Evidence from MPS and LAS (13 November 2018 Pt 2 of 2)

Full transcript

00:08:04 you

00:14:31 I'm sudra listen thank you scenario yes good thank you miss Gordon thank you sir good actually mr. Woodrow I want to pick

00:14:42 good actually mr. Woodrow I want to pick up by looking at a little bit more in detail of the communications between the LA s the NPS and the LF beyond the night so starting with the MPS at page 10 of

00:14:58 so starting with the MPS at page 10 of your statement at 2:10 you refer to an update via the shared radio channel from the NPS and if we look at the cads of

00:15:14 the NPS and if we look at the cads of that which is met zero zero zero one nine nine three one at page five

00:15:32 you'll see there but a third of the way down it says NP asking for us to the liaised with em pass for on and then

00:15:43 liaised with em pass for on and then it's just redacted because that's the radio channel I really think he's asking the rather lotta mr. Woodrow to read this as it is sorry should we zoom in on it I think you should

00:16:01 a bit further up and up again there we go so right at the top of the page you'll see MP asking for us to liaise with and pass on blank and that's the

00:16:15 with and pass on blank and that's the shared radio channel and then you'll see just below it says SOC advise to monitor do you know if that was the first time that the SOC would have switched on the

00:16:27 that the SOC would have switched on the shared radio channel or would it have been on earlier in the event in the incident so that channel is on would have been on it would have been on

00:16:39 have been on it would have been on throughout that evening it's a channel that's monitored as part of routine business and if we go over the page to page 6 and pass 4 is one of the police

00:16:50 page 6 and pass 4 is one of the police helicopters if we go on to page 6 and then we zoom in there's an entry there that says yes 3 smoke coming from western aspect open window halfway off

00:17:04 by the 3rd yep well you can see you can see two there cc1 at 210 top six floors yes and that's the one you referred to

00:17:15 yes and that's the one you referred to in your statements and then further down to 12 smoke coming from western aspects so the calls logged on this radio channel in the cards are all coming from the police helicopter yeah and from my

00:17:30 the police helicopter yeah and from my review of the cards there aren't any other messages from the shared radio being recorded in the calves

00:17:47 would you've expected as a matter of routine messages coming through that radio channel to be recorded yeah if the messages were were being picked up by by

00:17:59 messages were were being picked up by by the luggage then I would expect those messages to have been recorded in the log okay we also have evidence of phone calls between the MPs and a watch

00:18:11 calls between the MPs and a watch manager at the LA s the transcript for that is inq five zeros 379 and if we could pull that up at page 16 please now

00:18:29 could pull that up at page 16 please now this is a call where the I'll just summarize that the MPs have phoned in to say that they have a patient at Latimer Road tube station and they wanted to know how best to tell the LA s where to

00:18:41 know how best to tell the LA s where to come and pick that patient up because as you've already referred to there were issues with getting access to the scene because of congestion and you'll see on

00:18:52 because of congestion and you'll see on that transcript what the MPS is asking is how how they can best update the la s about where they are and you'll see the

00:19:03 about where they are and you'll see the caller says there can you read that okay or would you like us to do know I can read that um yeah relating to it and obviously there's there's been requests

00:19:14 obviously there's there's been requests gone in from all over the place and we've been making phone calls from cans that don't necessarily have yourselves linked to it we need help with this patient so I'm just wondering if you know what your link is to us the cab

00:19:26 know what your link is to us the cab number we're working from to work with you we can send stuff backwards and forwards but the location will be constantly changing I just don't want to get any confusion do you see where I'm coming from the watch manager says yeah

00:19:39 coming from the watch manager says yeah okay so just looking at our working card we haven't sent any messages directly to the police looking at to be fair because I think obviously you guys have been dealing with your part but we've not

00:19:50 dealing with your part but we've not yeah we've not had any communication with the police and then the caller says so no one's monitoring the radio and then the watch manager goes on to say yeah while I was going to say on the radio they are obviously

00:20:01 radio they are obviously there's reference there to two radio channels being monitored but obviously one of those radio channels will be the more relevant one in this scenario and

00:20:12 more relevant one in this scenario and then we go over the page to page 17 it says right okay yeah so that's fine so what I can tell you is the guys who are working if they need to tell you where

00:20:24 working if they need to tell you where the units required or not at the RVP are you happy to go by redacted rather than constant phone calls and so that there is the the MPs feeding it from you

00:20:35 is the the MPs feeding it from you information through the radio rather than phoning sorry could you ask that question ago sorry it's a way of just

00:20:46 question ago sorry it's a way of just summarizing there that is an example of the MPs saying and the LA s agreeing that it's more efficient to communicate via the shared radio yet then via phone

00:20:57 via the shared radio yet then via phone yes and would you agree that it's more efficient to do it that way yes I did okay you then have a reference in your statement to incoming call so to an

00:21:15 statement to incoming call so to an incoming call regarding patients on the 25th floor that was passed on to the lfb and you cite this as an example in your statement of information being passed to the lfb at 2:21 and we can see that on

00:21:28 the lfb at 2:21 and we can see that on page 10 of your statement you say DDF desk inform the lfb of cad 3 3 6 and information relating to patients alive on the 25th floor

00:21:45 that's 221 it's the one reference from the bottom yes yes do you know how this information was passed on so I suspect

00:21:58 information was passed on so I suspect that would have been by phone so DDS is the deployment dispatch deployment sector and so wouldn't have been

00:22:12 sector and so wouldn't have been wouldn't have been the desk that would have been managing the ps3 radio channel that would be the incident management there so phone would be obviously I

00:22:25 there so phone would be obviously I wasn't there but from the entry we don't have a direct cut link and they would not have been monitoring that channel it's a different desk that monitors the es3 channel DDS was actually sitting in the main control room so so DDS are

00:22:39 the main control room so so DDS are sitting in the main control room not the SSO the DDS is not a it's not a functional desk and that is implemented as part of a major incident it's a standard desk that is in the main

00:22:51 standard desk that is in the main Emergency Operations Center and the way that happened was obviously Elias received a 999 call from a member of the public saying there are people alive on the top floor yes and then DDS made the

00:23:04 the top floor yes and then DDS made the decision to pass that on to the Yeti and you accepted your statement that information from other 999 calls was not passed on by the Elias to the lfb yep is

00:23:16 passed on by the Elias to the lfb yep is there a reason why DDS would have decided to pass on this information not other information so I think that would have been a choice of the individual that would have just used the DDS the

00:23:28 that would have just used the DDS the DDS is not actively engaged in dispatching resources the DDS desk is looks at dynamic deployment it looks at allocation of rest breaks that kind of

00:23:40 allocation of rest breaks that kind of thing so it probably was a decision I wasn't there but I'm assuming a DDS would have been used as that DES would have had capacity to make a call so it wouldn't have been because that is that

00:23:52 wouldn't have been because that is that desks responsibility I think it was just a decision that was taken on that night and is there any protocol or policy in place that would require call handlers or dispatch to pass information on from

00:24:04 or dispatch to pass information on from fire survival guidance calls to the lfp so there is there is no defined policy but there is an expectation that when those types of calls come through that

00:24:17 those types of calls come through that either the watch manager is contacted or the call taking supervisor and to a certain extent common sense needs to prevail that that is important

00:24:29 prevail that that is important information it should be transferred but at the time in question there was no dedicated policy that stated that had to occur and you very fairly accepted in your statement that that's an area for

00:24:40 your statement that that's an area for improvement absolutely I'll ask you some more questions about that when we get to the end moving on then to communications from the lfb to the LA s we know that

00:24:54 from the lfb to the LA s we know that the NFP did not tell the lis that it had declared a major incident until 237 and it did that by phone the lfb actually declared its major incident at 206 would

00:25:10 declared its major incident at 206 would you expect the lfb to have updated the alias earlier than 30 minutes after yes

00:25:18 in that call the le s does not mention that it had declared a major incident shortly before it received the call and should the call handler have passed that

00:25:29 should the call handler have passed that information on no I don't think that would have materially affected it the declaration for us was around enabling the additional actions for us to respond

00:25:42 the additional actions for us to respond to that type it wouldn't have materially affected the LF B in any way so and does the fact of the LF be declaring a major incident have any knock-on effect for the LSE's decision-making or operations

00:25:54 the LSE's decision-making or operations no I think I mentioned previously that there will be occasions where another service will declare a major incident but actually that major incident might

00:26:05 but actually that major incident might not necessarily deem us to take any different action so I think in terms of the declaration that we made was purely on mr. Yano what

00:26:17 that we made was purely on mr. Yano what he was seeing what information he was getting and that was around initiating the required response that the LA s needed to provide to that incident in relation to health the Declaration of

00:26:28 relation to health the Declaration of the lfb declaring a major incident wouldn't have changed anything that we've done at that point and I've already asked you about the Jesuit recommendation that a single point of contact between control rooms is set up

00:26:40 contact between control rooms is set up do you think that information sharing between the LASD lfb and the MPS about important decisions such as declaring a major incident would have been assisted

00:26:52 major incident would have been assisted by a single point of contact in each control room

00:27:04 so the answer to that in my experience would be yes I think there are some additional factors that in my experience

00:27:16 additional factors that in my experience would assist with that so clearly this was a this was an incident of unprecedented nature and there were a number of changes in partners in terms of command roles so the incident

00:27:29 of command roles so the incident commander role changed a number of times with colleagues and I think that also created a bit of an issue in terms of

00:27:40 created a bit of an issue in terms of that that timely conversation because there was and there were numerous handovers that needed to occur and I think in some respects that could have slowed down some of that decision-making

00:27:53 slowed down some of that decision-making but that has to be taken in the context of the resource that was constantly escalating the incident was escalating but but that clearly was a factor in

00:28:04 but but that clearly was a factor in some of the communication issues moving on now to nine nine nine calls I pause here sir because I'm going to read from a transcript of one no no non call in a

00:28:17 a transcript of one no no non call in a couple of minutes there's a 909 call from flat 182 which is they all were happy family and I understand that some people may find that distressing and so they may wish to leave the room or stop

00:28:29 they may wish to leave the room or stop watching the live feed yes well you've drawn that their attention you're not coming to it straight away not straight away out it'll be within a few minutes you better warn us again I think when you get and so moving on now to 909

00:28:45 you get and so moving on now to 909 calls the le s has two emergency operation centers one in BO and one in Waterloo is that right that is correct and we have some witness statements from

00:28:56 and we have some witness statements from 999 call handlers that I think you have seen one from miss woodhouse and one from miss Morris miss Morris

00:29:06 miss woodhouse describes the layout of the Waterloo you see in her statement and she says that core handlers are on one floor

00:29:15 one floor but dispatch crews and management's are on another floor that right so not strictly so the Emergency Operations Center our Waterloo building there is

00:29:28 Center our Waterloo building there is one single room but at one end of the room our call handlers sit at one end of the room there is a partition and there

00:29:39 the room there is a partition and there is one step up to the dispatch end of the room two sites on a different floor the Emergency Operations Center is located on the ground floor but there are two ends of the room and the

00:29:50 are two ends of the room and the dispatch end of the room you step up one step to walk into that end of the room so that's kind of the set up of the control room in Waterloo and is that similar to the layout it flows so you

00:30:02 similar to the layout it flows so you have handlers and dispatchers or the same so the Emergency Operations Center at bow they are co-located and there isn't even a step-up or a partition at

00:30:14 isn't even a step-up or a partition at that control center and miss woodhouse refers to moving into the SOC room upon deck upon a declaration of a significant

00:30:27 deck upon a declaration of a significant incident does that mean some call handlers are moved to a different room or is it different personnel that have moved into that so when a decision is

00:30:38 moved into that so when a decision is taken that the specialist operations center room needs to be deployed and the original reason for that in relation to this incident was that a significant incident had been declared at around 140

00:30:52 incident had been declared at around 140 141 in order to operate that room essentially what we do is take the control of that incident out of the main control room so that we allow the main

00:31:03 control room so that we allow the main control room to continue to deal with the routine business in London in terms of the number of 9r9 calls that requires a number of different grades of personnel to come out from their core

00:31:14 personnel to come out from their core duty to fulfill that role in this just operation center so it is a defined list of people at significant there is a stage one SOC response which is a number

00:31:27 stage one SOC response which is a number of people when a major incident that is a level two response which means that we take more people out of the normal Emergency Operations Center environment into the specialist operation center so

00:31:38 into the specialist operation center so people whose role it is to answer the phone to 999 calls do they stay in the EOC or do you move some over to take known unknown calls for that incident the SOC okay so there are a number of

00:31:52 the SOC okay so there are a number of roles within the Emergency Operations Center so when you first join the Emergency Operations Center your primary role is to answer 999 calls as you

00:32:05 role is to answer 999 calls as you develop your career you can while still retaining your license to answer 909 calls you can become a dispatcher you can't become an allocator of resources

00:32:16 can't become an allocator of resources or you become an area controller so there is a career progression at all times however you can be redeployed into call handling so when we make the decision to move an incident into the

00:32:27 decision to move an incident into the specialist Operations Center the watch manager in charge in the night will take the requisite skill level ensuring that they're protecting normal business in terms of call answering but they might

00:32:39 terms of call answering but they might take a number of people that might not just be call handlers so it's a multi skilled workforce and that are deployed coming at it from a slightly different angle if you have people receiving

00:32:50 angle if you have people receiving information from the incident via 999 yes are they likely to be in the SOC room at that points or calls from the

00:33:01 room at that points or calls from the incident all directed to the SOC room or does it depend yeah it's quite possible that people just in the Emergency Operations Center could take nine line 9

00:33:12 Operations Center could take nine line 9 calls from the incident site we don't we do not we don't have the ability to cut off calls just for call handlers in in

00:33:23 off calls just for call handlers in in the SOC and and how do call handlers first of all within the EOC Kim indicate with the soc is it by an

00:33:34 indicate with the soc is it by an internal phone call yeah or it can be adding to the lock so the catalog is a rolling log and actually you can add that information onto the log so it can

00:33:47 that information onto the log so it can be it could be electronically transferred it can be a phone call into the SOC or it could be that the individual call handler contacts the

00:33:59 individual call handler contacts the watch manager in EOC and ask them to to take that information through to SOC we know that the LS received three 999 calls from within the tower on the

00:34:10 calls from within the tower on the nights you've identified them in your statement when you've got a major fire such as Grenfell would be LS normally expect to receive calls and from a fire

00:34:21 expect to receive calls and from a fire incident

00:34:28 I think it was extraordinary and that the the ambulance service actually got calls from the majority of time we will get information from the fire service we don't normally in in in no circumstances

00:34:42 don't normally in in in no circumstances receive calls from from victims that are trapped in a building and could you look at met zero zero zero one five six five

00:34:54 at met zero zero zero one five six five seven at page two it'll come up on the screen for you that is a statement from miss woodhouse where she says get the

00:35:08 miss woodhouse where she says get the right bit

00:35:21 I just want you the right section for you

00:35:25 you which said it's right at the very bottom so if we could zoom in on the very bottom paragraph please there she says the call handlers had not been given any

00:35:37 the call handlers had not been given any advice as to what to say to call us from the incident as it had been assumed the calls would be to the London Fire Brigade rather than to the LA s is that

00:35:48 Brigade rather than to the LA s is that the the working assumption within the lis or was that just her personal assumption no that's her personal assumption so to be absolutely clear our

00:36:00 assumption so to be absolutely clear our call handlers regardless of whether they're in a specialist operation center or in the Emergency Operations Centre have a defined scripted triage process which means that they take information

00:36:11 which means that they take information from the call and based on that information as I described previously they need to take the caller through a series of questions to reach a determinant whatever that determinant

00:36:23 determinant whatever that determinant will be so it's scripted we're not allowed to go off-script for obvious reasons and because they're non clinicians and can't make decisions on triage themselves which is why they they

00:36:35 triage themselves which is why they they license them now to stay licensed to use that tool and once the call handler works out that they are receiving a call from a fire and is there any facility

00:36:46 from a fire and is there any facility for transferring that call to lfb so there would be no facility to directly transfer that call to the lfb the

00:36:58 transfer that call to the lfb the procedure would be you take the call as you would through the the policies and procedures that we have so you take the caller through the script and then we

00:37:10 caller through the script and then we would pass information to the LF B depending if that information was relevant we would be able to transfer that information and are your call

00:37:21 that information and are your call handlers trains or advise to pass that information on so they aware that they might need to pass information on to the LSB if it's relevant information yes if they're not sure then we have call

00:37:33 they're not sure then we have call taking supervisors and whenever they're not sure in terms of that they are guided to ensure that they contact further advice if they think they they require it whatever the issue

00:37:44 they they require it whatever the issue is it's not specific to this particular incident but if a call hander is not sure what to do that's why we have call taking supervisors down where they are based for any queries or questions or

00:37:56 based for any queries or questions or advice to be given oh no no no call handler is aware of the stay-put policy and where this applies so they would not be formally aware of that policy through

00:38:08 be formally aware of that policy through any formal training that we give them

00:38:13 would the OAS expect to be told if the stay-put policy was changed to evacuate

00:38:26 it would be reasonable in the circumstances for us to have been informed that there was a change of advice but as a general matter of policy it's not written down anywhere it's not

00:38:37 it's not written down anywhere it's not that no we so in terms of the in terms of the triage tool that we use it does not give people specific guidance it's

00:38:48 not give people specific guidance it's there is there is in certain what we call chief complaint areas where there is a danger critical danger prompt that

00:39:00 is a danger critical danger prompt that if the call handler believes that individual for whatever reason is in critical danger there is a scripted message depending on which chief complaint that that call is is coming

00:39:13 complaint that that call is is coming through on and it's just a scripted message so again it's the system we just have to follow the system so it's not we don't train our staff to give people

00:39:24 don't train our staff to give people fire survival guidance or or any type of guidance outside other than the what is actually scripted within the triage system okay and I want to look at a few

00:39:37 system okay and I want to look at a few calls from the night with you yet um we've got a few to go through our last questions as we go along yet and then some more questions at the end this is

00:39:49 some more questions at the end this is where I'm going to refer sir to the transcript from flat 182 then people should be aware that we're going to hear or read a transcript of a call that some

00:40:01 or read a transcript of a call that some people might find upsetting more concerned about hearing it read and referred to now is the time to

00:40:14 no it was great and so the first call is the call received by Miss Woodhouse at Oh 239 yes and she says in her statement

00:40:25 Oh 239 yes and she says in her statement that she advised the caller that the emergency services were there based on what she could see on the TV she would however I've had access to the count as well wouldn't she and so watching TV was

00:40:40 well wouldn't she and so watching TV was an additional way of her keeping updated yes as to what was on the ground looking at the transcript it's inq five zeros 383 and if we go to

00:41:04 it's inq five zeros 383 and if we go to page five so by this point the caller has called to say that their flat is on

00:41:15 has called to say that their flat is on fire

00:41:17 fire miss Woodhouse then breaks off and speaks to another operator and and she says their operator - says hello operator one says all right mate 3 9 -

00:41:30 operator one says all right mate 3 9 - do I give instructions I mean they're obviously already on the way they say they're stuck in the tower and then operator 2 goes on to ask some further information and this Woodhouse describes

00:41:43 information and this Woodhouse describes the call operator - then says I don't know whether we should stay on the phone to them or not an operator one says I know that's what I mean I mean they're

00:41:54 know that's what I mean I mean they're all screaming you know do I do you know do I say I mean they're all panicking and screaming I don't know what to do so that's you've said the core handlers

00:42:08 that's you've said the core handlers aren't trained to give FSG advice and so that's her there being concerned that she's not not able to advise the caller about what to do is there anything in your protocols that might have helped her with that so in the

00:42:23 have helped her with that so in the circumstances the call handler should have taken the caller through the protocol which would have been the most suitable protocol to take the caller 3-wood of the am PDS protocol 7th fire

00:42:39 3-wood of the am PDS protocol 7th fire burns and actually that's all that our call handlers are trained is to try to take the advice down in terms of the

00:42:50 take the advice down in terms of the chief complaint so that the triage system generates the set questions that need to be answered and as I say there is a critical danger element to some

00:43:01 is a critical danger element to some protocols and if they'd have gone into that particular protocol they would have given a message there's a scripted message from from the a.m. PDS triage

00:43:13 message from from the a.m. PDS triage do you know what that message would have been for this kind of protocol just so that I'm absolutely clear the critical

00:43:24 that I'm absolutely clear the critical danger message if the call handler would have identified the caller was in critical danger would have been scripted as such if it's too dangerous to stay where you are and you think you can

00:43:36 where you are and you think you can leave safely get away and call us from somewhere safe these are the scripts they've got for protocol that's the

00:43:47 they've got for protocol that's the script for protocol seven that's the squid for protocol seven so these critical danger messages are not just in

00:43:58 critical danger messages are not just in protocol seven they're in a number of those protocols but obviously the the message would change slightly depending on the circumstances but that would have been the only guidance scripted guidance

00:44:10 been the only guidance scripted guidance that the call Handler could have given in terms of sticking through to the protocols of the triage system she didn't give that advice on the phone

00:44:21 she didn't give that advice on the phone as far as the transcript shows she was cut off and then miss woodhouse says that she didn't call the call her back

00:44:32 that she didn't call the call her back even though protocol requires her to is there any exception to that protocol about phoning people back is there any time when you wouldn't phone a caller back no moving on then to the the next

00:44:49 back no moving on then to the the next transcript this is another call that comes through at 3:00 a.m. and it's inq five zeros three eight four at page two and if we could thank you

00:45:13 and if we could thank you so here the caller phones and identifies himself as being on the 50th floor in flat 143 although on it for the record that we think that's an error and that's

00:45:25 that we think that's an error and that's noted in the witness statement yeah and the operator says towards the bottom the fifteenth is there smoke on your floor sir and he says I don't I'm not yeah the

00:45:36 sir and he says I don't I'm not yeah the operator asks okay sir can you see any flames and then goes over the page I will read it all out but if we zoom in a little bit please you'll see there the

00:45:50 little bit please you'll see there the operator is asking the caller about the conditions in the flat how many people there are and then asking whether or not there's a window nearby for them to get

00:46:04 there's a window nearby for them to get some fresh air and is that an example of the core of the core hands are going off-script yes so they're not trained to ask about conditions in a flat of someone phones

00:46:16 conditions in a flat of someone phones from a flat on fire no and I again I think you know it is important

00:46:27 I think call handlers were particularly traumatized that they were speaking I think there were some human human factors there around the scripted

00:46:39 factors there around the scripted questions did did they seem appropriate given the circumstances so you know this would not be a routine script for the requisite chief complaint those

00:46:50 requisite chief complaint those questions to be asked and there's one more phone call I don't need to go to it because you've answered all my questions already based on the previous calls but

00:47:02 already based on the previous calls but just for the inquiry records there is the final call received by the LA s from within the towers at 3:18 and the reference is inq five zeros 385 now by

00:47:19 reference is inq five zeros 385 now by the time the alias had received those last two calls so Oh 303 18 and the LF B had itself changed its stay-put policy

00:47:31 had itself changed its stay-put policy and I just want to explore with you how that was communicated to the lis so the evidence so far is that the LF b changed the stay-put policy around 2:35

00:47:42 changed the stay-put policy around 2:35 and 247 mm-hmm that was communicated over police radio to the police just before 310 do you know whether it was

00:47:53 before 310 do you know whether it was communicated to the is on scene at the same time so there is no record that I could find that we were directly communicated with a change of that advice was it communicated over the

00:48:04 advice was it communicated over the shared airwave Channel as far as you're aware not as far as I'm aware and would BLS have been able to hear the MPS radio messages on the scene not necessarily I

00:48:20 messages on the scene not necessarily I think I think that the other thing that's important here is

00:48:29 the script that we have for that type of incident includes that critical message that I've just so in actual fact if the lfb had informed us directly that they

00:48:43 lfb had informed us directly that they were changing their spadefoot advice our call handlers depending on the information were given would still have to work through those protocols and

00:48:55 to work through those protocols and ultimately if they feel that the patient's in imminent danger that message through AM PDS would have been given so the fact of the change in the policy by the lfb might not have

00:49:08 policy by the lfb might not have affected how 909 calls were handled by the la s but it might have affected the aliases appreciation of the severity of the incident war generally when doing it

00:49:21 on scene then the first tactical control meeting was held at 3:20 that's often called the silver meeting and Laurence iron who attended and he can't remember

00:49:35 iron who attended and he can't remember whether it was the first or second silver meeting where the LF be advised of the change in the stay-put policy but we know from the evidence that it was stated in the meeting at 3:20 that FSG

00:49:48 stated in the meeting at 3:20 that FSG has been deviated in persons herself evacuating and you won't find it in front of you but if you want reference to their meeting in your statement you can find it

00:50:06 so I paid 4320 yet page 40 mysterion who

00:50:18 so I paid 4320 yet page 40 mysterion who says that Helen Wiggly fed back from that meeting to the Elias control room I think my updates at 3:43 in your chronology so it's page 16 where it says

00:50:35 chronology so it's page 16 where it says bronze medic update SOC yes and that doesn't mention the change in stay put would you expect miss Wiggly or to

00:50:48 would you expect miss Wiggly or to appreciate the significance of the change in the stay-put policy and to communicate that back to control yes I would have

00:51:02 do you know if the alias was ever informed of the change in staples at the time of my statement I was unable to find any record of us being formally

00:51:14 find any record of us being formally advised

00:51:24 moving on in topics now mr. woodruf just to a few topics about decision-making on the night and again we know you weren't there but if you can help us with these questions they've come to you and so we

00:51:37 questions they've come to you and so we know that the OAS set up two sectors on the night of the fire yes and sector two was set up around 3:00 a.m. just after Elias staff and

00:51:48 3:00 a.m. just after Elias staff and their witness statements described initially being swamped by patients in Sector two whereas sector one appeared to receive fewer patients from your review of the logs and the evidence did

00:51:59 review of the logs and the evidence did setting up two sectors cause any problem or confusion on the night now I think it absolutely was the the right thing to do so the primary actions are to set up the

00:52:16 so the primary actions are to set up the casualty collection point and our heart staff were appropriately resourced further towards the tower because of the additional PPE that they wear and the

00:52:29 additional PPE that they wear and the lfb were extricating patients out to our heart teams and then our heart teams were doing an initial synth in terms of

00:52:41 were doing an initial synth in terms of first triage and then taking those patients to a casualty clearing station where we had other clinicians so that absolutely was the right thing to do

00:52:52 absolutely was the right thing to do it's not unusual to sector eyes major incidents where you start to see patients presenting in different parts

00:53:03 patients presenting in different parts where there is geographical distance etcetera or various hazards and on the night it became apparent that actually

00:53:14 night it became apparent that actually the lfb were extricating patients from the opposite side of the tower and there was a discussion on why that was and it was deemed to be that there was you know some real concerns around debris with

00:53:26 some real concerns around debris with coming out bringing patients out from the east aspect and therefore mr. Isle you set up a mirrored - - on the opposite side of the tower so

00:53:38 - - on the opposite side of the tower so that's entirely appropriate and within our response procedures and did the Elias and Hart teams have adequate resources to fully operate - centers so

00:53:49 resources to fully operate - centers so I think at the beginning when patients were exhibiting themselves there was it was a bit of a surprise because it had been agreed that patients would be extricated to the casualty collection

00:54:02 extricated to the casualty collection point in the casualty clearing station that was already set up but very quickly mister IOU is reported in his log of sending reassigning staff and as more staff were attending as a result of the

00:54:15 staff were attending as a result of the major instant declaration including hems teams that the sector - was set up and that's where iro Maria Canas was based

00:54:26 that's where iro Maria Canas was based and are you aware of whether that initial delay in getting resources to sector - and caused any issues with the treatment of patients I don't believe he

00:54:37 treatment of patients I don't believe he did another issue on the night was a request from the lfb four heart teams to go into the building are you aware of that yes aren't you and if we note the

00:54:51 that yes aren't you and if we note the heart policy on entering into buildings that's la s7 zeros number two at page three if we pull that up

00:55:03 that's very small tech so we could blow that up please thank you I'll just summarize that there it says that the decision about whether or not to deploy

00:55:15 decision about whether or not to deploy in EDB a so extended duration breathing apparatus is made by heart not by anyone else that's right isn't it

00:55:26 yes it would be a heart team leader in opera in conjunction with the operational commander so there would be a discussion and clearly there is a process before that needs to be undertaken before you would commit heart

00:55:38 undertaken before you would commit heart resources in terms of risk assessment and that process involves a risk assessment doesn't it and moving on to page 5 of the same document please and

00:55:51 page 5 of the same document please and zooming in again it says heart EDB a is not authorized for use in the following circumstances and then it says active fire but see below for work adjacent to

00:56:06 fire but see below for work adjacent to active firefighting when it says active fire does that mean you're not to go into a building that is on fire yes but you can work adjacent to it yes and one

00:56:19 you can work adjacent to it yes and one of the reasons for that is that the heart uniform is not designed to go into a building that's on fire because it doesn't have thermal protection doesn't have thermal protection yet : Pennington

00:56:34 have thermal protection yet : Pennington who's a heart officer in his statement says that they could have considered deploying staff to the bridgehead and that this has happened in the past including it Latin or house are you

00:56:46 including it Latin or house are you aware of that I'm not aware of that specific decision but in principle it was open to heart to consider whether or not to go into the bridge heads is that

00:56:57 not to go into the bridge heads is that right yes okay are you aware of any other fires where heart staff have been deployed into a bridgehead whilst there was active an active fire I'm not aware

00:57:08 was active an active fire I'm not aware not and with your knowledge of the tower and do you think it would have been feasible for heart to do that during the night of the fire so I believe with the information that was

00:57:21 believe with the information that was provided to both the incident commander in the heart team that we deployed Hart very close to the tower and used the

00:57:33 very close to the tower and used the concrete walkway as an area of protection I think it needs to be taken into the context of not just the the sheer scale of the fire within the block but clearly there were other issues that

00:57:45 but clearly there were other issues that we were concerned around in terms of falling debris and some of that debris was alight so I think in the circumstances the right decision was

00:57:56 circumstances the right decision was made but we were right within the inner cordon at the NFB had said so I believe the decision was right not to commit into the tower and Russell abuja who's

00:58:08 into the tower and Russell abuja who's another Hart office era yeah describes an lfb request to move the triage point into the lobby of the tower so not the bridgehead but the ground floor and lobby the IAS decided that this was not

00:58:20 lobby the IAS decided that this was not safe due to debris and hoses again with your knowledge of Grenfell and the events on the night would it have been feasible for the triage point to be moved into the lobby no I wouldn't have believed that would have been an

00:58:32 believed that would have been an appropriate place to set up a triage and why not because there were obstructions like hoses it was a very active area and the triage is a process that needs to

00:58:44 the triage is a process that needs to take place in a safe community confined environment where you can get on do your work so that's why the decision was made to do it outside of the tower under the

00:58:55 to do it outside of the tower under the cover of the walkway where where access was was better for Hart paramedics to undertake that initial tree triage with the decision not to go into the tower appears to have been taken on site was

00:59:08 appears to have been taken on site was it ever discussed at a higher level so with silver or gold command do

00:59:16 so I don't believe it it was the the SOP that you're quoting is a national so Hart the hazardous area response team

00:59:29 Hart the hazardous area response team sorry they are a national asset in terms of for ambulance services so this is a national standard operating procedure it's not lis specific it applies to Hart

00:59:43 it's not lis specific it applies to Hart teams across across the country and based on the page that describes the

00:59:55 based on the page that describes the risk of combustion of fire gases cannot be eliminated environments where for structural firefighting apparel was was in use I believe that decision not to commit Hart into the building was the

01:00:07 commit Hart into the building was the right decision based on that information

01:00:13 from the evidence we know that Hart were also concerned about the structural integrity of the building if they've been given early reassurance that the building was structurally sound do you

01:00:27 building was structurally sound do you think this would have made any difference to the decision that was made so I don't believe having seen what Hart

01:00:39 so I don't believe having seen what Hart operatives and indeed our frontline staff did on the night that actually the structural integrity of the building was a concern but I don't think that was a primary concern around whether they

01:00:51 primary concern around whether they entered the building or not I think it was the appropriateness of the job that Hart needed to undertake and was that being done in the best location so you know in my experience we will set up our

01:01:04 know in my experience we will set up our casualty clearing in but the rescue operation for victim from fire sits with the London Fire Brigade they extricate those patients to an area where we can

01:01:15 those patients to an area where we can do an initial triage then we would move them to casualty clearing where we would do a further assessment and then make sure that those patients received the appropriate rate treatment and definitive transport to hospital

01:01:26 definitive transport to hospital and so coogee have had one or two Hart officers deployed to assist in moving patients from inside the tower to the triage points on the right of the fire

01:01:38 triage points on the right of the fire now I believe the system that were set up on the night was the appropriate system under the circumstances the next

01:01:50 system under the circumstances the next topic I have is about transporting patients to hospitals yet the gold law at O 615 records that the silver medics summarized the dispersal of casualties

01:02:01 summarized the dispersal of casualties to four hospitals and if we pull that up so you can see it it's met triple zero one nine nine three four at page 22

01:02:30 do you need that reference again it's met triple zero one nine nine three four at page 22

01:02:53 you do have it it doesn't exist right I'm not sure sorry

01:03:14 we can get it there as well yes thank you hey yeah right so if we pull up la s7 zeroes then number nine at page 22

01:03:27 s7 zeroes then number nine at page 22 please so here we have the summary of where people were being sent that's Kings College Chelsea Westminster sent Mary's and the

01:03:40 Chelsea Westminster sent Mary's and the royal free & but if we go to the CAD which is met triple zero one nine nine three one at page 35

01:04:04 and the entry there at those 6:40 which

01:04:17 and the entry there at those 6:40 which is about halfway down the page give me the expense go further up please right so right at the top of the stop there at the top of the page it says under the

01:04:30 the top of the page it says under the impression there is only one hospital the casualty are going to anchor which hospitals the patients are being taken to it looks there is this there's some

01:04:44 to it looks there is this there's some confusion about which hospitals are actually accepting patients are you aware of that being an issue on the night no and is this a message from the

01:04:55 night no and is this a message from the LA s internally or is a message from the Met Police so I think that message is from the Metropolitan Police Service and I think that's in relation to the

01:05:07 I think that's in relation to the discussions around a casualty Bureau number being set up what's clear in the evidence that I reviewed and actually is the right thing

01:05:19 reviewed and actually is the right thing to do is that once the major incident was declared the hospitals that we put on standby were were nominated and they

01:05:31 on standby were were nominated and they were King's College Chelsea Westminster San Mary's and Royal Free there's two major trauma centres there and there were particular discussions about which trauma centres to send patients to and

01:05:42 trauma centres to send patients to and also to ensure that there was capacity in those trauma centres for the rest of London so that was discussed in the evidence that I've read was discussed at joint service meetings I think that's in

01:05:55 joint service meetings I think that's in relation to the setting up of a casualty Bureau and one of the purposes of a casualty Bureau is to be able to work out who's still missing correct right yeah what systems were in

01:06:06 correct right yeah what systems were in place to record the details of patients who are taken away from sight in order to assist that process in working out who went where so the process is in place is that when a

01:06:18 the process is in place is that when a patient is loaded onto a vehicle ready to be transported the destination Hospital is agreed and as part of a

01:06:29 Hospital is agreed and as part of a major incident process we also sent hospital liaison officers to the hospitals

01:06:36 hospitals so we've recalled when patients were leaving the scene that's that's the process and we had officers at hospitals so when the vehicles were arriving they were essentially had seen those patients

01:06:48 were essentially had seen those patients in and was that information passed on to those who were working out who was still missing so that information so this is where the strategic coordination group

01:06:59 where the strategic coordination group so those conference calls where you had numerous partners and there was discussion around such an application to Bureau then those information in terms

01:07:12 Bureau then those information in terms of where we were conveying patients became critical and and also we were passing that information on to the wider NHS in London and that would be in relationships of numbers of patients are

01:07:23 relationships of numbers of patients are leaving the scene in arriving hospitals but what about named individuals was that kind of information collected where we were able to record names the names were recorded on the patient report

01:07:35 were recorded on the patient report forms some of the patients that we conveyed weren't in a position to be able to give us their details we heard evidence this morning about when the casualty collection Bureau was was set

01:07:47 casualty collection Bureau was was set up

01:07:47 up had it been set up earlier would that sort of information have been available in one place for people to work out he was still unaccounted for sorry can you longer a long question and

01:08:00 sorry can you longer a long question and we heard evidence this morning that the casualty collection Bureau was set up when you say the casualty collection area used the wrong word is that the casualty collection point and yes the

01:08:12 casualty collection point and yes the point where people were working out which flats were cleared and who was still unaccounted for all right okay yeah

01:08:21 Mayon just our understanding is that that Bureau is where information about who's still missing was being worked out it wasn't set up until the morning of

01:08:33 it wasn't set up until the morning of the 14th was the was information about individual people being sent to individual hospitals passed to the MPS

01:08:44 individual hospitals passed to the MPS earlier than that time I would say at that time no the priority was to get those patients to the hospitals that

01:08:56 those patients to the hospitals that that they needed in terms of the requirements for their treatment so where we where we were able to complete a patient report fall on patients and

01:09:07 a patient report fall on patients and get patients details then clearly those those patient report forms would have been handed into the receiving hospital and those patients they would have been booked into the system that wasn't

01:09:19 booked into the system that wasn't possible to do with all patients but our primary concern is actually to stabilize the patient's treat them and get them to the definitive place of care and as part

01:09:33 the definitive place of care and as part of that process to dles collect information about the flat numbers and floors where residents had come from

01:09:42 if that was possible that would be a routine question that we would ask yet there's evidence from survivors that the inquiries already heard being sent to

01:09:54 inquiries already heard being sent to different hospitals from their families and then relatives having problems being able to locate their families could any improvements be made to LA s procedures to ensure that that doesn't happen in

01:10:06 to ensure that that doesn't happen in the future so I think can there be improvements yes in every scenario you know it's a continual learning process

01:10:17 know it's a continual learning process so it would be wrong of me to say here and say that things cannot be improved I think what is important is that when decisions are made to transport patients

01:10:28 decisions are made to transport patients to hospital the decision in terms of which hospital they're transported to is which hospital has the services they require for the best level of care and

01:10:39 require for the best level of care and those decisions are made on a clinical basis and where possible you know in the review of the evidence there were occasions where decisions were made to

01:10:50 occasions where decisions were made to try to keep families together but but principally the decision to convey people is to where is the best care that the patient requires where would that be delivered and thank you moving on then

01:11:04 delivered and thank you moving on then to the lessons learned that you identify in your statement at three point ten point two in your statement la s7 zeros

01:11:18 point two in your statement la s7 zeros and then number nine and that is at page 27

01:11:28 sorry which three-point 10.2 so if we zoom in on it it's just the second paragraph at the top of the page yes you say as might be considered inevitable in

01:11:39 say as might be considered inevitable in an incident of this nature there were areas that could have worked better and the area you identify there is instances where the timeliness of communication between the emergency services could have been improved we've been through

01:11:51 have been improved we've been through that in detail already in your evidence are there any further examples that you want to draw attention to so I think we we have fundamentally reviewed the

01:12:03 we have fundamentally reviewed the structures of our emergency operation centers and we're just in the process now of restructuring those rooms and delivering those we are aware that there

01:12:14 delivering those we are aware that there are some issues around to to control rent and how that were there were people taking some calls from the boat control room that weren't necessarily fully sighted on what was happening in the

01:12:27 sighted on what was happening in the specialist Operations Center at the Waterloo control room so we've restructured that we've put more supporting for for call takers additional training has been given in

01:12:38 additional training has been given in terms of you know the protocols and particularly around the critical danger messages and I think what needs to be taken into context at this point is the

01:12:52 taken into context at this point is the lis were tested a number of times in 2017 in terms of major incidents it's in my experience if you put in terms of

01:13:03 my experience if you put in terms of large scale events 7/7 was was the last big scale event that we dealt with I think in 2017 you know 10 days 10 days

01:13:18 think in 2017 you know 10 days 10 days previously we dealt with London Bridge which again was a major incident for us but a completely different set of circumstances of which we had to work we had to implement these plans so I think

01:13:29 had to implement these plans so I think our learning principally the way that we deliver our method of care is the same whether we would have been at grenfell tower or at London so we're trying to we're trying to

01:13:41 so we're trying to we're trying to capture the learning from all of those various types of incidents that had very different challenges and trying to build those in so you know I regret as I've

01:13:54 those in so you know I regret as I've said that there were some things that we should have done that we didn't do I you know that's down to individuals in the context of an unprecedented event and on the night but you know as an

01:14:05 the night but you know as an organization we're absolutely committed to learn and I've been driving that forward as we've as we've continued to develop services and you mentioned

01:14:17 develop services and you mentioned training around the critical messages yeah is the OES implementing training on what kind of fire survival guidance to use so so to be clear about fire survival guidance currently under the

01:14:29 survival guidance currently under the a.m. PDS triage system that we're licensed to use we're not at liberty to provide any fire survival guidance we have to use one of two systems NHS

01:14:41 have to use one of two systems NHS pathways is the other system again that system does not provide any any fire survival guidance what we have within our triage system is the critical danger

01:14:52 our triage system is the critical danger message and and we've reiterated the use when call handlers believe that someone is in critical danger that those that scripture be read to the individual and

01:15:03 scripture be read to the individual and and have you taken any specific steps to ensure that information is passed to other agencies in a timely manner during other incidents yes we have so

01:15:14 other incidents yes we have so particularly around the use of the emergency service 3 and we showed in in terms of some of the information that

01:15:25 terms of some of the information that was exchanged around the Parsons green tube incident that happened later that September 2017 we saw significantly better communication between services

01:15:41 and then in terms of any other aspects on the scene you mentioned an issue of parking and congestion being an issue has the LA s implemented any lessons

01:15:54 has the LA s implemented any lessons learned from that issue well I think in terms of trying to assess so I think our

01:16:05 terms of trying to assess so I think our reflections on the night is that where we were trying to pull resources closer to the scene I think there were multiple revisions of our VPS and in actual fact

01:16:18 revisions of our VPS and in actual fact in terms of the scales of the vehicles there's reference to actually vehicles being held at Hammersmith Hospital and then being drawn in so it's around

01:16:29 then being drawn in so it's around adaptability and thinking outside that actually having vehicles right on top of the scene sometimes in large numbers might not be the answer but to have a place where you can hold and bring smaller numbers in to keep roots in

01:16:41 smaller numbers in to keep roots in terms of access and egress clear general learning but again circumstances in terms of individual incidents you know we can we can write that into a plan but

01:16:53 we can we can write that into a plan but then we'll face something else where that plan doesn't work so it's just around constantly trying to adapt and I think mr. iru throughout that night was constantly looking at ways of trying to

01:17:04 constantly looking at ways of trying to do things differently and overcoming the challenges which you know we're quite unique and on an unprecedented scale that night and and finally can you look up met zero zero zero two three seven

01:17:17 up met zero zero zero two three seven one five at page nine this is the gold log I think

01:17:34 yeah so it's the reference at 7-eleven could you zoom in on that please on the left-hand side there's a reference in

01:17:48 left-hand side there's a reference in that log there you'll see two helicopters coming to evac from roof and

01:17:56 we know that helicopters did not evacuate anyone from Grenfell tower on the night of the fire do you know where that impression may have came from it's

01:18:07 that impression may have came from it's recorded in this log so I believe there was a discussion with lfb consideration

01:18:21 was a discussion with lfb consideration around whether Coast Guard could be brought in in terms of their ability to have winches in terms of that that

01:18:36 have winches in terms of that that message

01:18:37 message I didn't read anywhere that helicopters were being deployed but in the evidence that I've reviewed there was certainly a discussion around whether HM HM Coast

01:18:51 discussion around whether HM HM Coast Guard could add any value in terms of being able to evacuate any people that might be trapped in the high levels of the building and but it's not accurate

01:19:05 the building and but it's not accurate to say that the helicopters were coming no to evacuate people we knew that doesn't happen though thank you very much though sir

01:19:17 those are the questions I have for you but it may be that there are some more questions that others would like to ask so I will have a pause an arrow we're gonna have a break summer okay you get a

01:19:29 gonna have a break summer okay you get a Fraser and I'm gonna say 20 past give you chance Twitter legs of it thank you central turnaround for evidence please when you're out of the room you gave the option and surely

01:19:51 right 24 3 please

01:24:49 you

01:29:35 [Music]

01:29:44 mr. Woodruff I know anything about anything there will be a few few questions but not too many only three only three short questions are you'll be glad to hear mr. Woodruff and first of

01:29:56 glad to hear mr. Woodruff and first of all we just before you left the room we were talking about parking and congestion at the scene do you know if congestion at the scene had any impact in the speed at which people could be

01:30:08 in the speed at which people could be conveyed to us at all I don't believe it had any negative impact on patient outcome we also discussed the woodhouse

01:30:23 outcome we also discussed the woodhouse call from flat 182 Grenfell tower in your lessons learned exercise have you developed any specific training around passing on information from flats that

01:30:37 passing on information from flats that are on fire back to the LF beam so we in terms of the consolidation of the message or the reiteration of the message is the message that when you've

01:30:48 message is the message that when you've received a call in a scenario like that that message needs to go into the specialist Operations Center that message there gets logged and the NFB would be contacted and we also discuss

01:31:02 would be contacted and we also discuss the protocol that you should call back a caller if the call is dropped have you implemented implemented any additional training or any lessons learned around insuring that protocol is complied with

01:31:15 insuring that protocol is complied with well it's just been reiterated that that is something that we should do and we take 1.9 million calls and we do get calls that are dropped that should just be routine business of course in the

01:31:26 be routine business of course in the position we found ourselves in on that night for whatever reason the individual didn't didn't carry that that out so that's clearly been reiterated but that's just normal business for us

01:31:38 that's just normal business for us regardless of the type of call for call drops or abandons we need to call it back thank you that's everything thank you very much for coming and giving evidence to date I'd like to add my

01:31:49 evidence to date I'd like to add my thing

01:31:50 thing as well you've obviously taken a lot of time and trouble to get a full understanding of what was going on as far as elas were concerned that morning and I'm very grateful to

01:32:01 that morning and I'm very grateful to you for that because you've been able to give us a really good view as to what was going on I'm sorry if it's kept you waiting to come and give your evidence I'm sorry about that but we're really very grateful to you and it's a great help to us - thank you

01:32:13 and it's a great help to us - thank you so much you do yes you go to the ocean

01:32:29 good remembers Grogan what's next yes sir all I have to do now is read in the shed you love witness statements exhibits and documents from the LS to the inquiry right which she'll take

01:32:41 the inquiry right which she'll take about 30 seconds so if I could bring that schedule up on the screen it's eying NQ five zeros five to six

01:32:59 I could be zoom in a little bit

01:33:09 thank you and this schedule contains a list of witness statements and exhibits of Elias personnel who attended the scene on the night together with other key Elias documents I must stress that

01:33:21 key Elias documents I must stress that the material contained within the schedule includes distressing information about matters on the night I would ask that their scheduled material is now formally read into the inquiry record at its it's two pages long so if

01:33:35 record at its it's two pages long so if we could just scroll down to make sure we've caught everything

01:33:43 there we are right so a lot of people have made statements for the use of the inquiry

01:33:51 inquiry I think it's right to say that we are very grateful to all of them for taking the time and trouble to do that and that'll form part of the evidence before the inquiry and will be considered along

01:34:03 the inquiry and will be considered along with everything else thank you very much and thank you so that's it from me I think mr. Rawat is now planning to read in some statements right thank you very much

01:34:26 [Music]

01:34:49 yes mr. Romer good afternoon mr. chair

01:34:56 I'd like to do now if I may is just to use the remaining time afternoon to continue with the work of putting into the record statements from survivors

01:35:07 the record statements from survivors residents and bereaved individuals who've made statements and before I go so can I give the the explanation that we've given in the past which is that whilst I may from these statements be

01:35:20 whilst I may from these statements be reading extracts they are admitted into the inquiries record in their entirety and considered accordingly as evidence the first statement I wish to put into

01:35:31 the first statement I wish to put into the record this afternoon is the statement of Zecharia tube uni that's at iws four zeros one zero seven six please

01:35:48 if we go to page seven of that statement

01:36:00 seven please page seven oh sorry page nine give me

01:36:13 we seems gem that page 9 it's signed with a statement of truth and dated the ninth of September 2018 yes there are no

01:36:24 ninth of September 2018 yes there are no exhibits to accompany the statement you will remember miss Gemma hearing from the evidence of Hernan Wahhabi on Thursday last week Zak is her eldest son

01:36:38 Thursday last week Zak is her eldest son and if I may just read into an extract from his statement relates to the events of the night itself and I pick it up a paragraph 15 on page 4 the CCTV image of

01:36:58 paragraph 15 on page 4 the CCTV image of me entering the building that night gives the time as 12:30 8 a.m. when I got to the flat I went to my room and started playing PlayStation 4 a message

01:37:09 started playing PlayStation 4 a message with some friends from school and a few family members then I got food to eat I just finished eating I was watching television when I smelled plastic burning I thought it was my mobile phone

01:37:20 burning I thought it was my mobile phone charger so I unplugged it the burning smell wasn't particularly strong but it was constant about five minutes later I heard my dad get up and go to the kitchen he called me in my mum's name I

01:37:33 kitchen he called me in my mum's name I think he thought one of us had left something in the oven I went to the kitchen and could see that smoke was coming in through the extractor fan in the kitchen window the kitchen windows were closed we always sleep with the

01:37:45 were closed we always sleep with the windows in the kitchen and living room close because people throw things out of their windows sometimes like burning cigarettes that could catch a curtain and start a fire once rice was thrown

01:37:56 and start a fire once rice was thrown into a flat my dad's eyesight is bad so he couldn't see where the smoke was coming from which is why he thought it was from the oven I could see that it was coming in from the extractor fan in

01:38:07 was coming in from the extractor fan in the window and settling on the ceiling like water the smoke was black I wondered if people had lit a bonfire in the grassy area downstairs so I went into the living room to have a look

01:38:18 into the living room to have a look through the bottom of the living room window I could see the top flicker of a flame there's a little bit of black smoke in their living room too though not much not as much as in the kitchen I

01:38:29 not much not as much as in the kitchen I thought maybe the tree under the living room window was on fire and wanted to have a look so I went to open the window it's one of those windows that you can open in different ways if you turn the

01:38:40 open in different ways if you turn the handle so that it points straight up it opens like a door if you turn it another way it hinges open at the top and if you turn it another way it locks the window closed the windows behind the sofa so I

01:38:51 closed the windows behind the sofa so I had to climb onto the sofa to reach it I opened the window like a door I saw a spark and just as I leaned forward to see where the spark had come from fire shot straight up in front of my face I

01:39:04 shot straight up in front of my face I realized that the fire was on the outside of the building I moved back and my mum said quickly quickly close it so I closed back to the window my dad was

01:39:15 I closed back to the window my dad was saying we should stay in the flat but I was like no you lot can stay but I'm taking my sister I can't leave my little sister here names redacted but it's the name of Zach's sister was still in her

01:39:26 name of Zach's sister was still in her bed but she was awake because she'd heard the commotion I walked to her bedroom lifted her up and brought her out then I set her down maybe near the front door I can't remember I put on my

01:39:37 front door I can't remember I put on my sandals walked out far flat onto the landing and poked my head down the stairs to check there wasn't any fire on the landing or in the stairs there wasn't any fire but I saw some white smoke on the landing and in the

01:39:49 smoke on the landing and in the stairwell at this point I was wearing my tracksuit bottoms and my abaya which is traditional clothing that Muslims wear to the mosque and sandals on my feet my sister was wearing her

01:40:00 on my feet my sister was wearing her pajamas and no shoes my mum was wearing a brown dressing-gown and a brown headscarf my dad was wearing his work clothes I think when I got back to the flat my parents asked me whether there had been any smoke on the landing

01:40:12 there had been any smoke on the landing and in the stairwell I lied and said no as I knew if I told them about the smoke I'd seen they would say we should stay in the flat I picked my sister up from

01:40:23 in the flat I picked my sister up from ran down the stairs carrying her a smoke got worse as I went down I don't remember struggling to breathe but when I got out of the bill I was spitting black stuff I was coughing as I went down the stairs but I

01:40:35 coughing as I went down the stairs but I covered my mouth with my clothes and covered my sister's face with my robe I can't remember if my sister was coughing but I know she was crying I don't remember seeing any hoses in the stairwell I could see pretty well at

01:40:48 stairwell I could see pretty well at around the third or second floor we came across an older woman in the stairwell she looked Hera Tran was wearing a headscarf

01:40:55 headscarf she had two children with her a boy and a girl who looked around my sister's age I'm assuming the lady was their grandmother they're in front of us and were the first people we came across in

01:41:06 were the first people we came across in the stairwell stairwell was narrow too narrow for us to walk down side-by-side or for me to pass them so I had to let the lady in the kid she was with stay in front of me then the little girl with

01:41:18 front of me then the little girl with the older lady went back upstairs I think to get her parents when we reached the first floor we came across two firefighters they weren't wearing masks I could see their faces they were both

01:41:31 I could see their faces they were both white men with blue eyes and brown hair one was holding the door from the stairwell to the landing open the other told me to go back upstairs I thought that was such a dumb thing to say there

01:41:42 that was such a dumb thing to say there was no way I was going back but I started to back up like I was obeying him then the era of trend looking grandmother started speaking with the firefighters she couldn't speak English very well as she spoke with them I push

01:41:55 very well as she spoke with them I push past and walked out the door the firefighter was holding open he looked annoyed with me as I walked by but I kept going I've been shown a CCTV image showing me leaving the building carrying my sister

01:42:06 leaving the building carrying my sister the time on the image is 119 a.m. if I jump forward just a little bit in the statement Zac also sets out his

01:42:18 statement Zac also sets out his recollection of the contact that his family had with his uncle Abdul Aziz who was in flat warning news and that's a paragraph 27 when

01:42:28 my mum was talking to Fawzia and abdul-aziz on her mobile saying there was a fire she was speaking really quickly pushes panicking I tried to grab I tried to grab the phone from her so I

01:42:40 I tried to grab the phone from her so I could speak to them more calmly but she didn't let me so I used my dad's mobile and called Yassen I would say this was five to ten minutes after I got out of the tower so around 1:30 a.m. yes in

01:42:51 the tower so around 1:30 a.m. yes in answered his phone normally like there was nothing wrong I said bro you have to leave now he asked why and I told him that if they didn't get out they were going to be trapped he said okay all

01:43:03 going to be trapped he said okay all right then I'll come down he asked me if the files in the stairwell and I told him no that I had just come from there wasn't and there was no fire in the stairwell he said all right and again

01:43:14 stairwell he said all right and again said he would come down so I cut the phone and gave it back to my dad if I move forward to paragraph 29 that continues I saw a girl I'd gone to

01:43:26 continues I saw a girl I'd gone to school with who lives nearby and used her mobile to call my cousin's I tried them two or three times on the landline and nor hodor's phone what when know how to answer that around 2:00 a.m. I asked

01:43:38 to answer that around 2:00 a.m. I asked her have you come out yet and she said no they were still inside she said the firemen said they couldn't leave she didn't sound that scared nothing like in the 999 calls I think because she thought the fire brigade was

01:43:49 because she thought the fire brigade was going to rescue her I said that the firefighters have said the same thing to me and I told her not to listen to them because they were going to get stuck she said they were speaking to the fire brigade and we hung up a little while

01:44:02 brigade and we hung up a little while later I called Noor Hoda again and this time we didn't speak for very long she said they were still speaking with the fire brigade and I told her she needed to get out conversation was short because her dad took the phone from and

01:44:13 because her dad took the phone from and said we're busy or something like that as in they were busy speaking with the fire brigade he sounded like he was in a rush after that I didn't speak to them again I called a while later to the

01:44:25 again I called a while later to the house phone but he didn't go through and I called all of their phones but nobody picked up and that's all I proposed to read from that statement thank you

01:44:39 the next statement I proposed put into the record that mr. chairman is that of Malad Ayub Kareem the reference for that is that I WS four zeros one zero seven

01:44:50 is that I WS four zeros one zero seven seven we go to page thirteen please

01:45:03 there is a statement of truth has been designed and dated thirteen to September 2018 and it is not accompanied by any exhibits milord Kareem did not live in

01:45:17 exhibits milord Kareem did not live in Grand Hall tower but he explains in his statement that on the night of the 13th of June he was live visiting a friend Ruben Sabir who lived at number 23 on

01:45:29 Ruben Sabir who lived at number 23 on the fifth floor and he explains that he arrived at Grenville tower at around 11:00 p.m. and they were sitting together when they began to notice a

01:45:40 together when they began to notice a smell of smoke and burning which initially did not cause any concern particularly to Ruben but then as the smoke grew stronger Malad became more

01:45:53 smoke grew stronger Malad became more and more concerned and if I pick it up at paragraph 12 on page 2 please Ruben told me to check the kitchen to put my mind at ease so I went to the kitchen to

01:46:04 mind at ease so I went to the kitchen to make sure everything was ok I checked the cooker but there was no sign of fire in the kitchen but the smell became noticeably stronger It was as if I was standing close to a bonfire but I couldn't see it whilst in the kitchen I

01:46:17 couldn't see it whilst in the kitchen I could hear people outside shouting not screaming but I remember a woman and children speaking loudly the windows were double glazed so I couldn't hear exactly what was being said but it was

01:46:28 exactly what was being said but it was loud enough for me to hear it and become suspicious it was late so I wouldn't have expected children to be awake at that time so enter the window to see what was happening outside I looked out

01:46:39 what was happening outside I looked out of the kitchen window facing the playground and initially saw nothing I then look around to the left of the window facing the walkways when I saw a woman on the balcony of one of the walkway finger blocks waving and

01:46:51 walkway finger blocks waving and shouting to people in the tower she was in a dressing gown waving frantically at me whilst I was looking out of the kitchen window there were other people standing next to her and they seemed to

01:47:02 standing next to her and they seemed to be signaling to other people in the tower whilst others appeared to be having intense conversations on their mobile phone Ruben was still in the living room at this point I told him what I could see and told him that

01:47:13 what I could see and told him that something wasn't right and he told me to open the kitchen window to get a better feel for what was going on outside the flat is on the corner of the building with the kitchen window on one side of the building facing the playground and

01:47:24 the building facing the playground and the living room window around the corner on the other side of the building facing the walkways I opened the window on the side facing the playground and I could immediately smell a strong smell of

01:47:35 immediately smell a strong smell of burning there were firefighters in the playground about three or four and one was trying to communicate with me I knew at that point that something close by

01:47:46 at that point that something close by was burning but it wasn't until I looked up and right to my horror that I saw a fire raging from outside of the building above me in a Northwest direction I could see smoke lots of thick black

01:47:58 could see smoke lots of thick black smoke floating in the air the fire was red blazing red with a hint of yellow blue and green flames the flames and smoke were all mixed together I remember seeing fire and pieces of the

01:48:11 I remember seeing fire and pieces of the building falling to the ground I was shocked at how close the fire was to me I could see everything clearly from the window statement continues whilst looking up at the flames from the

01:48:22 looking up at the flames from the kitchen window the smoke appeared to be circulating moving in an upwards direction along the side of the building the fire was spreading quickly I said to reven we're in deep trouble as the

01:48:34 reven we're in deep trouble as the buildings on fire and reven jumped up from the living room sofa where he was sitting and went to the living room window when he saw the smoke he started talking in our language saying oh my god fire what are we going to do I noticed

01:48:48 fire what are we going to do I noticed at this point that a fireman was on the ground and a fire engine was parked under the bridge which connects the tower to the walkways I shouted at the firemen about six or seven times excuse me excuse me can you

01:48:59 seven times excuse me excuse me can you please help us we're trapped to get his attention as there's so much noise around us the firefighter eventually shouted what floor are you on how many people I shouted back fifth floor flat

01:49:12 people I shouted back fifth floor flat 23 two people the firefighters told us to stay where you are and don't panic I was shaking and scared but felt comforted that I'd spoken to the firefighter I thought we would be

01:49:24 firefighter I thought we would be rescued I left the kitchen window to go to the living room to join reven I think he was on the phone at this point or speaking to neighbors from the window we were in absolute shock completely

01:49:36 were in absolute shock completely petrified I just kept walking from room to room as I was so unsettled I looked outside the bedroom window and I could see a fire engine parked 10 to 15

01:49:47 see a fire engine parked 10 to 15 minutes passed and the firefighters had not come to rescue us so I went back to the kitchen window to speak with the same firefighter on the ground I asked if they were coming to get us as the smoke was getting stronger outside the

01:49:58 smoke was getting stronger outside the building at this point I was told by the same firefighter that it might be best for us to take the stairs I thought that was a good idea Ruben was still talking

01:50:09 was a good idea Ruben was still talking to neighbors but I did not hesitate went straight to the front door without a second thought the smell of smoke was now intense I sell smoke coming into the flat from the bottom of the front door as I walk

01:50:20 the bottom of the front door as I walk towards it so I became anxious I opened the front door looking straight ahead into the communal hallway in front of me to my horror I saw the communal hallway was already filled with a walk of wall

01:50:31 was already filled with a walk of wall of intense thick black smoke so thick I couldn't see anything clearly except the smoke it was pitch black I could just about make out the lifts from the front

01:50:42 about make out the lifts from the front door when I strained and squinted my eyes I could hear screams from the stairways in different languages Arabic in particular and firefighters talking to people I could hear men saying get out it's not safe

01:50:53 out it's not safe I could hear somebody call out oh ma are you okay I couldn't see anybody as a smoke was too thick and dark but I could hear what felt like a hundred conversations at once

01:51:04 conversations at once from different directions I remember hearing little children crying and screaming from different parts of the building that sound will never leave me I was at the front door for five to

01:51:15 I was at the front door for five to seven seconds in total shock I was thinking to myself oh my god what is happening how are we going to get out the shock hit me in my knees as it dawned on me that this is it

01:51:26 dawned on me that this is it there is no way out I was coughing as the smoke got stuck in my lungs my eyes started burning so I quickly closed the door I ran back to the kitchen window to

01:51:37 door I ran back to the kitchen window to speak to the same firemen I thought about jumping out the window to escape but couldn't as it was too high Ruben was still walking between the living room and the kitchen on his phone

01:51:48 living room and the kitchen on his phone trying to find out what was going on I spoke to the fireman said we couldn't take the stairs as the corridor was filled with thick black smoke and it was too dangerous I asked him to come and

01:51:59 too dangerous I asked him to come and get us out of the building I told him if he took the stairs we would die he told me not to panic and to stay there and they would come and get me I could literally see my whole life passing by

01:52:10 literally see my whole life passing by my eyes the smell was getting stronger every minute you could see the smoke was slowly creeping into the flat trying to force its way through the keyhole under the door and through the sides of the

01:52:21 the door and through the sides of the front door pravin suggested we take the stairs but haven't seen the condition in the communal hallway I told him that it wasn't safe he reassured me that it was okay and went to get his jacket from the

01:52:33 okay and went to get his jacket from the bedroom and we opened the door the second time that's when he saw the smoke for himself and he closed the door straight away as though it was so thick we were both scared terrified and

01:52:45 we were both scared terrified and feeling hopeless as we felt trapped I believe half an hour or so passed when two Farman came through ribbons front door I do not know how they got in but I remember they were wearing masks

01:52:56 remember they were wearing masks carrying red oxygen cylinders on their backs and torches I thought they had arrived to save us but they told us sustain the flats a little longer because they didn't have oxygen masks with them for us and it was too

01:53:07 with them for us and it was too dangerous to go down the stairs without them because the smoke was so bad I didn't want them to leave us but the firefighters said stay here and we will find another way to get you out don't panic we will get you out then

01:53:20 out don't panic we will get you out then they left they were only with us in the flat for no more than two minutes we'd closed the door behind them but a lot of smoke had already entered the flat I could see the reflection of the smoke

01:53:31 could see the reflection of the smoke and the torchlight when they were in the flat it wasn't thick smoke and we could still see everything in the flat at this stage but it was there the temperature in the flat was increasing by now we

01:53:42 in the flat was increasing by now we were totally panicked and did not know what to do it seemed hopeless but we were praying that somebody would come and get us out then about 20 to 30 minutes later I saw two firemen on the

01:53:53 minutes later I saw two firemen on the ground putting a ladder up against the building towards us but it was not long enough and only reached the floor below us at this point we thought we were going to die and there was no way we could be rescued we were desperate to

01:54:05 could be rescued we were desperate to get out of the building but didn't have many options we thought about tying bedsheets together to climb down to lower floors and then jump down to the ground we thought we would break some bones but at least we would be alive the

01:54:18 bones but at least we would be alive the ribbon didn't have enough sheets if I move forward and step to paragraph 48 it continues we talked to neighbors and people on the walkways but we had no communication with the firefighters for

01:54:29 communication with the firefighters for roughly twenty to thirty minutes then I saw some firefighters looking at the bridge near flat six which connected the tower to the walkway finger blocks the bridge was connected to a fence gate

01:54:40 bridge was connected to a fence gate which was locked with a massive chain if a firefighter put the ladder up by the playground the ladder would have been too short to reach us so I watched them open the gate to bring the ladder up onto the bridge the firemen had rope in

01:54:52 onto the bridge the firemen had rope in their hands which they attached the ladder to pull it up onto the bridge before extending the ladder up to the living room window now that the firemen had opened the gate by the bridge I

01:55:03 had opened the gate by the bridge I believe the ladder would be long enough to reach us once the ladder was on the bridge they extended it up but it was too short the ladder only reached a third or fourth floor they collapsed the ladder didn't say anything to us

01:55:14 ladder didn't say anything to us but after about ten minutes some firefighters on the bridge put another ladder up against the building towards us but they put it about three feet away from the window and was too difficult and dangerous to reach as desperate to

01:55:26 and dangerous to reach as desperate to get out of thought we would fall from the window while street for the ladder as it was too far from the wall of the building my feet were getting hot from the heat inside the flat

01:55:35 flat I remember shouting out to the firefighters asking them to move the ladder closer to the window so we could reach it without over stretching out of the window too far the firefighters moved the ladder at the

01:55:46 the firefighters moved the ladder at the kitchen window a fireman climbed up and asked if we were ok he looked so hot on a sweating heavily he asked me for a glass of water so I got him one he

01:55:57 glass of water so I got him one he stayed at the window and drank his water he only had a helmet on no breathing apparatus or mask I would guess he arrived after 2 a.m. but I can't say for sure he asked he who

01:56:08 but I can't say for sure he asked he who was going to go down the ladder first and revin told me to go revin is older than me so I think he wanted to make sure I got out safely before he went down I didn't want to leave him but he had to move quickly so I put my coat on

01:56:20 had to move quickly so I put my coat on and climbed onto the window ledge when I looked at the fireman's ladder it was very slim seemed flimsy and unsafe I asked the firefighter to tie me to the

01:56:31 asked the firefighter to tie me to the ladder or do something to make it secure but he said I had to go now and move quickly as the fire was approaching he said the fine smoke were escalating and the building was burning rapidly I will

01:56:43 the building was burning rapidly I will never forget him saying to me please just get on the ladder so I can save your life

01:56:47 your life that is when the reality of the situation dawned on me I just had to risk it if not I would die in the fire while sitting on the window ledge I could see heavy flames black smoke and

01:56:59 could see heavy flames black smoke and pieces of the building falling from the building the corner of the building on the northeast side was burnt completely I couldn't see the skies was covered by the flames and smoke the fire was really bad it was raging I've never seen

01:57:12 bad it was raging I've never seen anything like this before the firefighter told me what to do and guided my every step he told me to hold onto the window frame with my left hand and feel for the ladder step with my right foot it took about five minutes to

01:57:24 right foot it took about five minutes to get myself together because I was panicking I couldn't feel the ladder with my foot at first but I eventually managed it and I started to work my way down the ladder fireman was directing me from underneath me saying left foot

01:57:35 from underneath me saying left foot right foot left foot right foot we went down about 20 steps before top ladder ended and the lower ladder started which was scary but we carried on down I saw a fireman at the bottom

01:57:48 on down I saw a fireman at the bottom holding the base of the ladder when I got down the fireman directed me to a policeman who was standing near the main entrance I spoke to him and he sent me away from the building there was what

01:57:59 away from the building there was what seemed like hundreds of people everywhere Jim that's where I proposed to stop reading from that statement thank you

01:58:07 thank you the next statement I would want to put into the records the statement of four duma armored that is @ IW s five zero seven to nine could we go to page eight

01:58:21 seven to nine could we go to page eight to please statement carries a statement of truth it's signed and dated the 11th

01:58:32 of truth it's signed and dated the 11th of May 2018 it is not accompanied by any exhibits in her statement miss armored explains that she moved into flat 164 on the 19th floor of Grenfell tower in 2008

01:58:46 the 19th floor of Grenfell tower in 2008 she lived alone in her flat and on the night of the fire itself she had been at work until 9:00 p.m. and then she went

01:58:58 work until 9:00 p.m. and then she went straight home if I begin by setting out an extract of her account of the fire by going to paragraph 6 on page 2 at the

01:59:09 going to paragraph 6 on page 2 at the time of the fire was Ramadan when I broke my fast at about 9:00 p.m. after work after work I stayed in my flat and I was listening to Islamic lectures on my phone with headphones on about 120

01:59:21 my phone with headphones on about 120 a.m. I was still awake in my bedroom and listening to the lectures when I got a phone call from my cousin Saba Mohammed who told me that there was a fire in the building

01:59:30 building she lives near Grand Hotel and could see from the outside that it was on fire she told me that I should come out of the tower and get downstairs I spoke to supper after the fire she remembers checking her phone times and

01:59:42 remembers checking her phone times and told me that she first called me at 1:20 a.m. I was shocked by her call they had never been a fire before in Grandpa's house that I had seen I did not check if there was any fire

01:59:54 there was any fire and this time to not see any Farah smoking my flat with Sabbath phone call I sense it was serious and that something was very wrong so I quickly got ready to leave the flat I picked up

02:00:05 got ready to leave the flat I picked up my phone and keys put my shoes on and quickly came out of the flat I was thinking of going downstairs when I came out of my flat into the lobby it was full of dark smoke it was

02:00:16 lobby it was full of dark smoke it was thick dark grey and steamy and was very hard to see through I could not see very far because of the smoke it smelt a bit like gas and chemicals and I covered my mouth it burned my eyes and I just

02:00:29 mouth it burned my eyes and I just wanted to cover my eyes because of the pain on my eyes I could see my neighbour Debbie lamp rail standing opposite the two lifts near the cupboard doors there's a cupboard opposite the two lifts and she was next to it she lived

02:00:41 lifts and she was next to it she lived on the same floor as me and had the corner flat number one six one she looked frightened and said to me that people were going upstairs I thought that she had instructions to go upstairs

02:00:52 that she had instructions to go upstairs she was not panicking but it was as though she'd been given an instruction it was also clear that fire was lowered down the tower and walking down towards the fire made less sense I had known

02:01:04 the fire made less sense I had known Debbie since I moved in and so I thought I should do what she said the daughter the stairs was closed and I opened the door went to the stairway in the stairs there was only a little bit of smoke at

02:01:15 there was only a little bit of smoke at that time and it was light there was less smoke than in the lobby but there was some there was no fire alarm and there was no one else on the floor at the time Debbie and I walked slowly up

02:01:26 the time Debbie and I walked slowly up the stairs on the way up the stairs from the 19th floor to the 23rd floor I saw no one else I don't even know if Deborah was following me at the time I went

02:01:37 was following me at the time I went upstairs because Debbie had told me to I thought she might have had information about what we should do I just followed what she said I think I went straight to the 23rd floor but I'm a little confused

02:01:49 the 23rd floor but I'm a little confused about whether it was the last floor I came out into the lobby at the top from the smokers even worse than on my floor it was now very dark and thick and very hard to see it made my eyes hurt and as

02:02:02 hard to see it made my eyes hurt and as before smells of chemicals when I got to the top floor there was people standing in front of the door to flat 201 this is the flag that was opposite the lift in the corner the flat

02:02:14 opposite the lift in the corner the flat was in the same position in the building as Debbie's flat 4 floors below we were able to get into the flat although I'd never been in the flat before and did not know whose flat it was inside the

02:02:26 not know whose flat it was inside the flat there was some smoke but a lot less than the lobby and I could also see fire at the windows I standing in the corridor could look along the hall and see fire appearing in front of the living room window we stood in the

02:02:38 living room window we stood in the corridor the flat I think there were about 10 people there and we were crowded around the entrance door and hallway I've been showing pictures of people by the police and identified some of these there was Debbie lamp rail and

02:02:51 of these there was Debbie lamp rail and her male friend Gary monitors I often saw Debbie and Gary together and she lived on my floor there was also my other neighbor I'm al ahmar Dean from flat 166 who was also from my floor she

02:03:03 flat 166 who was also from my floor she was with her cousin Amina mum would address and her daughter there was also in a row Caribbean man who I now know was Raymond Bernard and he was the tenant of flat 201 there was also

02:03:15 tenant of flat 201 there was also Berkeley after on with her teenage son it was hard to recognize people and we couldn't talk to each other because of the smoke by now the smoke was going into our mouths and we could barely breathe the front door the flap was open

02:03:29 breathe the front door the flap was open a little and people were standing along the corridor near the door people were acting in different ways some were calm some were panicking and trying to cover their mouths we were all hiding in the corridor of the flat to

02:03:40 hiding in the corridor of the flat to get away from the flames near the window and because the lobby was so thick with smoke I think people were suffering because they were not able to breathe smoke was affecting people's minds and making it impossible to even think I was

02:03:53 making it impossible to even think I was feeling dizzy it was like a gas a mile and I began to go to the bathroom to try and bring water out and throw it onto the fire in the window we found a washing up Bowl about three times who

02:04:05 washing up Bowl about three times who carried water in the plastic bowl through to the living room we threw the water on the window because the top of the window was on fire the window opens in two ways it can open completely on its hinges like an

02:04:16 its hinges like an the window or it can tilt forward at the top it was tilted open at the top and the top had caught fire was burning away we were trying to throw water onto the window try and put it out I was worried

02:04:29 window try and put it out I was worried because I see that the television was closed by the window and was worried that it might become dangerous because of the fire and water and so we stopped I realized that the water was not helping I went back to the area just

02:04:42 helping I went back to the area just inside the front door near the boiler at that time I don't know how many people are still standing there there right 10 people next to the door and some was saying that they could not breathe we

02:04:53 saying that they could not breathe we felt trapped as the fire had broken into the flat through the window and was in the living room and thick smoke from the lobby was coming into the flat we were trapped with fire from one side that was starting to come in and thick smoke on

02:05:05 starting to come in and thick smoke on the other side I realized that I needed to get out and so I came out of the flat into the lobby which was full of thick black smoke I ran out of flat 201

02:05:16 black smoke I ran out of flat 201 straight into the stairway I couldn't see anything in the lobby because it was so full of smoke that the door to the stair was very closed around this time my family was calling me again and again

02:05:27 my family was calling me again and again telling me to get out and come downstairs this was not that easy and they did not understand what I was seeing I was worried about the fire coming from below and thought that there

02:05:38 coming from below and thought that there was no hope going downstairs I tried to go up further to get away from the fire but I quickly reached a metal door that was padlocked I tried to get through the door and banged it again and again I

02:05:49 door and banged it again and again I wanted to get out at the top but couldn't my police say me says I got on to the roof this is not correct I tried to get on to the roof and banged on the door to get up there but could not get

02:06:00 door to get up there but could not get out I could hear a helicopter outside and kept banging on the metal metal door it was a steel brownish colored door it was very small but locked I could hear the helicopter and kept thinking that

02:06:12 the helicopter and kept thinking that there was no way for them to get in they couldn't see me and I don't know why I was banging or how long I stayed there by now smoke started to come onto the stairs I was on the phone to my cousin

02:06:25 stairs I was on the phone to my cousin who was just and me just come down just come down but I knew how bad the smoke was in the lobby and knew that the fire must have been stronger downstairs even though my cousin was saying come down I thought

02:06:36 cousin was saying come down I thought there was just no hope going down more smoke was coming down the stairs and making it hard to face going down it was as if the smoke was following me up it was very scary the smoke was dark and

02:06:49 was very scary the smoke was dark and had a terrible smell it was like drinking gas my cousin was on the phone but I was thinking that they couldn't see what was really going on so it was coming up hitting me and

02:07:00 on so it was coming up hitting me and what they were saying and what I was doing were completely different smoke was coming up towards me that is what stopped me from going downstairs I felt that my conscious couldn't understand I

02:07:12 that my conscious couldn't understand I appreciated their calls but the reality was so different as I was banging on the door more and more smoke was coming up the smoke was getting thicker and thicker all the time in the stairwell

02:07:23 thicker all the time in the stairwell it was now so thick that I couldn't even see the stairs underneath my feet I remember speaking to my cousin on the phone I wasn't thinking straight and was breathing chemicals whenever the phone

02:07:34 breathing chemicals whenever the phone rang I wasn't always able to answer one-stage my sister called me I heard them both telling me to come down the stairs I decided to try and walk down the stairs but could hardly

02:07:46 walk down the stairs but could hardly walk on the way down there was smoking the stairs it was very dark and so I couldn't see things properly as I got further down the smoke got thicker and it became more and more difficult I

02:07:57 it became more and more difficult I could not breathe very well and was coughing I could not walk properly and had to hold the rails to steady myself further I went down the worse the smoke

02:08:08 further I went down the worse the smoke was he was making me cough and was making me feel dizzy but I came down two or three flights but finally could not do any more and sat down against the wall I think this was between floor 20

02:08:19 wall I think this was between floor 20 and 21 I remember this because it was halfway between floors and I was sitting and leaning with my back against the wall I don't know how long I was sitting there it may have been half an hour

02:08:31 there it may have been half an hour I just don't know there was so much smoke and breathing was so difficult and I felt weak I just prayed I wanted the smoke to take my soul but I didn't want to experience

02:08:42 my soul but I didn't want to experience the fire I knew I was going to die and felt like I was waiting to die I was thinking about the good things that I've done in Islam we believe the good things you've done in your life would protect

02:08:53 you've done in your life would protect you at the end I was wondering whether I had done enough good in my life and whether I had done the things that I should have done after about half an hour I saw a light coming towards me and I heard a fireman's voice the firemen

02:09:07 I heard a fireman's voice the firemen had a light on his forehead and I could see it through the smoke I don't remember speaking to him he wanted to hold my hand to help me down the stairs but I was too dizzy to walk very far and he began to carry me I

02:09:18 very far and he began to carry me I remember very little from this point I remember saying thank you I remember that he said that we needed to go downstairs I could not continue walking and he soon had to carry me down because

02:09:30 and he soon had to carry me down because I couldn't walk he was going very fast to get down the stairs but after this I don't really remember what happened my next memory is lying down somewhere and the ambulance people were with me there

02:09:42 the ambulance people were with me there was an ambulance and paramedics and they were giving me oxygen they took me to st. Mary's Hospital and I was there for about a week and that's where I propose to end with that statement thank you very much Jim can I now go to a

02:09:59 very much Jim can I now go to a statement which is that statement of Psalm as Satar which is that I WS five zeros seven six nine

02:10:25 can get page eight please

02:10:34 Stein carries a statement of truth it's signed and dated the 26th of June 2018 there are no exhibits accompanying the statement if I go back to the first page

02:10:48 statement if I go back to the first page please in her statement Psalm as Satta explains I'm the daughter of scheana's a frosty RB whose sister Seneca for CRB and Fatimah ephra see

02:11:00 Seneca for CRB and Fatimah ephra see I'll be died in the fire at Grenville tower

02:11:04 Sakina had lived at flat one five one gram for tower for about 12 to 18 months before the fire if I just read an extract of Psalm as a stainless

02:11:15 extract of Psalm as a stainless typically in relation to the events of the night itself I start at paragraph 7 on page 2 please

02:11:26 on 13th June Sakina Fatma my mother Shanna's for Reba who she explains was a cousin visiting from abroad and I spent the day together

02:11:37 from abroad and I spent the day together we had lunch at the zucchinis flat and stayed there that afternoon I left with my mother and Ferrari but about 9:30 p.m.

02:11:45 p.m. Fatima stayed with Sakina a few hours later after I'd gone home I received a phone call from a friend telling me the Grenville towers on fire I then immediately called Fatima I believe that

02:11:56 immediately called Fatima I believe that this call was made before 1:00 a.m. customer couldn't speak English fluently and so I would speak to her in Farsi which is her first language Latin mate answered the phone I told her that there

02:12:08 answered the phone I told her that there was a fire at Grandpa's house she said yes the buildings on fire come soon as possible she then asked me to call the fire brigade I called my mother and I told her about the fire at

02:12:20 mother and I told her about the fire at first my mother did not believe me and she thought that I was exaggerating she thought that it would be just a small fire I shouted at her that it was serious I was driven to grandpa'll tower

02:12:33 serious I was driven to grandpa'll tower by a friend when I arrived I saw that the fire brigade were already there there were a lot of firefighters around the bottom of the tower I'm not sure how many I believed I arrived at the base of the tower at about 110 am I've been on

02:12:46 the tower at about 110 am I've been on the phone too fast me from the moment I left my

02:12:48 left my she was telling me what was happening inside if I continue from paragraph 11 my mother came to the tower around 10 to 20 minutes after I had arrived so at around 1:20 a.m. to 1:30 a.m.

02:13:01 around 1:20 a.m. to 1:30 a.m. Chirac one of sakina's Sons arrived at about 45 minutes after me when we first arrived there only feet a few people who were not firefighters perhaps 10 people

02:13:12 were not firefighters perhaps 10 people at the base of the tower then people started to arrive from the surrounding area and it became very busy we were shoved and pushed by people trying to get close to the building or to get into the building to help rescue the people

02:13:23 the building to help rescue the people left in there I was on the phone to Fatima and remained speaking to her throughout the evening with a few very short breaks I can't remember what time

02:13:34 short breaks I can't remember what time everything happened during the night it is all a bit of a blur now I move on to paragraph 14 on the way to Grenville tower I remember asking Fatima if there

02:13:45 tower I remember asking Fatima if there was anyone to help her or if the fire brigade were there but Mae said she did not know at the time Padme said she was too scared to go to the window to see where the fire was when I first started

02:13:56 where the fire was when I first started speaking to her that she may was in flat one five one with Sakina by the time I derived a grim full tower that he may told me that they had left their flat intending to go down the stairs and to leave the tower but when they left their

02:14:09 leave the tower but when they left their flat they met other residents in the corridors she did not say exactly who or where and they were told not to go downstairs as there was fire further down inside the building

02:14:21 down inside the building Fatima told me that she and tsukino went up to her neighbor's flat on the 23rd floor I believe a neighbor was called for her from then on Fatima and Sakina stayed in this flat on the 23rd floor I

02:14:33 stayed in this flat on the 23rd floor I believe that this was flat 205 I do not know exactly what time it was that they went up to flat 205 but if I arrived at the tower at around 1:10 a.m. he must

02:14:44 the tower at around 1:10 a.m. he must have been shortly before then I saw the fire going up the building after I had arrived he was so quick it looked like burning paper the smoke got thicker and

02:14:55 burning paper the smoke got thicker and thicker as the night went on when I arrived I was standing at the base of the tower

02:15:01 the tower next to a police officer and London Fire Brigade officer they both asked me who I was speaking to and asked me who was up there I explained that my auntie's were on the 23rd floor and that they had to

02:15:13 on the 23rd floor and that they had to be rescued Fatima told me that she and Sakina were in flat 205 with two men and two other women I passed the information on to the police officer and the fire officer at

02:15:24 police officer and the fire officer at that time Fatima is quite calm she said to me to tell the police officer in the fire officer to bring trucks to rescue them she asked that they bring a cherry picker or an extended ladder that could reach them up on the 23rd floor

02:15:37 reach them up on the 23rd floor Fatima told me that there was no fire in her flat but there was smoke and that they could smell the smoke I passed this on to the police and fire officer I was told by the fire officers to tell Sakina

02:15:49 told by the fire officers to tell Sakina and Fatima and the others in flat 205 to stay put

02:15:53 stay put and that they would be rescued I told my aren't this the firefighter told me to tell my aunt's that they should make everything wet to wet towels and put them under the doors to wet the carpet

02:16:04 them under the doors to wet the carpet the sofa and to wet themselves when I told Fatima to do this she said they had already done all of that I continued to be in telephone contact with Fatima I could hear Sakina in the background but

02:16:16 could hear Sakina in the background but I did not speak to her I relayed what I was told to my mother Shahnaz and to Chirac for some of the time I put Fatima on speakerphone so that everyone could hear what she had to say I also

02:16:27 hear what she had to say I also translated what she was saying to the police and fire officer I was worried and scared but I believed of past events Aquino would be rescued we saw more and more firefighters and police officers

02:16:38 more firefighters and police officers arriving as time went by later on there was a helicopter flying around the tower that I thought was there to rescue people trapped higher up in the building I asked Fatima if she could hear the

02:16:49 I asked Fatima if she could hear the helicopter but she said she could not hear it I said it was probably there to rescue her I remember seeing that the fire brigade was spraying water on the outside of the building the water could only reach parked way up the building

02:17:01 only reach parked way up the building perhaps in the eleventh or twelfth floor it didn't look like it was reaching higher than this at one point that's me data coughing down the phone I told her

02:17:12 data coughing down the phone I told her to drink some water she told me that there was no water and the water supply in the flat had been cut later in the night I said to Fatima but I just wanted

02:17:23 night I said to Fatima but I just wanted to put down the phone to her so that I could tell the firefighters and police officers the information that she had told me

02:17:29 told me the firefighters gave me the advice to pass on which was that my aunt's should stay put and wet towels and put them under doors when I tried to call back Fatima when I tried to call Fatima back

02:17:42 Fatima when I tried to call Fatima back she did not pick up the phone after this I was not able to speak to her again the previous call had been the last time I had spoken to her I kept asking myself why I put the phone down

02:17:54 why I put the phone down even though I could not get through to that in May I still believed at the time that they would be rescued by the firefighters from where we were standing it looked like the other side of the tower was not yet on fire I actually

02:18:05 tower was not yet on fire I actually thought my aunts had been rescued and that was why Fatima was not answering her phone

02:18:10 her phone I see lights in the windows of the tower and I could see people holding lights in the windows and waving them trying to get attention I could hear people inside screaming for help from a low floor I'm

02:18:22 screaming for help from a low floor I'm not so sure which I saw a white sheet with knots tied in it being lowered down out of a window and then being taken back up I think it was a person inside trying to use the sheets as a rope to

02:18:33 trying to use the sheets as a rope to climb down that's German that's all I please to read from that state right thank you very much the next statement I now propose to put into the record is that of Shahnaz a

02:18:46 into the record is that of Shahnaz a fresh ARB which is at PI W s five zero seven six seven please

02:19:03 if we go please page seven of that statement

02:19:13 it has a statement of truth it's signed and dated the 26th of June 2018 and there is also a translators declaration accompanying statements there are no

02:19:24 accompanying statements there are no exhibits to put in and if again I just can read some extracts please and take us back to page 1 at page 3 the

02:19:43 us back to page 1 at page 3 the paragraph 3 sorry Shahnaz explains my older sister secondly and fatima and four CRB both died in Granville Tower I was very close to them particularly to

02:19:54 was very close to them particularly to second aitt if I move to now to paragraph 8 and again deal with the account of the night of the fire I

02:20:08 received a phone call from a family member

02:20:10 member in the early hours of the morning telling me there was a fire at Grenville tower at first I did not believe that it was very serious I think this call was made at around

02:20:21 I think this call was made at around 1:00 a.m. and then shortly after this call received another phone call this time from my daughter Samus she told me to get to ground for tower straight away she told me that the fire was real and that it was serious

02:20:32 that it was serious I told forever and this is a relative visiting from abroad that there was a fire at the tower and we left my flat immediately I stood in the street and I put my hand out in front of passing cars

02:20:44 put my hand out in front of passing cars asking them to stop and take us to ground fault our car stopped and we were given lift by stranger towards the tower who dropped herself at pump him pizza shop which was close to the tower

02:20:55 shop which was close to the tower we started walking towards the tower I got there around 1:30 a.m. if I continue at paragraph 10 the statement continues I tried to get into the tower I managed

02:21:07 I tried to get into the tower I managed to make my way through a small group of people who are all pushing and shoving each other to get towards the tower at the front of the crowd was some police and fire officers I pleaded with them to let me go into the tower but they didn't

02:21:19 let me go into the tower but they didn't let me in

02:21:20 let me in I could do nothing more but stand there and watch the fire much later on I saw that my arms and legs were covered in bruises

02:21:27 bruises I think these bruises were from me trying to get between the crowd to get into the tower and trying to get past the police so I get to the building and rescue my loved ones at one point was in the crowd I fell on the ground again if

02:21:40 the crowd I fell on the ground again if I move now to paragraph 12 I stood next to solmaz who was on the telephone to Fatima she was speaking in Farsi to Fatima as Fatima was not fluent in English so Lamaze was listening to what

02:21:51 English so Lamaze was listening to what Fatima had to say and then she would tell the firefighter and police officer standing next to us what was going on in their flat the officers then gave advice on what to do to solemnize and she then passed on their advice to fetta main

02:22:02 passed on their advice to fetta main Farsi I can't remember what the firefighters were saying Fatima is echinacea do sometimes psalmist put her phone on speakerphone so I could also hear what Fatima was saying and what was

02:22:14 hear what Fatima was saying and what was going on in the flat I can't remember what she said is there's so much going on at the time I do remember hearing Fatima in second they had moved from their flat on the 18th floor to another flat on the 23rd

02:22:26 18th floor to another flat on the 23rd floor where they were with some a second Asian neighbors we watched the fire getting worse we stood at the base of the tower helpless I did not know what to do it was like a movie I could hear

02:22:39 to do it was like a movie I could hear people screaming from the tower people around me were crying because they had loved ones in the tower I was just crying and I couldn't breathe again if I move forward in the statement out to paragraph 17 I saw a helicopter in the

02:22:53 paragraph 17 I saw a helicopter in the sky an hour or two after I'd arrived I remember that we all spoke about how we thought it was there to rescue my sisters I thought it was there to rescue people in the tower we all believed at that point that my sisters would be

02:23:04 that point that my sisters would be rescued out of the tower and out of the fire but that didn't happen days after the fire I found out that the helicopter was there to film the file Samas had been on the phone to Fatima

02:23:15 Samas had been on the phone to Fatima virtually the whole time since I had been there so I'm as told Fatima she was going to put the phone down so that she would get an update from firefighters about what they should do so she could tell Fatima and give her an update on

02:23:26 tell Fatima and give her an update on the rescue so I might put the phone down and spoke to some firefighters however fatima did not pick up her calls after this point she didn't pick up any calls after this we were no longer able

02:23:38 calls after this we were no longer able to reach her I think this was about 3 a.m. at the time I believe that they must have been rescued by the firefighters and my sisters were leaving or had left the tower I waited for my

02:23:51 or had left the tower I waited for my sisters to come out of the building but they didn't come it was incredibly difficult I was crying and found it difficult to breathe I was getting more and more worried about my sisters as time went on and I started to question

02:24:03 time went on and I started to question whether they had in fact been rescued finally ended by just reading a part of paragraph 23 I also went to a local

02:24:16 paragraph 23 I also went to a local church to get some water I believe I did this around 10 a.m. there were two registers of the church and I checked them one list was from people who'd been rescued from the tower and another list for those who were

02:24:27 and another list for those who were missing I saw that my sisters have been registered as having been rescued so I left and went to check all the churches nearby to try and find them I went to the Town Hall and to all the hospitals

02:24:38 the Town Hall and to all the hospitals where the survivors were being treated as to see if my sisters were there or if there was a record of them but there wasn't I do not know why my sisters were on a list as having been rescued because

02:24:49 on a list as having been rescued because we now know that they lost their lives in that fire while we were watching from the ground I found out that they died sometime on 14th June the pain I feel is immeasurable it's supposed to stop from

02:25:02 immeasurable it's supposed to stop from that reading from that statement at that point yes thank you very much

02:25:07 as chairman if I finished today's reading by just putting to further statements into the record first

02:25:22 statements into the record first statement if we could just have it up on the screen is iws four zeros one one four five this is a supplementary

02:25:40 four five this is a supplementary statement from NIDA man gova who was a resident in Granville Tower if we go pay to page two of the statement please

02:25:53 see it's carries a statement of truth it's signed in its data the 27th of October 2018 yes this statement was provided by mrs.

02:26:05 this statement was provided by mrs. mango but in order to clarify some additional details she has already has will be obvious on the face of the statement made a statement to the inquiry which has been

02:26:16 statement to the inquiry which has been read into the record and it was read into the record on the 15th of October and in the circumstances I don't propose to read any part of the statement today but would ask that it be formally

02:26:29 but would ask that it be formally admitted into the record yes and I would should have said that it's not accompanied by any exhibits the next statements deal with

02:26:44 is at iws four zero zero one zero three six please

02:27:04 this is a statement of Rebecca Ross who was a resident of flat one-to-two in in Greenville tower if we go to page 23 in

02:27:20 Greenville tower if we go to page 23 in the statement please

02:27:29 the statement carries a statement of truth and it is signed and dated the 22nd of August 2018 there are ten

02:27:41 22nd of August 2018 there are ten exhibits accompanying the statement and I should put those formally into the record they are labeled with in the statement of Rs r1 2 RS are 10 and in

02:27:52 statement of Rs r1 2 RS are 10 and in terms of their inquiry references they begin at high WS 1033 - I WS 1036 i SS 1039 to idle yes 1041 I WS 10 and 43 - i

02:28:08 1039 to idle yes 1041 I WS 10 and 43 - i SS 1044 and finally I WS 1046 as I've explained mr. chairman the statement

02:28:20 explained mr. chairman the statement sets out a great deal of detail including mistress's account of the night but I do not propose to read any part of the statement out loud today but

02:28:32 part of the statement out loud today but again would ask that simply that it be formally admitted into the record yes thank you I think we've got a little longer than I thought so perhaps could I just do one more statement if I may

02:28:44 just do one more statement if I may thank you

02:28:55 can we have please iws five zeros 952 on the screen

02:29:11 and if we go please to page 15 of the statement this is the statement of Makram housing and on the last page page

02:29:24 Makram housing and on the last page page 15 we see that it is signed with a statement of truth the date of the statement appears on the front page as 14th of June 2018 if we could go back please to that front page

02:29:46 in the statement mr. Hartley explained that he in June 2017 was living with his family at flat 54 on the eighth floor of

02:29:58 family at flat 54 on the eighth floor of Granville tower in a one-bedroom flat he was living with his partner and their son so I should say that his wife rather if I could just read out part of the

02:30:13 if I could just read out part of the statement in terms of mr. Aziz account of the night if I pick it up at page 6 and paragraph 28 to please in paragraph

02:30:28 and paragraph 28 to please in paragraph 28 mr. Hardy explains he and his wife had put their son to bed and gone to bed themselves between 11:30 and midnight on the night of 13th to 14th of June 2017

02:30:40 the night of 13th to 14th of June 2017 the statement continues in paragraph 29 I do not know exactly what time it was but sometimes after midnight we were all awoken by someone banging loudly on the front door of the flat my wife got up

02:30:53 front door of the flat my wife got up and went to see who was banging on the door he was our neighbor from flat 51 Khalid he said that there was a fire in the building we had to get out I confirmed that it was just Khalid at our door and he'd not spoken to any firemen

02:31:05 door and he'd not spoken to any firemen as far as I was aware there was no firemen with this stage that we could see I stop there and move on to paragraph 13 because the statement

02:31:16 paragraph 13 because the statement continues the three of us rushed out of off that's why if I die so I have but pause there there is a bit of paragraph Trenton I should read I it continues in

02:31:29 Trenton I should read I it continues in relation to the interaction with Khalid I remember that behind him we could already see smoke on our communal landing it was not fixed smoke but it was clearly visible at the time of leaving the flat there was smoke but it

02:31:41 leaving the flat there was smoke but it was not very thick the smoke was not black or more a gray white color and you could see through it I realized straight away that something was seriously wrong my wife and I decided to leave our flat

02:31:52 my wife and I decided to leave our flat immediately with our child the three of us rushed out of our flat in our night clothes

02:31:57 clothes we have two smoke alarms in our flat one in the kitchen and one in the hallway neither of these went off I know that they were both working as they would go off when we were cooking this had

02:32:08 off when we were cooking this had happened recently within the last month no smoke alarms were going off outside our flat as there were none I did not even stop to pick up my mobile phone nor did my wife we just got out with our son

02:32:19 did my wife we just got out with our son straightaway I did stop briefly to put on my shoes however my wife only had flip-flops on as we started down the stairs I recall that as we were leaving

02:32:30 stairs I recall that as we were leaving our flat our neighbor Khalid was knocking on our other neighbors doors when an elderly couple who lived in flat 56 opened the door and response to his knocking I recall at that point I could now see quite thick smoke coming out of

02:32:42 now see quite thick smoke coming out of the flat as the front door opened the smoke coming out of flat 56 came out when they opened their door the smoke that came out was black and much darker than smoking was on the landing I cannot remember what the smoke smelled

02:32:55 I cannot remember what the smoke smelled like as everything was moving so quickly there was lots of smoke coming out of their flat but I could not see inside their flat properly as their flat was in the corner all I could see was smoke

02:33:06 the corner all I could see was smoke leaving through the front door I could not see that they were coughing Steadman continues I could clearly see that by this stage the point at which my family and I had entered the landing to escape

02:33:18 and I had entered the landing to escape a time I do not know I could see the smoke coming from inside flat 466 this lent even more urgency to my decision for my family to leave the building soon as possible at the time I entered the

02:33:31 as possible at the time I entered the stairwell we had to open the door leading into it the stairs were quite busy it certainly was not possible to run down the stairwell and was not possible to walk at a hasty pace down the stairs this was because there were

02:33:43 the stairs this was because there were quite a number of people and cannot recall how many in front of and behind me and my family on the stairs I absolutely cannot remember how many people it was like a dream it felt like

02:33:55 people it was like a dream it felt like being in a dream going down those stairs in the stairwell I do not remember there being any smoke if there was then it was very limited I could see down the stairs as smoke if there was any was not thick

02:34:07 there was any was not thick as I've said I cannot remember if there was no smoke or if it was just very thin I do not remember if there was any smell of smoke on the stairwell there were lights on in the stairwell but I do not know if they were the emergency lights

02:34:19 know if they were the emergency lights or the ordinary lights I could not hear any fire alarms either above or below where we were while we were going down the stairwell however when I reached around the boxing gym on the first floor

02:34:30 around the boxing gym on the first floor shortly after I could hear alarms but I do not know where the sound was coming from or what the alarms actually were however it must have been close as it sounded quite loud as mentioned above

02:34:43 sounded quite loud as mentioned above when we were leaving our flat via the stairwell there were no firemen that we could see there were people in the stairwell who'd clearly just woken up who are in a state of semi undress and clearly did not have on proper outdoor

02:34:55 clearly did not have on proper outdoor clothes

02:34:55 clothes I remember seeing people topless and people just in their underwear or going down the stairs that obviously left left flats in haste and urgency just like me and my family we could only go down in

02:35:07 and my family we could only go down in single file down the stairwell as very soon we met firefighters coming up the stairs we first met the firefighters either on the floor with the boxing gym or shortly after that I think we passed

02:35:19 or shortly after that I think we passed about 3 or 4 firemen at this point I also recall seeing the firefighters hose this is being run up the stairwell the firefighters and their hoses restricted the width of the stairwell which could

02:35:30 the width of the stairwell which could be used by the residents leaving the building I do not know how long it took for my family to get down the stairs but it seemed to be no more than 5 or 10 minutes I really am not sure though I

02:35:41 minutes I really am not sure though I subsequently learned from the police that the CCTV camera which was located in our ground floor of the tower area captured me leaving the building at 1:24 a.m. from this information assuming that

02:35:53 a.m. from this information assuming that it took my family five to 10 minutes to get down the stairwell from the 8th floor I would have thus seen the smoke coming out of the front door flat 56 when it was opened by the occupants at between approximately 114 a.m. and 119

02:36:06 between approximately 114 a.m. and 119 a.m. and that's all I propose to read from that statement that's his reading for today yes well it's right that I should thank all those who made the statements you've read for taking the

02:36:19 statements you've read for taking the time and trouble to produce them for us and just to confirm that they will all be put into the inquiries record they'll form part of the evidence and will be taken into consideration with everything else thank

02:36:31 consideration with everything else thank you very much thank you that's it for today right thank you very much well we'll break at that point and resume tomorrow morning at ten o'clock

02:36:43 resume tomorrow morning at ten o'clock please thank you