148 so
00:31:29 to and then put 25 pumps at 130 148 so about two minutes later bringing you forward to that point in the night did did the speed of these makeups give you any information about the way the farm is behaving yeah what did you think was
00:31:47 is behaving yeah what did you think was it there you know I knew it was a massive fire yeah it's like a major fire a major fire did you did you get any impression of where in the building it
00:31:58 impression of where in the building it was it was it was moving spreading no no not really I didn't know how is progressing but it's it's unusual 20 pulses is unusual
00:32:11 it's it's unusual 20 pulses is unusual yeah and for it to go 20 you know you know you're dealing with something quite extraordinary really by that stage had
00:32:23 extraordinary really by that stage had it occurred to you or did you think that the farmers moving up the building at speed affecting the floors higher up than the initial floor well I mean
00:32:34 than the initial floor well I mean nights prior to that I just I'd taken a couple of calls from people on the upper floors saying that there was like smoke outside their windows yes which I
00:32:50 couldn't I just couldn't get my head round really because we knew the fire was on the lower levels and for the smoke to be still be outside people's
00:33:03 smoke to be still be outside people's windows on that floor it's I couldn't understand what was happening to the fire really can we go then to the control room report please at page 25 that's LFP
00:33:18 report please at page 25 that's LFP quadruple zero four seven nine zero and at page 25 you take it you'd say you
00:33:32 at page 25 you take it you'd say you want the top of the page you can see that you take a call from a male caller who's on his balcony in West two and he can see a whole block of flats on fire near Westfield cro hassan checks the
00:33:45 near Westfield cro hassan checks the individuals postcode that is satisfied that the caller is clothed in in close enough proximity to Granville for it to be the same incident now that stage you're told when you verify it's the
00:33:56 you're told when you verify it's the whole block of flats on fire and this is 130 did that give you information from which you could now tell that the fire
00:34:07 which you could now tell that the fire had moved substantially beyond the compartment of origin yes it did but I never really until I actually saw a
00:34:20 never really until I actually saw a picture at the building I had no understanding of what's going on there right I couldn't I just couldn't visit
00:34:31 right I couldn't I just couldn't visit what was actually happening there would it have helped to have a television or Helly telly downlink in front of you so you could see what was going on I don't
00:34:43 you could see what was going on I don't know I don't know whether it would have helped a lot really I mean it was it was a shock to see it
00:34:54 that was later in the night yeah yeah yeah when this caller tells you the whole block of flats on fire did you feel you believe him or did you treat it with skepticism I think at that point I
00:35:11 with skepticism I think at that point I I didn't disbelieve him I thought what that we was dealing with something obviously I thought we were stealing with a very serious fire but as I say
00:35:26 with a very serious fire but as I say until I got the visual I didn't realize quite how how bad it was
00:35:34 and there's a call at 1:37 if you go forward to page 35 that you take one 3709 third of the way down the page you
00:35:45 3709 third of the way down the page you take a call through the female caller who states that she can see a massive fire in a table and people may jump out caller states they're not in the building that can hear people screaming for help
00:35:55 for help CRO has some states there are 10 fire engines there are more enroute in fact by that stage the make up is 25 had you not heard that will seem that message on in the room or on the vision
00:36:07 message on in the room or on the vision log reading mr. wood we should be well a third Oh 137 uh we had the previous one
00:36:21 third Oh 137 uh we had the previous one don't worry I just repeated through two cell phones yeah CRN houston takes a call from a female caller States she can see a massive fire in a tower and people may jump out caller states they're not
00:36:33 may jump out caller states they're not in the building but can hear people screaming yes engines there yes did you oh I see a root so you had heard that it was 25 by this stage yeah yeah
00:36:43 yeah no at that point you'd had the call earlier at 1:30 and 14 whole block of flats on fire now you're hearing a call that there's a massive fire and pmo jump out by this stage had you realized that
00:36:56 out by this stage had you realized that people were as it were exaggerating this was this was a serious blow fired yeah absolutely on the other hand I think up until that
00:37:07 on the other hand I think up until that night I I truly believe that 20 appliances could deal with anything
00:37:15 right I really did so I was confident that once we had 20 machines they're under firefighters in my mind I'm
00:37:26 under firefighters in my mind I'm thinking whatever it is we can you know we can deal with it I'm going to ask you about certain calls that you took prior
00:37:37 about certain calls that you took prior to the change in stay-put advice but first of all call from the 23rd floor flat 201 and we could pick this up at the control room report page 27 thing
00:37:49 the control room report page 27 thing just go back this is at 1:32 10 top of
00:38:01 just go back this is at 1:32 10 top of the page CRO Houston takes a call from what sounds like a child who says they're in the top floor flat now I just want to show you the transcript of that
00:38:12 want to show you the transcript of that if I can this is lfb five zero six six seven
00:38:23 and we can see the time of this call from the top line next to event second group of numbers from the right Oh 1 3 2 1 Oh so 1:32 10 and the call
00:38:36 1 3 2 1 Oh so 1:32 10 and the call starts on that first page underneath that hello there's a big fire at Greenfield tower and then turning the page - we go to page we're on page 1 you
00:38:50 page - we go to page we're on page 1 you could see that the person says it towards the bottom of the page and answer to your question what flat are you in caller where we're at the top floor top right what number
00:39:01 floor top right what number what's your door number over the next page my actual door numbers 155 but I'm at someone else's house now you know that they're at the top and then on page
00:39:13 that they're at the top and then on page 3 if you turn to that you can see that the caller tells you after there's a lot of smoke coming in and the middle of a
00:39:24 of smoke coming in and the middle of a packed page there you ask okay well what I want you to do write the first not in your flat is it no but I can see it and the window is already burning up so
00:39:35 the window is already burning up so you're told the window is burning up and you say ok all right listen know what you just trying to stop that smoke coming into the flat at that stage given that you were told that the window is burning
00:39:45 burning what was it not a fast survival guidance call and this person was affected by fire yeah it was no we don't see you then saying you need to leave can we can
00:39:57 then saying you need to leave can we can we assess the means of exit is there a reason why that is well I still believed at that point that if I could keep them safe where they were that we would
00:40:09 safe where they were that we would rescue them and then if you turn to page 4 two-thirds of the way down that page
00:40:18 where there's a disco after the discussion about speaking to an adult
00:40:25 caught caller says hello and then you say hello hi I've just been speaking to a motet know if that's one of your children and the caller then says oh my god the fire is coming through and I
00:40:37 god the fire is coming through and I know listen him I'm just trying to explain you're on the top floor I you know hang on hang on hang on in order for the smokes coming through the window this makes coming through the window and then call goes on to page five and you
00:40:49 then call goes on to page five and you say don't let the smoke in shut all the windows the fires below I take it is it yeah and then there's no more answer and the call finishes by the end of this
00:41:02 the call finishes by the end of this call were you completely confident that the the fire had not actually come into the flat and it was just smoke I say just but as opposed to fire yeah given given that the you hotel that the father's coming in the wind egg by the
00:41:14 father's coming in the wind egg by the caller was coming through why were you so confident that it was only smoke and not fire I mean it's just it was
00:41:27 not fire I mean it's just it was inconceivable that there on the top floor and it would be on fire we know from earlier calls that you had been told that on two occasions before this
00:41:42 told that on two occasions before this call 127 and 130 what they said in one occasion to be fair to you one occasion 1:30 that the whole block of flats was on fire and you'd heard the makeups why
00:41:53 on fire and you'd heard the makeups why was it inconceivable that a flat on the top floor was on fire just get my head round it just couldn't work just felt I
00:42:04 round it just couldn't work just felt I still felt at that time we were doing rescues I still felt at that time I could keep him safe where they were and get the firefighters to then but that
00:42:15 get the firefighters to then but that was their best option I think there was a point where the thought of getting them out of their flats into I don't
00:42:29 them out of their flats into I don't know what he was just seemed too dangerous right were you in a position to assess at that stage whether the
00:42:40 to assess at that stage whether the exits really were so dangerous that you couldn't encourage or advise them to leave well I mean look at that I don't think I even asked no is there a reason
00:42:51 think I even asked no is there a reason why not no it's no reason I just we was in the process of doing rescues right just I was just trying to keep them away
00:43:04 just I was just trying to keep them away safe in their flat until they were rescued is one reason perhaps you tell me that this wasn't a fire case it was a smoke case and in your mind a smoke case
00:43:15 smoke case and in your mind a smoke case yes until FSG cold yeah I think that's probably what my mindset was up until that point okay now do you remember and maybe you don't but at the same time
00:43:26 maybe you don't but at the same time your colleague Sarah Russell's was on the phone to a young girl do you remember her being on the call at that
00:43:37 remember her being on the call at that time yeah
00:43:39 time yeah yeah to do were you did you get any information or did you hear any information that Sarah was picking up which would enable you to assist on this call I didn't I didn't hear any of the
00:43:50 call I didn't I didn't hear any of the call but I was facing Sarah and she she was quite new in the job and I can remember looking up and looking at her
00:44:01 remember looking up and looking at her and she looked distressed she wasn't really sort of saying too much I just nodded
00:44:11 nodded you didn't yeah no I mean I was I was on calls at the time you didn't put her two together with each other and work out that you were on the same you're on the call on different calls to call us from
00:44:22 call on different calls to call us from the same flat no I didn't know that different flat different floor if I can flat 194 22nd floor is Toni dissing
00:44:34 flat 194 22nd floor is Toni dissing control room report page 59 and a day is a need to see the transcript because we get everything we need from the control report summary page 59 this call is at
00:44:50 report summary page 59 this call is at at two o'clock and 33 seconds
00:44:59 cRIO Hassan I'll read it all to you CRO Houston takes a call from a male caller who says he's been waiting 15 minutes and his flat is getting worse the caller explains that it is black in
00:45:10 the caller explains that it is black in the flat and he can't see anything he then advises CRO Hassan that he's a pensioner and she checks that he is preventing smoke from getting into the flat which the caller states that he is CRO house and asks if there
00:45:21 that he is CRO house and asks if there is another room in the flat which is less smoky and the caller suggests that the front room is probably the best one CRO Hassan tells him to sit on the floor as the air will be cleaner and asks for the flat number which the caller gives this has one known form the 22nd floor a
00:45:34 this has one known form the 22nd floor a smoke alarm is audible in the background cro hassan confirms the brigade will be there as soon as they can the caller sounds similar very similar to an earlier call taken by cro fox now he
00:45:45 earlier call taken by cro fox now he told you as we can see that his flat was worse it is black having regard to the policy we looked at 5:39 did you think
00:45:56 policy we looked at 5:39 did you think that this caller was now affected by fire or smoke or was this just a smoke case as we've discovered from this and therefore he wasn't affected by fire no
00:46:09 therefore he wasn't affected by fire no I don't think he was affected by fire I thought we was affected by smoke did you consider whether you should be exploring with him whether he could safely leave
00:46:20 with him whether he could safely leave no is there a reason why not again because I felt it was in the safest place is that plate is a mystery is that
00:46:31 place is that plate is a mystery is that because he wasn't affected by fire yes right
00:46:37 and then this may begin to come a familiar theme no no this house and safer here next one is flat one nine two twenty second floor there are a number
00:46:48 twenty second floor there are a number of calls take these as quickly as I can with the first one is at two ten thirty one this is control room reports sixty nine and the transcript is lfb five five
00:47:01 nine and the transcript is lfb five five zero is three four five i i'd like to look at that transcript with you if i can we can see the first page of it time - OH - ten thirty one you can see that
00:47:12 - OH - ten thirty one you can see that from the column the right-hand bunch of numbers so first from the right and if
00:47:23 numbers so first from the right and if you look at the start of the call fire brigade year high fire brigade yeah various fire hello yet there is fire in our kitchen see that and then you go on
00:47:37 our kitchen see that and then you go on to get the flat number and floor from them over the bottom of the second page and to the top of the third page and then on the fourth page for page four
00:47:50 then on the fourth page for page four third of the way down you say right so when you say a fire was it the cooker or something call us several inaudible words there is already fire something get down here something get down get down get down
00:48:01 get down get down get down and then the towards the bottom of the page you say listen we're dealing with a fire on the fourth floor okay is the smoke and then the caller says there's fire on the 22nd floor on the 22nd floor
00:48:12 fire on the 22nd floor on the 22nd floor in your something kitchen yeah yes yes okay 22nd floor so there's a fire in the kitchen so you've established at this point in the call that the keep of the flat is on fire
00:48:27 do you know why you told the caller that the fire was only on the fourth floor at that stage
00:48:41 about now I think I still didn't I still didn't appreciate that the fire was affecting flats that high up in the
00:48:54 affecting flats that high up in the building we've seen a call earlier the one at 1:32 just a moment ago that we went from flat what 201 top floor that
00:49:05 went from flat what 201 top floor that the window was burning and you've been told that the whole building was on fire I just wanted to know really why you were still thinking that the fire was on the fourth floor because that's where
00:49:19 the fourth floor because that's where the original fire was you know and everything it just the fire it just it didn't do what other fires do it just
00:49:35 didn't do what other fires do it just shouldn't have happened you know the fire shouldn't have been there and I've still I think I was still couldn't get my head round what was happening on the building within the building and I was
00:49:48 building within the building and I was still working trying to keep people safe
00:49:53 now to be rescued and I still felt at that point that was the safest place for them and I was just trying to keep them
00:50:05 them and I was just trying to keep them away from the worst of it and keep them safe in their flats
00:50:12 if you go on we've seen what we've said but what is said at page four cooker and fire fire in the kitchen we look at page five a third of the way down you now say
00:50:26 five a third of the way down you now say flat one line two so there's a fire in the kitchen
00:50:31 we then see on to page nine if we look forward to page eight we can see as we pass it it's confirm there's a fire in
00:50:43 pass it it's confirm there's a fire in the kitchen at page 9 you say at the top of the page alright well listen I mean the moment we're advising people to stay in their flats but if you've got a fire in your
00:50:55 flats but if you've got a fire in your flat it's your decision you may have to try and get out okay how near are you to the stairwell they reply how near are you to the stairs and then there's discussion about that and then towards the bottom of the page yeah
00:51:06 then towards the bottom of the page yeah we are trapped and you talk about children and and the cause essentially ends there page 10 without much further
00:51:17 ends there page 10 without much further information now my question is you know now there's a fire in the in the flat you've suggested to them that they should leave the advice on page nine but
00:51:30 should leave the advice on page nine but you say to them it's your decision you may have to try and get out okay can I just ask you why didn't you tell them what and given that you've got a fire in your flat you need to leave and make it very clear they had to leave can
00:51:43 make it very clear they had to leave can you help me with why you didn't do that we also see that you don't explore with them how safe it is for them to leave has smoke logged the lobbies or stairs is there a reason why you didn't do that
00:51:55 is there a reason why you didn't do that no I mean at the time we were still following like the staple policy right as you understood it yeah no there's a
00:52:11 as you understood it yeah no there's a second call and this is transcript LFP five zeros three five one a few minutes later
00:52:20 later this is 280 and and six seconds second page of which establishes same flat one nine to twenty
00:52:31 establishes same flat one nine to twenty second floor and then on page three very much the same thing smoke and fire fire in the kitchen again as you can see in the middle of the page and then the top of
00:52:47 middle of the page and then the top of page four again you'll have to try and make yourselves make your way to somewhere safer for fire is in your flat to the stairwell and then you give them some advice in the middle of that page you say to the stairwell so wherever the
00:53:00 you say to the stairwell so wherever the smoke is less heavy if you can take some blankets and towels and put them around your mouth so you're not breathing in the smoke okay you get to the place try and head to where there's least smoke and the advice continues as you can see
00:53:11 and the advice continues as you can see and then you go on to page five just they tell you we've laid one of the side wind and other side windows and then just after halfway down you say
00:53:23 then just after halfway down you say have you left the flat no reply have you left the flat where are you now one nine two at that stage what were you what were you trying what were you trying to do
00:53:37 well just trying to keep them safe trying to get them away from the fire we can see from this call that you were trying to assist them to leave my question really is why were you doing that on this call when they call back
00:53:48 that on this call when they call back and not on the earlier call it was just things things that should have been happening weren't happening you know we
00:54:00 happening weren't happening you know we should have been you know these people should have been rescued and we weren't able to get to them right and what the
00:54:14 able to get to them right and what the policies that we heard that have always worked in the past they weren't working this call is at 2:18 at that point or by that point had you had any information
00:54:25 that point had you had any information positive information in the control room to lead you to think that crews were going to be able to get to the 22nd floor so why were you thinking expecting
00:54:38 floor so why were you thinking expecting that crews were going to be able to reach them because we do it's an assumption is it we do you know we do get to people I'm gonna do rescue them
00:54:50 get to people I'm gonna do rescue them there's a third call from this plant a few moments later a few minutes later at o2 34:16 and that's lfp 5 0 63 I'm just
00:55:03 o2 34:16 and that's lfp 5 0 63 I'm just picking a point or two up from that call you say on page 3 it's the same flat you say on page 3 in the middle of the page two adults and three kids yell all right
00:55:14 two adults and three kids yell all right so just stay sorry and then female speaker inaudible is being affected by the fire and flames and smoke they got to get out damp towel they were speaking together up or down where to go down can
00:55:27 together up or down where to go down can you just tell me what's happening on that are you speaking to someone in the control room or are you speaking to someone on the end of the phone so I which which part was it this is Henry yeah just below halfway down where you
00:55:38 yeah just below halfway down where you see female speaker
00:55:44 inaudible is being affected by the fire and flames and smoke they've got to get out downtown they were speaking together up or down way to go do you can you help me with whether you're speaking to someone on the end of the phone or
00:55:55 someone on the end of the phone or somebody in the control room I don't you know I mean I did there was a lot of times on calls where I was speaking to people in the room as well I don't know
00:56:08 people in the room as well I don't know in that particular call do you think this was you taking guidance from a supervisor is that possible
00:56:19 possibly you can't remember possibly I mean that did types of conversations where I was on calls and speaking to supervisors right do you
00:56:33 speaking to supervisors right do you remember any language or communication difficulties with this particular of these callers in this particular flat I don't know about this particular plan I
00:56:44 don't know about this particular plan I mean there were some calls where it was difficult because of like language or noise or like sheer panic I wouldn't be
00:56:56 noise or like sheer panic I wouldn't be able to say which which ones in particular right now another call from this time from flat 205 23rd floor at 22
00:57:10 this time from flat 205 23rd floor at 22 25:38 control room report page 80 and lfb five zero six seven zero now this is
00:57:23 lfb five zero six seven zero now this is as you can see from the top of the page at 212 25:38 as i've said and it's a connection it looks like from bt which
00:57:37 connection it looks like from bt which starts as a female on the line says she's in flat 205 or 23rd of the full of the building and they can't get out and they're running out of oxygen and then
00:57:48 they're running out of oxygen and then the cool
00:57:50 the cool is essentially put through and I just want to look at the bottom of page two with you the caller says no the bottom
00:58:01 with you the caller says no the bottom but my mother she's diabetic got asthma you say okay alright listen I'm just gonna speak to the cruise call it - could you get a chopper or something gonna get a helicopter or something to get us out there is there is one there
00:58:14 get us out there is there is one there okay alright the fire brigade are on their way now they're making their way you know first of all do you remember well did you consider whether you needed to ask the caller whether the the mother
00:58:29 to ask the caller whether the the mother has any difficulties moving and the mobility issues they told about diabetes and asthma did you ask did you think to ask about mobility issues as well yeah okay is there a reason why why you
00:58:41 okay is there a reason why why you didn't do that no I mean I think by that stage it was the conditions everybody was gonna have difficulties dealing with
00:58:53 was gonna have difficulties dealing with the situation now you can see as we just I just read to you the bottom of page two top of page three you're asking
00:59:04 two top of page three you're asking about the helicopter do you remember if you thought at the time that the helicopter was there to carry out rescues no did it occur to you to tell
00:59:16 rescues no did it occur to you to tell the caller that the helicopter was not there to carry out rescues and indeed could not carry out rescues
00:59:29 know that to be honest I didn't really I suppose I've dismissed the conversation about the helicopter it's not something that we use right you say you dismissed
00:59:41 that we use right you say you dismissed it did you'd occur to you that by saying to them there is a helicopter there and the fire brigade are on their way you might have planted in their minds and hope or expectation yeah it would be
00:59:53 hope or expectation yeah it would be restless I had a casa play yeah it's not yeah it could it possibly could have done that it's not my intention though No
01:00:08 and then well let me just ask you following up on that question it wasn't your intention to do that are you trained to when giving reassurance to
01:00:20 trained to when giving reassurance to callers to make sure that whatever reassurance you give them you don't raise expectations falsely in their minds about rescue not specifically I
01:00:32 minds about rescue not specifically I mean I am I think maybe it was my expectation was raised about what we couldn't couldn't do right possibly but well it was definitely did
01:00:45 possibly but well it was definitely did you think that I had a cop too no I did not even the case of a helicopter right I mean I knew the helicopter wasn't the brigade helicopter I mean we haven't got one we don't use them so you know that would have been like the police he'll
01:00:57 would have been like the police he'll eat any or but but no I think it was probably my expectation on the night of what we could do really that I was that
01:01:09 what we could do really that I was that I was giving to the callers right up until the point where we was told to give that to get them out right because we weren't going to be able to get to
01:01:20 we weren't going to be able to get to them so up into that point I was any hope I was giving to the corners was I think my hope I died dick genuinely think we were still gonna get
01:01:33 genuinely think we were still gonna get there and help these people now one more question then I go to ask for a gem for a short break okay if I can go just because I don't to leave this call hanging know if you look at
01:01:44 this call hanging know if you look at the bottom of page five and over the top of page six you can see that you say at the bottom okay all right okay well if a
01:01:57 the bottom okay all right okay well if a fire is in the living room you need to get out of there so this was now a fire call caller - how we gonna get out we can't something up in flames guys there's flames we need to go and you say
01:02:09 there's flames we need to go and you say okay call her - it's black and then you say this listen it's your decision if you need to leave you need to leave call her but the problem is it's black we can't breathe you need to get some towels
01:02:20 towels and and then you go on to tell them you need to get out
01:02:30 was it clear to you at this stage that this was clearly definitive advice that they had to leave come what may yeah it was now mr. Chen I think that's a
01:02:42 was now mr. Chen I think that's a convenient moment is it right go to a different area yes yes well miss house we're going to have a short break now please don't talk to anyone while you're out of the room at least about your evidence and so on and if you go with
01:02:56 evidence and so on and if you go with the our show will resume at 25 past 3 thank you very much
01:03:13 that's 325 jeez
01:16:58 boy sounds ready to carry on jealously thank you for coming back to us I want to take you back to a call to show you the transcript because the summary I
01:17:09 the transcript because the summary I showed you of the call was not completely complete this is a call at odhh 200 hours of 33 seconds from attorney distant flat one nine four
01:17:20 from attorney distant flat one nine four can i ask you please to be shown lfb five zeros three three seven three three seven and we have the time of the call
01:17:35 seven and we have the time of the call at the top of the page Oh 233 seconds can I ask you please to go to page two and you say there you'll see that you see there that you're told
01:17:47 see that you see there that you're told I'm a pensioner darling I can't get about and then you are told then you say
01:17:58 about and then you are told then you say okay listen you can't go anywhere anyway you're in the safest place there all right darling it's black listen the fire is on the fourth floor okay are you doing everything you can to get the
01:18:09 doing everything you can to get the smoke coming in yes yes you are okay my my my letterbox won't close so it's coming through the letterbox alright well put a towel in put something in it alright thanks alright just one or two
01:18:21 alright thanks alright just one or two questions about that but first of all by this time was it clear to you that the fire had spread to the top floor this is two o'clock more or less if you had had
01:18:38 two o'clock more or less if you had had the images from the Helle telly downlink all the television showing the external fire spread or smoke spread do you think your advice to this caller would have been different I honestly don't know
01:18:52 been different I honestly don't know when you've been able to say to him when you must get out or to seek to explore the safety of the exit routes with him at that stage as I say I honestly don't
01:19:04 at that stage as I say I honestly don't know I've always been confident in a staple policy and it's always had good results and I that's what I was that's
01:19:22 results and I that's what I was that's what I believe was going to happen and I believe that I was keeping them safe to be rescued and I don't know whether having a Pelle telly there would have
01:19:37 having a Pelle telly there would have made any difference to that right seeing the outside of the building still not knowing really what's going on inside the building what the state of the
01:19:48 the building what the state of the stairwells the communal areas was like so I don't know I don't know where it would have made any difference I was I was doing following a procedure that
01:20:03 was doing following a procedure that I've followed many times and there's always saved people's lives and and that's what I did that nya I want to
01:20:17 and that's what I did that nya I want to ask you about the change in stay put can I take you back to your statement yeah you say page six of your statement in the third paragraph that you can't
01:20:36 in the third paragraph that you can't remember an exact time but you say I received instructions from my assistant operations manager Debbie ray ow real sorry to that we needed to get these people out and that the advice had changed I now needed to tell people to
01:20:48 changed I now needed to tell people to get out of the building do you remember even roughly what time that was
01:20:55 that was No do you remember exactly what she said she stood in front of me and she said
01:21:06 she stood in front of me and she said something to the effect of right get them all out now right she said tell him what tales blankets
01:21:17 what tales blankets cover their faces and get them out of their flats we can't get to them was that the first time that you realized that the firefighters won't be able to
01:21:28 that the firefighters won't be able to rest to rescue people in the building yes did you get an impression of which floors couldn't be accessed or was it all of them or them did she hold a piece
01:21:39 all of them or them did she hold a piece of paper up in front of you with some writing on it no but she was very clear in her instructions I was she very clear in the terms and tone of what you were
01:21:50 in the terms and tone of what you were supposed to say yes how clearly did you understand that the advice you were to give to callers was you must get out at all costs it's a live or die choice very
01:22:02 all costs it's a live or die choice very clear right no I just want to look I think we'll just just one call around the time of the change in the advice can I ask you please to look at lfb 375 this is a call summarized in the
01:22:16 lfb 375 this is a call summarized in the control-room report on page 95 it's flat 203 on the 23rd floor time 202 4602 so you can see from the number and the in the column at the top and if I can
01:22:28 in the column at the top and if I can ask you please to go to the first of all the first page of the call
01:22:51 and you you say that you see a you see you're given the flat number hi I'm in flat for 2 or 3 what floor are you on 21st floor and then if you go to page 2
01:23:03 21st floor and then if you go to page 2 you see you're told record the fact that you're told the flat on fire and you say put some stuff around the windows as
01:23:14 put some stuff around the windows as well just to try and keep as much smoke as much smoke out keep low obviously we're letting fire crews know that you're there how many of you in there that continues and then towards the bottom of the page that you see that you
01:23:27 bottom of the page that you see that you can say alright I'll let them know they are getting to you as soon as they can ok all right just try and keep that smoke out if anything changes call us back and then at the bottom of the page you say well as I say I've got a note of where you are in making your way up to
01:23:39 where you are in making your way up to you and do you think looking at what you're saying there that this is a call that was made and you took before or after Debbie had given you the
01:23:51 after Debbie had given you the instructions we thought before right and why do you why do you say that we've because after she said it it's giving people faster to get out right
01:24:11 No
01:24:18 we saw a call before the break at 2:30 floor from flat 192 it looks like they're taking guidance from a supervisor we're not sure
01:24:31 and in the end you have you told them to leave in that call why did you tell the callers in that call to leave but not in this case
01:24:51 is that is that the second thoughts that call you just spoke to me about isn't it no it's a different flat
01:25:14 no that one that while I'm telling them to stay would you like to put the question against well I yes I suppose I
01:25:26 question against well I yes I suppose I don't have to you know um there's a call earlier which we looked at before
01:25:40 at 2:34 which is lfb 363 I don't have to get back all over it again but this is the call at the end of which you gave
01:25:52 the call at the end of which you gave advice about damp towel get out essentially was a get out cord yeah that was a 234 I think there was one point where I told you to get out prior to the
01:26:04 where I told you to get out prior to the instruction because there was the flat was on fire right I see okay so that is that the difference that that that flat was on fire so you're telling them to leave but now you've given been given the general
01:26:16 now you've given been given the general the once we had the instruction right that was to tell all occupants all the residents to leave
01:26:31 in this in this call flat 203 at 242 you don't think you've been given the instruction by Deborah at this stage no once I've been given the instruction that was the advice I gave right now
01:26:45 that was the advice I gave right now there's a further call at 258 42 and this is lfb five five eight and this is
01:26:56 this is lfb five five eight and this is with summer outside the tower you just go to the first second page of that please call her I've got someone on the 23rd floor 23rd floor and the presences
01:27:09 23rd floor 23rd floor and the presences are not in the flat she's in the flat I'm at Silas in the middle of the page and this is flat 2 a 3 again and if you turn the page you can see
01:27:26 this is five five eight I'm supposed to be on
01:27:29 be on second page LF b five five eight second page
01:27:36 yeah so you see there to a three to a three and then third page it's a next page please and then you have a
01:27:48 page please and then you have a conversation about the floor calling 999 and the but at the bottom you say all right I'll let the fire crews now all right and let the crews know and then just turn the page to what I believes
01:28:00 just turn the page to what I believes the end of the call and then you say if she does fail you and we're advising again now they need to get out of the building okay but how will they get out of the building no one show up show them
01:28:11 of the building no one show up show them the way well they need to attempt to get out the building if they can't stay in the flat anymore have you spoken to them and then there's a continuation of the
01:28:22 and then there's a continuation of the discussion about smoke and it's just go to the lot to the next page please they're gonna call ends and then you say at the top well I'm gonna well that's what I'm gonna do is I'm gonna let the crews know that she's still in there and
01:28:34 crews know that she's still in there and you get more details and then you say oh I'm gonna let the crews know now this is a just before 3:00 a.m. after the time I think as we've established when you were told you've got to give get out of all cost advice and I just asked you why did
01:28:46 cost advice and I just asked you why did you tell this caller that the you let the crews know given that you'd already now by now being told by Debbie real that the crews weren't going to be able to rescue anybody
01:28:57 to rescue anybody oh no I mean still letting the crews know that we would I mean I told him to tell the occupants today we saw that and you did yeah but we didn't stop telling
01:29:10 you did yeah but we didn't stop telling the crews that would advise people in flats to leave I mean not not all of the well I don't know for sure but I'm
01:29:21 well I don't know for sure but I'm working on the premise that not all of the people that we spoke to call back after we got the instruction to to leave the building so when well me
01:29:35 to leave the building so when well me personally when always telling people today who was still passed that information on my question really is what was the purpose of telling this caller who was calling about their
01:29:47 caller who was calling about their family in that flat that you were telling the crews that where they were if in fact the crews weren't going to be able to rescue them well you know we didn't know that they were oh stop
01:29:59 didn't know that they were oh stop trying they were still trying to rescue people and if they had notification that people room were in flats and we've told them to leave then that's important as
01:30:11 them to leave then that's important as well now going back to your statement at page 6 if I can just take you to that you say in the second paragraph at one
01:30:23 you say in the second paragraph at one point the officer of the day walked around the control room and had a picture of the town on his mobile phone the whole building looked like it was on fire I cannot remember the time when
01:30:34 fire I cannot remember the time when this was once I had the visual of what we were dealing with everything made sense I was still giving advice of statehood to people who are calling because we did not been instructed any further I was sticking to the policy
01:30:45 further I was sticking to the policy half of me was thinking how will we get them out and the other half was thinking what do we do is it your recollection that you'd seen Jason olaf's or the
01:30:58 that you'd seen Jason olaf's or the officer of the day phone and the picture on it before Debbie Rael came to you with the instructions that you should now tell everybody you to get out yeah I
01:31:10 now tell everybody you to get out yeah I think it was before and you say half of you was thinking how we get them out and half what do we do did you discuss that dilemma with
01:31:21 did you discuss that dilemma with anybody in the control room no I mean a couple of times I just shout it out in the room you know how long are we gonna
01:31:33 the room you know how long are we gonna you know how long's it gonna take to get to these people and but we didn't have the answers we didn't that we didn't know do you remember how long after seeing that image you continued to give
01:31:46 seeing that image you continued to give stay-put advice for short I don't know I don't think it was it wasn't very long do you think that if you'd seen that
01:31:57 do you think that if you'd seen that image earlier on it would have assisted you having the whole picture in the advice you were giving to call us it's questionable but just I write does drink no I don't think it would have changed
01:32:10 no I don't think it would have changed the advice I was given does I say it it still wasn't it still didn't give us an idea of what was going on inside the building it was it was just shocking it
01:32:26 building it was it was just shocking it was just you know and it's it was just
01:32:34 I don't know it's just
01:32:39 I suppose it kind of made me think
01:32:44 about you know that it wasn't necessarily going to be a good outcome I suppose but I still felt that what I was
01:32:56 suppose but I still felt that what I was doing what we was doing was still the safest option
01:33:12 finally can I just ask you a slightly separate question if you had known that the number of callers in the building were calling from flats which had front door flat front doors with no
01:33:24 door flat front doors with no functioning automatic door closers would that have affected the advice that you were giving no this hasnt and thank you
01:33:35 were giving no this hasnt and thank you very much you'll be glad to know i've come to the end of my questions there may be one or two others and I feel I should ask looking back over my notes so I'm just here to ask the Chairman to give us a short break I'm not sure maybe
01:33:48 give us a short break I'm not sure maybe it may be necessary to rise because we had a short break not very long yeah well normally we have a little break at this stage to give counsel a chance to check he's asked all the questions you should have asked very often I do we do
01:34:00 should have asked very often I do we do go out and I write through but I think today you can sit down for a bit you and I can sit here and then just ignore what goes on and then anyone who wants to speak to mr. millet can do that now all
01:34:13 speak to mr. millet can do that now all right Thank You mr. chairman
01:36:16 rather than rather than risking further open-outcry treating you like an auction I shall ask my final questions right miss housen I do have one or two more that's right
01:36:29 do have one or two more that's right first of all did there come a time in the night when you knew that no more firefighters were being sent to carry out rescues in upper floors no just
01:36:41 out rescues in upper floors no just being specific didn't at 3 o'clock what was the state of your knowledge about the extent to which firefighters were getting up to the upper floors of the building now we looked at the call at
01:36:59 building now we looked at the call at 240 206 which was lfb 375 in relation to flat 203 we looked we looked at that call to 4206 that was the call from the
01:37:12 call to 4206 that was the call from the 23rd floor we discussed where you you you don't tell them to leave and then
01:37:24 you don't tell them to leave and then you get the instruction from debris real did you my question is did you consider calling flats 203 back to tell them that the advice had changed and that they must now leave you didn't did you
01:37:39 must now leave you didn't did you is there a reason to that I didn't even think about it you didn't think that we
01:37:50 think about it you didn't think that we were still receiving calls
01:37:56 well miss Hasson you'll be glad to know that those are all of my questions it remains for me to thank you very much indeed for coming here to the enquiry today and for assisting us with our investigations we're extremely grateful to you so thank you can I say thank you
01:38:09 to you so thank you can I say thank you as well as I some I'm sorry if this has been a slightly disagreeable exercise having to go back through the events of that night in some detail and I can well understand it might have been but it is very important to us to understand as in
01:38:22 very important to us to understand as in as much detail as we can what was going on that that night and so we're very grateful to you for coming to tell us what you know about it and thank you very much indeed if anything I've said
01:38:35 very much indeed if anything I've said it helps of course yes very much so thank you very much would you like to go with the actual McCarty [Music]
01:38:56 yes mr. minute mr. chairman we can now call our final witness of the day Heidi Fox control room officer Hans thanks
01:40:10 that's what speaking to
01:41:03 [Music]
01:41:08 thank you very much sit down make yourself comfortable we can take this at your pace and if at any point you feel you would like to have a break you just make that clear to me
01:41:20 break you just make that clear to me right thank you very much yes mr. minute and this force could you please give the inquiry your full name Hydra Jane Fox okay
01:41:31 Hydra Jane Fox okay and as the chairman has said if only anytime you feel need a break during my questions all you need to do is indicate and we can take a short break we don't
01:41:43 and we can take a short break we don't sit for more than an hour at a time but we can sit for shorter periods if it helps you give your best evidence my questions are supposed to be short and simple and sometimes they're not so if you want me to repeat a question or ask
01:41:54 you want me to repeat a question or ask it in a different way and more than happy to to do that can I ask you to first to look at your statement that you gave to the police in October last year
01:42:05 gave to the police in October last year you'll see it in the file in front of you or on the monitor over on the desk to your right which might be easier to look at it there because we blow it up and look at passages it's day to the 5th of October 2017 and it's reference to
01:42:18 of October 2017 and it's reference to the Emmy T quadruple 0 7 7 6 4 it's there now 5th of October 2017 do you recognize that as the statement you gave to the police yes I did have you read it
01:42:31 to the police yes I did have you read it recently yes I have can you confirm that its contents are true yes now once you'll start by asking some questions about your role and training I think it's right that you've worked for the lfb is this right for 32 years or so
01:42:44 the lfb is this right for 32 years or so prior to the date of this statement so since about 1986 I think it's correct and has that always been in the position of a control room officer yes and after
01:42:56 of a control room officer yes and after your initial training were you given any refresher training or additional training yes I have been and when was the last training you received before
01:43:07 the last training you received before the grenfell tower fire in June 2017 to 11
01:43:11 to 11 12 to 16 right and in 2016 could you tell us what training that was that was with the command jr. 2012 what was that training that was 5:5 all guidance
01:43:23 training that was 5:5 all guidance refresher training were you trained on emergency core management policy 539 do you think yes what about fire survival guidance policy 79 zero
01:43:34 guidance policy 79 zero yes you were and were you ever trained on the lessons learnt from national house if I can yes we were what were you trained on and what was
01:43:46 what were you trained on and what was that training the questioning is different now we ask more questions and the attendance has changed right now you say in your statement that you have
01:43:59 say in your statement that you have personal experience of flat fires now those high-rise fires some high-rise right and have you had personal
01:44:11 right and have you had personal experience of handling fire survival guidance calls yes roughly how many during your long experience numerous can you give a number dozen plus my dozen
01:44:24 you give a number dozen plus my dozen plus we're any of those from high-rise residential blocks I can't recall okay
01:44:33 have you ever had any training on or experience of a situation where the control room is receiving multiple FSG calls no no until the night of Grenfell
01:44:45 calls no no until the night of Grenfell yeah luck and all there wasn't as many as Granville but we had a few but not as many right you you were I think one of the control room officers lack and
01:44:58 the control room officers lack and already yes and I think you spoke to one of the caller's handled an FSG call out that can I ask you this when grenfell happened and unfolded did your
01:45:10 happened and unfolded did your experience of being a control room operator at the lack and low fire help you in any way
01:45:18 yes it did help but every fire survival guidance call is different I see in what way did it help help from some of the knowledge and some of the hurrying calls
01:45:30 knowledge and some of the hurrying calls that we received at Loughran or I'm obviously where had a lot of heroin cause going on that night right now I just want to ask some questions about
01:45:42 just want to ask some questions about your understanding of what we've come to call the stay-put policy in your state in your statement on page two you say in the paragraph second four bottom you say
01:45:55 the paragraph second four bottom you say in my experience instinct takes over and the advice to stay or leave for the property is given I try to remain on the phone line for as long as possible to reassure the person calling ordinarily we are trained to advise someone to
01:46:07 we are trained to advise someone to remain within their property unless they are able to leave just breaking that down when you say you're trained to advise someone to remain within your property unless they're able to leave is
01:46:20 property unless they're able to leave is that reference to advice you give to callers from high-rise residential blocks specifically or any kind of fire in any kind of building no that isn't loaded very well it is high-rise blocks right now when you say you advise them
01:46:33 right now when you say you advise them to remain in their property unless they are able to leave can i clarify that do you mean that you advise them to stay unless they are affected by heat by smoke heat fire or heat yeah if they're
01:46:47 smoke heat fire or heat yeah if they're affected by it if there's no smoke inside their property they're normally safer to stay that in building breezes and the duration is compartmentalize and if there is smoke within the property
01:47:00 if there is smoke within the property that takes smoke for example if there's smoke within the property what do you then do we advise them to maybe move into another room and open a window put the towels down if they are affected by
01:47:13 the towels down if they are affected by smoke do you advise them to leave or do is in a high-rise we're talking about high-rise buildings we advise them to put the towels down okay
01:47:25 put the towels down okay and at what point in a call like that would it become a fire survival Gardens called in your mind if there are no but to get out of the property okay at what point in the in a
01:47:36 property okay at what point in the in a call would you let's make an assessment of whether it was safe for the caller to leave well you would ask ask the call of the questions and I've been able to get out you would assess the situation right
01:47:47 out you would assess the situation right at what point what would you what information would you have to have in front of you before you would start on that assessment well the four principles of the fire Survival Guide is to escape
01:47:59 of the fire Survival Guide is to escape assess and protect well let's look at that in a bit more detail can I first of all ask you to look at 5:39 policy 539
01:48:11 all ask you to look at 5:39 policy 539 that's lfb 737 tap three of the policies bundle and if we go to appendix 3 on page 16 and it's called first survival
01:48:28 page 16 and it's called first survival guidance and just scanning all right miss Fox down this page if you would are you familiar with with this guidance in this policy yes okay now looking at the third paragraph down it says Brigade control advise
01:48:40 down it says Brigade control advise callers to get out and stay out however if a call is received from a high-rise building where fire heat and smoke are not affecting the caller LFP would advise that you are usually safest to remain in your premises unless
01:48:52 to remain in your premises unless affected by fire heat or smoke if the situation changes you should leave your premises and online I know and if you need further assistance and then there's something goes on to tell you what should happen if the caller is unable to
01:49:05 should happen if the caller is unable to escape now just looking at that appendix first of all is what I've just read to you does that accord with your understanding of the stay-put policy yes
01:49:17 understanding of the stay-put policy yes it is it does can you explain what information you would use in your experience to make this the assessment as well as to whether a caller's premises are affected you can see the
01:49:28 premises are affected you can see the word affected by fire heat or smoke what information would you need for that we would need to know where the smokes coming from if it's got inside the
01:49:40 coming from if it's got inside the property if there was smoke inside the property the color was telling you I got smoke in my flat in a high-rise building
01:49:51 does that mean that the caller is not safe for remain in their premises and should be looking to escape it it depends if the smoke is inside their
01:50:02 depends if the smoke is inside their property or if the smoke is on the stairwell
01:50:05 stairwell I see if it was inside I'm sorry in the corridor okay if it was inside their their flat would that mean that they were no longer safe and therefore should look to escape well you could ask them where the actual if there is a fire
01:50:17 where the actual if there is a fire inside the flat or where the smoke is coming from it might be the smoke that's come from outside in the corridor just under their doors into the actual property itself right in which case you
01:50:28 property itself right in which case you could ask them to go to a window and close the door
01:50:33 okay then moving away from just note because you referred to it that on that same page if we look further down we can see that you have the four principles
01:50:46 and I just asked you about that before we leave this page those four principles when do they first kick in when you take
01:50:59 when do they first kick in when you take a call right is the first of those is to assist the caller to identify a safe alternative escape route I'm just going to have the bottom part yeah I think
01:51:10 to have the bottom part yeah I think it's very different I wanted it on well there's no reason why I wanted the whole thing because it links back to something at the top of the page all right well can we just if we could just look at the
01:51:21 can we just if we could just look at the whole thing to start with you can see that at the bottom of the page it starts I think it starts not quite close as the control room officer will ascertain
01:51:33 control room officer will ascertain through initial questioning the type of premises the caller is in and use the link on the reference information file and then the control room officers will always use the four principles of escape assess
01:51:44 assess effect and rescue to provide guidance to these callers and my question is these callers to your way of understanding the four principles of escape assess protect and rescue applicable to
01:51:56 assess protect and rescue applicable to FSG callers or is it any caller who calls from within a flattener in a high-rise building who says that they're affected any color any color right so a
01:52:10 affected any color any color right so a person who calls and says I'm affected by smoke I've got smoke in my flat - your way of thinking miss Fox does that mean that you would you would then start the four principles by identifying at
01:52:22 the four principles by identifying at the first one a safe alternative escape route you would ask him if I could if you could if they could get out right and then you would go on if it wasn't
01:52:34 and then you would go on if it wasn't possible assess the situation by asking the call of direct questions is that your understanding of how you should proceed yes right so just just pausing there before we look at 790 does it work
01:52:47 there before we look at 790 does it work like this as I understand your understanding if a caller is in a high-rise residential block and isn't affected by smoke heat or fire they you tell them to stay where they are if the
01:52:59 tell them to stay where they are if the smoke coming into the flat is the next thing you do to waive your turn to your web understanding you start by assessing whether there's an or safe alternative
01:53:10 whether there's an or safe alternative escape route for them to leave if their smokes coming inside the fat from outside then you ask them to block the doors and right if it's cut you said it
01:53:24 doors and right if it's cut you said it was coming did you say it was coming from outside if they were affected in any way by smoke yeah you would ask them to block the doors right so where you've got a caller who says there is smoke in my flat at what point would you begin to
01:53:36 my flat at what point would you begin to identify a safe alternative escape route
01:53:43 is it hormones is it a super on highways well you would just you would you would question them and you would ask him if
01:53:56 question them and you would ask him if they know where their respect ruh-roh tease right but most people that live in the flats and high-rises do know where their escape route is because there's
01:54:07 their escape route is because there's normally they'd just go through their front door to their nearest stairwell that they know where the route is but the your this policy says that you need to assess or help them identify a safe
01:54:20 to assess or help them identify a safe alternative escape route the number of questions the first question is at what point in a in a call would you start that exercise you would ask him if they can get out of the property and would at
01:54:34 can get out of the property and would at what point would you ask them that question sorry I don't understand the question
01:54:40 question okay so you've got a caller who says I've got smoke in my flat my question to you is would that then prompt you to go to say well tell me whether you can get
01:54:52 to say well tell me whether you can get out or would you we do not assess the safe alternative escape no you would ask him if it was safe to get out if the point was inside that flight you would ask him if it was safe to get out there
01:55:04 ask him if it was safe to get out there proper today no you say if there's fire inside there flat I understand that but what about smoke if there's smoke inside there flat I would tell him scale you
01:55:15 there flat I would tell him scale you would write and you would have to would that does that mean that you would you would go through this process of helping them first of all identify a safe alternative escape route yes you would
01:55:27 alternative escape route yes you would know
01:55:28 know so that's your understanding so smoking the flat asset help them assess an escape route yes I'm not pushing this I
01:55:39 escape route yes I'm not pushing this I just want to know what your understanding is so we're clear yeah yeah okay now can I take you them to policy 790 which is tab five of our
01:55:51 policy 790 which is tab five of our policy bundle you could see from the first page of that that this was reviewed as current as of April 2014 were you familiar with this this policy
01:56:04 were you familiar with this this policy has at the night of the ground for town fire yes okay page two if you would under paragraph section too far survived from guidance called definition an FSG
01:56:16 from guidance called definition an FSG call as a call received into control with a caller believes they are unable to leave their premises due to the effects of fire and where the control officer remains on the line providing appropriate advice is that your
01:56:28 appropriate advice is that your understanding of what a faster viable guidance call is yes it is know looking
01:56:40 guidance call is yes it is know looking at the first line of that where a court where the caller believes they are unable to leave their premises is it a
01:56:52 unable to leave their premises is it a fast about to the your understanding is it a fast survival guidance call when the caller says I can't get out or I don't think I can get out or is it an FSG call when you're satisfied that the
01:57:04 FSG call when you're satisfied that the caller genuinely can't get out having explored it with him or her when the caller tells you they can't get out because they're the ones that have got the visual and they're the ones out there okay so you're relying solely on
01:57:17 there okay so you're relying solely on the information given to you by the caller about whether they can get out yes okay so you that mean you don't go through the process of saying well come on let's see if anyone this is what's
01:57:28 on let's see if anyone this is what's the smoke like outside your your flat can you actually see the other side of the corridor do you go through that kind of process or on the information that the caller gives you right would you
01:57:42 the caller gives you right would you normally get or expect to get updates from the incident ground into a set to help you make that assessment we get informative messages the instant ground yeah mate individual
01:57:56 the instant ground yeah mate individual color we get informative some minutes right and looking at paragraph for prioritizing calls the same page for one
01:58:09 prioritizing calls the same page for one occasionally control receives multiple FSGS at an incident all FSG is received by controller treated with the same level of urgency however in certain circumstances the officer in charge of
01:58:20 circumstances the officer in charge of control may direct call handlers to terminate a call to answer another first have you ever had experience of being in the control room where the officer in
01:58:31 the control room where the officer in charge of control directed call handlers to terminate a call to answer another
01:58:39 not previously to Grandville now previously I meant your right represe to go from there and then same page bottom of the page
01:58:50 and then same page bottom of the page paragraph five information transfer to the incident the suitors controllers confirmed that an FSG called is in progress they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details this stage is likely through basic
01:59:02 this stage is likely through basic information relating to the number of persons involved and their location within the property that's what that's what that says in your experience what would be the usual method that the control room would adopt for passing
01:59:13 control room would adopt for passing over information to the incident ground we would pass the information over via service request to the appliance on scene or the command unit on the scene and give the information to the fire
01:59:25 and give the information to the fire ground you say service request does that come up on that's on the vision log is it in on the vision and you say to the to the radio operator the service request will go to the radio operator and the radio operator will pass the
01:59:37 and the radio operator will pass the information on to the fire ground I thought it thank you
01:59:45 now at that early stage when you're collecting initial details would you would you collect and I'm talking about FSG calls specifically so a call where a caller believes they cannot escape at
01:59:58 caller believes they cannot escape at that point would you obtain or collect details about the age or disability of any of the caller you can ask the caller
02:00:09 any of the caller you can ask the caller normally if they've got disability the caller would normally give that information in the selves but would you normally expect to ask so the answer is no you wouldn't ask for it you'd expect them to volunteer always do you ask them how many people are inside the property
02:00:21 how many people are inside the property you asked if there's any children and if the person has got a disability they normally give that information in themselves right now if you turn the next page please in the policy to
02:00:32 next page please in the policy to paragraph five point five you'll see and we can have that blown up control will attempt to gather all information with control on the control information form see appendix two and related information to be incident as and when it becomes
02:00:44 to be incident as and when it becomes available
02:00:44 available I've lost lots of control room officers about control information form have you ever used a control information form in the control room do you know why it's
02:00:55 the control room do you know why it's never used or you haven't used it I don't know the reason but normally when you get a fire survival call the last thing you want to do is join it for a
02:01:07 thing you want to do is join it for a form and start feeling that then you can see a list of bullet points of details number of flat house number of persons involved location of Cora etc now we're
02:01:18 involved location of Cora etc now we're dealing with FSG calls so caller is trapped or believes they can't get out and in your experience would you expect to be able to get all of that information from the caller yes you
02:01:32 information from the caller yes you would try and hope that you would right
02:01:37 now would you and then you pass that over to the incident ground with your son and that would be walk through a service service division log yeah yes I
02:01:48 service service division log yeah yes I see can i that turn to the night of the fire
02:01:50 fire now we know you were based in the Stratford control room you were seated well let's see if we can do this by a
02:02:01 well let's see if we can do this by a picture can I ask the witness please to be shown lfb quadruple zero four seven nine zero a page 175 that is a photograph of the Stratford control room miss Fox can you just help us where were
02:02:13 miss Fox can you just help us where were you sitting on the night of the Grunfeld tower fire I was saying you people pointing at your monitor oh sorry don't stand up would you like thank you thank you very much so the little red dot is
02:02:29 you very much so the little red dot is hovering over a screen right in the far corner okay so you're the other side of the okay who was sitting next to you no
02:02:43 the okay who was sitting next to you no all right you're on your own right who's the nearest other controller of operator I believe Pete daddy was sitting I think he was sitting here so that witness is
02:02:55 he was sitting here so that witness is pointing to the left hand arrow in the pair of arrows on the left of the photograph oh they're right the whiteboard is behind him okay so there's
02:03:06 whiteboard is behind him okay so there's a bank of screens there at the back of the room as it was there nobody but you sitting there lonely pitch okay right um now we've been told where the
02:03:19 right um now we've been told where the television was I think it was on the back walls it's right behind the om and a om yeah and it was I think you say that you couldn't see if it was on or
02:03:30 that you couldn't see if it was on or off no I couldn't say where I was saying right
02:03:36 was there any point during the night when you thought it would be useful to see the images that might have been on the on the news on the television I think we were too busy to look I would
02:03:47 think we were too busy to look I would were real too busy to look and see the images no we are you aware or were you aware that there should have been images available to the control room from the
02:03:58 available to the control room from the heli tele downlink it didn't work didn't work would it have been helpful to have that working again we were so busy I don't think we would have had time to actually looked at it and say Network
02:04:11 actually looked at it and say Network now you say in your statement this is pet page for a third paragraph second line but you now summarized on the night
02:04:22 line but you now summarized on the night of the incident you went on a break with anji gods and about one o'clock and then within 20 minutes you were told by Peter May to come back into the room summarizing what you say there now the
02:04:33 summarizing what you say there now the first record of a call taken by you was at 1:25 12 and that's page 15 of the control-room report lfb quadruple zero four seven nine zero but you just had
02:04:44 four seven nine zero but you just had that on the screen page 15
02:04:55 do you see 125 12 but it's a simple question I think does that sound about right to you as the time at which you took your first call yes okay and I'm
02:05:07 took your first call yes okay and I'm going to ask one or two specific questions about about some calls before I do that can I just ask you when you started to take calls how did you go
02:05:19 started to take calls how did you go about recording the information that you were getting on the vision system right and does that mean that that when that day went to shower and I'll be on the radio and she passed it to the incident ground to take the call we took the call
02:05:32 ground to take the call we took the call in the vision system if we if we gave a message to Sharon it would have been via the service request yes on the vision system and do you remember that at one
02:05:43 system and do you remember that at one point there was an officer who came into the control room and set up a whiteboard yeah that was officer thing I'm Jason Olin Jason Otis and how long roughly after you started to take the calls do
02:05:54 after you started to take the calls do you think he stood he did that I don't know when he did that what did you understand the purpose of the whiteboard system to be he was putting the flat
02:06:05 system to be he was putting the flat numbers up the meant of the people inside the threats was that replacing the usual system of radio operators passing information to the incident ground or was it an additional method of
02:06:16 ground or was it an additional method of communication it was an additional method base also visual method so that we could see it in the control room
02:06:24 no you come back into the control room you take your first call what information at that point did you have about what was happening well when Peter
02:06:36 about what was happening well when Peter may knocked on the knocked on the door ing and I he said it's a 10-point fire so we walked into the room and I'm a
02:06:47 so we walked into the room and I'm a temp on fire right after you sat down do you remember hearing the make ups 10 and 15 and then 20 I think I remember the 20 but after
02:06:58 20 I think I remember the 20 but after that the only one I remember after that was the 40 right okay you don't remember it going 25 130 no was this increase in
02:07:09 it going 25 130 no was this increase in makeups that you've come into something you never experienced before not at that fast pace right what did that fast pace tell you about the way this bar was behaving it I didn't know how the fire
02:07:21 behaving it I didn't know how the fire was behaving but it told me that it was gonna be a big job right a big job a big job in what sense what major fire major fire I just want to ask you about two or
02:07:35 fire I just want to ask you about two or three calls before the stay-put have ice changed first of all can I ask you please to look at the control room report page 17 this is at 126 58 and
02:07:50 report page 17 this is at 126 58 and this is a call from flat 95 towards the bottom of the page 126 58 CRE Fox takes a call from a female reporting a fire in
02:08:02 a call from a female reporting a fire in Grenfell tower the caller explains that she's on the 12th floor and asked for some advice on what to do CRE Fox clarifies the address in the corner explains you can see the fire through the window and reports that her
02:08:13 through the window and reports that her neighbor says that the fire is in her kitchen already the caller says that smoke is coming from the main door and cRIO Fox advisors had to put wet towels down to stop the smoke there's some
02:08:24 down to stop the smoke there's some audible confusion regarding whether the towel should be wet or dry and CIO Fox then confirms the location and the flat number it's flat 95 Sarah Fox states that she'll pass the infamy on the information to the crews when the call
02:08:37 information to the crews when the call lasts 2 minutes and 10 seconds now that we can see that the call is from the 12th floor and you you're told that there's fire coming through the window
02:08:50 she could see fire through the window and that there's a fire in her neighbor's kitchen that's that is what's said here in the summary and also smoke
02:09:01 said here in the summary and also smoke coming through the caller's main door now with all of that information what did that tell you about where the fire was and how it was behaving at this point 1:26 well I believe the fire was
02:09:14 point 1:26 well I believe the fire was still on the in the fourth floor but
02:09:20 obviously she's she is saying that there was smoke on the 12th from she's also saying that her neighbor is saying that the fire is in her kitchen already so why did you think that the fire was was
02:09:33 why did you think that the fire was was was still on the fourth floor I don't remember no did it occur to you that
02:09:46 remember no did it occur to you that this fire but obviously started on the fourth floor but had spread enormous Li and was now on the 12th who's that I thought you had at the time I can't
02:09:58 thought you had at the time I can't remember what I was thinking at the time okay did you tell anyone in the control room that there were reports of smoke and fire on the 12th floor at this point everybody in the control room was inundated with fire calls I believe I am
02:10:13 inundated with fire calls I believe I am I write the number down on the piece of paper is there a reason why you given the information you had you didn't advise the caller to leave or check
02:10:26 advise the caller to leave or check whether it was safe for them to leave and help them with that again I can't remember but so many calls that night I cannot remember that marker do you remember making some kind of assessment as to whether this caller was actually
02:10:38 as to whether this caller was actually trapped in their flat or whether in fact they could leave I don't have taste into the tape again right would you classify this call as an FSG call I mean I appreciate I've only shown you a summary
02:10:49 appreciate I've only shown you a summary but on that information would you call this an FSG call to the waiter your way of understanding possibly
02:10:58 possibly possibly what makes you unsure again I'd have to listen to the tape or listen to the caller and clarify exactly what what
02:11:10 the caller and clarify exactly what what was happening maybe I didn't officer enough questions at that time we can look at the transcript if it helps you
02:11:21 look at the transcript if it helps you this is lfb 309 let's do that
02:11:31 NFB quadruple zero or quintic was very a nine and let's go to page two it starts
02:11:44 nine and let's go to page two it starts hi good evening I'm calling from Grantham town we do have fire in the building we're living on the 12th floor you establish the address the foot of
02:11:55 you establish the address the foot of the page you're told I need to know I got us something because I heard that it's in its the floors below next door my far is sorry my neighbor's saying
02:12:06 my far is sorry my neighbor's saying sorry my neighbor she's saying the fire in her kitchen already I have two kids we really don't know what to do and then you say yeah you got to smoke any smoke coming into your property and we turn the page
02:12:17 the page yes it's coming through the floor from our main door cause it's outside and then you explore putting sheets or towels down to stop the smoke coming in
02:12:28 towels down to stop the smoke coming in and then there's more discussion about which flat number and floor number it is and then you say two-thirds of the way down I'll tell them on the radio and your flat 95 on the 12th floor okay
02:12:39 your flat 95 on the 12th floor okay thank you okay is it the normal towel wet towels sorry I can't I can't hear you and then we turn the page is it the normal towel wet towels it doesn't say it's a flat 16 in
02:12:52 towels it doesn't say it's a flat 16 in the grenfell towers no no no we're on flat we're on the floor twelve twelve yeah but I'm telling you listen and I'm just telling you where the actual fire is okay so it's flat sixteen and then the caller says it's 60 but it's already
02:13:03 the caller says it's 60 but it's already came to the 12th she's saying that she's telling that she was shouting that she's having the fire in the kitchen yeah that's right from the fire brigade her on the scene okay okay all right then of the call and the call then ends so
02:13:15 the call and the call then ends so that's the totality of the of the call I've shown you admittedly at some speed miss Fox but my question was would you classify this as an FSG caller fire Survival guidance call it would have
02:13:28 Survival guidance call it would have been if I survive over call fires the fish Chico yes yeah my question is what why would it be sorry what do you get from that information to lead you to
02:13:39 get from that information to lead you to think that the caller was trapped and couldn't leave their flat
02:13:49 because she she was saying that she's having a fire in the kitchen that's next door
02:13:56 door sorry I've misunderstood it and she's getting smoke inside their property so I would have told her to put the wet tales down there's a couple of points on there where it says it's inaudible right okay
02:14:08 where it says it's inaudible right okay again on the transcript it looks completely different to when you're actually listening to the caller on the phone right and also the noise in the room and they
02:14:19 and also the noise in the room and they call it it looks clear and easy on the transcript but when you're actually taking the call it's completely different I'm going to go to another call this is flat one nine for
02:14:31 another call this is flat one nine for Tony dissing 22nd floor this is his call at 1:30 and 8 seconds probably easier and quicker to go to the transcript at FB five zeros for five nine
02:14:52 now if you go to page the next page he says it's terrible up here middle of the
02:15:03 says it's terrible up here middle of the page you can't see a hand in front of you
02:15:06 you listen just make sure you put some towels down and things to stop the smoke coming in all right them darling thank you all right then thank if you're cool I'll tell all the rest all right then all right thank you 22nd yeah thank you
02:15:18 all right thank you 22nd yeah thank you bye - anything thank you bye it's a short call now what I want to focus on is he says if the conditions are terrible and you can't see a hand in front of you you don't ask him whether
02:15:29 front of you you don't ask him whether there's fire in his flat or why is that because normally the caller would turn round and tell me that there is a fire inside us flat again was there a reason
02:15:40 inside us flat again was there a reason why you didn't go through the assessment with him to see whether he could safely leave probably the amount of course that we're receiving on the night we had to be aware that there was numerous calls
02:15:52 be aware that there was numerous calls coming in and we had to deal with everybody and try and speak to everybody but also we were looking after the rest of London and there could have been a major fire or a house fire somewhere in the south of London again that we didn't
02:16:04 the south of London again that we didn't know that was within them cause right
02:16:16 another call this is flat 205 23rd floor 138 and 16 and this is lfb three one seven and we believe this is Miriam L
02:16:30 seven and we believe this is Miriam L quarry who originated from flat one nine six but was now in flat 205 on the 23rd floor if I can just ask you to be shown that this is 138 16 and if you just look
02:16:44 that this is 138 16 and if you just look at the next the first full page she says hi there's a fire in grateful tower I know you guys are here but the line got cut off last time I called and then she tells you we are all stuck on the 23rd
02:16:55 tells you we are all stuck on the 23rd floor 23rd yeah 23rd floor okay we were actually on the scene you're aware but I'll tell me on the 23rd floor yeah 23rd it's flat what flat is it 205 and then you continue him and continue the next
02:17:06 you continue him and continue the next page please and then there's no smoking or anything coming into the property nothing yet our flat was underneath no smoke that was absolutely fine and all of a sudden just blew into our kitchen now just on
02:17:22 just blew into our kitchen now just on what she's telling you there did that tell you that at this point is 138 the fire had had by now spread from the fourth floor to the 22nd floor which is
02:17:35 fourth floor to the 22nd floor which is where she'd come up from and she was telling me there was smoke on the 22nd floor
02:17:44 floor well she's I'm just sorry I'm so sorry
02:17:53 yes but the crews were on scene and I believe that they were they were going up and checking every floor at that time right did it tell you that did this
02:18:05 right did it tell you that did this information tell you that whatever else had happened before that by now the fire had definitely spread from the fourth floor and was attacking the 22nd floor from reading that information yes yes
02:18:17 from reading that information yes yes did you tell anybody in the control room such as Debbie Rael rial at that point that the fire had now
02:18:28 at that point that the fire had now definitely spread to the topmost part of the building I think more the supervisors were busy and I think they probably would have established that by now but you don't know you don't know
02:18:41 now but you don't know you don't know that okay now I get to ask you some questions about the change in stay-put advice if I can ask you to go to your witness statement not very much longer
02:18:55 witness statement not very much longer yes it takes but might be convenient for a short right now well would you like a break at this stage I don't mind I'd rather continue you're happy to keep
02:19:06 rather continue you're happy to keep going are you all right can I just ask others in Rome in particular the document manager and the stenographers you contend to go on for a little bit all right thank you very much yes we'll
02:19:17 all right thank you very much yes we'll press on in that case I'm grateful so everybody thank you can I ask you to look at your witness statement page 4 bottom paragraph
02:19:36 and you say there initially the advice was given to remain inside the building until my om Alex Norman informed me that the advice had changed and she said to me tell them to get out
02:19:48 me tell them to get out I remember hearing about there being problems with the stairwell and I remember one operational staff member saying to me we aren't going to get to them do you remember first of all even
02:20:00 them do you remember first of all even roughly what time this was no I had no idea of time it was a complete blur do you remember exactly what she said to
02:20:11 you remember exactly what she said to you by way of advice as my statement said to tell them to get out tell them to get out that's that's your clearest memory of her exact words I said did she
02:20:23 memory of her exact words I said did she give you any indication as to how to get that across to callers and what terms to use what tone to use no she just told him to get what she advised to tell him
02:20:34 him to get what she advised to tell him to get out right and was it your understanding that that advice tell him to get out I had to be absolutely clear
02:20:45 to get out I had to be absolutely clear this was a life-and-death choice she didn't say it was a life in jest choice but to tell them to get out obviously it was is that your understanding it was
02:20:57 was is that your understanding it was right
02:21:03 no you go as I've shown you you've said that you you say that you remember one operational staff member saying to me work we aren't going to get to them do
02:21:15 work we aren't going to get to them do you remember at this point all by this point how do you learnt that firefighters were not going to be able to rescue people trapped in the building in that part my statement that that
02:21:28 in that part my statement that that hasn't been written very well that was on an actual another call that I got that I was asking Jason Olaf and that's when you said to me we're not going to get to them was that another cop I see was that before or after deli rail had
02:21:41 was that before or after deli rail had come to you with the change in advice that was after it was after how long after do you remember I can't remember did you get any kind of impression as to whether that was the whole building or just parts of the building which were
02:21:53 just parts of the building which were going to be inaccessible to fire crews I can't remember okay I just want to look at one or two of the calls that you received or took around this time first
02:22:06 received or took around this time first of all flat 182 21st floor and there's a transcript that reference lfb 374 we can
02:22:17 transcript that reference lfb 374 we can see the time of this call is o2 4354 and if you go to the first page you can see that you establish the flat number and the floor number and the number of
02:22:28 the floor number and the number of people in the building and in the flat five of us hurry up two adults three children and then the next page you say okay you able listen are you able to get
02:22:39 okay you able listen are you able to get yourself out of the property safely no okay write what you need to do is get some damp towel sheet standard sheets and put them over yourself as well hello hello and I think the call ends at that point it's not a very long call and
02:22:52 point it's not a very long call and perhaps we can't do it off this but but you - you're telling them there to get your asking can you get out safely do you think this call was before or
02:23:03 do you think this call was before or after you've been told by Deverell to tell callers to get out looking at the terms of the advice you're giving here I can't remember to me it to be precise
02:23:15 I can't remember to me it to be precise that if and Alex Norman came round and told us to tell them to get out in it it would have been afterwards right is
02:23:26 would have been afterwards right is there a reason why you just you didn't say to these callers you have to leave come what may get yourself out no well I think the line cleared by the second
02:23:37 think the line cleared by the second find looking at now right because I'm asking him hello hello and in the liners the line is cleared before I can ask him any any further information there's
02:23:49 any any further information there's another call I'll show you one nine two flat one nine to twenty second floor at two forty two twenty two so this is the next call you take will shortly after and this is lfb
02:24:05 take will shortly after and this is lfb three seven eight if you just look at that it starts on page two you can just have that please father over on the 22nd
02:24:16 have that please father over on the 22nd floor we have died in 22nd year what floor are you on 22nd when it carries on and again and at the foot of the page after going through who's in the flat you say okay now listen to me are you
02:24:28 you say okay now listen to me are you able to get yourself out of your property safely no we can't we opened it and we can't have you turn the page you can't I tried that we can't we're trapped in the bedroom they're in the
02:24:39 trapped in the bedroom they're in the bedroom yeah what are you waiting for we're dying and then there's an off call conversation now do you remember who you might have been talking to in the control room during that call no no I
02:24:53 control room during that call no no I don't remember you ever having assistance from Debbie rail or ortho Joe Smith at this stage this is Sir I don't remember
02:25:01 remember this isn't about 245 I don't remember you ever getting any assistance during the night with calls from senior operations managers with the control no because they were too busy dealing with other alright so if
02:25:14 busy dealing with other alright so if you didn't if you didn't get assistance from operations managers who would you have been talking to okay no he goes on
02:25:25 have been talking to okay no he goes on to say yeah I've been telling them inaudible right hello yeah yeah what you need to do is you need to get out of the property now you need to get out we can't you have to try to get out you
02:25:37 can't you have to try to get out you have to try and you need to get some towels around your head and faces in the body and you need to try and leave the property because the firemen are there ok so you need to try to leave try and leave over the page you say just pick
02:25:51 leave over the page you say just pick this up the next page where are they they're on different floors so you need to try and make out safely now you looking at that do you think this call
02:26:02 looking at that do you think this call was after Debbie Rael had told you the new advice looking at the terms of the advice you're giving yes because I'm telling him to get out right
02:26:16 and they tell you if you get to the next page
02:26:24 you're told the only place that they can go is the window cuz the corridor is already full of smoke and it continues in that vein essentially you're telling them to leave and they say they can't
02:26:35 them to leave and they say they can't just get to the next page I think we can see that more clearly that's we can't the call ends my question is is there a reason why you didn't stay on the call and try and guide them out
02:26:50 there's no reason but you can't maybe at the time I couldn't stay on every call or maybe they weren't listening to me not all the caller's were listening to us we can only give a guidance and we
02:27:01 us we can only give a guidance and we can only advise the caller hmm they're the ones there on the scene we can only do our best to guide the cobbler and give him advice to get out of the property but not all callers were
02:27:12 property but not all callers were listening to us know understand that were you conscious during this call or perhaps other calls that the callers you were speaking to were individuals for
02:27:25 were speaking to were individuals for whom English was not their first language
02:27:28 language there was a lot call as I spoke to the English wasn't their first language some of them may had have had problems understanding what we were saying right did you take any kind of steps to try to
02:27:42 did you take any kind of steps to try to help them understand you what you were saying you always paint steps for them to help for you to help them that's what we do we do we save life we always try and help everybody it doesn't matter
02:27:53 and help everybody it doesn't matter what language they are can you only just have to help me just identify what those steps are if you're talking to someone who's English for whom English isn't the first language how would you how would you go about helping them to understand
02:28:05 you go about helping them to understand you you would maybe speak to them a bit slower you would maybe turn imprecise your words a bit more again every chord is different but you try and help every
02:28:16 is different but you try and help every caller right
02:28:19 do you think you did that on the night I believe we all done that will chide our best now getting back to your statement in page on page five that fifth paragraph from the top middle of the
02:28:33 paragraph from the top middle of the page you save a rat around five o'clock ours was the first I saw grenfell towers on Sky News what did you see
02:28:48 it was fate of a shot it was a high-rise building that was literally on fire do you remember who showed you that image no I can't remember do you think that if
02:29:02 no I can't remember do you think that if you'd seen that image earlier on it would have assisted you in terms of the advice that you were giving I don't think so because we were giving
02:29:13 think so because we were giving everybody the advice that was appropriate at the time different question different topic if you had known on the night that many callers
02:29:26 known on the night that many callers were calling from flats or about flats which had front doors with no functioning automatic door closers would that have affected the advice that you
02:29:37 that have affected the advice that you were giving no we would have given the same advice okay miss Foxx thank you very much for your patience I've come to the end for the time being of the questions that I've got for you normally
02:29:48 questions that I've got for you normally what we do is take a short break and I'll check my notes and see whether there are any further questions that we have so mr. Chen you might be able to do that yes I have a five minute break so
02:29:59 that yes I have a five minute break so that council can do any sweeping up there needs to be done thank you please then talk to anyone about your evidence while they're after the room and if you'd like to give the office you look after you all right
02:30:24 mr. minute I'll say quarter to five but if you really assume that get the ushers thank you thank you very much mr. chairman thank you
02:38:18 well mr. minute you found one or two they have been found and we will press on but not not not for long mr. chairman I hope
02:38:46 greatness Fox I think one or two more Pistons not I hope too many as Fox there are a few further questions but I hope not to detain you for very much longer say so thank you very much for coming
02:38:57 say so thank you very much for coming back to this last last innings the first is a call at 250 421 I'm going to ask you short questions about it's very
02:39:08 you short questions about it's very specific calls for certain families this is lfb 549 but it the best place to pick it up is page 108 of the control-room report if we can this is a
02:39:20 control-room report if we can this is a call to come up in the screen the call of 254 21 well we could
02:39:32 well we've got this transcript now it's probably takes longer to go through it perhaps it doesn't matter we'll use it use the transcript navigator hello navigator what's the name of the block
02:39:44 navigator what's the name of the block navigator hello can I help first of all what's a navigator so I wasn't a question I've just prepared to ask you but I'm curious I haven't got what is it I mean all right
02:39:57 what is it I mean all right and then navigator says yeah it's a fire Grenville house and handing you over to someone who knows someone that trapped inside does that help us identify navigator
02:40:09 [Music]
02:40:13 well then let's pick it up then you say navigator can I help you yeah my friends stuck on the 22nd floor of the building that's on fire 22nd floor okay yeah 194 then you say
02:40:25 22nd floor okay yeah 194 then you say what's her number and if you turn the page one nine four I can watch him looking out the window and that's far all around him you say yeah I know and
02:40:36 all around him you say yeah I know and how many people are stuck in inside there it's just there just him him there right what we're doing is well why isn't he ringing he needs to ring nine nine nine
02:40:46 nine that's what he needs to do and then my batteries died I can't get through to him my batteries died I don't know his number right well we're asking people to
02:40:57 number right well we're asking people to leave their properties but I tell them and then it it goes on my god if you just turn the page I think we'll see the cool end yes all right I'm gonna thank you tell them
02:41:08 all right I'm gonna thank you tell them on the radio they alright don't worry I'm gonna okay This Is It this is at 2:54 21 I think you were saying earlier
02:41:20 2:54 21 I think you were saying earlier in that call that you were telling people to leave so can we be clear that this was after Debbie Rael had told you to change the advice to get out it wasn't
02:41:31 wasn't some Alex panics at Comerica solid okay but in timing terms I can't remember that call I listened to you before the time was a complete blur I don't know
02:41:42 time was a complete blur I don't know what time they told us to get them out or I know that was Alex was in front of me and she told him to get out I can't tell you what it was when you were told that this caller was in flat 194 on the
02:41:56 that this caller was in flat 194 on the 22nd floor did you did you refer to the white board during this call for someone matching that flat number and floor no I
02:42:07 matching that flat number and floor no I didn't refer to the white board because it would have been it would have been too busy and I we've all must taking our slips of paper and she was given Joseph Olaf that was updating the white board right did you write down the details of
02:42:19 right did you write down the details of this on a piece of paper and give it to Jason airlift at that point do you think I could have done but I took so many calls that night I can't remember that particular one okay can I ask you to be
02:42:32 particular one okay can I ask you to be shown lfb five zeros for one nine which is a call from flat one for two and you
02:42:44 is a call from flat one for two and you can see the time of this oh three 18 just go back to the first page so that it's it's clear please Ralph oh three eighteen forty five so this is not long
02:42:56 eighteen forty five so this is not long after I think we've established that the stay-put advice had changed and I go to the first page of that transcript please and you're told the address one for two and you you say a third of the way down
02:43:12 and you you say a third of the way down you need to try and get yourself out of the property and they say but it's too hot like outside that door five people inside and then if you turn the page
02:43:24 inside and then if you turn the page you're there's some discussion and then in the middle of the page you'll say you say so you've got five hours and you're not able to get yourself outside : no there's two elderly people
02:43:35 outside : no there's two elderly people and you're a flat 143 17th floor 1 4 2 1 4 2 1 4 2 you're awful - ok ok I'll tell them on the radio please come there's elderly people here please all right thank you bye bye the call ends and the question is and to
02:43:51 the call ends and the question is and to be fair to you you're told there's there are elderly people but given now that you've been told clearly by this time that the advice has to be that they must get out is there any reason why you
02:44:03 get out is there any reason why you didn't tell this caller that that they must leave come what may I can't
02:44:14 must leave come what may I can't remember that call but I'm sure I would have told him to get out maybe maybe they won't listen to me I can't remember that call ok there's a call earlier in
02:44:28 that call ok there's a call earlier in the evening and we can do this I think by reference to the control-room report different flat and this is page 139 and 140
02:44:45 I'm sorry 39 and 40 forgive me my fault page 39 and 40 of the control room the world
02:45:02 this is 208 40 just give me a moment I'll find it and pray it's Oh - Oh 848
02:45:26 and it's page 67 yes it's lfb quadruple zero four seven nine zero yeah the control-room report its 208 48 cro fox
02:45:43 control-room report its 208 48 cro fox takes a call from a female caller who explains that she was in Grantville tower and there is a fire on the floor below them the caller is in flat 175 on the 20th floor Sierra Fox asked how many people there
02:45:55 Sierra Fox asked how many people there are in the flat and the caller replies and there is her her husband three kids one baby
02:46:01 one baby Sierra Fox confirms this and states that she is passing all the details on to our command unit that is on the scene caller says this is the important part there is smoke coming into the flat and c-raf Fox
02:46:12 smoke coming into the flat and c-raf Fox provides FSG about blocking the doors to keep the smoke out when the caller advises that she had already done that craf Fox confirms that she passed on the information to the crews to come and get them
02:46:22 them tells the caller to call back if she needs to a question is given that your told their liberal caller says the smoke coming into the flat mr. Fox why did you make no attempt to assess
02:46:34 why did you make no attempt to assess with the caller whether there was a safe means of escape because I touched her told her to put the towels down and the sheets down and I think at that time we
02:46:46 sheets down and I think at that time we we were still using the same book policy yes I think you said to us earlier on that once there was smoke coming into the flat you would start to assess the means of escape from a flat my question
02:46:59 means of escape from a flat my question really is why didn't you do that given that that was how you would normally go about assisting a caller I think I may have got confused before
02:47:10 I think I may have got confused before we got questioning with my questioning possibly right so let me get back over because if it wants there to be any confusion just to roll back a little bit
02:47:23 confusion just to roll back a little bit when a caller tells you they are affected by smoke is it your understanding that at that point you would start to assess the safety of means of escape or would you leave that till later no we
02:47:36 or would you leave that till later no we would assess the means of escape and ask them to block the doors and stop the smoke coming in right I'm gonna pass that information okay on to the raid on
02:47:47 that information okay on to the raid on to the radio of the command unit right so the question is given that you are told on this call that there was smoke coming in why didn't you start with the caller to assess the safety of the means
02:47:59 caller to assess the safety of the means of escape maybe because of the number of calls coming in McConnell it's not quite and I can't remember the night okay and there's another call along the same lines 211 at 42 which I went to ask you
02:48:19 lines 211 at 42 which I went to ask you about and I can't actually find all the control report we have a call as we know which you handled for some 33 minutes
02:48:30 which you handled for some 33 minutes with marcio gomez in the 21st floor which started at 2:00 at 3:25 and we've been through that with mr. Gomez I'm certainly not going to ask you any
02:48:41 certainly not going to ask you any details about that call miss Foxx I just want to ask you one question can you tell us why you stayed on the call with mr. Gomez from 325 but didn't stay on on
02:48:52 mr. Gomez from 325 but didn't stay on on any FSG calls with any other callers prior to that time to assist them out of the building again I can't answer that it was very alien to all of us in the
02:49:03 it was very alien to all of us in the control room that night we never ever put the phone down to people when it's with regards to fire safety guidance calls we always try and help people the fire crews always get there in my 32
02:49:14 fire crews always get there in my 32 years mr. gomez and his family I don't know maybe instinct took over and I don't know I think it was because he was
02:49:25 don't know I think it was because he was started off calm and then he said the fire was in his flat I'd asked him how many children he got I said his wife was pregnant with a baby as my take and I just stayed on the line with him helped
02:49:36 just stayed on the line with him helped guide him down the stairs and done the best that I could that night your same as we all did we just worked so hard and again looking at the transcripts and listening to the calls
02:49:47 transcripts and listening to the calls are completely different finally just to cover walk walk more calls at one 26:58
02:50:02 there's a call in relation to flat 95 which I think we looked at on the 12th floor that you took and it is
02:50:25 17 of the control-room report so this is lfb quadruple zero four seven nine zero control them report say are a fox this
02:50:38 control them report say are a fox this is the bottom of the page we looked at this I think before takes a call from a female reporting a fire in Grenfell tower do you rember we discussed that earlier on in your evidence we did and was asked for advice we could see the
02:50:52 was asked for advice we could see the summary of that call here and the end it says that CRA Fox states she'll pass on the information to the crews and that's in fact that is information that there was smoke and fire in the neighbors
02:51:05 was smoke and fire in the neighbors kitchen did you consider passing this information to the fire ground to pass
02:51:16 information to the fire ground to pass the information on to the fire ground
02:51:27 do you know how you would have done that
02:51:32 Cartman exactly again it would have been a service request or it would have been piece of paper and we would have passed it to the command unit they either way
02:51:44 it to the command unit they either way we were passing as much information under the fire ground as we possibly could that night
02:52:09 and I'm not sure at the moment we could see a record of that in the short incident log but if there isn't can you explain that if there was no record in this short incident log it would have
02:52:21 this short incident log it would have been done by paypal the incident log is so long to look throwing that's certain
02:52:32 so long to look throwing that's certain that I'm not putting a false point to you if you go to the short incident log which is a meaty triple 0 1 3 a 3 0 and go please to page 19 look please at the
02:52:49 go please to page 19 look please at the time mark of Oh 1 40 40
02:52:58 we can see a message sent or a service request made by a G in fact angie gots persons trapped in flat on 12th floor
02:53:09 persons trapped in flat on 12th floor unable to leave that's obviously not you but can you explain why it was that angie gots was passing that message or perhaps this wasn't a duplicate call and
02:53:22 perhaps this wasn't a duplicate call and she could have had a duplicate call but i wouldn't that there was no reason why I wouldn't have passed the message are
02:53:34 I wouldn't have passed the message are you able to relate this call at 1:26 to this service request message at 144 T do you think no I can't remember that call
02:53:46 you think no I can't remember that call in particular it looks as if this was not necessarily a response to your call but a call that Angie got took is that
02:53:57 but a call that Angie got took is that right
02:53:58 right do you know I can't remember okay if in fact it wasn't you passing this information to their Instagram but Angie
02:54:09 information to their Instagram but Angie goes in this but in response to another call
02:54:12 call can you explain why you didn't pass the information you had about this flat to the incident ground I can't explain it because I can't remember the call right
02:54:29 this box thank you very much I have now come to the end of my questions it remains for me only to thank you very much indeed for coming to the enquiring and assisting us with our investigations
02:54:40 and assisting us with our investigations I know it's not been easy for you to recall the events of that night and I am extremely grateful to you for coming so thank you very much I also had my my thanks to the transcribers and to the to
02:54:51 thanks to the transcribers and to the to the trial director for his patient their patients all of their patients in sitting far later than I would have liked on a Friday evening and to see Walsh well I should thank you very much
02:55:02 Walsh well I should thank you very much on behalf of the enquiry as a whole I would imagine you've been standing around or sitting around for quite a long time waiting to give you a rapid entry which is a disagreeable thing in itself so I'm very sorry about thank you
02:55:14 itself so I'm very sorry about thank you but it's very helpful to hear your account of these matters it all goes to enable us to piece together the big picture so we're very grateful to you for coming I'm sorry thank you thank you
02:55:28 for coming I'm sorry thank you thank you very much okay thank you thank you right to go to the options
02:55:46 and that must be it for today mr. chairman it is and I I just want to say there's a personal thank you to you Anthony to the transcribers and to the trial director for their papers they meant to me but it's been a very long
02:55:57 meant to me but it's been a very long day for everyone so I'm grateful to all of you for your patience the way you've listened so quietly to the evidence yes and of course I'm very grateful to the document manager and the trial director
02:56:08 document manager and the trial director and the stenographers who always work on late without any complaint can I can I also just this is a competition well not a competition for thanks but I just want
02:56:19 a competition for thanks but I just want him to express my thanks to the lfb when i said stephen water I really meant him and his corporate capacity for making these witnesses available to us and I apologize for the rescheduling we've had
02:56:31 apologize for the rescheduling we've had to have but it was important that we heard from them yes thank you very much right thank you very much well we'll break now we resume on Monday at 10 o'clock and we shall get back to the evidence of dr. lane yes thank you thank
02:56:44 evidence of dr. lane yes thank you thank you
02:56:46 you [Music]