Metropolitan Police Service evidence on their operational response to Grenfell Tower fire, including communication breakdowns, stay put advice, evacuation coordination, and police officers' role in assisting firefighters. Inspector testified about not hearing critical radio messages.
00:10:09 it's a freight inspector ready to carry on sir inspector thank you for coming back to us I just want to revisit one topic we covered just before the break if I can
00:10:20 covered just before the break if I can and that was the assignment of PC need to assist PC Jacobs PC Nev has given us a statement and he says he joined about three joined Alex Jacobs about 3:30 and
00:10:33 three joined Alex Jacobs about 3:30 and I think he said to us before that when when you found out that he had joined her it was his idea to do so is that right I didn't assign him he was assigned I suspected he did it himself
00:10:45 assigned I suspected he did it himself right okay did you ever find out whether he had actually been assigned by something but then I didn't ask you that I just accepted it fair enough it hon it is a hindsight question do you think
00:10:58 is a hindsight question do you think looking back on it that this cover to deal with FSG was too little too late as I wasn't there when the information was being passed is a very difficult
00:11:09 being passed is a very difficult question to answer if Alice felt she needed the help and obviously need felt he should help then maybe it should have been put in earlier but without having been there and understanding how
00:11:21 been there and understanding how difficult or taxing the actual mechanism of delivering information was it's difficult to say now you have told us and we can see actually from the
00:11:32 and we can see actually from the body-worn footage that one of your primary priorities was establishing a reliable and safe police Courtney yes at any time in in the night this is a general question during your
00:11:43 general question during your establishment and oversight of those police cordons did you see any did you see the police cordons preventing family members and friends passing a fire
00:11:54 members and friends passing a fire survival guidance messages or messages about trapped individuals within the tower to the command unit
00:12:04 sorry can you rephrase that yes did you ever let me put it a different way did you ever see or get the sense that the police cordon was operating in such a way that individual family and friends
00:12:15 a way that individual family and friends of people trapped in the tower was was stopping messages coming through the court into the command unit were preventing messages yes I didn't see anything being prevented the closest
00:12:26 anything being prevented the closest that game was when two gentlemen had got through the cordon and we're about to come in to the command unit and I turned them around and sent them back to the cordon but in terms of it one else but actually preventing no right and when
00:12:38 actually preventing no right and when they did turn up at the command unit do you recall taking information about trapped residents from them and passing it to those in the command unit no I didn't I didn't tell them I've done it I didn't make many promises I turned them
00:12:50 didn't make many promises I turned them around and sent them back to the cordons where that could be done right now
00:13:05 we saw in the footage before the break item chapped lips six some
00:13:16 item chapped lips six some communications about flat eighty-three remember you remember seeing the clip and all to play to you again do you remember any update about flat
00:13:27 remember any update about flat eighty-three over the radio a general communication over the radio to the to the effect that flat eighty-three had been checked at any time but after that
00:13:38 been checked at any time but after that did I saw yes I come you can't remember
00:13:44 and if there had been an update from the lfb about checking a particular flat how would that your expectation have been communicated but if the if the Met were
00:13:58 communicated but if the if the Met were revolved in that communication how the update have come through so are you asking how the fire brigade would tell us that a TDS had been checked when it
00:14:09 us that a TDS had been checked when it would have gone through it would either be in the control room through the formal channels or straight to Alice on the at the command unit right now can I
00:14:20 the at the command unit right now can I turn to the topic of stay put and the revocation of the stay-put advice we use the expression stay put advice as a shorthand which may not be entirely accurate inspector but but when I say
00:14:32 accurate inspector but but when I say state a state would advise what I mean is the advice generally given by NFB operators to callers saying stay in your flat you will be rescued when you took
00:14:45 flat you will be rescued when you took silver command did you discover what advice @fv were giving to people who were ringing in on 999 calls I knew quite early on that that was the advice I can't remember a specific time upon my arrival
00:14:57 remember a specific time upon my arrival that I was told that is the advice but I didn't know very early on do you remember how you knew now as I said yeah I knew I knew but I can't say that a
00:15:09 I knew I knew but I can't say that a particular person said to me this is the advice did so far as you could see you're here all know did your officers know that that that was the advice yes because the main way of
00:15:21 advice yes because the main way of understanding that they knew was that they were asking me is this the advice and do you recall specific instances of
00:15:32 and do you recall specific instances of being asked by officers what is the advice I know that it happened I can't tell you at this particular time in this particular location right and when you
00:15:44 particular location right and when you were asked that question by officers in and I know it's difficult to remember specifics was it because they had residents on the other end of the phone or they were had a family member or friend next to them both those scenarios
00:15:56 friend next to them both those scenarios any number of scenarios the volume of calls the amount of information coming from the cordon lines was consider overwhelming but there there was a lot
00:16:07 overwhelming but there there was a lot right out of desperate people
00:16:13 and have you had any communication with the lfb itself about that advice or when you not remember what in terms who told me yes who and when no I said who had
00:16:25 me yes who and when no I said who had told me and when the tell me don't think the only tell me where he went into the detail was that the command meeting with mr. Roman he explained why they were that was the advice now in your third witness statement if we could please go
00:16:37 witness statement if we could please go to that of page ten you describe the change of state but advice under the heading on that page and you cover it to
00:16:50 heading on that page and you cover it to the rest of the page and over the top of the page one to page you never and you say that having viewed your bwv recording or body-worn video recording
00:17:01 recording or body-worn video recording reactions on the night and I've read my initial statement provided soon after the events I am now aware you say with a message about the change in stupid advice have been received from the lfb by a met CCO 308 hours before it was
00:17:17 by a met CCO 308 hours before it was transmitted out across the radio by met CC to all police officers at 310 a 310 hours I do not now have a positive recollection of hearing the Met CC
00:17:29 recollection of hearing the Met CC message I just want to ask you a little bit about that first of all can I ask you please to go to CAD 482 so net triple zero to three to nine four and go
00:17:41 triple zero to three to nine four and go please to page 20
00:17:50 and we can see on that page just below halfway down at the time mark of a 308 27 lfb dot dot dot dot our instructions to people that are still inside the
00:18:01 to people that are still inside the flats are to escape by any means necessary do you see that yep um just help me it says at the start lfb who is
00:18:15 help me it says at the start lfb who is communicating that message to met CC that's the fire brigade as to who he came from I couldn't tell you right Oh can you tell me any more about the means
00:18:26 can you tell me any more about the means by which they're left be communicated that who met CC sorry I can't right now that message is you can see recorded there by the met CC operator did that go out by radio to all officers at the
00:18:38 out by radio to all officers at the scene it did go a short time later I think it was if you look at my statement I give the time you do and I I just want to know what the difference is between these two if I can ask you please to
00:18:49 these two if I can ask you please to turn the page to page 21 you can see that the message is repeated in similar terms not identical 310 56 just about a
00:19:01 terms not identical 310 56 just about a quarter of the way down the page do you see 310 56 it says LFB anyone who is in the flats to get out and escape by any
00:19:12 the flats to get out and escape by any means
00:19:12 means do not stay inside flats now is that is that the same kind of message transmitted by an FB to the Met CC or as that is that recording the transmission
00:19:23 that is that recording the transmission of the earlier message out to officers
00:19:28 as far as I can see this is again information coming from the NFB going to the control room right whether he went I don't think toast at their times about
00:19:40 don't think toast at their times about that time the operator did put out over the air the airwaves that that that the advice have changed and people would self evacuate right now you said in your statement that you don't have a positive
00:19:52 statement that you don't have a positive recollection of hearing the met at the Met CC message let's see if we can pick it up in your in your bwv your body want video and this is six at inq five zeros five one seven
00:20:08 six at inq five zeros five one seven with an adjusted time of three ten ten and it runs from 3 10 10 to 3 10 27 if we can just have that there are two clips within this topic just played that
00:20:21 clips within this topic just played that one please to start with right now I
00:20:43 one please to start with right now I think we can both see what's going on on that in that clip we can hear you and can see what you're doing we can also hear the radio message coming in and
00:20:54 hear the radio message coming in and halfway through it you are dealing with what's happening in front of you on the ground going back to the radio message and reviewing the clip is that the radio
00:21:05 and reviewing the clip is that the radio message yes rod casting to all officers that the change in advice yes right now you didn't hear it at the time clearly because he said in your statement and we can see why well they didn't say I
00:21:16 can see why well they didn't say I didn't hear it I have no positive recollection but you're quite right silence
00:21:20 silence you're quite right I had the right next I couldn't have done any more to hear it I know it's a bit of bad answer but it's the best I can give him afraid you'll feel quite right virginity in terms of the nature of the broadcast we can see
00:21:32 the nature of the broadcast we can see you we can hear it being broadcast over your handheld radio was that message broadcast to all officers at the incident ground yes that moment yes and who was broadcasting it that was the
00:21:43 and who was broadcasting it that was the controller right now there's also a clip clip 7 which is inq 5 to 3 which runs
00:21:56 clip 7 which is inq 5 to 3 which runs through an adjusted time of oh three 14 25 203 14 32 very short clip we must have that again safety comes first
00:22:11 have that again safety comes first safety first I'm so we're gonna play that again because it's it's quite hard to hear what's going on on the red here but if we can listen out for what's being broadcast over your radio we may
00:22:22 being broadcast over your radio we may be able to pick that up if we can just have that again please
00:22:26 safety comes first not as clear can you help us with what's being said over the
00:22:37 help us with what's being said over the radio no no and they're more than weekend okay and again assuming that one can hear it clearly and then that was a direct message about persons who were trapped
00:22:49 message about persons who were trapped in the building again would that have been heard by all the officers of the answer to that right do you know when
00:23:00 answer to that right do you know when it's and then we can go back to the card do you know whether the message came from the LF B's control room originally or from someone on the incident ground I don't you don't know
00:23:18 given that you were at the scene is the information that anyone who was in the flat should be told to get out and escape by any means and do not stay in the flats is that advice something you
00:23:30 the flats is that advice something you would have expected to have been told directly by lfb at the incident round rather than hearing it by radio from your own control room I would rather he
00:23:41 your own control room I would rather he got out the people that could make a difference before that some sort of deference to rank so I wouldn't expect anyone not to pass that advice just because they wanted to talk to the silver commander most important thing is
00:23:52 silver commander most important thing is getting that message out yes I see say it more important to get the message spread across all officers rather than just talking to you yes because all I
00:24:03 just talking to you yes because all I would do is tell them to do what they did yeah now you then go on to say we can get back to page 10 of your third witness statement you you say
00:24:25 that at 3:20 this is this is a just below halfway down the first paragraph on page 10 you say I do not remember a feeling of surprise when a 320 hours TCM
00:24:38 feeling of surprise when a 320 hours TCM the lfb lead explained the reasons behind the decision you see it perhaps we should just highlight it there about two-thirds of the way through that block of text as far as you recall inspector
00:24:50 of text as far as you recall inspector was that the first time that you remember being told directly about the change in statement advice that's the first good memory I have of it at that
00:25:03 first good memory I have of it at that moment when you heard that and have a good memory as you say all that do you remember whether you considered sending that message out to all of your police officers so that they knew the
00:25:14 police officers so that they knew the most up-to-date advice from the lfb no it didn't cross mine to do that but having seen the body-worn video and having it right next to my ear then that
00:25:25 having it right next to my ear then that work had already taken place mmm had I thought that this was critical information had not been passed and that would have been the first thing to have done well let me put it let me try this when you do get the information at 3:20
00:25:37 when you do get the information at 3:20 during the TCM that the advice is it is to evacuate it was do you remember thinking that's the first time I've heard that and then you don't remember
00:25:49 heard that and then you don't remember thinking that no okay that if they fight that because here means it's a significant moment and that's where the surprise you know or some sort of there would have been an impact yes but there
00:26:01 would have been an impact yes but there was no impact say you're going on your the fact that you didn't feel surprised about hearing that news led you to think of that station you'd already discovered it right I see
00:26:15 and then
00:26:23 if we can just see that see ad summary this is a new document I haven't shown you this is M et triple 0 2 3 2 9 3
00:26:35 which is a different document I should just I think perhaps get you to explain what it is first of all and we've called it a CID or CAD summary could you just
00:26:47 it a CID or CAD summary could you just explain what this is looks like it's information taken from the cab that's been lifted directly onto a word document and cobbled together right okay
00:26:58 document and cobbled together right okay and he's got some things on here which are not in CAD 482 but could I ask you to look at pages 16 and 17
00:27:13 go to the bottom of page 16 first of all
00:27:22 and you can see it says there 326 four five 2ww female 11th floor flat 82 she's in the Far bedroom and then at 3:27 Oh
00:27:35 in the Far bedroom and then at 3:27 Oh two BS flat 193 attractive family CAD 951 advise to escape by all means in general terms of the are these the kinds
00:27:48 general terms of the are these the kinds of advice that you would buy this time expect to have been passed was this the kind of advice that by this time you would expect to have being passed well
00:27:59 would expect to have being passed well that's what I could hear being passed right but as he's just seen the body 1 he was an incredibly busy night that was being pulled from pillar to post so you couldn't it's not like you're standing there just listening to your radio
00:28:10 there just listening to your radio constantly was constantly briefing people arriving being told of a new problem making the decision and all of that unfortunately means you can't listen to absolutely everything sure before you went into the TCM at 3:20 did
00:28:23 before you went into the TCM at 3:20 did you get do you have any recollection of getting any message or any impression of any message that advice was being given by NFP all met control room rooms to
00:28:36 by NFP all met control room rooms to stay put and the thing that raised concern now going back to your statement
00:28:47 concern now going back to your statement if you could please at page 10 where we were before you say in the second paragraph on that page under the under
00:28:58 paragraph on that page under the under the heading the changes stay good advice but ECM finished at a 33 hours and immediately on stepping from the command unit I was called upon to deal with decisions around the evacuation of buildings providing long shields to
00:29:10 buildings providing long shields to support lfb and the public providing respite centers now just pausing there well let me continue actually I thought you say
00:29:22 you say you just pausing there do you remember at that stage making any communication with any of your officers about the stay-put advice my next involvement with
00:29:35 stay-put advice my next involvement with the stay-put advice was some a short time after then as well as well when I did hear some message being passed and the content of the messages wasn't what
00:29:47 the content of the messages wasn't what I was expecting it didn't sound as if people are really taken on board the information right well let's just take this slowly just looking a little bit further down the
00:29:58 looking a little bit further down the paragraph you say at about 53 about a 353 hours I got the impression that not all the officers have heard or understood the message about the change in stay-put advice I got that impression
00:30:09 in stay-put advice I got that impression from hearing a rapid series of radio transmissions detailing the location of trapped residents which may be believed that the old Three Tenors communication was not necessarily being acted on now
00:30:27 that would have been after the TCM had finished yes is that right right perhaps we should just look at another clip of
00:30:38 we should just look at another clip of the body wheels warm footage and this one is inq five zeroes 5 to 7 its clip 9 and this has an adjusted time of oh 3
00:30:49 and this has an adjusted time of oh 3 5305 to a 350 620 and i should just give a trigger warning before it comes up and this does again this is shows this shows
00:31:00 this does again this is shows this shows images of the tower on fire so again I want just to make sure that people have a fair opportunity to either leave this reward or remove themselves from the livestream
00:32:09 MP browser one just walk down the silver meeting with directions for officers that are getting these information from
00:32:21 that are getting these information from the building yeah you know it's been
00:33:07 the building yeah you know it's been major three miles right we got the world and I don't know what work the hair offices can do
00:33:23 in here that goes on the third floor and it's just yeah that's better yes from
00:34:39 it's just yeah that's better yes from the defense we turn the lights down take a few minutes okay now just a few
00:34:55 a few minutes okay now just a few questions that come out of that clip first of all the person broadcasting that message is that gun command wallet a superintendent warning that we get
00:35:06 a superintendent warning that we get here it is now we can hear him say that it's a significant decision what did that mean to you it was a sleeping mode in the night it is what is it certainly
00:35:20 in the night it is what is it certainly significant in was in respect in what respect that a lot of people weren't gonna get out right was that the first time that you realized that but when he
00:35:32 time that you realized that but when he made that message no it was that message a direct order to all officers yes it's important that he made that call based
00:35:43 important that he made that call based on a feeling I had I've nothing to to say that message early messages hadn't gone through he was just a feeling I had and quite often when you are at a
00:35:56 and quite often when you are at a significant things incidents it's the voice you understand you know when you trust coming over the radio that actually gets through to you so it's not so much they need to know the message in
00:36:07 so much they need to know the message in generate it needs to come from the commanders on the scene least a couple Weber's leading because that has more impact you know you had a you came from
00:36:21 impact you know you had a you came from a feeling you had was that feeling prompted by hearing any specific advice to stay put which continued after your TCM or I don't know again he wasn't a
00:36:33 TCM or I don't know again he wasn't a device to stay put it was just constables I think there were three and they passed it message there was the reference to that person on the eighth floor
00:36:42 floor I think just before then there were people trapped on a stairwell a family and there was another flat Annie I don't know he did and it's only after years
00:36:54 know he did and it's only after years and years have been on the street listened to the radio you you think that they should it should have been there in the stairwell advice has been passed or they're if they're trying to get up the fact that coming down something more than just this is where they are because
00:37:06 than just this is where they are because that this is where they are wasn't enough was this sorry so I told him no please go was this was this feeling you had which led to that message being broadcast
00:37:18 to that message being broadcast something which originated in your doubt that you had heard the first broadcast back at 3 no it was just this message 3 always gesture just it must have been
00:37:29 always gesture just it must have been quite quiet but I was able to listen to the radio more closely you get this message and just didn't feel right right now can I ask you to look at em et
00:37:40 now can I ask you to look at em et triple 0 D 2 3 2 9 3 the CAD summary not careful way to the CAD summary M et
00:37:51 careful way to the CAD summary M et triple 0 2 3 2 9 3 at page 21
00:38:02 and we could see 2/3 of the way down that page that it says that oh 3 58 0 3 gold from the Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade the advice from the LFP is
00:38:14 Fire Brigade the advice from the LFP is to try and self evacuate there is no guarantee that the lfb will be able to go on go in and evacuate people due to the safety of the building and post collapse is that the message which
00:38:29 collapse is that the message which superintendent warned it caused to be broadcast just after your discussion we can see in the clip at about a 356 yes yeah he did it very well um when that went out and I was standing
00:38:43 um when that went out and I was standing where I was standing as you can see you can see that the building and what you can't see through my body one is sits here because my chest sticks out the
00:38:54 here because my chest sticks out the lens is angled up so you can't see what's a ground level and ground lit with that green area was just full of broken firefighters you couldn't see the Elias working on people in the corners
00:39:05 Elias working on people in the corners you can see the bodies but when that came out we'd lost
00:39:25 and do they have a visible effect on the coolies yeah well everyone sauce a bit more slumped people looked good you knew
00:39:38 more slumped people looked good you knew what it was he was a death sentence you just knew they were you could see them sorry you can still see them no thank
00:39:54 sorry you can still see them no thank you did you in that moment get any sense that officers on the incident ground had
00:40:09 that officers on the incident ground had not been fully or formally advised that the advice had changed and that I'll keep him so I we're just thinking about something completely different you have to start again that's quite all right
00:40:20 to start again that's quite all right you want to take it just take a look no it's okay I'd like to have a break I
00:40:27 mean just try the question a different way - but at that time did you when this message went out did you from what you could see perhaps what we can't see did you get any sense that your officers
00:40:41 did you get any sense that your officers who were there had not been fully or formally advised that the advice was to evacuate no of course it was more a case
00:40:52 evacuate no of course it was more a case of it was
00:40:57 of it was rammed home quite rude to me but it was required in this message here in this
00:41:09 required in this message here in this CAD summary we can see that it looks as if this message had come from gold that superintendent warned it yes but it took it originated from the commissioner of
00:41:20 it originated from the commissioner of the London Fire Brigade Danny Qasim do you know how do you know anything about that only that when I got the impression that we needed to reinforce the message and I said to mr. walnut
00:41:32 and I said to mr. walnut should we tell them that's ensure we tell them he wanted to go and speak to the FB just to make sure one games such a significant moment as you saw him in a
00:41:43 a significant moment as you saw him in a few seconds in fact you heared on the radio before I saw him again yeah now I want to show you a document and
00:41:55 now I want to show you a document and ask you one or two questions and all the same kind of lines but looking at this document particularly it's n et triple zero two three five seven six and this
00:42:09 zero two three five seven six and this is I should just tell you what it is it's the note of the debrief of the initial police response with ER PT a
00:42:20 initial police response with ER PT a could you just explain to us what er PTA is ERP T stands for emergency response policing team right so those are the initial people that turned up for a
00:42:32 initial people that turned up for a night duty at ten o'clock okay the following line the previous not now this meeting took place to think that conceived foot of the page but they are they at the so we can't see it with
00:42:44 are they at the so we can't see it with the document well we could sit in the third look that part of it says overview this document comprises the debriefing of ERP ta on Saturday the 17th of June
00:42:55 of ERP ta on Saturday the 17th of June 2017 in Kensington police station parade room do you remember this meeting yes okay and we can see who the attendees were at the top of the
00:43:06 were at the top of the Paige at the and the topics that are covered in it that's the overview they can see that and you full lines down in that paragraph say that you led the debrief highlighting Corden's road closures
00:43:17 highlighting Corden's road closures building evacuations premises emergency services an individual officer feedback on their roles this document sets out all mentioned above and then you go through it and the building evacuations
00:43:29 through it and the building evacuations we can see that that covers not the tower itself but test us and walk Barrentine walking shred build house now I want to ask you two something about page to return to that please under the
00:43:42 page to return to that please under the heading emergency services the first bullet point there if we can highlight that is lfb provided advice for
00:43:54 that is lfb provided advice for residents to remain in their flats and then at 300 hours LF be advised that they would not be able to extinguish the fire at approximately oh three thirty
00:44:05 fire at approximately oh three thirty hours LF be advised that they could no longer into the building and the advice to trapped individuals was to try to self evacuate
00:44:18 first of all that time of three o'clock a.m. hell f be advised they wouldn't be able to extinguish the fire who drove who said that at this meeting no and that you can't put much credence
00:44:30 no and that you can't put much credence on these timings this was room of both amazed attendant for work quite frankly the or did turn up for work and we were initially told we had an hour to do our
00:44:41 initially told we had an hour to do our statements and then go back to work but that wasn't appropriate so we all got together and we just talked through the
00:44:53 together and we just talked through the night to these timings are just conversation there was no reference to the CAD there was no looking at body-worn it was an exercise and helping everyone peace the night together because after they have to end home in
00:45:08 because after they have to end home in the morning we were into our rest days so we had the next three days off so there was no getting together and this was the first chance we could sit down
00:45:19 was the first chance we could sit down and talk about what had happened because we left the tower piecemeal and every time you've turned on the television listened to a radio got on a train it
00:45:30 listened to a radio got on a train it was just this all the time so everyone had their demons and this was an attempt to try and put those demons to rest by understanding where their actions
00:45:43 understanding where their actions through the night fitted into the puzzle so yeah it is don't don't pin your hopes on that over 300 hours no 3:30 no I
00:45:56 on that over 300 hours no 3:30 no I understand but let's just see how far we can get with it is it fair to say that this 3:30 timing would actually coincide with your evidence in your third witness statement that you and superintendent
00:46:09 statement that you and superintendent Warren it registered the advice had been changed at the tactical coordination meeting at 3:20 or just after that but it would have been that's the not so
00:46:20 it would have been that's the not so much registered but that would be formal time we're in the department society as part of the command meeting that information was was passed didn't
00:46:31 that information was was passed didn't do you anybody at this meeting say do you remember well actually we heard the radio messages at 308 and 310 which a record which we can see recorded in CAD for a -
00:46:42 which we can see recorded in CAD for a - wasn't answer and we breathe we knew we knew the advice had been changed earlier it was nowhere near that and it wasn't we were talking about carrying bodies we were talking about seeing people jumping
00:46:54 were talking about seeing people jumping from the building we were talking about putting people in a morgue we were talking about stopping loved ones going to try and save their dears we weren't talking about 308 I had a message do you
00:47:06 talking about 308 I had a message do you know why this record of this debrief doesn't record the decision by superintendent walnut to tell all pcs at a 356 that the advice had changed and
00:47:18 a 356 that the advice had changed and that occupants should now do their best to evacuate because he wasn't designed to capture that information it was designed to record the fact that we did all get together and we tried to muddle through
00:47:29 through he referred earlier on to the evidence which we saw where he superintendent Warner says that this was a significant decision you've described very graphically for us why that was I just
00:47:41 graphically for us why that was I just want to get a feel for why that this document doesn't record that given its significance because as I said it was a just a general overview I mean it's just basically recording the fact that the
00:47:52 basically recording the fact that the decision the advice changed it's not meant to be in that detail here whose immense of you know 18 people trying to
00:48:03 immense of you know 18 people trying to put their lives back together which sounds often in the context as people had far worse than us bear with me for a few more questions on this and
00:48:15 me for a few more questions on this and are you aware of any of the police officers present at this meeting telling you or indicating to you that they heard the stay-put advice change before 3:30
00:48:26 the stay-put advice change before 3:30 no and I didn't ask them and what about after 3:30 no it wasn't part of this we really weren't in hinging upon that right so do
00:48:38 weren't in hinging upon that right so do we take you from that the best of your recollection none of the attendees of this meeting said that the first time they heard that the advice had been changed was after the message of at 3:58 which we've seen as I say we didn't go into that much
00:48:50 as I say we didn't go into that much detail he was a case of mark what did you do well I did this this this thank you very much next year what did you do and then someone would pop up and say well that ties him or what I did and they were able to piece
00:49:02 what I did and they were able to piece it together it's part of this process am what I don't mention a name but one of the constables said that he had helped her mother and child out of the tower
00:49:14 her mother and child out of the tower and he had the child's name and they they went off hospital alive and he was a distinctive name and then soon at the back of the room was able to point out that week he had spoken to the father
00:49:29 that week he had spoken to the father and the father who had been in there as well he thought that his his children were were dead and his wife was was dead
00:49:40 were were dead and his wife was was dead was able to be they did manage to marry it up through the sea and say no you're they're alive they're impossible I don't know which hospital were there in hospital that the PC the front didn't know that the piece in the back had been
00:49:51 know that the piece in the back had been able to do that and that's the value of this meeting not at 308 a particular message was sent
00:50:02 I understand that can I can ask you to look at page five we've got the
00:50:14 look at page five we've got the individual contribution to the meeting as with all those pcs who attended who gave their contributions we've got the contribution of PC rig one nine two Bs
00:50:25 contribution of PC rig one nine two Bs and you can see them just below the middle of the page that he or she is PC ring of male or female now he says that he assisted with Corden's and family
00:50:37 he assisted with Corden's and family members trapped inside over the phone did he say anything do you remember about what advice he was giving to family members trapped inside no or what
00:50:48 family members trapped inside no or what time he was having these calls no it wouldn't have been right to dig at that point okay can I get a move to a
00:51:00 point okay can I get a move to a different topic clans clans owner of the building it's a natural flow isn't it that sorry well it's the hope slightly
00:51:11 that sorry well it's the hope slightly less troubling for you do you remember when you first heard a request for building plans for this building it was in one of the early command meetings
00:51:22 in one of the early command meetings from mr. roat to the local authority
00:51:27 right let's just take this in stages can I ask you to go first to paragraph 11 of your third witness statement
00:51:38 and then go to the very foot of the page that you say there so this is a meaty triple zero page 11a meaty triple zero
00:51:50 triple zero page 11a meaty triple zero to three to eight four at page 11
00:52:00 liaison with other agencies foot of the page you say I was aware from the TC ends that the lfb had been trying to get plans of the tower from the council and that they needed to update sorry they
00:52:11 that they needed to update sorry they needed up-to-date information about who the residents of the tower were and how many residents there were I believe that they liaison with Nick Layton about this now first of all why did you believe
00:52:24 now first of all why did you believe that they were liaison with Nick Layton because he was in the meeting right and I'm going to show you a little bit of the body-worn footage of the tactical coordination meeting that took place at 7:13 a.m. and that shows a discussion
00:52:38 7:13 a.m. and that shows a discussion about plans it's his inq five one eight this is all within the command unit and I don't think there's a need for a trigger warning mr. chairman for this this is i NQ triple up quintuple zero
00:52:50 this is i NQ triple up quintuple zero five one eight and the adjusted time is oh seven twenty nine forty five and it runs 207 thirty fifty it's clip ten let's just look at it you know it's on
00:53:16 let's just look at it you know it's on the way
00:53:18 Haskell analyzed by Rena and
00:54:10 now first of all does this assist you in your recollection as to when you heard the lfb requesting plans yes and adults before that point right now as to that
00:54:21 before that point right now as to that first of all went how long do you think before this meeting did you understand that the lfp was after plans right from the word go I think right and did you
00:54:33 the word go I think right and did you did you monitor or keep up to keep up to speed with what was happening with the process of getting plans not compared to what I was dealing with on the outside did you know who the individual was with
00:54:45 did you know who the individual was with in that meeting speaking for our bkc or indeed the TMO at that stage I thought it was Nick Leighton but you've asked me that question so I'm guessing it wasn't right okay
00:55:00 have you have you heard of a gentleman called my crumble I have now rabbit okay does that trigger a recollection as to who it was who was speaking in that meeting
00:55:09 meeting no right were you ever aware well have you ever heard of something called a premises information box no okay can I
00:55:24 premises information box no okay can I just ask you a question or two about a dangerous structure engineer did you have any dealings on the night with a dangerous structure engineer no but I am aware information was advice was given
00:55:37 aware information was advice was given to the NFB that the building was in the core down I can't begin sorry
00:55:51 I don't know how that building is still standing to this day it should have come down we should have all been dead I have absolutely no idea how it didn't you've
00:56:02 absolutely no idea how it didn't you've seen the body woman there's an awful lot more than what you've seen and it doesn't give doesn't do justice to what he was like there there the sounds were like a cliff coming down
00:56:13 the sounds were like a cliff coming down I grew up on the coast and it was exactly like a cliff face coming down when the debris fell and the little pops you know the camera they were explosions how that building is still there I have
00:56:25 how that building is still there I have no idea so I was really very relieved when mr. Rose said that the structural engineers say it's not going to come down but I would have been morally until that structural engineer been standing
00:56:36 that structural engineer been standing next to me yes do you know how it was due to Dan's name did you have any dealings with the borough surveyor on the night no now if
00:56:49 borough surveyor on the night no now if you go to CAD 482 please same topic just stay with it just for one or two more questions and 482 at page 27
00:57:07 we have an entry at 449
00:57:14 I'm so sorry I put you in the wrong document it's the CAD summary my mistake m ET triple 0 2 3 2 9 3 page 27
00:57:32 and at the top of that page m ET triple 0 to 3 293 page 27
00:57:53 we can see that you get a message or there is a message broadcast by 260 BS lfb saying dangerous construction
00:58:04 lfb saying dangerous construction engineer is that a quarter them not sure which one this is Oh for I'm sorry Oh for 4935 top of the page what is or who is 260 BS that would
00:58:17 page what is or who is 260 BS that would have been a constable on the corners I see you don't know who ought to top my head but and LFP saying dangerous construction engineer is that cordon and
00:58:28 construction engineer is that cordon and not sure which one did you hit you remember hearing that message no but that would probably have been that some the RFP would have called the engineer who would have attended the court ins
00:58:39 who would have attended the court ins and then he's phone they're busy I'm here
00:58:42 here I see so not sure which one is a reference to the cordon is it yeah rather than the engineer yeah now going back to the start of your
00:58:55 now going back to the start of your involvement I want to ask you about your communications with RB Casey and you said I think early on in your evidence that you used your personal radio to ask or to talk to our B Casey but I didn't
00:59:07 or to talk to our B Casey but I didn't talk to him but I asked one of my colleagues to talk to them right can I then take you back to CAD at 482 so not the cap summary but CAD 482 and turn
00:59:19 the cap summary but CAD 482 and turn please to page six and you can see there
00:59:30 please to page six and you can see there that 129 39 is the time mark at that time you ever seen this before you you ask what you say send a message to be s 2 n 2 contact the local authority as
00:59:42 2 n 2 contact the local authority as they will need to rehouse residents from this building
00:59:51 did you follow that message all that idea up after this time only through the meetings and seeing the lay low who was
01:00:02 meetings and seeing the lay low who was mostly stationed outside the command unit right and as and when there was requests for where are we putting people on the radio then I would speak to the
01:00:13 on the radio then I would speak to the later where possible and then we see we can look at this this morning at page 11 of the of cat for a to just but just
01:00:26 of the of cat for a to just but just above the bottom of the page to 1002 we can see it that says TW AP KFC council
01:00:37 can see it that says TW AP KFC council informed they'll be contacting their duty officer who will liaised BSC direct that council have set up a dedicated op named Aaron for any further poll contact first of all was this before or was this
01:00:49 first of all was this before or was this after you'd made initial contact with Nick Layton I couldn't tell you did you ever have contact with someone called Aaron no right do you know whether your officers did I don't know right now on
01:01:06 officers did I don't know right now on page 8 of your statement your third statement
01:01:17 you say you deal will you deal with the topic of use of the leisure center as a mortuary and you say this pen never
01:01:29 mortuary and you say this pen never started that paragraph it was clear that there was going to be a large loss of life and the bodies would be recovered from the tower superintendent Warnock wanted forensic tends to be used to cover the dead in the first instance I believe we had five
01:01:40 the first instance I believe we had five of these at the scene and this would not be enough
01:01:43 be enough other than the lfb command unit we did not have a command of police or ambulance service at the scene I had requested that the RB Casey open up a building for us but that had not happened now first of all when was the
01:01:57 happened now first of all when was the first request that you made of our bkc to open up the building at a building so that you could use it as a met as a mortuary do you remember specifically as
01:02:08 mortuary do you remember specifically as a mortuary yes I can't if I said specifically as a motor I can remember saying that we need that building pointing to the
01:02:20 we need that building pointing to the the Kenda the Sports Center right let's take it in stages would you remember when you said that I can't give you a
01:02:31 when you said that I can't give you a tarp it was still dark right okay well we can and you have a recollection of what for purpose you said I need that building because it had everything we were going to need we were obviously
01:02:42 were going to need we were obviously going to have a lot of bodies right we needed light we needed power we needed I needed to set up an effective can't say
01:02:53 needed to set up an effective can't say command but an effective like a command center before those that would come after me and it just made sense to use that big open space everything we needed in there just a sensible thing to do
01:03:06 in there just a sensible thing to do I'm going to show you one more clip which might assist and this is bwv I am q50 is 5 to 4 with a time mark of
01:03:18 q50 is 5 to 4 with a time mark of adjusted Oh to 45 55 and it runs to an adjusted time Oh to 47 50 this is clip 11 and I just want to add entry warnings
01:03:31 11 and I just want to add entry warnings needed for this because there are no pictures of fire but it is yeah it's the outside please
01:04:03 [Laughter]
01:05:01 can I give you guys it so you become a
01:05:12 can I give you guys it so you become a member already believe we got bus is coming to take people to wherever you are just passing it tomorrow so if you
01:05:23 are just passing it tomorrow so if you just wait here then so I know where you are which later in the day right that was Nick Layton we
01:05:42 the day right that was Nick Layton we will see you being introduced to okie do we take it from that but that was the first time on the night that you saw Nick Layton yes so that's at about 247
01:05:53 Nick Layton yes so that's at about 247 or so and before that we saw that you were discussing with a lfb officer breaking down the door was what was that - what was the door - to the ledge
01:06:05 - what was the door - to the ledge Center right okay that sort of conversation had happened through the night with pcs fire officers asking we need some way prior to the arrival of Nick later at the scene there do you
01:06:16 Nick later at the scene there do you know yourself what are bkc were doing to make the legislature available to you know did the are bkc assists you one stipulation was on scene after this
01:06:27 stipulation was on scene after this discussion to get into the register yes no I had a very similar conversation with constable Collins as I did with that fire officer I said to him as well he asked the same question I said to him
01:06:38 he asked the same question I said to him week I'm getting very close say and just smashed the door I turned around turned back and PC Collins and smashed the door he had gone in and he was right to do so was that after this discussion with Nick
01:06:49 was that after this discussion with Nick Layton that we've just seen so yeah do you know how long afterwards
01:06:55 corded in the cattles when I sell my bed okay now I want to cover and slightly different topic with you and I like mr.
01:07:07 different topic with you and I like mr. Chanin I've got about 10 or 15 minutes more questions and we were just under an hour
01:07:12 hour yes I could probably find is less than that actually it's about 10 minutes maximum might I be able to finish off my questions with the witness well if the witness is William do you deduce a yes
01:07:27 witness is William do you deduce a yes right the topic I want to cover is the identification of casualties and survivors now we don't want need to get back to it I will if you want me to but
01:07:38 back to it I will if you want me to but the clip from your bwv at an adjusted time of 2:39 where which we saw this morning is that is the clip where you are having a discussion with DAC
01:07:50 are having a discussion with DAC O'Laughlin now we consider if you like but he says that the first and biggest thing that the lfb needs is identifying the people and the casualties we can get
01:08:01 the people and the casualties we can get back to it but do you remember that yes okay did did you appreciate the importance of that function to the lfb search and rescue operation at that time at that time yes again it's the hard
01:08:18 at that time yes again it's the hard thing about all these questions and all these answer to your questions that way we've moved round not chronologically at any given time the situation was different I understand what you're
01:08:30 different I understand what you're saying and yes it is going to be essential but the other feels to say that they have to have a systematic it's systematic search of the entire building and look into all the flats so yeah I understand what you're saying but when
01:08:43 understand what you're saying but when mr. McLaughlin will O'Laughlin O'Laughlin when the end of three gentlemen said that it was a priority within 15 minutes we were looking at the
01:08:54 within 15 minutes we were looking at the entire building coming down so he was less of a priority than that and keeping people safe so the answer is yes but it had to be prioritized in context what we were faced do you remember whether you
01:09:05 were faced do you remember whether you said any systems up in to perform the function of identifying people who are coming out of the building no it was unless we'd been there right from the word go and started
01:09:16 there right from the word go and started taking names of people that were coming out right from the word go we'd have had an understanding of some but I was more concerned getting people out getting them to hospital and then doing that piece of work behind the front line as
01:09:30 piece of work behind the front line as it were and what was your understanding of how people coming out of the tower were being identified they were taken to the first aid posts and that would be
01:09:41 the first aid posts and that would be when with the basic parts of the triage did your officers have any involvement in identification or the process of assisting with identification I didn't specifically task anyone to that right
01:09:55 specifically task anyone to that right now we know that there's a policy
01:10:00 provision in the may in the the London resilience document we call it as a shorthand for survivor reception centers and relative ends and relatives
01:10:12 and relative ends and relatives reception centers to be set up are you familiar with that I'm a mum the idea yes yes do you know I think it's right that the responsibility of setting that up rests with the police so the so the
01:10:24 up rests with the police so the so the Good Book says so the Good Book says did you appreciate that that is what the Good Book said on the night I knew we had to run again it's a matter of prioritizing what we wanted to do and what we could actually do yes it was
01:10:36 what we could actually do yes it was that an action that you took us you actually took a silver did you do that which I introduced mr. Perkins to the the leão to make sure of that us under
01:10:48 the leão to make sure of that us under way and we had other people just members the public opening their doors other churches religious centers opening their doors so it would be wrong just to consider just the local authority
01:11:00 consider just the local authority provision of rest plight centers the entire community of Cadets doors to the people were people just going into other people's living rooms so as I say unless we were their rightful would go with a
01:11:11 we were their rightful would go with a register people coming out that was going to be a significant hour I think it's right that the debriefer document records you as having responsibility for setting up survival
01:11:23 responsibility for setting up survival reception centers and family centers we can go back to it if you like but I think that's what let's say what what did you do to do that to set those up I asked the local authority to find a premises that we could use in that in
01:11:36 premises that we could use in that in those circumstances and and they used they found what what do they find in the end there was a fire sparked reaching as well in Shepherds Bush there's the Rugby Club on clubber sorry
01:11:48 there's the Rugby Club on clubber sorry on Preston Road and there was men went up on towards the Harrow Road but they were just the the local authority was as I say the way the community rallied around each other people were going
01:12:00 around each other people were going where they were most comfortable opposed right and what office what what involvement did you yourself or your officers themselves have been setting up those those those centers in setting
01:12:11 those those those centers in setting them up not a great deal right but once we had control of the Corden's and we had a semblance of an organization then I sent officers to each one to find out
01:12:23 I sent officers to each one to find out who was there what they needed if there were problems than what they needed from us so yes it was we didn't initiate it but once we had the resources and the ability to go and
01:12:34 the resources and the ability to go and try and take any remedial action required we did so were you aware at any point during the night that rescue
01:12:45 point during the night that rescue centers or centers for families were within the cordon no you didn't think they were it's it's news to me you
01:12:59 they were it's it's news to me you didn't switch Gordon talked about and where
01:13:04 do you recruit well let me try this way do you recall either you or any of your officers preventing relatives from going inside the cordon to look for loved ones in rescue centers now that's news to me
01:13:17 in rescue centers now that's news to me news to you for example the garden grill do you remember that whether that was remember that being mentioned on the radio a lot but in relation to your question I can't help right inspector you'll be pleased
01:13:36 help right inspector you'll be pleased to hear that I've come to the end of my questions at least I think I've come to get my questions you said ten that was four I'm glad to be able to disappoint you but it may yet turn into ten I'm
01:13:48 you but it may yet turn into ten I'm going to ask the Chairman to rise for a few minutes just to see whether I've got any further questions or whether any other questions which emerge from those where and then I lost the chimp to come back would it be sensible at this stage
01:14:00 back would it be sensible at this stage to take a ten minute break normally do in the middle of the afternoon yes we'd better take our afternoon break short term writers know that yes of course
01:14:11 term writers know that yes of course thank you
01:14:12 thank you yes well it may be that mr. millets ran out of questions it may be he hasn't quite run out of questions and you'll have a short break now so that he can consider that and you can get to a
01:14:23 consider that and you can get to a breath back of it will come back as twenty past three keys then talk to anyone about your evidence and then we'll see if there any wrap-up questions there thank you all right
01:14:34 there thank you all right thank you very much like to go to the ocean please
01:14:53 25 3 please
01:25:56 yes mr. minute did you find one or two of us I have been found one has been found for me
01:26:13 yes I think that this one or two questions yes it probably yes inspector in during the course of the night did you become aware at any time that
01:26:25 you become aware at any time that friends and loved ones of those still trapped in the tower were attempting to get past the cordon just to try to rescue them all to speak to them I did
01:26:36 rescue them all to speak to them I did and let were you also aware that friends and loved ones were trying to get past the Corden's to see or assist with the identification of those being treated in
01:26:48 identification of those being treated in the rest centers or rescue centers in the West by sentence and of yeah the rescue centers I think we called them generally but no I wasn't aware of that right and just to confirm what you said
01:27:03 right and just to confirm what you said before is it right that you weren't aware that there were any scr's survivors reception centers or family
01:27:14 survivors reception centers or family centers within the quarter not within the cordon no I asked you about specifically about garden bar and grill I definitely hear the bar and grill
01:27:27 I definitely hear the bar and grill being spoken of as a center but I didn't make the connection in my mind that that was within the cordons right were there any premises within the Corden's that you know or knew of that
01:27:39 Corden's that you know or knew of that were being used to treat or hold those who had escaped the tower no I spent most of my time physically see things
01:27:50 most of my time physically see things that the judges of Bowmore own near the Sports Center the other addresses that we're coming through were just addresses and it it did nothing connected in my
01:28:01 and it it did nothing connected in my mind thing where the cordons were and then make that cognitive leap as to that address is within that Gordon because I was so busy where I was that make sense
01:28:12 was so busy where I was that make sense yes did you get it did you ever go to any of these survivor reception centers or rest centers
01:28:21 but well inspector thank you very much that those are all the questions I have for you I just want to say thank you very much to you for coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our
01:28:32 inquiry and assisting us with our investigations we very much appreciate it so thank you very much I'd like to add my thanks inspector it's very difficult for you I think some research to come and talk about what happened on
01:28:43 to come and talk about what happened on TV any question the morning in question but it's really valuable for us because we need to know what the police were doing and how that fits into the rest of the story I'm sorry it's but if it's
01:28:54 the story I'm sorry it's but if it's been a difficult exercise if I may say so I think you're given your evidence in a very impressive way and we're very grateful to you for coming to do a job so thank you very much may I go beyond
01:29:05 so thank you very much may I go beyond the realms of this inquiry and I won't get a chance to speak to the families that were in there again directly and to say I'm sorry I'm really sorry
01:29:17 say I'm sorry I'm really sorry well one seconds and finished yet the the community as well afterwards from from dawn onwards what they did made
01:29:29 from dawn onwards what they did made everything else possible and I can't say that it was a decision anyways but it just happened and I won't get another chance to speak and thank you that's all
01:29:40 chance to speak and thank you that's all well thank you very much all right if you'd like to go with the officer she'll look after you so thank you very much
01:29:57 yes estimate mr. chairman our next witness is commander Neil Jerome of the Metropolitan Police Services thank you
01:30:08 Metropolitan Police Services thank you thinking please have commander Jerome
01:30:14 fight
01:30:17 mr. chairman I'm told he wants to sit and give his we'll just make arrangements for that
01:31:27 I sleep I'm watching book I swear by Almighty God that the evidence of such a big evidence I shall give me the truth shall be the truth
01:31:41 thank you very much commander no you sit down and make yourself comfortable thank you sir yes mr. minute mr. chairman
01:31:52 chairman commander good afternoon good afternoon can I ask you please to start by giving us your full name Neal Jerome Neal to Rome and I'm going to begin by thanking you very much for coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our investigations
01:32:05 and assisting us with our investigations into what happened on that night we very much appreciate your doing so my questions are intended to be short and simple sometimes they're not so if you wish me to repeat the question in any way at all or ask another question I'm
01:32:17 way at all or ask another question I'm happy to do so and if you need to break at any time then again please let me know
01:32:21 know thank you I shall now you've given a statement to the inquiry which is a meaty triple zero to three to eight six
01:32:32 meaty triple zero to three to eight six I just have that on the screen now you've got a bundle in front of you in which to look at it if you like or you can look at it on the monitor on your desk it's dated the 80 the 8th of
01:32:43 desk it's dated the 80 the 8th of October 2018 and that's the first can you confirm for us that that's the first page of it yes it is and have you read
01:32:54 page of it yes it is and have you read it recently yes I have it can you please confirm that the contents are true yes they are and can you confirm for us that before coming here today you haven't discussed this statement or your evidence with anybody no I haven't now
01:33:06 evidence with anybody no I haven't now there are a number of exhibits to it I'll read those into the record there's n aj one which is the strategic coordination protocol which is m ET triple 0 - 3 - 8 8 n AG n aj 2 which is
01:33:21 triple 0 - 3 - 8 8 n AG n aj 2 which is summary of mps 999 calls which is m ET triple 0 - 3 - 9 1 n aj 3 a summary of relevant police witness statements which is M eet triple 0 - 3 - 8 5 na j 4 which
01:33:36 is M eet triple 0 - 3 - 8 5 na j 4 which is CAD 482 m ET triple 0 - 3 - 9 4 na j 5 the summary of cad for a - which is m ET triple 0 - 3 - 9 - 3 na j 6 the joint
01:33:47 ET triple 0 - 3 - 9 - 3 na j 6 the joint doctrine interoperability framework and triple zero to three to nine zero and aj7
01:33:53 aj7 the major incident meeting minutes for five am m18 triple zero to three to eight seven na j8 the major instead of meeting minutes for 6:30 m8 m ET triple
01:34:05 meeting minutes for 6:30 m8 m ET triple zero to three to nine two and finally n aj nine the incident management log m ET triple zero to three to eight nine I've read those two or all out formally to you so they are now formally part of our
01:34:16 you so they are now formally part of our evidential record thank you now I'm going to start by asking you one or two questions if I may about your position and training you joined the Kent Police Service in 1990 I think that's right yes yes and I think you say
01:34:28 that's right yes yes and I think you say on page two of your statement in paragraph four that in 2016 you transferred to the Metropolitan Police Service that's right on promotion to the rank of commander on the UH promotion to rank of commander and as at the night of
01:34:41 rank of commander and as at the night of the fire
01:34:41 the fire 14th of June 2017 was that your position was that your rank Kumasi yes it was and are you still commander yes I am well and you say in your statement that you've been trained
01:34:53 your statement that you've been trained in commanding multi-agency incidents and that's a paragraph four on page two we can just have that art it's the third
01:35:06 can just have that art it's the third line from the bottom of that paragraph who delivers that training and deliver to that training so that is delivered by the college of policing right and it's a
01:35:19 the college of policing right and it's a it's a national course which all police services and other emergency services are enrolled to and in addition to that
01:35:30 are enrolled to and in addition to that I have completed other training as well did that training include incidents involving large scale fires not specifically it covers a range of different scenarios but it didn't
01:35:41 different scenarios but it didn't specifically carve out large scale flowers
01:35:44 flowers did it ever include or did it include incidents that have been declared a major incident by either the police or another emergency service yes it did it did
01:35:54 did now you say in your statement that you have experience of commanding a number of multi-agency incidents including severe weather events and events declared as emergencies under the civil
01:36:06 declared as emergencies under the civil contingencies act were any of those incidents where the London Fire Brigade were involved as the lead organization now they weren't those were incidents
01:36:19 now they weren't those were incidents that took place when I was a county police officer where any of those incidents where Kent Fire and Rescue Service were involved as the lead organization not as the lead
01:36:30 organization not as the lead organization they were flooding of which the Environment Agency to come took the lead as well as severe snow and also operation stack which is the parking of
01:36:41 operation stack which is the parking of heavy goods vehicles on the m20 motorway right and those severe weather or can insa dense with a dynamic incidence that required changes in decision-making that speed as you went um no not so much
01:36:55 speed as you went um no not so much they're more of a slow incident particularly the lights of flooding where there's advanced advance notice
01:37:06 now it in his witness statement and in his evidence today inspector thatcher says that it's not uncommon for the London Fire Brigade to assist the request police assistance at a fire
01:37:19 request police assistance at a fire involving six pumps or more is that your experience so my understanding is that absolutely that that is that is correct will be within my my experience I would
01:37:30 will be within my my experience I would not be called for those types of incident but unfortunately those types of incident are relatively common across London and was that pump level your experience when you were at Kent when
01:37:41 experience when you were at Kent when you were in Kent it's a bad badly phrased question when you were in Kent before you move to the Metropolitan Police in 2016 or to your understanding
01:37:52 Police in 2016 or to your understanding we did Kent Fire and Rescue Services have a six pump level with them at which they would involve Kent Police so I was aware that Kent Fire and Rescue would
01:38:03 aware that Kent Fire and Rescue would request the assistance of can police incidents however in terms of the actual trigger point of those I'm unaware of after you moved to the
01:38:16 unaware of after you moved to the Metropolitan Police in 2016 did you receive any training in performing a role jointly working with the lfb I have undertaken training which is to do with
01:38:28 undertaken training which is to do with a marauding terrorist attack which is done in conjunction with the London Fire Brigade and other emergency responders across London did that involve any
01:38:39 across London did that involve any training on how to share key information received from members of the public about the incident that does include receiving of course remember the public
01:38:51 receiving of course remember the public which might be really beneficial to how we deal with the incident coming into the police control room and of course the the general arrangements that are put in place through a multi-agency
01:39:03 put in place through a multi-agency response would be such where we will be expected to share information with other emergency services and other responders right and did you ever have any training or on how to go about establishing
01:39:15 or on how to go about establishing channels of communication with other emergency services such as the NFB um so I've received training in the chairing of strategic coordinating groups which is how you share that information at a
01:39:27 is how you share that information at a strategic level right but not specifically in terms of operating of radios or computer systems okay
01:39:36 and have you ever had any training or any experience of setting up systems whereby information coming from members of the public about the incident could be shared on a multi-agency basis no not
01:39:48 be shared on a multi-agency basis no not specifically I want to turn to your role on the night of the five I can you say at page three of your statement in paragraph seven that you were the on-call chief officer for London on that night you explain what that is and you
01:40:03 night you explain what that is and you say that in the third line the role ensures that there is a chief officer available for significant events and authorizations across the Metropolitan Police what is classified as when you
01:40:14 Police what is classified as when you use the expression significant events is that a is that a defined term or is it just the expression you're using no it's um it's not defined in terms of that that's my expression however if there
01:40:27 that's my expression however if there were an incident that required a pain London mobilization of police resources or an incident that required say the notification of a major incident to my level then I would be informed right so
01:40:41 level then I would be informed right so a significant event would include but wouldn't be restricted to a major incident as defined that's right and there are those incidents that that occur that a commander above can give authorization to so there are certain
01:40:54 authorization to so there are certain aspects within law that a commander or above can authorize not just in relation to dealing with major incidents but across across the board of policing London right now I'm going to ask you to
01:41:05 London right now I'm going to ask you to look please at a document which is M eet
01:41:09 M et triple zero to three to eight nine which is exhibit nine to your statement at page 14
01:41:20 this is your to say you know what it is is your incident management log for the night of the fire we just get the first page of that I'm sorry page one to start with just to identify what it is just
01:41:33 with just to identify what it is just just tell us that's your that's your incident management log for the night isn't it yes it is and at page 14 if we can jump to that please you can see that you say they're at to 10 hours this is
01:41:46 you say they're at to 10 hours this is the very top of the page at 2:10 hours on Wednesday 14th of June 2017 I was contacted by I'm afraid you have to read that out for me I was
01:41:58 have to read that out for me I was contacted by Chi Chi suspected our Barrett the met grip chief inspector informing me that emergency services were responding to reports of a block of
01:42:09 were responding to reports of a block of flats a light a Grenville Tower Latimer Road Kensington the initial call came at 1:15 from LF beams a six-month fire and then you go on to say just a third of
01:42:21 then you go on to say just a third of the way down the page at this stage the information was very limited you see just four lines down from where it's yes
01:42:32 just four lines down from where it's yes we pick it up again at this stage the information was very limited and whilst I considered activating the SOR on the basis of the information and the existing command structure I considered this not to be proportionate and nothing
01:42:44 this not to be proportionate and nothing could be lost in a waiting and update when more information could be available do you know when Chief Inspector Barrett arrived on the scene so he wasn't at the
01:42:57 arrived on the scene so he wasn't at the scene he was the control room chief inspector based it our special operations room at Lambeth right and let me let me take it in stages and what
01:43:10 me let me take it in stages and what time did he arrive at Lambeth do you think so he would have been the night duty chief inspector my understanding is they work a 12-hour nights and he would have been coming on
01:43:21 nights and he would have been coming on duty
01:43:24 approximately [Music]
01:43:27 [Music] about 1900 hours okay right so he was there anyway yes I see is a 24/7 function operating throughout throughout
01:43:38 function operating throughout throughout the year now we know that police had been at the scene were at the scene from about 120 we heard from inspector thatcher this morning that some of the constables were there such as constable
01:43:49 constables were there such as constable sangha and and constable reese do you know why chief inspector barrett only had limited information at 2:10 when officers have been at the scene since about 120 50 minutes before so in
01:44:03 since about 120 50 minutes before so in referring to limited information while that referred to is that initial call that came to me and clearly he would have been in receipt of a lot more comprehensive information than what he
01:44:14 comprehensive information than what he gave me but the purpose of that call at OU 210 was to wake me up and get me in a position where I would then be able to receive a further phone call
01:44:25 receive a further phone call subsequently well I would then receive more information so the information he gave me at 10 minutes past 2:00 in the morning was sufficient in order to get me up and beginning to function so that
01:44:39 me up and beginning to function so that I could then be in an appropriate position to receive more detailed information when he then rang me back and he rang you back at what time at OU to 3030 we come to that at this early
01:44:50 to 3030 we come to that at this early stage did you know that the LFP had been in contact with the Metropolitan Police twice once at 1:16 and once at 1:50 to provide them with an update I did not so
01:45:02 provide them with an update I did not so the there was that initial call that came through I would expect at that stage at o2 10:00 just to receive sufficient enabled for me just to start thinking through what the police actions
01:45:14 thinking through what the police actions and what my actions would need to be as well did you have a facility for you to be able to access the overall CAD for the incident which is CAD for a to
01:45:25 the incident which is CAD for a to remotely no I did not right and certainly in terms I've never operated the computer-aided dispatch system the CAD system and it's clearly
01:45:39 system the CAD system and it's clearly you need a high degree of training in order to operate it and to and to then ensure that it's working properly now in your statement at the bottom of page
01:45:51 your statement at the bottom of page three we can just go back to that you say that
01:46:05 - line up from the bottom I would expect to be notified between 30 and 60 minutes of an incident coming to police attention would you expect to be notified would you expect to be notified
01:46:20 notified would you expect to be notified as soon as the incident has been declared a major incident not necessarily so because whilst an incident may be declared as a major incident by the police the there are
01:46:32 incident by the police the there are five stages to and how we would manage a major incident so the London resilience forum set out of those five stages ranging from monitoring right the way
01:46:45 ranging from monitoring right the way through to a full escalation of a strategic coordinating group and it would be a judgment by whoever is in command at that point as to what stage would we look to manage that particular
01:46:59 would we look to manage that particular incident at what stage would you normally be expected to be notified so once a major incident we were looking at the mobilization of resources from
01:47:11 the mobilization of resources from across London and where there would be an activation of the strategic coordinating group then I would be expected to be notified right now when
01:47:25 expected to be notified right now when Chief Inspector Barrett woke you up did he tell you this is at 2:10 did he tell you that the police had already declared a major incident some 40 minutes 35
01:47:37 a major incident some 40 minutes 35 minutes before not at that stage now do you know why he wouldn't have done no I do not did he tell you that the London Fire Brigade had just declared as they indeed had a major incident he did not
01:47:49 indeed had a major incident he did not know again is there any reason why I don't know okay would you expect him to have done at that stage at o2 10 it probably would have helped my thinking
01:48:02 probably would have helped my thinking in terms of beginning to think through what the major incident protocol was but I think and I would need to refresh my memory he did so when he rang Nero to 30 hours to inform me that a major instrument had been declared yes and and
01:48:15 instrument had been declared yes and and indeed a paragraph 42 of your statement on page 12 we can turn to it you say after the initial caller 2:10 I was contacted again at 2:30 by a chief
01:48:26 contacted again at 2:30 by a chief inspector parent who advised me that a major incident had been declared and that there were multiple casualties being reported and then you say declaring a major incident is a significant declaration which by its very definition is infrequently used and
01:48:38 very definition is infrequently used and therefore has a significant impact when it is upon hearing this information I decided a full multi-agency response would be needed requiring the activation of a strategic coordinating group scg
01:48:51 of a strategic coordinating group scg the senior representatives from the agencies involved in line with joint emergency services interoperability principles known as jezik etcetera would
01:49:05 principles known as jezik etcetera would you have expected or wanted to have been contacted as soon as the police had declared a major incident at a 132 that latest no not necessarily so because
01:49:16 latest no not necessarily so because because of those different levels of managing a major incident it would not ordinarily be a reflex action to bring the chief officer on call to let them know that it would only then be if we
01:49:28 know that it would only then be if we were looking to activate those higher levels of response that are set out in the London resilience forum paper right no just focusing on the different levels
01:49:39 no just focusing on the different levels you refer your statement to a full multi-agency response would be needed that's something you decided does that tell us that when you learn that there's a major incident you might decide that
01:49:51 a major incident you might decide that something less than a full multi-agency response would be needed so within those that those levels you can have very much a tactical commanders meeting that takes
01:50:02 a tactical commanders meeting that takes place to resolve something if it looks as though a incident will be prolonged will require specialist specialist resources and be something which will
01:50:13 resources and be something which will have a significant impact which this clearly will have clearly on the lives of those individuals who tragically lost their lives but also on those it bereaved and
01:50:25 lives but also on those it bereaved and survivors on the local community and on London in general and also probably on the nation as a whole then it would require that full response but it does
01:50:37 require that full response but it does depend upon the nature and those those different varying responses now what was it about what Chief Inspector Barrett told you at 2:30 that led you to decide
01:50:50 told you at 2:30 that led you to decide that a full multi-agency response as opposed to something lesser would be needed so the notification of multiple casualties that that to me clearly
01:51:05 casualties that that to me clearly thinking through a large building multiple casualties lots of people who call Grand Hotel that's their home that for me my instinct is there are going to
01:51:16 for me my instinct is there are going to be an awful lot of people who are going to be involved in this tragedy and we need to put in place the right mechanisms in order to support them
01:51:29 did we take it from that that when he initially contacted you at 210 spec cheaper Spectre Barrett didn't tell you that there were multiple casualties at that stage not at that point it was a
01:51:40 that stage not at that point it was a very factual almost this is what this is what we've responded to so that I could then just begin to wake myself up and
01:51:51 then just begin to wake myself up and gets myself into a position where I could then start making some critical decisions when he told you at 2:30 that a major incident had been declared did
01:52:02 a major incident had been declared did Chief Inspector Barrett tell you who had declared it now he did not so you didn't know whether it was a police declaration or an under fire brigade declaration no I did not did you ask him no I did not
01:52:13 I did not did you ask him no I did not would it have assisted you to know um it was significant for me to know that Oh 2:30 that a major incident had been declared and with that other information in terms of multiple casualties that it
01:52:25 in terms of multiple casualties that it would be my understanding that that is a that's a significant declaration and a significant piece of information that he's conveyed to me did you discover at that stage that in fact the police had
01:52:40 that stage that in fact the police had declared a major incident just under an hour before no I did not does it surprise you that an hour had gone by before you were alerted to the fact that a major incident had been declared with
01:52:52 a major incident had been declared with multiple casualties again it very much depends so whilst the police officers at the scene had declared a major incident that would have triggered a response at the scene the establishment of a command structure
01:53:03 the establishment of a command structure they calling out an attendance of the senior officer on duty so all of those factors have all taken place when then the full significance of that becomes
01:53:15 the full significance of that becomes realized of multiple casualties and then also the fact that we would require resources from across London specialist assets to make their way to to that area
01:53:28 assets to make their way to to that area as well as the the other agencies involved such as the fire brigade and also the ambulance service then it's at that point then for me then becomes a chief officer incident
01:53:41 then becomes a chief officer incident that requires involvement now the paragraph 14 of your witness statement on page 5 if you could just go back to it back in the dot in your statement to
01:53:54 it back in the dot in your statement to it you define will set out the definition of a major incident from the London resilience partnership strategic coordination protocol which you've
01:54:05 coordination protocol which you've exhibited at NJ n AJ one you quote here from 1.4.7 and I need to read it out to you you then go on in paragraph 15 to say but the declaration of a major incident
01:54:17 the declaration of a major incident recognises the special arrangements need to be implemented by emergency services to deal with a range of serious consequences by one or more emergency responder agencies at the point of the
01:54:29 responder agencies at the point of the declaration of a major incident I think you're telling us that there may be different kinds of major incident and therefore your response would have to be more would have been nuanced so flexible to has to be a flexible response so part
01:54:42 to has to be a flexible response so part of being a police commander of whatever level is whilst having received the training and you understand what the policy and procedures are the application of that to the circumstances
01:54:53 application of that to the circumstances that you have in front of you will be flexible right and going on then to page six of your statement paragraph 16 you
01:55:08 six of your statement paragraph 16 you you say the declaration of a major incident will will trigger a multi-agency conversation between the emergency services to share information and create a common operating picture of
01:55:19 and create a common operating picture of this nature of the incident and the emergency response it will trigger the establishment of a strategic coordination center and strategic coordination group to support the multi-agency response to the incident
01:55:30 multi-agency response to the incident now it looks from that that you're saying that every time there is a major incident declared that triggers these things in the strategic coordination
01:55:41 things in the strategic coordination center and the group and the multi-agency response really automatically is that right so not in every instance so when a multi major incident is is
01:55:53 when a multi major incident is is declared then there should be a conversation between the control room leads for the emergency services that should take place every time that there's a declaration that takes place and of course it may mean that those
01:56:06 and of course it may mean that those conversations are also taking place at other levels as well within the organization's but it's not the case that every major incident will require a strategic coordinating group to be
01:56:17 strategic coordinating group to be established right because it looks from here you're saying in the third line it will trigger the establishment of a strategic Coordination Center and strategic coordinating group it looks
01:56:28 strategic coordinating group it looks from your statement you're saying that every declaration of a major incident automatically does that so I'm referring in that statement there to the circumstances of this particular tragedy right as opposed to and I would not wish
01:56:41 right as opposed to and I would not wish to mislead to say that every major incident requires an S CG because my experience is such that that that would not be required every single time right now just focusing on this incident
01:56:56 now just focusing on this incident then this multi-agency conversation who would you or did you expect would speak to whom once the major incident had been
01:57:09 to whom once the major incident had been declared by the police just after 1:30 so that would be our respective golds and Silver's that would have that conversation right does that mean that
01:57:20 conversation right does that mean that in order to have this conversation the LF B and deed the LA s would need to know that the police had it had called a major incident they would clearly be an
01:57:31 major incident they would clearly be an expectation that an understanding that the reason why a police gold is going to speak to their their equivalent would be that something significant has taken place and that would be the declaration
01:57:42 place and that would be the declaration of a major incident have you ever come across a situation where the police declares a major incident without alerting the other emergency services to the fact I haven't in my experience
01:57:54 the fact I haven't in my experience however each when you are dealing with with incidents they are incurred complex and our first priority is the
01:58:07 complex and our first priority is the saving of life and there may well be many actions that officers are bravely taking at the time which will mean that when you look at the procedures it will say to notify others but if that would
01:58:20 say to notify others but if that would be compromised by trying to save an individual's life then those officers will attempt to save life and reprioritize and then come to alerting emergency services that a major incident
01:58:31 emergency services that a major incident has been declared our overriding priority is to save life yes and given that the looking at this incident that the what gets triggered by the
01:58:44 the what gets triggered by the declaration of a major incident is the multi-agency conversation given that that's one of the trip one of the things that is triggered what would happen if the lfb didn't know that the the
01:58:55 the lfb didn't know that the the Metropolitan Police had declared a major incident so I think in this instance with everything we knew on the night and we know subsequently I think this would
01:59:07 we know subsequently I think this would be a fairly obvious categorization of that incident the declaration of a major incident and those conversations taking place would be taking place anyway and
01:59:19 place would be taking place anyway and and certainly for me for those officers on the night it would have been clear to them that this was something which would require a response which was certainly
01:59:30 require a response which was certainly out of the realms of business as usual I'm not quite getting there and you have police declaring a major incident at just after 130 132 the sake of argument
01:59:42 just after 130 132 the sake of argument would you expect that the police would at that stage tell the LA s and the LFP that they've done it and reasonably as soon as possible thereafter yes do you
01:59:54 soon as possible thereafter yes do you want do you know why in this case the LASD LFP were not told that the point a major incident and I do not how was a
02:00:06 a major incident and I do not how was a multi-agency conversation going to happen if the RFP did not know that the police had declared a major incident so I would expect that officers on the scene would be going to go and speak to
02:00:17 scene would be going to go and speak to their colleagues and the other agencies and having those conversations with them they don't need to have a major incident declared to go and have those conversations with them do they not they
02:00:28 conversations with them do they not they need to know that a multi-agency conversation as such is happening in the light of a major incident so as to be able to put together a common operating plan or common operating picture so
02:00:40 plan or common operating picture so those conversations would take place and the sharing of that information to get to that that shared common operating picture would be taking place the fact that it hasn't been shared that there's
02:00:51 that it hasn't been shared that there's a major incident would not stop those conversations from taking place in the first instance no I understand that there may be a level of informality about it but I just want to see how
02:01:02 about it but I just want to see how close we get to compliance with policy that's what this is really about if you can look please at MIT triple 0 2 3 2 8 8 M et triple 0 2 3 2 8 8 this is the
02:01:15 8 M et triple 0 2 3 2 8 8 this is the London resilience partnership strategic coordinating protocol
02:01:26 and turn please in that document to page 13 at the top of the page
02:01:43 it says how much perhaps take you back to the place before paid before is where we see the definition of a major incident and you've quoted parts of that in your statement at the top of page 13
02:01:56 in your statement at the top of page 13 that were still within paragraph 1 point 4 point 7 it says declaring a major incident triggers a predetermined response from some emergency service and
02:02:07 response from some emergency service and other responder organizations it takes time for operational structures resources and protocols to be put in place - tearing that a major incident is in progress as soon as possible means that these arrangements can be put in
02:02:18 that these arrangements can be put in place as quickly as possible now just pausing there within your experience would you agree with that statement yes I would so speed is of the
02:02:29 statement yes I would so speed is of the essence yes yes it is and following the MPS declaration of a major incident at a 130 - what multi-agency conversation will you expect ordinarily to happen so
02:02:41 will you expect ordinarily to happen so I would be expecting that the silver and gold commanders would be having conversations with their colleagues in the other emergency services and would it assist the NPS to know whether and if
02:02:53 it assist the NPS to know whether and if so when the other organizations had declared a major incident that would be certainly helpful but it would not stop those conversations from taking place right would you agree that it's less
02:03:08 right would you agree that it's less than optimal for the Met to declare a major incident without the NFB knowing about it and vice versa I would expect each agency to share that information as
02:03:20 each agency to share that information as soon as they were able to and that is less than optimal that they don't I don't think that it would stop those
02:03:31 don't think that it would stop those conversations but clearly it does for absolute clarity the declaring of a major incident and sharing that information across the emergency services should take place as quickly as possible yes going down it in the next
02:03:47 possible yes going down it in the next paragraph it says a major incident may be declared by a single partnership organization or jointly it is feasible that only one organization may determine an emergency is a major incident on the type of incident and scale of
02:03:58 on the type of incident and scale of their resources required this may not necessarily mean it as a major incident for all other organizations would you agree with me that that doesn't indicate that major incidents can be declared as
02:04:11 that major incidents can be declared as it were in a vacuum without other agencies knowing about it yes
02:04:25 now on page six of your statement sorry let me go back a little bit we know that the lfb declared a major incident at o2 o6 and I don't need to show you a
02:04:38 o6 and I don't need to show you a document about that we've had evidence about that about and that's about 30 minutes or so after the MPs had declared a major incident Biff and I you were
02:04:49 a major incident Biff and I you were asleep at oti 6 to be fair still just yes judge just to be a but it's about to be woken up and therefore you may not be able to help me with this but to the
02:05:02 able to help me with this but to the best of your knowledge did the lfb know about the MPS's declaration of the major incident I'm sorry I don't know you don't right now put your witness statement on page 6 it is the
02:05:14 statement on page 6 it is the continuation of paragraph 15 if you could just go back to that please commander you
02:05:26 you say that any member of an emergency service - can declare a major incident
02:05:40 is that something that you're aware of from experience or from documents that you refer to in your witness statement certainly in my experience that a
02:05:51 certainly in my experience that a constable can declare a major incident and the trust and the professionalism that we place in our offices is such that the first officer on the scene can
02:06:04 that the first officer on the scene can declare a major incident and if that is done would you would you expect that fact to be disseminated widely and urgently around all the other officers involved yes I would and how would that
02:06:16 involved yes I would and how would that be done generally by the radio system that
02:06:26 and have you had any experience of your own of members of other emergency services declaring a major incident after the police had declared one so
02:06:43 after the police had declared one so there will always be a difference in the time that different organizations may declare a major incident I can't recall a specific example off the top of my
02:06:55 a specific example off the top of my head but because of the different priorities and the different responses of other emergency services it might be that there is a difference in timing between those organizations declaring a
02:07:06 between those organizations declaring a major incident or not it doesn't have to be everybody declaring it all at the same time yeah my question was well about your personal experience or professional experience have you ever expended incident where but where two
02:07:18 expended incident where but where two agencies had declared a major incident yes it does take place yes in your experience have you had yes it has and what what were those incidents so
02:07:29 what what were those incidents so declaring of a with regards to public disorder that was taking place that
02:07:40 disorder that was taking place that would be slightly different in terms of the time scales because of the different responses of the police ago that the lead agency for dealing with that public disorder but also then within that either agencies coming images at that
02:07:52 either agencies coming images at that point was the ambulance service because of injuries that are being being sustained they see and what who asked you some questions about the start and the progression of the incident and first of all before you became involved
02:08:03 first of all before you became involved because you detailed quite a lot in your statement about what happened before you were involved and let's see how we go with that but paragraph 10 on page here first of all you
02:08:19 you say there that PC Sangha and PC Rhys were the first officers at the scene at 122 now we know from PC Sanger's witness
02:08:33 122 now we know from PC Sanger's witness statement and that's a meaty quadruple 0 7 837 he says that his intention was to make contact with the LFP incident commander and make an assessment of the scene in order to prioritize the your
02:08:46 scene in order to prioritize the your role to save life and lemon assist the NFB with cordon and control of the scene and he then goes on to say that he asked PC Rhys to make contact with the LFP command unit from your knowledge of the
02:08:58 command unit from your knowledge of the events of the night do you know if PC Reese received a briefing from the incident commander the lfb Incivek commander at the scene I'm sorry sir I don't know ok now you you say that a PC Sangha with a people statement you say
02:09:13 Sangha with a people statement you say that PC Sangha reported it's a three lines up from the bottom that it was unknown if people were trapped but but that evacuation of the building was
02:09:24 that evacuation of the building was required parts of the building appeared to be falling from the exterior of it and that it ought to be declared critical incident first of all do you know where PC sang had got bad
02:09:35 know where PC sang had got bad information from no I do not when you say here what you do in your statement where are you taking that information from so I believe I'm taking that from
02:09:47 from so I believe I'm taking that from their statements I see so this is you're repeating essentially what you read in their evidence yes this isn't this isn't your own recollection as you know I see okay and does that does that is that
02:10:02 okay and does that does that is that true of everything you say in paragraphs 10 11 and 12 yes that's correct
02:10:12 do you know in general and because we can see we could see statements in the in CAD for a - about it where he refers to evacuation do you know in general
02:10:24 to evacuation do you know in general where PC Tseng have got information about evacuation from no I do not now if
02:10:36 about evacuation from no I do not now if I can take you to the foot of page 9 of your witness statement paragraph 31
02:10:44 where some three pages into the part of your statement which starts on page 7 dealing with the events of the night actions taken by police officers paragraph 31 you say foot of page 9 as
02:10:56 paragraph 31 you say foot of page 9 as the morning progressed the response remained focused on the tower but there was additionally a focus on trying to establish where evacuees were in which hospitals the casualties have been taken - so that the casualty Bureau could run
02:11:07 - so that the casualty Bureau could run effectively now can I start by asking you to look at the major incident procedure manual which is rbk triple zero 1 3 - 9 4 rbk triple 0 1 3 - 9 4
02:11:25 and gay please in that document to page 34
02:11:39 it's our BK triple 0 1 3 2 9 4 page 34
02:11:52 are you able to bring up on the screen for me please yes thank you thank you come on I wouldn't dream of putting sent me all this document to you without you seeing it this is the citta so you know
02:12:05 seeing it this is the citta so you know what it is is the London it's the Le SLP major incentive procedure manual version 9.4 for 2015 I can show you the first page if you like
02:12:16 can show you the first page if you like but it's a long document fun and this is page 34 we have it on the screen and it's paragraph nine point seven or section nine point seven survived a reception center now looking over the
02:12:30 reception center now looking over the page at paragraph nine point nine I'll come back to survivor reception center in a moment at nine point nine you can see the part of the circuit which refers
02:12:42 see the part of the circuit which refers to casualty Bureau and it says police may establish a casualty Bureau where details on on all dead casualties survivors and evacuees will be collated this centre will be would also take
02:12:53 this centre will be would also take telephone inquiries from friends and relatives of people who are believed to be involved in the incident casualty bureau staff will then match details of persons involved with inquiries where a match is made appropriate contact with
02:13:05 match is made appropriate contact with the inquiry will be made now I've shown you that on a showing your statement when you refer in your statement to the casualty bureau as we see at the top of page 10 within paragraph 31 is that what
02:13:16 page 10 within paragraph 31 is that what you're referring to yes I am now what role would the police normally take in assisting with the establishment and operation of a casualty bureau so the casualty bureau would be a police and
02:13:27 casualty bureau would be a police and lead facility that would be established the casualty bureau has a number of different elements to it so partly that is receiving calls from from persons who
02:13:42 is receiving calls from from persons who believe that they may have someone who's involved with an incident and then there is also then a separate part to it that receives information either from hospitals or from survivors reception
02:13:53 hospitals or from survivors reception centers or certainly what we saw at Grenfell was the fantastic response from the local community of trying to help out their neighbors so people wouldn't
02:14:06 out their neighbors so people wouldn't simply go to a survivor reception center they would be going to a whole host of different places as well and and that really is I think a measure of the just the humility and the humanitarian
02:14:19 the humility and the humanitarian assistance that people were spontaneously given so we take that information marry that then with the information that we're receiving of individuals and loved ones who who may well be missing marrying that also up
02:14:31 well be missing marrying that also up with the information that's coming from our hospitals to say who are the injured as well as tragically those individuals who would have certainly lost their lives as well putting that all together
02:14:42 lives as well putting that all together is a casualty Bureau function to then enable us to give very accurate information to to loved ones and also then to other agencies such as the
02:14:53 then to other agencies such as the coroner if we need to do you know when the casualty bureau was established so saying that you know when the casualty Buuren for Grenville tower was established yes I believe that was established at approximately 6:30 right
02:15:04 established at approximately 6:30 right and it didn't have a geographical place was it in a in a particular location so the casualty Bureau is established I believe hendon however because of the
02:15:15 I believe hendon however because of the volume of calls that come in the police service operates in a mutual a basis where other police forces will provide
02:15:24 telephony telephone receipt for that my understanding certainly from my point of view is that I made the command decision that we would activate a casualty Bureau
02:15:35 that we would activate a casualty Bureau that does take time to put in place so that was one of the first critical decisions are made at Oh to 30 hours because I did understand that that would some time to put in place so whilst
02:15:46 some time to put in place so whilst there is a physical location to it certainly the Metropolitan Police would ask other forces if we needed to to provide assistance to us and who was put in charge of establishing the casualty bureau so we would so Chief Inspector
02:15:59 bureau so we would so Chief Inspector Barrett would start the process of calling people out and then we would then have a casualty bureau manager working to the senior in our dental ocation manager who in turn would then work to the coroner
02:16:10 work to the coroner right and do you know why the casualty bureau wasn't established or are ordered to be established earlier than 2:30 so
02:16:23 to be established earlier than 2:30 so that that would be our suspect because it was at that point it became crystal clear that we were tragically dealing with many people who were going to be
02:16:35 with many people who were going to be casualties or indeed who lost their lives now in your statement of paragraph 32 on the top of page 10 you can just go back to it you say MPs officers did not
02:16:52 back to it you say MPs officers did not assist with any aspect of the evacuation of residents from the tower itself given that the lfp were quite rightly the lead emergency service for that aspect of the incident when you refer to evacuation
02:17:04 incident when you refer to evacuation there of the residents what are you referring to so I am referring to police officers entering the tower in order to
02:17:15 officers entering the tower in order to escort those residents out of their flights right we know from the witness statement of PC Reese that he in fact did enter the tower and assist in
02:17:27 did enter the tower and assist in evacuation of residents from the stairwell did you know that at the time I did not and certainly what has emerged is the bravery of my colleagues who put
02:17:38 is the bravery of my colleagues who put them selves absolutely in harm's way to protect life and go into a building which they were under the very real understanding was a very dangerous structure and may collapse but
02:17:50 dangerous structure and may collapse but they put themselves into harm's way to save other people's lives it did you learn when did you learn the p-series had entered the building quite some
02:18:02 had entered the building quite some considerable time later on it did you know or do you know whether he was acting alone or whether there were other police officers at the scene also doing what he was doing and assisting in evacuation I'm sorry I don't I mean I
02:18:14 evacuation I'm sorry I don't I mean I would suspect that given that our resources in those very early stages would have been building up that that those numbers would have been I would have thought quite small but absolutely
02:18:25 have thought quite small but absolutely they wanted the one of the things of a police officer is you make those independent decisions based upon the circumstances that you have in front of you at the time now going back in your
02:18:36 you at the time now going back in your statement to page 9 please come on to paragraph 30 you say in the beginning of that paragraph specialist resources were also deployed to Grenfell tower the territorial support group was deployed
02:18:48 territorial support group was deployed these officers are highly trained in a range of skills including the rapid entry to buildings and they have additional protective equipment that would be unavailable to response officers now just I'm trying to put a
02:19:00 officers now just I'm trying to put a time on that if I can ask you please to be showing the first CAD 482 which is M et triple zero to three to nine four at page eight
02:19:17 you see they're on page eight at time mark of 135 23 just below halfway down the page there's a little tag or legend
02:19:34 the page there's a little tag or legend CCH a chi and do looks like and correct me if i'm wrong something like command center Hendon would that be right I don't like this a
02:19:45 would that be right I don't like this a certain if I'm guessing that may well be the case but I'm sorry I don't know definitively no no liaised with met grid you told us what met grip is so that's
02:19:57 you told us what met grip is so that's the chief inspector who's based at the control room yet in Lambeth yeah requesting TSG assistance with evac now TSG is I think territorial support group
02:20:09 TSG is I think territorial support group like my question is does first of all does this help identify the time at which TSG officers were requested for deployment yes it does do you know when they first of all did
02:20:23 do you know when they first of all did they come do you know they whether they turned up
02:20:25 turned up yes they did do you know when they turned up not precisely know the the CAD I would expect would be able to tell us that precise information and how perhaps
02:20:36 that precise information and how perhaps you can't help me with this but see if you can how would the territorial support group be able to assist with evacuation so my understanding of that particular comment is that because of
02:20:51 particular comment is that because of the very real fear that the fire was going to spread beyond the tower and that the falling debris could well ignite other properties and those who
02:21:03 ignite other properties and those who were fast asleep that night would be unaware of what was happening so police officers were going to those different properties in order to to wake the
02:21:14 properties in order to to wake the residents in order to evacuate them out of there so that they're out of danger but of course there may be those flats where people simply won't wake to repeated knocking
02:21:25 repeated knocking and the police and Criminal Evidence Act does give us a right power a legal power to enter property to save life so if a if an officer isn't receiving the door
02:21:37 if an officer isn't receiving the door being open to repeated knocking then officers from the territorial support group do have equipment available to them so that they could force entry to that property in order to save life and
02:21:48 that property in order to save life and do so and that for me would be again something where those officers are putting themselves into harm's way in order to save other people's lives now this is evacuation not of the tower it
02:21:59 this is evacuation not of the tower it sounds like from your evidence but of the neighboring authorities that's correct because police officers will be clearly entering into into
02:22:10 will be clearly entering into into groennfell itself they they have no idea the equipment or the training in order to fire fires right could those officers have assisted with evacuation of residents from the tower itself they
02:22:22 residents from the tower itself they wouldn't be able to do so because the entering that that tower did it the smoke because of the danger of fire those officers would not be equipped or
02:22:34 those officers would not be equipped or trained in order to enter a fire a fire firefighting environment so does this tell us that at this time or by this time 1:35 there was a concern within the
02:22:50 time 1:35 there was a concern within the Met that this fire would spread to those neighboring blocks so that would certainly give rise to that concern and what I am seeing there is that so
02:23:02 what I am seeing there is that so exercising of what I would expect of commanders which is thinking through what are the options for for later on should we need to need to use those resources because it's better to think
02:23:13 resources because it's better to think in advance and get those resources there rather than suddenly think I need them and then have to wait for them to respond so part of being a commander is that not just certainly the rank sorry
02:23:24 that not just certainly the rank sorry but in terms of that exercise of leadership and of command is thinking through what are the scenarios that I may be caught to deal with and then ensuring that I've got the right
02:23:32 right resources in the right place to deal with them right does the training of TSG officers include evacuation from dangerous structures or structures that are on fire I don't know for certain but
02:23:44 are on fire I don't know for certain but I would doubt that very much now turning to a slightly different topic communication with the lfb is it right that the police Metropolitan
02:23:56 right that the police Metropolitan Police would expect or be expected to share information with partners promptly and to monitor establish a monitor a joint emergency service airwave Channel
02:24:10 certainly establishing joint comms that would absolutely be the case whether that is a wave channel or not I think would depend upon the circumstances if
02:24:22 would depend upon the circumstances if you've got individuals that are co-located talking to each other then the provision of an air wave radio would seem to frustrate those those conversations let me just put put
02:24:34 conversations let me just put put something to you can you please be showing rbk triple zero one three to nine four which we looked at a moment ago at page 13
02:24:59 and if you go to page 13 and look please at paragraph 4.1.2 you can see it says under the general heading working together communication share information with partners properly establish a
02:25:11 with partners properly establish a monitor a joint emergency service air wave channel through met cc in at this incident would you expect that to happen yes I would did it happen I do not know
02:25:22 yes I would did it happen I do not know who would normally establish that channel but there would be through the met control room right and how would they liaised with the London Fire Brigade control room in order to establish that channel so that would be
02:25:33 establish that channel so that would be through telephone and then getting back that particular channel established right and can you help us to whether or how that was established in this
02:25:44 how that was established in this incident I'm sorry that's not within my knowledge Kenny please turn will be turned to page 28 of the same document
02:25:58 and there you see pay paragraph 810 which deals with interagency command and it says on under 8 10 1 la s and l FB command vehicles that attend the scene
02:26:09 command vehicles that attend the scene on each equipped with tetra airwave radio to the TV police also have access to tetra airwave radio so are our radio
02:26:21 to tetra airwave radio so are our radio system is airwave yes right and then it goes on at 8.10 point to all services were able to communicate on Airways interoperability talker groups that are common to all emergency services and it
02:26:35 common to all emergency services and it goes on to say as you can see there that these are the es talk groups which are found in each four specific folder in both handheld the control room radio terminals and there are two different kinds talk group I see one
02:26:46 kinds talk group I see one and then there's interagency talk group IAT one available to all air wave users as well as a number of police and multi-agency mutual aid talk groups does that tell us that anyone who's got an air wave radio could actually get onto
02:26:59 air wave radio could actually get onto the interagency talk group and talk to their opposite number or somebody else in the inner in a partner agency it would but it would also mean they did so doing they take themselves off their own channel that they were listening to so
02:27:11 channel that they were listening to so there's always a balance between what do I need to listen to and of course what this advice is is is driving towards he's establishing back that shared
02:27:22 he's establishing back that shared communication it doesn't need to be done necessarily over a radio it can clearly be done face-to-face and through meetings but there is that balance between do I go on to a shared talk
02:27:34 between do I go on to a shared talk route or do I stay with on the own radio channel from my own agency and there's always that balance that a commander just needs to think through in terms of what's right at those different circumstances you know whether a talk
02:27:47 circumstances you know whether a talk group for tactical commanders were set up a ground for I don't know what about an I 81 talk group do you know whether that was set up a crowd fell not done turning to a different topic commander
02:28:00 turning to a different topic commander FSG calls and information that paragraph 8 10 of your statement if I can get back to that you say on page 10 under the heading faster
02:28:15 say on page 10 under the heading faster Bible guidance calls an information you deal with that ever two pages from paragraph 33 onwards but at paragraph 33 you say that you're aware that the initial advice from the scene was - was
02:28:28 initial advice from the scene was - was that the lfb was saying stay put and you you say in the last sentence of that paragraph para 33 I can see the officers at the scene when following that guidance from the lfb when they were
02:28:39 guidance from the lfb when they were being approached by members of the public seeking advice and is that your reading of evidence to the inquiry all to the police or is that your own personal knowledge so that's my reading
02:28:50 personal knowledge so that's my reading of the evidence to the Enquirer that's not my personal history okay now do you know from your own knowledge of the events of the night what advice
02:29:01 events of the night what advice particular officers were giving in particular times not and when I arrived on on duty into the control room by that point the state policy had been changed
02:29:15 point the state policy had been changed so I am aware subsequently of what that advice was that on the night when I arrived the state that policy had changed no you arrived about 4:10 I think interact what time did your call
02:29:28 think interact what time did your call with that started at 2:30 with Chief Inspector Barrett finish so I didn't make a note at the time but I suspect that it was approximately a 240 Oh 245
02:29:40 that it was approximately a 240 Oh 245 right and you then what happened after that did you leave immediately no so I then got myself ready in order to make myself available then to come up
02:29:53 to make myself available then to come up into into the special operations room at Lambeth yes that's right during that period between 240 245 did you get any
02:30:07 period between 240 245 did you get any information yourself about the change to stay put advice or the advice that was being given to occupants of the building you were still trapped no I didn't did you have any any conversations at all with anybody during that period I
02:30:18 all with anybody during that period I received a couple of updates on my way in very very short just in terms of to the the extent of the fire that was that
02:30:30 the the extent of the fire that was that there was taking hold but there were very short inputs from the control room because clearly they were trying to manage the incident immobilized resources and I wasn't in a position
02:30:42 resources and I wasn't in a position where I could take calls because of the the speed at which we were making our way can I ask you to be shown just in light of that answer m ET triple zero to
02:30:53 light of that answer m ET triple zero to three to nine three which is a CAD summary prepared by the Metropolitan Police and turn to page 21 in it please it's a meaty triple zero to three two
02:31:05 it's a meaty triple zero to three two nine three page 21 and 358 a three you can see a message from gold which
02:31:17 can see a message from gold which reports a message from the Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade the advice from the lfb is to try and self evacuate there is no guarantee that the lfp will be able to go in and evacuate people due
02:31:29 be able to go in and evacuate people due to the safety of the building and post collapse did you hear that message at that time no I did not do you know why you didn't because I was still albeit arriving very shortly thereafter but I
02:31:41 arriving very shortly thereafter but I would still be very close to arriving at Lambeth but not in a position to receive that my understanding is and is particularly chilling to to hear that
02:31:56 particularly chilling to to hear that but that would have been communicated over the radio system and you've got to Lambeth at about 4:10 did you subsequently discover that this message had been sent yes I believe so I think
02:32:07 had been sent yes I believe so I think my notes show that people were trying to being told to self evacuate after the build and how long after arrival at Lambeth do you think you were told that so I arrived I for 10 it would have been
02:32:21 so I arrived I for 10 it would have been quite quickly thereafter whilst I was receiving the briefing
02:32:44 now we know that I'm going to turn to the specific set of FSG calls commander and if you don't have any specific recollection of these then say say but I
02:32:57 recollection of these then say say but I just want to ask you there's some questions about a particular resident call design Abdeen now at 129 and I'll
02:33:08 call design Abdeen now at 129 and I'll put this - because it's in the it's in the CAD and in the other in other records but at 120 905 she reports that a far as coming into her building and then the call ends abruptly and just for
02:33:22 then the call ends abruptly and just for the record that call is CAD 543 a call goes through to the Metropolitan Police Patrol center and then he and then the operator rings her back at Oh - Oh 140
02:33:34 operator rings her back at Oh - Oh 140 she reports that her son was with her and that they were unable to get out and she was advised by the operator to go to the window and wave to the police helicopter I've got to show you this
02:33:47 helicopter I've got to show you this it's inq five zero two seven zero
02:33:58 and this is the if you go please to page three to start with in this this is a this is a transcript of this call and this is call five at the foot of page
02:34:10 this is call five at the foot of page three and I'll just show you this design Abdeen yes hi mrs. Dean is that you sounds of smoke alarm in background yeah yes yes there is a large fire at your
02:34:21 yes yes there is a large fire at your location are you able to get out and no how can I get out and turn the page please to page four and then there's some discussion about fire exit and then the operator says five lines down okay
02:34:32 the operator says five lines down okay you're gonna have to remain calm okay how many people with you me and my son be my son you and your son alright calm down okay there's fire brigade coming up the stairs trying to in fact are you able to have a look and see if
02:34:43 are you able to have a look and see if it is able to go downstairs I mean where is the fire exit just pausing there can you help us as to how the operator that knew or was able to say to her that the
02:34:54 knew or was able to say to her that the fire brigade was coming up from the stairs trying to evacuate everyone I
02:35:00 don't know for certain other than it may well be that certainly there is communications between the control room
02:35:13 communications between the control room that's dispatch and in conversations with the London Fire Brigade with the the operators that would be my my assumption
02:35:25 and then lower down she says I can't go into it the smoke is coming from the inaudible okay and then the operator says is are you able to go to the window
02:35:37 says is are you able to go to the window and wave to the police helicopter sign up Dean over speaking and shouting is there anyone go to the window says the operator go to the window and wave to the police helicopter and then is there
02:35:50 the police helicopter and then is there anyone at the 14th floor hello then this Dean says speaking but initial words on clear alone on the 14th floor unclear words outside outside over speaking hello hello yes and then the MPS
02:36:03 hello hello yes and then the MPS operator says you need to remain calm okay go to the window and see if you can wave to the helicopter and then it continues yeah and then hello and then there's no further response and if we
02:36:15 there's no further response and if we turn the page again I think that's the end of them all so that's the end of the call now my question is do you know why the MPS operator would advise a resident
02:36:27 the MPS operator would advise a resident to wave to the police helicopter from her window no I do not is there any kind of police protocol or guidance or policy which would tell her what an operator to
02:36:39 which would tell her what an operator to tell a person trapped in a burning building to to signal their presence to the police helicopter if you thought one was there
02:36:46 was there I don't know right do you know what do you know whether there is a system whereby police helicopters would
02:36:57 whereby police helicopters would identify people waving at buildings and do something about it so certainly a police helicopter if it were able to see what was going on would
02:37:08 were able to see what was going on would then be relaying that information back to the control room do you know where the pilots were updated by the control room about what that resident was doing
02:37:21 room about what that resident was doing so I can just repeat the first few words where is were pilots updated do you know but by the control room by the police control room about what was happening with that resident I
02:37:32 resident I don't know can I ask you to see the mi manual major incident manual at rbk triple zero one three two nine four
02:37:43 triple zero one three two nine four please this is the le LSP major incident procedure manual she looked at a minute a moment ago when we were looking at casualty bureau and the reception
02:37:55 casualty bureau and the reception centers and I want to show you something else in it at page 37 please and we can see it at section 10 of this document is
02:38:07 see it at section 10 of this document is headed helicopters in Section ten one is police helicopters and a 10-1 three helicopters can provide the following support facilities and you can see the
02:38:18 support facilities and you can see the long list of bullet points there including the fourth bullet point casualty search assessment of numbers you see that
02:38:31 do you know whether the police helicopter was present for that purpose at groennfell on the night so not
02:38:42 at groennfell on the night so not specifically albeit reading that now sunny my experience I've used helicopters to search large expanses of land in order to try and find casualties
02:38:54 land in order to try and find casualties using their thermal imaging equipment of course they can do that far more efficiently than relying on police officers to do so on their own when
02:39:05 officers to do so on their own when performing the role of supporting casualty search and assessment of numbers would you expect a police operator to advise a caller to attract the helicopters attention
02:39:26 could you rephrase the question yes loose and you could sit well let me let me put it a slightly different way if you look at all those bullet points none I could put it to you this way none of
02:39:37 I could put it to you this way none of those involve the actual rescue by helicopter or of a of a 999 caller that's absolutely right police helicopters are not equipped nor trained
02:39:50 helicopters are not equipped nor trained to carry out those types of rescue for Russians so looking at those sorts of support facilities that the police helicopter present at Grenfell could assist with
02:40:01 assist with one of them is putting this to you a bullet point for casualty search and assessment of numbers yes yes and you said you didn't know I think whether whether that was one of the purposes for
02:40:12 whether that was one of the purposes for which a helicopter was deployed to Granville so I think it would have been deployed so this is my understanding I I did not call it myself but was to give
02:40:24 did not call it myself but was to give an assessment a wider assessment of the same coordinates and clearly there are people in distress within the building then they would be radioing that through
02:40:36 then they would be radioing that through to the control room and would you my question then is would you expect the police operator to tell the caller to attract the helicopter pilots attention
02:40:47 attract the helicopter pilots attention in the way that we see in the transcript and I think the the operator is is making an assessment based upon the circumstances that they've they've got in front of them are not doing their
02:40:59 in front of them are not doing their best to try to help and doing their best to try and aid the rescue of those individuals would you expect the operator to explain to the caller exactly why they were telling them to
02:41:11 exactly why they were telling them to attract the helicopter pilots attention given that the roles for a police helicopter do not include actual rescue I think the circumstance is that our
02:41:23 I think the circumstance is that our operators were dealing with on that night I clearly incredibly incredibly emotional to expect an operator to describe it in those
02:41:35 describe it in those I would doubt very much I mean really what I'm doing to be to cut through the verbage what I'm trying to get at I think is why would a police operate a teller corner to signal to a helicopter
02:41:48 teller corner to signal to a helicopter if the helicopter wasn't going to rescue them I don't know why that operator said that can I turn to a different topic which is the change in what we call the
02:42:01 which is the change in what we call the stay-put advice now in your statement at paragraph 35 at the top of page 11 you say exhibiting the CAD CAD 482 that a
02:42:15 say exhibiting the CAD CAD 482 that a 308 a message was received by the MPs control room from the lfb stating that the fire safety guidance have changed the days inside the building or to escape by any means possible and you say
02:42:29 escape by any means possible and you say my current understanding is that the message was communicated across the airways to officers shortly before 310 what was that current understanding based on as it was at the reading of the CAD yes it was okay do you know how the
02:42:43 CAD yes it was okay do you know how the message was relayed from the lfb to the NPS control room I don't know do you know whether the message was relayed from the LFP control room or from the
02:42:54 from the LFP control room or from the LFP officers at the incident ground itself do you know I'm sorry I don't know do you we could also see that the message was repeated 3 to 2 to 3 minutes later at 3
02:43:07 repeated 3 to 2 to 3 minutes later at 3 1056 and I don't need to show to you but do you know why the message had to be repeated 2 minutes later so I don't know for certain but I would suspect that something as significant as that would
02:43:19 something as significant as that would be absolutely crystal clear to everybody to know so I said I would expect that that's probably the reason why just a repeater and we can see as I've shown
02:43:30 repeater and we can see as I've shown you before from page 28 of CAD for a2 that the gold had said that the London Fire Brigade commissioner essentially repeatedly advice was that to residents to try to self evacuate no
02:43:43 to residents to try to self evacuate no guarantee that the LFP would be able to go in and evacuate people that message was centered oh three fifty eight oh three my question is do you know why that was sent at that time no I do not you don't
02:43:54 you don't now you say at paragraph 32 on page 11 of your statement sorry paragraph 36 on page 11 of your statement that there is a schedule of
02:44:05 statement that there is a schedule of witnesses witness statements which you've exhibited at na j3 where you say that you could see that a number of officers at the scene recall hearing a message at approximately three o'clock and passed on that guidance when required to do so is that your
02:44:21 required to do so is that your interpretation or reading of those witness statements yes it is right it's not your own evidence no it's not like do you know whether or not from your own knowledge of the events of the night
02:44:32 knowledge of the events of the night officers was telling for telling members of the public who were on the phone to residents inside the building to stay put
02:44:40 put after 3:10 no I don't need to look at the cache but that would not be within my own personal knowledge right now
02:44:53 my own personal knowledge right now we've heard evidence from the London Fire Brigade that the decision was made to change the statehood advice in the control room around about 2:35 a.m. or
02:45:08 control room around about 2:35 a.m. or between 2:30 and 240 sorry 230 and 250 a.m. and also made or at least logged at the scene at 247 am assuming that the
02:45:20 the scene at 247 am assuming that the decision by the London Fire Brigade to change the advice was made at all at those times or within that time range when would you have expected your officers to be told of the change in the
02:45:32 officers to be told of the change in the statement advice so I would expect that to be undertaken as soon as possible can you account for the delay in getting that information to your officers no I can't
02:45:43 can't I'm sorry do you know if the delay in communication of the changing statehood advice if there was a delay that had any effect on Europe or on your
02:45:54 that had any effect on Europe or on your operations so need the the advice that officers would be giving to the public
02:46:04 would be based upon the the very latest advice that they've been given
02:46:15 No and I'm going to ask you questions or two about your involvement on the night and they're going to ask you to go to paragraph 49 of your statement did my interrupting you
02:46:27 interrupting you can you give us any indication of how many more questions well I asked the question because the commander's been giving evidence for quite a while
02:46:39 giving evidence for quite a while yes we're normally it was topped at half past four but he may prefer to finish his evidence today if that's possible
02:46:47 but I thought if we're gonna go out and he'd like from now how long he's gonna go on yes I can't I would say I would like to ask him rather more questions and I suspect I get to be able to know
02:46:58 and I suspect I get to be able to know I'm not trying to restrict your time at all I've got about half an hour more questions together half enough yeah well I could cut it down to 20 minutes possibly no let's take a break I might
02:47:10 possibly no let's take a break I might be able to cut things out well exercise it's getting on in the afternoon and we all get tired at the end of the day and you can hang your own weight to give evidence anyway would you prefer to stop
02:47:23 evidence anyway would you prefer to stop now but come back tomorrow what would you prefer to carry on this evening with or without a short break now outing myself in your hands on this one thank you so clearly I'm here to help and
02:47:36 you so clearly I'm here to help and assist inquiring as much as I'm able I could certainly do with a comfort break right now if I may you please and then if if we were able then to continue then
02:47:50 if if we were able then to continue then I think that would be that would be good okay but of course if he's going to take I want to give very best answers that I can to help the inquiry so if we need to
02:48:01 can to help the inquiry so if we need to come back tomorrow then I'm very happy do you feel comfortable about going on this evening for let us say for half an hour yes I am right if you get to the point then when you feel you're getting
02:48:13 point then when you feel you're getting too tired
02:48:13 too tired it can happen quite suddenly you must indicate thank you well then what we'll do is we'll have a just over five minute break ten to five and then
02:48:24 five minute break ten to five and then we'll see if mr. Minnick can get through thank you No Deal why's that
02:48:56 now I've made it clear to mr. minute he said he thought he had half an hour and I made it quite clear I'm not expecting him to cut down now if he can't finish within the half an hour I think we're
02:49:08 within the half an hour I think we're gonna have to stop anybody but commanders very busy man he's probably got other commitments and although I'm sure he would come back tomorrow if he were asked to do so he might prefer to finish tonight well I do absolutely
02:49:21 finish tonight well I do absolutely right say that we it's important that there be no rush or no truncating the questions you didn't have to persuade me about that but I think we need to see
02:49:33 about that but I think we need to see how we can get on all right look we're not gonna break for just over five it's ten to five and then we'll see where we go from there [ __ ] I should to say for mr. Thomas's benefit that none of the questions I was going to cut so far as I
02:49:45 questions I was going to cut so far as I know come from him there would be my own questions say well but but in any case we will I think have the full time so there'll be no cutting commissioner you come on you you go with the okay and
02:49:58 come on you you go with the okay and please don't talk to anyone about your evidence when there are
02:50:13 right when I'm gained rise for five minutes I'm quite happy mr. Thomas to make it clear quite clear to mr. millet and everyone else in the room that I'm not expecting him to trim his
02:50:25 not expecting him to trim his questioning in order to finish this evening all right
02:50:42 yeah well you said it and I hope I've made it clear that is not getting to result in any truncating of the questions all right very good thank you very much 10:00 to 5:00
02:56:52 all right come on no you have to carry on for a bit thank you yes I thought as I say if you feel you're getting too tired just
02:57:00 commander and mr. chairman first of all commander thank you very much for coming back to us mr. chairman I've had some discussions with various people and looking at my notes again it may be sensible not to rush tonight just to
02:57:12 sensible not to rush tonight just to because it's been a long day I'm told and commanded will correct me if I'm wrong but he will be available to come back tomorrow morning to finish off his evidence which will not take very long if need be
02:57:23 if need be so rather than pushing on through the dark hours it might be sensible to stop but I've alright I will see how we go and finish it save five past five or ten past five well if you think you've got
02:57:35 past five well if you think you've got the last time I ask you thought half an hour yes well but my only experience is that that's often around the flexible estimate yes not just in your case as
02:57:46 estimate yes not just in your case as well I think if we're not going to finish by five ten plus five it would be wiser to stop now I think we've got to travel to lanza to come back again
02:57:57 travel to lanza to come back again tomorrow and I'm quite see that that is perhaps inevitable yes then we'd be better to stop at this point I think on any of you we will not be able to finish
02:58:08 any of you we will not be able to finish by 10 past 5:00 including the break in order to for me to check my questions of course as it is welcome Andre I'm sorry I've got you back in to tell you we not
02:58:20 I've got you back in to tell you we not gonna finish tonight after all which means I'm going to have to ask you to come back tomorrow morning and hope not to detain you too long there at least I
02:58:32 to detain you too long there at least I think we can give you a proper start thank you
02:58:35 thank you alright okay this is very important that you don't talk to him for evidence absolutely the ones who leave the room yes all right thank you thank you very much at 10 o'clock tomorrow 10 o'clock tomorrow we'll I
02:58:46 tomorrow 10 o'clock tomorrow we'll I think deal with it satisfactorily so back at 10 o'clock tomorrow thank you thank you very much right
02:59:07 right well then we'll stop at this point and resume tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock indeed there will be I should just say mr. chairman there may be a very small knock-on effect in terms of
02:59:18 very small knock-on effect in terms of mr. Ravitz reading in a further residence witness statements but I hope that that can be accommodated without any further disturbance as well tomorrow right thank you thank you very much ten o'clock tomorrow empties