Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Evidence from MPS and LAS (13 November 2018 Pt 1 of 2)
00:11:25 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing we're going to begin by hearing the rest of commander Jerome's evidence good morning mr. chairman yes we are collectors call commander Jerome back
00:11:43 [Music]
00:11:53 come on leave good morning good morning thank you very much for coming back to us this morning thank you am I going to turn now to your involvement on the night or rather to turn back to it can I ask you please to go to page 13 of
00:12:05 can I ask you please to go to page 13 of your witness statement and look at paragraph 46 I'll just wait for it to go
00:12:16 paragraph 46 I'll just wait for it to go up on the screen there it is and you say that you arrived at the special operations room at 4:10 a.m. and you were briefed by Chief Inspector Barrett
00:12:27 were briefed by Chief Inspector Barrett and I think it's right isn't it that this was your second briefing having had the first substantive briefing at 2:30 that's right yes now before you arrived
00:12:39 that's right yes now before you arrived at the incident room which was at Lambeth were you receiving any updates about the incident so on my way in I received a phone call from Chief
00:12:52 received a phone call from Chief Inspector Barrett just given me an update in terms of just the extent of the fire but clearly at that point traveling at speed in a vehicle there
00:13:03 traveling at speed in a vehicle there was no way of making any notes and certainly no way that I could make any decisions at that point right did inspect about tell you while you're on route about the change in stay-put
00:13:15 route about the change in stay-put advice no did he tell you anything about the number of casualties or fatalities neither being experienced no what did he
00:13:26 neither being experienced no what did he tell you just as the fire was continuing to spread and that it was a very serious incident right and did you take any
00:13:38 incident right and did you take any actions or making any decisions on route as a result of what he told you I did not I wasn't in the position with a telephone line which was very difficult to make any decisions at that point and
00:13:50 to make any decisions at that point and it would've been appropriate to do so elsewhere in my statement I set out what the command protocols are for assuming command of an incident and at that point I was neither in the position to
00:14:02 I was neither in the position to have good communications neither had I been properly briefed as I would be at 4:10 when I came in and also my location in a vehicle on a motorway where service differed from
00:14:14 motorway where service differed from just well yes now you say in your in paragraph 46 that he breathes me on the nature of the incident this is at the bottom of the paragraph he briefed me on the nature of the incident the command
00:14:25 the nature of the incident the command structure put in place the resources being deployed and the current status of the activations initiated on my earlier call during that briefing did he give
00:14:36 call during that briefing did he give you any further new information about the incident would it be okay to refer to my notes yes of course thank you now
00:14:48 to my notes yes of course thank you now just so we know what those are I think you're referring to the G the Jerome log which is at M ET triple zero two three two eight nine is that is that what
00:15:01 two eight nine is that is that what you're referring to as your notes yes it is yes okay and thus they start just so we're all keeping up with you on page 14 internally and indeed the
00:15:13 page 14 internally and indeed the relativity reference and I think the part you want to refer to is on page 15 a quarter of the way down the page oh I'm sorry I had fun so I'm on page eight
00:15:25 I'm sorry I had fun so I'm on page eight all right that document
00:15:34 that's the one yes so that says Oh 4/20 briefing from that do aim Barrett yes it's right but yes CAD 482 say what
00:15:46 it's right but yes CAD 482 say what would you like to refer us to so during the course of that he's telling me that clearly the call came in at a 116 he's given me the CAD reference that it was
00:15:57 given me the CAD reference that it was initially a six pump fire the timing of our first units on the scene the number of MPs units its location the gold commander which is walnut at that point
00:16:09 commander which is walnut at that point and then talking through the resources that we've got at the scene updating me that we believe there to be at least tragically four people have died the
00:16:21 tragically four people have died the number of people that we believe had had evacuated the fact that we'd put our callers onto the nine nine nine systems that we didn't have anybody waiting to
00:16:34 that we didn't have anybody waiting to come through that was to give support to the London Fire Brigade the additional resources that we've that we've got going to that and then also on some of the the activation so GT staff coming in
00:16:47 the the activation so GT staff coming in means that we've got control room staff that are making their way in to activate the special ops room just a couple of things on that page and first of all the
00:16:58 things on that page and first of all the third of the way down the page you say or you recalled everyone on two nine nine nine and then there's no no waiters no waiters so that means with it that
00:17:09 no waiters so that means with it that you've got nobody waiting for 999 calls that's right does that mean that you that a command had been given to the metropolitan police control room met CC to take grenfell calls yes
00:17:21 to take grenfell calls yes that was my understanding and that why he had put members of the control room onto onto the telephone systems to prioritize the 909 course right well
00:17:32 prioritize the 909 course right well we'll come back to that shortly then goes on to say is this essay 19 what is that but it's oso 19 is our armed response vehicles right we spoke yesterday that the territorial
00:17:45 we spoke yesterday that the territorial support group have enhanced training as well as building entry skills our armed officers have clearly an advanced training as well and also means of method of entry into into into buildings
00:17:58 method of entry into into into buildings as well should they be required in order to gain access they weren't there in an arm to capacity I'd like to emphasize that they're there purely in the case of getting as many resources there as possible in order to have that option
00:18:11 possible in order to have that option available to us should we need to get into people's houses and save their lives now it says here essay 19 going to go due to building collapse how would you deploy those officers in
00:18:23 how would you deploy those officers in the event of the collapse of the building or the imminent threat of the building's collapse so in making that note clearly they wouldn't go into a
00:18:35 note clearly they wouldn't go into a collapsing building but the danger then to the surrounding area the building comes down if we can get people out to save their lives in the in the buildings
00:18:48 save their lives in the in the buildings around the tower itself I follow so this wasn't a question of sending these particular officers into Grenville tower itself absolutely not it was it was the surrounding area that he obviously yes on us now just a little bit lower down
00:19:00 on us now just a little bit lower down that page I don't think you got there but just four lines all four entries up from the bottom under the same time mark it starts at 4:20 at the top it says still in rescue mode can you remember
00:19:12 still in rescue mode can you remember what Chief Inspector Barrett told you which led you to write that down there
00:19:21 so I can't remember specifically but it's very much into the life-saving phase of an incident so an incident will have a number of different phases and
00:19:32 clearly we were still in a life-saving phase at that at that point did he tell you at that stage that the stay-put advise as it as we've come to call it
00:19:45 advise as it as we've come to call it had been revoked and that the advice to all residents was to self evacuate if they could I haven't made a record of that and so I can't record that off the top of my
00:19:56 can't record that off the top of my haircut okay and is there anything else you'd like to tell us about that briefing over and above what we can see there on that page note those are my
00:20:08 there on that page note those are my notes that that I've made as he's going through briefing me
00:20:18 now just just going back a little bit to the timing of this briefing this briefing is you've recorded starts as we can see at the top of this page at 4:20
00:20:29 can see at the top of this page at 4:20 which is ten minutes after you arrived yes as you put your arrival time of 4:10 and what made what allowed you to remember that your arrival time was 4:10 as you said in your statement fingers a
00:20:44 as you said in your statement fingers a case ever checked my watch to see what time I'd actually arrived in this special ops room you did that did you yes you have a clear independent recollection of it but yes 10:00 now you told us yesterday that your phone call
00:20:55 told us yesterday that your phone call with Chief Inspector Barrett which he'd had with you while he was still at home started at 2:30 and I think you said yes that it ended at 240 240 over time so
00:21:06 that it ended at 240 240 over time so that meant that that took you an hour and 20 minutes to get from your home to to Lambeth to the GT room at Lambeth that's right is that right that's right [Music]
00:21:17 [Music] is that time period a function of the distance between your home and Lambeth so it would be a combination of the
00:21:29 so it would be a combination of the distance and also the fact of then just getting in a position where I'm ready to ready to go I did consider so I I have a
00:21:43 ready to go I did consider so I I have a staff officer who lives a reasonable closeness to me whether I would use him to convey me in or whether I would divert a resource to come down and pick
00:21:54 divert a resource to come down and pick me up and then convey me back in and certainly my my view at that time was to divert I a resource that was sorely needed on the night to save people's
00:22:07 needed on the night to save people's lives would not be appropriate and therefore I made the decision I would call my staff officer right were you delayed in any way in getting to the special operations room following your the end of your call with the Chief
00:22:19 the end of your call with the Chief Inspector Barrett only making your way through South London even at that time in the morning make making your way through traffic does impede your
00:22:30 through traffic does impede your progress and it yes do you think there should have been someone of your rank available in the GT room at an earlier stage this this is
00:22:46 room at an earlier stage this this is something which I have given a lot of thought to in terms of those timings but I was reassured by my phone call early on with Chief Inspector Barrett that
00:22:58 on with Chief Inspector Barrett that certainly the the police command structure was in place we had a gold with an experienced superintendent who was actually on duty at the time and the
00:23:09 was actually on duty at the time and the call-out procedures for a chief officer to arrive whilst clearly I will be making command decisions that are looking forward and how we will be managing the incident going forward that
00:23:21 managing the incident going forward that I was confident we'd had a come-up we've got a command structure in place gold and silver and that that was appropriate at that time
00:23:38 now going back to your statement and going back to what you told us a moment to go based on your note we may need to have both open you say paragraph 49 if
00:23:50 have both open you say paragraph 49 if your statement on page 14 Chief Inspector Barrett further informed me that he had deployed the MPS controller
00:24:02 that he had deployed the MPS controller and start on two nine nine nine calls this meant that there were no callers waiting for their call to be answered we covered that just a moment ago very briefly but I just want to explore that a bit more with you and commander and
00:24:13 a bit more with you and commander and first of all was this deployment something that had been done exceptionally but you can SPECT about so
00:24:27 exceptionally but you can SPECT about so it doesn't happen as a matter of routine but it certainly does happen when there's exceptional volume of calls coming through that we would work with the other emergency services in order to assist them we also do the same with
00:24:39 assist them we also do the same with other police forces as well so it's not unusual but it's not common
00:24:48 do you know what time that Chief Inspector Barrett had deployed the MPS control staff to deal with Grenfell town nine nine nine calls no I do not did he tell you no do you know whether
00:25:03 did he tell you no do you know whether he'd done so in liaison with the London Fire Brigade so whilst I don't know what the the precise procedure is my assumption is you could only do that
00:25:15 assumption is you could only do that once you had been in a consultation and a conversation with the London Fire Brigade because you wouldn't know the volumes of 999 course and the fact that you had people dialing in on the 911
00:25:27 you had people dialing in on the 911 system do you know whether Chief Inspector Barrett found out from his opposite number or from the control room staff that at Stratford the lfb control
00:25:40 staff that at Stratford the lfb control room starts at Stratford what advice the control room staff were giving - nine nine nine callers from Granville tower I'm sorry I don't know we don't do you know whether he instructed the Met
00:25:52 you know whether he instructed the Met control net control room staff himself whether he delegated that to somebody else
00:25:56 else I'm sorry doll I would I would assume that there was a delegation involved but I don't know for certain now you have
00:26:07 I don't know for certain now you have exhibited as exhibit number two to your statement and it's M et triple zero to three to nine one a summary we can just have a look at that it's a summary of
00:26:21 have a look at that it's a summary of nine nine nine rules are handled by the MPS control room will met CC and you've
00:26:33 MPS control room will met CC and you've put a column in as we can see the second column from the right which says advise and then we can see that it tends to vary evacuate stay evacuate stay
00:26:44 vary evacuate stay evacuate stay evacuate evacuate stay etc when you compile this summary did you yourself study each transcript now so that was produced for me so I didn't go through
00:26:57 produced for me so I didn't go through each and every one no right did you go through any of them I've not each transcript no I went through the summary that was produced for me I see so you didn't cross check
00:27:09 for me I see so you didn't cross check the summary with the underlying transcripts no I did not who prepared this for you do you know that would have been one of our legal professionals or
00:27:20 been one of our legal professionals or but okay when you were given this summary and looked at it as you said you did did you note that the advice appears to have varied as between MPs control
00:27:31 to have varied as between MPs control room staff prior to 2:00 a.m. that's right it does vary what did what did you take away from noting that so my my
00:27:42 take away from noting that so my my reflections on that are that clearly our operators are listening to individuals on the telephone and
00:27:56 on the telephone and clearly they're wanting to save life as well and they wanting to save their lives and I think that each individual is making an assessment based upon what they're hearing and the call at the time
00:28:07 they're hearing and the call at the time so whilst I can see that there is stay-put advice that people are following but I can also see that there are individuals there are core takers that are probably listening to those those people on the other end of the
00:28:19 those people on the other end of the line and making an investment with them to say look I think that you do have a chance to get out so I can see that they're making those flexible decisions
00:28:33 they're making those flexible decisions based upon what they're hearing at the time and clearly not rigidly adhering to to the advice that had been given to them and I suspect that in many of those cases they would have actually have saved people's lives as well well from
00:28:47 saved people's lives as well well from your knowledge do you know whether or not met CC control room staff are trained in how to advise a caller who is
00:28:59 trained in how to advise a caller who is calling from a burning building I don't know do you know whether they're trained in or have any knowledge of any of the London Fire Brigades policies on that subject I don't know you don't know
00:29:19 on the night itself did you know or come to learn that the advice that was being given by met cc control room staff tended to vary from caller phone
00:29:31 tended to vary from caller phone operator to operator in Alberta caller no I wasn't here subsequently right would you have expected there to be a consistent approach adopted by met CC
00:29:42 consistent approach adopted by met CC control room staff so our operators are having to make decisions often life-and-death not not talking with
00:29:54 life-and-death not not talking with regards to the fire but life-and-death decisions when they're talking to distress members of the public and are making those decisions in the very best interests of those individuals they're
00:30:05 interests of those individuals they're talking to so clearly London has been through a very traumatic period in the last 18 months and many of those operators would have spoken to individuals at the time they will know what the advice is within those
00:30:16 what the advice is within those circumstances but they'll also be assessing and using that advice and applying it to the circumstances that they hear at the time so these are our operators are making very fluid
00:30:28 operators are making very fluid judgement calls based upon what they're actually hearing at the time and not rigidly following a a script or a procedure they're making sure that they're given the very best advice in
00:30:39 they're given the very best advice in the circumstances that they hear because those circumstances will vary yes the circumstances will vary but you wouldn't expect would you the policy or the basic ground rules of how to give advice to
00:30:50 ground rules of how to give advice to vary would you so there would be clearly that make an assessment and and we are one of the things that we are trained in using is a decision-making model and one
00:31:03 using is a decision-making model and one of those is clearly taking into account policies and procedures but also making sure that you apply those to the circumstances that are present before you but there is a consistency in how you arrived at that decision making
00:31:14 you arrived at that decision making process well it may be commander you can't help me with this but in your experience in general terms how experienced is the Met CC as a control
00:31:27 experienced is the Met CC as a control room in giving advice to callers from burning buildings that would be certainly in this instance quite rare albeit that as I said in my
00:31:39 quite rare albeit that as I said in my evidence yesterday it is not uncommon to receive fire calls about about tower blocks but in these circumstances this
00:31:50 blocks but in these circumstances this is very very rare and normally is this right normally when the Met CC receives a call from a caller and a burning tower block that would be handed over to the lfb and it would be then dealt with by their controller so I don't know about
00:32:05 their controller so I don't know about certainly in my experience it wouldn't be quite as cold as that so the operator clearly is going to take some information from the caller in order to
00:32:16 information from the caller in order to maximize the chances of saving people's lives before then indeed maybe transferring it over well let me be a bit more specific well is this right that all weather operator might well
00:32:27 that all weather operator might well take initial details name address perhaps the conditions mass of that nature when it came to specific advice to the caller would the end with the Met CC operator then hand the call to the
00:32:40 CC operator then hand the call to the LFP control room or would they go further and take upon themselves the giving of that advice as to whether to stay or to get out and and to assist the caller in assessing whether it was safe
00:32:51 caller in assessing whether it was safe to get out I don't know that level of detail sorry would you expect the London Fire Brigade to be in contact itself with the Metropolitan police control
00:33:02 with the Metropolitan police control room Met CC supervisor so as to ensure that the advice that was being given by the Met CeCe's control room about whether to stay or to leave was
00:33:13 whether to stay or to leave was consistent with the LF B's advice and so I would expect those conversations to take place and I would expect that the lfb supervisor would be in contact with us I don't on the night in terms of
00:33:25 us I don't on the night in terms of whether those those checks in terms of consistency but clearly I would expect those conversations to be taking place do you have a recollection of when
00:33:38 do you have a recollection of when during the night let me try this again do you remember being told during the night that the stay-put advice had changed and that the advice was now to evacuate I do recall that happening it
00:33:51 evacuate I do recall that happening it was at some time later on sometime between oh four twenty and and later but I can't recall exactly when that took
00:34:02 I can't recall exactly when that took place your recollection is that that took place between or after 4:20 so after your briefing that she perspective less I I can recall but I haven't made a note of it that someone did mention that
00:34:15 note of it that someone did mention that the state put it vice had changed during the course of that night and you put your learning moment after 4:20 yeah you remember whether you were told at that time that it had changed earlier or that it had now change to know that it
00:34:27 it had now change to know that it changed much earlier right and did you discover when that was and I you did I
00:34:33 were looking at your schedule you look at for example it's not really an
00:34:45 at for example it's not really an example but it's a last of them on the page where it says stay 9 3 2 is the CAD reference time of call 3:05 advice stay
00:34:57 reference time of call 3:05 advice stay caller this is the police I'm trying to I'm trying to get someone to you but you need to tell me where you are
00:35:06 whoever has read the transcript has interpreted that as a stay assuming that's right because I didn't you can help us with that were you aware that that was some 15 minutes or so at least
00:35:21 that was some 15 minutes or so at least after the lfb had revoked the stay-put advice and was now advising all callers to leave yes that's right can you
00:35:32 to leave yes that's right can you account for that can you account for why that advice was being given by your control room even at that stage no I'm sorry I can't [Music]
00:35:48 if this is to some extent a hypothetical question but if in fact the Met CC was giving stay put stay put advise at or around this time 3:05 then assuming that
00:36:05 around this time 3:05 then assuming that that was not the same advice as the advice now being given by the lfb my question is is that consistent with the approach required by the principles of joint working as set out in the Jesuit
00:36:17 joint working as set out in the Jesuit document the joint doctrine interoperability framework so again if so I think it would be useful to actually look at 9:32
00:36:29 actually look at 9:32 if we do have it available to go go through that CAD but if not then clearly in the interests of Jessup and that John working and the sharing of sharing of
00:36:40 working and the sharing of sharing of information then that clearly should have taken place and so I didn't quite catch that last part of that then that should have taken place has taken place yes I'm not going to go through CAD 9:32
00:36:51 yes I'm not going to go through CAD 9:32 because you didn't and therefore I'm not going to do it with you here now but I know your answer can I turn them to the heli tele downlink and get back to paragraph 49 of
00:37:04 downlink and get back to paragraph 49 of your statement please commander you say four lines down from the start of that
00:37:16 four lines down from the start of that paragraph the National Police air service were requested by the control room to provide assistance and emergency
00:37:27 room to provide assistance and emergency services are allowed to deploy into such temporary flight restriction zones to help assist with dealing with the incident in accordance with the rules laid down by the Civil Aviation Authority now and do you know what
00:37:38 Authority now and do you know what specific assistance n pass the National Police Air Service were asked to provide so I know that the crest was provided to
00:37:51 so I know that the crest was provided to the National Police earth Service to lift earlier on in the evening I don't know precisely what they were told in terms of
00:37:59 terms of the assistance that they would be given they would ask to be given when you say
00:38:12 they would ask to be given when you say I think in that our last answer the request was provided to lift earlier in the earlier on in the evening that's what the transcribers taken from your answer what did you say that yes so
00:38:24 answer what did you say that yes so that's a that's a technical term for me for the deployment of a helicopter oh I see
00:38:29 see right so the request I didn't take Holloway gosh yes the the the common phrase would be to take off I thought because that might cause confusion it
00:38:42 because that might cause confusion it caused confusion with me but not lift people off a building but absolutely I'll not go to the building so as I said yesterday the sonne of the police helicopters do not have a rescue
00:38:54 helicopters do not have a rescue function was the deployment of an n paths helicopter an automatic jzip response by the police to a major incident so it would be a consideration
00:39:07 incident so it would be a consideration and certainly in my experience that using helicopters do provide you with an additional additional perspective on an
00:39:18 additional additional perspective on an incident whether you're dealing with public order or whether you're dealing with with a major incident such as this yes and do you know as I say I think I
00:39:30 yes and do you know as I say I think I think I take from your last answer that it's not a an automatic jezic response to a major incident does that mean that somebody would then have to apply their mind and make a specific decision yeah there's a context of a major incident
00:39:41 there's a context of a major incident whether to deploy a helicopter yes do you know who that was I don't know do you know why it was no I do not right now
00:39:48 now can I just ask you to look at CAD 4:8 - I want to ask you about the heli telly downlink itself if you go to CAD for 8 -
00:40:01 downlink itself if you go to CAD for 8 - please and turn in it - page 22
00:40:09 just above the bottom of the page at a time mark of oh three 23:36 we'll just wait for it to come up on the the screen
00:40:20 wait for it to come up on the the screen that's MIT triple zero two three to nine for CAD four eight to page 22
00:40:34 thank you just a little bit above the bottom of the page of the time mark of ode 323 36 you can see GT a su FYI Oh II
00:40:47 ode 323 36 you can see GT a su FYI Oh II 21 n have to portable down links on board and on route to scene 4 lfb and police to view Haley Telepictures first of all I think it's right that
00:40:58 first of all I think it's right that some inspector Thatcher told us yesterday GTA su was the GT controlled room at Lambeth that's right and fYI I don't know what that means early to 1n what is that so I certainly
00:41:13 early to 1n what is that so I certainly know what fYI is she's for your information but the rest of it I would presume that's a callsign right okay and they have two portable down links as we can read there and where you were made
00:41:25 can read there and where you were made where you made it where at any point that the lfb were not receiving the heli tele downlink from the helicopters no so
00:41:36 tele downlink from the helicopters no so at this point 3:23 you finished your conversation with Cheevers back to Barrett and we're on route to Lambeth did Chief Inspector Barrett during his
00:41:48 did Chief Inspector Barrett during his first substantive call with you at 2:30 tell you that there were difficulties in receiving the heli Terry darling no did you get any information while enroute that this problem had emerged no did you
00:42:00 that this problem had emerged no did you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett when you arrived at GT Lambeth that this problem had now emerged and I does it come to a surprise as a surprise to you to find out that there was no
00:42:12 to you to find out that there was no operating heli telle down link between the helicopter and the other piece command units clearly we would expect those to work I wouldn't expect that that information to come directly to me
00:42:25 that information to come directly to me my role of gold I'll expect that to be be resolved other levels but clearly having a helicopter and having the ability to view the downlink would be of
00:42:38 ability to view the downlink would be of great assistance yeah and do you know even now why the command units at the lfp were not able to receive the heli tele downlink no I
00:42:49 to receive the heli tele downlink no I do not do you know why the lfb will not put in direct radio contact with the helicopter pilot no sorry I do not you
00:43:02 helicopter pilot no sorry I do not you don't do you know whether they should have been so on our air wave systems and really I don't know I mean definitely lfb once but there is a facility from
00:43:15 lfb once but there is a facility from ground to air to just patch in and speak to the to the air support unit yes do you know why it wasn't used no I do not what you said a moment ago and with your answer that you would expect the curing
00:43:31 answer that you would expect the curing of the defect with the operating helical or non operating heli tele downlink to be resolved at other levels who would you expect to have resolved that issue on the night so if there's the ability
00:43:43 on the night so if there's the ability clearly for individuals who know how to operate the technical aspects of that to done so my reading of that is that that
00:43:55 done so my reading of that is that that people were trying to find a workaround in order to work around some of those technical difficulties that were being experienced do you know whether the
00:44:07 experienced do you know whether the portable down links well let me ask you this do you know what these portable down links are no you don't know right okay so you won't be able to help me with my next question there which is why
00:44:18 with my next question there which is why they won't take it into the command unit and used by the lfb I do not okay do you know if the airwave channel on which an pass messages were being communicated we're available to the lfb
00:44:30 communicated we're available to the lfb so i don't know for certain no you know I do know one our police handsets there is a ground to where channel and I would assume that they would be the same further London Fire Brigade as well yes
00:44:44 further London Fire Brigade as well yes but certainly each each handset is programmed slightly differently
00:44:54 can I ask you to go to your log of the night which is M et triple zero two three two eight nine and go to page
00:45:10 three two eight nine and go to page eight
00:45:15 near the bottom of the page you can see just above 5 a.m. it says arranging briefing with Paul walnut he was the I think he was the
00:45:29 walnut he was the I think he was the gold from who you took over yes you taken over from him had you taken over from him
00:45:36 from him prior to 5 a.m. yes I had ok say that the was it that briefing during which you took over from him so I took over I
00:45:47 you took over from him so I took over I received the briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett that was a tow for 20 side then considered that I was in a in within the Special Operations room that
00:45:59 within the Special Operations room that I'd received the briefing that I was then in a position to assume command right now that's cold okay it's going to tie this up then with your statement paragraph 50 at page 14 I'll just go
00:46:12 paragraph 50 at page 14 I'll just go back to that
00:46:19 you say there once I'd arrived at GT and received the briefing from chief inspector bat at 4:10 I was of the view
00:46:30 inspector bat at 4:10 I was of the view that command could now transfer to me I undertook the road of gold commander at that point now did you do so after
00:46:41 that point now did you do so after having had a briefing from superintendent walnut no so I assumed command before I had that briefing from superintendent walnut and right when you
00:46:55 superintendent walnut and right when you assumed that role therefore you were working on the basis of the briefing given to you by Chief Inspector Barrett yes right when you had your briefing
00:47:07 yes right when you had your briefing with Paul walnut superintendent walnut
00:47:11 was it a detailed briefing it would it was sufficiently detail for me to
00:47:22 was sufficiently detail for me to confirm what I've received from Chief Inspector Barrett and enough for me to confirm that I was I was making command decisions right did you did he did he
00:47:35 decisions right did you did he did he say anything to you about statehood advice at that stage much of that stage did he say anything to you about the problems with a heli telly downlink no do you remember what he did tell you so
00:47:48 do you remember what he did tell you so do you think got a later conference call that I've recorded with him I didn't record that that initial briefing that I took before or five o'clock which was
00:47:59 took before or five o'clock which was the first strategic coordinating group with Paul on it I haven't recorded unfortunately do you know what superintendent walnuts warned its role was once you'd assume gold command then
00:48:11 was once you'd assume gold command then he would become silver he became silver yes and does that mean that the state of Thatcher became bronze or did you come out of the structure so what because of
00:48:23 out of the structure so what because of the gold silver bronze structure what you could have with an inn with an inspector such as such as Nick Thatcher he could then become effectively working with silver so yeah you would
00:48:36 working with silver so yeah you would only have ever have one silver but clear because of the continuity because of everything that was taking place because of the complexity the fast-paced nature of the incident that Nick Thatcher could
00:48:48 of the incident that Nick Thatcher could then assist mr. Warnock with with his discharge of his functions of silver right I said once you had assumed gold command what was your plan so my plan
00:49:01 command what was your plan so my plan was very simply to preserve protect life as much as we could and I think I've detailed in my notes just very very briefly what that what that initial plan
00:49:13 briefly what that what that initial plan was does that at page 80 any T triple zero to three to eight nine yes
00:49:25 zero to three to eight nine yes so the initial the initial planning is very simply in those very very early stages that you would go straight to our
00:49:36 stages that you would go straight to our core duty protect and preserve life and then provide assistance to those individuals who are injured as well as providing assistance to those individuals who are evacuated right
00:49:55 now you say that apart from well you say that you were your world essentially to attend and share the strategic away from group meetings and you did those at five
00:50:06 group meetings and you did those at five o'clock a.m. and 6:30 a.m. - right and continuing throughout the yes in addition I in the rest of the days in addition to those meetings did you carry out any other actions in your role as
00:50:18 out any other actions in your role as gold commander so everything would come through the strategic coordinating group there would be elements where silver would come to split the police silver sorry the police silver would come to me
00:50:30 sorry the police silver would come to me and then we would then agree whatever it was that they come to me and they would keep a separate record of those now turning to the strategic coordination meetings you cover these from paragraph
00:50:43 meetings you cover these from paragraph 54 onwards of your statement at the foot of page 15 if I could just ask you please to go to that calendar page 15 of your statement you say
00:50:59 your statement you say the first meeting of the strategic coordinating group took place at 5:00 a.m. this indeed this initial meeting was focused on ensuring there was a common shared situational awareness of
00:51:11 common shared situational awareness of the incident and was largely concerned with each agency providing a situation report of their response and putting in place an initial multi-agency strategy
00:51:23 when you say an initial multi-agency strategy do we take from that that there there was until that point 5:00 a.m. no multi-agency strategy so my
00:51:37 multi-agency strategy so my understanding that there was clearly what I would need to do is making make sure that that multi Aegis multi-agency strategy was was appropriate given the time scale and the information that we
00:51:48 time scale and the information that we were receiving a strategy is not a fixed point it doesn't it remains flexible and must change according to the updated information that's coming in yes I just
00:52:01 information that's coming in yes I just wonder why you use the word initial there in your statement Wow so for me because that would be my first digit coordinating group that would be the
00:52:12 coordinating group that would be the first multi-agency strategy of bringing all of the London resilience Forum together that would be the first opportunity for that to take place clearly that does not prevent that
00:52:24 clearly that does not prevent that earlier on there is that joint strategy of working together to save people's lives so does that mean that before 5:00 a.m. there was a joint strategy it just wasn't as it were a London resilience
00:52:36 wasn't as it were a London resilience forum joint strategy yes what could you just explain the difference so the London resilience forum brings together other other responders other than the blue light emergency services so clearly
00:52:47 blue light emergency services so clearly before that point the the initial part would have been mainly first first responders the London resilience forum is wider than just the first responders
00:53:09 would the methane message which would normally be sent at the point at which a
00:53:21 normally be sent at the point at which a major incident is declared not engage agencies wider than the blue light agencies certainly at that point not
00:53:32 agencies certainly at that point not necessarily it would be very much focused on what the the primary objectives are and the resources you've got available and in a fast-moving complex where people's lives are at risk
00:53:44 complex where people's lives are at risk then I would expect that it would be focused on those on those arrangements we're all absolutely clear as emergency responders but our first duty is and that's to save people's lives yeah
00:53:56 that's to save people's lives yeah say do I take it from that that at this point you you didn't have an multi-agency strategy under the umbrella of the London resilience forum did that
00:54:10 of the London resilience forum did that mean that up until that point there was no shared agency strategy outside the blue light on the emergency services so I believe that there would be the
00:54:21 I believe that there would be the purpose of putting in place this is as as you're moving into a stage where more and more plants are coming around the table what you need to be absolutely
00:54:32 table what you need to be absolutely clear of is and my role as the chair of the strategic coordinated group is making sure that we're all aligned and we know what our priorities are that's the purpose of making sure that we have
00:54:43 the purpose of making sure that we have this in place at this point 5:00 a.m. did you know that the council had already triggered their own emergency
00:54:55 already triggered their own emergency response in accordance with their own policy yes I must have done because I know that there were local authority representatives at that meeting at the
00:55:07 representatives at that meeting at the at Lambeth at 5:00 a.m. at 5 o'clock who was there can I refer to me we can go to your native you like
00:55:34 so from the local authority there is a Stuart priestly David carry marks soya right just to be clear
00:55:45 right just to be clear can I ask you to look please at M et triple 0 - 3 - 9 - I'm turning that document to page 3
00:56:04 I'm so sorry I given you the wrong reference it's M et triple zero two three two eight seven that's the that's the London resilience s e-g minutes with
00:56:20 the London resilience s e-g minutes with the 5:00 a.m. meeting that's right when I just gave you is the 6:30 a.m. meeting and if you go to page three of that document you can see the local authority
00:56:34 document you can see the local authority representatives Stuart Priestley David Carey and mark soya were they physically present at Lambeth or were they patched in by telephone I can't remember right I
00:56:45 in by telephone I can't remember right I know I can't remember right were they that was this the first time that you engaged with those individuals all those yes representatives now go back to a
00:56:59 yes representatives now go back to a page in the document you can see item 1 1lf be requested attendance by a structural engineer due to concerns over
00:57:10 structural engineer due to concerns over the structural integrity of the building the engineer is now confirmed on the scene to your knowledge was that the first time that the lfp had requested attendance or earlier on in the night so
00:57:23 attendance or earlier on in the night so that would have come from the London Fire Brigade representative Richard Mills yes that's right so I clearly I don't know at what time they they made
00:57:35 don't know at what time they they made that call and then at paragraph 3 one under the title situation brief you can see it says at a 55 LFP was called to the incident in north kensington a block of flats of 24 floors grenfell Tower
00:57:47 of flats of 24 floors grenfell Tower West one the building is alight from the second to the 24th floor approximately a hundred individuals involved lfb has declared a major incident did anybody
00:57:58 declared a major incident did anybody say at that meeting that in fact the Metropolitan Police had also declared a major incident we just read down through
00:58:24 no they did not but then I was aware that we had so within my knowledge I was clearly aware that the police had also declared a major incident and had done so in some 35 minutes before the
00:58:36 done so in some 35 minutes before the lfb had done yes and how was this meeting updated with the priorities that
00:58:47 meeting updated with the priorities that were being adopted at that time on the incident ground itself
00:59:08 so at the end of my note which I've got is two three two eight nine and page
00:59:20 is two three two eight nine and page nine of that yes so we're about a third
00:59:31 nine of that yes so we're about a third of the way down it says save life informed public welfare of staff so there will have been a conversation
00:59:42 there will have been a conversation during that over five hundred meeting that was not recorded in the minutes about the priorities it also says difficulty gaining access
00:59:55 it also says difficulty gaining access fifteenth floor above a waiting sit update do you know how long after this meeting you had to wait to get a
01:00:07 meeting you had to wait to get a situational update I said during the course of that night there were situational updates coming in incredibly regularly right so it wasn't as though
01:00:21 regularly right so it wasn't as though you have these periodically every hour on every hour and a half they would have been coming in pretty instantly and going back to the role of the RB kc representatives Priestley Carrie and
01:00:33 representatives Priestley Carrie and soya do you know what their duties entailed or rather than what what they were actually doing so the the role of the local authority are there primarily to provide the humanitarian assistance
01:00:46 to provide the humanitarian assistance so there would be opening out casualty and survivor represent centers did anybody at the meeting mention the the
01:00:58 anybody at the meeting mention the the fact that the London Fire Brigade had asked for plans of the building
01:01:18 not
01:01:26 now
01:01:33 but at an earlier meeting in the command unit between DAC O'Laughlin who was the incident commander at that time and
01:01:44 incident commander at that time and inspector thatcher who was silver at that time and i say time it was about 240 DAC O'Laughlin identifies as the
01:01:57 240 DAC O'Laughlin identifies as the first and biggest thing that the LF be needed from the Metropolitan Police was identifying the people and the casualties I can show you a clip of the
01:02:08 casualties I can show you a clip of the body worn video if you like but take your take it from me that that is what is is said by the time of your involvement and by the time of this first meeting of 5:00 a.m. of the scg
01:02:21 first meeting of 5:00 a.m. of the scg did you appreciate the importance of that function identification of people and casualties to l FB search and rescue function yes so yesterday I described the role of a
01:02:34 so yesterday I described the role of a casualty Bureau and taking information from a number of different sources that includes the hospital includes the survivor reception centers so that we have an accurate picture of individuals
01:02:45 have an accurate picture of individuals that may or may not still be within Grenfell tower now it took time a thing for that casualty bureau to be set up as we heard yesterday i think some four
01:02:59 we heard yesterday i think some four hours as you're I'm told it was instructed to be set up at 2:30 and got set up about 6:30 that's right that period of four hours knowing maybe put it he was rather long was it not if in
01:03:12 it he was rather long was it not if in fact what was supposed to be happening is that the NFP were trying to know who had been cleared from particular flats and who had not so whilst the casualty Bureau is a formal formal process and a
01:03:23 Bureau is a formal formal process and a very formal structure in terms of getting that information in clearly in the meantime of that taking place officers on the ground and working with the London Fire Brigade and also with
01:03:35 the London Fire Brigade and also with the London Ambulance Service of getting those records of who's who's come out that's clearly going to be difficult because there will be individuals who will
01:03:45 will self evacuated and not gone to a to a recognized center they the the community were absolutely outstanding in helping one another and clearly bringing that
01:03:58 one another and clearly bringing that assistance to other human beings who are in peril is is one of the one of the things that really does stand out from this absolute tragedy so there isn't a
01:04:10 this absolute tragedy so there isn't a clean and clinical way of gathering all of that all of that information it's going to be complex it's going to be multiple sources multiple places just trying to understand who's come out and
01:04:23 trying to understand who's come out and who may well be remaining in there and and certainly I'm aware that officers and Corden's were speaking to people on the corners to try and get that information through what was your
01:04:34 information through what was your understanding of how survivors from the tower were actually being identified so it would be my understanding that we would be taking names names and
01:04:46 would be taking names names and addresses from people as they've as as we would engage with them right and say what say what your officers would speak to evacuees yes and what was the system
01:04:59 to evacuees yes and what was the system for for doing that well it was there a system for doing that so I think it would be certainly in those circumstances I think it would be very dealing with it as it happened as you
01:05:13 dealing with it as it happened as you came across people and who was doing that so I think that would be a whole host of different officers who are coming coming in contact with people I think the priority at that point though was clearly people have come out but
01:05:25 was clearly people have come out but also identifying individuals who remain within the tower and seeing what we could do to try and save them yeah and what was what did your officers I
01:05:36 what was what did your officers I actually do together with the lfb to facilitate that aim so I don't know don't in an absolute data right
01:05:47 now we know that the VLE LSP major incident manual document provides for survivor reception centers and friends and relatives reception centers to be
01:05:59 and relatives reception centers to be set up so that survivors can be met by police and other services and enables survivors to be documented and missing persons then to be identified and have
01:06:11 persons then to be identified and have information submitted about them and can I ask you did you appreciate at the time that the primary responsibility for setting up these centers rested with the police supported by the local authority
01:06:23 police supported by the local authority so my understanding at that point was because the police don't have access to buildings that would enable that to take place that that would be the role of the
01:06:34 place that that would be the role of the local authority to do so right and did you'd have any discussion with the local authority about how they were going to be setting up those centers so I didn't but I was assured from the O 500 meeting
01:06:46 but I was assured from the O 500 meeting that that was in the process clearly it says that to rest centers were open and a further three premises to be opened right and we picked that up at paragraph 3 point 8 yes if we can just get back to
01:06:57 3 point 8 yes if we can just get back to it at a meaty triple zero to 3 to 87
01:07:10 under the rubric shelf up under the word shelter and care including access to medication to be provided for evacuated people our bkc adult social care arrangements to be developed to rest centers open further three premises to
01:07:23 centers open further three premises to be able to shelter people likely to consolidate later in the morning and then you can see the reference to the casualty beer under 3.10 my question is
01:07:39 casualty beer under 3.10 my question is what a rank one involvement did your officers have in the establishment of those centers so specifically I don't
01:07:53 those centers so specifically I don't know right and water rain what involvement did your officers have in going to those centers and assisting evacuated people with identifying themselves and and those loved ones who
01:08:06 themselves and and those loved ones who were still in the tower so as to be able to relay that back to the lfb to assist with their search and rescue so again specifically again I don't know precisely the answer to that but it
01:08:19 precisely the answer to that but it would be my my understanding that our officers would be going there albeit that recognizing that our primary focus is to save life as well
01:08:35 and you know what your officers role was if any in overseeing the documentation of the survivors and gathering or providing information in relation to residents who may be still in the tower
01:08:47 residents who may be still in the tower or who were missing no I do not come on des thank you very much I've come to the end of the questions I have for you I've been getting nearly an hour there may be one or two more I just want to double-check I've I've covered mr.
01:08:59 double-check I've I've covered mr. chairman this may be appropriate for a break now yes well I think we'll have the usual mid-morning break ten minutes and then when we come back commander
01:09:11 and then when we come back commander will have an idea whether there are more questions that we need to ask you thank you all right so you know ask you to go to the ocean now if you would not to talk to anyone about sure evidence when you're out of the room and we will
01:09:22 you're out of the room and we will resume the bastard thank you
01:09:38 The Tempest lemon please
01:20:50 all right come on now I haven't actually asked mr. militant I suspect he has got some Christmas a few but not not very many commander um the first is about the call handler
01:21:05 um the first is about the call handler handling the advice on CAD 932 at 3:05 I know you wanted to see that I'm not gonna show it to you but I am good to take you back to your your witness statement to paragraph 35 if I can please
01:21:18 page 11 where you've exhibited CAD 482 and you say this shows that at 308 a
01:21:30 and you say this shows that at 308 a message was received by the MPS control room from the lfp stating that fire safety guidance had changed and that those inside the building ought to escape by any means possible - my current understanding is that that
01:21:41 current understanding is that that message was communicated across the airways to officers shortly before 310 so to be fair to you when I asked you about whether or not the call that we
01:21:53 about whether or not the call that we see in your exhibit na j2 which was finally at 3:05 was was inconsistent
01:22:08 finally at 3:05 was was inconsistent with the advice that had then changed and putting the two together is that right there would be my understanding yes right so would that mean and it
01:22:20 yes right so would that mean and it it's your guess is as good as mine but to be fair to you would that mean that in fact that particular control room operator at met CC had not yet heard or been given the message that the advice
01:22:34 been given the message that the advice was now to evacuate because the first time that was broadcast from met CC to all officers was at 308 yes that could well be the case yes but I think it
01:22:45 well be the case yes but I think it remains the case that you still can't explain why that is so given that the LF beam had changed the advice at 247 latest that's why I did honor now just
01:22:57 latest that's why I did honor now just continuing in the same topic can I take you back please to your note of the night
01:23:04 night at MIT triple zero to three to eight nine at page eight this is your incident management log first part and you say
01:23:15 management log first part and you say there and we looked at it earlier it's a third of the way down the page everyone on two nine nine nine no waiters and you told us that that confirmed that the Met
01:23:28 told us that that confirmed that the Met CC was taking Grenville calls yes do you know the mechanics of how that would work in terms of bt connecting cause I'm
01:23:39 work in terms of bt connecting cause I'm sorry I know that would be a technical question I don't know the art do you know whether there are any protocols that the Met has with bt as to how they would put calls through to the Met or through to a another control room which
01:23:52 through to a another control room which was not an Effie no I'm sorry I don't know different question hell it back to helicopters again
01:24:03 helicopters again can I ask you please to go to our BK it's triple zero one three to nine four and within that please to go to page 37
01:24:14 and within that please to go to page 37 this is the LEL SP so an le s LP major incident procedure manual version 9 point 4 2015 paragraph ten point one point three and you could see there what
01:24:29 point three and you could see there what helicopters can provide by way of the following support facilities and there's a list of bullet points there airborne command and control etc would any of
01:24:40 command and control etc would any of those support facilities in the context of a fire involving the lfb be available in the absence of a functioning heli
01:24:52 in the absence of a functioning heli tele downlink
01:25:00 could you rephrase that question again for me please yes looking at those that list of support facilities that are
01:25:12 list of support facilities that are available when an NPS helicopter is deployed would any of those be available in the absence of a heli tele downlink
01:25:25 in the absence of a heli tele downlink so any text of a fire yes so clearly we would provide that evidential video the capture of the scene clearly from a perspective of a helicopter you wouldn't
01:25:36 perspective of a helicopter you wouldn't be able to get that from the ground the airborne command and control in the immediate aftermath of an incident that wouldn't be applicable in this particular incidents the overview of the
01:25:50 particular incidents the overview of the scene clearly that would give you an addition allottee from an airborne perspective caret research and assessment of numbers in my evidence yes yes of my experience that that's more
01:26:02 yes of my experience that that's more around searching of large open spaces identical identification of president potential hazards clearly that that that would give again an airborne of view of
01:26:14 would give again an airborne of view of maybe some of those transportation of personnel and equipment that wouldn't be appropriate in these circumstances weather conditions and wind direction at scene that would clearly be available by
01:26:28 scene that would clearly be available by it by other means but it would give the degree of drift of the burning material that's falling from from the building and weather emergency services on the
01:26:39 and weather emergency services on the scene would need to extend the cordon at all the area at containment including chord and deployment infringement that would you would get that from officers
01:26:50 would you would get that from officers on the ground as well however it does give you that their wider perspective and the traffic management route planning clearly one of the one of the primary roles for us in supporting the
01:27:01 primary roles for us in supporting the London Fire Brigade is allowing not just them but other emergency course access to and fro off the scene so that would give you that perspective that you may not necessarily quite get from the from the ground itself and then
01:27:14 from the from the ground itself and then imagery at the scene including photographs and video thermal imaging that would give you a different perspective of that just following up on on that in relation to the third fourth and fifth bullet points so immediate
01:27:26 and fifth bullet points so immediate overview of the scene etc casualty search stroke assessment of numbers and identification of present or potential hazards let me suggest you that it must be right mustn't it that in the absence
01:27:38 be right mustn't it that in the absence of a heli tele Dan link between the NPS helicopter and the l FB command unit these support facilities offered by the
01:27:49 these support facilities offered by the helicopter in relation to those functions would be very severely limited so the operators within the helicopter are incredibly experienced and what they
01:28:01 are incredibly experienced and what they would be able to do is convey that verbally to the to those on the ground it wouldn't necessarily rely entirely upon a holy tele downlink so they would be providing their their own assessment
01:28:12 be providing their their own assessment clearly they would but without the visual as a repeat the question the LF B's ability to gain support from the facility would be very severely limited
01:28:24 facility would be very severely limited um I wouldn't say severely limited I mean it clearly it would be of benefit absolutely it would but also of benefit is the fact that the operators within the helicopter would be talking to those on the ground as well and describing
01:28:36 on the ground as well and describing what they are seeing in the hazards can I ask you to their gang then gave back in this document different slightly different topic back in this document to
01:28:47 different topic back in this document to page 11
01:28:51 so we're still within the le SLP major incident procedure manual but at page 11 they were dealing with the local
01:29:04 they were dealing with the local authority
01:29:12 you can see that there's reference under 382 to local authority gold and the ll ACC and under 3.9 the local authority
01:29:23 ACC and under 3.9 the local authority liaison officer Lalo the Lalo is the senior representative of the affected borough who is able to react to requests for local authority assistance but is
01:29:34 for local authority assistance but is the on-scene liaison point for count to the council and you could see what the Lalo is required to do although we don't see reference to it in the le SL p
01:29:47 see reference to it in the le SL p itself would you expect the Lalo's role to include the provision of plans of the building in an incident such as this so if they had that within clearly if it's
01:30:00 if they had that within clearly if it's a council building a trip to Council to access then I would expect that to be the case yes would you expect the lower layer to be able to provide a list of residents yes it would would you be able
01:30:11 residents yes it would would you be able would you expect the Lalo to be able to identify vulnerable residents such as those who were partially sighted or non-sighted all those with mobility difficulties certainly vulnerabilities
01:30:24 difficulties certainly vulnerabilities yes come on - thank you very much I've come to the end of my you just wait one
01:30:36 come to the end of my you just wait one Damon I'm sorry I'm
01:30:42 I'm asked to ask you as you can see from once just happened as could the helicopter have used the public address system and we could a helicopter have used a public address system such as a
01:30:53 used a public address system such as a megaphone or some other kind of way of communicating with residents so it does have access to to that whether that
01:31:05 have access to to that whether that would have been heard or not I don't know so I don't know specifically the answer to that question and what is that access how does it work functionally do you know I'm sorry
01:31:21 thank you very much commander I have no further questions for you
01:31:29 come on thank you very much I've no further questions can I say thank you very much to you for coming along and assisting the inquiry with our investigations we very much appreciate it
01:31:38 it so thank you thank you I'd like to add my thanks commander I'm sorry that we had to call you back for a second day and thank you for coming back to the same day and your evidence is very
01:31:49 same day and your evidence is very helpful it's another piece in the jigsaw puzzle which we're trying to put together so we're very grateful to you for coming along to tell us what you could thank you thank you very much and now you're free to go if you'd like to give the airship on here sure look after
01:32:00 give the airship on here sure look after thank you thank you
01:32:18 yes just a minute mr. chairman the next oral witness to come is mr. Woodrow from the London Ambulance Service yes and
01:32:29 the London Ambulance Service yes and Miss Rose Grogan will be examining him good and will probably take a short break in order for him to be brought to conduct so to rearrange matters for that before I do that can I just read into
01:32:41 before I do that can I just read into the record a number of further pieces of evidence yes I want to read into the record to sheduled of witness statements exhibits and documents the first of
01:32:52 exhibits and documents the first of those contains a list of witness statements and exhibits of other police officers who attended the scene on the night and also temporary Chief Inspector winch who describes how the emergency
01:33:03 winch who describes how the emergency calls and the Metropolitan Police command and control system operates the reference to temporary chief inspector winches statement is inq quinn tuple
01:33:14 winches statement is inq quinn tuple zero five one nine and that's the schedule and if you can please be put up on the screen so people can see what I'm talking about that would be helpful inq triple zero five one nine
01:33:40 and all of those references are the references to those witness statements which are which are being read in
01:33:51 which are which are being read in inspector windshield chief inspector winch's statement is M ETS triple zero two zero six six four there's a second
01:34:02 two zero six six four there's a second list of documents which is inq Quinn tuple zero five one five that could also please be shown on the screen and when it comes up on I'll explain what it is
01:34:13 it comes up on I'll explain what it is and that is a list of helicopter and in past witness statements with the name of
01:34:24 past witness statements with the name of the witness statement maker as in the other schedule the exhibit numbers where relevant and the met references now I
01:34:35 relevant and the met references now I should just add this the material contained in both sheduled that's five one nine and five one five does include distressing information about matters on
01:34:47 distressing information about matters on the night and the end past material also includes live footage from the N Pass helicopter which is distressing and graphic and so if anybody wants to
01:35:00 graphic and so if anybody wants to access it then I would just say that if they do say they need to be mindful of any distress that may be caused by this material either to themselves or to anybody who is looking at it with that
01:35:12 anybody who is looking at it with that well thank you for drawing attention to that so mr. chairman with that I would ask for another short break say that the preparations can be made before the next
01:35:24 preparations can be made before the next witness comes very well I'll rise to five minutes or less if you find that already sooner but if miss it's miss Grogan who's going to be taking you in Jimmy and Mike Lee plural thank you
01:42:26 yes what's Grogan good morning mr. chairman the next witness for today is mr. Paul Woodrow from the London Ambulance Service good can we please call mr. Woodrow
01:42:50 but I swear by Almighty God the evidence that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth the whole truth
01:43:01 thank you very much mister do you like to take a seat make yourself comfortable
01:43:09 all right yes it's Grogan thank you can you please give the inquiry your full name my full name is Paul Andrew Woodrow thank you very much for coming to give evidence
01:43:21 very much for coming to give evidence today and to assist the inquiry with its investigations it's very much appreciated I'll be asking you the questions today if you have any difficulty in understanding any questions please feel
01:43:32 understanding any questions please feel free to ask me to rephrase or to go slower and if you feel you need a break at any point then just signal and we'll have a short break okay and please keep your voice up and speak into the microphone so that the
01:43:44 speak into the microphone so that the transcribers can hear you as well all right you've made a witness statement for the inquiry it's an a folder on your desk in front of you and it will also appear on the screen so it may be easier
01:43:56 appear on the screen so it may be easier to look at documents on the screen than in the bundle okay can I start by taking you to that statement it's lis seven zeros and then number nine it's dated
01:44:08 zeros and then number nine it's dated June 2018 have you read your statement recently yes I have can you confirm that the contents are true yes I can and have
01:44:19 the contents are true yes I can and have you discussed your evidence with anyone no mister to save you the trouble of getting too close to microphone I think you'll find that you are about the right distance at the moment thank you so if
01:44:31 distance at the moment thank you so if you're not someone will waive real tenure okay thank you okay thanks I'll stop leaning forward as well I think you've also provided exhibits a list of those exhibits is at La s600 ten
01:44:47 list of those exhibits is at La s600 ten if I could get that up on the screen please
01:45:01 and the references just for the record for those exhibits are la s seven zeros two to LA s seven zeros eight going for
01:45:15 two to LA s seven zeros eight going for us to your statement then mr. Woodrow and on page three could you look at paragraph two point two so two point one and two point two and in two point two
01:45:30 and two point two and in two point two you say that you've drawn on information and documents generated and held by the LS in preparing this statement can I just check what those are so did that at the time you wrote your statement include witness statements taken by the
01:45:42 include witness statements taken by the police and subsequently disclosed by the inquiry now the information that I used in terms of crafting my statement at the
01:45:53 in terms of crafting my statement at the time were obviously the policies and procedures that we have internally I reviewed our computer-aided dispatch logs the instant logs that were
01:46:05 logs the instant logs that were completed by operational commanders I did not actually have access to any of the MPS witness statements when I crafted the statement that was submitted
01:46:17 crafted the statement that was submitted have you reviewed those now I have reviewed those statements now and again just for the record the LS gold log references met three zeros two three
01:46:30 references met three zeros two three seven one five the LS calves reference is met three zeros one nine nine thirty one did you also review the nine nine nine course transcripts yes I did thank
01:46:43 nine course transcripts yes I did thank you you say at paragraph two point one of your statement that you've worked for the LS for 27 years and have been a senior operational manager for the last 15 years that right that's correct and
01:46:56 15 years that right that's correct and you are currently director of operations at the London Ambulance Service NHS Trust yes I am and you say your role includes line management of all frontline services does that include
01:47:08 frontline services does that include heart that's the hazardous area response team yes it does and the air ambulance so there the London air ambulance is a separate entity but
01:47:19 air ambulance is a separate entity but the London Ambulance Service provide the flight paramedics for that service and we also provide the dispatch facility within our Emergency Operations Center
01:47:30 within our Emergency Operations Center you also say there that you're responsible for 999 emergency operation centers
01:47:35 centers does that include 999 call handlers it does indeed so you have ultimate oversight of of call handlers at the LA s that's the year the emergency
01:47:46 s that's the year the emergency operation centers are one of the functional lines within my Directorate yes in your rule are you personally required to carry out any frontline activities such as attending a scene of
01:47:57 activities such as attending a scene of an incident so within my particular role now I'm not routinely deployed as part of the command structures but depending
01:48:08 of the command structures but depending on the certain types of incident there may be a role where I will be deployed as part of that structure as indeed I was on the night in question would you
01:48:19 was on the night in question would you be deployed to scene for all major incidents or would it depend on the incidents no I wouldn't and when you are deployed as part of a major incident what would your rule usually be well now
01:48:32 what would your rule usually be well now my role would usually be to be a spokesman for the service to work in terms of multi multi service media that
01:48:44 terms of multi multi service media that kind of thing I wouldn't routinely be deployed to manage an incident we have a structure in place that does that routinely I wouldn't be routinely required to do that so the inquiries
01:48:56 required to do that so the inquiries already heard about gold silver and bronze command do you sit slightly apart from that command structure I do and what experience do you have of attending major instance in recent years so I've
01:49:10 major instance in recent years so I've had quite a long career and my career's started initially as a clinician so I qualified as a paramedic so I attended a number of major incidents essentially
01:49:24 number of major incidents essentially I are a related terrorist so I attended some of our eight bombings as I moved forward and qualified as a paramedic and then went into management I attended the
01:49:36 then went into management I attended the 7-7 suicide bombings in London and I was the ambulance incident commander at Russell Square so I've had a varied
01:49:47 Russell Square so I've had a varied range of experience of major incidents throughout my career do you have ultimate responsibility for training of the people within your Directorate as well as for operations so
01:49:59 Directorate as well as for operations so overall accountability for the delivery of training yes thank you I'll move on now to ask you some questions about your role on the night of the fire when were
01:50:11 role on the night of the fire when were you first alerted to the fire at Grenfell tower well as I said I wasn't I wasn't structured on call that night so I I wasn't the nominated officer on call
01:50:22 I I wasn't the nominated officer on call we had a gold on call I in the nature of my role like to have my telephone with me at all times and I wasn't directly contacted but I woke up and looked at my
01:50:35 contacted but I woke up and looked at my phone and looked at my inbox and saw that a pager message had gone out relating to this incident I think woke up contacted the gold
01:50:50 I think woke up contacted the gold strategic commander that I knew was on duty that night which was Stuart Crichton I asked Stuart Crichton to give me a verbal update on on the telephone and the verbal update was essentially
01:51:03 and the verbal update was essentially that we've got the structures in place our gold command suite was open and that the the incident was being managed in accordance to our policies and procedures I asked if there was any
01:51:14 procedures I asked if there was any specific assistance he required at that time and he was confident that the the instant was being managed in accordance to our procedures so lax procedures
01:51:26 to our procedures so lax procedures don't require you to be notified or to attend but you decided to phone in yes so my role as executive director of operations there's no direct requirement
01:51:38 operations there's no direct requirement I can be paged to certain types of incidents and the goal commanders can choose to contact me as the director of operations if they feel they need something specific from me and that is normally for me to manage the wider NHS
01:51:52 normally for me to manage the wider NHS to allow the goal commander to concentrate on the strategic command of the incident so unusually used as trying to manage our executive our board and
01:52:04 to manage our executive our board and the wider NHS in terms of the provision of information and you did decide to go in that morning to the EOC at Waterloo and you arrived at about 6 a.m. that was
01:52:16 and you arrived at about 6 a.m. that was correct we briefed about the incident to that state I wasn't what was the content of that briefing that they'd obviously been a major fire with most of the
01:52:30 been a major fire with most of the building actually alight large numbers of patients trapped trapped in the building there was a difficulty around trying to identify finite numbers I was
01:52:43 trying to identify finite numbers I was given an update on many casualties that we'd treated so far and the key thing for me at that point was to ensure that we would get an accurate information
01:52:54 we would get an accurate information because our NHS partners would require that so I was just ensuring and that essentially we had the resources the
01:53:05 essentially we had the resources the next thing was around the management of shift change over so you know were we thinking about the crews that have been on the night shift and the fact that we needed to turn those those crews around with Dave so it was really just a
01:53:17 with Dave so it was really just a situational report and an update in terms of and then I allowed gold just to continue his normal business working through the recognized structures that he had in place you then left to travel
01:53:30 he had in place you then left to travel to the tower at about quarter to 7:00 that morning and when you arrived at the tower what was your role so essentially I'd been nominated by the strategic commander and because of the scale of
01:53:43 commander and because of the scale of the incident to to be the media spokesman there was a lot of information coming
01:53:50 coming around large amounts of media congregating at the scene and it's often the case that when there is a major incident that we do nominate a senior
01:54:02 incident that we do nominate a senior operational officer and heed it in our incident response plan that a senior designated officer is sent to the scene to manage press briefings so that was
01:54:14 to manage press briefings so that was primarily the role that I undertook when I when I went to Grenville tower that though given the time that you arrived at the tower can we take it that you're familiar with the external layout of the
01:54:25 familiar with the external layout of the Grenfell tower and where the L is set up sector 1 and sector 2 yes very much so if we could pull up met three zeros one 905 nine onto the screen that's a map
01:54:39 905 nine onto the screen that's a map produced by the incident response officer Lauren say you knew the bronze medic as part of his evidence does that map
01:54:49 map reflect what you understand to be the layout of the scene on the night absolutely okay thank you I'm now going to move on and ask you some questions about the role of the LA s in a major incident and
01:55:02 role of the LA s in a major incident and your policies and procedures you've exhibited some policies to your witness statements that's the le SLP major incident procedure manual manual the
01:55:14 incident procedure manual manual the desert joint Doctrine interoperability framework and la s's Incident Response procedures not exhibited but relevant is the strategic coordination protocol is
01:55:25 the strategic coordination protocol is that right yes yeah and you are familiar with that documents I am so the starting point is that there's a legal duty under the civil contingencies Act 2004 for the
01:55:37 the civil contingencies Act 2004 for the LA s to assess risk to plan for emergencies and cooperate and share information with other responders correct and you are familiar with that legal obligation at both Leslie as I
01:55:49 legal obligation at both Leslie as I call it is that what you call it let slip yeah both Leslie and jessup deal with coordination between agencies is that right that's correct and the strategic coordination protocol also
01:56:00 strategic coordination protocol also deals with joint working correct before we look at the policies can I just check the agencies that would be working together on the night of grenfell so that would be the la s
01:56:11 grenfell so that would be the la s obviously the lfpp the police and the local authority is that right yes they would be the primary people that would be working together there would be
01:56:22 be working together there would be supplementary organizations so utilities can come into to that equation on the night but the primary partners in the incident are the three emergency
01:56:33 incident are the three emergency services and local authority but that doesn't exclude depending on the circumstances of the incident other participants what expectations would BLS
01:56:44 participants what expectations would BLS have of a local authority it's a major incident such as Grenfell so I think each service has different expectations for us in terms of our role within a
01:56:55 for us in terms of our role within a major incident is obviously to deal with the immediate the immediacy of treating patients ensuring that their triage that they're treated and that are transported to suitable centers for definitive care
01:57:09 to suitable centers for definitive care I think where we look to the local authority is to set up where people have been displaced survival reception centers for people that are what we
01:57:21 centers for people that are what we would describe as p3 patients that patients that are up and walking and don't have an immediate need to be transported to a hospital having reception centers where they can have shelter so that's the primary concern
01:57:33 shelter so that's the primary concern for us in the first stages a major incident that we would look to the local local authority to facilitate if we could pull up Leslie now that's LA s7
01:57:46 could pull up Leslie now that's LA s7 zeroes 5 at page 13 this is section 4 of Leslie which you refer to in your statement
01:57:55 statement it contains guidance and the key principles for effective multi-agency working it advises that agencies should meet at the scene face to face that's
01:58:06 meet at the scene face to face that's 4.1.1 share information with partners promptly establish a joint emergency airwave channel and also understand key priorities activities and issues of partner
01:58:18 activities and issues of partner agencies let's go through each of these in turn first of all meeting at the scene who would the LS expectedly A's with at an incident like grenfell Terra
01:58:29 with at an incident like grenfell Terra when they arrived so we would look for the fire service for London Fire Brigade command so in that type of incident we would look to liaise with the the
01:58:42 would look to liaise with the the operational commander from the London Fire Brigade how quickly would you expect the relevant supervising officers to meet with one another well in in
01:58:53 to meet with one another well in in ideal circumstances the three emergency services should actually have their sort of control command units co-located and
01:59:04 of control command units co-located and therefore and very distinguished in terms of there are individual beacons that flash from command units that make
01:59:15 that flash from command units that make it visible so we would normally expect to see that in in terms of that that is the ideal place where you get the the three services jointly located so if you
01:59:27 three services jointly located so if you have a first responder from the LS attending the scene would you expect them to go straight to the LF b command units so the first responder on scene the first thing that we would do is
01:59:39 the first thing that we would do is expect them to give us a report back in terms of what is going on so we wouldn't expect the first responder to for example to treat stop and treat patients what we want that first responder is to
01:59:51 what we want that first responder is to get eyes onto the incident try and feed information back to the Emergency Operations Center or the special operations center depending on whether the incident has been declared a
02:00:03 the incident has been declared a significant incident or a major incident and we would expect them to do that and then look for the person in charge commander in charge so it would be the second thing you'd expect them to do
02:00:14 second thing you'd expect them to do when they arrive yeah and what information would you expect to be shared at that first meeting between an LS responder and the LF b command so we
02:00:26 LS responder and the LF b command so we so there's there's two things that we we train our staff so I think it's important to say that apart from the training that we give our staff we give our staff a set of action cards which
02:00:38 our staff a set of action cards which they're obliged to carry at all times on duty that essentially sets out that the whole set of actions that we expect including the the roles that major incidents what the duties for those
02:00:50 incidents what the duties for those particular roles are so that allows people even if they're unfamiliar with a with a certain type of role actually it's a checklist that says these are the duties you need to discharge in that role so we would expect the information
02:01:06 role so we would expect the information back would be for us it's it's I think you've seen reference to something called methane which is essentially the
02:01:19 called methane which is essentially the first report that we would expect someone to give from from an instant site so that is whether it's a major incident or we have within our operating
02:01:30 incident or we have within our operating procedures we have declaration of a significant incident which I can talk about if required so whether it's a significant or a major incident the exact location the type of incident that
02:01:42 exact location the type of incident that we've got potential hazards access and egress to the incident number of casualties so and the emergency services
02:01:53 casualties so and the emergency services other emergency services that are on scene so it's a very quick situational report that tries to give us a flavor in terms of the Emergency Operations Center and the command teams around what what
02:02:05 and the command teams around what what type of incident we're facing I'll come back and ask you questions later about what happened on the night and just tried to establish the principles here but thank you the next thing in less up
02:02:16 but thank you the next thing in less up is to share information promptly what methods of communication are in place between the LA s and the lfb so routinely then we will we will have
02:02:28 routinely then we will we will have interactions with with the lfb control room and how it is it's like they are by phone so we don't we have an electronic
02:02:39 phone so we don't we have an electronic CAD computer-aided dispatch link which is with the Metropolitan Police we don't have that with the London Fire Brigade but so we use a standard standard telephone procedure both ways we have
02:02:54 telephone procedure both ways we have air wave radios so both the London Fire get well all the emergency services have air wave digital radio technology there
02:03:05 air wave digital radio technology there is a emergency services a try agency channel emergency service three channel which is always in operation and is monitored and in critical information
02:03:17 monitored and in critical information can be shared across that channel so there's a numerous ways and then obviously when we're on scene face to face communication in terms of the information flow coming from from our
02:03:28 information flow coming from from our control room and vice versa the shared radio is that monitored on the scene as well as in the control room so no the for us emergency service 3
02:03:43 so no the for us emergency service 3 channel is monitored in in our control room on the incident management desk and in course of a significant incident or a major incident being declared we move that incident into a specialist
02:03:54 that incident into a specialist operation centre that channel would be critically monitored during that period you mentioned that the Elias has a link with the MPS cabs we've heard evidence
02:04:09 with the MPS cabs we've heard evidence about how you can update the others care does that right how does that work in practice with the Metropolitan Police Service so yes we have the ability to
02:04:20 Service so yes we have the ability to electronically transfer messages directly into each other's CAD so without the need for them to physically contact us they're just typing messages
02:04:31 contact us they're just typing messages so it's it's actually an electronic link so they can provide update information electronically to us and can you see Vera CAD or can you and Lea pass messages now we don't actually see their
02:04:42 messages now we don't actually see their cat it's just the messages that they're sending us and that goes into our log as a message received from the MPS with whatever information they're given us we don't see their live cat and they don't see your liner thank
02:04:53 cat and they don't see your liner thank you is it right that command vehicles
02:05:04 you is it right that command vehicles are equipped with air wave radio as well that is correct and so the command unit on scene you would also expect to be listening into that joint emergency services channel yes the next moving on
02:05:20 services channel yes the next moving on in lizard the next heading is to understand key priorities you would expect this to happen on scene wouldn't you yes are there other ways of sharing
02:05:32 you yes are there other ways of sharing this information for example at Silver Eagle command level so in the first stages of an incident you primarily be getting that information from the scene
02:05:44 getting that information from the scene from the actual operational commanders on the ground as the instant gets more established if there's a decision to create a strategic coordination group
02:05:55 create a strategic coordination group then you might get that information being shared at different levels but certainly at the beginning of an incident that information will be coming from people on the ground and is that
02:06:06 from people on the ground and is that when you start to have interagency gold meetings well so so so on-scene you would be having operational command meetings so that the three services
02:06:18 meetings so that the three services would be meeting together talking about the operational challenges the latest situation reports exchanging that information that information would then come back up through through to our
02:06:31 come back up through through to our specialist Operations Center and where we where our tactical commander would be based and that tactical commander then would take anything he or she felt was required to to the gold meetings what
02:06:46 required to to the gold meetings what procedures are in place then for communicating information learned from other agencies at the scene back to controller more widely through the lis is that by radio is that by phone so it principally go by radio yeah if
02:07:01 so it principally go by radio yeah if information needs to be disseminated it would go through air wave radio and is the same procedure then in place for communicating information learns a command level back to the scene so would
02:07:15 command level back to the scene so would you have the control room radioing Elias officers at the scene yes so so the yes so our emergent well it would be our specialist Operations Center absolutely
02:07:26 specialist Operations Center absolutely has dedicated radio channels for not only the resources that are being sent but also for the commander's there on a separate radio channel so yes we have
02:07:37 separate radio channel so yes we have that two-way information flow could we pull up le s7 zeroes and then the number one please
02:07:51 and we're looking for it that's page six so this is Jesuit which also emphasizes effective communication if we flip forward on to page 10 of the
02:08:08 if we flip forward on to page 10 of the same document section 6 of Jessup talks about control rooms and they it says that the control rooms play a vital role in managing the early stages of a
02:08:19 in managing the early stages of a multi-agency incident there cannot be a coordinated multi-agency response or effective communication of control rooms do not deliver a swift and joint
02:08:30 do not deliver a swift and joint approach to handling them it also says a bit further down that's a dialogue between control room supervisors should be established as soon as possible within the LA S what's roller rank is
02:08:44 within the LA S what's roller rank is the control room supervisor is that a bronze or silver or is it something entirely different and now it would be something entirely different so it would normally as I've said when we have a
02:08:58 normally as I've said when we have a significant incident or a major incident declared that that the learning that we've we've gained from previous major incidents is that rather than trying to manage that
02:09:09 manage that within the main Emergency Operations Center along with all the other business as usual calls that are coming into our control room we move the the incident out into a specialist operation center
02:09:22 out into a specialist operation center each shift there are nominative roles which are allocated to the watch that are on duty and that will include critical August's watch managers dispatchers and at the
02:09:36 watch managers dispatchers and at the beginning of each shift those those people are nominated in so it would be a member of controlling staff that would work under the SOC manager who would be
02:09:48 work under the SOC manager who would be a a bronze level manager and I think you said the trigger for that is a significant incident significant or major significant or major we go on to
02:09:59 major significant or major we go on to page 11 of the same document please
02:10:07 now it says there at little B that one of the things you should do is nominate a single point of contact in each control room to establish a method of communication between the different
02:10:19 communication between the different agencies which could involve creating a telecommunications link or a multi-agency interoperable talk group do you know if that was done on the night
02:10:31 you know if that was done on the night of the 14th so the multi-agency interoperable tool group which is the channel that I refer to as emergency
02:10:42 channel that I refer to as emergency service three was in operation because detailed in my statement I do note that there are the the Special Operations Center pick up messages that coming
02:10:55 Center pick up messages that coming through on es3 so that that channel was live and indeed that is live 24/7 was
02:11:07 live and indeed that is live 24/7 was there a single point of contact was there one person in Ch I DIF I could not definitively define if there was a single point of contact on that night from and would you be able to say whether there was a single point of
02:11:18 whether there was a single point of contact within the NPS or the LF be that you really as English no I couldn't I couldn't say that night we move on now
02:11:30 couldn't say that night we move on now to the lsah zone procedures again staying with the theme of communications that's LS seven zeroes and then the number eight page 79
02:11:48 could we actually have kjt please sorry that's an error in my referencing an under 4.6.1 1 it says robust
02:12:00 under 4.6.1 1 it says robust communication links must be established as soon as possible that would be via the links that we've discussed so airwave 999 calls and the card is that
02:12:11 airwave 999 calls and the card is that right that's correct and finally to complete the picture we have the strategic coordination protocols and that's met three zeros two three two eight eight at page 18 and this at two
02:12:31 eight eight at page 18 and this at two point five refers to core function five of creating and maintaining shared situational awareness that would be through effective communication between agencies wouldn't it would you like mr.
02:12:46 agencies wouldn't it would you like mr. Woodrow to read that yes the same problems I went a little bit too fast a bear
02:13:01 yes
02:13:05 so it's fair to summarize the policies in this way responding agency should be in regular communication with one another do you agree that's correct but without the scene a menace attacked
02:13:17 but without the scene a menace attacked tactical and strategic level correct responding agencies should have access to key information about the incident when it's available yesterday and they
02:13:29 when it's available yesterday and they should also have an understanding of the other active of the other's activities during the incident correct thank you during the course of a major fire what kind of information would you expect to
02:13:40 kind of information would you expect to be shared between the NFP the MPs and the lis you can just give us the key headlines ok so actually from the fire
02:13:56 headlines ok so actually from the fire brigade we would expect fire brigades have been leading leading the leading agency for this type of incident so how much of the building is affected do we
02:14:09 much of the building is affected do we know how many properties are within the building do we have any idea of casualty numbers do we know any idea of patients that have have self evacuated or have
02:14:21 that have have self evacuated or have been rescued from the police our initial expectation from the police would probably be to manage the scene in terms of the coordination of Corden's ensuring
02:14:36 of the coordination of Corden's ensuring that the scene situs is safe so they would be the principal things that we'd look for in the first the first the
02:14:48 look for in the first the first the first instance going back to the LF B would you expect them to share details of their tactics and the way in which they were intending to fight the fire or to evacuate or not evacuate residence
02:14:59 to evacuate or not evacuate residence yes we would
02:15:05 and what is the LSE's experience of the reliability of Lal FB communication equipment prior to the fire well the the
02:15:21 equipment prior to the fire well the the l FB use two different types of communication so the l FB have a UHF radio system which enables l FB
02:15:32 radio system which enables l FB commanders and firefighters to to exchange information we use our air wave radios for for all of that so they have different types of radio communication
02:15:45 different types of radio communication where we have song use of air wave and we just provide different radio channels to to split resources depending on what type of incident is I suppose in reality
02:16:00 type of incident is I suppose in reality the actual amount of times that we work together as two agencies in a year if you take the London Ambulance Service takes around 1.9 a million million
02:16:12 takes around 1.9 a million million emergency calls 1% less than 1% of those calls are actually caused to fire related issues from the London Fire
02:16:25 related issues from the London Fire Brigade so that's our interaction are on a day to day basis it's quite small compared to for example our working with the NPS what you would expect incidents
02:16:42 the NPS what you would expect incidents where we are required to work together is that we all work together to establish the Jessop so Jessop was designed to ensure that the three emergency services work more cohesively
02:16:53 emergency services work more cohesively together so we would expect we would expect that to happen now clearly there are challenges there are challenges with every plan that when you try to enact
02:17:06 every plan that when you try to enact that plan there were always sets of circumstances which which create challenge but but I wouldn't say from my experience that that that we've had overarching
02:17:20 that that that we've had overarching problems with communication with the London Fire Brigade we work closely with them and indeed we've we exercise regularly with them going back to your
02:17:32 regularly with them going back to your statement and moving on now to talking about the events of the night yeah if we pull up your statement at page six that's la s700 you've provided a
02:17:47 that's la s700 you've provided a chronology for the inquiry that sets out key events on the night from the LA S is prospective starting at starting a 129
02:17:59 prospective starting at starting a 129 that's when the first 909 call was connected to the LS and that was actually from the LF b wasn't it that's correct and I think you've explained that it is usual practice for the LF b
02:18:10 that it is usual practice for the LF b to phone you rather than you use any other form of communication right without you and and they do that by way of a 999 call do they do and this call
02:18:21 of a 999 call do they do and this call was placed about 30 minutes after we now know that the LF b attended the scene is it normal for that amount of time to pass before the LF b contacts the LS now
02:18:32 pass before the LF b contacts the LS now i think we would reasonably expect to be contacted sooner than
02:18:42 we can now look at the transcript of that call which is inq five zeros three seven eight that will just be on the screen rather than in your bundle
02:19:00 and if we could have page two please
02:19:12 so that's the start of the call where the operator answers and the London Fire Brigade identify themselves if we could move on to page three you'll see there's
02:19:29 move on to page three you'll see there's some explanation of the location of the event which I'll come back to and just at the bottom of the page the caller tells the LS operator that they've got a 20 pump fire yeah and then on page four you'll see
02:19:48 yeah and then on page four you'll see just below the middle of the page the operator says yeah bear with me mate so you've got a 20 pump fire person's supporting but I think that was a Miss transcription of persons reported caller
02:20:02 transcription of persons reported caller says he said 25 pump fire now and the operator confirms 25 pump fire so during the course of this short call the LF be
02:20:14 the course of this short call the LF be attendance goes up from a 20 pump fire to a 25 pump fire yeah would an LS call handler understand the significance of a 20 pump fire when answering a call not
02:20:28 20 pump fire when answering a call not just based on 20/20 pump fire so the person's reported is the bit that that
02:20:42 person's reported is the bit that that is importance of us so it I think what's important I supposed to point out is that the London Fire Brigade do respond
02:20:53 that the London Fire Brigade do respond to fire incidents in London with large amounts of appliances too you know industrial units overnight so so we are not it's not uncommon for the lfb to
02:21:06 not it's not uncommon for the lfb to call us to say that they're dispatching a large amount of appliances or it said a large pump fire the important things
02:21:17 a large pump fire the important things for us is it is around a persons involved
02:21:21 involved that although the call handler is taking this call I think what we can draw on what I certainly drew from from reviewing is actually this type of
02:21:34 reviewing is actually this type of message that we get for the lfb warranted further action before before too long and when the dispatcher then
02:21:49 too long and when the dispatcher then decides to dispatch Elias resources to the scene is it just the information in the nine-oh-nine call that they've taken to account yes and as you said the significant thing in that call is that
02:22:00 significant thing in that call is that persons were reported yet based on your review of this call and the information contained within it would you have expected the Elias to declare a
02:22:11 expected the Elias to declare a significant incident at this point so not directly from this one call I think
02:22:23 not directly from this one call I think I mean this call came in at one 2906 and from recollection the Emergency Operations Center so this would have
02:22:34 Operations Center so this would have been a call that was coming into one call handler once that was identified by the watch managers then very quickly just based on the intelligence from this call it was the Emergency Operations
02:22:47 call it was the Emergency Operations Center that declared is significant so we didn't wait for anyone to arrive on scene the EOC declared it a significant instant and there were a number of actions as a consequence of that taken
02:23:01 your statement says that the call was triage through protocol eight yeah and those protocols are used to triage individual patients that right yeah so
02:23:13 individual patients that right yeah so we have I guess it's important to be clear about how we triage so every ambulance service in England has one of
02:23:25 ambulance service in England has one of two triage systems that are licensed to be used in in England one of those is NHS pathways and one of those is a medical priority dispatch system the
02:23:37 medical priority dispatch system the London Ambulance Service uses that that triage tall what that triage tall essentially does is our call handlers are non clinical so they take
02:23:50 are non clinical so they take information from the 999 caller and that will guide them based on that information will guide them into a set
02:24:02 information will guide them into a set of questions that that need to be asked and responded to with yes and no answers and then there are some specific questions that you get through the idea
02:24:13 questions that you get through the idea is to work through what priority of response based on the information that were that's been taken from the caller do we need to allocate in terms of
02:24:24 do we need to allocate in terms of dispatching the resource do the protocols assume that the person on the other end of the phone is either a patient or is or could be a third third-party caller that is passing
02:24:35 third-party caller that is passing information yes so we have to go on the information that we receive from from the call so are there any more general protocols where you're being called to an incident rather than where there's one individual patient well so what what
02:24:50 one individual patient well so what what we will get is what something that we call a chief complaint so the chief complaint will be of someone saying difficulty in breathing then that will take them to the protocol for difficulty
02:25:02 take them to the protocol for difficulty in breathing and within that chief complaint there will be a number of questions that get asked based on the answers to those questions it will lead to different questions and ultimately at the end of the protocol equal Dean a
02:25:16 the end of the protocol equal Dean a response requirement in terms of the priority of that patient and the length of time that we have to respond to that so it's quite a complex system they allocates chief complaint and then once
02:25:28 allocates chief complaint and then once we've got the chief complaint based on what the information is being given to the call handler that then through the computer-aided dispatch leads them to a set of questions to eliminate some conditions and ask further questions and
02:25:40 conditions and ask further questions and ultimately when that project always is concluded that is reached and the response the response is allocated does the protocol tell you how many resources to dispatch or is
02:25:53 how many resources to dispatch or is there an element of discretion involved there yep so that there is an element of discretion involved you say that the
02:26:04 discretion involved you say that the incident was classed as a category C to coal yes what is C to so not immediately life-threatening and would require
02:26:18 life-threatening and would require response within 30 minutes that was the initial triage of that call I think that's in relation to the fact that there are no patient details received so
02:26:31 there are no patient details received so at the time the information was that there was a there was a fire related incident where there were people reported has been involved in that but there was no direct clinical information
02:26:44 there was no direct clinical information regarding to patient and essentially the triage system when you get patient specific information will so if there
02:26:57 specific information will so if there had been someone with severe difficulty in breathing that was confirmed clearly that call to that patient would have been a higher priority but this was a generic call with persons reported and
02:27:08 generic call with persons reported and it generates a a subset or a standardized priority which was a c2 and then it goes to the dispatcher and the dispatcher decides which resources to
02:27:19 dispatcher decides which resources to send to the incidents correct on page 9 of the transcript so that's the document that's on the screen now but page 9
02:27:32 you'll see at the end the caller so this is actually the la s calling I think gives a reference of 2 4 7 which is to
02:27:44 gives a reference of 2 4 7 which is to the le s can't you know why they would do that with the LF b yeah so that is just confirming to the London Fire Brigade what what we would call our
02:27:55 Brigade what what we would call our working CAD is the information that we've just received from the lfb it's essentially reading them back our reference and why
02:28:06 reading them back our reference and why do they do that when the lfb can't see the LS s cows sorry why do they do that when the LF B does not have access to the la s is cat because if they want to pass us any further information in in
02:28:18 pass us any further information in in subsequent calls they can then turn around and say in relation to your to the la s cat 247 which then we can automatically link to the original call so that's the reason why we give that
02:28:30 so that's the reason why we give that reference so going back to your statement and moving on a bit in the chronology so that's back to LA s seven zeroes nine at page six we see at 133
02:28:44 zeroes nine at page six we see at 133 wait for it to come up and screen and 133 the first iro is dispatched to the scene and then in the next five minutes I've counted up that the LS dispatchers
02:28:57 I've counted up that the LS dispatchers to ambient to further ambulances the London air ambulance for heart operatives you can just see that at the bottom of the page and one further
02:29:08 bottom of the page and one further incident response officer do you know the basis upon which the dispatcher decided to send that level of resources to the tower so it would be so incident
02:29:23 to the tower so it would be so incident response officers we have on duty 24/7 right across London it is standardized procedure for us that when we receive a call from the London Fire Brigade to a fire with persons reported that an
02:29:35 fire with persons reported that an instant response officer was sent in terms of the ambulance and the hazardous area response team again for an incident of this type our hazardous area response
02:29:47 of this type our hazardous area response team would automatically be dispatched to to what we would call a Farkle I just pausing there to the reference to four hearts mean four teams or just for
02:29:58 hearts mean four teams or just for individuals for resources and if resource is one person no we've got to - we've got four vehicles they have different levels so we sent a heart
02:30:09 different levels so we sent a heart responder
02:30:10 responder was solo in the car we sent to in another vehicle so we have two teams on duty Hart teams 24/7 in London one based in West London one based in East London
02:30:21 in West London one based in East London that's a national asset and we have to have those twelve Hart two teams of six we have to have those on duty 24/7 now
02:30:36 we have to have those on duty 24/7 now and and bigger vehicles so they they are a team so we will for example when some types of call we might send a heart operative to go and provide a
02:30:47 operative to go and provide a situational report which means we wouldn't send the whole party we'd hold some back so they just have different methods of responding but essentially they work in two teams of six in
02:30:59 they work in two teams of six in different vehicles so we've been taking breaks about every hour over the last two days
02:31:08 two days I'm very happy myself to push on to lunch time if you well it's already uncomfortable if those yep well we'll press on if you get to the stage when
02:31:19 press on if you get to the stage when you think you've had enough for the time being just make it clear stop thank you moving on in the chronology then on page seven of your witness
02:31:32 then on page seven of your witness statement at 0 41 right at the bottom there if we could blow out the last entry on the screen and that is when CAD
02:31:44 entry on the screen and that is when CAD two four seven so this incident and was declared a significant incident by the EOC
02:31:53 and we can see that on the cards so that's met triple zero one nine nine three one at page three and it's about
02:32:10 three one at page three and it's about two-thirds of the way down it says I think we have to have expended for you I think it says call made significant incident due to Intel there it is it's a
02:32:25 incident due to Intel there it is it's a 140-142 by K R and me can you see that miss Warren okay yeah um core made a significant incident due to Intel on
02:32:37 significant incident due to Intel on instruction of a CDL and is a CDL a person yes so I see
02:32:48 person yes so I see I do apologize because the London Ambulance Service is full of acronyms AC will be area controller and an area
02:33:01 will be area controller and an area controller is within our Emergency Operations Center we have dispatched groups for certain parts of geography in London so we have South West London
02:33:13 London so we have South West London South East London northeast north central North West London within those dispatch groups there are controllers that are controlling resources that are
02:33:24 that are controlling resources that are available in those sectors overarching though oversee in those sectors is an area controller so that is someone in our Emergency Operations Center and I
02:33:35 our Emergency Operations Center and I believe looking at that document that that would have been area controller David led on the evening in question and he's a relatively senior person within
02:33:46 he's a relatively senior person within the EOC yeah and you say in your statement that this was this decision was made was because of the nature of 999 calls and information that had been reported was that the information from
02:33:58 reported was that the information from the lfb so I think it was obviously the the information that originally came from the lfb in term of the number of pumps that they were
02:34:10 of the number of pumps that they were deploying there were a subsequent call and I think it was just the area controller put in that intelligence together very quickly and saying this is
02:34:22 together very quickly and saying this is something that is not not routine and declaring that quickly so we can see in your chronology we don't need to pull it
02:34:33 your chronology we don't need to pull it up but by that stage you'd had four and nine nine nine calls relating to the scene although they weren't from inside the tower they were from members of the public correct site the definition of a
02:34:49 public correct site the definition of a significant incident is in the ls incident manuals that's LA s7 zeroes eight at page 20
02:35:11 again what sorry my references on this document seems to be out by a page if he could go on to page 21 please there's the LS definition of a significant
02:35:24 the LS definition of a significant incident and it says there that if five persons reported fire calls six to ten pumps and above or large-scale evacuation and by this status was a
02:35:38 evacuation and by this status was a twenty five pump fire we learned that from the 909 call based on that information she did not have been declared a major incident rather than a significant incident no I don't I don't
02:35:54 significant incident no I don't I don't believe at that time that that it should have been we were receiving information of the building fire but this is quite
02:36:05 of the building fire but this is quite quite difficult around in in some aspects this is why we've created through learning the declaration of a significant incident because there are
02:36:16 significant incident because there are times where the lfb will attend for example an industrial fire where where there are no persons involved at all and there are a large amount of pumps
02:36:29 there are a large amount of pumps dispatched to that to that incident and but that would not be deemed as a major incident thought for us so some of the learning was that in the initial stages
02:36:42 learning was that in the initial stages if you think there is potential for an incident to escalate we've now created within the incident response plan something called a significant incident which essentially changes the way that
02:36:54 which essentially changes the way that we're dealing with that incident up until the point that we can actually get better intelligence from the scene but things that as declaration of a significant incident do is for example
02:37:06 significant incident do is for example to take that incident out of our Emergency Operations Center put it into the Special Operations Center we send more resource than we would normally do to
02:37:17 to you know a a routine incident so we starting we start to enhance that response at an early stage by by defining it as a significant incident
02:37:28 defining it as a significant incident was the alias aware at this time that the police had already declared a major incident to 132 no we were not is that
02:37:39 incident to 132 no we were not is that the sort of key information that you would expect the MPs to have told the LA s when they made their decision so we would have expected that information to have been conveyed to us yes and was the
02:37:53 have been conveyed to us yes and was the shared airwave channel 3 up and running at this point it would have been so that's a route by which they could have communicated it to you yes and and would
02:38:05 communicated it to you yes and and would having that information about the MPS's decision have made a difference to the la s's decision
02:38:19 depending on the information that the Metropolitan Police Service would have passed with that message because it is possible for our individual services to declare what they deemed to be a major
02:38:32 declare what they deemed to be a major incident for their individual organization but for us as you know a category one responder and principally our role within a major incident is the
02:38:44 our role within a major incident is the the treatment the triage and treatment of patients it's not always the case that if the Metropolitan Police Service declare a major incident that we would deem it to be such an incident from a
02:38:55 deem it to be such an incident from a health perspective so I think it sounds as if I'm not being big clear on the question I think major incident declaration is certainly an important thing but what we would have looked for
02:39:06 thing but what we would have looked for was the reason so we would have expected when when a major incident is declared and all of the doctrine refer to this what you expect the person that is
02:39:17 what you expect the person that is declaring a major incident is to give you that methane report which is very high-level but it describes what the reasons for the declaration I think based on that information that could
02:39:29 based on that information that could have well influenced a decision but because we didn't see receive that information moving on again in the chronology the first Elias resource
02:39:41 chronology the first Elias resource on-scene arrived at 145 and that was wide 251 this is on page 8 of your statements yes and that was a Hart
02:39:52 statements yes and that was a Hart officer and shortly afterwards an advanced paramedic arrives on scene and then the first incident response officer Lawrence say you knew says he arrived at 149 yeah so that's a 12 minute response
02:40:06 149 yeah so that's a 12 minute response time between first dispatch and and arrival is that a reasonable time in your experience yet
02:40:16 when deciding who to dispatch to the scene with the is dispatcher look to see who was closest so we have in terms of officers yes they're dispatched
02:40:30 officers yes they're dispatched differently in terms of the actual ambulance resource our ambulance resource is tracked is on electronic tracking and so the allocators four
02:40:41 tracking and so the allocators four resource would press a suggestion button and what the CAD system does is take the GPS coordinates of where the call is and then does a scan round and gives the the
02:40:55 then does a scan round and gives the the allocator or the dispatcher the list of the nearest resources so yes and how would you expect those different LS personnel arriving on scene to liaise
02:41:07 personnel arriving on scene to liaise with one another so I think obviously the the first officer on scene they
02:41:19 the the first officer on scene they would essentially assume the role of operational commander and they would then look well the first thing never do is report back and and give a report
02:41:30 is report back and and give a report back into our Emergency Operations Center they would then look to put depending on what they seen the relevant structures in place to to manage that so allocating primary command roles they
02:41:44 allocating primary command roles they would be looking in terms of suitable access and egress points for resources so setting up a rendezvous point they would do that very quickly in the first the first few minutes of arriving then
02:41:58 the first few minutes of arriving then what they would look to do is to find out where the other emergency services in terms of their command and try to get further information would the other la
02:42:11 further information would the other la espera styles such as paramedics and heart officers knew in advance that Lawrence II you know had assumed the rule of Bruns medic so they wouldn't so
02:42:22 rule of Bruns medic so they wouldn't so they wouldn't know the name of the individual but but they would obviously you know the fact that we've got bronze medic bronze medic would be given instructions back to EOC in terms of can
02:42:35 instructions back to EOC in terms of can you tow ambulances where the rendezvous point is and that information in our ambulance vehicles we have mobile data terminals so there's just a lot of data gets transferred onto a screen those
02:42:48 gets transferred onto a screen those that information would be updated through to crews based on that the information that's coming back from the scene and requests for you know
02:43:00 scene and requests for you know rendezvous points and directions on where crews are to to head to the heart don't have access to MDT's is that right than their vehicles so heart on that
02:43:11 than their vehicles so heart on that particular night that sort of vehicles that heart were in were not we're not MDT they had satellite navigation but what we have on their wave radios is the ability to pass information in terms of
02:43:24 ability to pass information in terms of messages down on their air wave radio in text message as well as voice and to people on the scene have remote access to the cat or is that just something that exists now so the cat is just a
02:43:37 that exists now so the cat is just a computer-aided dispatch system that's used within the Emergency Operations Center and we can see from the transcript of that initial 999 call we
02:43:48 transcript of that initial 999 call we don't have to pull it up that there was some confusion initially of the postcode and you've mentioned that in your statement yeah and resources were initially sent to SW 11 instead of W 11
02:43:59 initially sent to SW 11 instead of W 11 in that call the LA s handler refers to yet another address that doesn't match is there a problem with identifying addresses on lis systems no this was a
02:44:10 addresses on lis systems no this was a this was a user error the address was incorrectly and putted into the CAD which was why Southwest 11 was inputted instead of West 11 which was why a different location was coming up on on
02:44:22 different location was coming up on on on the gazetteer do you know whether that confusion over the address caused any delay in getting la s personnel to the tower I don't believe it did
02:44:34 going back to your chronology now on page nine of your statement at a 152 you say that the L is updated the FB by
02:44:46 say that the L is updated the FB by phone that the LA s had declared a significant incident yet that's ten minutes after the declaration was made within the L is correct
02:44:58 within the L is correct do you know why it took 10 minutes to relay this information well I wasn't there I can so I can't definitively tell you I think probably from the declaration what we would be doing is
02:45:09 declaration what we would be doing is taking the steps that we need to take in terms of the actions that the emergency operation said it would say so as I explained previously the specialist
02:45:21 explained previously the specialist operation center would be opened up people would be moved into that room I think that's probably just a gap of getting people settled and and then obviously updating the lfb that we've
02:45:34 obviously updating the lfb that we've taken those actions should it have been communicated sooner
02:45:44 I think that's impossible for me to say I think what I would say is is that it is imperative that we get that information across to partners as soon
02:45:55 information across to partners as soon as is practicable I can't I can't answer that question specifically because I was not actually in the specialist operation center when that happened and well I suppose one could ask does it look like
02:46:06 suppose one could ask does it look like a long delay or does it look so from my experience in terms of doing what we need to do to get these things do set take time so I wouldn't say that that
02:46:18 take time so I wouldn't say that that was unreasonable and to be honest the information that we're passing to the lfb actually doesn't doesn't essentially impact anything that the lfb were doing
02:46:29 impact anything that the lfb were doing so this is really more of a courtesy message to say that we we have upgraded that incident and to let them know that we're responding accordingly and the
02:46:40 we're responding accordingly and the Declaration of a significant incident doesn't appear to be recorded on cab 247 if it would help you I can pull up the page that uses that time period so that's met three zeros one nine nine
02:46:51 that's met three zeros one nine nine thirty one page four
02:47:28 they were just wait for it screaming for you met three zeros $1.99 31-page for
02:47:48 No 1 9 9 3 1 not 1 1 9
02:48:04 yep and then page four about document please
02:48:13 so if you just take a second to reefa miliar eyes yourself that page mr. Woodrow yeah can you see anywhere on that page where the significant incident is logged
02:48:33 if I find it it seems to be earlier so it may be an error in your statement at 1:47 yeah it says significant paging
02:48:44 1:47 yeah it says significant paging initiated is that a significant incident yes so that's one once the significant instant is declared that as I say then
02:48:58 instant is declared that as I say then sets off a number of actions one of those actions are then to page out that a significant incident has been declared to command groups but the the update to
02:49:09 to command groups but the the update to the LF B is not recorded on the cards
02:49:34 no it doesn't appear to be on that page now would you expect it to be yes I would and there is an entry at a 152 that says met Paul aware no ref passed
02:49:45 that says met Paul aware no ref passed is that a reference to informing the met police about the significant incident yes and what does it mean when it says
02:49:59 yes and what does it mean when it says no ref passed so no reference passed so no additional CAD no reference no new CAD just associated with the with the original when the alias
02:50:17 original when the alias informed the lfb that it had declared a significant incident do you know if any other information was shared with the LF be it at that time no I don't I would
02:50:29 be it at that time no I don't I would suggest from previous experience it would have been just a very quick call to say that we've declared a significant incident and with the earth we know what that meant yes moving topics to liaison
02:50:46 that meant yes moving topics to liaison with the LF be on scene and we know that you weren't there on the night's until later but please answer these questions in light of York's your general experience and if you don't know the
02:50:58 experience and if you don't know the answer then please do say Lawrence a unit says that when he arrived at scene he was not sure who was in charge for the LF B would you expect that sort of
02:51:12 the LF B would you expect that sort of information to be available to an iro so would they be told in advance who to look for
02:51:19 so an incident response officer would would look for would look for officers so officers and officers tabards and so they would look for the incident
02:51:31 and so they would look for the incident commander by the nature of the tab art I think when our instant response officer
02:51:43 think when our instant response officer arrived on scene and actually was on looking at the east aspect of the building saw a number of lfb personnel
02:52:00 building saw a number of lfb personnel who were officers and the officers are denoted by the fact that they wear a different color helmet and that was where the iro first went to see whether
02:52:13 where the iro first went to see whether he could get information around who was commanding the instant if we pull up mr. your news statement it's met zero zero zero one oh eight six two and page five
02:52:27 zero one oh eight six two and page five of that statement
02:52:54 okay and it's just that first paragraph you've mentioned his description of having seen a group of firefighters near the base of the building he says there
02:53:06 the base of the building he says there there were several other firefighters still standing there I walked over to them someone in a white hat and a commander Tabar then said it's not as bad as it looks we believe it is an external fire and
02:53:19 we believe it is an external fire and has not penetrated internally and mr. Aiona says that in light of that information he was expecting to deal with patients with smoke inhalation only
02:53:32 with patients with smoke inhalation only you can't answer for him obviously but in general with that sort of information effect the AES decisions about how to set up on scene and what resources to deploy so I believe that we would be
02:53:50 deploy so I believe that we would be going to the London Fire Brigade for that specific advice around the type of incident that we were dealing with from
02:54:02 incident that we were dealing with from my experience that would have played into decision-making in terms of not penetrating internally and I think
02:54:15 penetrating internally and I think that's the reason in terms of the
02:54:21 comment regarding smoke inhalation in terms of actually the the integrity of the in terms of the building had not
02:54:32 the in terms of the building had not been penetrated at that time soon your experience would that have affected his decision-making about where for example to set up a triage point or how many
02:54:43 to set up a triage point or how many people to have dealing with triage and issues such as that no I don't think so so I think that that comment doesn't
02:54:54 so I think that that comment doesn't influence the instant response officers so the instant response officer by nature of the fact that he's declared a significant incident is already in too setting up the the normal procedures
02:55:07 setting up the the normal procedures that we would we would expect them to do so it doesn't influence his decision to do anything differently at that time and Paul Hammond who's another member of La
02:55:19 Paul Hammond who's another member of La s personnel who attended the scene on the night says that Lauren C owner decided to keep the incidents as a significant incident because the IFB said they thought the fire was superficial I can pull up that reference
02:55:32 superficial I can pull up that reference for you it's met three zeros one for 408 at page four
02:55:56 and which posed you likes it look at some paragraph
02:56:07 that's not sorry that's not the right reference you just G zoom out again and I'll just find the right bit
02:56:25 so it could you zoom out again please
02:56:32 yeah
02:56:35 so that's that that same page met 1:40 yeah thank you
02:56:57 so I think the reference in my notes are wrong I'll pull out the correct reference later and perhaps we can come back to to my question so I can let you see the evidence so pause that mystery
02:57:13 see the evidence so pause that mystery only then first meets with a cero from the lfb at 2:32 23 in the morning which is over 30 minutes after mr. Inoue
02:57:24 is over 30 minutes after mr. Inoue arrived on scene would you expect liaison between on-scene commanders to happen earlier than that ideally yes and
02:57:36 happen earlier than that ideally yes and it's the only way of them communicating with one another on scene to go and find each other in person or is there a way of doing it via radio or some other way
02:57:47 [Music] the normal way would have been to go and identify that person face to face at the command unit and other witnesses
02:58:05 command unit and other witnesses described similar issues with being unable to locate lfb staff for example Maria Conyers she says that communication from the earth beyond the night was virtually non-existent in her
02:58:17 night was virtually non-existent in her view that the LAF could not locate the earth be safety officer early in the night and and that they would have been assisted by an lfb counterpart in contact and relaying messages that they
02:58:28 contact and relaying messages that they received we've been through the policies that emphasize the importance of communication between agencies would you expect there to be better communication on-site between the LS la S&L FB then as
02:58:40 on-site between the LS la S&L FB then as described by mr. Conyers so I think I
02:58:48 think we have to contextualize this incident it was unprecedented in terms of its nature and its size it undoubtedly was a very complex incident
02:59:01 undoubtedly was a very complex incident in terms of not just the type but but but the other factors that were involved in the management of this incident it's it is clear that communications were one of those
02:59:12 that communications were one of those challenges that night and there are new numerous references to people trying to
02:59:26 numerous references to people trying to attain situational awareness I just think on the actual night that was just very difficult tactically to be able to achieve so in a perfect world yes you
02:59:39 achieve so in a perfect world yes you would expect communication to have been much better than it appeared to women on that night but it has to be taken into the context of the operating environment that people were working in and and the
02:59:52 that people were working in and and the dynamic environment of there were things ever changing on scene that night and I think that that all contributed to those challenges with communication so
03:00:03 challenges with communication so practically speaking men does marina con your statement reflect your experience of other large incidents and or is it out of the ordinary I think this was unprecedented so from my experience you
03:00:18 unprecedented so from my experience you know as I say the the emergency services
03:00:26 have a close relationship they do work together we do exercise together I just think the nature and scale of this incident and I think there were other environmental challenges that were in
03:00:39 environmental challenges that were in play there which just made it very difficult information was shifting and it was changing constantly and I think that just created a very difficult environment to maintain those clear
03:00:51 environment to maintain those clear communication channels I've now found my reference for that part of mr. Hammonds statement so we can go back to that that's met three zeros one for 408 page
03:01:02 that's met three zeros one for 408 page three so if we could have that up on the screen please
03:01:09 and zoom in on the third paragraph from the bottom starting with having liaised
03:01:21 the bottom starting with having liaised sorry third for the bottom so starts having liaised with lawrence who has spoken to lfb commander there we go the commander has said the fire is
03:01:33 the commander has said the fire is superficial and on the outside of the building and there are currently no patients due to the information from the lfb commander Lawrence has kept it as a significant incident just looking at the
03:01:48 significant incident just looking at the information that he received so he's been told they think it's superficial and that there are currently no patients and do you think at that stage it was reasonable to keep the incident as our significant incident so I think the
03:02:05 significant incident so I think the instant response officer weighed up the information from that from the lead agency he would have taken that
03:02:17 agency he would have taken that information as expert advice from from the lead agency and I believe in terms of his overall decision-making and the fact that actually there were currently
03:02:28 fact that actually there were currently no patients and you know we we had sent a predetermined attendance that at that time he deemed it reasonable and to keep
03:02:40 time he deemed it reasonable and to keep it a significant incident and is the fact of their being new patients with major factor in in decision making I wouldn't say it was a major factor but
03:02:53 wouldn't say it was a major factor but it would have been a factor from from recollection iro Ayano also reflects on an incident of a fire previously where
03:03:08 an incident of a fire previously where it was declared as a major incident and there were three patients treated so I think in his mind he was trying to put all of this situational awareness his experience from previous
03:03:19 experience from previous incidents and come up with that option and based on that information he took that decision I've got one more topic that I think we can get through before
03:03:30 that I think we can get through before lunch which is the esses declaration of a major incident and that decision to declare a major incident was made at OU 225 yeah and we can see that in your
03:03:43 225 yeah and we can see that in your statement at paragraph at page 11 oh we don't need to pull it up that was again
03:03:54 don't need to pull it up that was again declared by Elias bronze medics though that was mr. Ayano and he says that this was based on information from the lfb at that stage having attended cu7 and spoken to a cero and that forest
03:04:07 spoken to a cero and that forest survival guidance calls were reporting 40 people trapped and patients coming out of the building unconscious the consequences of declaring a major
03:04:18 consequences of declaring a major incident include increasing the predetermined attendance is that right yes and again I think I can summarize that's 20 ambulances eight officers three of which are ir o--'s and five
03:04:30 three of which are ir o--'s and five operational commanders a tactical devise a tactical advisor a command support vehicle with the command support team medical emergency response incident team
03:04:41 medical emergency response incident team ambulance liaison officers hospital liaison officers deployed to appropriate hospitals heart and central operations and equipment support vehicles to that sound
03:04:52 sound I've taken that from the LSE's policies is it right that a command support vehicle was dispatched but could not get close to the scene do you recall that
03:05:04 close to the scene do you recall that from the evidence yeah so there was a particular challenge there was a general challenge throughout that incident in terms of physically being able to access
03:05:17 terms of physically being able to access with vehicles close enough to the scene
03:05:23 I think part of that issue is that there were a large number of LFP appliances were already arriving on scene before we were notified of the event there were
03:05:37 were notified of the event there were large numbers of metrical and police service that were requested within the first hour from from the time of the origin of the call and and that made it a constant challenge and there are
03:05:50 a constant challenge and there are normal there are numerous references around trying to solve our VPS and try to get this issue of access definitively
03:06:05 to get this issue of access definitively arranged I think you know from my experience the actual area that the roads were quite narrowed there were lots of private cars parts and then with emergency service of vehicles that there
03:06:18 emergency service of vehicles that there was a real challenge in terms of clear access and egress what would you expect a command support vehicle to do at a major incident well they would locate
03:06:31 major incident well they would locate themselves near partner command units and that would be a place for the operational commander to base to base
03:06:44 operational commander to base to base themselves obviously they would be liaising with partner partner agencies fire and and police but then he would be able to use that command support vehicle
03:06:57 able to use that command support vehicle then to hold meetings with with teams on the ground be able to transmit messages through that vehicle back through to the specialist Operations Center and that
03:07:09 specialist Operations Center and that vehicle would have access to the that joint radio channel that we've already talked about yes so it has it has a way of communications so they'd be able to hear messages coming through on that from other agencies as well yes and do
03:07:23 from other agencies as well yes and do you think the fact that the CSV couldn't get close to the site had any effect on LS operations on the night of the fire
03:07:33 now I don't believe it did I think the the personnel from that vehicle made their way to the scene and the equipment that the command support vehicle in
03:07:44 that the command support vehicle in terms of the airwave radios they were retrieved from the vehicle when they were distributed to other key members of our response so in terms of for the the
03:07:58 our response so in terms of for the the bronze operational commander did he have a vehicle where he could get in and sit down and have meetings no he didn't but actually that didn't stop him having meetings and indeed his communication
03:08:12 meetings and indeed his communication with his command team in the roles is very clear that there was there was good communication between mr. IO and the rest of the command teams so might have
03:08:24 rest of the command teams so might have helped with better communication between the lfb command units and the lis what do you think might seem really yes and
03:08:35 do you think might seem really yes and by the time you declared a major incident to the la s declared a major incident do you know whether the predetermined attendance had in fact already been met on-site so from my
03:08:48 already been met on-site so from my review no not entirely but I think the decision was made in the the specialist
03:09:01 decision was made in the the specialist operations center once the significant incident had been declared that actually we were starting to deploy more resources so from my review by three
03:09:16 resources so from my review by three o'clock the full predetermined attendance for a major incident was met
03:09:25 3 a.m. so that's about 35 minutes after the declaration was made
03:09:38 what are the other consequences of declaring a major incident so it sets up a number of actions in terms of the
03:09:49 a number of actions in terms of the wider NHS so in terms of hospitals so once we declare a major incident and we put those hospitals on standby or indeed
03:10:03 put those hospitals on standby or indeed we declare those hospitals as hospitals that will receive patients it triggers those hospitals to take actions in terms of ensuring they're able to take receive
03:10:16 of ensuring they're able to take receive likely patients that we'll send I think when we're declaring a major incident we're also trying to deal with the major incident but also trying to think of how we retain core service delivery to the
03:10:30 we retain core service delivery to the rest of London it triggers issues around our requirement in terms of deployment of all of our
03:10:41 in terms of deployment of all of our heart resources so there was consideration then around if there was another incident in another part of London or required heart resources how would that be managed so it triggers off a whole host of actions outside of the
03:10:54 a whole host of actions outside of the delivery of the predetermined attendance
03:10:59 but the SOC itself has already set up when you have a significant incident yeah and so does that have much of an effect in terms of the resources at command level that you deploy - yes so
03:11:10 command level that you deploy - yes so we so once a major incident then there would have been more staff would have been deployed from the Emergency Operations Center to run the incident through the SOC so more staff would have
03:11:21 through the SOC so more staff would have been allocated to SOC and was the Alice's decision to declare a major incident communicated to either the MPS or the ofb I believe it was yes do you
03:11:33 or the ofb I believe it was yes do you know how it was communicated
03:11:47 leave it was through the CAD link to the MPS
03:11:57 and to the NFB so I think that would have been Lawrence IR knew would have informed lfb commander on cyber who's declaring a major that's a convenient
03:12:13 declaring a major that's a convenient moment for me so look if it's convenient for everyone else but we're gonna have a break now mr. Woodrow seriesin all get some lunch okay no ask you please not to talk to anyone about your evidence while
03:12:25 talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room yes sir and we'll stop now we'll resume at five plus two and don't you like to get the Usher Sheila copies thank you
03:12:47 and just for my benefit miss Grogan are you getting on yeah well there's never
03:12:58 you getting on yeah well there's never so I just wanted to see how the human can work out thank you very much five phones too