Control Room Officer Yvonne Adams gives evidence about her 45 years at LFB, training on FSG calls, her handling of calls on the night of the fire including telling callers fire was on the fourth floor when it had already spread. She admits never experiencing multiple FSG calls from a high-rise before Grenfell.
00:01:12 you
00:04:06 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing now by way of a change today we're going to hear from three of the control-room officers whose names we've
00:04:17 control-room officers whose names we've seen use quite a lot and documents but from whom we haven't yet heard then like mr. millet mr. chairman it is good morning thank you I'm going to start by calling control room officer Yvonne Adams please
00:04:29 Adams please [Music]
00:04:52 I do solemnly sincerely enjoy today I just summon sec
00:05:07 thank you very much do sit down make yourself comfortable yes good morning miss Adams can I ask you please to give the
00:05:19 can I ask you please to give the Chairman your full name Yvonne Felicia Adams thank you and I'm going to start by thanking you very much for coming today and assisting the inquiry with its investigations we're extremely grateful to you for coming my questions are
00:05:32 to you for coming my questions are intended to be short and simple but if they don't work out that way please tell me and I will ask the question either again or we'll put it in a different way we're going to be covering the events of
00:05:43 we're going to be covering the events of the night in some detail this morning if at any time you need a break then we can take a break all you have to do is just indicate and we can stop the aim is to sit and take evidence for no more than
00:05:55 sit and take evidence for no more than an hour but if that's too long again tell me and we can we can take it in shorter shorter pieces now can I start by asking you please to look at your witness statement that you gave to the
00:06:07 witness statement that you gave to the Metropolitan Police last year what I'm going to show you will appear on the screen on the desk in front of you or if you want to use the screen at the back of the room you can do that as well can the witness please first be shown a
00:06:19 the witness please first be shown a meaty quadruple 0 776 - and now that is a witness statement with your name on it dated the 11th of October 2017 given to the Metropolitan Police is that your
00:06:32 the Metropolitan Police is that your statement yes have you had an opportunity to read it recently yes can you confirm that its contents are true yes thank you now I'm going to begin my questions with asking you some something
00:06:43 questions with asking you some something about your role and experience in the NFB and you are currently a control room officer yes and employed by the NFB yes and I think it's right that you've been
00:06:54 and I think it's right that you've been in that position for over 45 years yes so you started in 1972 that's it yeah now following your initial employment in 1972 miss Adams and over that 45 year
00:07:06 1972 miss Adams and over that 45 year period
00:07:07 period did you receive regular training on coal management not regular but received training yes right
00:07:19 training yes right not regular when was the last training that you received prior to the night of the fire in June 2017 do you mean on just general core management or FSG
00:07:31 just general core management or FSG let's start with general core management I can't remember right what about FSG my training was 2016 and there was two
00:07:43 training was 2016 and there was two sessions in 2012 and I did some workshops with the command unit but that was for their training not not us that was the better anticipated right just
00:07:55 was the better anticipated right just focusing on the 2016 training can you just tell us what that involves please to be honest I can't really remember I think it was just generally going over the FSG guidance and just our general
00:08:08 the FSG guidance and just our general procedures on it right were you shown and given a help understanding policy 5 539 emergency call management um yeah we
00:08:20 539 emergency call management um yeah we would have just gone over general FSG guidance I can't remember it specifically okay was it based on documents or was it was it was there any role play involved I know we did do role
00:08:33 role play involved I know we did do role play but I can't remember which one that was
00:08:35 was it might have been in the 2012 but I honestly can't remember did you get training on policy 790 during the do you know something called
00:08:47 during the do you know something called set policy 790 FSG you have survived the guidance yes and will come to look at that policy shortly and before the
00:08:58 that policy shortly and before the growth felt our fire did you get any training or other kinds of education on matters arising or lessons learnt from the lack of house fire which happened in 2009 we changed a procedure slightly and
00:09:12 2009 we changed a procedure slightly and the questions we asked so remember that FSG guidance lesson and we change our attendance to fits G cos you changed
00:09:24 attendance to fits G cos you changed your attendance to FSG calls yeah we know what you mean well prior to that we didn't send specific appliances to deal with us FSG calls and now we do oh I see so so we
00:09:36 calls and now we do oh I see so so we send a command junior at station manager support yes that resourcing and who we're gonna contact on the rifle when they get there passing the course - ok
00:09:48 they get there passing the course - ok did you get training in 2016 or in 2012 on how to handle multiple FSG calls in other words what happens when the control room starts to receive more than
00:09:59 control room starts to receive more than one not in our training that I remember just when I did the workshops with the command unit and when did you do the workshops with the command unit sorry I
00:10:10 workshops with the command unit sorry I can't remember those dates okay and I've done two of them come with the dates okay is it was it long before the ground fell terrified you said not that long I don't think maybe one year before
00:10:21 long I don't think maybe one year before so I say and the training you did with the command unit did that involve did that involve multiple FSG calls it did you how many do you remember hmm maybe six at the most maybe not that many
00:10:33 six at the most maybe not that many right do you remember being trained on communications to and from the command unit in relation to those FSG call it was looking at various ways because
00:10:45 was looking at various ways because normally we pass fsj caused by radio but on this occasion he was phoning them person I was during the training with my pizza Mei he was passing the command
00:10:57 pizza Mei he was passing the command unit the FSGS calls by phone by phone was that was that an admin line or was that mobile it was a 1 farad mid lines yeah it was all done at the lock where
00:11:10 yeah it was all done at the lock where we work but nothing right and did during that training did somebody play the role like an actor or something like that of a fire survival guidance caller um I was
00:11:21 a fire survival guidance caller um I was doing the rage I don't think anyone was I think we was just passing the COS in writing it down and impasse tips of command doing it right so just to focus a bit more was this training on communications between the controller
00:11:33 communications between the controller and the command unit rather than handling the call coming from the corner it was specifically for the command units benefit and we were just participating in workshop so for them to
00:11:44 participating in workshop so for them to learn what to do it they around more than us I think do you do you remember enemy maybe because it wasn't directly you can't but see if you could help me do you remember what the lesson that the
00:11:56 do you remember what the lesson that the command unit was supposed to learn from that training was as you'd have to ask them ok all right now have you ever had any specific training on fires in high-rise residential buildings don't
00:12:09 high-rise residential buildings don't think specific
00:12:12 would it follow that you've also not had training in how to go about advising lots of callers to evacuate a rep high-rise residential building no not at
00:12:25 high-rise residential building no not at all in 45 years they'd never happen before it's just unprecedented a you trained on what to do where the caller tells you that the exit route is snow clogged just how to
00:12:39 exit route is snow clogged just how to keep people safe generally I don't they tell us the exit is blocked we try and keep us if they're in their flat would say stay where you are and we'll come to you stop smoke coming
00:12:50 and we'll come to you stop smoke coming in okay we'll come back we'll come back to that in a moment in your experience your long experience as a control room officer have you ever experienced a fire
00:13:02 officer have you ever experienced a fire in a high-rise residential block involving multiple FSG calls we've had fires in high-rises and we've had several FSG going calls going but
00:13:15 several FSG going calls going but nothing on the scale of Graham field no and so breaking that down a bit then in your experience prior to the night of the grenfell tower fire had you given
00:13:27 the grenfell tower fire had you given FSG advice to a caller in a high-rise or just gentleman would let that start within in any corner um yeah over the years there has been occasions yes right
00:13:39 years there has been occasions yes right not many but there has been occasions right not many I mean I know it's difficult I know it's counting back over 45 years I started to keep saying 40 it's an impressive period of time can
00:13:54 it's an impressive period of time can you count the number of FSG calls from any building that you've had to handle maybe I don't know maybe up to ten maybe really and have
00:14:09 maybe up to ten maybe really and have you ever experienced being in a control room or the control room I should say where there were multiple FSG calls coming from a single incident yeah do
00:14:21 coming from a single incident yeah do you remember one occasion when we was taking multiple calls which was that in a high-rise it was Frederic tower and Leighton Fred I was afraid week tower
00:14:33 Leighton Fred I was afraid week tower I was radio operator at the time but it the calls were going on around the room and when was that sorry it was oh sorry
00:14:46 and when was that sorry it was oh sorry I don't know let's try and get the decade hmm well it was it was in the 20s and I honestly can't remember just be
00:14:59 and I honestly can't remember just be guessing maybe five six years ago right I'm just trying to work out was it before or after lack after that yeah did to the best of your recollection did the lessons that you'd learn from lack and
00:15:10 lessons that you'd learn from lack and all helped handle or help the control room handle the Frederic tower fire I don't know I wasn't on duty flacon all so but I couldn't say right now I want
00:15:29 so but I couldn't say right now I want to turn to explore briefly with you your understanding and application of what we've come to call the stay-put policy so I'm using that as a shorthand perhaps
00:15:41 so I'm using that as a shorthand perhaps for a number of different ideas first can you just tell us what you understood as a June 2017 by the stay-put policy
00:15:53 as a June 2017 by the stay-put policy well if they're not being affected by the fire smoke hate that they would stay where they were and we would make a note of where they call him from that number
00:16:05 of where they call him from that number if we're talking about high-rise flat numbers their floors how many people and we would relay that information to the fire ground would the crew would go get them or talk to him if
00:16:16 crew would go get them or talk to him if they're safe now can I ask you then to turn to page 2 of your witness statement and if you gave there you'll look it you'll see on the
00:16:28 there you'll look it you'll see on the screen the third paragraph and you describe FSG at the start of that paragraph we'll come back to that halfway through the paragraph or just a
00:16:39 halfway through the paragraph or just a bit below it you say national advice for FSG calls in yellow highlight for you national advice for FSG calls in
00:16:50 national advice for FSG calls in high-rise buildings is to stay put and await rescue blocking any smoke with towels alongside reassurance a CRO would usually stay on the phone to the caller until rescued yes now you also say
00:17:05 until rescued yes now you also say earlier in the paragraph I just want to show this to you that an FSG a call becomes FSG this is the second sentence the call become FSG when a caller is
00:17:16 the call become FSG when a caller is unable to get out of a building or house due to a fire or smoke now I just want to see if I can pin pin this down a bit
00:17:27 to see if I can pin pin this down a bit more and are you saying that you would give stay-put advice to someone who is trapped and wouldn't leave or couldn't leave depends on the call I mean if they
00:17:40 leave depends on the call I mean if they can't get out then you'd do everything to try and make them safe yeah but just depending on the call so let me ask the question this way would
00:17:52 let me ask the question this way would there be any point in giving what you understand a stay-put advice to somebody who is trapped and can't do anything other than stay put so sorry
00:18:03 other than stay put so sorry is there any would you ever give stay-put advice as you understand it to someone who tells you that they're trapped well you don't have to stay they wouldn't make retract I mean this what
00:18:14 wouldn't make retract I mean this what else can they do and then you could just hope just hope you can keep them safe yeah so moving on then when you receive a call for somebody who says they're trapped or they can't leave well they've
00:18:27 trapped or they can't leave well they've tried to leave they can't in your experience would you will your understanding of the policy would you immediately proceed to give them FSG advice or would you first try to
00:18:38 advice or would you first try to establish to your satisfaction whether they may there may be some way of leaving the building I think maybe go down that route generally there was if it's a house fire because there may be
00:18:50 it's a house fire because there may be other alternative some ways of getting out they've not thought was right maybe through a window that you know flat roof is some other way of escaping that they've not thought of in a high-rise
00:19:02 they've not thought of in a high-rise building they don't have any many of terms yesterday so do I take it from that but when the caller says I'm trapped or I'm stuck I can't leave do you take them at face
00:19:14 I can't leave do you take them at face value and proceed straight into FSG or do you ask why I can't leave generally right really first question normally right yeah how hard would you push them in giving you detailed information about
00:19:27 in giving you detailed information about why they can't leave so that says to be able to continue to advise them be so dependent on the cola if they're listening to you with a there's a language problem all sorts of things
00:19:40 language problem all sorts of things it's not a black-and-white it's a gray area
00:19:44 area but you do you just do your best to try make yourself clear when you're making an assessment of whether they can't leave or can leave do you rely only on
00:19:58 leave or can leave do you rely only on the information that the caller is giving you or do you also or might you also rely on information that you were getting back from the fire ground if you had any probably mainly the caller and I
00:20:12 had any probably mainly the caller and I mean the only information we get back from the fire ground normally is informative messages don't typically get many messages back telling us what's
00:20:24 many messages back telling us what's happening at the instant how helpful would informative messages be in the case of a high-rise fire in assisting you in assessing whether or not that the
00:20:36 you in assessing whether or not that the caller can safely leave it's so difficult to say probably would help I mean you'd still be asking the same questions because until you get told
00:20:47 questions because until you get told otherwise all you can do is try and keep them safe and if there's smoke coming on under their front door you know there's smoke on the other side or a fire so you
00:20:58 smoke on the other side or a fire so you can't simply pull up into those conditions okay let's look at the policy and I'm gonna start with policy 539 okay
00:21:10 and I'm gonna start with policy 539 okay if we can please have that that's to have three of our policies bundle and this is the policy called emergency core
00:21:21 this is the policy called emergency core management and it's there on the screen this Adams for you current as at March 2014 and issued in November 2007
00:21:32 2014 and issued in November 2007 originally and can I ask you please to go to appendix 3 on page 16 I ought to start by asking you are you familiar
00:21:43 start by asking you are you familiar with this policy generally yes and are you familiar in general terms with appendix 3 which is entitled fire survival guidance now if you look at the
00:21:58 survival guidance now if you look at the third paragraph it says Brigade Control advised callers to get out and stay out and that's an inverted commas however if a call is received from a high-rise
00:22:09 a call is received from a high-rise building where fire heat and smoke are not affecting the caller lfb would advise that and then you've got a paragraph underneath that you are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire heat or
00:22:21 premises unless affected by fire heat or smoke if the situation changes you should leave your premises in down nine nine nine if you need further assistance
00:22:30 now just pausing there does that sentence accord with your understanding of the stay-put policy as we've called it yes okay so would it be right to say it's
00:22:42 okay so would it be right to say it's stay put unless yes now just focusing on the word affecting in the in the in the
00:22:53 the word affecting in the in the in the first of those paragraphs we looked at and then affected in the second affected by fire heat or smoke what information
00:23:04 by fire heat or smoke what information would use a can as a control officer use to make your assessment as to where the premises are affected by fire heat or smoke just information from the court
00:23:15 smoke just information from the court what they're telling you what kind of information would that be where the smoke is it's coming from outside the front door so this is is this affected inside the flat or or more generally all
00:23:31 inside the flat or or more generally all of it really I mean just all dependent on what they're telling you okay and would somebody be affected by fire heat or smoke if they could smell smoke but couldn't see it necessarily no right
00:23:46 but couldn't see it necessarily no right just smell it not necessarily would somebody be affected it dies by fire heat or smoke if they're flat wasn't on
00:23:59 heat or smoke if they're flat wasn't on fire but they could see the fire approaching I suppose you could say that weren't being affected by it but where would the where with the fire be coming
00:24:10 would the where with the fire be coming through their windows to use in Jenin or just outside their window just other way yeah I mean and they are being affected by the fire right and again and it's a
00:24:22 by the fire right and again and it's a question they asked before but when you make your assessment of whether a caller is affected by fire heat or smoke would you rely solely on what the caller was telling you or what do you also look to rely on information coming to you from
00:24:33 rely on information coming to you from the incident ground information coming back yeah would you normally and I know him over the years done that many FSG calls in that in that experience that
00:24:45 calls in that in that experience that you can recall would you would you find the information coming from informative messages useful if it's just a normal fsj coal and someone's trapped in their house you normally hear the firefighters
00:24:57 house you normally hear the firefighters anyway you just hear them coming okay and then you hear them talking to the person and then the person they just put the phone down they don't even say goodbye to you normally because they rescued you so you know that they're
00:25:08 rescued you so you know that they're safe yes coming back to a question we looked at earlier which I don't think I completely covered with you in your experience you give given a sum and a rough number of the FSG calls you
00:25:19 rough number of the FSG calls you covered during your experience how many of those were from residential high-rise blocks
00:25:25 blocks remember any being in high-rise
00:25:32 now now can I turn to your witness statement again we'll come back to the policy shortly you go back to page 2 of your witness statement miss Adams you
00:25:44 your witness statement miss Adams you say in paragraph 2 paragraph 3 on that page which starts they call me sometimes become that's the third paragraph
00:25:57 become that's the third paragraph tunnelled second substantive paragraph a call may sometimes become a fast survival guidance call or FSG in short and then you say a call becomes FSG when
00:26:10 and then you say a call becomes FSG when a caller is unable to get out of a building or house due to a fire or smoke we looked at that a minute ago can I just just clarify something with you keep that on the pet on the screen
00:26:23 you keep that on the pet on the screen it will be kept on the screen for you and I'm going to ask you now to look at policy 790 that's lfb quadruple zero one two five seven which we've got you know
00:26:36 two five seven which we've got you know in our policies bundle at tab five and that's the first page of it issued as at February 2012 and reviewed as current
00:26:47 February 2012 and reviewed as current April 2014 first miss Adams are you familiar with this policy yes yes I've returned in that policy first of all to page two and
00:26:59 that policy first of all to page two and look at paragraph two point one under the title fire survival guidance call definition it says and we can expand that for you there it is an FSG call is
00:27:10 that for you there it is an FSG call is a call received into control where the caller believes that they are unable to leave their premises due to the effects of fire and where and this is in bold where the control officer remains on the
00:27:21 where the control officer remains on the line providing appropriate advice now just pausing there in that paragraph and preparing that with what you say in your statement at the big it which we can
00:27:33 statement at the big it which we can also highlight a call becomes FSG when the caller is unable to get out I'm interested in whether there's a difference between being unable and called a believing that they're unable
00:27:44 called a believing that they're unable and the question is on your understanding of when they call becomes an FSG call is it when the caller believes that they're unable to leave or
00:27:55 believes that they're unable to leave or is it when you've assessed they can't leave and in your judgment they can't leave it would all be down to the caller so if I believe they can't leave then I have to believe then that they can't
00:28:07 have to believe then that they can't leave so does that mean that you take them at face value and you don't say to them well actually although you say you can't leave let's test that a bit have you looked outside your front door have
00:28:19 you looked outside your front door have you look if you tried an open window yeah you would do that you would do that and you you would as a soundin or not a high-rise call it would pursue other avenues of why they can't leave right
00:28:30 avenues of why they can't leave right but I think is you never handle an FSG call from the high-rise perhaps your experience doesn't help us right now um well we're on the same page of the
00:28:41 um well we're on the same page of the policy page - can I ask you please to look at paragraph for prioritizing calls
00:28:48 paragraph 4.1 and if we can have that expanded please that would be helpful from it says occasionally control
00:29:00 from it says occasionally control receives multiple FSGS at an incident all FSG is received by control are treated with the same level of urgency however in certain circumstances the officer in charge of the of control may
00:29:11 officer in charge of the of control may direct call handlers to terminate a call to answer another before the light of Granville Tower miss Adams is that something you'd ever experienced have
00:29:23 something you'd ever experienced have you ever ever in your career being directed to terminate an FSG call in order to answer another
00:29:34 because I think the next question I can predict the answer to but do you know what the circumstances would be where the officer-in-charge may tell you to stop an FSG call to handle another just
00:29:46 stop an FSG call to handle another just an overwhelming amount of calls coming into the control yep but you've never had the experience before Grenfell of that okay now can I ask you to turn the
00:29:58 that okay now can I ask you to turn the page please within the policy to paragraph five point five if we could please have that highlighted there and
00:30:10 please have that highlighted there and this says control will attempt to gather all the information on the control information form see appendix 2 and relay this information to the incident as and when it becomes available and
00:30:22 as and when it becomes available and then miss Adams we can see a long list of bullet points under that which are details of of information number of flat house number of persons involved etc um
00:30:34 house number of persons involved etc um and appendix 2 just so you know what it is that is you're going to move on to that
00:30:54 that leaves page 10
00:30:58 page eight and says our page eight of of this exhibit appendix to control information form is that form something
00:31:12 information form is that form something you're familiar with I think I've seen it but we don't use it you don't use it no have you ever used this form in the controller of new
00:31:24 this form in the controller of new experience right now came back to the detailed information of paragraph five point five we were just on
00:31:40 looking at that list of bullet point details
00:31:50 would you normally expect to gather this information during an FSG call yes you would yeah in your experience of FSG
00:32:06 would yeah in your experience of FSG calls is it normally possible to get all of this information from the caller again it's all dependent on the caller you just you just don't know until
00:32:17 you just you just don't know until you're taking that call yeah even if they listening to you you know if they're in a panic or they're talking to other people with them so you would try your best to get that information good deep deep and again it's difficult
00:32:30 good deep deep and again it's difficult because I know your experience of these is limited limited even though you've had 45 years of control-room experience but have you ever known a time when you took an FSG call in which you've got all
00:32:43 took an FSG call in which you've got all of this information I can't remember hopefully I've got most of it right I can't say I've got all of it
00:32:58 perhaps the clues in the word attempt at the beginning so you've attempted but never have succeeded is that right yeah and what's relevant at the time it's
00:33:09 and what's relevant at the time it's just um yeah you would hopefully get them back
00:33:12 them back right
00:33:18 and turning them to well back in the policy please to the bottom of the previous page page two paragraph five
00:33:30 previous page page two paragraph five information transfer to incident if we could just have that expanded you can see at the foot of that page of that policy paragraph five point one says as soon as control is confirmed that an FSG
00:33:42 soon as control is confirmed that an FSG called is in progress they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details at this stage it is likely to be basic information relating to the number of persons
00:33:53 relating to the number of persons involved and their location within the property now looking at that in your experience what would the usually method
00:34:04 experience what would the usually method of passing that information over to the incident ground be could be a service request or you could could normally ask
00:34:16 request or you could could normally ask someone if he was taking the call it may be your supervisor or a colleague will come and listen to the call with you so if they was close to the radio operator they could even just go over to the raid
00:34:27 they could even just go over to the raid operator say to him tell him they're in the backroom they get there as quick as possible information to the ground and you'd probably back it up with this service request so would that be you
00:34:38 service request so would that be you making the service request or you telling the radio or it could be a colleague it would all depend on your staffing levels and what the Manning was at the time how many people were free to assist you with that call yeah I see so
00:34:52 assist you with that call yeah I see so it would I think what you're telling us is it would it would depend it very much so depend on your staffing levels so would that be is this right would there be two methods of communicating that first of all the radio operator and
00:35:04 first of all the radio operator and secondly the the the service request it could be because to me it's always the quickest way to get the information to the ground right so you know it may be if your can speak to the radio just say
00:35:15 if your can speak to the radio just say quickly tell them that they're in such-and-such a room and then you could do the niceties of the log afterwards when you if you were to do a service request what would happen to it it would
00:35:27 request what would happen to it it would come up on the screen in the control room yeah would it also come up on a screen somewhere on the incident ground you know it just goes in on our log in the country goes into your log yeah so
00:35:39 the country goes into your log yeah so it would have to be actioned by somebody in the insert in the control room yeah a toe bracelet so in fact the method of communication under five point one is the radio operator yeah initially yeah yes yes thank you now I'm going to
00:35:54 yeah yes yes thank you now I'm going to turn this Adams to the events of the night of the fire itself if I can now if I can ask you please to go to your witness statement and look at page three second paragraph down from the top of
00:36:05 second paragraph down from the top of the page you say that you were you were assigned as a pager officer for the
00:36:16 assigned as a pager officer for the night working alongside the other control room officers I started work at 8:00 p.m. and it was all very normal for the first few hours Sharon Darby and I had a rest period at around midnight the
00:36:27 had a rest period at around midnight the CRO staff rotate rest periods throughout the shift just picking up a point about pager officer to start with does that mean that you at the start of the shift at least were responsible for ensuring
00:36:38 at least were responsible for ensuring that there were enough correct senior officers president present at the incident yeah that would be my job normally now I'd like to get an idea of
00:36:49 normally now I'd like to get an idea of where it were was you were sitting in the control room on the night if I can ask you please to be shown the NFB control room report which is lfb
00:37:00 control room report which is lfb quadruple zero four seven nine zero and turn pleads to page one seven five
00:37:11 this is a photograph of the Stratford facility and the layout can you point out to us where you were sitting please so I'm to the right of this
00:37:24 please so I'm to the right of this supervisors desks just in that corner in the bank you can't say says that one on the right-hand corner would it be possible for you to sorry oh thank you
00:37:37 possible for you to sorry oh thank you it would be helpful to point it out yeah you're there you can see where the red dot is hovering yes okay who was to your left and right so the right was Pam
00:37:50 left and right so the right was Pam Jones
00:37:50 Jones that's the bank of two positions and Pam was next to me and in this bank that was Christine right at the front of the screen said so the chair we see there on
00:38:02 screen said so the chair we see there on the right at the bottom of the screen is that that's Christine House's chair is it and yeah I think she was sick either that chair or the other chair okay and then the supervisors at the bank I'll fingers it was Debbie real was closest
00:38:14 fingers it was Debbie real was closest to me
00:38:14 to me I think Consuela I think he was doing so you were you were in very close proximity to Christine housen and Pam James Pam Jones I was very close to yes
00:38:27 James Pam Jones I was very close to yes she's next to me hmm but Christine house and looks like actually just opposite yeah just opposite yeah that's it it's quite difficult for us and there's a reason for me asking this who come to you lately it's quite difficult for us
00:38:38 you lately it's quite difficult for us to get a clear idea of the distance between Christine houses chair and your chair and comparing it with where you're sitting and where the Chairman is sitting are you further or nearer so probably where the Chairman sitting
00:38:51 probably where the Chairman sitting right there yeah about the same all right now in his witness statement Pete duddy says that he was working notifications such as when incidents to
00:39:05 notifications such as when incidents to were to go from a six to an eight pump fire and notifying the senior officers and the press officer that's what he says do you remember him doing that role on the night initially no was off in the corner but I'm right how
00:39:19 was off in the corner but I'm right how would your two roles work together um he does the more my role is the operational officers that go into the incident so when the instance are upgraded with the
00:39:30 when the instance are upgraded with the makeups they respond to the paging operator and then it would be my responsibility to book them onto that incident to become status to going on and and give them information that they
00:39:43 and and give them information that they require and then we have a sheet that we were to ensure that you've got the right amount of officers and and also if they've not responded you'd be chasing
00:39:54 they've not responded you'd be chasing them up paging them again or phoning them and saying have you got the order in and see just but that's the for the attendance and then Peters role is more the senior officers above that and
00:40:07 the senior officers above that and notification on that level it's not what the patron of operators okay so he was on the senior officers and you were all yes on the other results yeah my father
00:40:19 yes on the other results yeah my father um in the position you were operating on the night would you be able to or usually take nine nine nine calls as well as being the pager officer yes you would now I think you as you say in your
00:40:33 would now I think you as you say in your statement you started to take nine nine nine calls from grenfell and stand then moved away from your role as pager officer yeah that's just because of the volume like that started lately I think
00:40:45 volume like that started lately I think I spoke to a few officers when they responded but I didn't get complete mushy and check that there was enough officers for the attendants or anything it just it just went mad yeah now I
00:40:59 it just it just went mad yeah now I think we might be able to put a time on that if I can take you back in the same document to which is the control room report to page 12 with a time mark
00:41:14 report to page 12 with a time mark of oh one 21 24 we believe this is the first call you take and it's from a female caller reporting the smell of
00:41:26 female caller reporting the smell of smoke from inside Grenville tower she states that she is from flat 195 on the 22nd floor to the best of your recollection was that the first call you
00:41:37 recollection was that the first call you took from this incident yes and we'll come back to that call later and did you stop your role as pager officer at that point or or before that I was probably
00:41:48 point or or before that I was probably still doing both at that point what so I'm still taking response from senior officers I've just been you know pension on the volume of calls I would have
00:41:59 on the volume of calls I would have prioritize the calls right but then we'll come to that the prioritization shortly but did you then stop your role as pager officer after this call there was not stopping my role it was more
00:42:11 was not stopping my role it was more just combining the choke right if I was afraid to take a page in an officer responding to page you know would if there was you know lots of calls waiting
00:42:23 there was you know lots of calls waiting to be answered then I'd probably answer the call but did they come a point when you did stop acting his pager officer yeah I think that was did somebody take over they must have just whoever was in the room that was free to pick the off
00:42:35 the room that was free to pick the off calls up I mean the where answered but it wasn't always by me right now at the moment you start to take 999 calls we can pin that down to a 120 124 for you
00:42:48 can pin that down to a 120 124 for you miss Adams do you remember what system was generally in place in the control room for handling information over to the incident ground I think it's still at that time it would be service
00:42:59 at that time it would be service requests if you had any further information so you would make yeah and it would go to the right right sir yes I see so we you weren't is
00:43:11 right sir yes I see so we you weren't is this right you weren't using pieces of paper at that stage not at that point okay now we don't we've got something
00:43:22 okay now we don't we've got something called a short incident log but you may be familiar with will come to look at it okay in due course but we don't actually see your initials on the incident log shortens of the log creating service
00:43:34 shortens of the log creating service requests to pass over FSG messages create you don't actually write you don't think that one was like just a duplicate call because she was just saying there was smoke smell smoke and I
00:43:47 saying there was smoke smell smoke and I think I told her that I had a fire on the full floor because she was ringing from this 22nd floor I mean well I just can't comprehend that that's where the
00:43:58 can't comprehend that that's where the fire was okay no well we'll come we'll come back to look at that into you course but do you know what whether you passed this information challenge I did because it said to me that was just a
00:44:10 because it said to me that was just a duplicate all right for the incident what do you say duplicate call what do you mean just to further quarter this call we were attending and we just duplicate it to the original cold how
00:44:23 duplicate it to the original cold how did you know it was a duplicate Court because if the address she gave me right and then you get offered a repeat call by the system it'll say to you get a
00:44:34 by the system it'll say to you get a blue flashing light and then you click on that and it said you want to make this a repeat call the call that you're receiving and then you just repeat it right say yes I do
00:44:45 right say yes I do and then those on the log right I see do you were you aware of passing were you aware prior to this core which you called a duplicate call that the information about flat one-nine-five on
00:44:58 information about flat one-nine-five on the 22nd floor had already been passed at the incident ground I don't know I believe that's the first call then No because if you didn't pass this message
00:45:09 because if you didn't pass this message to the incident ground I didn't is that because you thought it already been passed at the incident ground no it's because I thought there was just another call to the incident and it just it didn't warrant further information being
00:45:23 didn't warrant further information being sent to the ground what was it about the call that you thought warranted not sending information to the incident ground just looking at the summary and just it was just a smell of smoke and
00:45:35 just it was just a smell of smoke and that we were in attendance and we were dealing with the fire on the fourth floor
00:45:40 floor right I see and we don't think there was I don't know if the makeups had started coming in by them just believed that we was dealing with the fire and it was just the remnants of
00:45:52 the fire and it was just the remnants of the smoke going up the building in some way because we've had cause to dust shoots in the past where you know that it goes up on all floors and people you know a report in all the smoke it's actually just the dust shoot chamber
00:46:04 actually just the dust shoot chamber that's on fire right so so you do I take it from that that you didn't think it would be helpful for the incident ground to know about a report to the smell of
00:46:15 to know about a report to the smell of smoke yeah even though was right at the top of the building well they was there they could see what was happening so providing they're in attendance maybe if they wasn't in attendance then
00:46:28 maybe if they wasn't in attendance then I might have considered sent another message you know someone should have received a further call you know smelling smoke but as they was there and dealing with fire it didn't seem relevant on that one so you thought this
00:46:43 relevant on that one so you thought this was this residual smoking
00:46:52 and I'd also say there bring us back if things change right now at this point 1:21 had you heard the makeups of the
00:47:04 1:21 had you heard the makeups of the pumps to that point I can't remember I remember something coming in but I can't remember all the sequence all the times
00:47:16 it's a matter of recollection and impression I think yeah do you know is that does that tell us that you don't remember having any particular impression about how the father's already progressing at this point 1:21
00:47:28 already progressing at this point 1:21 no I can't recall not at that particular time right
00:47:41 so you don't remember that pumps have been made eight by that point No
00:47:50 now the next thing we see in the report if we can please turn to page 22
00:48:04 is at 1:29 38 you take a call from a female requesting fire brigade attendance at labret Grove Lattimore
00:48:16 attendance at labret Grove Lattimore road and and summary goes on CRO Adams confirms that this is to Grenfell tower and explains that the brigade is already
00:48:28 and explains that the brigade is already in attendance the caller asks CRO Adams to send more fire engines and states that the whole of a left side of the building is on fire the caller then corrects herself by stating that the whole of the right side is on fire CRO
00:48:40 whole of the right side is on fire CRO Adams advises that 20 fire engines are coming and the fire service are already in attendance now at that point it looks
00:48:51 in attendance now at that point it looks as if you were aware that the makeup had reached 20 yeah it does um and they also I think as he told us before you were aware that the fire was on the fourth floor yes yes and a Mac it
00:49:05 on the fourth floor yes yes and a Mac it took to be clear that's is that because you had an informative message earlier well because the original call was on the fourth floor okay now so you know
00:49:19 the fourth floor okay now so you know that the been a make up to 20 pumps and
00:49:26 the message at 128 that you were had also got of persons reported you knew that as well I think did you
00:49:37 okay well let's just see if I can see if I can prompt your memory if you go please to the short incident log we'll come back to this perhaps keep this on on the screen and go please to the short
00:49:48 on the screen and go please to the short incident log m ET triple 0 1 3 8 3 0 and turn to page 18 at the very top of the
00:50:00 turn to page 18 at the very top of the page that's a meaty triple 0 1 3 8 3 0 page 18 and miss Adams if I can just ask
00:50:15 page 18 and miss Adams if I can just ask you to look at the very top of the page you can see it 101 2840 Sharon Darby's created a service request persons
00:50:27 created a service request persons reported and then at a 128 47 as a makeup person's reported so you can see that and then at 1:29 15 a service
00:50:40 that and then at 1:29 15 a service request updated persons reported and so it goes on so is it right that by this
00:50:51 it goes on so is it right that by this time you'd heard the makeups and you'd had a call from the public do you think you'd also seen that there was now an official persons reported message coming
00:51:02 official persons reported message coming from the incident ground I honestly can't remember okay looking at all that information in the run was it clear to you by this point 129 38 when you get
00:51:13 you by this point 129 38 when you get this call from a member of the public that the right side of the building the home of the right side of the building is on fire that this was a very seriously spreading fire no longer confined to the 4th floor does seem like
00:51:25 confined to the 4th floor does seem like why yes
00:51:26 why yes do you say it seems that way do you recall it that way yeah I mean and sometimes people exaggerate you know a negative cause so still had nothing
00:51:37 negative cause so still had nothing confirmed so when you're still it's someone's vision of a fire right did don't finished no sorry not seen yet all
00:51:50 don't finished no sorry not seen yet all right
00:51:50 right do you remember whether you communicated this information that you got from this female caller about the whole of the building being on fire to anybody in the control room no cuz I think there was a
00:52:02 control room no cuz I think there was a lot of calls coming in something everyone was taking calls maybe might have been aware but I don't know I didn't pass it on to anyone got it miss
00:52:16 didn't pass it on to anyone got it miss happens we've been going for 50 minutes are you happy to continue for another 10 minutes or would you like a break now No ten minutes is fine yeah okay and then moving from that call we've just
00:52:27 then moving from that call we've just been looking at to a call which you took where somebody was saying they were actually trapped can I ask you to look please at the brigade control report lfb
00:52:41 please at the brigade control report lfb quadruple zero four seven nine zero that we've been looking at and turn please to page 37
00:52:55 and this is a call at 1:38 18 towards the bottom of that page we've expanded it there for you and I'll just show you
00:53:06 it there for you and I'll just show you the summary see REO adams takes a call from a female who is shouting loudly and repeatedly stating that she is on the 14th floor in flat 1 1 5 she shouts that
00:53:18 14th floor in flat 1 1 5 she shouts that the fire is coming into the building and asks how she can get downstairs cre adams confirms that the caller is in Grenville tower and frequently asks what flat the caller is into which the caller responds 14 the caller shouts that she's
00:53:31 responds 14 the caller shouts that she's going to die and CRO Adams informs her that she will get crews to her CRA Adams then manages to confirm that the smoke is coming in under the door and windows and advises the caller to block the door and shut the windows the caller is very
00:53:43 and shut the windows the caller is very distressed and says that there's fire coming through the door and states that she feels like jumping a smoke alarm is audible in the background and it's a four minute twenty second call and first
00:53:56 four minute twenty second call and first do you have an independent recollection of this call I do you remember yes do
00:54:03 now I'm going to show you the transcript of this call just to pick up one or two very particular points from it if I can is that okay that it this is the transcript is l FB 3 zeroes 3 2 1
00:54:28 and you can see that it starts at oh one 3818 by looking at the second group of numbers in the blue line second from the right that's oh one three eight one
00:54:39 right that's oh one three eight one eight so that's what we get the time from oh one 5818 miss Adams and if you can game please in the call to page two first of all and we can see there that
00:54:51 first of all and we can see there that she's the caller is in the middle of the page saying 1414 how can I get out of here and I'm on the 14th floor tell me what flat you are 14 14 14
00:55:04 what flat you are 14 14 14 I'm sorry 14 or 13 yes 14 14 that goes on like that and then it paid five we can see that she tells you just below
00:55:16 can see that she tells you just below halfway down the page I have a child I have a child I have a child help me you see that and then and then at pages 6 and 7 the bottom of page 6 she tells you
00:55:30 and 7 the bottom of page 6 she tells you there's a fire coming and the top of page 7 you go to page 7 the caller says there's fire there's fire coming from the door inaudible I feel like jumping I
00:55:42 the door inaudible I feel like jumping I feel like jumping can anybody come now Shane you a lot of that do you remember taking down these details or recording
00:55:53 taking down these details or recording them in some way while you were hearing them from the caller only on the format that we have come up to record the initial : umm yeah just on there I don't
00:56:08 initial : umm yeah just on there I don't think I recorded it anywhere else can you just explain for us what that format is that comes up so when a call comes in it automatically generates call collection form and you type the address
00:56:20 collection form and you type the address in and the details of the call on there and
00:56:24 and I yeah we'll just take it on that phone right and what would have to say you tiny in details would you yeah well the flat 14 gram flour tower right that's the flat number you
00:56:37 right that's the flat number you understood is it yeah I think I got that wrong
00:56:40 wrong I think she was saying something different at the beginning of the call but she was I remember she was really screaming it's very hard to understand what she was telling me um and I think
00:56:54 what she was telling me um and I think she misunderstood me when I'm asking her a flat number because she's saying 14 I think that was the floor she yes we could see you pressing for the we terms
00:57:06 could see you pressing for the we terms of recording the details she was giving you so far in the flat or coming through the door the fact that you had a child do they were those details details that you recorded I don't where I mean if you
00:57:21 you recorded I don't where I mean if you did record them how would you go about recording them was this on the I would done it on the original call and maybe I can't remember stage we were at where he's writing stuff down or kiss he was
00:57:32 he's writing stuff down or kiss he was just going mental so I can't I can't honestly remember whether I wrote that one day or not if you typed it into your system on just the core collection form what would then
00:57:43 the core collection form what would then happen to that information it would just get logged on to the a duplicate column not repeat call on the system would the radio operator then see that no they wouldn't say that I'd have to do a
00:57:54 wouldn't say that I'd have to do a service request which I know I didn't do because I don't think I did any so but I'm not sure I think I tried to establish somewhere if we had flat 14 because I've got the impression she may
00:58:05 because I've got the impression she may have called already for summaries why I say you didn't do a service request do you know why you didn't do a service request um no not at that point I don't I think I was just trying to establish what was going on in the room
00:58:17 establish what was going on in the room because it was just so much happening and it was just horrendous so do you remember whether you passed these specific details about this caller to
00:58:28 specific details about this caller to Alex Norman or somebody else in the control room remember I think I have said if we've got flat 14 but I only I honestly can't remember if you look on
00:58:40 honestly can't remember if you look on in the control room report to page 52 that's at FB quadruple zero four seven nine zero at page 52 you can see that
00:58:51 nine zero at page 52 you can see that over 150 49 you make a call on a landline to the mobile phone allocated to command unit 8 in order to pass on FSG calls yes and then I'll just look to
00:59:04 FSG calls yes and then I'll just look to show you the two you pass on flat 133 and flat 182 it is there a reason why you didn't pass on the information that you were getting from this call the what
00:59:16 you were getting from this call the what you think was before 13 I just got the impression that we had it already and that it's already been passed but I just I can't remember specifically right let
00:59:28 I can't remember specifically right let me just one more question before the break if I can to see if I can follow that up if you go back two pages please in this same document to page 50 at 147
00:59:39 in this same document to page 50 at 147 44 you can see that Alex Norman om Norman rings command unit 8 and passes over a request for the flats below to be checked we can see that in that box
00:59:55 checked we can see that in that box there that there is a third item down floor number 14 but no flat number and the remarks in the call om Norman says she doesn't know the flat number because
01:00:07 she doesn't know the flat number because the call had disappeared does that help with your recollection I don't know if that's
01:00:11 that's I call or not I don't you don't know okay right mr. chairman is that's a convenient moment in the questions for a break is that convenient to UM to them
01:00:23 break is that convenient to UM to them to the witness it is good well I have a short break now please don't talk to anyone about your evidence what you're out of the room and we'd resume at ten parceling if you'd like to give her the
01:00:35 parceling if you'd like to give her the oh sure sure
01:00:50 in ten past eleven please
01:12:44 all right carry on yes very good thank you yes mister miss Adams thank you very much for coming back to us can I just get back to a call we looked at earlier
01:12:55 get back to a call we looked at earlier this morning which you'd taken from a member of the public outside the building yes who told you that the whole of the left side and then in fact the whole of the right side of the building was on fire just to refocus the document
01:13:08 was on fire just to refocus the document it's LF it's the control room report lfb quadruple zero four seven nine zero page 22 this is at 129 38 my question and
01:13:20 22 this is at 129 38 my question and we'll wait for it to come back there it is on the screen three entries up from the bottom but my question about that is when the caller said to you that the whole of the left side then the whole of
01:13:32 whole of the left side then the whole of the right side is on fire did you actually think that she was exaggerating or or did you think she was being serious it's hard to say now one thought
01:13:44 serious it's hard to say now one thought at the time and it could be I mean we've had scaffolding up buildings before and it's going up hold the side of the building so it could be all sorts of reasons I didn't imagine that it really
01:13:57 reasons I didn't imagine that it really was the whole building that was a lie I think at that time but I can't say what I was thinking at that time I'm getting the impression from what you said that
01:14:09 the impression from what you said that actually you treated what you were being told with a dose of skepticism you know you were Sneden only what she was saying but and also that there were so many calls probably coming in started coming
01:14:21 calls probably coming in started coming in and we were on the same dealing with it so you know there wasn't much I could do with that information I didn't that I thought would assist in any way sort of
01:14:32 thought would assist in any way sort of them telling them on the ground because they're there hmm what I'm really trying to get at is that when you get this call and I told the whole side of the building left all right
01:14:41 right doesn't matter is on the flower combined with a number of calls that you've been seeing coming in my question really is what why did you treat that with skepticism or some degree of skepticism
01:14:52 skepticism or some degree of skepticism why didn't you take it at face value I don't uh it's hard to say now but yeah by that time you're thinking what the hell is going on there right you know I
01:15:03 hell is going on there right you know I mean we were all sort of thinking what's happening no well sitting there the wildered that all these calls coming in they willed it okay now moving forward
01:15:17 they willed it okay now moving forward then in the timeline can I ask you to move forward also in this document to page 48 to 49 bottom of 48 top of page 49 this is a call at 146 18 you take
01:15:31 49 this is a call at 146 18 you take from the MPs control room about a quarter in flat 133 on the 16th floor and you can just see what we would have said there the MPs CRO asks if there's
01:15:45 said there the MPs CRO asks if there's any advice they can give callers and it explains that she has a caller that stuck on the 16th floor he was very distressed the MPS operator asks if she can set up a conference call between the individual and CRO Adams CRO Adams
01:15:57 individual and CRO Adams CRO Adams agrees and provides advice about blocking doors and closing windows she asks what flat the caller is in and he replies that he is in flat 1 3 3 CRO Adams tells the caller to call back if
01:16:08 Adams tells the caller to call back if it gets worse and the MPs take the call back releasing CRA items from the call 2 minutes 31 seconds now just focusing on a point deep some points of detail there do your acid in the call to set set up a
01:16:20 do your acid in the call to set set up a conference call is that something that you've done before never right did you do you know what they wanted you to do but just presumably to talk to the caller yeah I was surprised it is that
01:16:35 caller yeah I was surprised it is that what you expected the police to do police control room to do if they receive call from people trapped in the building no never seen it before right had dealings with that before right I
01:16:47 had dealings with that before right I don't even know it was possible right but you did manage to speak to the caller yeah I did yeah yeah I'm just going to show you the transcript and ask you one or two questions about it because which we don't get from from
01:16:59 because which we don't get from from this summary it's the l FB five zeros three to six and we can see the time of
01:17:11 three to six and we can see the time of the call second group of numbers from the right in blue Oh 146 81 46:18 and it starts on page two hello Fire Brigade caller 1 hi the fire brigade it's the
01:17:23 caller 1 hi the fire brigade it's the met police here and it goes on regarding your fire that you've got on the Grenfell tower at the moment I've got someone stuck on the kitchen floor we've got nothing on your camp query as
01:17:36 we've got nothing on your camp query as to what advice to give people is there anything that you're giving because inaudible stressing out like mad inaudible and then you talk about get being on the phone and mediating a teleconference call then you say yeah no
01:17:48 teleconference call then you say yeah no problem so clearly it wasn't a problem even if you hadn't come across it before but I'm just interested in what you what's being said to you by the caller at the beginning of the call the Metropolitan Police caller in that part
01:18:01 Metropolitan Police caller in that part I just read out when he or she said we've got nothing on your camp as to what advice to give people did you know what they meant no I presume they don't
01:18:12 what they meant no I presume they don't have fire survivor guidance information I don't know what camp is no I didn't quite hear it and I can't see on the transcript what you just said could you
01:18:24 transcript what you just said could you repeat your answer please um I don't know what camp means I presume it's they've got no guidance on FSG calls because right right did did
01:18:36 FSG calls because right right did did you expect the Metropolitan Police to know what to advise callers who say they're trapped no right why would they they're a different service why would they they're a different service um did
01:18:50 they they're a different service um did you tell any of your supervisors that you had taken a call from the Metropole police I think everyone was too busy to
01:19:01 police I think everyone was too busy to pass individual calls information okay did it did it did it occur to you as him as important at the time that the Metropolitan Police were taking 9 i9 calls from people trapped in the
01:19:13 calls from people trapped in the building but didn't know what advice to give them no not at the time cuz I didn't know where our calls were going to this so this map in a one-off right
01:19:25 to this so this map in a one-off right presume there was pinging everywhere cuz we couldn't cope them all so did it did you have any thoughts about whether it would have helped Alex Norman or Debbie
01:19:37 would have helped Alex Norman or Debbie rail to know that other emergency services were taking calls from people stuck in the building and didn't have the right advice to hand to give them or didn't know what they've already been
01:19:48 didn't know what they've already been aware of that I mean I don't know you didn't
01:19:56 and just to close this off this Colin if you go to your statement you see at the
01:20:09 you go to your statement you see at the top of page before if we can go to that
01:20:18 that you say that you took a call from a man on the 20th floor who was saying that there was smoke coming into his flat this was shortly after the initial call and I don't think it was a fire survival guidance call I told him that
01:20:31 survival guidance call I told him that he would be okay because the fire was on the fourth floor at that point I hadn't received any new information or update so assumed that it was that was still the case and thought how could he be affected on the 20th floor
01:20:43 affected on the 20th floor I gave him advice to put towels under the doors and try to get some fresh air to help prevent the smoke from coming in before the call ended the first survival guidance calls then began to come in which all are CR OS were dealing with
01:20:55 which all are CR OS were dealing with and I just want to see if we can pin down that call and link that link the the points of information I don't think you did actually take a call from a man
01:21:07 you did actually take a call from a man on the 20th floor at any point in the night I think that was the lady that called I think that was the original cold I was referring to and I've ugly right remember it correctly you think
01:21:19 right remember it correctly you think that was the original cause I think so I see okay because I'm just going to ask you whether it might be this call where
01:21:32 you whether it might be this call where you you give him advice to try and block up the smoke and stay where you are and tell him that you're dealing with a fire on the fourth floor but that's not this call you don't think is that right so
01:21:47 call you don't think is that right so long ago I did the statement I can't even look or call I was referring to it may possibly put in that first call okay and I've got a young that's one yeah okay now staying with this call and
01:22:00 okay now staying with this call and looking if we can go back to the transcript please lfb five zeros three to six
01:22:09 at the bottom of the second page page to
01:22:15 you speaking to the operator and the operator is you and caller one is the Met control room and three-quarters of
01:22:30 Met control room and three-quarters of the way down the page caller one that's the Met control room says all right lovely bear with me two seconds I'm just going to pop inaudible now I know your phone's probably crazy inaudible and you
01:22:41 phone's probably crazy inaudible and you say oh it's manic there's so many people stuck in their flats and then you get put on to the caller at the top of page three and you give advice and then at
01:22:54 three and you give advice and then at the top of page four you can just be shown that please you say okay if it gets worse ring us back but just try and
01:23:05 gets worse ring us back but just try and stop the smoke coming in and just stay where you are for now but we are dealing with a fire on the fourth floor and then the cone end caller two which is the caller in the flat on the fourth floor okay and then you say yeah on the fourth
01:23:17 okay and then you say yeah on the fourth floor so just try and keep your windows closed to put something against the bottom of the door to stop the smoke coming in and if it gets worse down nine nine nine and ask for the fire brigade I just want to ask you about why you were
01:23:28 just want to ask you about why you were saying that the fire was on the fourth floor and at this at this stage just summarizing the information and that when I say at this stage I mean at the time of this call which was at over 146
01:23:39 time of this call which was at over 146 and you'd already be told the built that building was on fire all the way up one side by a corner outside you'd had the woman on the 14th floor at 1:38 saying
01:23:51 woman on the 14th floor at 1:38 saying that she had fire through her front door at this point did you realize that the fire had gone climbed above the fourth floor well by this point I think we knew
01:24:04 floor well by this point I think we knew it was it was not contained on the fourth floor so that's probably the wrong information to give this caller but I'm just probably saying where the original fire started yes but without
01:24:15 original fire started yes but without having any other information as to where the fire was other than what you just said it was just yeah and also at that time we're
01:24:27 just yeah and also at that time we're still was anticipating that the firefights was gonna get to them you know we're just advising people to stay where they are and we'll go go to them yeah and we could see what you say that
01:24:40 yeah and we could see what you say that you're telling the caller that the fire was on the fourth floor my question really is what why were you giving the call of that information when you had other information which would suggest that the fire had spread significantly
01:24:51 that the fire had spread significantly above the fourth floor I can't say I said that at the time all right just maybe that's what I definitely know at that time I didn't I didn't wear no clarification at that point as to where
01:25:03 clarification at that point as to where the actual fire was threatened to of and then what's coming in from the callers but nothing specific from the ground itself yeah now we couldn't see from
01:25:15 itself yeah now we couldn't see from this transcript that you didn't explore with the caller whether the caller and his wife could leave their flat and exit the building do you think that's something that you could have done it's
01:25:28 something that you could have done it's difficult to say because you wouldn't want to advise people especially if they smoke outside to go out into the smoke and also we still didn't at that point have information as to quite what was
01:25:41 have information as to quite what was going on in that building so and it's not and it's high-rise you're usually safe in your flat but can I just go I'm
01:25:53 safe in your flat but can I just go I'm so sorry I keep I keep cutting across you I'm sorry okay can I ask you to look at page three okay over this transcript at the beginning of your conversation
01:26:04 at the beginning of your conversation with the caller he tells you in the first third of the page you ask him okay
01:26:15 first third of the page you ask him okay then where's the smoke coming from under the door the front door caller says under the door the front door now at that stage to your way of thinking was
01:26:26 that stage to your way of thinking was the caller affected by smoke only that it's coming under the door so he wants to protect himself from that smoke and try and stop it coming in so
01:26:39 smoke and try and stop it coming in so yeah but without hearing all the coal and everything it's hard to say from this transcript what I was thinking is
01:26:50 this transcript what I was thinking is is there a reason why having been told that the smoke was coming into the flat under the front door you didn't then explore with him whether he could get out which was the next thing that happens if you're affected by fast Matt
01:27:03 happens if you're affected by fast Matt fire or smoke you maybe because he's in a high-rise I'm thinking there's only gonna be one door right I see so is that an assumption that you made probably yeah so you didn't think
01:27:16 made probably yeah so you didn't think there was a point in exploring the exit route because it was a high-rise maybe I can't really say at this point but that may have been a reason right but I don't
01:27:27 may have been a reason right but I don't want to put ideas in your own words in your mouth but I'm just trying to get a feel for you didn't explore with the caller why yep there wasn't a safe exit route well I can't imagine they'd have a
01:27:39 route well I can't imagine they'd have a back door on the 38th floor it would only be a front door that they'd be gain access to so you're probably thinking on that lines
01:27:53 did you think he was trapped at this stage not necessarily I think just the
01:28:06 stage not necessarily I think just the smoke was coming in and he needed to protect himself from the smoke if you didn't necessarily think he was trapped and the question again I have to ask is
01:28:17 and the question again I have to ask is what if he wasn't necessarily trapped why didn't you explore with him whether there was a safe exit route I don't know
01:28:26 now we can I think move on from that transcript and go to the control room report page 52 and go please to the call
01:28:45 report page 52 and go please to the call you made at 150 49 if we can see on that page which we looked at earlier on this
01:28:56 page which we looked at earlier on this morning miss Adams you make a call it said on a landline to the mobile phone allocated to command unit 8 in order to
01:29:07 allocated to command unit 8 in order to pass on FSG calls do you remember that yeah you do can you tell us why you decided to pass
01:29:18 can you tell us why you decided to pass the information on in this way in other words on an admin line call I remember so Alex been on the phone to them and so
01:29:31 so Alex been on the phone to them and so and I think she was passing five survivor guidance calls and I called across and at that point she put the phone down so because I said to our Lakes I've got couple more and she put
01:29:43 Lakes I've got couple more and she put the phone down said I'll dump my ring them back and so I found him and I think it was Michael and pan who was next to me I think was on a really long call at that time and I just
01:29:56 that time and I just yes seemed the quickest way of getting the information to the fire ground because the radio was obviously really busy and it's and we was passing I think
01:30:07 busy and it's and we was passing I think I believe he was passed in FSG caused by landline by that time says the answer my questions that you volunteered to do this because you knew that yeah just use
01:30:18 this because you knew that yeah just use my initiative yet okay now in your statement if we can listen look quickly at that back to page four you say that
01:30:36 at that back to page four you say that in the third paragraph
01:30:41 three lines up from the bottom I did ring the command unit at the scene to pass on details of the flats in trouble based on the calls that I'd taken normally they are informed by message
01:30:52 normally they are informed by message but a call was easier and quicker in the circumstances at that stage did you have any concern about radio messages that
01:31:03 any concern about radio messages that Sharon Davi was sending not getting through to the command unit not concerned I know in the past it's not always easy to contact the fire ground and pass information to him and it's
01:31:16 and pass information to him and it's easier to do it via a phone conversation than on the radio and obviously Sharon was so busy and I just remember Alex was passing them anyway by phone so it just
01:31:29 passing them anyway by phone so it just seemed a quicker way of doing it what was Alex using the admin landline I believe so yeah she's okay now gang back
01:31:40 believe so yeah she's okay now gang back if we can to the control report at that page we can see that you pass a message about floor 16 flat 133 smoke coming in
01:31:53 about floor 16 flat 133 smoke coming in I'm so sorry we get back to page 52 which I think we're still on actually but if we can have the box underneath this text as well if you highlight the
01:32:04 this text as well if you highlight the whole thing thank you we can see that on this call you pass over to command unit a flat 133 floor 16 is that the call which we've just been looking at I
01:32:15 which we've just been looking at I believe so yeah yes smoke coming in
01:32:21 we can also see that you pass over a message about flat 182 on the 21st floor cannot stop smoke coming through front door so have gone into living room now
01:32:33 door so have gone into living room now if we one can do this and look back in the report and didn't necessarily need to but that's at page 38 it's a call Pam Jones starts at one thirty eight thirty eight and she's sitting next to you yeah
01:32:46 eight and she's sitting next to you yeah did she ask you did she give you this information to pass over to see you eight about I understand when I find them I said because she was sitting next to me
01:32:56 to me yes and I asked I said Pam what's your details and she gave me the information to pass okay and she was obviously on a long call it's obviously a difficult call right she's on there so long so I
01:33:09 call right she's on there so long so I see do you know whether Alex Norman in making earlier admin line calls to speak to the command unit had asked control
01:33:20 to the command unit had asked control room officers for details sorry if she dust control room officers for details don't you don't know where she was
01:33:31 don't you don't know where she was getting details to pass to the command unit from like like you're doing here he she probably did um but I didn't hear her I mean she probably sees okay got information and at the moment when you
01:33:46 information and at the moment when you passed this message about flat 182 to see you eight do you remember where the Pam James was still on the phone yes she was I think it was a long column did
01:33:57 was I think it was a long column did now when you made this call did you know as you perhaps you don't did you know that Alex Norman that had also been on the phone to see you ate a few minutes earlier one forty seven forty four to be
01:34:09 earlier one forty seven forty four to be precise well I believe that was the call that she was when she was talking to him that I wanted to add my flat numbers why and then she as I say she just put the
01:34:20 and then she as I say she just put the phone down so that's when I decided to find must I said don't worry I'll ring them perhaps we could just just identify that for the sake of completeness if you can be asked please to go back to page
01:34:31 can be asked please to go back to page 50 of this same document and look at the call oh one 47:44 that Alex Norman makes to see you eight we looked at this earlier this
01:34:42 you eight we looked at this earlier this morning we can see there the list of flats is that the call you're talking about I think so right yeah I think it
01:34:54 about I think so right yeah I think it was I see now I want to go back to the call we're that you do 150 49 so page 52 of this report has come back to it and
01:35:07 of this report has come back to it and I'd like to show you the transcript for that call as well and please it's inq five zeroes to 0-3 do you say you see on
01:35:24 five zeroes to 0-3 do you say you see on the first page of that at the time of this call is Oh 150 49 we can get that from the second group of numbers from the left this time you can see that there so we've got a time mark for that
01:35:36 there so we've got a time mark for that Oh 150 49 and if you go to page one sorry page two the first page of the of the actual script operator I'm ringing
01:35:48 the actual script operator I'm ringing the command unit 182 do you know what floor that's on and then cu8 says charlie innovate and you say hi it's control again just picking up that very
01:35:59 control again just picking up that very first line in that transcript you say I'm ringing the command unit 182 query do you know what floor that's on who are you speaking to do you think I probably Pam yes and then Charlie uniform 8 comes
01:36:14 Pam yes and then Charlie uniform 8 comes on
01:36:15 on hi it's control again hello and you can you then say okay we've got a couple more go again it's flat 133 16th floor and 1/8 to 21st so you cover that
01:36:26 and 1/8 to 21st so you cover that information there and then if I can ask you to go to page three of the transcript the next page
01:36:36 you say a third of the way down the page sorry I'm just listening to my colleague
01:36:47 sorry I'm just listening to my colleague the one on the 21st floor they can't stop the smoke coming in the front door so they've gone into the living room now just pausing there is that also information coming from Pam Jones who's sitting next to you yes right and then
01:37:02 sitting next to you yes right and then CUA says he's at the 21st or 23rd and you say the 21st floor cu8 says right so is that your priority at the moment 21st now I just want to ask you about what
01:37:14 now I just want to ask you about what you understood by that what did you think
01:37:18 think see you ain't meant by is that your priority presumably they're prioritizing the calls on the ground you say presumably did you think at the time
01:37:29 presumably did you think at the time that that is what they were doing on the ground maybe I can't say what I remember from that there it looks like and
01:37:40 from that there it looks like and they're asking its prioritize calls like did you take from that that cu8 was expecting the control room to prioritize incoming FSG calls and tell them what
01:37:51 incoming FSG calls and tell them what the priority was no I think it's probably their decision on the ground is to the information we passed them as to how they prioritize the calls going on
01:38:05 how they prioritize the calls going on the operator says to be honest that's you my caller wasn't too bad in 133 but I think the one in at 182 sounds a bit panicked she's still on the phone to them I think the she we've established
01:38:16 them I think the she we've established with Pam James right but the smoke seems heaviest on in on flat on floor 21 that operated that's the caller we've got at the moment just a couple of points from
01:38:29 the moment just a couple of points from that
01:38:32 you're giving him a comparison between flat 133 and flat 182 was your understanding that CUA wanted a prioritization only as between those two
01:38:43 prioritization only as between those two flats or more generally I think more generally but I can't say okay exactly and then continuing at the bottom of page three cu8 says okay all right thank
01:38:57 page three cu8 says okay all right thank you very much and then you say at the top of page four they're just coming on every floor so what she's saying what do you need us to do it looks like you're talking to two people in that sentence
01:39:10 talking to two people in that sentence they're just coming on every floor is intended to see you eight and so what she's saying is that being asked are you asking that question of Pam Jones okay
01:39:23 asking that question of Pam Jones okay and then cu8 says we need to know the area or priority so because we've got so many it would be nice to have an idea of priority operate and maybe prioritize a little bit yeah yeah so ask them what
01:39:35 little bit yeah yeah so ask them what smoked longing is like how heavy the smoke is can you explain to us did you understand at that stage that
01:39:47 did you understand at that stage that you are being asked to prioritize callers on the basis of smoke density he asked he asked me that question but then I'm thinking that they're all a priority there was just so many coming in and I
01:39:59 there was just so many coming in and I thought what do you do how do you deal with it yes so and we were taking information I mean the operators were all had you know if you looked at our
01:40:11 all had you know if you looked at our whiteboard you can see it was taken in number people disabled children so we were taking information anyway and so yeah and I can remember thinking oh my
01:40:24 yeah and I can remember thinking oh my god they're all a priority there's just so many of them so what do you do yeah we're just looking at this call he he
01:40:36 we're just looking at this call he he and cu8 is asking you to attempt some kind of prioritization based on smoke density yeah is that what you understood him to be asking you I did yeah and and I can remember looking around the room I
01:40:48 I can remember looking around the room I think I'll try and tell people but it was just to impart that information we thought what was going on was so difficult I just got back to call taking okay having been asked to prioritize on
01:41:02 okay having been asked to prioritize on the basis with smoke density did you tell any of the supervising officers in the control room that that is what cu8 had asked oh I don't think so I think that was all on the phone that was all doing stuff it was just did you think to
01:41:16 doing stuff it was just did you think to tell cu8 that his request to prioritize on the basis of smoke density was unrealistic in the circumstances you were now facing no no I didn't I just
01:41:28 were now facing no no I didn't I just said yes I wasn't but then right it was so difficult is it was there a risk that cu8 had been left with the impression that that was what you were going to do hopefully not that as I say there was so
01:41:41 hopefully not that as I say there was so many calls and he was passed in so many calls I was dealing with their prioritization at their end in their own way
01:41:52 and I think you told us earlier that you actually never received any training and how to go about a control room prioritization is that that's right yeah I think it's more the ground that their
01:42:06 I think it's more the ground that their prioritize the calls on we can only give them the information we don't know what's happening at their end now moving ahead the next call we see is from you
01:42:17 ahead the next call we see is from you at 2 o'clock and 34 seconds can we move in the control room report please RAF to page 61 and this is a quarter of the way
01:42:32 page 61 and this is a quarter of the way down that page Oh two zero zero 34 crl Adams phones come on unit 8 on the team leader mobile number to pass information about calls that have been received which are summarized in the table below
01:42:44 which are summarized in the table below the command unit operator summarizes by suggesting the floors 21 to 23 are the most affected and CRA Adams agrees that they seem to be the most worrying now look at the transcript I think in a
01:42:56 look at the transcript I think in a moment you can just to pick up the precise floor numbers that we can see there yeah 180 to 200 190 to 165 and 194 and some
01:43:08 180 to 200 190 to 165 and 194 and some details next phase if I can ask you please to go to the transcript it's inq five zeros one nine five
01:43:23 and against to pick up the time mark of it page1
01:43:29 it page1 second group of numbers from the left you can see Oh two double zero 34 so 34 seconds past the hour and if you go please first to page 2 you can see that
01:43:43 please first to page 2 you can see that the conversation starts
01:43:47 Charlie uniform 8 go ahead yeah the one we were reported in flat 182 sorry can you repeat that yeah flat 182 on the 21st on the 21st flat 182 and then you say yeah they're saying that the fires
01:44:00 say yeah they're saying that the fires next door to them and the smoke is just pouring in well fine we'll just find out how many's in there how many is there Pam three children to adults that's clearly Pam James it is yes yes and she
01:44:12 clearly Pam James it is yes yes and she was still on this call she started I think at 138 to flat 182 the the the that's the first one you cover and then you go on to the top of
01:44:25 cover and then you go on to the top of page three after the command unit officer says yeah go on you say one in flat 201 on the 23rd floor and and it
01:44:38 flat 201 on the 23rd floor and and it continues down the page and there's some more details about that you can see who's in there 11 and then at the bottom of page three you say flat 92 on the 12th floor and then it continues on to the next page at
01:44:52 then it continues on to the next page at the bottom twenty-second four one nine four and you can see that there we could pause that for purposes of my question were with these calls that you were
01:45:03 were with these calls that you were telling cu8 about 95 194 calls that you had taken no did you have a list in front of you or some other I base information because I already rung them
01:45:16 information because I already rung them on the previous one about the two calls that me and Pam will take and it all the supervisor was so busy I thought it might be like an idea for me
01:45:27 thought it might be like an idea for me to go around the room and take the flat numbers so again I just used my initiative so I went ran to each operator asked him their flat number and details they could pass and then I just
01:45:38 details they could pass and then I just run the command unit again I see so you it's sure you went around the room he told you you write it down again about your desk come and join and you said was off your
01:45:49 come and join and you said was off your own initiative it was yet right it was Alex Norman or Debbie rail aware that you were passing problems on that in their way there's so bogged down with stuff that was doing so it just seemed
01:46:02 stuff that was doing so it just seemed to be most expedient way of getting the calls to the ground yeah so not just use my own initiative I wasn't told to ditch Erin Darby know that that's what you were doing probably
01:46:13 that that's what you were doing probably not no I mean she may have heard me going around speaking to people but I wouldn't a thought sir right now was there a did you know that there was the
01:46:25 there a did you know that there was the possibility of duplication probably but it's best traffic twice than not at all okay I'm just gonna take pick one example and just cover that with you flat 201 it is a flat that you are
01:46:41 flat 201 it is a flat that you are giving co8 information about and we've seen that on page three the transcript we just flip back to that you can see it page 3 of this transcript
01:46:56 you can see at the top of the page flat 201 on the 23rd floor you know I suppose you remember who you got that flat number from in the control room and
01:47:12 flat number from in the control room and you passed this over on this call but if we look back to page 58 of the control room report 58 that's lfp quadruple zero four seven nine zero you can see there
01:47:26 four seven nine zero you can see there that under the time mark of oh one 5905 command unit eight reply to radio operator Applegate control go ahead over
01:47:37 operator Applegate control go ahead over radio operator that's Sharon Darby at Brigade control then send information about flat 201 Charlie afore made a further call we have eleven persons and a baby trapped in flat 201 most likely
01:47:49 a baby trapped in flat 201 most likely or one that's 11 persons and a baby over so looks as if the information that you are sending at just after 2 a.m. by admin line call to see you 8 duplicated
01:48:02 admin line call to see you 8 duplicated this radio message yes it does yeah did you alert Sharon Darby well first of all did you know that Sean Darby had already passed this message over by radio - no does it follow then that you
01:48:19 radio - no does it follow then that you didn't say - Sharon I've done it again or a duplicated it no no ok with were these calls that you were sending and I haven't shown you the hold of the
01:48:30 haven't shown you the hold of the transcript there are others but we could see the numbers and flats from the control room report that you did were saver were you sending them as a priority to see you ate or were these all the information that you had at that point that was just the information I
01:48:42 point that was just the information I had at the time and it was prior to Jason Oh lived there station manager arriving in control and he took over the role
01:48:54 get going to the I want to have the transcript of this call and page 61 of the control report up at the same time please for the purposes of my next
01:49:05 please for the purposes of my next question the transcript page 3
01:49:25 and you you can see that it the transcripts Patriots inq five zeros 1 9 5 page 3 if
01:49:40 Patriots inq five zeros 1 9 5 page 3 if you have both at the same time
01:49:51 you consider for 201 on page three you've get you get the number of persons and their location in the flat in the bedroom but you don't say anything about
01:50:05 about the smoke conditions in there and indeed if we look at the summary on page 60 on the left-hand side of the screen there's nothing in there about snow conditions but my question is is there
01:50:17 conditions but my question is is there any reason why you didn't but first of all did you have any information about that flap so far as smoke conditions were concerned if it doesn't say it then
01:50:28 were concerned if it doesn't say it then I probably didn't but I was speaking to operators as they were still on the line so that was passing me they're trying to tell me so I quickly jotting it down and
01:50:40 tell me so I quickly jotting it down and said on the call to the caller it is so yes is there a reason why you didn't ask that controller and officer giving you the information about flat 201 what the
01:50:51 the information about flat 201 what the smoke conditions were like in the flat you know just literally them trying to speak to me and I'm quickly writing it down as they're on the call and just again just to get the information over
01:51:02 again just to get the information over to the ground as quick as possible right
01:51:12 and if you look at the information on page 60 of the control-room report for flat 181 65 that you pass over
01:51:38 perhaps it's better to do this off the transcript at the same time you say on page four of the transcript you can just flip forward one page in it 165 is
01:51:52 flip forward one page in it 165 is something you pick up a third of the way down I think they're the most whirring and flat 165 on the 19th sorry can you repeat that yeah flat 165 on the 19th floor and we've got two adults flat 165 query yeah flat one
01:52:06 two adults flat 165 query yeah flat one six one six five and two adults and a baby but they're not too bad at the moment and that information goes across it's also summarized in the in the control-room report when you say there
01:52:21 control-room report when you say there to see you ate they're not too bad at the moment was that your own assessment of the situation or is that something that you were told by the control room officer you got this information from
01:52:32 officer you got this information from his must have been from the control operator because I wouldn't have said that if if I didn't have that
01:52:43 that if if I didn't have that information right
01:52:49 now just a little bit further up the page let's see you see you eight says I'm getting the impression this is a quarter of the way down I'm getting the impression its flaws 21 and 23 between
01:53:00 impression its flaws 21 and 23 between 21 and 23 are the most severe and you agree with him you say yeah I think that they're the most worrying just on that
01:53:12 they're the most worrying just on that at that point given that what you had learnt about smoke and fire affecting the floors at the top of the building did you think about the statement advice
01:53:24 did you think about the statement advice that you were giving to other callers no not really all still just passing the information and we hadn't it again at that point probably hadn't had the
01:53:35 that point probably hadn't had the information to tell him to get out so right given the clear difficulties with those high floors did you that it did he
01:53:46 those high floors did you that it did he think to have a discussion with cu8 about whether a cruise could actually get up to those floors at that point - alive is there a reason why not I think was just more concentrating on past in
01:53:57 was just more concentrating on past in the flats and leaving it up to them as to what who they went and what their prioritization was at therein right did you did you think to ask cu8 well what's
01:54:08 you did you think to ask cu8 well what's happening at the building so that we can work out what advice to give callers in those Heights not at that time it was passed it's quick quick as possible right and then answer calls because I
01:54:20 right and then answer calls because I was still call shaking as well and you then go on at the end of the call of page five if we can look at the transcript and we cover one nine four
01:54:32 transcript and we cover one nine four just Taney dissing pensioner with heavy smoke their floor 22 and then two-thirds of the way down the page you say yeah I think our view ringing you again in a
01:54:44 think our view ringing you again in a minute that I think we're up to date at the moment yeah no problem alright Cheers
01:54:47 Cheers but it's not sounding good now up-to-date in a minute
01:54:54 why did you think that you were up-to-date well let me ask it this way sorry what did you think you were up-to-date at that moment at that moment in time I thought I passed all there was
01:55:05 in time I thought I passed all there was to pass okay what made you think that just I don't know I've just gone around the room and that's all I assumed at the time no one was telling me anything
01:55:16 time no one was telling me anything different okay and and by telling him I think I'll be bringing you again in a minute
01:55:22 minute was that because you were expecting to gather more information from the control room and pass it on yeah just more flats Realty project did you intend after this cool to get up and go around again and I
01:55:34 cool to get up and go around again and I probably would eternally kiss them as I say the supervisors were inundated and I'd already started doing this so I thought carry on but then I think station manager come in and he took over
01:55:46 station manager come in and he took over that role right I thought probably would have gone round again but depending on the work I was doing at the time no you said a minute ago that you thought the
01:55:57 said a minute ago that you thought the station manager came in and took over that role and this point was just after 2 a.m.
01:56:04 2 a.m. had the person you're referring to you could recall a station manager had he come in and started can't remember the timescale no are you talking about Jason
01:56:16 timescale no are you talking about Jason Olaf yeah and his white board which is okay and had he started that at this point do you think I don't think so cuz I think he come in before a dream Fenton
01:56:29 I think he come in before a dream Fenton and the others and I just remember him then going over in the corner set to wheel it from one end to the other and it collapsed as they wheeled it out this is broken and so I don't think it was
01:56:42 is broken and so I don't think it was him because when the others come in they pulled myself so at this point had you essentially taken over as the point of communication or FSG information from
01:56:55 communication or FSG information from the control room to the command unit not in an official way but just unofficially that it just seemed I was doing it at this particular moment in time
01:57:11 now after this admin line call we see one more admin line call that you make at 228 and 27 seconds can I ask you please to be shown two
01:57:24 can I ask you please to be shown two things first of all page 83 of the control room report LFP quadruple zero four seven nine zero page 83 and also
01:57:44 four seven nine zero page 83 and also have up at the same time please the transcript for this call @i n cube quint equals zero two zero four inq two zero four
01:58:01 now I'll just show you the start of the transcript on page two it's seven four
01:58:14 transcript on page two it's seven four eight and seven four eight says seven four eight control hello it's control again could you just help us with what seven four eight is is that that is that a number or designation of cu8 I don't
01:58:25 a number or designation of cu8 I don't know okay
01:58:26 know okay and then you say hello it's control again so you're ringing it hello control hi we've got flat 205 and then you start and you passed a black
01:58:39 then you start and you passed a black detail call over floor 23 and we can see that it's seven adults now just at that point is the point of timing were you aware at that point that there had already been a message relayed to the
01:58:52 already been a message relayed to the control room at 223 so five minutes or so before that all FSG calls were to be passed to see you seven I wasn't and I
01:59:03 passed to see you seven I wasn't and I don't remember him saying when I phoned cu8 that that it was see you seven other side would you find them
01:59:14 side would you find them can I ask you please to be shown the short incident log that's M et triple zero one three eight three zero our page 22
01:59:28 and look in the middle of that page please
01:59:32 please @o 22333 you can see there that Sharon Davi puts out a message which says key
01:59:44 Davi puts out a message which says key c7 run all FSG calls via c7 at that time on the night you would you have had access to that message via your vision log if I'd have looked in the log that
01:59:58 log if I'd have looked in the log that the logs really difficult to read and I didn't look at the log at all that night why is the log difficult to read that's just so much information on there its pages and pages of it is it coming up
02:00:11 pages and pages of it is it coming up just keep the scroll mean through each individual page it's nothing it's not easy right as it comes onto the screen is it coming on to your screen now in live time your doctor interrogator
02:00:23 live time your doctor interrogator interrogate the log right said there's a mechanical question is is it not therefore possible to be on a call and watch the information going onto the vision log as it comes on no no if
02:00:35 vision log as it comes on no no if you're taking a call so if you wanted to know what messages had gone through the vision log or come onto the system as a result of Sharon Darby inputting a message like that you would have to
02:00:47 message like that you would have to interrogate the vision or you would and how easy is it to do they're not easy at all
02:00:52 all what do you have to do just going you've got page this big and then you just scroll in a page after page after page onto page right some of its color-coded to try and make it stand out a bit so if
02:01:04 to try and make it stand out a bit so if it's an informative message with color code it blue but as I saying especially on an incident like that it's just pages of it do you know will recall whether
02:01:15 of it do you know will recall whether other CRA is in the control room where we're constantly or at all interrogating the vision log will keep a live insurance no I wouldn't think so I was just taking call after call after call
02:01:35 now can I ask you to look at the transcript take them to take that off the screen these short incidental look at the transcript I just want to ask you
02:01:47 at the transcript I just want to ask you first about something on page one you can see on page page two of the transcript page one of the script and
02:01:58 transcript page one of the script and you can see there that the call goes to seven four eight did you were you aware
02:02:09 seven four eight did you were you aware that it was still going to see you aid just my right I've got ahead of yourself a little bit you can see that in the transcript at
02:02:20 you can see that in the transcript at the top of page two it says seven four eight hello it's control again we were you intending to call cu8 yes because I believed you were still doing one of the history calls and as I say didn't tell
02:02:32 history calls and as I say didn't tell me otherwise I was added instantly dog cu7
02:02:36 cu7 now by this point was Jason Olaf in the control room yes he was and did he have his whiteboards up there yet and the
02:02:47 his whiteboards up there yet and the reason I called them myself because I wasn't on a call at the time and Kristine was opposite me and I could it was an extremely difficult call and I
02:02:58 was an extremely difficult call and I could just hear her and and I said which and I looked in the corner and they was all busy and I thought oh my god this is so bad that are such Christine should I
02:03:09 so bad that are such Christine should I found the command unit and tell them and so I phoned her myself I just thought was quicker because I was listening to the calls she was taking and passed the information to him because it sounded so
02:03:22 information to him because it sounded so serious
02:03:26 yes now this Adams it may be a convenient moment for you to take another short break perhaps we shouldn't suit you yes a short one yes if that's
02:03:37 suit you yes a short one yes if that's convenient to you all right we'll have another short break now thank Sam he's in talk to anyone about your evidence wanna racks the room can come back at 12:50
02:04:00 right 12:15 please you
02:15:11 don't
02:15:45 all right carry on thank you yes mr. inside thank you for coming back to us just a couple of points of clarification arising out of some evidence we've
02:15:56 arising out of some evidence we've covered already this morning very very briefly first of all you said in relation to the admin line call that you made at 150 49 remember we talked about
02:16:07 made at 150 49 remember we talked about that and you said and it's just for our record it's paragraph 6 page 67 lines 11 to 20 of the raw transcript that you
02:16:18 to 20 of the raw transcript that you said that at that time there was a whiteboard so you could see that there was taking a number of people disabled children so you were taking in information anyway this is a point of
02:16:30 information anyway this is a point of clarification to the best of your recollection at 150 and that 49 so just afterwards was the whiteboard already established in the control room or did that come later
02:16:45 next question about way of clarification when you went around the control room often offices at the foot before making your call to see you ate at just after 2 o'clock 2:00 a.m. in 34 seconds
02:17:01 did you ask those callers about smoke density as CUA dad asked before sorry is there a reason why you didn't say to them I need information about Smeg
02:17:13 them I need information about Smeg density I don't think I did I don't think I do is I think I was just taking the information that he was passing me right well I'm trying to get that is there a reason why having been told by cu8 that that they wanted you to prioritize on the basis this makes it
02:17:25 prioritize on the basis this makes it smoke density you didn't ask the other co-host I think it was just the difficulty of them being still on the line and sort of just I thought the main priority was the flat numbers and the people in there look where they all
02:17:38 people in there look where they all still on the line when you spoke to them I think so yeah right I think it was literally watch your flat number how many people and just very brief information is there a reason why you
02:17:50 information is there a reason why you didn't say to get them to tell you about some get about smoke density and tell me probably because they it was very difficult for them talk to me and the caller at the same time now going back if I can then to the
02:18:04 time now going back if I can then to the transcript of the call we were on just before the break and miss Adams which is which we have in front of us which is inq five zero two two zero four just got
02:18:19 inq five zero two two zero four just got a couple more questions on this before we finish it off at the bottom of the page page three you we can see there
02:18:31 page page three you we can see there that you you say three three entries up control yeah you tell him to leave Christine that that's clearly Christine house and you describe the circumstances of this particular call just before the
02:18:44 of this particular call just before the break we've just had and just for our record that's Christine house ins call that starts at o2 25:38 page eighty of the control report which lasts just over
02:18:56 the control report which lasts just over four minutes us for both for all of our benefit and at the bottom of the page you then say or okay hold on I'll just see if there's any more for you any more
02:19:08 see if there's any more for you any more for the command unit they're getting out are they yeah we're trying to persuade them to leave so I'll leave you with that one and I'll ring you back if there's more anymore when you say any
02:19:20 there's more anymore when you say any more for the command unit who are you talking to I presume I just did general broadcast to the room as I was on the phone Jim Farrell but it wasn't anybody
02:19:32 phone Jim Farrell but it wasn't anybody specific right did you get a response from anybody come in probably not and when you say they're getting out are they is that a question to Christine it was here and then you say yeah we're
02:19:45 was here and then you say yeah we're trying to persuade them to leave so I'll leave you with that one and I'll ring you back if there's more you then talking to the command unit I see and when you say yeah we're trying to persuade them to leave was that because
02:19:58 persuade them to leave was that because you had been told now to tell all people to leave
02:20:02 to leave you've come what may or was this a decision made by Christine based on how she was being told I can't remember well I don't know whether she knew at that time I think and I didn't hear a call I
02:20:16 time I think and I didn't hear a call I just heard her end of that call and I presumed that the the fire was in there flattened that there needed to leave did you tell Sharon Davi or Jason Olaf
02:20:28 did you tell Sharon Davi or Jason Olaf that you'd made this communication with zuh I didn't know is there a reason why not Sharon didn't really need to know because she wasn't passing any calls
02:20:39 because she wasn't passing any calls anyway at that time because it was sort of Jason Olaf and no it was just they was all busy in the corner it just seemed hear anything I'd done that so okay at this stage that you get a sense
02:20:53 okay at this stage that you get a sense that the officer in cu8 was was at the same time talking to Jason Olaf I thought Jason was not on the phone at
02:21:04 thought Jason was not on the phone at that time because I think I would have maybe said team like Christine's got a very bad call but I can't remember you can't okay no I want just to pick up a
02:21:18 can't okay no I want just to pick up a particular caller at around about this time before coming to the change in stay-put advice this is a call at 2:30 no three from flat 165 on the 19th floor
02:21:34 no three from flat 165 on the 19th floor and this is Nicholas Burton and his wife pili now we can pick this up in summary format page 72 of the control report
02:21:46 format page 72 of the control report that's lfb 4 7 9 0 page 72 and that's the summary to 1303 cro adams takes a call from a
02:21:59 to 1303 cro adams takes a call from a male caller who says he is nick burton reporting that his whole tower block is on fire he is in flat won 6-5 on the 19th floor now I want to show you the
02:22:10 19th floor now I want to show you the transcript for this please this is lfb five zeros three four four
02:22:23 and a page-one of that transcript we could see the time second group of numbers from the right Oh 2 1 3 0 3 so 2 13 or 3 seconds and on page 2 of the
02:22:34 13 or 3 seconds and on page 2 of the transcript you can see that the the call starts and the caller says oh hi this is inaudible from 165 Granville tower I know you and you say 165 caller yeah
02:22:47 know you and you say 165 caller yeah Granville tower tower tower block is on fire yeah and then and then he says and were trapped in the 19th floor but nobody's coming in the flames next door's getting very close to our windows
02:22:58 door's getting very close to our windows now and the smokes in the houses over speaking now just at that point where he says we're trapped in the 19th floor did the use of the word trapped by the
02:23:11 did the use of the word trapped by the caller alert you to this the fact that this was now an FSG court possibly without seeing the rest of it I'm not
02:23:22 without seeing the rest of it I'm not sure he's saying his traps I assume that he just needed some guidance right well we continue we can see the rest of the call it runs over and over five pages or
02:23:36 call it runs over and over five pages or so you go on to say yeah what floor are you on 19 how many of you in there - me and my wife something dog two adults on a dog okay yeah so are you blocking the
02:23:47 a dog okay yeah so are you blocking the smoke from coming in and it goes on in that vein over page three and you say at the bottom of page three yeah we are trying to get to you but we've got
02:23:58 trying to get to you but we've got numerous people trapped in the flats so yeah I understand top of page four we just want to sort of try and assess how bad it is but do you
02:24:09 try and assess how bad it is but do you are you okay is the smoke okay at the moment and he says smoke in the whole house okay not bad smoke we've got but you're okay we've got the windows just closed yeah and the door if you blocked the smoke from coming in yeah yeah you
02:24:21 the smoke from coming in yeah yeah you put something against the door okay if it gets any worse top of page five bring us back that we are trying to get to you that's that's most of it I've covered quickly look that's most of it yeah he
02:24:32 quickly look that's most of it yeah he we can see from page four we just go back to it but he says a quarter of the way down that page it's over speaking smoke in the whole house and we can see
02:24:44 smoke in the whole house and we can see how the call ends you say yep you check he's okay and you say that that you're trying to get to them and he should ring back if it gets any worse and number of
02:24:55 back if it gets any worse and number of questions first of all you don't ask the caller to explain why they think they're trapped is there a reason for that
02:25:07 [Music] I think he's explained as the conversation goes on that there's smoke in the house and the smoke coming from underneath the door so presumably he's
02:25:20 underneath the door so presumably he's not gonna go out in the smoke you say presumably was that an assumption you made the family was trapped because we can see that you don't explore with him whether he had actually already tried to get out or what the conditions are
02:25:31 get out or what the conditions are outside the flat in the escape routes is there a reason why you didn't do that no probably more cause were waiting and it's literally so many calls coming in that you just was down to take his brief
02:25:44 that you just was down to take his brief or details as she could to answer another call he was saying he was safe so and hopefully by that at that time I think we all believed all the call
02:25:55 think we all believed all the call takers that the crews were still going up to him and we'll get to a mall I don't think it was it was the time the call we had the information to tell them
02:26:06 call we had the information to tell them to leave at that point - 13 or so yeah at that point we were still anticipating that the crews would be with them right did you have any solid information that
02:26:17 did you have any solid information that crews were getting up there or was that just an assumption you were making written because we'd had no information to stay otherwise is there a reason why because we can see on this call what you
02:26:28 because we can see on this call what you do say you don't ask him whether either he or his wife or anybody else in the you know his wife had any mobility problems
02:26:36 problems is there any any reason why you didn't answer that question don't think that's a general question we asked and if you asked if you were saying to someone can you leave and they tell you anyway
02:26:47 can you leave and they tell you anyway they'd say well I'm disabled or whatever they offer that information themselves but you didn't ask him mine you could leave so you didn't even get to that point so you got a trapped caller and
02:27:01 point so you got a trapped caller and you don't know whether they've been able to leave or can leave and and whether and if not why not the caller said it's not bad smoke we've got I believe there so I'm
02:27:12 smoke we've got I believe there so I'm just assuming it's not that bad at the moment right another cause might be more serious so all I could tell him we was gonna get to him as soon as we could
02:27:24 gonna get to him as soon as we could bring us back if it gets worse right did you form a view about how safe it was for this caller to stay in their flat no also they're there they need to make
02:27:37 also they're there they need to make their own choices as well that's what they feel safe or not safe so did you give the details of this call to Jason
02:27:49 give the details of this call to Jason earlier
02:27:50 earlier do you think I can't remember I thought I wrote all my calls down and passed him but I can't I hope I did at this stage in this stage how are you recording the
02:28:01 in this stage how are you recording the calls and pops I was writing on a piece of paper and then how did that piece of paper get to Jason Oh leave out the white top to him and gave it to him
02:28:13 given the policy we've looked at before is there a reason why you didn't at least explore the possibility with this caller of whether he and his wife could leave right I'm just pressing you a bit
02:28:28 leave right I'm just pressing you a bit on this I'm afraid but is there a reason why you didn't I couldn't only assume the volume of calls that were coming in and when they're saying there it's not too bad smoke that they're safer than
02:28:41 too bad smoke that they're safer than some of the other callers that were you know the calls waiting to be answered right I think the thing we didn't have on Grenfell night was the luxury of time to give to callers and we've all got to
02:28:53 to give to callers and we've all got to live with that we was letting we was having just not spend as much time as we normally would and we was just adjusting it to the conditions of the room and it
02:29:09 it to the conditions of the room and it was just horrendous so he's just trying to get through as many calls as possible to pass those flat numbers to that crews on the same for them to go and rescue
02:29:20 on the same for them to go and rescue them and in comes some cases that didn't work out now we looked at it earlier but you'll remember that the definition of the fire Survival Guide was called is worthy the operator stays on the line
02:29:32 worthy the operator stays on the line until the plural call is cleared or the caller is rescued you can see that that doesn't happen with this call even though the caller is true says he's trapped can you explain why you didn't
02:29:43 trapped can you explain why you didn't stay on the line with this corner he's just having to make decisions as to whether you let people go and you just judge it I think on personnel vulnerable
02:29:55 judge it I think on personnel vulnerable they were
02:29:57 they were I don't know decisions I hope I can never have to make again but we did we did on that night did you feel a point
02:30:10 did on that night did you feel a point to ask the question as as good as any as points go but looking at this particular example did you feel at that time that your many years of experience and the training that you'd had had equipped you
02:30:22 training that you'd had had equipped you properly to deal with this call I don't think you'd ever be fully equipped to deal with those calls those particular that particular night if it was a different occasion
02:30:33 different occasion you'd give that person all the time in the world you'd have someone listening to you while you're dealing with it with passing information to the ground but not on that night can you say not on
02:30:48 not on that night can you say not on that night because because it was overwhelming there was only seven call takers dealing with all those calls coming in and we
02:30:59 with all those calls coming in and we just did our best form we now turn to a different topic which is the change in the advice now you cover this on page
02:31:11 the advice now you cover this on page four of your witness statement we can go back and look at that top of page
02:31:19 it's at bottom of page four and over to the top of page five you say at around 2:30 to 2:45 a.m. I remember being told in person by our operations manager
02:31:30 in person by our operations manager Alexandra Norman that the advice to call us had changed and there's now to get people out and self-rescue she told us all CRO is going around the desks this is not normal policy and is really alien
02:31:42 is not normal policy and is really alien to me as it has never happened before all of a sudden I was telling people to get out of the building giving them advice to find the nearest staircase asking them if they can get out I didn't
02:31:53 asking them if they can get out I didn't know how many staircases there were in that building but could any advise and reassure any callers know first of all timeframe given as of 2:30 2:45 a.m.
02:32:06 timeframe given as of 2:30 2:45 a.m. when you made this statement and how did you come to recall that as the timeframe 2:30 to 2:45 a.m. I can't I can't recall
02:32:17 2:30 to 2:45 a.m. I can't I can't recall it just seemed around that sort of timescale okay do you remember how Alex Norman relayed that information to you you say it was in person yes she stood in front of me she had a piece of paper
02:32:29 in front of me she had a piece of paper with instructions written down as she just said which house wet sheets and tell them to leave and I can recall
02:32:43 tell them to leave and I can recall distinctly saying to her all floors and she just said all floors
02:32:51 and then you're just trying to get your head round the woman that you're telling people to stay we're gonna come and get come to you and the next minute you've got to get out and leave so just
02:33:03 got to get out and leave so just breaking that down a bit she gets you showed you some written instructions to G it was on a piece of paper but she firmly said it okay it was the verbal thing that I remember and you then asked
02:33:16 thing that I remember and you then asked her all floors I did yeah is there a reason why you asked that question because it was incomprehensible that we was telling everyone on every floor to
02:33:28 was telling everyone on every floor to suddenly get out we weren't gonna make it
02:33:31 it it was just alright yeah unprecedented did you you say you didn't know how many staircases there were in the building
02:33:42 staircases there were in the building would that have helped you well I was only given that advice because I thought will they know which way to turn but I learned afterward there was only one one staircase right so because if
02:33:56 one one staircase right so because if you're going out into a smoke-filled corridor you you know it's just which way you're gonna go where is your nearest exit but obviously that wasn't relevant because they only had one when
02:34:08 relevant because they only had one when Alex Norman gave you these instructions did she did she give you a clear impression of of how to give that advice in other words what terms or tone to use
02:34:20 in other words what terms or tone to use with corners no she couldn't do that did she leave you with the impression that you were still able to give the caller some kind of choice or did she make it
02:34:32 some kind of choice or did she make it clear to you that this was essentially a live or die instruction yeah a live or die latter that's the impression I got from it why she gave me
02:34:44 she gave me after you had that instruction and in those terms from Alex Norman did you start applying that advice straight away I believe so yes okay I'm just going to look at one or two
02:34:55 I'm just going to look at one or two calls with you to see if we can pin this down a bit more the first one is page 91 to 92 of the control report this is at
02:35:08 to 92 of the control report this is at 237 exactly bottom of that page crl Adam takes a call from a female caller in
02:35:20 takes a call from a female caller in flat 193 on the 22nd floor who is reporting that a lot of smoke is coming into the flat and she's blocked up the
02:35:31 into the flat and she's blocked up the door but look at the transcript of that it's probably easier to do it it spits lfb five zeros 366
02:35:50 and again you can see the time from the second group of numbers from the right oh 237 what 0 0 so 237 exactly and at
02:36:03 oh 237 what 0 0 so 237 exactly and at the top of page 2 it says fire brigade caller 1 yes inaudible 22nd floor in not in 193 Grenfell tower we can see the
02:36:17 in 193 Grenfell tower we can see the fire what flat number are you 1 9 3 on the 22nd floor the 22nd sorry flat number again it's the 22nd floor 193 193 on the 22nd floor just pausing there is
02:36:28 on the 22nd floor just pausing there is there a reason why you keep having to ask just to confirm we've got the right number in the right floor right sometimes you can easily miss here and then towards the bottom of the page you
02:36:40 then towards the bottom of the page you say okay what's happening now is there smoke coming here or a fire in caller says there is smoke coming in a lot and then you say at the bottom of the page have you tried blocking it off have you
02:36:51 have you tried blocking it off have you put towels against the door at that stage did you understand that the these callers were trapped from that it sounds
02:37:04 callers were trapped from that it sounds like they conk out yes yeah and then it continues on to page 3 and you go through the numbers in the flat 8 adults and then the caller says come a helicopter please take takers please and
02:37:17 helicopter please take takers please and then you say so is it eight adults no three four five six okay adults of three children three children yeah how many adults are just paid for I've got a flow very bad asthma okay we're trying to get you what's happening in your house and
02:37:32 you what's happening in your house and then I'm just going to run through the rest of the call picking up some some parts of it but a page five you say at the top yeah I understand that and we're
02:37:44 the top yeah I understand that and we're trying to get to you as soon as possible we're going to tell the farm and where you are and looking at that do you think that this was at a time before or after
02:37:56 that this was at a time before or after you'd had the instructions from Norman to tell callers on all floors to leave I think that before that maybe in my last school I took leave right I've got the instruction say when's I think I
02:38:08 got the instruction say when's I think I would have said you've got to leave or attempt to leave okay so when we see on page four and here again at the top of page five we are trying to get to you as soon as possible was that based on any
02:38:23 soon as possible was that based on any information that you'd had from the incident ground or was that again the assumption or expectation that you heard my expectation we would write listening
02:38:36 my expectation we would write listening to what was going on in the control room at that stage could you hear colleagues now giving get out advice
02:38:50 then the next okay then the next question is you're told by this caller that there are children in the flat and that the chorus herself has got asthma
02:39:02 that the chorus herself has got asthma very bad asthma is that information that you passed over to Jason Olaf I don't think so probably just the number of people and going on with the call to the
02:39:14 people and going on with the call to the end at paper we can take this quite quickly it's quite clear what's happening you say at page five a quarter of the way down just after the part I show you okay look I'm gonna go now
02:39:25 show you okay look I'm gonna go now because we've got lots of calls coming in I'm gonna tell them where you are and you just try and keep yourself safe try and stop the smoke coming in go to a room that's the least smoking and all stay together we'll get to you as soon as we can okay okay bring us back if it
02:39:38 as we can okay okay bring us back if it starts catching fire in your house is there a reason why you said I'm glad to go because we've got lots of calls coming in and not stayed on the line helping them again the volume of calls
02:39:50 helping them again the volume of calls it's just the sheer amount of calls that were waiting to be answered okay but from that I think that wasn't I couldn't have known on that call that the instructor had changed okay okay I think
02:40:04 instructor had changed okay okay I think it was probably that last call I took before I start telling people to leave no you say in the middle of page five all right bring us back if it starts catching fire in your house what
02:40:15 catching fire in your house what difference would it have made I don't know it's just things you say at the time I mean obviously if they would have attempted to leave if the fire was in
02:40:27 attempted to leave if the fire was in their flat hopefully on their own accord but it would just be further information for us and if we was um if we were still in the hope that we was gonna reach him that we prioritize that call but no at
02:40:44 that we prioritize that call but no at 2:43
02:40:46 2:43 yeah I'm sorry I'm alright I can hear it go yeah yeah I'm fine at two forty three fifty five so not very long after this
02:40:57 fifty five so not very long after this call you and this this call is at 237 and say this is six a few minutes after this call a 243 55 you take another call
02:41:10 this call a 243 55 you take another call from the same flat and this is lfb five zeros 376 and just for the note it's page 98 of the control report but we
02:41:21 page 98 of the control report but we don't need to see it we'll look at the transcript 376 lfb 376 and again you could see the time of this from the
02:41:33 could see the time of this from the second group of numbers on the right at the top 243 55 and it starts on page 2 of the transcript fire-brigade hello hello Fire Brigade
02:41:44 fire-brigade hello hello Fire Brigade and the third of the way down it says yeah what flat number are you this is you caller 22nd floor 22nd floor flat number 193 so this is the same flat same floor as the call you've just taken and
02:41:56 floor as the call you've just taken and we just looked and you say okay what's happening now is the fire coming in to your flat who is the fire in your flat or is it just smoke is it's just next door it's next door all about your flat over the page it'll be in a minute in my
02:42:09 over the page it'll be in a minute in my flat okay so can you get out if the fire starts coming in now that's the first time I think we see you actually asking or exploring exit routes with the caller
02:42:20 or exploring exit routes with the caller in this flat because of the possible proximity of fire what can you explain why you did that that did it at that point and not at an earlier point when you were told that there was smoke coming in a lot of smoke
02:42:36 I think well I'm asking her can you get out if the fire starts coming in so I but why I'm asking on this one I don't
02:42:47 but why I'm asking on this one I don't know no maybe because things were intensifying and just the number of volumes of calls we was having I don't know it's hard to say right and then we
02:43:02 know it's hard to say right and then we can see you're asked about a helicopter and you say I'm sorry we don't have any helicopters I'm sorry so it's flat 193 22nd floor you've got eight people and then you ask can you get out at all and
02:43:13 then you ask can you get out at all and you're told it's full of smoke the fire from the other side is over our building you say okay but is the fire in the corridor and it continues in that vein and you do explore exit routes as we can
02:43:27 and you do explore exit routes as we can see and on page four you say two-thirds the way down okay well we're trying to get to you but it's very difficult so I'm saying to you is if it gets very very bad you need to get yourself out of
02:43:39 very bad you need to get yourself out of those flats get all your eight people out cover yourself with wet towels wet sheets anything and try to get out okay all right hmm I'm going to leave you now you make the decision whether you think you need to leave or not
02:43:51 you need to leave or not all right now looking at what you're telling them at that stage do you think that was before or after Alex Norman had given you the instruction I remember do
02:44:05 given you the instruction I remember do you think maybe after but do you think that it was consistent with what Alex Norman had told you to tell them um
02:44:17 Norman had told you to tell them um without knowing if it's before or after I can't honestly say right well let me put it let me see if I can get it this is a slightly different way you mean uh I don't know if they're saying they're
02:44:29 I don't know if they're saying they're trapped and they can't leave then um telling them advising am I supposed to cover themselves so
02:44:40 cover themselves so and get out sighs soon we'd been given the instruction when you say at the end
02:44:51 if it gets very very bad you need to get out and then again you make the decision whether you need to leave or not it looks from the terms of that that you're giving them a choice mate and making
02:45:02 giving them a choice mate and making them make the assessment but my question is is that what you understood from the instruction that Alex Norman had given you no I think it was to tell him to leave
02:45:12 leave maybe I wasn't very clear on that one so yeah I mean and it's always their choice I mean if they're there they're seeing it there they know what's on the other
02:45:24 it there they know what's on the other side of the door they know what's in their flat so I'm just on the end of the phone just trying to help him I mean did you understand Alex Norman's instructions and yet look did you
02:45:36 instructions and yet look did you understand them to mean that you could leave the caller with a sense of choice or or did you understand the instruction that come what may these callers needed to understand that they had no choice
02:45:47 to understand that they had no choice and had to yeah I believe I did understand that but don't if it come full across on that call very well can you explain why you didn't give them the advice in uncompromising terms no I
02:45:58 advice in uncompromising terms no I can't
02:45:59 can't hopefully I did better on the others all right
02:46:05 flat 182 of 21st floor at 2:46 this is a transcript lfb five zeros 379 we can do
02:46:20 transcript lfb five zeros 379 we can do it on the transcript but for our reference again this is page 100 of the control room report 246 for actually 246
02:46:31 control room report 246 for actually 246 42 I'm sorry I said 41 you could see that from the top of that page and if you go to the start of the call page - hello fire brigade hello fire brigade
02:46:43 hello fire brigade hello fire brigade I'm stuck in my house okay you in Granville tower yeah flat 182 okay is it just smoke or is it fire there are five of us what floor are you on 21st 21st right what you need to
02:46:55 you on 21st 21st right what you need to do now is get yourself out of the building I can't so you need to cover yourself up I can't I can't okay you flat 182 and the advice continues over the page on page three
02:47:09 continues over the page on page three you saying you need the second or third of the way down you need to get out okay we can't we can't okay we're advising people now to try and leave the building okay so at that point and this is 246
02:47:25 okay so at that point and this is 246 only a minute or two after the end of the last calls you're now telling 182 in very clear terms it seems from this that they have to leave did anything change between the last call on this call I
02:47:37 between the last call on this call I don't know I don't know if that was the first call I took we're following that instruction or the last call on ously can't remember okay that one's very clearly I'm saying to them you've got to
02:47:48 clearly I'm saying to them you've got to leave so that seems more likely that the first call to tell them to leave well we have the timings the one we looked at
02:48:03 have the timings the one we looked at was 243 and this is 246
02:48:07 but you recall it yeah maybe this maybe this was the first caller honestly can't remember I'm sorry now going to the end of the call we can see that you you say
02:48:19 of the call we can see that you you say in the third but from the end part try and get yourself out of the building get wet towels wet sheets anything try and get out of the building as you leave your flat think where the nearest
02:48:31 your flat think where the nearest staircase is ahead for it and run all right okay I'm gonna have to leave you sorry we've got 70 calls coming and just trying it out of the building when the call ends hello I'm going to go now try
02:48:42 call ends hello I'm going to go now try and get out of the building okay just try and get out I've got to leave you I'm sorry I've got to go why did you end the call so quickly again it was just the volume of calls coming in the calls
02:48:55 the volume of calls coming in the calls that needed to be answered and the other people that may have been calling that needed to be given that advice to leave just didn't have the luxury of time with
02:49:08 just didn't have the luxury of time with these people it's just did you think that this caller would be able to self evacuate without your assistance or guidance I don't know did you think that judgment did you
02:49:21 did you think that judgment did you think about that I was thinking it was just dreadful you just had to leave them and just answer another call
02:49:46 just want to further questions and can I ask you to go back to your statement at page five please
02:50:07 you say in the second paragraph on that page
02:50:16 that
02:50:28 on page five in the second paragraph you you describe how the television wasn't put on because these supervisors didn't want to upset you summarizing general
02:50:41 want to upset you summarizing general questions when you're working at the Merton control room are you used to having the television on yeah it's on 24/7 would you have a downlink from an N pass helicopter if if one was there we
02:50:53 pass helicopter if if one was there we should have but it's not been working for years so we worked a few years and we in Mersin yep what about Stratford I think it used to work there well GV not a Stratford it
02:51:04 work there well GV not a Stratford it doesn't work I think in a previous control room that GPP I think we had a link but it's never worked at the look not you know control anywhere or in Stratford have you ever used it when it
02:51:16 Stratford have you ever used it when it did work not me specifically but believe it's helpful for the fire ground like when your major fire but not for us in
02:51:28 when your major fire but not for us in control with not particular used it would you in the past have been able to use what was on the television if it was on to assist you giving advice to call us on write night um when London was
02:51:45 us on write night um when London was burning we were seeing the vision affirm in Croydon Reeves corner we was watching that sort of fire occur so it's always
02:51:57 that sort of fire occur so it's always good in my view Trevor an awareness of what's happening right but never specifically on other calls it's never that major that it appears on the television anyway I'm sure on this night
02:52:08 television anyway I'm sure on this night I don't know what time it started being screened I think it would've maybe been helpful for us to see it it was a shock when I first saw the image of it would
02:52:21 when I first saw the image of it would having either or both of television and a heady telly downlink have assisted you in being able to give advice to corners no because we can't make that decision
02:52:33 no because we can't make that decision as call takers we would still need Pacific instructions to tell people to leave if that was the case so but it's just an awareness so we might have when
02:52:46 just an awareness so we might have when they are telling us that the fires on the top floors you could see they are really do mean it's on the top floors
02:52:56 and knowledge is always just good the more lowly knowledge you have it's always helpful
02:53:24 but Miss Adams I come to the end of my questions I have to ask you what I normally do is to ask the Chairman to rise for a few minutes just to make sure that I've covered everything I need to cover okay with you so I'm going to ask
02:53:36 cover okay with you so I'm going to ask him to do that mr. chairman yes well great well counseling checks are there any other questions he needs to ask again please don't talk to anyone about the more evidence one around agree and
02:53:47 the more evidence one around agree and we'll come back in five minutes or as soon as you can
02:54:06 if I say one o'clock or sooner if possible
03:01:29 Renton's I suspect one or two questions yet yes without being specific about number first of all miss Adams can I just get back to the TV
03:01:40 just get back to the TV Helly telly we were discussing just before we finished would having the television on in the control room at Stratford that night or having that heli telly darling
03:01:51 telly darling working would it not at least have given you a visual impression of the speed and extent of external fire and smoke spread around this building yeah possibly would
03:02:02 around this building yeah possibly would that not have assisted you and then being able to judge what kind of advice you were giving to individual callers we would still have to go by the guidelines of stay put and unless of eyes otherwise
03:02:19 of stay put and unless of eyes otherwise we couldn't just say offer a run back something get out now assuming that stay put hadn't been changed to use an overall expression so that you were
03:02:31 overall expression so that you were still in as it were stay put territory would it not have assisted you though to be able to us advise callers on whether they should be assessing them
03:02:43 on whether they should be assessing them ease with which they could get out and more closely possibly it's very hard to say but this as an afterthought yeah I know it's difficult but would it have
03:02:55 know it's difficult but would it have assisted you in pressing cu8 for them to tell you what the conditions were like inside the stairs or inside the building again possibly but it's so difficult to
03:03:06 again possibly but it's so difficult to say I mean I assumed like we was getting that information like because Jason Olaf had an open line to him so I sort of assumed they would be updating Jason but
03:03:20 did there come a time and we've covered the night up to about 250 now but did they did there come a time when you became aware that firefighters were not able to get to upper floors of the
03:03:32 able to get to upper floors of the building
03:03:34 building only when Alex told us to teen frankness and then that when the policy changed then I was thinking yeah and she said
03:03:45 then I was thinking yeah and she said all floors I assumed that we wasn't gonna get to anybody I see anybody at all
03:03:50 all yeah doors well yeah all floors I think later on and I don't know what the timescale was but I believe there was a mention of they're not getting above it was I've the 11th for the 15th floor but
03:04:02 was I've the 11th for the 15th floor but I couldn't give you any time scale on that and it was just something I've heard in the room thank you now just one or two specific just further questions
03:04:13 or two specific just further questions about specific calls we looked at the call at 2:46 42 182 where you give very unequivocal
03:04:24 42 182 where you give very unequivocal advice you need to get out and we looked at the call 243 where you say you need to make the decision whether you need to leave or not is there a reason why you
03:04:35 leave or not is there a reason why you weren't able to call that caller back the one there called off 243 and say you need to leave just the amount of calls coming in and you'd have to find that
03:04:47 coming in and you'd have to find that call amongst that's hundreds of calls that was coming in so it was impossible really
03:04:56 really and all the calls that were waiting to be answered to tell them to get out now finally can I just ask you to look at something we haven't looked at before
03:05:07 something we haven't looked at before which is a call at two forty nine twenty lfb 5-0 381 it's a short call
03:05:20 and you can see the timing of that call at the top again 249 20 and it starts
03:05:31 at the top again 249 20 and it starts fire brigade there's flames coming out at the top of the roof darlin come and get me I know I know can you get yourself can you get yourself I can see the flames coming down my flat darling right can you get out of the building no
03:05:43 right can you get out of the building no I can't see a thing why can't you leave because it's too dark I don't darling up 67 years of age I can't be running are you on your own yes I'm on my own okay we're advising what floor are you on oh my the times I've told everyone
03:05:55 on oh my the times I've told everyone 22nd
03:05:56 22nd please love right we're advising listen to me we're advising people to leave the building and then he says he don't take an hour something okay something again I can see the flames come and get me and
03:06:07 can see the flames come and get me and then come and get me operate what we're trying to get to you but it's very difficult so you may have to leave the building yourself you need to cover yourself with wet towels wet sheets something has he cleared okay thanks now
03:06:19 something has he cleared okay thanks now showing you the whole of that call because it's short did you realize that you'd already spoken to him I can't say okay when he said I can't be running I'm
03:06:31 okay when he said I can't be running I'm 67 years of age I can't be running what did you understand by that he was having difficulty leaving and do you remember
03:06:44 difficulty leaving and do you remember how the call ended you've given the advice but then there's an or something that happens in it it ends do you have any recollection of how the call ends if it says there has he cleared I think he
03:06:55 it says there has he cleared I think he must have put the phone down right because I must be talking to the BT operator so he left the call right you say just before the end of the call
03:07:07 you say just before the end of the call we are trying to get to you again was the only solid basis for that or was that no I was just thinking of something to say to someone who's telling you they can't leave just to give them a little
03:07:18 can't leave just to give them a little bit
03:07:19 bit hope I think was trying to stress that he needs to go because by this stage you've already you had it very clear in your mind that yeah there were no firefighters that could get into the building at all so the question is given
03:07:32 building at all so the question is given that knowledge at this point why did you say to him we're trying to get to you just again um because he's saying you can't leave so what do you say to some
03:07:44 can't leave so what do you say to some money
03:07:44 money you can't leave did you when the call ended did you think that mister that this caller had understood that his only chance of surviving was to to try to
03:07:56 chance of surviving was to to try to leave I don't know because he's obviously cleared the line so I don't know what he thought do you do you remember what you did with this information after after this call um no I think possibly we wasn't still passing
03:08:10 I think possibly we wasn't still passing information to Jason to pass because it seemed um that it was just that was our remit to tell everyone to leave the building so and if they could get to
03:08:25 building so and if they could get to them they would
03:08:33 thank you well this Adams thank you very much I've come to the end of the question so I'm going to ask you about and I'm very grateful to you for your patience and for coming to the inquiry
03:08:44 patience and for coming to the inquiry today to help us with our investigations we are extremely grateful to you so thank you very much and I'd like to add my thanks for those mr. Millard it's very important to us to understand how the control room was working that
03:08:55 the control room was working that evening and what went on in some detail so we're really grateful for your help in coming to tell us what your part was but thank you very much thank you and know you're free to go so the ashwin
03:09:06 know you're free to go so the ashwin will look after you
03:09:23 that must be a convenient moment mr. Mellott it is right-click or break now I resumed at ten past two please