Police Evidence

Full transcript

00:07:55 good morning everybody welcome to today's hearing today we're going to hear evidence from members of the Metropolitan Police Service good morning mister yes we are my first witness today

00:08:07 mister yes we are my first witness today is inspector Nicholas Thatcher can I please call inspector Thatcher

00:08:33 I swear by Almighty God that the evidence that I shall give shall be the truth the whole truth thank you very

00:08:45 truth the whole truth thank you very much yes mr. chairman inspector can you please give the inquiry your full name

00:08:56 inquiry your full name inspector Nicholas Thatcher right and can I start by asked by saying to you thank you very much for coming here today and assisting us with our investigations we very much appreciate

00:09:07 investigations we very much appreciate it it may be difficult at site at times in your evidence to relive the events of the night of grenfell Town fire and say if you need to break at any time all you need to do is just indicate and we can

00:09:18 need to do is just indicate and we can take a break we will plan to sit for no longer than an hour before we take a break at each time but if as I say you need a break at any stage before that just signal and we can stop thank you

00:09:29 just signal and we can stop thank you also I should just say that well I'm well I'm asking you questions it may be that I'm looking at the screen or looking at my notes but I am at the same time also listening very keenly at what you're turning into what you're telling

00:09:41 you're turning into what you're telling us now you've done I think three witness statements in relation to this incident I'm going to take you to them first of

00:09:52 I'm going to take you to them first of all and we're going to put them into the record formally the first is data the 27th of June 2017 and it's a meaty triple zero one two five eight two can I

00:10:07 triple zero one two five eight two can I ask you to look at that it'll buy it it'll be in a bundle in front of you which I think I can see is open or also it's on the monitor on the desk in front of you to your right

00:10:22 I would to know my daughter's not yet she does the technical things see if we can rectify that because one of the things that can be done is to blow up

00:10:33 things that can be done is to blow up the text to make it highlight the text to make it easy

00:11:18 should we start using the written text and yes I was going to suggest that we did for the time being respect someone that companies they've got a technical glitch for the time being we will use the screens in the

00:11:31 being we will use the screens in the back of the room and your printed version in your phone in front of you that's all right sitting will fix the glitch as soon as we can perhaps in the next break and see how we go if it becomes a problem we will stop now your

00:11:42 becomes a problem we will stop now your first statement as I say is dated the 22nd of June 2017 but if you could go please to the last page of that it's page 12 that is that the last page of it

00:11:55 page 12 that is that the last page of it that's right okay the second one is dated the fourth of July 2018 and that's M et triple zero one eight two zero one and that is an exhibit statement which

00:12:10 and that is an exhibit statement which exhibits your body worn footage that was taken by you on your and on your body worn camera on the night is that your statement it is the third statement you did is data the 8th of October 2018 we

00:12:26 did is data the 8th of October 2018 we could just have that which is M et triple zero two three two eight four triple zero two three two eight four is that the first page of your third

00:12:37 that the first page of your third statement it is and the fourth one that you did is dated the 16th of October 2018 which is an exhibit statement for photographs of maps and it's exhibit

00:12:51 photographs of maps and it's exhibit nt1-a and that's M et triple zero two three six nine two correct is that your statement yes it is have you read all of these statements recently it's data and can you confirm

00:13:03 recently it's data and can you confirm for us the contents are true now and have you discussed your evidence with anybody before coming here today to give your evidence no thank you now in terms of your exhibits I just want to read into the

00:13:15 exhibits I just want to read into the record the references we have from the body worn footage inq quintuple zero one five one through two inq quintuple zero one six five inclusive we have inq qin

00:13:29 one six five inclusive we have inq qin tuple zero one four five one six five one eight inclusive and 522 525 inclusive and 527 and 528 we also have

00:13:41 inclusive and 527 and 528 we also have two maps any which are n t1 and n t2 and t1 is met Amy T triple 0 2 3 2 8 2 and n t2 is met Amy T triple 0 2 3 2 8 3 now

00:13:56 t2 is met Amy T triple 0 2 3 2 8 3 now having got the formal part of putting our evidence into the record after the way can I start by asking you some questions about your position and training now you say in your first statement that you have 23 years of

00:14:07 statement that you have 23 years of experience as a police officer is that right

00:14:10 right hitter analyst AIDS now I think 24 years also and given the time that that's elapsed since your first statement and at the time of your of the time of the

00:14:22 at the time of your of the time of the fire I think it's right that you're ranked within the Metropolitan Police that was assistant inspector acting inspector acting inspector and are you now and a full inspector I am we're not

00:14:34 now and a full inspector I am we're not your sorry I'm sorry I've gone to the promotions process at several weeks before Grenville tower and then I got the results about three weeks later and how long had you been an

00:14:45 later and how long had you been an acting inspector by the time of the grenfell terrified about seven years now on the night of the Granville tower fire you were nominated to be a silver

00:14:57 you were nominated to be a silver commander within the gold silver bronze structure that's great can you please explain for us as briefly as you can the role of a silver commander as at June 2017 within that structure the silver

00:15:10 2017 within that structure the silver sits with the framework of bronze silver and gold gold as the strategic overview and sets the what is to be achieved at whatever the incident might be the silver is very much the how that's to be

00:15:23 silver is very much the how that's to be achieved the the nuts and bolts of making it happen and then below them are the the bronzes who have specific responsibilities within that well whatever

00:15:33 whatever incident might be in it could be a role be fire

00:15:35 be fire or on certain punjabi on this matter he was in charge of parking which is essentially making sure the movie services could get to the tower but it could it could be be a geographic area

00:15:46 could it could be be a geographic area so in Notting Hill Carnival they have a bronze per area as its divided into sections I see so it would it be right to summarize it the gold makes the

00:15:57 to summarize it the gold makes the ultimate decision silver is responsible for putting that into operational effect and the bronze is assist in specific areas of that operational effect that's right and there are checks and balances

00:16:09 right and there are checks and balances within it gold will retain the overall responsibility and make sure that Silver's actions are proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances right now in terms of training and we'll come

00:16:21 now in terms of training and we'll come back to that structure later on but in terms of training you say in your first witness statement it's on page one that you are fully trained in the management of major incidents this is four lines down from the start of the statement um

00:16:35 down from the start of the statement um what did that training consist of as act June 2017 the previous July attended it's bit wordy the joint emergency services inter interoperability program

00:16:48 services inter interoperability program which is a desktop learning with all the emergency services about how to actually manage a major incident it was attended by the fire brigade it was run by the ambulance service and there were members

00:17:01 ambulance service and there were members of local authorities there as well where they would give you a structured you do like an acronym in methane which is a way to build the response to a major

00:17:13 way to build the response to a major incident so that everyone understands what they're doing what they're working towards and was the the underlying base document for that training the the jzip

00:17:25 document for that training the the jzip interoperability framework of July 16 yes which I think we have just for the record at MIT triple zero two three two nine zero

00:17:34 nine zero can I just we better just have that up so that I can link it to you and vice-versa m et triple zero two three two nine zero

00:18:02 is is that the document yes and was that available to you for the purposes of that training exercise it was sent to us afterwards but the elements of the training were taken from that document I

00:18:13 training were taken from that document I see okay

00:18:15 see okay now within that training was there any training in the management of major incidents involving a large-scale fire

00:18:27 incidents involving a large-scale fire not a fire they did use two case studies one was the croydon tram crash which it happened shortly before this training was brought in and one was a

00:18:39 was brought in and one was a particularly nasty car crash on the m4 that involved some hazardous substances right that was any of that it sounds as

00:18:51 right that was any of that it sounds as if that training did not involve a major incident in a densely populated urban area no or a large-scale fire per se not that I remember let alone a high-rise block definitely

00:19:02 let alone a high-rise block definitely not to me as at June 2017 did you have any training in how to take and carry out the responsibilities of a silver

00:19:13 out the responsibilities of a silver commander the gold silver and bronze structures not ranked specific so I have done the strategic the tactical role but

00:19:25 done the strategic the tactical role but on a much smaller scale I've been a public order trained officer since 1997 and I've done that role as Constable sergeant and inspector so I've done the

00:19:38 sergeant and inspector so I've done the bronze role but much much smaller and I've also worked as part of the the management team working directly to who would have been the the silver at the time at events such as the the New

00:19:51 time at events such as the the New Year's Eve celebrations pre-planned operations like that I see it sounds as if you're experienced in

00:20:02 it sounds as if you're experienced in what I can loosely describe as crowd control

00:20:06 control [Music]

00:20:08 [Music] where you're in your own experience when you were appointed on the night were you appointed silver because of that experience or because of some other factor it's an impossible question to

00:20:21 factor it's an impossible question to answer I would say yes and it was my role I was the inspector it was my team first there it's my responsibility right okay that leads to this question what

00:20:35 okay that leads to this question what I'm assuming there are other inspectors in the Metropolitan Police in addition to you why were you selected silver I was the first senior officer there I'd already started putting plans in place

00:20:49 already started putting plans in place mr. walnut who was a detective Superintendent right very shortly after me

00:20:54 me I know mr. warnet he knows me and he had confidence that could do the job going back to training briefly did you ever have training in how the London Fire

00:21:06 have training in how the London Fire Brigade would communicate with and advise residents in a burning building in a burning millet no did you ever have training in relation to any of the

00:21:18 training in relation to any of the policies adopted by lfb while at the incident ground no training no okay did you ever have any professional experience of interoperating I can use

00:21:31 experience of interoperating I can use an expression with the London Fire Brigade at a major fire yes not a major fire but the principles are very similar

00:21:42 fire but the principles are very similar I've gone into a couple of burning buildings myself and I've attended fires as a sergeant and as an inspector and I've been involved in talking to the

00:21:54 I've been involved in talking to the lead fire officer and understanding what they need but the scale is knowing gentle town did you ever have any training in or experience of what we've

00:22:07 training in or experience of what we've what we call the statehood policy training no experience only in so much as I've been in many tall buildings and I've read the the fire escape advice so

00:22:19 I've read the the fire escape advice so I knew it was in existence right okay

00:22:24 did you ever take the road of silver commander at a major fire no and have

00:22:36 commander at a major fire no and have you ever had any training in or experience of ensuring closeness of communication between the Metropolitan Police's control room and the London

00:22:48 Police's control room and the London Fire Brigades control room on a controlling basis no but the the need for a shared understanding and communication was a main part of the

00:23:01 communication was a main part of the joint doctrine training okay before July 2016 when you were trained off about the joint doctrine that we've got on the

00:23:12 joint doctrine that we've got on the screen there did you ever have any other training about interoperability between emergency services the closest would have been working as part of the Chelsea Flower Show team whereby the the RHS

00:23:25 Flower Show team whereby the the RHS planned things very very thoroughly and prior to any of the the flower shows they always have an emergency planning meeting and said I gained another tabletop scenario and the fire brigade

00:23:37 tabletop scenario and the fire brigade in the ambulance service and the police were there and they would give us a scenario that seems the last time was the main marquee Catching Fire right that was very useful but that was I

00:23:49 that was very useful but that was I wouldn't say that was formal training and that was just luck yes thank you now I want to turn if I can please to the night of the fire

00:24:00 the night of the fire and I know that for a meeting your statements you were involved in the incident for a long period of time and you undertook a range of tasks in your role as silver commander and I'm not going to ask you about every single aspect of that role

00:24:12 aspect of that role but I'm going to focus on a number of different particular areas that call for further examination okay now can I start with notification of the incident

00:24:23 with notification of the incident leading to the declaration of a major incident with a capital M and a capital I because that's a defined expression you were first I think notified of the incident when the initial call for assistance came

00:24:35 the initial call for assistance came across the radio that's correct and you deal with that at page two of your statement

00:24:41 statement do you remember approximately what time that was shortly before 1:00 o'clock I was actually mentally out at the police station I was in the Chelsea area on my

00:24:55 station I was in the Chelsea area on my own we had a problem that time with you using

00:24:57 using mopeds to commit crimes right I was in Chelsea in the quarter to a six pump fire at cranville tower right and did you know a grünfeld tower was yes it's on your ground as it were yes I

00:25:09 on your ground as it were yes I previously been the neighborhood well acting inspector and sergeant in Notting Hill and our base was hundred yards from it so you knew the streets and the layout

00:25:20 so you knew the streets and the layout of the building and the surrounding buildings not as well as a constable but I had a good understanding of yes now if I can ask you to look at a document we're going to come back to but many

00:25:31 we're going to come back to but many times during this morning it's some M et triple zero to three to nine four which is C ad for 8 to

00:25:50 and it runs for a number of pages first of all can I just ask you to identify for us what this is inspector this is a

00:26:02 for us what this is inspector this is a typed record of the call for assistance that would happen if anyone who dials 999 and asked for the police come into one of the control rooms be answered by

00:26:13 one of the control rooms be answered by a call handler who will decide how to categorize the particular incident they then complete a predefined pro-forma

00:26:24 then complete a predefined pro-forma electronically and they decide is it going to be an emergency or a soon or a at some point to call and each one of those has a different response times in

00:26:35 those has a different response times in emergency you have to be there within 15 minutes this was an emergency call so as a manager of a response team myself insiders are able to prioritize where we

00:26:48 insiders are able to prioritize where we go first by frankly and use our resources to the best effect and this is what is this it looks like a running log collected by a computer database and we

00:26:59 collected by a computer database and we can turn the pages if you like perhaps we should look at page two to see where the the actual time starts it's got a right you can see here sorry yes if you can go back a page please I right go back to page one please

00:27:14 this will dictate which division is involved so normally this would incredible town would have been just vs me and brother Xia which is the two letter code that signifies Clinton and Chelsea ASU is the air support unit to

00:27:26 Chelsea ASU is the air support unit to be ourselves AFV our armed units and it goes on to Kingston one's worth giving than kneeling Harrow everywhere right

00:27:37 than kneeling Harrow everywhere right that's a very widespread it needed a lot of people only the codes that are here this would then get sent to the borough that is using board being asked any sort of resource so as you can see all those

00:27:48 of resource so as you can see all those boroughs were asked for resources and is that a summary of all the borough's that were asked for resources throughout the incident all those that were asked at the start of the incident this is linked to this particular cat message I believe

00:28:00 to this particular cat message I believe there were others and certainly on the night you can you can tell how far and wide was also coming from from the two letters that appear on I don't have unfortunately a is the center of London

00:28:14 unfortunately a is the center of London X is out in Hayes Kingdom and Zed is down in Croydon and on the night we had the entire alphabet if you will keep

00:28:27 the entire alphabet if you will keep going down and say recorded it's an emergency course it came on the nine nine nine system this is the location yes to major incident although that

00:28:39 yes to major incident although that wouldn't have been when the wasn't the court acres decision lancaster request estate of mattress in the olden days we all had these great big hardback maps

00:28:51 all had these great big hardback maps and you actually had to have the map reference and you sit that juggling wanted your driver is telling you and known certain terms to find the exact location to go to the computer hasn't been updated

00:29:03 and then the process what units are available at that time to turn to go so whilst all those you know divisions were in it were involved at some point or

00:29:14 in it were involved at some point or this message was sent to them yes but it first came in one two three four five six seven eight nine ten there Sheldon a must there ten people were available at

00:29:25 must there ten people were available at a time and that's at that just say we have it on the transcript you're pointing at the line under proposal that's right which starts vs a to n so

00:29:36 that's right which starts vs a to n so to is the sexiest ardent three that's a carrier so there would have been a unit of more than two constables well yet ones in the three numbers of individual officers yes and in that line you can

00:29:49 officers yes and in that line you can see just by proposal Bo see you at oh one nineteen first of all what is bocú and baroque operational command unit and oh one nineteen is that

00:30:01 command unit and oh one nineteen is that the time of the first quarter that would mean that the time that this the computer decided these offers were available right and then if you could turn to page four of this document please

00:30:16 we could pick it up two-thirds of the way down the page where the title appears guidance relating to incidents involving fire and there under that oh one 1914 of June CHS entered by CHS @ o1

00:30:33 one 1914 of June CHS entered by CHS @ o1 1834 on that date five room flat on the fourth floor 75% of light first of all CHS is that the control room operator yes and okay where would they have got that information from five

00:30:45 they have got that information from five room flat on the fourth floor 75% of life at that time that would have been straight from the initial telephone call right and do you know do you happen to know who made that call whether it came from the lfb or a member of the public

00:30:57 from the lfb or a member of the public might tell you can't tell from that okay now you were told you say in your statement on page two that it was that

00:31:09 statement on page two that it was that you were asked to request I asked for assistance of a six pump fire do you remember who told you it was a six month fire it was transmitted directly over the radio channel

00:31:20 the radio channel did you remember who told you whoever was controlling the channel that that night we don't have a very good name a first name basis we had a relationship with the people running the channels but do you know whether that information originated from would have been from

00:31:33 originated from would have been from this message okay now somebody would have told the control room to send that message that it was a sexpun fire and Metropolitan Police's systems needed do you know who that was

00:31:44 you know who that was I don't know but if they've said six pump fire I would guess that's from the fire brigade right okay you go on in your statement four lines down from the

00:31:55 your statement four lines down from the paragraph break on page two to mention two police constables sangar and Reese do you know whether they had any involvement in the notification to the

00:32:06 involvement in the notification to the control room which led to this initial message not the initial message no but they were the first uniformed officers on scene yes okay now you say on page two that it's not uncommon for the

00:32:18 two that it's not uncommon for the London Fire Brigade to assist request assistance at six pound fires is it a matter of policy that the Metropolitan Police

00:32:26 Police notified once there's a see there is a six pump fire I believe there's a threat shot they have to work too but I don't know what that is I'm not trained in their policies okay but how would the Metropolitan Police normally be notified

00:32:38 Metropolitan Police normally be notified of a fire which you would customarily attend you yourself through the cat system is really system and what's notified of such an incident what is the means typically by which the Metropolitan Police will be kept

00:32:49 Metropolitan Police will be kept informed of the escalation or de-escalation of such an incident if we've got officers at the scene then it'll be direct from the officers that are there giving a situation report if we haven't got anyone there as yet

00:33:01 if we haven't got anyone there as yet then the fire brigade control and can communicate with the police control room and would you expect the London Fire Brigade to provide the police once

00:33:14 Brigade to provide the police once notified in this way of the progress of the incident I've never been involved in anything like this before the level that

00:33:26 anything like this before the level that I've been involved in you're talking they're a flat on fire above a shop or a house on fire so that particular question it just doesn't happen right

00:33:41 question it just doesn't happen right okay let me try and put get at it this way have you ever been involved in or had any training on what the police response should be he in a in the case

00:33:54 response should be he in a in the case of an incident which goes from a six pump fire through higher numbers of pumps very quickly 10 15 20 25 only the jetted chain we discussed at the start of the seventh okay nothing

00:34:07 the start of the seventh okay nothing specific but in within that training that you had would you expect all over a system foot by wedge lfb would provide the Metropolitan Police with an update

00:34:19 the Metropolitan Police with an update even if it's just we're now at 10 pumps we're now at 15-point that would be through the cat's sister that would be would you expect that to be the case you would you expect that to be communicated I would and what would the point of

00:34:33 I would and what would the point of contact at the Metropolitan Police be for those updates if it's going through the control room and there's a senior officer that works up there who has responsibility to understand what's exactly happening all

00:34:44 understand what's exactly happening all across London that officer is primarily concerned with allocating resources so he or she has to understand what's going on and what the threat is and where resources can be best used would that

00:34:55 resources can be best used would that person to your knowledge and I am asking you not then clearly but with that person to your knowledge expect the London Fire Brigade to keep that control room updated as to the number of pumps

00:35:07 room updated as to the number of pumps at the scene and oncoming emergency traffic I would hope so if this if it's going to significantly escalate and be a more much more demanding our resources I

00:35:20 more much more demanding our resources I would hope so I can't expect because it's I have no to be another understand

00:35:32 if you had been told shortly after six pumps that it was now for example a ten pump fire or a 15 pump fire within a matter of minutes what

00:35:45 fire within a matter of minutes what would that have indicated to you things were significantly escalating and we would need more resources and what kind of resources would you need people yes

00:35:57 of resources would you need people yes but what to do what to whenever there's a fire or a nasty car crash which we tend to be the two things will be involved in a fire brigade with it just

00:36:08 involved in a fire brigade with it just draws people it really is it's unpleasant but people come from far and

00:36:19 unpleasant but people come from far and wide social media makes things worse the first thing you see is a bank of handheld telephones recording what's happening so it's something like this then it was a beacon and the time of

00:36:33 then it was a beacon and the time of year religious festivals there are lots of people on the street so you'd need to know as soon as possible so you can start getting cordons in place to keep the people safe and allow the fire here

00:36:46 the people safe and allow the fire here to do their jobs and that was the that was the point of the policing that was the major concern at Granville Tower yes I was making sure that the people coming we're safe here and that we could

00:36:57 we're safe here and that we could provide a safe working environment for our colleagues in the fire brigade and the ambulance service and did it follow from that that you would need to know

00:37:08 from that that you would need to know you would need to know the speed and scale of escalation of pumps so that you could act timely with the right resulting response yes

00:37:22 now when you learnt it was a six pump fire where were you I was on the kingsroad in Chelsea were you in your vehicle I was well you alone at the time hours were you clearly you were in you

00:37:37 hours were you clearly you were in you had your radio is that an air wave radio it is yes and what they ask you about the channel you say on page two of your first witness statement that we've discussed this briefly just over it this

00:37:48 discussed this briefly just over it this morning that police constable sang her and Reese were the first officers on the scene and you say a third of the way

00:37:59 scene and you say a third of the way down the main paragraph on page two of your statement you say you he began to relay a situation report actually six

00:38:11 relay a situation report actually six lines down from the top of that page because APC sanger quickly began to relay a situation report using his personal radio you see that yes he

00:38:22 personal radio you see that yes he described that a flat on the third floor was alight it was unknown if there were people trapped that evacuation of the building was required and the sections of the building were falling to the ground so I just like I would like that

00:38:34 ground so I just like I would like that highlighted if I can it starts it really four lines down from the start of that chunk PC Stanga quickly began to relay

00:38:48 right now it's one or two questions about that first of all are you sure it was the third floor that he was describing that's what he said I'm sure

00:38:59 describing that's what he said I'm sure that you've got a clear a collection of it and you say that you say that he said that the evacuation of the building was required do you have a clear

00:39:11 required do you have a clear recollection of him saying that yeah there weren't his exact words no now can I just take you then to the messages that we see in C ad 482 if we can go

00:39:22 that we see in C ad 482 if we can go back to that which is M et triple zero to three to nine four at paid fun

00:39:38 at the top of the page we see a time mark of Oh to 23:28 1 1 9 BS other flats

00:39:49 mark of Oh to 23:28 1 1 9 BS other flats at risk of fire going to be a massive evacuation but first of all 1 1 9 BS I think is PC Sangha do you know that's right is it yes now he says it's going

00:40:04 right is it yes now he says it's going to be a massive evacuation as we can see do you remember hearing him say that what mister yeah I think that word but yes okay so it was the message that you heard him say which you recorded in your

00:40:16 heard him say which you recorded in your statement the same message that we can see encapsulated at this time mark him in the C ad here yes right now what did what did you respond to him in terms of

00:40:30 what did you respond to him in terms of over your radio I would have acknowledged it I comment for what I exactly said to him but as soon as Peter Sanger said he was going to be a critical incident that's when I used my

00:40:43 critical incident that's when I used my blue lights and siren to make sure I would get there at that point I got as far as Holland Park Avenue okay right well comfort will come back to critical incident in just in just a moment before

00:40:55 incident in just in just a moment before I do I just want to focus on this massive evacuation that PC Sangha thought was required when he said that what did you do with that information do you remember I understood that he was

00:41:09 do you remember I understood that he was far more input far more desperate situation in the usual six pump fires we get with the NFB and that I needed to get there quickly to make an assessment where did you think he was obtaining the

00:41:21 where did you think he was obtaining the information from that there was going to be a massive evacuation his own experience right and what was that experience did you know but he said he's

00:41:32 experience did you know but he said he's a very competent incapable principal that I do trust so if he says something is critical and and the evacuation then I believe him right so to be clear that you thought at

00:41:46 right so to be clear that you thought at the time that it was his view rather than something he was told by the NFP definitely yeah it would in his view okay

00:41:51 okay would you expect him to have been liaising with the incident commander at this stage in terms if you have to put this into the context of the time I think they've only been there a matter

00:42:03 think they've only been there a matter of seconds you you do hear officers arriving at these scenes that'll say on-scene or sometimes they will say Toa it means time of arrival which has been the cat operators and from memory he had

00:42:16 the cat operators and from memory he had only been there very very briefly and as he'd only been there very very briefly then I would have expect him to have spoken to anyone of but rank within the NFB right okay do do you know whether

00:42:29 NFB right okay do do you know whether your own knowledge because you say trust PC Sangha what experience or even training he's had in the evacuation of densely populated buildings in the event

00:42:40 densely populated buildings in the event of a fire he wouldn't have any formal training it would have just been experience there are a number of addresses in the Notting Hill area that we quite regularly had to evacuate

00:42:51 we quite regularly had to evacuate people because of gas leaks and as mustard gas seems to be fair so we've done it but no formal training right did you form a view at the time when he used

00:43:02 you form a view at the time when he used the words in massive evacuation that he meant the tower which was on fire itself all the surrounding buildings or both I didn't have time to consider them what do you know how the police would have

00:43:13 do you know how the police would have assisted the lfb with any evacuation at that stage would have done exactly what we were told to do by phibn right so you would have would have had a new

00:43:25 so you would have would have had a new plan of your own you wouldn't have had any any plan of your own for evacuation if the fire brigade had said can you do with the evacuation then we would have put a plan in place if they'd said we will deal with it but you can do you can

00:43:38 will deal with it but you can do you can assist with action a B C or D would have done that with very much been led by the fire brigade I see now did you just stay with this page at page 5

00:43:51 with this page at page 5 just look halfway down it please you can see a time mark of Oh - sorry Oh 20 again Oh one 2605 m XB 155 is there any

00:44:04 again Oh one 2605 m XB 155 is there any CCTV and consider linking with the council Riya vacua ssin first of all what is M xB 1 5 5 I believe that's mr. warnet who would have been the yes

00:44:16 warnet who would have been the yes mister for Intendant and did you action or did anybody to your knowledge action this message in any way so as to link with the council in relation to

00:44:27 with the council in relation to evacuation yes I didn't hear him say that but before I arrived at the tower I had already decided it would be a major

00:44:39 had already decided it would be a major incident and I asked my colleague I think he was sergeant Blondell who was in our local it's not quite a controller but it's a half to start making phone calls to the council to find a place to

00:44:52 calls to the council to find a place to put the people right and did you monitor what's you say sergeant Blondell yes did did you did you follow-up or did he follow up throughout the night yes right

00:45:03 follow up throughout the night yes right but in terms of immediate immediacy there were more pressing matters to be concerned about do you know from your own knowledge whether sergeant Blundell got through to anyone at the council at

00:45:14 got through to anyone at the council at that time I believe he did

00:45:19 then what happened as a result you know it took a while to get anywhere open exactly the mechanics behind it I I don't know the local authority have a duty officer who understands their

00:45:32 duty officer who understands their procedures and their ability to respond to requests it's a mobile telephone that links to switchboard the switch will then cause they're on duty local authority member and then they will work

00:45:44 authority member and then they will work through their organization do we need do you know what time roughly or how long after this message roughly started Blundell got through to our vkc in relation to evacuation I'd be

00:45:57 our vkc in relation to evacuation I'd be guessing that it wouldn't have taken long because it was I say just a phone call hmm did you follow that up with the lfb when you arrived on scene no as I said her of more pressing things than

00:46:08 said her of more pressing things than wondering if I could open a church wall okay now PC Sangha has provided a witness statement and that's M et quadruple 0 783 7 I just read that into

00:46:22 quadruple 0 783 7 I just read that into the record but I will just tell you what he said on page one he says his intention was to make contact with the lfb incident commander and make an assessment of the scene in order to prioritize our role and save light to

00:46:34 prioritize our role and save light to save life and limb and assist the LFP with Courtin and control of the scene and he then goes on to say that he asked PC Ries to make contact with the lfp command unit arising from that one of

00:46:48 command unit arising from that one of two questions first of all do you know where the PC Reese received any briefing from the incident commander I don't believe so a p-series will have provided a statement sir when I arrived PC Reese

00:47:00 statement sir when I arrived PC Reese was within the building helping residents from the staircase right do you know where the PC Sangha made any contact with the incident commander when I arrived PC Sangha had already moved to

00:47:12 I arrived PC Sangha had already moved to the other side of the building I didn't speak to PC saying that properly till significantly one evening did you receive any kind of handover from PC Reese or PC Sangha when you arrived no I

00:47:24 Reese or PC Sangha when you arrived no I didn't see PC Sangha but I did see PC Reese I am pulled him out of the building it was chaotic p-series was clearly under stress

00:47:38 was clearly under stress he wanted to go back in and help people so the best thing I do fear was getting out get him a distance from there so he could settle himself and the control

00:47:49 could settle himself and the control unit we are talking about was just behind me so I could go and do it myself did either did PC Reese during that discussion tell you who the incident commander world no did you ask him I

00:48:01 commander world no did you ask him I don't believe I didn't know but as I say he was just behind me so it was a redundant question right did you have any interests any discussion with the incident commander at the time of your arrival yes I went into it had to know

00:48:13 arrival yes I went into it had to know at what time but one of the first things I did was to go into the math command unit and I spoke to a senior officer there and asked what they required of us ok we'll come back to that because I do have some questions about that detail

00:48:25 have some questions about that detail but before we do can I take you on in the CADC 84-82 please to page 6 and ask you please to look at the time mark of out 129 39 be s 1 n 2 be s 2 n 2 contact

00:48:44 out 129 39 be s 1 n 2 be s 2 n 2 contact the local authority as they will be need to be rehired lead to rehouse residents from this building first of all be s 1 n is that you yes and be s 2 n it was that to be calling

00:48:57 and be s 2 n it was that to be calling sergeant at the police station that wasn't sergeant Blondell but sergeant Blondell responded right now do you remember hearing that message that

00:49:08 you remember hearing that message that was me asking that was you asking here in Bravo Sierra 1 to 2 is it right and did you expect but what did you expect

00:49:19 did you expect but what did you expect to be happening in relation to the evacuation of residents at this point I don't believe I arrived at this point okay so it would have been make sure that telephone call was put into the

00:49:30 that telephone call was put into the local authority duty officer right when you did arrive is this something you discussed with the lfb at all it wasn't one of the main priorities okay now was there any kind of discussion in

00:49:43 now was there any kind of discussion in about evacuation of the residents from Grenville at this stage say would at all before

00:49:49 before Oh 129 39 no just looking that back a

00:50:00 Oh 129 39 no just looking that back a page to page 5 in the C ad you can see that at oh one 26 32

00:50:24 I'm looking I'm looking at page I'm trying to look at page five but 1001 26:32 you can see we've got it quite on

00:50:36 26:32 you can see we've got it quite on the screen actually let's start with let's start with out 126 21 which we do have on the screen just halfway down where it says 1 1 9 vs this is turning

00:50:50 where it says 1 1 9 vs this is turning into a critical incident did you hear that message yes okay and then a few minutes later or seconds later but four fifths of the way down the page at 126

00:51:01 fifths of the way down the page at 126 36 just above it be s 1 n declared as critical incident that's you yeah that's wrong though it was major incident right so just breaking that up

00:51:17 incident right so just breaking that up first of all did you hear PC Sangha saying this is turning into a critical incident yes ok did did that statement

00:51:29 incident yes ok did did that statement of his over the radio have any kind of status in it made me realize behind because he's saying that such a competent capable customer if he thinks it's acquittal incident then it's far

00:51:41 it's acquittal incident then it's far more dangerous than the other six pond fires and so he does elevate the significance of what I was going to yes

00:51:52 significance of what I was going to yes now you I think say in your statement was correct me if I'm wrong that actually any officer can declare a critical incident yes was this a declaration of a critical

00:52:05 was this a declaration of a critical incident by PC Sangha I took it as it is right now lower down page 5 we can see as you've just told us you declaring a

00:52:17 as you've just told us you declaring a critical incident no I defended May at no time did I say this is a critical incident right then sorry straight in at major so exactly the document says

00:52:29 major so exactly the document says declared is a critical incident so is it right just in summary that Oh 26:32 you declared a major incident yes so we take the word critical in the

00:52:40 so we take the word critical in the record and change it to major because that's a mistake so that's right that's correct now why did you reach that decision and make

00:52:51 did you reach that decision and make that declaration you have to understand the difference between a critical and a major really a critical is any instant which if handled wrongly will that affect the public's confidence in the

00:53:03 affect the public's confidence in the police so it can be anything and doesn't there's no matter of scale it's just if we don't do it things absolutely perfectly then it'll really affect how the public sees which is a big concern

00:53:14 the public sees which is a big concern to be policed by consent a major incident on the other hand again it's any instant but it requires a predefined response by any of the emergency services and typically involves the

00:53:25 services and typically involves the movement of large numbers of people I was looking at a housing estate in the sky on fire it seemed to fit the definition

00:53:39 now just moving ahead a little bit to page 7 the same document

00:53:52 very near the bottom of that page you can see with stars either side of that Oh 132 27 the document says major

00:54:03 Oh 132 27 the document says major incident can you first of all explain why that appears at that point in the C ad at about about six minutes or so after you have declared a major incident

00:54:16 after you have declared a major incident I can't who would be responsible for putting that into the system which generated this this document that would have been the station station the the

00:54:28 have been the station station the the channel controller right do you know from your knowledge of any intervening declaration or communication with the control room that produced this this these words here major incident

00:54:41 this these words here major incident that might have led to the control room putting major incident no okay so can we take it that although there's a gap of about six minutes between your declaration of a major incident of 126

00:54:54 declaration of a major incident of 126 32 126 32 126 36 and 132 27 that is the

00:55:05 32 126 32 126 36 and 132 27 that is the major incident that you declared I believe sir right okay now can I take you back your witness statement page 2 please first witness statement and use

00:55:23 please first witness statement and use explain at the bottom but towards the bottom of the page

00:55:30 invert you immediately transmitted to the control room that this was a major incident and you say five lines up in the bottom I made the decision to call a

00:55:43 the bottom I made the decision to call a major incident because it was immediately clear that all the blue light emergency services would be called to respond in special predefined ways relevant to their role and the incident would involve a massive number of people

00:55:55 would involve a massive number of people what could you see we can see what you say no statement but what was it about what you could see which made you declare a major incident

00:56:11 mr. wall net had already asked me it's not recorded if I didn't see on the cat was I considering calling it as a major incident when I was on Hamra Park Avenue it's a massive step up to go from

00:56:23 it's a massive step up to go from critical to major I said I'll be there in a few seconds so I'm just gonna reserve my decision until I can actually see what's happening and up the little

00:56:34 see what's happening and up the little hill if you're familiar blubber Grove past the police station started coming down the other side and I have a memory of seeing the tower and third or fourth floor above my head I saw the fire for

00:56:46 floor above my head I saw the fire for the first time and it was the intensity it was like a jet engine coming out of this window ain't starting to go up the side in just moving around in straight

00:57:00 side in just moving around in straight lines the the other things I've been to power wise even ones that are on fire you don't get that you get the windows haven't gone half the time but when it

00:57:12 haven't gone half the time but when it has gone you just get flame you know licking up the building you don't get that and it was just like nothing I had ever seen and the flame came out went up

00:57:23 ever seen and the flame came out went up in the building so yeah it was a major incident

00:57:27 incident wait just going back to what you said in the last answer about superintendent walnuts rolling and you say in your statement just below halfway down that he contacted you he was a senior officer

00:57:40 he contacted you he was a senior officer we just have that highlights it you say just there the top of where we could sit on the screen detective Superintendent Warren it

00:57:49 Warren it there was the on-duty senior officer just have that highlighted

00:57:56 contacted and also the local superintendent contacted me via the pr asking if i was going to declare the fire and major incident do you know why he asked you that question well because

00:58:10 he asked you that question well because i was the inspector and it boss any officer can make the call I've had the Jesuit training I'm more experienced I've it's my job right

00:58:24 I've it's my job right what well first of all where was superintendent Warren it at that moment absolutely no idea what do you did you think he could see or know that you

00:58:35 think he could see or know that you couldn't see all knew nothing which is why I wasn't worried about telling my detective Superintendent to to wait then

00:58:46 detective Superintendent to to wait then I make my own mind up do you know why he was thinking of a major incident because there's six bump fire in a block of flats but he's approaching it from a career detectives point of view not someone who spent over 20 years in

00:58:57 someone who spent over 20 years in emergency policing this was my bread and butter I fought it then you then go on to

00:59:13 well let me ask you this and you say on page two we've covered this at the bottom that it was clear that all the blue light emergency services would be called to respond what did you want to

00:59:25 called to respond what did you want to achieve by declaring a major incident I wanted everything I wanted police I wanted ambulances fire brigade were already there yeah I wanted everything

00:59:38 already there yeah I wanted everything it's this was I made the call and I'm so glad I did but I could quite easily have been wrong but I would far rather have made the call early started things

00:59:50 made the call early started things moving and had the resources sent than the not because you can always say I'm wrong and I'll get told off reprimanded later on but what I was seeing it was

01:00:03 later on but what I was seeing it was clear that I was gonna have to get things moving move I'm sorry and moving quickly it's it's important to understand just how big the organizations are we talking about yeah

01:00:14 organizations are we talking about yeah it's it's a big beast the Metropolitan Police Service there's not much it can't do but it takes time to wake up it's it's a machine you know how many times

01:00:25 it's a machine you know how many times you turned on your computer and wanted it to go quicker it's it's it's like that when it wakes up and it moves it's it's a phenomenal engine but it takes time and the quicker you can turn it on

01:00:36 time and the quicker you can turn it on the better did you know at that point and when I say at that point I mean at a 126 when you declared a major incident

01:00:48 126 when you declared a major incident whether the lfb or any other emergency service had declared it a major incident no idea did you have any expectation that the lfb or any other emergency

01:01:00 that the lfb or any other emergency services certain service I didn't thought you didn't give it a second thought

01:01:05 thought from your point of view would it have assisted you if the NFB had already declared a major incident or at the same time

01:01:16 time made the same declaration assisted me we had different roles within the event event we had different roles to do would

01:01:31 event we had different roles to do would an extra few fire engines helped me on the Corden's probably not would it have made a difference overall being a bit

01:01:44 made a difference overall being a bit more specific at that time 1:26 also would it have helped you and your planning already to have received a methane message as a result of the lfb declaring a major incident not really when you consider

01:01:56 incident not really when you consider what meat that actually stands for its a major incident yes the exact type when I can see a huge burning building you know the elements were there and my zit I

01:02:07 the elements were there and my zit I should also probably mention that this it's a massive call to make you took half a second right and many of the things going through the night I will

01:02:19 things going through the night I will say again that it's we have structures we have frameworks we have ways of doing things that are put in put in place to help people make decisions but when you're looking at something and if you act people might die if you don't that

01:02:31 act people might die if you don't that people will die you have a clarity hmm I'm just really trying to get a feel for why you were able to make that decision

01:02:42 why you were able to make that decision in 30 seconds yes and that there's a snap second but but the lfb didn't as we know they didn't I've considered this myself because I have also been fond of

01:02:53 myself because I have also been fond of this in there in the media when you were a distance from the tower you can see it in all its horror

01:03:05 in all its horror when you were under it you couldn't it was a significantly different yeah things are dropping on you then you had to be a bit nimble but you couldn't see

01:03:18 to be a bit nimble but you couldn't see no it was predatory the fire it was going up the side of the building in straight lines it's but I've tried to describe it to

01:03:30 it's but I've tried to describe it to people if you're of a certain age there was a science-fiction film called Tron and it involved some chap being chased on a bike and his his bike left a trail

01:03:41 on a bike and his his bike left a trail and straight lines he no need to make 90-degree turns and that's what the fire was doing and you could see it and he was going up the building and that included me in the imitating intensity

01:03:53 included me in the imitating intensity from the point of origin that was significantly different to standing underneath in the perspective of just looking up so now this has probably played a part but I'm guessing and this

01:04:04 played a part but I'm guessing and this was at the top of the hill at Labrador at the lights as you go north I have a memory of that very good I can see it now but I can't have seen it from there

01:04:16 now but I can't have seen it from there because I've been back and checked so it's probably on Blenheim present I think which is half way down the hill turn left but we're talking about I don't know five hundred meters sorry when you're

01:04:30 five hundred meters sorry when you're looking at it from the southeastern I'll take you pitch that was like the front of my gonna take my own I'm the last person you should take that from yeah but I think that's I think that is right you could see I was heading north it was

01:04:41 you could see I was heading north it was to my left so yes it would be

01:04:49 we have I'm just about to get just about to finish this line of questions and I have yet to do so within a few minutes inspector did you know that the jzip joint doctrine in and operability

01:05:02 joint doctrine in and operability framework says that each responder agency should send a methane message to the control room as soon as possible now you didn't know it wouldn't make any

01:05:14 now you didn't know it wouldn't make any difference either right when you declared as let me ask you this when you declared a major incident at 1:26 did you ask for a methane message to be sent no because as soon as you say the

01:05:27 sent no because as soon as you say the words major incident that's when the machine wakes up and that's when the control room comes into its own so you assume do you that the control room is going to send a methane message itself I would say I trust nice you okay thank

01:05:40 would say I trust nice you okay thank you I'm buddies could be good mr. chairman yes yes we're gonna bring home inspectors that please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while they're out of the room will resume at 10 past 11:00 and if you'd like to go to the air

01:05:51 11:00 and if you'd like to go to the air show she'll look after you

01:06:07 ten past eleven casein to kill

01:17:04 right carry on inspector so it's better thank you for coming back to us and can I just go back over one or two things we covered before the break and if I can

01:17:15 covered before the break and if I can take you back please to page five of the CAD CAD for 8 - which is M et triple 0 - 3 - 9 4 and pick up the Declaration of

01:17:27 3 - 9 4 and pick up the Declaration of as it says critical incident just at or just below the time mark of Oh 126 32 we could see that it's next to your callsign put this to you first of all a

01:17:43 callsign put this to you first of all a PCs PC sink Sangha in his statement has said that he declared a critical incident now he was the one who did that

01:17:56 incident now he was the one who did that and can I ask you really have firm your recollection is that you declared a critical incident at around this time and no time they declare this critical

01:18:07 and no time they declare this critical incident so you never declared a critical in service as you told us before the person writing this in the log

01:18:16 log putting critical when they meant major was a mistake is that right Japanese sir would that be a very serious or grave

01:18:27 would that be a very serious or grave mistake given the differences between critical and major it would be less and helpful but you'd have to also consider what they were actually doing I've

01:18:39 what they were actually doing I've worked in a control room and this operator would have been very used to title to a critical critical incidents happen quite regularly there's nothing to say that they didn't type critical

01:18:50 to say that they didn't type critical and then start the major incident process they would have had to be something that would have six minutes late so make them realize I haven't added to the that are you able to go back to the screen that had that the

01:19:04 back to the screen that had that the major incident pro forma at all yes which i think is

01:19:12 page1

01:19:20 no next we say the pro forma yeah it's unfortunate isn't look any different with the CAD system if you type in a particular code F predefined among

01:19:32 particular code F predefined among information fields appear on the screen so there's one for a crystal incident and there's one for a major incident there's one for a missing person and anything that holds a lot of risk and it's almost like a predefined risk

01:19:44 it's almost like a predefined risk assessment and things you can consider so even though the the CAD operator here has written critical six minutes later they have then added the pro forma for a

01:19:55 they have then added the pro forma for a major in stats page seven you want to see that well I think it is well but let's come let's take the slips slightly more slowly sticking with page five at the moment you say you never declared a critical

01:20:06 you say you never declared a critical you only determine major yes PC Sanger says in his statement that he did declare a critical incident given the importance of the difference you've

01:20:17 the importance of the difference you've told us between critical and major is it possible that in fact what this cat is recording here is PC Sanger's declaration of a critical incident at 126 32 so you'd rather confused me to be

01:20:33 126 32 so you'd rather confused me to be honest well I think what mr. millet is suggesting is that the attribution to you be easy that is wrong so yeah the attribution is BS and one or maybe wrong

01:20:44 attribution is BS and one or maybe wrong is it could that be the mistake no no no no there's Dave my voice is distinctive and when you hear BS one nights or

01:20:55 and when you hear BS one nights or charlie risky one nights that means that's the duty officer and when the duty officer speaks you know it's the duty officer right that's their job if it's attributed correctly to you then

01:21:07 it's attributed correctly to you then the person who inputted the information into the CAD putting it in as critical as opposed to major made a mistake yes

01:21:18 as opposed to major made a mistake yes and that's not a type of graphical mistake is it no it certainly says critical and the given the difference between critical a major I'm suggesting to you that that is a an important

01:21:30 to you that that is a an important mistake for an operator like that yes and then turning over the page I just want to pursue this a little bit

01:21:41 just want to pursue this a little bit further because PC Sangha says he did declare a critical incident do you recall hearing him declare a critical incident at any stage I heard him saying this was a critical incident

01:21:53 him saying this was a critical incident yes and that's what made me more concerned to the extent that I then limited my blue light snooze my Scion to get there quickly right and would you expect we've seen him saying this is

01:22:04 expect we've seen him saying this is turning into a critical incident did you hear him say anything about a critical incident more than once no right and then going over to page 7 which i think

01:22:15 then going over to page 7 which i think is - I think what you referred to as the pro forma for a major incident and he was checked with you at 131 52 you can see it's eight items of information there is that what you're referring to yes is the pro forma you can see it item

01:22:28 yes is the pro forma you can see it item four in their exact nature of duty TSG commissioners reserved required to perform risk assessment must have been

01:22:39 perform risk assessment must have been completed major incident fire what does what does that tell us about whether a lot of a major incident has been declared yet or is about to be declared

01:22:50 declared yet or is about to be declared yeah the the : would indicate this is a real if we wind it back at at so I've been told off and not talking to my friend yes the exact nature of duty TSG

01:23:02 friend yes the exact nature of duty TSG commissioners reserve so exactly what it means what are you asking them to do is this is not a request for resources TSG is the territorial support group which are a reserve officers that can be

01:23:15 which are a reserve officers that can be available to assist their borough colleagues for anything

01:23:21 this is would have been this is pre I believe this is pre populated everything after the colon is then typed in by the operator right I see say the operator

01:23:35 operator right I see say the operator needed to know that this was a major incident before typing that in at item four yeah right okay and how would they know what to type in how would they know that that this was a

01:23:47 how would they know that that this was a major incident well because I told them earlier so they would be aware that you told them that would they go back over the log up to that point back say to

01:23:58 the log up to that point back say to page five to look for whether it was a met to look for the moment when you declared it a major incident or they just carry it in their heads your guess is as good as mine right um having

01:24:09 is as good as mine right um having declared a major incident at latest bio 132 27 at that second ISM a common time mark what steps did you take to ensure

01:24:20 mark what steps did you take to ensure that the London Fire Brigade knew that the Metropolitan Police had declared a major incident

01:24:31 I can't actually specifically remember saying to anyone that this is a major incident fast us being the police I

01:24:43 incident fast us being the police I don't remember saying that but in the context of the night it wouldn't made any difference well you say our chorus remember actually specifically remember saying to

01:24:55 actually specifically remember saying to anyone that this is a major incident I thought that you had set that of a message of 126 I know I mean a ton on the ground I'm talking face-to-face right okay just asking my question again

01:25:07 right okay just asking my question again what steps if any did you take to tell the lfb either by radio or on the ground or asking somebody in your organization to pass it on the Metropolitan Police

01:25:18 to pass it on the Metropolitan Police had declared a major incident that would have been the controller's responsibility because they would coordinate everything that's their reason for being right did you follow up with the control room or monitor the

01:25:32 with the control room or monitor the control room in any way in respect of them passing on to the lfb the fact that the Metropolitan Police had declared a major incident no once I've said that then the procedure should take over

01:25:43 then the procedure should take over right and do you know whether there's a procedure within the control room whereby once an officer such as yourself

01:25:54 whereby once an officer such as yourself has declared a major incident formally in the way we've seen they would then take over and disseminate that information to the other emergency services I believe there is but what it

01:26:05 services I believe there is but what it is I couldn't tell you right now going forward then and can you confirm for us that you asked over your radio for our b kc to be told

01:26:17 over your radio for our b kc to be told about the fire while you were on route yes you did and i think we can see a message in the cad at page six and this

01:26:32 message in the cad at page six and this is at 129 I'm sorry yeah 129 39 just below halfway down the page the sn1 that's you we've looked at

01:26:44 page the sn1 that's you we've looked at this before this morning this is you telling be sn2 to contact the local authority and is that a record of your message that you told us about in your

01:26:56 message that you told us about in your statement yes okay now just jumping ahead a little bit to page 11 in this state in this document in the CAD if you

01:27:10 state in this document in the CAD if you go to the time mark of it to 1002 four-fifths of the way down the page you can see that there's a message

01:27:21 can see that there's a message TWA P K and C council informed as a reference Katherine Anne scattered Askim they will be contacting their duty

01:27:32 they will be contacting their duty officer who will EA's with BSC direct council have set up a dedicated or named dedicated op named Erin Freddie further Paul contact first of all watch TWA P I

01:27:44 Paul contact first of all watch TWA P I don't know right do you know anything about this entry no okay do you know whether it was about this time when RB Casey were notified or or was it before

01:27:58 Casey were notified or or was it before that it's gonna be hour after to made the request TW does stand for Twickenham Opie is normally operate so it could be

01:28:09 Opie is normally operate so it could be that because of the increased demand in the service from the control room they've brought people across from the quieter channels it's possible that it was quite a night

01:28:20 it's possible that it was quite a night on Twickenham and they had their operator come across or therefore shouts it's it's an open-plan room like this they could shout it across the room phone this number and then the TWU operator has done that for them and they

01:28:33 operator has done that for them and they have updated everybody else by typing on this message because the nibble at mark there means frogs it's from Twp this is what I've done okay now going back if we

01:28:46 what I've done okay now going back if we can to page seven of the CAD looking at the time mark of o1 30305 you can see

01:29:00 the time mark of o1 30305 you can see you send a message this is BS n1 top two floors of building is on fire that's that's your entry yes you because it's got your callsign and then over the page

01:29:14 got your callsign and then over the page at 134 28 just above halfway down you send another message entire side of the building is on fire 20 floors you see

01:29:25 building is on fire 20 floors you see that yep just have that highlighted o1 34 28 entire side of the building is on fire 20 floors and where were you at

01:29:36 fire 20 floors and where were you at that point do you remember I think I was underneath it right and what was the purpose of that message do you know as you say to

01:29:47 that message do you know as you say to try and get people to understand the speed of it right it was just phenomenal so you were unseen at that stage now given what PC sync and sanga was saying

01:29:59 given what PC sync and sanga was saying earlier about the need to evacuate the entire building that we've seen now there are other messages as well to that effect do you have any thoughts at this point about whether there should be a full or partial building evacuation on

01:30:13 full or partial building evacuation on my arrival I thought there wouldn't be but I'm not trained in that side of things we have clear said we have clear defined roles within it my fire training

01:30:25 defined roles within it my fire training as such it's essentially which fire extinguish but what kind of fire and I can remember being asked by the control room quite early on do I have enough ambulances

01:30:36 early on do I have enough ambulances there I can remember looking around and thinking I've got too many I should see more people and that was a concern but in terms of me going into the fire

01:30:47 in terms of me going into the fire brigade and saying you need to evacuate this building that's they're the experts yeah it was a concern but they're the

01:30:58 yeah it was a concern but they're the experts did you have any discussions with anybody at the scene about evacuation no because I say you get there what do you need from us they tell

01:31:09 there what do you need from us they tell us what they need and then we provide them the safe way to move on to do their jobs we've seen from the CAD and we've identified already one or two instances

01:31:24 identified already one or two instances of PC Sangha whose view that the building was going to be evacuated and when you arrived did you share that

01:31:37 when you arrived did you share that opinion I can't remember going there with and focusing just on that point

01:31:49 with and focusing just on that point going there as soon as I'd said it was a major incident I was thinking what I would have to do and I was thinking about the corns about getting more resources about looking after the crime

01:32:00 resources about looking after the crime on the rest of Kenton chelsea whilst we were done putting all that in place I'd never thought I need to go and speak to the fire brigade and say you need to

01:32:11 the fire brigade and say you need to evacuate this building as the training was you talk to them you find out what they need and you do your best to allow them to do their jobs much like if it

01:32:24 them to do their jobs much like if it had been a crime orientated say one of the terrorist atrocities at the bridge is that very same summer there would have been a fire brigade version of me turning up to the police saying what you want me to do they wouldn't turn around

01:32:36 want me to do they wouldn't turn around and say you need to shoot that man right going back to page six of the CAD at 128 37

01:32:51 you can see this is PC Sangha saying the building is 30 stories high it's being evacuated now we need off Borough units to assist lots of burning masonry

01:33:02 to assist lots of burning masonry falling from the building now first of all do you know whether you were on scene by that stage it looks unlikely given what we've will be there where you were 126 but you tell me I think I

01:33:17 were 126 but you tell me I think I probably was and I think I got the back quarter past one what well you told us early that you declared a major incident at 1:26 from your van I've just been

01:33:28 at 1:26 from your van I've just been arriving there yeah okay now looking at that time entry it says it is being evacuated now that's what PC Sangha is recorded as having broadcast over his radio

01:33:38 radio do you remember hearing that no you don't okay when you arrived did you did you expect in the building to be evacuated in it consistently with this

01:33:51 evacuated in it consistently with this message or to be in the process of being evacuated I don't know what I expected tonight

01:34:02 I didn't think we'd be leaving anybody in there but whether that process was already underway didn't didn't cross my mind so you didn't think to yourself

01:34:13 mind so you didn't think to yourself well I've heard a message about evacuation being underway I don't know arriving that they see well it's my duty but I don't remember doing that okay all right now you say on page three of your

01:34:27 right now you say on page three of your statement and they won't take you to it for them just yet you parked in Bowmore Road and took a moment to assess the situation you remember it being Bommel Road I see you because you're familiar with the area what did you do to assess

01:34:39 with the area what did you do to assess the situation

01:34:45 just take it wouldn't really had a deep breath I'd already been considering things in my mind and the short time it took me to get there from making the

01:34:57 took me to get there from making the call Bowman Road was a a good vantage point you can see the seat of the fire you can see it tracking up the building

01:35:08 you can see it tracking up the building you could see the fire brigade you can see an open space and I just worked out what I needed and I know how I needed to prepare the ground for the ambulance

01:35:20 prepare the ground for the ambulance service so obviously to be needed more fire engines which were probably going to be needed and just work out what was going to go where and stop putting the jigsaw puzzle together and then worrying

01:35:32 jigsaw puzzle together and then worrying about where PC Sam and PC Reese where this consoles have an awful habit of running in yeah and you said before that you didn't get to meet with PC Sankar but did speak to PC Reese yes now

01:35:44 but did speak to PC Reese yes now inspector warm it says in his statement that he arrived on scene at about 1:45 a.m. does that accord with your recollection he was there shortly after

01:35:55 recollection he was there shortly after me right and he says that he met you and you discussed priorities clear priority yeah do you remember that yes okay and one of those priorities was getting the

01:36:06 one of those priorities was getting the public a safe distance back from the tower and allowing the lfb a safe and large

01:36:12 large working area yes that that's right is it okay

01:36:16 okay did you know at that point when you first started discussing matters with superintendent Warren it that you were going to be taking over silver command not at that time I don't believe but the

01:36:30 not at that time I don't believe but the niceties of your the gold commander this did the silver commander they really pale into insignificance its he is my it's my senior officer I'm his junior

01:36:44 it's my senior officer I'm his junior officer and I'm above everybody else it was just my immediate response team there the put in the frame into place did come in losing the power of speech

01:36:56 did come in losing the power of speech mr. Warren net did put the gold silver bronze firmly in place relatively quickly after that but initially it would have been silly to start talking

01:37:08 would have been silly to start talking about the niceties when we just needed to act right okay now in do you know whether at that stage when you first met

01:37:19 whether at that stage when you first met in superintendent walnut he had it spoken to the incident commander I believe he had he said he spoken to lfb

01:37:30 believe he had he said he spoken to lfb but I had as well who had you spoken to come member his name I identified himself as the senior officer that NFB was in the command trip just on

01:37:42 was in the command trip just on Grenville Road and he said my priorities at the time were the cordons for safe working environment and he was concerned about identifying any fatalities now this was this right on arrival

01:37:55 this was this right on arrival immediately after arrival or it was the first contact of Hammond lfb yes but was that on arrival within a couple of minutes right and where was that contact that was in the command truck in the command unit yes

01:38:07 command unit yes was that the one on Babel Road or the one near upon dreadful Grenville Road

01:38:14 right do you remember the name or rank of the officer you spoke to no he was a tall chap with gray hair and how long was your discussion with him very short

01:38:27 was your discussion with him very short because the is his priorities were exactly as expected and

01:38:38 do you know whether superintendent walnut spoke to him or whether he spoke to anybody else I don't know okay now on

01:38:51 to anybody else I don't know okay now on page four of your witness statement your first witness statement you describe

01:38:59 various things and a third of the way down this is after you for after you've arrived on on the incident ground the third of the way down you say the lfb were clearly too busy to speak to me at

01:39:13 were clearly too busy to speak to me at what point did you try to speak to them but couldn't make communication I think that was as close to media as possible when I went down to to try and find

01:39:24 when I went down to to try and find where my constables were right there was lots of coming going from the command truck I was gonna go across and make the contact there but it was a lot people

01:39:36 contact there but it was a lot people coming going lots of received lots of radio channels and chatter they're all in intent on NFB business so I thought I'd give them a few minutes to get

01:39:47 I'd give them a few minutes to get themselves sorted out I'd find my constables and then I'd go and find out what the their prices would be right but as I say it was quite obvious okay do

01:40:00 as I say it was quite obvious okay do you know whether they're anybody you spoke to or did you know whether anybody you were speaking to was the the actual incident commander at the time yes so the person you spoke to you thought was the incident commander yes and did the

01:40:12 the incident commander yes and did the person you spoke to tell you that they were the incident commander I think so right that's the tall person with grey hair in the command unit yes right nobody on the incident ground do you

01:40:26 nobody on the incident ground do you mean outside I mean outs I'm you're quite right I mean outside at the base of the tower no one outside the tower said that they were in charge right now you go on in the middle of page four and it's a block of text I'm afraid but to

01:40:38 it's a block of text I'm afraid but to find it just below halfway down you say at this you say I could only see one or two people who will walk coughing this was whirring as I should have seen hundreds of people at this

01:40:52 have seen hundreds of people at this point my priorities were to save human life both inside and outside the tower and just where were you when you say I could only see one or two people walking but coughing I was if I just heard you

01:41:05 but coughing I was if I just heard you got a map of the young society no yes I think it's your second exhibit actually which we can have that that what many use there's a another building Emilia

01:41:16 use there's a another building Emilia Jason's - Granville Tower called bound and walk yes there's a narrow strip of concrete between them that's like a covered way yes and I was under there

01:41:29 covered way yes and I was under there mates I was right next to the the glass entrance to the tower yes so I could see who was coming out and who wasn't coming

01:41:40 who was coming out and who wasn't coming out - right and I could see the fire brigade going in right I see and you could see them coming down the stairs through the glass and you're having out of the exit digit and you go on to say

01:41:54 of the exit digit and you go on to say at this point my priorities were to save human life both inside and outside the tower and then you say to prepare the ground for 20 lfb 20 la s and as many police units as possible what do you

01:42:08 police units as possible what do you mean by 20 lfb my understanding was that that's once you say it's a major incident and then they come into hundreds of 20 right I see did anybody told you that 20 more pumps were

01:42:19 told you that 20 more pumps were oncoming at that point at that point I don't think so okay did anybody tell you that in fact the incident had been escalated to 25 pumps by 131 now going

01:42:33 escalated to 25 pumps by 131 now going back to this question of appointment of gold and silver command we discussed a moment ago can I take you back to the CAD please and turn to page 10

01:42:47 at 1:53 just below the top of the page 153 48 we can have that highlighted please it says SI command structure Gold

01:43:01 please it says SI command structure Gold Superintendent Paul wore it and then a little bit down the page silver in stature bronze TBC but first of all si

01:43:13 stature bronze TBC but first of all si is that superintendent no that's a it's a it's a function within the control center

01:43:21 center well it's looked at since down so I couldn't tell you it comes from outside it's a it's a role within the command center do you know what it is yeah right well that's a lie if you want something that everyone says send it to si it's

01:43:34 that everyone says send it to si it's something that they do it's it's a way of command list command and control but exactly who it isn't what they do do you

01:43:45 exactly who it isn't what they do do you ever have any training on how the command and control center actually works for more training no right so your your knowledge of how it works is based on your day-to-day experience deadly

01:43:58 on your day-to-day experience deadly experience and I was a cap operated when I was a constable we used to have control rooms in each of the borough so there was one for healing them the only one for Harrow there's one for

01:44:09 one for Harrow there's one for Kensington then about 15 years ago we moved to three large call centers at

01:44:21 moved to three large call centers at Bogue Lambeth and Hendon when it was working when it had a control room on Borough I worked in there and I also had a year working for the

01:44:32 and I also had a year working for the New Zealand Police in their southern control room which was slightly different way we did it but the same pressures right and worries was

01:44:43 pressures right and worries was obviously worn it

01:44:45 can I just ask you was this about the time 153 48 was that about the time that your command structure was established to the best of your recollection yeah that would have been put in as a result

01:44:57 that would have been put in as a result of mr. Warren had contacted them saying this is the command structure right do you know why it wasn't established sooner than that there's a big difference between it being established

01:45:08 difference between it being established and someone typing now on a computer record right so how big a difference is it in this case how long do you think elapsed before Oh 153 48 when the

01:45:19 elapsed before Oh 153 48 when the operator typed this in I have no idea it's difficult to put anything that night into chronological order I have memories of events I have memories of taking decisions but if you

01:45:32 memories of taking decisions but if you to ask me put things in a chronological order no it's it's fractured it's like a broken jigsaw do you know did you know at that point prior to or as that 153 48

01:45:48 at that point prior to or as that 153 48 whether the lfb had declared their own major incident no did you know that they hadn't no you didn't know one way or the

01:45:59 hadn't no you didn't know one way or the other no did you as I say it was that that's very defined and clear role so I had my role I knew what I had to do I really couldn't worry about what they rfb were doing because my role was

01:46:11 rfb were doing because my role was significant enough is it is it not important for joint responder agencies to know whether each other have declared

01:46:24 to know whether each other have declared a major incident

01:46:28 well it must be but in the nature of this event it was so fast that it's the time you're talking about we're talking minutes a lot of the the training for

01:46:40 minutes a lot of the the training for the interim interoperability the training it's for things that take you know you've got time to sit down and consider and establish control these shared ways of working and sharing and

01:46:53 shared ways of working and sharing and 15 cups of tea and if you've got the time what you have to understand his time was our enemy you just had to add it because if you

01:47:04 you just had to add it because if you didn't act then all was lost so someone not typing that on the computer screen really didn't have much bearing on him

01:47:16 really didn't have much bearing on him whatsoever and yes the the fire brigade if they declared it a major incident I must have been assumed it was because there was a tower block in the sky on fire so

01:47:28 tower block in the sky on fire so someone telling me that very interesting but didn't make any difference to what I had to do because I had to make sure that they had a safe working environment I had to make sure that everyone that

01:47:39 I had to make sure that everyone that came out of that building was able to get to hospital and didn't die in the grass I had to make sure that no one else coming to the building to get through and harm themselves rather going into the building I had all that to

01:47:52 into the building I had all that to worry about so whether or not then mate said it's a major incident for us it's an administrative process as far as I was concerned it sounds as if they what you're telling us is that it call this an administrative process it's one that

01:48:03 an administrative process it's one that at least on this night was it was one that could be begun in its own vacuum without knowing whether or not the LFP hid themselves very much they declared

01:48:14 hid themselves very much they declared an emergency I agree with that yeah but and isn't the pup but isn't the purpose of jzip

01:48:20 of jzip and all these arrangements that you were trained off to get emergency services in London working together so that each and you what the other was doing but I I knew what the others were doing I was

01:48:31 knew what the others were doing I was there I could see them doing it you're right it is all about the cooperation and shared and standing shadow of risks and goals and aims and were as you say it's working together it sounds cheesy but it's not

01:48:42 together it sounds cheesy but it's not what I experienced on that night was the finest example of teamwork I have ever been involved in it was if you think what happened in those short hours between arriving at half a dozen fire

01:48:55 between arriving at half a dozen fire engines and 20 coppers and what left left it's amazing it really is amazing and at the time at the time every time

01:49:07 and at the time at the time every time you thought you had a handle on something it changed and your priorities change well I didn't progr didn't change there was saving human life but where that human life was changed so yes you

01:49:19 that human life was changed so yes you are quite right it is important but I would say then my experience to having left the the Jesuit training I knew the framework and I knew that we had to understand what each other needed we had

01:49:32 understand what each other needed we had to understand where each other were we had to understand how we could support each other I knew all that and all that did happen yes the niceties probably are missing but the niceties weren't important what

01:49:43 but the niceties weren't important what was important was something happened and we had to bloody well move what people would die sorry no that's understandable I understand why you've used this those

01:49:54 I understand why you've used this those those terms but I just want it what I'm really trying to get at is it is how Jessup's program policy worked in the

01:50:06 Jessup's program policy worked in the context of this fire can I just ask you to look at em et triple zero to three to nine zero which is the interoperability framework which we looked at very

01:50:19 framework which we looked at very briefly at the start of your evidence and on which you said you had training but can I ask you to go to page 14 of that

01:50:29 and I'm not going to read it all to you you're just going to show you what it looks like on the page section seven is entitled establishing a common operating picture a common operating picture Co P

01:50:42 picture a common operating picture Co P has been defined as a common overview of an incident that is created by assessing and fusing information from multiple sources and is shared between appropriate command controller coordinating groups to support a joint decision-making

01:50:53 decision-making it goes on single it's a single point of reference for those involved and supports joint decision-making and the various questions that then get asked and then under eight not a paragraph

01:51:06 and then under eight not a paragraph before we get to eight the common operating picture should have a clear relationship with established command control and coordination groups and then under eight arrangements for joint working decision-making an incident

01:51:17 working decision-making an incident management follows a general pattern of working out what's going on situation establishing what you need to achieve direction deciding what to do about it action or informed by a statement and understanding of overarching values and

01:51:28 understanding of overarching values and purse then under eight one on the next page there is a joint decision model is self explanatory Mike my question is a sync single one a simple one unless you

01:51:40 sync single one a simple one unless you knew what lfb was doing visa fee a major incident and unless they knew what you are doing

01:51:45 are doing visa via general there I'm a major incident how could you establish a common operating picture because I could see I was there I everything you've just

01:51:59 see I was there I everything you've just talked us through happened I knew what was important I knew what was happening I knew I knew what they needed of me but you didn't know whether or not they declared a major incident no but as I

01:52:11 declared a major incident no but as I say that's no I didn't you say it wouldn't have made a difference but does it mean though that what is

01:52:22 does it mean though that what is intended by this policy wasn't operating as this policy contemplates at that point that part of it didn't happen yes do you remember what your first point of

01:52:34 do you remember what your first point of contact with the NFB after the establishment of the gold and silver command structure was we've been prior

01:52:45 command structure was we've been prior to the first command meeting that's the time I couldn't tell you right so well okay so we have a period between 153 when the when superintendent walnut

01:52:56 when the when superintendent walnut establishes the gold and silver structure gold silver bronze structure 153 and then your first tactical command meeting which is at 3:20 yes so it's an hour and a half so during that an hour

01:53:08 hour and a half so during that an hour and a half period do you remember what your first contact with the NFB was or was there none is this after I've spoken to the gentlemen the gray hair but on what you told us before this morning

01:53:20 what you told us before this morning given that you made that contact very shortly after arrival it follows the answer to that is yes but I'm asking you I don't remember any other contact right

01:53:31 I don't remember any other contact right now on page six of your statement just just slightly separate point you described how you let someone called Michael Perkins through the barrier you

01:53:44 Michael Perkins through the barrier you just go to page six you can pick this up in statement there about two-thirds of the way down the page

01:53:55 you'd be describing what's been happening on the cordon and then you say three quarters of the way well two thirds of the way down the page perhaps is better three other males they're meant to go past me I've a more Road I

01:54:09 stopped one no that's not okay you're going down keeping down yeah three other males you see the bird is a reduction mark three other males they went to get

01:54:22 mark three other males they went to get cost me up they worried I stopped one who I don't acknowledge me Michael Perkins I've started to tell him to get back he said he had keys for a hall which he wanted to open up for the residence

01:54:31 residence I thanked him a lesson through he was walking up Bowmore road away from the tower and I needed a place of refuge for survivors I believe it was now that I started to push the message to the constables that they needed to be forceful but not to start a riot because

01:54:43 forceful but not to start a riot because we would not win do you remember roughly what time this was it was this is my first day which I say was Ashley not

01:54:55 first day which I say was Ashley not correct right it was memories from the night I think that was just after one of the meetings it's it's on my body warned

01:55:07 the meetings it's it's on my body warned we'll come up with the exact time I couldn't tell you right okay I will come to look at you think it was about three ish right okay

01:55:25 and then you get one to say just a bit lower down after the sentence which starts from the balance of probability and you see three lines on from there it says I think it was now but I found the

01:55:37 says I think it was now but I found the lfp command unit park just up Bogle Road and I made first contact with a lefty command it was a brief conversation about what they need it now I was going to ask you that in the context of talking to Michael Perkins but given

01:55:49 talking to Michael Perkins but given what you told us this morning about making contact within the command unit early on after your arrival is what you've said there in your statement really correct no that's collage play it's out out I

01:56:02 no that's collage play it's out out I can remember making content with mr. Perkins having just come from the lfb right so I had that joined a bit of mind I just left in lfp but obviously I've got which contact wrong because I've

01:56:13 got which contact wrong because I've made contact with the grey agent much much much earlier before I suppose mr. Wace so is that sentence then a reference to what you told us this morning about the brief conversation in the command unit with the incident

01:56:24 the command unit with the incident commander tall chap grey hair yes right

01:56:30 now can we start then by taking you through a number of clips of your body warm footage now I understand this is

01:56:41 warm footage now I understand this is also going to bring back very clear recollections of the night inspector if you'd like a break at this point we know they can erase duties all right okay if at any point during this you'll know

01:56:54 at any point during this you'll know okay now can I ask you please to be shown and this is some there's not a very long clip it's inq quint equals zero five to one

01:57:13 and

01:57:17 this starts at an adjusted time I should tell you

01:57:20 tell you Oh 239 10 and runs just for a minute or so - OH - 4027 swim swim yourself to be

01:57:51 so - OH - 4027 swim swim yourself to be identifying the casualties and the people that will be repoing stuff like that because we've declared major each donor and our cause and the traffic or them we're not even close to being near the outside at least often get is a

01:58:02 the outside at least often get is a priority I'll say we've probably already got about we've Chloe's fun yeah we proposed planned Andros yet so that's gonna be a biggie much to me around here

01:58:13 give me an idea numbers I've got 50 fire engines plus another 50 going on yeah yeah yeah things all the people I've

01:58:25 yeah yeah things all the people I've done if you've got a chance to get rid of the people yeah it was those down yeah safety comes first

01:58:53 now the senior officer of the LF be that you were talking to there is he we know who he is but not telling who he is in a

01:59:04 who he is but not telling who he is in a minute but was he the tall chap gray hair that you were referring to earlier in your evidence yes was this the first occasion on which you met him yes right so there was no meeting with this officer immediately prior to arrival no

01:59:18 officer immediately prior to arrival no okay now we've got just to remind you a time mark of this meeting at Oh two thirty nine and ten seconds and that runs the clip runs for a minute and ten seconds we'll say do you think you had

01:59:31 seconds we'll say do you think you had any meeting with any other officers in a command unit prior to that time no right okay now that's for you and for the record is is DAC Lachlan and Ear Lachlan

01:59:42 record is is DAC Lachlan and Ear Lachlan who was incident commander at that time and was then relieved by Assistant Commissioner ro um I know she did actually tell me it

01:59:54 um I know she did actually tell me it was a major incident but it didn't register right

02:00:04 so that means that you first spoke to the lfb in this context at least about an hour after you arrived that's surprise to me if that's what it

02:00:19 that's surprise to me if that's what it says in terms of the it must be they went down to find where Kieran and Joshua mmm the brief conversation that bought of the tower they were busy could

02:00:34 bought of the tower they were busy could well have been I mean times I'm fast forward that night yeah I mean I just say you know first of all this is an adjusted time because we have to adjust forward an hour and your time clock in

02:00:45 forward an hour and your time clock in the top right hand corner but we've also looked at them WWE V footage before that and there isn't any there's no discussion in the command unit prior to that just say you know now that being so

02:00:58 that just say you know now that being so your first discussion of detailed discussion with the lfb about an hour after you arrived what can you just explain to me why that was why you left it until then because we needed to act

02:01:10 it until then because we needed to act when we first got there upon arrival there were people edging towards the tower more people coming towards it the priorities were going to be clear it was going to be accordance to keep everything safe and then getting ready

02:01:22 everything safe and then getting ready further as a safe for the the ambulance service and and all the blue light matters so actually going to see them and having the physical this is our priorities we save people first forgive

02:01:39 priorities we save people first forgive this question and I detect what they think I know you're going to say but would it be normal for you at a major incident to leave it an hour before speaking to the LF B for example another

02:01:52 speaking to the LF B for example another emergency service it this is the first major incident that I've been in this position to deal with so normal I have absolutely no idea right would it have been best if I was planning it of course

02:02:04 been best if I was planning it of course I'd have gone there much earlier but you have to balance that against the priorities of stopping people going into the burning building yes and the first officer to arrive all right there was a from us so could I justify not if I made

02:02:18 from us so could I justify not if I made up say 10% of the arriving and police officers could I justify not being there and stopping people hurting themselves or getting in the way in harmony fire brigade because I wanted to go and have

02:02:29 brigade because I wanted to go and have a chat it's tell me something that was obvious

02:02:32 obvious did you're not going to the command unit for an hour or so after your arrival causes you any difficulties in understanding the priorities and tasks to be carried out by you know it just

02:02:44 to be carried out by you know it just confirmed right now I'd like to show you please what we called clip 2 which is inq quintuple zero five to zero which is

02:02:59 inq quintuple zero five to zero which is also just to tell you what it is is also you in the command unit if we can display that please I've got a number of questions about what we see we may have to play it twice and it runs just say you know from o2 to judge the helicopter

02:04:25 you know from o2 to judge the helicopter they say it's going up transmitting I just don't know if you guys will LFP now

02:05:05 just don't know if you guys will LFP now they just forget blink they are aware certain aspects in problems helicopter circling yeah

02:05:34 okay with that just a number of just a number of questions I won't play to you again less you like this we have to to get them to make my questions more comprehensible but and first of all who

02:05:46 comprehensible but and first of all who are you talking to on the radio I think that was the helicopter operator okay and was the problem that they knew you couldn't access the heli tele downlink

02:05:58 couldn't access the heli tele downlink it sounds like they were asking whether the fire brigade could to see yeah the downlink and you say we couldn't quite hear it but I let me see if you can

02:06:09 hear it but I let me see if you can recall it having been prompted with that you were yet to find a command unit that had access to your pictures was that that's what you were saying was it yeah I'd um popped into I'd gone to several

02:06:21 I'd um popped into I'd gone to several of the command units trying to identify who was where and what was doing what right okay and how long were you doing that for before this conversation roughly do you think and did you find

02:06:34 roughly do you think and did you find out from that that there was no command unit that had access to the heli tele downlink yeah I believe that that command you that we were just viewing was the at that point was there the main

02:06:47 was the at that point was there the main decision placed right and we can see from that that an LFP officer yes who think I think a station manager Johnson

02:06:59 think I think a station manager Johnson although he's wearing a red t-shirt we've been able to identify he said it's not working did you take from that that the heli telly downlink wasn't working yes right we've had some suggestion in the evidence so far that it was that the

02:07:11 the evidence so far that it was that the messages were being scrambled by the Metropolitan Police so they weren't actually reaching the command unit can you comment on that scrambled well that's the word that that is the a word that has been used by lfb

02:07:24 is the a word that has been used by lfb my understanding and I'm clearly not helicopter pilot is that the when we had individual helicopters assigned to police forces and services they had a

02:07:37 police forces and services they had a way of communicating with each other through

02:07:40 through standard channels we moved to the National Police air service or n pass a few months ago couple years ago now so a lot of firm the met had three

02:07:52 lot of firm the met had three helicopters but they pulled them all together so if I was a burglary or something in Notting Hill and I requested a helicopter it wasn't uncommon for them CS helicopters assigned where's it traveling to on

02:08:04 assigned where's it traveling to on please

02:08:04 please Devon right which point you say thank you very much don't worry we'll put a dog in but that's the practicality of it so we had helicopters coming to us

02:08:15 so we had helicopters coming to us moreover because they were from different force areas they didn't necessarily have the rights I don't think that some sort of code they had to put in so as long as you knew the code

02:08:27 put in so as long as you knew the code that particular helicopter needed to speak to that particular fire service everything was fine if neither one had that particular code there were problems there's on a well known discrepancy or

02:08:40 there's on a well known discrepancy or problem as at June 2017 the first time I hear if it was after rental town right okay just pursue this a little bit more which I'm gonna show you a reference in the CAD in a moment before I do at that

02:08:53 the CAD in a moment before I do at that point during this discussion - do you have any any plan to communicate the N Pass helicopter radio messages either to the LF b command unit or to the MPS

02:09:08 the LF b command unit or to the MPS control at that point no because it was a problem that looked like people are working on right I see okay but what about the radio messages was there a way

02:09:19 about the radio messages was there a way in which you could harvest the radio messages and get those messages to the LF v command unit at that point it would have been going through the command control center there's a the police

02:09:30 control center there's a the police control and talking to the fire brigade control room and moving around in that direction right say let me just get the line of communication helicopter to met CC met CC - LF B at Stratford and then

02:09:44 CC met CC - LF B at Stratford and then that Stratford - come on unit at that point yes at that point did that chain of communication change during the night to your knowledge specifically the helicopter

02:09:56 knowledge specifically the helicopter interesting generals specifically from the helicopter I don't know of anything that was put in place Pacific from the helicopter but we did have an awful lot of radio traffic coming from

02:10:07 of radio traffic coming from Constable's and the precursor to the mess was were always is anybody with lfb to pass a message and again I come back to this time aspect and making sure that we were moving as quickly as we could

02:10:19 we were moving as quickly as we could because you were just reacting to what was happening in the tower so I stationed a constable there with a radio at the command center and if someone said anybody with lfp that

02:10:31 someone said anybody with lfp that officer was there just speak directly so they didn't have to go around the houses we've discussed okay and do you know who which officer was that customer Jacobs Jacobs and she was on the incident

02:10:43 Jacobs and she was on the incident ground yes do you know who she had direct contact with within the lfp control room I couldn't give her the person's name but I stood there and said you talked to him right okay we'll come

02:10:55 you talked to him right okay we'll come will come to that then in a bit more detail in of it in a moment can I take you back to CAD for a to please and go to page 22

02:11:09 I think mr. chairman now is probably as good a time that presented for a short break right can you help me before we before we break are you going to want to show him a lot more body-worn footage

02:11:20 show him a lot more body-worn footage they're going to show him a little yes there's a lot of some yes yes that's some more now the reason I asked that

02:11:31 some more now the reason I asked that question inspector was because there was a point at which you obviously wanted to get on with these films and see them but I think to be honest it would be in your interest to have a short break now and I'm afraid there are more than two look

02:11:43 I'm afraid there are more than two look at you maybe you're banded easier to look at

02:11:46 look at when you've had a bit of a break alright say we'll have ten minute break resume a quarter past twelve go on from there I should mr. Chairman I should just

02:11:57 should mr. Chairman I should just mention for everybody's benefit that one of them were going to come to you in about ten or fifteen minutes after the break

02:12:03 break requires a trigger warning because it shows the building on fire and the very start of the clip right but from something I say part it's from some distance but it nonetheless shows the

02:12:14 distance but it nonetheless shows the building on fire I just say that for your benefit inspector and for the benefit of those in the room and those watching on the livestream so they can make arrangements all right so we relate to care with the

02:12:25 all right so we relate to care with the actress you look after you thank you

02:12:39 right 12:15 teaser

02:21:08 all right Hannity curry on the sweater yes thank you say I've just spoken to my wife you see if I mean she says I'm becoming argumentative oh I don't know if she can see you sir

02:21:20 if she can see you sir if that is the case I'm sorry I know this isn't this isn't pinning you know I understand the inquiry but it's just very difficult if I have become I'm

02:21:33 very difficult if I have become I'm sorry I didn't think you have and can I just ask you are you comfortable with that fan blowing at choose from such I have no idea what it is it was quite an that's fine thanks mr. chairman

02:21:49 that's fine thanks mr. chairman inspector thank you for coming back to us can I just ask you one or two questions arising out of the exchanges we've had just before we broke first of all when its major incident is declared

02:22:01 all when its major incident is declared and you are put in our silver command as we see you were 153 or thereabouts does that mean that you a silver command across the board for the whole incident

02:22:12 across the board for the whole incident or just silver command so far as the Metropolitan Police were concerned just replace just the police and so everything you were doing in that role was limited was it to to the police and

02:22:24 was limited was it to to the police and it might well be another silver commander for the other FB or for the LA s exactly they say there are defined rules at this when any incident so there will be someone similar to myself

02:22:36 will be someone similar to myself working within the ENFP delivering on the ground but and would that silver person be your your point of contact within that emergency service if

02:22:52 contact within that emergency service if we're talking just in terms of Greenville tower because of the speed of nature of it everyone got together in the command meetings so in it and I'm assuming you're going to be asked me who was that person and did I

02:23:04 asked me who was that person and did I go to that person through the night there wasn't an occasion that I needed to go and speak to people because certainly could change typically on the ground I thought that the the command meetings on the hourly basis from by

02:23:16 meetings on the hourly basis from by mister

02:23:16 mister were very useful and they pretty much confirmed what you could see was happening now and we could see from the last clip that you go into the command

02:23:28 last clip that you go into the command unit when did you first realize that there were two command units not just one I can't give you a time but it was quite literally on hey they're more than two there were lots and that was one of

02:23:42 two there were lots and that was one of the things that made me understand just how bad this was gonna get because you only see a command unit at a significant deployment of the fire brigade and there

02:23:57 deployment of the fire brigade and there were lots of demand units all right well we'll come back to that in a moment can I then go to back to the question of the heli telly downlink now in the clip

02:24:09 heli telly downlink now in the clip we've just seen where you're told it's not working before that it was another officer with a red t-shirt who comes up to you with a mobile with what looks like a map on it which looked like it

02:24:21 like a map on it which looked like it neared the map or on the main screen my question is to your knowledge was there a mobile app that would if it was working carry the heli telly downlink I have no idea my experience of heli telly

02:24:34 have no idea my experience of heli telly is limited to one previous occasion before that right which was New Year's Eve 2011 into 12 whereby I was working

02:24:45 Eve 2011 into 12 whereby I was working with the command team at the New Year's Eve celebrations in central London and that's the only time I've ever used it right but are you aware whether or do you know whether there is a mobile app no in which and off no I don't you don't

02:24:57 no in which and off no I don't you don't know right now can I take ask you to go to CAD 482 at page 22 and look at the time mark of three to three 23:36

02:25:09 time mark of three to three 23:36 four-fifths of the way down that page you can see that it says there GTA s you

02:25:20 you can see that it says there GTA s you my eye Oh II to one and have two portable downlinks on board and on route to scene for lfb and police to view heli telly pictures first of all do you know anything about

02:25:32 first of all do you know anything about that message no in fact it's hid answers a question I've always wondered why they turned out Iceland they didn't ask for them GT is the control room so it's from GT to ASU which the aerial support unit

02:25:43 GT to ASU which the aerial support unit for your information Oh II too and night it's a traffic unit they have the handsets and they're making their way to us GT you say control room that's not

02:25:54 us GT you say control room that's not met cc that was the Strategic Command GT is a special-operations rumor center that's get set up it's in Lambeth as

02:26:05 that's get set up it's in Lambeth as opposed to end imagery of normal domestic control room right and you say in your last answer but one you said I always wondered why they turned up did they turn up yes I saw them once did they work yes yes so was there a point

02:26:19 they work yes yes so was there a point in the night when the lfb was able to view Hurley Telepictures I believe that when it was Metropolitan Police helicopter they could but when he wasn't

02:26:30 helicopter they could but when he wasn't they couldn't but my involvement with whether they could see the television pitch from their helicopter or not was minimal right Pressey so you yourself have no information to give us about

02:26:41 have no information to give us about whether you you saw this in operation once these points or is an operation in the police environment but not in the firing innermark what was that environment mr. warnet had the handset and we were discussing the danger to

02:26:53 and we were discussing the danger to bound the morton tredgold house as the helicopter was saying that the ruse of those two buildings were heating up to appointment they were both likely to catch fire and that debris is now

02:27:04 catch fire and that debris is now blowing down onto the roofs did you ever see any heli telly down negative images only that and for about two seconds on

02:27:15 only that and for about two seconds on what they can on what device on the the portable down links which that message of authority where do they go those portable darlings were they on the

02:27:28 portable darlings were they on the incident ground sorry but mr. Warren it had one right well then what I don't know I mean can you just describe it for us is it

02:27:34 us is it like a mobile phone or is it like an iPad or oh it's larger it's part about iPad size - two handles it's probably not too far from dimensions they say a full binder right and first of all

02:27:47 full binder right and first of all roughly do you know roughly how long after 3:23 those arrived no I did okay and do you know whether they were shown to the LF be given to the LF be in the command unit no I say or the first I knew of them was when mr. Warren it had

02:27:59 knew of them was when mr. Warren it had one right do you know why the lfp weren't supplied with with these no no do you know who who do you know who might be able to tell us why those were not supplied to the other FB no the

02:28:13 not supplied to the other FB no the first idea that didn't happen first I really know that the going for your line of question I'm sir I'm guessing that they didn't get to see the pictures at all through the night hmm this is the first idea they I knew there

02:28:26 this is the first idea they I knew there was problems like sir I know interaction with these things you saw a couple of seconds worth on superintendent walnuts both portable downlink is there any

02:28:39 both portable downlink is there any reason you didn't say to him well that's very helpful come on unit needs one let's take it there it wasn't that helpful it was helpful in terms of seeing the rules of

02:28:52 helpful in terms of seeing the rules of the adjacent buildings but we were there we could see everything there was no you could see what debris was blowing because you were there you could see people at the windows because you were

02:29:03 people at the windows because you were there you could see everything that the helicopter could tell us we could see because we were there the main benefit at helicopter say was the fact that it could show exactly exactly but give you

02:29:16 could show exactly exactly but give you an indication how hot the adjacent buildings Roos were getting but I think in the one of the previous Clips the helicopter said that the southern aspect is starting to crumble we know because

02:29:27 is starting to crumble we know because it's there given the fact that the you were told by the end Pass helicopter pilot that the images weren't getting through and you were told by the NFB

02:29:38 through and you were told by the NFB officer and their a t-shirt that they weren't they received in the command unit why didn't you suggest to Superintendent warned it that the portable downlink he was holding be run

02:29:49 portable downlink he was holding be run round to the command unit said that though that those in the command unit could have access to the heli tele downlink images because of that time I didn't know they didn't so I knew there were problems early on but I didn't know

02:30:01 were problems early on but I didn't know that that was the case but equally you didn't have any reason to think that the problems had been solved no but you have to trust your colleagues did anybody did anybody tell you that the heli telly downlink problems have been solved so

02:30:13 downlink problems have been solved so that you didn't have to send the portables around to the command unit no but in terms of Grand Hotel worrying about a heli telly image was Dan a monastic varieties no

02:30:31 can I

02:30:35 to ask you to get to page six of your first witness statement please

02:30:47 and

02:30:52 you say in that on that page four lines up from the bottom you're discussing your conversation we've already seen the

02:31:04 your conversation we've already seen the clip of you say I explained what our situation was and we would be able to clear the area once more resources arrived he accepted this now I just want

02:31:17 arrived he accepted this now I just want to show you a short clip and ask you whether the discussion you're referring to in your statement here is captured in this clip it's inq five one six which

02:31:30 this clip it's inq five one six which runs from an adjusted Tyler row to forty five ten 202 45 35 so it's very short and it's what we have is clip four

02:31:47 we haven't gone with eleventeen chemical what really helped me as a national party booty this hammock please please please

02:31:55 please we've called the world they will arrive late this is Major I know yeah your guys gonna go to Bramley row of ours near the Clarendon Road as they come in would push new house I've been

02:32:09 come in would push new house I've been since I started is that the discussion I

02:32:17 think so but that first statement was as I said memories were not quality correct they were fractured it all just came out really it took me several days to write

02:32:30 really it took me several days to write it can you just show me the state and again please the statement again I can remember that that snapped a conversation with mr. Rose yes came after the conversation with the

02:32:43 came after the conversation with the gray-haired gentleman but before the first command meeting yes is that you understanding that is my understanding brilliant and it's your evidence I think

02:32:54 brilliant and it's your evidence I think oh yeah but I could show you a statement again page six for loans up from the of the page is that is that do we put these

02:33:05 the page is that is that do we put these two together

02:33:19 I think so okay now we then move on in your statement you stick with this you say and it's highlighted I pull the PC four to eight from the nearest cordon

02:33:30 four to eight from the nearest cordon and tasked her as the conduit between police and lfb is that Alice Jacobs yes right now I'm going to ask you some questions about her role shortly but before I do so can I just ask you this

02:33:44 either on arrival or during the incident did did you expect to communicate personally with the lfb well at some

02:33:57 personally with the lfb well at some point yes yes now you didn't have any formal shared communication channels in the first few hours and you say that in your second step in your third statement at page 9 I don't need to take you back

02:34:09 at page 9 I don't need to take you back to it but you do say that you told lfp commanders which airwave channel you were using yes did you have any discussion with any of the commanders about setting up a shared communication

02:34:20 about setting up a shared communication channel with them not at that time I can remember that conversation it was the gentleman in the red t-shirt right um the one on the right I'll take you away for that you know I my t-shirts I mean

02:34:32 for that you know I my t-shirts I mean that there were which one was it do you remember well it would have the the gentleman that I told we're on the radio in fact I showed him my radio he was wearing a red t-shirt right right okay

02:34:43 wearing a red t-shirt right right okay that's control room was hectic there are a number of at least two or three radio channels going on it's wouldn't have made sense to add another radio channel in there to get another member of the

02:34:55 in there to get another member of the lfb to listen to our conversations so did you establish a shared channel at any stage not in the early hours no when

02:35:08 any stage not in the early hours no when did you establish a shared channel that would have been done through the command control conference I'd you know when there was no okay do you think it would have assisted your role if you'd had a shared communication channel at an early

02:35:19 shared communication channel at an early stage in the in the incident

02:35:28 it's a very difficult question to answer because it's it's in the abstract isn't it

02:35:37 I honestly don't know it if you were planning this event we would probably have planned to have the shared control

02:35:48 have planned to have the shared control capacity but in terms of turning up to an event that then escalated from minute to minute

02:35:58 to minute at what point you would think we definitely need a control chair dissociate controller now I don't know when that point would be because that was the real difficulty around this fire

02:36:10 was the real difficulty around this fire or was there just escalated and escalated and got worse and worse

02:36:20 No

02:36:25 a p-series who's given us a statement says that he told members of the public that there was a dedicated line set up on 999 for people just to ring and say

02:36:36 on 999 for people just to ring and say that they were in Greenville tower that's his that's what he said and I paraphrase it dude does that accord with your recollection that p-series said that although there wasn't like that

02:36:47 that although there wasn't like that there was a line ah no idea no idea okay did you or did the MPs have a dedicated 999 line for Grenfell at any stage I don't think you can dedicate a 999 line

02:37:00 don't think you can dedicate a 999 line okay do you know whether the officers in general on the ground of the incident ground were told that there is a

02:37:11 ground were told that there is a dedicated 999 line for Greenville tower not by me and I don't remember the control-room saying that right now I want to ask you one or two questions about PC Jacobs's role you asked her as

02:37:23 about PC Jacobs's role you asked her as we've seen in your statement and still on the screen to act as the conduit between the police and the NFB did you we've seen some of the discussions you've had you had with the LFP but did

02:37:35 you've had you had with the LFP but did you ever receive a briefing from the lfb about what kind of information should be collected and passed on to them regarding far survival guidance no

02:37:46 regarding far survival guidance no conditions in the building or in flats to no briefing

02:37:57 were you aware of that there were two but were you aware that there was a command unit specifically designated to deal with far survival guidance calls not immediately but through the night

02:38:10 not immediately but through the night yes

02:38:11 yes when did you come to learn that probably a half way do you think when I was initially when I spoke to PC Jacobs she was at a command unit and then when I went to check on

02:38:23 unit and then when I went to check on her later on she had a different one and that's what I understood but that was the role that was happening at that location was this before or after your first meeting first conversation with

02:38:35 first meeting first conversation with Assistant Commissioner Rehn after I think was it before or after your first tactical command meeting before I think right and we know that that started at

02:38:47 right and we know that that started at 3:20 or so so you learned that there was a designated command unit between about 240 until 2:15 I suppose and 320 within

02:39:03 240 until 2:15 I suppose and 320 within that half an hour period it sounds like it but no one said okay this is the dedicated command unit for fire safety guidance it was a case of seeing what's going on and working out for myself right did you actually need to have a

02:39:16 right did you actually need to have a separate liaison officer to communicate with Kumar but with command and control or between between the MPS and the FSG

02:39:29 or between between the MPS and the FSG command unit are you asking did was there a role from TC Jacobs des was there an operational requirement to have a liaison officer yep there was traffic was building up on the air around I said

02:39:42 was building up on the air around I said the precursor was is any officer with lfb we had before PC Jacobs was put there there was no one that was specifically with the fire service so it

02:39:53 specifically with the fire service so it made sense to put someone there to answer those calls right and that was your idea was it yes and in the role that you asked her to to assume what did

02:40:04 that you asked her to to assume what did you think she would have to do I thought it would mean more than more logistical aspects of the work that in terms of they needed police officers at a particular location because the corns within or people who

02:40:16 because the corns within or people who got through or we needed to tell fire brigade they said more the management rather than the fire survival guards it turned into when you tasked her did you

02:40:28 turned into when you tasked her did you think that you were tasking her to pass on

02:40:32 on FSG messages from residents of the cordon to the command unit no that just evolved through the night in many ways I'm glad that she was there because that

02:40:46 I'm glad that she was there because that work could be done did you ever specifically task any officer with gathering FSG information from people gathered at the cordon and then passing them on to the command unit by the time that had already started I

02:40:58 by the time that had already started I realized that was always happening this they were already doing the job now on page 9 of your third witness statement if I can ask you to go to that please that's a meaty triple zero two three two eight four

02:41:13 you describe your decision to station PC Jacobs with NFB command and you say in the second sentence I did not know of any formal shared communication channels

02:41:24 any formal shared communication channels that were operational in those first hours and then you go on to say four lines down police channels were busy with officers trying to pass messages to

02:41:35 with officers trying to pass messages to lfb this could be done via met CC passing electronic messages to the lfb control room this would however take time now first of all what type of

02:41:48 time now first of all what type of messages were being passed that you're describing that I can't tell you specifically it's when you're in the in

02:42:01 specifically it's when you're in the in the moment not just in Grandville tower but at at anything really you understand that you're listening to the radium there's no other things going on as well it just comes with experience and I

02:42:12 it just comes with experience and I could just hear anyone there left be anyone with lfb and that precursor saying that there's a blockage somewhere not well yeah a blockage that we needed

02:42:23 not well yeah a blockage that we needed to get information to people exactly what the nature was I couldn't tell you because you know there's something clicked in my mind that we need to do something to actually get this through and that's why I asked PC Jacobs to go

02:42:35 and that's why I asked PC Jacobs to go and fulfill that role right well let me just show you CAD for a2 again and a few pages in that just to pick up some of the messages at certain times and see what see where we go with that if you go

02:42:46 what see where we go with that if you go to page 9 of of CAD 482 m ET triple zero to three to nine four to three to nine four

02:43:01 page nine you can see first of all on that page 142 57 PS 142 57 BS op 142 50s

02:43:20 that page 142 57 PS 142 57 BS op 142 50s MBSR we are getting numerous calls in FC from people inside rentals how are saying they are trapped was that the sort of message that you're referring to in your statement on page nine or third

02:43:33 in your statement on page nine or third statement no that's a communication between the the people indeed this wouldn't be I doubt this would have been put out over the airwaves these are people within the controller talking to

02:43:45 people within the controller talking to each other right so PS refers to the opera channel manageably was the domestic John we were using BS from operator operator it's going to be the call receipt side of the room so they're

02:43:57 call receipt side of the room so they're the people that are actually talking to people on the telephones that message would have gone to all of the officers no it probably didn't get that's they're just telling the telephone operators are

02:44:10 just telling the telephone operators are telling the channel operators they're getting kind of telephone calls that's it

02:44:14 it what would the channel the channel operators do with those messages

02:44:23 what in let me also question how did the information to pass the NFB is that when you don't let me ask the question a different way the channel operator receives that from the telephone operation and puts it on the log I think

02:44:35 operation and puts it on the log I think that's what you're saying and in your experience words the channel operator at met CC then passed that information on first of all to anybody else within the

02:44:46 first of all to anybody else within the met at the incident ground each telephone call would have generated another CAD message and that individual message could be passed I would expect it to be passed electronically to the fire brigade you say you would have

02:44:58 fire brigade you say you would have expected it let's look at another example that's perhaps slightly more pertinent page 11 of the cad kelly had

02:45:10 pertinent page 11 of the cad kelly had four eight to a time mark of Oh 207 25 BS flats from one one five are trapped

02:45:22 BS flats from one one five are trapped floor on fire aren't able to get out for info so what would happen what would happen but to that message again that

02:45:35 happen but to that message again that hasn't come from the court and so that would have been again I'm thinking it's just my take on it that this is information that's come from a call handler who's created a separate CAD but

02:45:47 handler who's created a separate CAD but they're informing the the channel controller that there are people trapped and would that message in some way go to

02:45:59 and would that message in some way go to the lfb out of the incident ground that message would have had a separate CAD and that could have been passed electronic tell me right now how would it have been passed to the incident ground there's a mechanism but I've

02:46:10 ground there's a mechanism but I've never worked that environment so I couldn't take exactly how it happens right using that as that as an example and there are plenty of others we can see in the CAD but using that as an example and going back to your third

02:46:22 example and going back to your third witness statement a page that page nine when you refer to

02:46:30 met ceci passing electronic messages to the lfp control room are you referring to these kinds of messages that I've just shown you in the CAD okay so all

02:46:45 just shown you in the CAD okay so all the jumping around isn't it bits consisting you show me that statement yeah yes sure if you go to your third witness statement as we can have both on the screen at the same time ruff you can put keep the KitKat 482 on the screen and

02:46:58 keep the KitKat 482 on the screen and then have MIT triple zero two three to a four page nine which is your third statement also on the screen you can compare

02:47:15 so highlighting if we can where you say the police channels versus five lines down in your statement the police channels were busy with officers trying to pass messages to a fs2 lfb this could

02:47:27 to pass messages to a fs2 lfb this could be done via net CC passing electronic messages to the other P control room but my question is is rid of what messages and all the messages that are passed to

02:47:41 and all the messages that are passed to the LF p control room messages such as we see as highlighted only in the can on the left-hand side of the screen yes and my question I think I've asked it on ask it once well what is the mechanism

02:47:52 it once well what is the mechanism whereby that kind of message the to a seven twenty five gets passed to the LF p control room it's the cat system it's the cad system how does that account of

02:48:04 the cad system how does that account of the two link how does the cad system linked to the LF b system I don't know you know do you know what but when you say you posted PC Jacobs as you do in

02:48:18 say you posted PC Jacobs as you do in the next line with the LF be to act as a conduit in real-time to speed up the process and reduce ambiguity what did you ask her to do to be at the command unit and when someone says anyone

02:48:29 unit and when someone says anyone without FB if they're passing whatever MIT that information could be to speak directly to the NP and where would she get that information from from the officer that's on the radio right in the

02:48:40 officer that's on the radio right in the Met CC control room no no on the but whoever but yeah it would normally have been on from my memory people on the on the ground right now there are later messages so they want to

02:48:52 there are later messages so they want to get in broad in a time point but assuming for the moment that this kind of message 207 25 was the message that you tasked Alice Jacobs to pass on to the aleph beam where would how would she

02:49:06 the aleph beam where would how would she have got that information from the control room from the Met CC control room that had come over her radio they wouldn't necessarily have told her they would have cousin they would have contacted them through their channels so

02:49:18 contacted them through their channels so they would have been two channels on writers I think getting out yes is that the control room has a way the control room communicates but there was also as he ejected on the ground right now you say all state pc

02:49:30 ground right now you say all state pc jacobs on the ground she had a radio on who was giving her messages over that radio that you expected her to pass on into the command unit colleagues and the court ins colleagues at the courts so at

02:49:41 court ins colleagues at the courts so at the ends of the ground itself yes i see what about the met CC control room they they monetary or they don't they're not completely divorced from this process the could the cad controller is

02:49:53 the could the cad controller is listening to everything that goes on the channel with the cad controller also radio alice jacobs and give a pass on messages such as this i don't know if that happens what so as far as you can

02:50:04 that happens what so as far as you can you a concern when you toss Dennis Jacobs it was to essentially take message radio messages from colleagues at the cordon who were getting them from members of the public and then pass them into the command unit when I tasked her

02:50:17 into the command unit when I tasked her it was for that said the logistical side of things like this developed through the night this is what it became now before you tasked PC Jacobs and we have a time for that of o2 54 which is after

02:50:30 a time for that of o2 54 which is after we your own first meeting with Andy row um how would these messages getting to the LF page you know before you task time it would have been straight to the

02:50:41 time it would have been straight to the control room right but do you have to remember that police units were arriving throughout this time so in the early stages there was less volume because there were less of us right the more officers arrived the more the volume

02:50:53 officers arrived the more the volume increased I understand that are you saying your last answer but one it would have been straight through the control room again what was the mechanism whereby the police at the cordon would

02:51:04 whereby the police at the cordon would be able to speak to the lfb control room that would have been communicating with the channel operator as we've discussed tonight it would then pass it through the system I see so it was done control them to control rooms I see and you could I

02:51:17 control rooms I see and you could I think you could help us further about how that mechanism whereas you told us before you come okay and do you know of any recording system within the Met that you're aware of that would show how these messages messages

02:51:28 would show how these messages messages were passed to the lfp nope I don't know right did you toss her specifically to

02:51:40 right did you toss her specifically to sorry when you did tasks Alice Jacobs did you toss her specifically to pass on any any FSG messages she got when I first asked her it was for anything

02:51:51 first asked her it was for anything right and who was she to talk to she got a message from the cordon about a family or persons person trapped who did you talk to ask her to speak to what I when

02:52:03 talk to ask her to speak to what I when I first put her there it was this is the control just knock on the door and speak to someone in there I didn't say this is your contact his name's bill or whatever it was a matter you are here that's the

02:52:15 it was a matter you are here that's the control room what she did that information would depend upon the nature I'm guessing if it was as important as there's someone trapped in a particular flat then obviously she would speak to

02:52:26 flat then obviously she would speak to someone who's dealing in that part of their business if it's a matter of the fire brigade needs some more water it would be someone else I'm guessing right and did you intend when you first asked

02:52:38 and did you intend when you first asked her that she was going to be the sole point of contact for the MPS messages to go to the lfb or did you intend her to be supplemented I thought she was supplemented to the control system right

02:52:50 supplemented to the control system right so did you start off when you first asked her you would eventually supplement her or did you intend her to be carrying out that role on her own oh I see sorry it's difficult to follow the

02:53:04 I see sorry it's difficult to follow the line of you'll never heard the question again it wasn't very well put when he first instructed Alice Jacobs to take on the role of acting as a conduit did you intend at that stage that she would be acting alone or did you intend to that

02:53:16 acting alone or did you intend to that stage that she would be helped well at the time I that put her there and with the nature the message that I thought they were I was gonna leave it on her own by the time I realized it had become the fire Survival Guide she had already

02:53:28 the fire Survival Guide she had already been joined constable Nev yes okay and we'll come back to him shortly now I've got to show you some body worn footage if I can it's about three minutes of that it's given

02:53:40 about three minutes of that it's given number it's inq Quinn tuple zero five to five but I need to repeat the trigger warning I gave before the break in case anybody didn't hear it or forgotten

02:53:51 anybody didn't hear it or forgotten about it

02:53:53 about it it does have at the beginning images of the building on fire at a distance and doesn't last very long but I think it's right to tell people so that they can make arrangements either to leave this

02:54:04 make arrangements either to leave this room or to get away from the live stream if they're there so should we just wait a few seconds to think it up yes a short I love people to do that

02:54:18 inspector are you happy to view this no all right we'll do our best and see how we go if you need a break at any point during this footage that we can we could take a break right can we

02:54:29 can we could take a break right can we can we can we can be back what I said before I play it I just I've just tell you what I go to art I'm gonna be asking you questions about Anna's Jacobs's role and instruction and also the involvement

02:54:41 and instruction and also the involvement of Nicolaitans of the rbk sees it look out for that can we play that please

02:55:18 you will have to she will be stationed

02:55:42 there there's a please this PC get

02:56:39 there there's a please this PC get message to us if you speak to her an equal plus h3 have been clear to the deployment

02:56:56 okay this is Nick he's from the Arby's Casey 8383 he's the local authority who's managing the power centers are we gonna put yeah so if it is any messages to Nick will

02:57:08 so if it is any messages to Nick will give you a shout and vice versa so you basically anyone who anyone who says

02:57:19 basically anyone who anyone who says nobody to me anyone who has message philosophy apollyon when we go do speak yeah just come through you and now we if anyone wants the anything Bobby Casey you speak to me now first of all is what

02:57:58 you speak to me now first of all is what we've just seen your briefing of Alice Jacobs yes so we could put a time mark on that of o2 54:25 three to two fifty four fifty nine or so when you tasked as

02:58:12 four fifty nine or so when you tasked as we've seen to pass information to Nick at the rbk see first of all you had already met him had you at that point been introduced yet yeah and you knew he

02:58:23 been introduced yet yeah and you knew he was the lale the local authority liaison officer pick what did you anticipate she would do in in that respect liaison with him if he had been able to set up rescue

02:58:34 him if he had been able to set up rescue centers or respite Center I should say or if they need anything from the police in terms

02:58:39 in terms best bite sentence then he could speak to her and she could get directly in touch with me now we've heard you stationing her a command unit yes said that do you know where Nick Leighton was stationed he spent most of his time

02:58:51 stationed he spent most of his time there as well okay so they had an easy liaison you know well that's where Alice was initially put the lfb then obviously when events have taken the turn that

02:59:03 when events have taken the turn that they did in terms of the fire survival guidance she was then moved around by lfp to the other command unit as I said further down the road right but that was my next question do you know what time

02:59:14 my next question do you know what time that was at what point that was no I checked back with in there with her three or four times through the night did she did she tell you that she'd been moved by the lfb to the other command unit cu7 I can't meet up now

02:59:32 unit cu7 I can't meet up now when you were pointing to the window and asking her to communicate with the messages going that way was that you instructing her to pass messages which were coming from the officers of the cordon to the lfb anyone yeah if anyone

02:59:45 cordon to the lfb anyone yeah if anyone needed to get the message through and communicating directly okay now

02:59:55 did you communicate to other met officers that PC Jacobs was to act as the conduit between the police and the lfb I told the control room of the main

03:00:08 lfb I told the control room of the main channel that she was there and everyone was listen to that one channel right now on page 9 of your third statement if we can just go back to that we were on it a

03:00:19 can just go back to that we were on it a moment ago you you say six or seven I think it is lines up from the bottom of the page PC Jacobs was only a few weeks into the job and I was trying to keep

03:00:31 into the job and I was trying to keep her away from the front line I either more challenging Corden's I expected her to be required to receive lfb requests for police assistance and then passed and passed them all and vice

03:00:42 then passed and passed them all and vice versa in fact this became a more significant role because of the way in which the incident developed when that apparent she was came apparent she was joined by more experienced officer PC need now at the point at which you first

03:00:55 need now at the point at which you first deployed her or instructor did did you ever have expending experience of your own of assigning somebody to this role no did you think she had the sufficient

03:01:06 no did you think she had the sufficient experience to carry out the role you were initially giving her yes did you monitor or supervise her when she was carrying out the role that you'd initially given her I went back and

03:01:17 initially given her I went back and spurn made sure that she was yes I went back to to where in terms of was I able to listen to her specifically on the radio I don't remember listening out for

03:01:28 radio I don't remember listening out for her but then in the context the night that within but anyway no in your first witness

03:01:40 but anyway no in your first witness statement just just to take you back to that at page 6 you say at the very bottom of the page second line up I did

03:01:51 bottom of the page second line up I did think that this would have been a logistical role however it evolved into a critical role as she guided lfb to track residents what point did you first

03:02:03 track residents what point did you first discover that she was undertaking a critical role guiding lfb to trap residents when I found out that she'd been moved to the other command sentient

03:02:16 been moved to the other command sentient PC need was with her that's when they hit me but that's what she was doing right and how long do you think after first instructing her at 2:54 or so did

03:02:29 first instructing her at 2:54 or so did she move to the other command unit I don't know might be getting was it before your first tactical command meeting do you think I'd be guessing

03:02:40 meeting do you think I'd be guessing okay my big guess you don't you date was it light because was it was it getting light no it was still dark yesterday how did you discover that she was guiding a

03:02:52 did you discover that she was guiding a left be to trap residents as you say because I went down and spoke to his PC Neve actually and asked what was happening

03:03:03 and did you tell the lfb that she was the PC who had FSG information from the cordon I one of the command meetings I did tell the command group that there

03:03:16 did tell the command group that there was a constable stationed in that role but I didn't say what their name right before that and because the first one is a 321 so before that did you tell the LF people if there was a an offer a met

03:03:27 people if there was a an offer a met officer acting as a conduit from between the cordon and the command unit but other than speaking to them when I did it yes or no just that once when I spoke to the command unit first now and said

03:03:38 to the command unit first now and said she's here and we saw that on the clip yeah but you didn't do anything else it's all right I know Chris but I just want to know I just I just don't think could I have done anything else and short of standing there and saying she's here to talk to

03:03:49 there and saying she's here to talk to you okay

03:03:56 now I don't know whether you could see this but it may need to get back to it in the clip we've seen that when you try

03:04:07 in the clip we've seen that when you try to pass on information relating to flat 83 you're told by the lfb officer in that command unit that the other command unit is the one dealing with FSG do you

03:04:18 unit is the one dealing with FSG do you remember that from the clip or do I need to show you that again mmm him speaking but that's what he said that's what he said right at that stage did it what did you hear him say or did

03:04:31 did it what did you hear him say or did you understand him to say that in fact there was another command unit dealing with fire survival guidance I can't honestly say I would have understood

03:04:42 honestly say I would have understood what the acronym FSG was stood for right well perhaps we should just look at that clip if we can start that clip at o2 54

03:04:53 clip if we can start that clip at o2 54 exactly and stop it at over 250 1854 and 15 seconds just look at 15 seconds of him see if we can get that he'll be early on so if we start at o2 54 exactly

03:05:28 can we play that

03:06:18 right did you pick up from that the officer the window was saying there was another FSG unit the this head here the chap in the window inside the command

03:06:30 chap in the window inside the command unit yeah you heard that now whether I heard on the night but that's Mike right were you aware on the night that the officer inside the commander was act was pointing out that there was another FSG there was another command unit handling

03:06:42 there was another command unit handling FSG caught I don't remember that okay

03:06:52 why did you station PC Jacobs at this command unit because that was the main command place that the the incident command was at okay

03:07:04 command was at okay did you become aware you want to let me put it this way did did PC Jacobs tell you that in fact there was another command unit carrying out a discrete role in relation

03:07:16 carrying out a discrete role in relation to fast survival guidance calls at that point after this not at the only time I realized that's what was happening when

03:07:27 realized that's what was happening when I went down and spoke to him PC Nev who was with her at the time okay there was no separate briefing that said this is the command unit for us fire survival but did you ask a PC nev to

03:07:39 survival but did you ask a PC nev to assist pc jacobs or did no he had taken upon himself right now do you know what time he joined pc jacobs we've got that

03:07:56 time he joined pc jacobs we've got that from we have from her body warm footage that it was about 3:30 or so would that accord with your recollection I I don't

03:08:07 accord with your recollection I I don't know okay my recollection is I don't know you don't know I'm not used you my friend

03:08:13 friend mr. chairman that's a convenient moment it'll zoom yes well we'll have a great nervous and lunch inspector and please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room and we'll

03:08:26 while you're out of the room and we'll resume at five past two geez all right you'd like to give the officer

03:08:44 just for my guidance mr. millet are you getting on and I will be I think another hour or so with this witness but the

03:08:56 hour or so with this witness but the following witness Commander Jerome will be will be shorter but it'll be it'll be a well-filled afternoon I don't think anyone expected anything else thank you

03:09:07 anyone expected anything else thank you very much indeed five past ten please

03:19:20 you

03:22:56 you

03:24:44 you

03:28:35 you