Dr Barbara Lane's expert evidence on fire safety in Grenfell Tower, examining flat entrance doors, fire resistance testing, building regulations compliance, and door closer maintenance failures.
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00:08:18 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing we're going to continue this morning with the evidence of dr. Lane yes could you all stop to learn to come
00:08:29 yes could you all stop to learn to come back in please
00:08:50 alright ready to carry on yep thank you very much this is great thank you and so just a signpost what we're going to be dealing with today I want to focus today on the active and passive fire safety
00:09:02 on the active and passive fire safety measures inside the building and the extent to which they failed to control the spread of fire and smoke and contributed to the speed at which the fire spreads and in general we're going to be looking at the certain passive
00:09:14 to be looking at the certain passive measures first including the flat and stair doors and then looking at the active systems later in the day including the fire main the lift and the
00:09:25 including the fire main the lift and the smoke control system mr. chairman I want to just give a very minor trigger warning at this stage on the basis that during the next two sections dealing with doors we will look at some images
00:09:37 with doors we will look at some images of fire doors in Granville Tower including some images of the doors when tested with smoke and flames around them so it's just a it's just a minor trigger
00:09:48 so it's just a it's just a minor trigger warning now in case anyone would find those images distressing and before we we start I understand dr. Lane that there is one point of clarification that you would like to provide in relation to
00:10:00 you would like to provide in relation to your evidence from last Thursday yes there is I think it was just before lunch there was owed quite a rapid series of questions about non combustible and combustible and
00:10:12 combustible and combustible and flammability yeah so I just want to speak very briefly about that the question about non combustible was did I I think was did I agree it dealt with
00:10:23 I think was did I agree it dealt with calorific content only my answer is no because sustained flaming mass loss and temperature difference must also be
00:10:35 temperature difference must also be measured and within limits that's what becomes the definition of a non combustible material the word flammability threw me because it's not a defined term in in reaction to fire
00:10:48 defined term in in reaction to fire tests or in general it's a word I won't use as a fire safety engineer I think if the person mentis deigned flaming if sustained flaming is part of assessing combustible and non
00:11:00 part of assessing combustible and non combustible materials the answer is yes with zero required for a non combustible material and then different quantities of sustained flaming remember we talked
00:11:13 of sustained flaming remember we talked about the B down to F then for other materials so it's a very technical point but I just have felt quite bad I didn't answer it on Thursday thank you thank
00:11:24 answer it on Thursday thank you thank you yes so just before we we consider flat doors specifically I just want to start by considering the overall consequences once we have a multi-story
00:11:37 consequences once we have a multi-story fire in existence now once that was the case so we have this external fire spread what fire safety features of the building do you think became most
00:11:49 building do you think became most critical inside the building okay so I haven't given an order of contribution yet as you know and so I wouldn't mind
00:12:01 yet as you know and so I wouldn't mind actually talking about that for just a little a little while so once the cladding fire had become a multi storey fire then over time
00:12:12 multi storey fire then over time internal fires also commenced and so we now over time had a multi-story internal fire condition so it's two multi storey
00:12:23 fire condition so it's two multi storey events a few will warn caused by the by the other and I also made clear on Thursday that in the next phase of my work I'm going to be looking at intrinsic risk and risk assessments and
00:12:35 intrinsic risk and risk assessments and this is important because a non-compliance system will either play a role or not in terms of a hazard posed to an individual or a grouping of
00:12:48 to an individual or a grouping of individuals as a function of the fire hazard in that location so giving a theoretical example a non-compliant fire door
00:12:57 door may have a substantial contribution to the severe consequences in one location for a grouping of people and it may have had no contribution in another location
00:13:10 had no contribution in another location where the consequences were not extreme so the non-compliance status is important and we'll be talking a lot about that today and in terms of health and safety duties but the next thing then is the overall
00:13:23 but the next thing then is the overall assessment of risk understanding the hazards to the people who lost their lives particularly in those locations and how each active and passive fire
00:13:34 and how each active and passive fire safety measure contributed to what's called severe harm and I had I've put in section two of my report a document I wanted to make you aware of it's called
00:13:46 wanted to make you aware of it's called pass 79 and that sets out a fire risk assessment methodology and risk is a function of probability of occurrence and consequences of failure and where
00:13:58 and consequences of failure and where there is multiple loss of life that's defined as severe harm so we know the consequences and we know the probability and the next step then is to analyze for
00:14:10 and the next step then is to analyze for each grouping of people who lost their lives how each one of the active and passive measures contributed so I can't pick one more than the other for all
00:14:22 pick one more than the other for all conditions because the fire hazard is different as a function of one's location just in terms of kind of
00:14:34 location just in terms of kind of particular features that are critical would you agree that the protected stairs and the lobbies are two particularly important spaces yes so so in Grandville tower and there was only
00:14:48 in Grandville tower and there was only one staircase and when when a resident was in a flat one lobby leading to one staircase and so once the fire had spread through the cladding on multiple
00:15:00 spread through the cladding on multiple floors there was only one way to leave the building and so the staircase but particularly the lobby immediately became the most important protection measure
00:15:11 the most important protection measure for those persons when they were evacuating for people who stayed various active and passive fire protection
00:15:23 active and passive fire protection measures were needed or relied upon by them to make that staying put safe in that context okay so the stairs
00:15:34 safe in that context okay so the stairs on the lobby became very important but the compartment ation to the flats was exceptionally important for people who did not walk down the stairs of their own accord within particularly the first
00:15:48 own accord within particularly the first 40 minutes and I've gone into considerable detail on this subject in section 14 particularly I just wanted to give it to you so and what you're saying
00:16:01 give it to you so and what you're saying there is that flat doors and stair doors which we're going to come to in a moment become particularly important become particularly important but there are other openings in the lobby that are potential for fire and smoke spread so
00:16:14 potential for fire and smoke spread so any riser breaking through the lobby such as the smoke control riser when it's shot must also prevent fire and smoke spread and there was multiple other services in the lobby built as
00:16:28 other services in the lobby built as part of the primary refurbishment and they too needed to prevent fire and smoke spread but in terms of the immediate line between a person in a
00:16:39 immediate line between a person in a flat and the conditions and the lobby and the conditions in the stairs the doors are particularly important in my opinion yeah just one more question before we get specific too specifically
00:16:50 before we get specific too specifically to flak doors in terms of the active and passive safety systems in the building that your evidence is that the greater number of layers of safety which fail the greater the likelihood of a major
00:17:01 the greater the likelihood of a major incident
00:17:02 incident yes that's correct and that that's not let's say an opinion I formulated on my it's kind of classic disaster catastrophe theory where the more layers
00:17:14 catastrophe theory where the more layers it just as the statutory guidance builds in layers and multiple layers we spoke a lot about cavity barriers on Thursday there's at least three for example between one window and the next so the
00:17:29 between one window and the next so the more layers that are defective or an or entirely defective the the higher the risk and the more severe the consequences so turning them to
00:17:43 consequences so turning them to specifically look at flat doors it's really chapter fifteen and it's particularly chapter fifteen point five and appendix I that are going to be relevant here if you want to make sure you've got those yeah and and and
00:18:00 you've got those yeah and and and picking up on that theme about flat doors and their importance in the LGA guide on purpose-built blocks of flats it says that flat doors are critical to the safety of the common parts would you
00:18:11 the safety of the common parts would you agree with that yes I do
00:18:14 in terms of the relevant legal framework and what happened at Grand Hotel we know that there was a significant flat door replacement in 2011 yes in Grenville
00:18:27 replacement in 2011 yes in Grenville Tower at that time a hundred and six flat doors were replaced you give the figures in your report that's 58 unglazed flat doors and 48 glades and
00:18:40 unglazed flat doors and 48 glades and both types of door were mastered or sure door doors that's correct correct and in addition there were fourteen doors that were not replaced at that time which you believe
00:18:51 replaced at that time which you believe may have been twelve leaseholder doors and two tentative doors is that correct yes we should perhaps note at this point that you've noted that in certain
00:19:02 that you've noted that in certain chronologies produced the inquiry that there's some reference to flat door replacement works in or about 1985 but is it right that we don't have any documentation at this stage to assist it
00:19:14 documentation at this stage to assist it in what would have been a scope of those words that's correct now as we've already discussed back at last Thursday your view is that ground-fault hours originally
00:19:25 ground-fault hours originally constructed in accordance with the guidance set out in CP 3 1971 and you've explained to us what the CP 3 1971 guidance would have been for doors
00:19:37 guidance would have been for doors you've said the recommended performance specification was for something called a type 3 fire resisting door yes that correct yes and you've explained in your report that that meant they must have
00:19:49 report that that meant they must have freedom from collapse for at least 30 minutes and resistance to passage of flame for at least 20 minutes and fitted with automatic self closing devices is that correct that's correct yeah now building up towards the 2011
00:20:03 yeah now building up towards the 2011 flat door replacement you know that there was some D CLG guidance in 2006 Farva state fire safety risk assessments sleeping accommodation often referred to
00:20:14 sleeping accommodation often referred to as the DC LD sleeping guide yes that that was available and in force at the time the 2011 door replacement was being considered is that correct yes and you
00:20:26 considered is that correct yes and you say that that assisted in any risk assessment relating to doors is that correct it should do and you say that a key point that is made in that D CLG
00:20:37 key point that is made in that D CLG guidance was that all doors onto a protected corridor should have a self closing device is that correct yes and you also know that from July 2011 there
00:20:51 you also know that from July 2011 there was the Local Government Association LGA guide on purpose built blocks of flats crabbed
00:20:58 crabbed which also applied to doors and Grenville Tower is that correct correct and is it right that this represents guidance to assist responsible persons to discharge their duties under the fire
00:21:09 to discharge their duties under the fire safety order 2005 yes it is I just want to look at a few potentially relevant parts of that guidance so if we can pull that up and if we can go to CTA r50 33
00:21:24 that up and if we can go to CTA r50 33 at page 98 this is internal page 95 of the LG a guide and if we can just if we
00:21:38 the LG a guide and if we can just if we could blow up that table at the bottom that's great can you see that okay yeah yeah actually it's probably worth saying
00:21:49 yeah actually it's probably worth saying nothing has been made available to me and I would have thought it should have been by name and as to what the performance spec for those works actually were and so what document was
00:22:03 actually were and so what document was actually relied upon or considered what I'm going to do is look at the DL GA guide now and then we'll look at HEB the
00:22:14 guide now and then we'll look at HEB the relevant parts of HIV which you've summarized so just sticking with this the LDA guide this is giving benchmarks for existing blocks of flats yes and
00:22:27 for existing blocks of flats yes and what it's saying is if you've got different travel distances you may be advised to do different things with your doors is that correct that's correct and at Granville tower we'll come back to
00:22:38 at Granville tower we'll come back to your diagram in a moment you've meant measured travel distance in the lobby as up to ten point five meters yes which means that are we on this second to last
00:22:49 means that are we on this second to last bullet point exactly so in if if one agrees with the LGA guide and it says that for a travel distance between ten to fifteen meters in an existing
00:23:02 to fifteen meters in an existing building you know as a minimum the existing doors should be upgraded as opposed to being replaced with a new door yeah so just to read that in
00:23:14 door yeah so just to read that in ventilated lobbies and corridors travel distances of ten to fifteen meters may be acceptable providing all doors to the common corridor or Lobby are at least upgraded FD 30s doors and the smoke
00:23:27 upgraded FD 30s doors and the smoke ventilation comprises Peavey's or a ovie that's correct so it's travel distance and ventilation yeah just to be clear what PV or a ovie means is an a permanent vent and an
00:23:40 means is an a permanent vent and an automatically open event yes thank you and if we can then stay with this LGA guide for a moment and go to paragraph
00:23:51 guide for a moment and go to paragraph 62 point 17 that's on internal page 101 if we can highlight yeah so here what
00:24:02 if we can highlight yeah so here what it's saying is it's not going to be practicable to test existing doors to confirm their actual fire resistance therefore various options exist in relation to doors and and so this is
00:24:14 relation to doors and and so this is saying you can either accept the door as it is upgrade the door or replace the door is that correct well it's the view of this guy n't that it's not crap table
00:24:26 of this guy n't that it's not crap table practicable to test existing doors and so it it offers you some other approaches to consider yeah and one of those is replacement yes the door is
00:24:38 those is replacement yes the door is indeed yes exactly it might be helpful at this point because this is going to come up in relation to doors generally where we've got upgrading of the door it
00:24:51 where we've got upgrading of the door it talks about fitting in tumescent strips and smoke seals could you just explain to the Chairman what the difference is between an intermittent strip and a smoke seal yes I can so an an inch msyn
00:25:03 smoke seal yes I can so an an inch msyn strip operates under heat and it's intended to prevent the passage of flame as well as the gaseous gaseous products of combustion a smoke seal is intended
00:25:15 of combustion a smoke seal is intended to prevent the passage of gaseous products of combustion only and it's it's also called a cold smoke seal
00:25:25 again just sticking with this guy for the moment can we go to page 102 and look at 6220 so is it right that that is
00:25:39 look at 6220 so is it right that that is making clear the fitting of suitable self closing devices whether to replace rising but hinders all because the doors are not fitted with self closing devices must be undertaken in the short-term as
00:25:50 must be undertaken in the short-term as a matter of priority so in this guide it is very clear that you must fit self closing devices as a priority is that correct absolutely which aligns with the statutory guidance yes yeah which we're
00:26:03 statutory guidance yes yeah which we're going to come to you next and then can we also look at paragraph sixty two point two two of the LJ guide that's at the bottom of there and is it right that
00:26:15 the bottom of there and is it right that that makes clear that any new or replacement doors within an existing block of flats should meet current standards for fire resisting doors so if you choose to put in a new door you need to put it in in accordance with current
00:26:27 to put it in in accordance with current standards yeah that's correct and so one one would be expected to have the relevant test evidence to either the National clas or the European class thank you now just before we come on to
00:26:40 thank you now just before we come on to an approved document b we talked about travel distances and your assessment of travel distances and if we go to you've put a very clear figure in your addendum
00:26:51 put a very clear figure in your addendum to your report that's B L as50 is 37 on page 24 figure fifteen point five we
00:27:02 page 24 figure fifteen point five we could bring that up
00:27:23 you know it's not that sorry BL as50 is 37 on page 24
00:27:37 [Music] no not that either hmm sorry I'll just take that down so it's it's within the
00:27:48 take that down so it's it's within the it's within that same addendum and it's figure fifteen point five
00:28:10 I'm just getting the pace on for it
00:28:21 do you want me to just speak anyway I'm not sure the figure can really dude fine if you just want to experience power 'full as it might be yeah yeah so I think on the drawing I marked up the
00:28:33 think on the drawing I marked up the travel distance from each door yeah and it's quite striking actually when you think about consequences later the difference in terms of journey distance
00:28:44 difference in terms of journey distance as a function of what flat you lived in and in terms of the LGA guide that the travel distances are exceeded I don't
00:28:55 travel distances are exceeded I don't know if you wanted to cover and come back so that we can come back to that in a bit we'll check we've got the right so for example flat you have 225 the travel distance is only four and a half meters it's a very short distance but for other
00:29:08 it's a very short distance but for other flats it's in excess of ten meters and that's why this situation about the hazard experienced in specific locations is going to become so important yes that's it if we can zoom in on that
00:29:22 that's it if we can zoom in on that middle figure to play that out yeah so just that illustrate your yes travel
00:29:33 just that illustrate your yes travel distances yeah so you can see flat for occupants a flat for travel have to travel you know over a double that of
00:29:44 travel you know over a double that of say somebody living in flat one I now want to go to your summary of the requirements of approved document b the
00:29:55 requirements of approved document b the relevant part of a pre document b in and this is in table i three of your report if we could bring that up on the screen that's BL as50 30 at 36
00:30:15 thank you and you've explained in your report that at the time of the flat door replacement work in 2011 approved document b 2010 would have been in place
00:30:27 document b 2010 would have been in place is that correct that's correct and what you've sought to do in this table which I think appears in a3 landscape in your report yes is to summarize the key
00:30:39 report yes is to summarize the key performance requirements that are there in a proof document B 2010 is that correct correct I just want to pick out some of the the key ones at this stage so if we go the fourth column along
00:30:52 so if we go the fourth column along you've got fire resistance and there you've got no integrity failure up to 30 minutes when tested to the relevant british standard does that correct
00:31:03 british standard does that correct that's correct that's 30 minutes integrity 30 minute or just reminders what integrity is and it's a measure of preventing flame and temperature coming through cracks that's a very simplistic
00:31:15 through cracks that's a very simplistic definition there are certain ways of measuring it during the test yep but it's basically just it to start to make sure there's no cracks and no flames protruding yes in the next column
00:31:29 protruding yes in the next column you've got smoke leakage performance standards yeah and you refer to they have to have a leakage rate not exceeding three cubic meters per meter
00:31:40 exceeding three cubic meters per meter per hour when tested in certain ways that yes that's correct and measuring that leakage is deemed to represent the smoke leakage condition yep and two
00:31:55 smoke leakage condition yep and two other points on this table glazing in your next column in a sixth column it makes it clear no glazing unless the glazing has has as per table a4 has been
00:32:08 glazing has has as per table a4 has been demonstrated to achieve an insulation performance equivalent to the required integrity performance is that correct explain your glazings not got to be a weak point is that correct that's correct so our on escape routes the
00:32:20 correct so our on escape routes the glazing
00:32:20 glazing basically has to be detailed up to be the to to not be a weak spot and not allow heat heat transfer through the glass so insulation performance is
00:32:32 the glass so insulation performance is about preventing detailing to prevent temperature rise on the unheated side so it's protecting the person walking past the closed door if the fire is behind
00:32:44 the closed door if the fire is behind that door
00:32:45 that door and then the point you made earlier about self closing device is in the very next column self closed a performance standard so that makes it clear that it
00:32:58 standard so that makes it clear that it is required under pre document B 2010 it must close the door from any angle and against any latch yes is that correct that's what you were emphasizing earlier that this statutory guidance the LGA
00:33:09 that this statutory guidance the LGA guide with a DC LD sleeping guide they are all clear about self closing they were all entirely aligned about the provision of self closers and the guidance since the seventies has been
00:33:21 guidance since the seventies has been very clear about the what the role of a self closed or isn't quiet is so important do you want to just explain why it's so important it may just shut the door shut the door
00:33:36 it may just shut the door shut the door after a person to make - you know to make sure the door can close yeah and now what I can't say anything else yeah
00:33:47 now what I can't say anything else yeah you're tuned to make sure did I say a sure it doesn't close no to make sure it does close yes now I want to run through your conclusions about the performance
00:33:58 your conclusions about the performance of the flat doors based on your investigation yes and primarily we're looking at the the 106 master door door yes that were replaced and you say in your report that you surveyed eight of
00:34:10 your report that you surveyed eight of these master door doors during your site visit yeah correct yes and you've noted a large number of problems with these doors I just want to pick up on some of the key ones there's a lot of detail in
00:34:22 the key ones there's a lot of detail in a pending
00:34:23 a pending but I want to focus on some of the key points you seem to be making you say that the 106 doors were not tested for 30 minutes integrity from both sides of
00:34:34 30 minutes integrity from both sides of the door and therefore were not compliant with the requirements of a peed document B is that correct yeah so there is the door installed and granville Tower and then there is the
00:34:45 granville Tower and then there is the door that was tested and used as the relevant test evidence so the test door was tested from one side only but as you
00:34:56 was tested from one side only but as you know the test door type isn't what was installed a grande filter okay so the door was tested from one side only yep yeah and it's worth well I think at this
00:35:10 yeah and it's worth well I think at this point noting that you have referred to the bre global test report that the MPs obtained on one of these doors yes they
00:35:22 obtained on one of these doors yes they tested one of these doors on the 13th of February 2018 for fire integrity and the door achieved just 15 minutes integrity is that correct that's correct on it with the glazing panel yes I'd like to
00:35:34 with the glazing panel yes I'd like to just look at that test report I think that's just useful so if we can bring that up there we go that this is the test report met triple zero one nine nine nine six and if we go to internal
00:35:46 nine nine six and if we go to internal page 25 of this test report if you can perhaps zoom in on that image
00:35:59 and here we have the door and it says in the label exposed face of specimen at time of first integrity failure 15 minutes can you just talk us through
00:36:10 minutes can you just talk us through what we're seeing in that pic well I mean it's a bit blurry I don't know how other so what I see is flame coming out presumably where the glazing glazed area
00:36:24 presumably where the glazing glazed area is in that door yeah and that's it takes
00:36:36 is in that door yeah and that's it takes is significant that we're also seeing smoke coming from the sides of the door yeah so this that's that's a bit complicated actually because if that
00:36:49 complicated actually because if that smoke isn't hot enough by definition in the test it doesn't matter that smoke that smoke is coming around the door and I have to be honest that that just
00:37:04 I have to be honest that that just really also witness some other doors being tested and it really struck me during those tests that that was deemed to be acceptable if we then go just one
00:37:18 to be acceptable if we then go just one page on that page 26 that is the door at 28 minutes is that right at the end of the test
00:37:27 the test yes I just wanted to kind of yes so sure we can see the difference so total failure of the door yeah now you know that this is a retrospective test of a
00:37:39 that this is a retrospective test of a door taken from ground floor tower yes and it's obviously a glazed specimen that we're looking at here yes and in those circumstances how representative do you think this test results of be of
00:37:50 do you think this test results of be of the likely doors performance of those doors performance I think it was nearly half the doors had glazing in them yeah yes and where there's all I can see
00:38:02 yes and where there's all I can see where there's a glazed door you consider this test evidence to be relevant yes well my understanding is this is yet the door that was installed a grand filter but you know the BRE and
00:38:13 a grand filter but you know the BRE and the police would need to just confirm all of that but my understanding is that is one of the doors and so it is representative now on glazing that's
00:38:24 representative now on glazing that's another one of the issues you've identified in your report you've noticed that the glazed test specimen used for the original fire tech support in support of those flat doors used a
00:38:35 support of those flat doors used a different specification of glass to that which was actually used in a 2011 upgrade that correct that's correct they're not described the same way and
00:38:47 they're not described the same way and obviously if we wanted to pursue that further would be useful to understand exactly what the exact technical specification that was proposed and what
00:38:58 specification that was proposed and what was installed in the tower but I you know I'm not I personally don't need that level of detail because I'm clear the door failed and the test yeah and you say for that
00:39:09 and the test yeah and you say for that reason that that test evidence that came with the doors is not relevant test evidence in circumstances where the glazing is different exactly because it's so it's it's made very clear and
00:39:20 it's so it's it's made very clear and the strategy guidance document the importance of taking care with the glass and so when one is offering a door with glazing for installation in a
00:39:31 glazing for installation in a residential building it's important to make sure that glazed element is a glazed element that's been tested satisfactorily and will allow the door to perform to the required standard now
00:39:45 to perform to the required standard now you've also concluded that the flat doors don't comply with certain cold smoke leakage requirements in a DB table b1 what you've said is there's no information in the test report about
00:39:57 information in the test report about cold smoke leakage performance yeah exactly so there's there's two points here so there is no terms of works there's no technical
00:40:09 terms of works there's no technical specification for the work so I don't know who asks for a fart type of door so in I have to rely on a spreadsheets from master door and they are far F t30 doors
00:40:23 master door and they are far F t30 doors with no s stated and the test report I have is also FD 30 with no s test done
00:40:34 have is also FD 30 with no s test done so you could say they match but I don't understand why an FD 30 door was installed when an FD 30 s door should
00:40:45 installed when an FD 30 s door should have been installed so it's it's two separate points s wasn't doesn't appear to have been called for and s was not provided and s is about cold smoke leak
00:40:57 provided and s is about cold smoke leak yes it is it's again can you just explain to scold what cold smoke leakage is referring to in simple terms so the the door and its final form with any
00:41:08 the door and its final form with any fixtures and fittings any intumescent anything at all needed for fire resistance is put under pressure and the leakage measured and has to be lower
00:41:19 leakage measured and has to be lower than a defined value and that represents what the door would do when smoke is attempting to pass through it now you've
00:41:32 attempting to pass through it now you've also concluded that the doors contain different hardware including locks hinges letter plate setter boxes than in the test reports that's correct
00:41:43 the test reports that's correct can you explain why that's potentially so significant different Hardware in yes well the statutory guidance document approved document b makes that clear and the test reports for fire doors makes
00:41:55 the test reports for fire doors makes that clear and it it seems to be because if you want to use a brace getting the door through the test it's a sensitive
00:42:07 door through the test it's a sensitive business
00:42:08 business so any piece of metal any gap you know so Lux letterboxes may act as a heat transfer route as a flame spread route
00:42:20 transfer route as a flame spread route or a hot smoke spread route and so would cause the door to fail so a door when sold can be detailed up to perform
00:42:32 sold can be detailed up to perform perfectly satisfactorily but then it must be installed that way too because of those sensitivities and I consider those sensitivities to be very well documented as an issue now in terms of
00:42:47 documented as an issue now in terms of intimate seals in your report you've compared the intumescent seals that were specified for the 109 replacement doors with those included in the test specimen
00:42:58 with those included in the test specimen yes and again you found that none was specified with the same intumescent seals as the test report so so the seal near the locks some of the seals near
00:43:13 near the locks some of the seals near the locks and the hinges were but the main seals around around the leaf were not so the majority of the seals were not as communicated in the test report
00:43:27 not as communicated in the test report provided as being relevant and then in terms of self closing mechanisms yeah you've noted that the door closes which was specified for the refurbishment were
00:43:39 was specified for the refurbishment were not the same as the door closer in the one specimen that was tested is that correct that is correct it was an overhead closer that classic arm closer in test and most of the doors I saw had
00:43:56 in test and most of the doors I saw had that internal closing device using the chain but you'll see in the detail in my report
00:44:02 report for example there's photos from London Fire Brigade after the fire where they did observe a door one door with an overhead closing device but I don't know
00:44:15 overhead closing device but I don't know why that was there because it was the chain closing mechanism appears to have been the one specified during the door replacement works you've highlighted in your report
00:44:29 works you've highlighted in your report several instances of door closes malfunctioning or braking based on the written evidence you've seen do you agree that we've heard more examples of that in the oral evidence from the yes
00:44:40 that in the oral evidence from the yes idea SARS during the course of the BS our evidence and you've also noted in terms of frequency of inspections you
00:44:51 terms of frequency of inspections you note in your report that the LGA guide suggests six monthly inspections and preventative maintenance for by resisting doors that's a current aimed at identifying defects such as missing
00:45:03 at identifying defects such as missing or ineffective closing devices that crowd you also know that there's a relevant british standard BS eight four one two two thousand eight which recommended six monthly checks yes of
00:45:16 recommended six monthly checks yes of the door closes and you also say the d c-- LG guidance suggested more frequently perhaps month noisy joke yeah i think there are more making sure I would consider that when you're doing a
00:45:28 would consider that when you're doing a monthly inspection if the door is able to close and the sixth monthly inspection would be a careful review of the door yep and you've noted that the TMO policy was for fire risk assessment
00:45:40 TMO policy was for fire risk assessment on an annual or two yearly basis is that correct
00:45:46 correct apparently so yeah so if that and we will have to look at the evidence on this and if that was the only time the
00:45:57 this and if that was the only time the door closes were checked for yes hypothetically if it was the only time they were checked what you're doing attention to is that there's other guidance that suggests more frequent expect inspections so I'm dealing I haven't dealt with maintenance yes yes
00:46:09 haven't dealt with maintenance yes yes so yes the frequency seems to be different but in phase two I'd be more interested in the quality of the inspection and the maintenance that occurred in the tower
00:46:22 now before we come on to the impact of these issues on the events of the night just on the 14 doors that were not
00:46:33 just on the 14 doors that were not replaced yes in 2011 that's 12 leaseholder doors and 2:10 into doors and you say in your report you can't confirm the specification of the original 1970s installation or
00:46:46 original 1970s installation or installation or any subsequent replacement of the doors because they've now been lost in the fire was that correct yes so I couldn't inspect the doors because they're all gone yeah and no relevant paperwork has been made
00:47:01 no relevant paperwork has been made available to me about them and the only thing I know is worth the risk Assessor set the TMO which is in my report and he considered those doors to be fire
00:47:13 considered those doors to be fire retardant which isn't a relevant term regarding fire resisting doors you've said in your report that the compliance of these doors cannot be determined at this time and that because the doors
00:47:25 this time and that because the doors have been lost their compliance will not be able to be determined is that your position unless the PMO or other parties produce the paperwork and information
00:47:37 produce the paperwork and information they relied upon when they decided the performance of those doors so I now want to look at the impact of those issues that you've identified on the events of
00:47:50 that you've identified on the events of the night and and you summarized the potential contribution that these issues may have caused in your report a paragraph nineteen point five point two
00:48:01 paragraph nineteen point five point two a can we just go to that that's BL as50 is 19 at page 20 and so you said you've crystallized for us here what you say
00:48:14 crystallized for us here what you say are a number of ways in which the flat entrance doors failed to control the spread of smoke and fire to the lobbies yeah in these paragraphs I just want to take you through them and just some
00:48:26 take you through them and just some okay and so you say an a fairly to prevent the spread of smoke and flame by leakage through gaps between the door leaf and the doorframe is that correct that's correct
00:48:37 that's correct yeah and that's important in the early stages of a fire yeah or if one is waiting some time in a flat to remote from a hazard and smoke a spreading from
00:48:49 from a hazard and smoke a spreading from the lobby and be what you're drawing attention to there I think it's very - but it resists the spread of fire and smoke from within an apartment due to multiple untested components in the door
00:49:02 multiple untested components in the door yes that would include Hardware glazing yes that's correct and so once once a severe fire happened near a door or
00:49:14 severe fire happened near a door or there was a flashover in an apartment or any kind of localized heat and condition failure of the door would be a would be expected in theory and obviously it's
00:49:26 expected in theory and obviously it's supported by witness evidence see you've got failure to resist the spread of smoke and fire from flashover within flats yeah due to the presence of glazing
00:49:38 yeah due to the presence of glazing expected you say - cause early failure based on correct evidence yeah D we have a failure of an unknown number of doors to self closed after an occupants escape
00:49:49 to self closed after an occupants escape that's correct yeah and you also say in the next paragraph if we could go to the next page at the top of your report that the fire doors failed in a second way
00:50:01 the fire doors failed in a second way which is they fail to resist the spread of smoke and fire from the lobby given that they're supposed to perform in both directions that's that correct point you're making again I'm back to this issue of what is
00:50:13 again I'm back to this issue of what is the hazard and it's in a specific location of and at a specific time that's very important so in the event that one was in a flat with no fire
00:50:25 that one was in a flat with no fire within it it maybe there was a hazard in the lobby that you required protection from
00:50:34 yes do you have a current view as to which of those are potentially the most significant on the night I want to look
00:50:46 significant on the night I want to look at the hazard in a specific location before I give a final opinion I do consider the fire doors to be a very
00:50:57 consider the fire doors to be a very significant fire safety measure in general and I think therefore their contribution to the events on the night
00:51:08 contribution to the events on the night require very careful review what would you say to the point which can be made that the doors even if compliant would have only had 30 minutes integrity
00:51:19 have only had 30 minutes integrity that's correct yep that's so it's not 60 minutes it's not 120 minutes as it is 30 minutes and given that such doors are not intended
00:51:30 given that such doors are not intended to provide indefinite perfect protection isn't it inevitable that they're going to fail at some point it is indeed inevitable that they're going to fail at some point but the important point is
00:51:42 some point but the important point is what happens before that happened before that failure occurs so I don't think it's acceptable to have you know to consider because they might fail anyway
00:51:53 consider because they might fail anyway it doesn't really matter what happens in the time period before that I think that's very important particularly for people who are waiting in flats I've
00:52:08 people who are waiting in flats I've been asked to put to you the following proposition to the extent that the flat entrance doors were non-compliant that had at most only a limited effect on the spread of fire and smoke and the outcome of the fire which I don't agree with
00:52:20 of the fire which I don't agree with that at all do you agree that there would you like to explain why
00:52:29 I think that those fire doors were needed first-first it for so many different reasons as a function of where
00:52:41 different reasons as a function of where one was living or you know waiting for rescue in the time so we have conditions where you know protection from fire or
00:52:53 where you know protection from fire or protection from smoke either in one's own apartment in a lobby and say from another another flat on the floor so wherever you're
00:53:06 flat on the floor so wherever you're located there may be nearby fire or remote fire and you are relying on those lines to prevent those products eventually reaching your location and
00:53:18 eventually reaching your location and I'm not being I'm not avoiding the answer that's why I've emphasized at the start today the location of the flat and the location of the person is so
00:53:29 the location of the person is so important in terms of what that fire protection measure was needed for and doors protect against fire and smoke and so I will give a view therefore on how
00:53:40 so I will give a view therefore on how they pros doors performed in the lobbies for the lobbies for our flats when I carry out my risk assessment and Phase two okay so it's not appropriate
00:53:53 two okay so it's not appropriate therefore either to simply say they all failed they all have the same contribution it's relevant to location and the hazard they were required to protect a person from so will it be
00:54:07 protect a person from so will it be relevant to your analysis at phase two that we can see examples from the BS ARS evidence some residents where they are talking about smoke coming in through
00:54:18 talking about smoke coming in through the front door whether underneath the bottom around the sides a couple of examples clear examples through the letterbox that's correct
00:54:26 correct those are all areas you're interested in I'm very interested in those areas yeah and and and one can give a number I'm not going to go through them all now there are a number of examples from the
00:54:37 there are a number of examples from the be SRS and what will evidence yes there are and that's why again I don't want to give any kind of overall opinion on one measure I think there's a really important piece of
00:54:49 there's a really important piece of analysis per flats per la be required to you know to give a fair view on what those systems did because would you
00:55:00 those systems did because would you accept that there are some examples of flat doors appearing to felt farewell on the night for example Antonio Runkle RT who's there for a very long time here's the last amendment I think that's a
00:55:12 the last amendment I think that's a really good example actually so the hazards in that flat was entirely different to example flat wound up at
00:55:23 different to example flat wound up at level 23 so when I'm looking at the doors in that context I will explain the hazard and that flats and why it was so different to the hazard in for example flat one at level 23 and so explain the
00:55:36 flat one at level 23 and so explain the relevance of the non-compliant fire doors does it often come down to a matter of timing in terms of as I said before people staying in their facts and
00:55:47 before people staying in their facts and and waiting in accordance with the the stay-put instruction and the length of time that that door is hurting them from her I wouldn't want it that's quite a
00:55:59 her I wouldn't want it that's quite a general question and I would not want to answer it generally I don't think it would be appropriate it's all about specific hazards and specific protection
00:56:12 specific hazards and specific protection needed would it be possible to estimate how much smoke might seep out from a a representative closed non-compliant door
00:56:23 representative closed non-compliant door as compared with a compliant door would it be possible to do that exercise I'm sure there's somebody clever somewhere I can run a CFD analysis and work that out if if it was important do you think that
00:56:36 if if it was important do you think that exercise would be a useful one at the moment I don't have any plans to do that what I let you know if I change my mind and Phase two and I think you've answered this but in terms
00:56:49 think you've answered this but in terms of doing a flat by flat analysis of the impact for example of no self closing device or inadequate self closing device yes whether the door nevertheless the
00:57:01 yes whether the door nevertheless the shutter was shut behind is that the kind of analysis I like being excited for Phase two would you agree that the presence of smoke in the lobbies is most
00:57:15 presence of smoke in the lobbies is most likely to have been caused by a combination of factors which may have also included flat entrance doors being held open or propped open flat entrance doors being broken down by firefighters
00:57:27 doors being broken down by firefighters to fight fires would you agree that all of those factors are going to be relevant in terms of the presence of smoke on lobbies though all those factors will be relevant but I don't
00:57:39 factors will be relevant but I don't think we should overstate those other features in terms of quantity of location that actually occurred so there's a you know saying the fire
00:57:50 there's a you know saying the fire brigade broke down doors you know it sounds as if that was happening it's I think it's a bit of a sweeping statement isn't it so there is very specific activity on specific floors and I would
00:58:03 activity on specific floors and I would look at the doors carefully in that regard and in terms of smoke and the lobby you I've made clear there there may there are other and there may be
00:58:15 may there are other and there may be more contribute contributory features also and I will take each measure and turn just in terms of the early presence
00:58:26 turn just in terms of the early presence of smoke on the lobbies and some firefighters say they were very surprised to find smoke in lobbies at a very early stage in the fire we get the evidence of for example by do who's
00:58:37 evidence of for example by do who's going up and and and firefighter secret similarly do you have any view at this stage about what factors might have been important in terms of explaining that early presence of smoke in
00:58:49 early presence of smoke in nabis or would you give the same answer
00:58:54 well in I mean again I want to do the location by location review but there there was a trend in terms of the location of the external flame front and
00:59:07 location of the external flame front and the progression of early smoke in the lobbies so clearly there was a smoke spread route from the cladding fire out
00:59:20 spread route from the cladding fire out to the lobby and will part of your analysis look at the flat sixes and in specific importance of the flat sixes and their self closing device or their
00:59:33 and their self closing device or their door yes it will fine yep because remember the whole point about having a self closer is that when a person evacuates they don't cause harm I don't
00:59:46 evacuates they don't cause harm I don't like to you know that's not a nice way of putting it but the whole point of having a self closer is the door closes behind the person who's evacuated and they've they're for the protection is
00:59:58 they've they're for the protection is maintained that's why they're so incredibly important I'm now going to turn to a different but related topic of the stair doors yeah for this purpose
01:00:13 the stair doors yeah for this purpose it's really chapter 16 and appendices I and a little bit of em but mainly I that that is relevant you want to make sure you for those two homes now turning to
01:00:28 you for those two homes now turning to the stair doors therefore in your revised report you've done a considerable amount of work to try and ascertain the history of the stair doors at Granville Tower including whether they were compliant with relevant
01:00:40 they were compliant with relevant standards over time including looking at their original installation at Granville Tower is that correct yeah so I just probably wouldn't mind being able to say that I I have been contented since I
01:00:52 that I I have been contented since I wrote my report about the CP 3 requirements for stereo doors but I know that other people had a lot of concern with my view so that's why I did that extra work to
01:01:04 so that's why I did that extra work to try and explain with a lot of detail the performance of historic fire doors and I've done that work but I my position remains about the CP 3 requirements far
01:01:18 remains about the CP 3 requirements far those doors because doors and ventilation together protect a lot protect a stair no prior to asking you some some more detailed questions about about that and about the stair doors in
01:01:31 about that and about the stair doors in detail can we just look at your conclusion at paragraph nineteen point seven point two seven of your report elas five zeros nineteen page 45 I just
01:01:48 elas five zeros nineteen page 45 I just asked you to read that paragraph to yourself for a moment so this is the failure to prevent smoke spread into the stairs into the stair yeah the stair doors appear to be the primary route of
01:02:00 doors appear to be the primary route of spread of smoke and heat to the stair because I didn't find any other open yep no other significant failures and the construction separating the stair from the lobby or flats has been observed yes
01:02:12 the lobby or flats has been observed yes and and then is the next I wants to fix on the next stage you say at this stage the stair door was being opened or held open by either firefighting equipment or other objects appears to be the primary
01:02:24 other objects appears to be the primary failure
01:02:24 failure yes that's correct because I didn't observe on-site sorry I didn't observe in in the tower apologies severe damage
01:02:36 in in the tower apologies severe damage to the concrete in the staircase and I would expect to see severe damage in the staircase for example if the door had entirely failed so collapsed for it you
01:02:50 entirely failed so collapsed for it you know collapsed on some form I haven't seen that so I can't say they fail that way
01:02:55 way so I have to assume therefore that any heating effects I observed in the staircase or the smoke observed in the staircase came through the the you know
01:03:10 staircase came through the the you know the activity of the doors yep and would you agree that we need to bear that in mind when it comes to any potential problems in terms the performance of these stair doors your completion I mean
01:03:23 these stair doors your completion I mean you're saying you think the primary failure appears to have been opened doors do we need to bear that in mind when we think oh yes I think I've been quite clear on that yes yeah just in
01:03:35 quite clear on that yes yeah just in general can you explain the importance of stair doors in a building like Granville Tower with a single staircase yeah so they have two rolls to prevent
01:03:47 yeah so they have two rolls to prevent smoke from the fire flat which may have entered the lobby entering the staircase and so prevent an escape from above the
01:03:58 and so prevent an escape from above the fire on the second roll is on it that's why it's to a higher standard actually is again to prevent smoke entering the staircase to protect firefighters who
01:04:11 staircase to protect firefighters who are moving up and down and that staircase carrying out their various duties yeah so as you say because of that dual role it has a particularly protective status that staircase yes it does yeah and does that make it
01:04:27 yes it does yeah and does that make it all the more important as a safety feature I think it's important yes I think it's important I'm probably not ready to say all the more important about anything just yet now I'm about to
01:04:41 about anything just yet now I'm about to go to a more more detailed passage I'm happy to stop now or carry in terms of a break I mean like a break at this point I'm okay but how how much it would it be another three hours if we
01:04:52 it would it be another three hours if we don't have a break it could easily be 20 minutes I would suggest we have a break now okay and maybe have another one in the button Rose okay you gave the up
01:05:05 the button Rose okay you gave the up show and we'll come back at 5000m right
01:19:57 all right how did it go on yep Nielsen screams thank you I just have a small correction to make to the transcript and an apology and to page 36 of the transcript I'm recorded as saying Antonio Runkle
01:20:09 I'm recorded as saying Antonio Runkle Otto was one of the lakh was the last person to be rescued in fact that's not correct it was el pedo Bonifacio from flat 83 he was the last person with
01:20:20 flat 83 he was the last person with rescued and I ought to correct that and apologize thank you okay thank you so um in terms of these stair doors you have
01:20:32 in terms of these stair doors you have concluded that all 20 doors on levels for 223 our original 1972 construction doors is that correct that's correct and
01:20:43 doors is that correct that's correct and we just look at a couple of pictures of those doors just to remind ourselves what they looked at you've got two pictures that are helpful in your report elas five zeros thirty at page 78 figure
01:20:59 elas five zeros thirty at page 78 figure i-25 if we can zoom in on that so this is a level six stair door is that correct yes it is and and if we can look
01:21:13 correct yes it is and and if we can look at the figure at the bottom figure i-26 we're going to come back to this picture and look in a moment but there we see what the edge looks like of those doors
01:21:25 what the edge looks like of those doors you say brush sealed present I'm not going to ask you questions about that right now but okay that this is just to remind ourselves what those doors look like so that's the door on level six can we also look at the level 19 stair door
01:21:38 we also look at the level 19 stair door that's BL as50 38 page 82 figure i30 so this is the level 19 stair door
01:21:51 this is the level 19 stair door the fire and again so we can see the single vision panel the same as we saw on level six and you've drawn attention to the rails that are kind of horizontal
01:22:04 to the rails that are kind of horizontal exciting yes the style is that a kind of vertical yes and then we can also see a little bit of what the edge looked like yeah so that's that's the level 19 stair
01:22:17 yeah so that's that's the level 19 stair door now as we've discussed previously and sorry
01:22:21 and sorry yeah just also actually because of what you asked me earlier if you just have a look around the door on the concrete you know you can't see any spoiling effects but you can see the significant charring
01:22:35 but you can see the significant charring of the stair door you know you were asking me earlier about why I had chosen opening rather than a total failure so
01:22:46 opening rather than a total failure so it's the conditions around the door on the stair side are very important and understanding that just that picture is a good one yeah that's we don't have a picture of the other side of that door
01:22:58 picture of the other side of that door do we we do in the in my report yes and they are very interesting too if you looked at look at them in sequence on every level right and they suggest that
01:23:12 every level right and they suggest that the doors actually responded but well so the doors remain stable they haven't collapsed they have undergone significant charring due to
01:23:23 undergone significant charring due to heat and you can see very unfortunately the condition of the lobby this is level 99 okay
01:23:32 99 okay so they have it how's that door has remained in place despite those conditions thank you yes now as we discussed previously and you
01:23:45 now as we discussed previously and you consider that the design basis for Graham for tower CP 3 1971 and you've explained in your report that the CP 3 1971 requirement for access to the main
01:23:57 1971 requirement for access to the main stairway was for something called type 2 doors is that correct that's correct can we just look at that definition if we go within your report to BL as50 at
01:24:09 we go within your report to BL as50 at page 67 and I five point two point five yep and if we can look at zoom in on the type 2 door definition thank you so yeah
01:24:30 there you use and you've concluded that the type 2 door must have a 25 min a minute millimeter rebate and is that correct yeah so that that's taken that's
01:24:43 correct yeah so that that's taken that's pasted directly in from CP 3 and for a type 2 door it has the 30 minutes performance requirement for collapse and
01:24:55 performance requirement for collapse and passage of flame and a rebate is listed there also of 25 millimeters and and again the self closing device and you
01:25:06 again the self closing device and you understand that that's a requirement of a 25 millimeter millimeter rebate rather than a testing condition is that correct I don't understand the question I'm really sorry
01:25:17 really sorry you're saying that to comply with the type 2 door it needed to have a 25 minute minutes of rebate is that correct yes it did yes just sorry I understand now yeah yes it did and test evidence
01:25:31 now yeah yes it did and test evidence that exists from the time supports the reason why that number is written into the 1971 guidance yeah in general can you just explain first of
01:25:44 in general can you just explain first of all just what a rebate is just so everybody's clear and what the effect is of a rebate on for example freedom from collapse and passage of flame okay so a rebate if I think they use called
01:25:57 so a rebate if I think they use called them like door stops or smoke stops in the old days and it's just a cut and a piece of timber so when you push the door it can't get through you the frame at that part so there's a little
01:26:08 at that part so there's a little trying to see if there's something to help are we talking about the death of what one might call the door jamb I mean how far into the it's so how far into
01:26:19 how far into the it's so how far into the setting how far in and and how wide the setting is so it's got to it's it's an l-shape okay and I have I know there
01:26:31 an l-shape okay and I have I know there has been huge interest in rebates there are drawings in my report with or that I mentioned for all the different types of doors it's it's it's dimensioned and so
01:26:43 doors it's it's it's dimensioned and so the door can't move any further if you will yeah and that return on the rebate is actually important is it in terms of the the freedom from collapse and the
01:26:55 the the freedom from collapse and the passage of flame or smoke through the door that the L shape and the width of that L shape yes so I refer to actually I brought them I refer to tests done in
01:27:06 I brought them I refer to tests done in the 70s by Morris and it's referenced in my reports of people can read it and he tested a whole series of doors off the earth with the same leaf as appears to
01:27:20 earth with the same leaf as appears to have been stalled and ground floor tower with different rebates and he he found the dimensions to be very important and he actually concluded particularly on it
01:27:34 he actually concluded particularly on it on the twelve and a half millimeter rebates it prevented the ability for a door to achieve in his testing regime anything more than twelve minutes yes fire resistant
01:27:45 yes fire resistant yeah back then we'll come back we'll come back to that in a moment just sticking for a moment with the type two doors under CNN 371 yeah that also makes
01:27:56 doors under CNN 371 yeah that also makes clear that it has to have our self closer is that correct that's correct so again we see self closes they're right back from the 1970s and and you also note in your report that the DC LD
01:28:07 note in your report that the DC LD sleeping guide is again relevant which required such doors to be self closing yes you've also mentioned in your report the LGA guidance which we looked at
01:28:18 the LGA guidance which we looked at before in purpose-built blocks of flats we can go back to that if you like but as we noted earlier that required at least upgraded FD 30s doors is that
01:28:30 least upgraded FD 30s doors is that correct yes and we look at that again it's actually not clear arm stair doors just sorry you're nearly nearly said the wrong thing it's not clear at all on the
01:28:43 wrong thing it's not clear at all on the replacement or the upgrade of stair doors it's very clear on flat entrance doors yes let's have a look at that let's go to CTA r50 33 at page 98
01:28:57 let's go to CTA r50 33 at page 98 [Music]
01:29:27 yes so if we zoom in on the table again and we're on this second to last bullet point in ventilated lobbies and corridors travel distances of ten to
01:29:38 corridors travel distances of ten to fifteen meters may be acceptable provided all doors to the common corridor or Lobby are at least upgraded F D 30s doors and the smoke ventilation comprises TVs or air these I think you
01:29:52 comprises TVs or air these I think you say in your report on one reading of that all doors to the common corridor or Lobby could be interpreted as all doors including the stair door in my opinion illa it should include the stair door
01:30:04 illa it should include the stair door yep and you've noted that the LTA guidance only recommends upgrading the
01:30:15 guidance only recommends upgrading the door so that it's classed as an upgraded door F D 30s door where the existing door satisfied the specification at the time of construction and was there for
01:30:26 time of construction and was there for something called a notional FD 30 door let's yes let's look at that in the guidance so if we go to page 101 within this document paragraph 62 17 so here it
01:30:43 this document paragraph 62 17 so here it said in this guidance that it's not practical to test existing doors three options exist and and here what you're referring to is bullet point one you can accept the door as it is sorry yeah
01:30:56 accept the door as it is sorry yeah except the door as it is provide it's a good fit in its frame and that it satisfied the standard applicable to fire resisting doors at the time of construction of the building or manufacture of the door and that's
01:31:08 manufacture of the door and that's what's referred to as a notional FD 30 door and again it's just worth looking at the definition of an upgraded FD 30s
01:31:21 at the definition of an upgraded FD 30s door that's page 182 within this document
01:31:33 and if we go I think it's right at the very top yes it is the notional FD fire resisting door is a door assembly that
01:31:44 resisting door is a door assembly that satisfied the current specification or fire resistant test for 30 minutes at the time of construction of a block of flats our manufacture of the door that's that the definition of that now let's
01:31:58 that the definition of that now let's then look at what you saw when you inspected the doors you say in your report that you inspected one door on level six but you consider that door to be representative is that right yes
01:32:11 be representative is that right yes that's correct based on photographic evidence so it does appear from what we've seen that all those doors between levels 4 and 23 were of the same make and construction is that correct it
01:32:22 and construction is that correct it appears to be the case yes there is no documentation and what you've noted is that the stair doors had a rebate depth
01:32:34 that the stair doors had a rebate depth of 12 millimeters is that that's not correct I think we've got a picture of that we can look at BL as50 16 at page 23 I think this picture might help us in
01:32:50 23 I think this picture might help us in terms of does that does that help us I'm sorry I'm showing me bait no it's we'd see the rebate when you open the door
01:33:01 see the rebate when you open the door yes when you open the door you can look in you see where the the edge of the door where you push the door yeah on the frame on the left there yeah you you'll just see the little stop yeah made of
01:33:15 just see the little stop yeah made of timber and and you say in your report that that rebate depth of 12 millimeters you say is too small to comply with the requirement for type 2 doors under CP 3 1971 is that correct that's correct
01:33:28 1971 is that correct that's correct but what you've said is following your investigations the stair doors appear to have been constructed potentially as a class a door and number three Class A door under the London constructional
01:33:40 door under the London constructional amending bylaws is that correct that's correct so rise at the beginning of your evidence
01:33:45 evidence we looked at the different machines that were in play yes and there were these London constructional bylaws and the relevant London Building Act yeah and that defined something called a a class a door and a type a a typhoid or
01:34:00 a class a door and a type a a typhoid or you know a type a door yeah and what you've concluded is that that twelve millimeter rebate would satisfy that standard yeah so in the London
01:34:12 standard yeah so in the London construction of bylaws and provides four forms of type a door the performance
01:34:23 forms of type a door the performance resistance is actually 30 minutes which is the same as a class - yes a type 2 door in CP 3 okay so the bylaw door and
01:34:35 door in CP 3 okay so the bylaw door and let's say the break the CP 3 door the performance resistance is written on paper the same way the issue with the type door so the bylaw doors is it also
01:34:49 type door so the bylaw doors is it also gives examples of construction forms one can select to comply with the type a requirements and all of them are status
01:35:01 requirements and all of them are status stated as being allowed to have a rebate of twelve and a half millimeters but you say in your report you go on to say that and this is what you were touching on
01:35:12 and this is what you were touching on earlier about that the Morris research in the 1970s that based on certain research you've done that you've identified from the early 1970s you've concluded that in fact this door may
01:35:23 concluded that in fact this door may only achieve 20 minutes integrity and 30 minutes stability to the standard applicable at the time of construction is that correct yes so he he discovered it so doors with that rebate were
01:35:38 commonly available let's say and in his tests he discovered that once the rebate was 12 and 1/2 millimeters the
01:35:49 was 12 and 1/2 millimeters the resistance would drop as low as as twelve minutes and if the rebate was increased to 25 millimeters and inch msyn strips were also provided to the
01:36:01 msyn strips were also provided to the leaf we the door leaf we have a grandfa tire you and was very carefully fitted you could get that door up to a thirty minute thirty twenty standard yes so as
01:36:14 minute thirty twenty standard yes so as you say that was only if what you refer to as tolerances of fit example to less than 1.5 millimeters okay can you just have is what are tolerances of fit so he
01:36:25 have is what are tolerances of fit so he observed and the test that unless the door to frame the gaps around the door relief were you know absolutely it's very tiny the paper is very interesting to read unless they were literally down
01:36:36 to read unless they were literally down at a millimeter or two are not coupled with a 12 and a half millimeter rebates and even with the 25 millimeter rebate with that type of door leaf the rail and
01:36:48 with that type of door leaf the rail and stile leaf it really altered their fire performance what you say is you've carefully examined the door and they do
01:36:59 carefully examined the door and they do seem very similar to these half hour fire check doors referred to in a british standard from 1951 that's correct so the door leaf with the rail and style type so the timbers if you
01:37:12 and style type so the timbers if you will as to how the leaf has made are the same as something called a british standard fire check door and they were considered to offer some performance but
01:37:23 considered to offer some performance but not full fire resistance performance so for a 30-minute door full fire resistance was thirty minutes for preventing collapse for thirty minutes integrity for thirty minutes a
01:37:34 minutes integrity for thirty minutes a fire check door the collapse regime of thirty minutes was raped retained but you couldn't get the integrity at thirty and so a fire check door was twenty minutes instead
01:37:46 minutes instead so they were considered to act as a fire door but with a lower performance yeah with that rail and style leaf and so is it on that basis that you consider the performance of that door the class-a
01:37:58 performance of that door the class-a door doesn't satisfy the same stability and integrity requirements of a type 2 door under CP 319 mm yeah and you've highlighted in your report that you consider it might be worth thinking
01:38:10 consider it might be worth thinking about an amendment to relevant guidance including the LGA guide because it you think it might have to flag up that there may be an entire category of doors still present in tower blocks today yeah
01:38:22 still present in tower blocks today yeah which would have met these lower London constructional bylaw standards but which in fact to have a proven lower performance standard than other doors that were installed in the 70s exactly
01:38:34 that were installed in the 70s exactly and I think you make clear that even if you upgrade these doors so you put in smoked seals intumescent strips the
01:38:46 smoked seals intumescent strips the performance is potentially still concerning exactly because of those original exactly what to do with the closeness of fit and whatever rebate is installed in that building or this building and that's very well documented
01:39:00 building and that's very well documented in various papers I've given the publication's in my report yep now let's just go back and look at figure I 26 on BL as50 is 30 it paid at
01:39:14 figure I 26 on BL as50 is 30 it paid at 78 and look at what we see in turn if we get we could blow up figure I 26 yeah and it's right as that you don't you
01:39:27 and it's right as that you don't you done send detective work contain us looking really carefully at these doors and trying to work out what may have happened to them yes time yes I have yes you note here in the label below you say
01:39:40 you note here in the label below you say brush seal present unknown if intumescent still present below the brush seal yes so can you just explain to us and what a brush seal is well it can be to
01:39:53 what a brush seal is well it can be to stop drafts or could be for the purposes of cold smoke I don't know what's underneath that I haven't done a destructive test of the
01:40:05 haven't done a destructive test of the door and if therefore there's intumescent hidden behind it which would act in the event of a fire to seal off the door for fire resistance purposes I say just to be clear an
01:40:18 purposes I say just to be clear an intermittent seal would be different to a brush I think that would be underneath it I showed some pictures of standard products in my report it should be underneath there as I understand it yep
01:40:33 underneath there as I understand it yep and and that's what you've said in your report that you say it's unclear whether there may be an intimacy seal underneath the brush seal yes and that only if we did a destructive analysis could we be
01:40:46 did a destructive analysis could we be able to definitively confirm that you need to take take it out of the door and have a look yeah and and you've also noted based on the documents you've seen so far that there's potentially
01:40:57 so far that there's potentially inconsistent factual evidence at this stage as to whether cold smoked seals possibly combined with an intermittent seal could have been retrospectively installed in order to upgrade these
01:41:09 installed in order to upgrade these stair doors is that correct that's correct and again so the difference in a cold smoked seal and an intermittent seal what's the difference denotation so I think there is conflicting evidence
01:41:21 I think there is conflicting evidence about if works were done to the stair door and if if the works consisted of installing something as we can see here
01:41:33 installing something as we can see here on the leaf what exactly those works were okay it's not just about if it was a cold seal or an engine essence yeah so
01:41:45 a cold seal or an engine essence yeah so different parties have provided different evidence where regarding whether works have been done to the stared or are not since the tire was
01:41:59 stared or are not since the tire was constructed and in reviewing photos from the time of the primary refurbishment showing seals
01:42:10 the primary refurbishment showing seals being installed on one or two doors I still cannot conclude what the seal
01:42:22 I still cannot conclude what the seal was far and how many indoors it was installed on or not so they so those you know that that some photos have been provided by mr. States that show a seal
01:42:35 provided by mr. States that show a seal in some doors that's visually similar to a combined cold smoke and intumescent seal yeah you're not clear where the work was done to all the doors or just some of the doors at this stage exactly
01:42:46 some of the doors at this stage exactly that's correct and I've provided a series of photographs in my report to explain why I can see a combined seal in in a photo
01:42:57 I can see a combined seal in in a photo but I can't see that it has been consistently installed and there's a conflict in whether works were done at all as I've explained in my report so at
01:43:09 all as I've explained in my report so at this stage can we draw any conclusions as to whether or not I won't draw a conclusion about what works were done but I acknowledge that there is is a
01:43:20 but I acknowledge that there is is a brush seal installed on some doors I don't know what it's far who put it there or or fie and is this something
01:43:31 there or or fie and is this something that could be looked at further at phase 2 investigated further as necess yes I hope the relevant information will be provided to me so I can close that out and I intend to do a destructive test
01:43:42 and I intend to do a destructive test off the door and myself you do intend to do that yes yes I do yep now you note that the BRE has carried out testing yes to a stair door
01:43:56 carried out testing yes to a stair door and that was found we're going to look at the test report in a second to have just 16 minutes integrity and three minutes installation if we just pull up
01:44:07 minutes installation if we just pull up the test report that's any too triple zero two one seven eight oh and
01:44:18 triple zero two one seven eight oh and if we can go that's the test report dated September 2018 if we can go to internal page 22 of this test report and
01:44:32 internal page 22 of this test report and if we could just zoom in on that to this long yep so this is the condition of the door after 16 minutes is that correct that's correct as recorded by the BRE
01:44:45 that's correct as recorded by the BRE yep
01:44:46 yep and and we see I mean this is one of the stair doors from Graham full-time yes and we see the glazing unit and then we can see a little bit of flame at the top
01:44:57 can see a little bit of flame at the top exactly i smoke around the edges yes and then let's go the insulation the three minutes installation is recorded at page 13 of 23 if we go back into page 13
01:45:11 13 of 23 if we go back into page 13 there we see yes again can you just remind us of the difference between integrity and insulation yes so you typically don't have to provide insulation on a fire door because it can
01:45:22 insulation on a fire door because it can open and ideally there isn't storage of combustibles up against the door and insulation is to do a preventing heat transfer onto the coat you know on to the cold side the unheated side
01:45:34 the cold side the unheated side integrity is about preventing flames through cracks so I'd imagine that when there's a cotton pad when they put that near the flame up on the top left-hand
01:45:45 near the flame up on the top left-hand corner that's why they recorded failure now to be fair you know that the testing standard that was applied by the bre is a more recently you say it's a 1987 version of BS 4/7 yes yes then would
01:45:58 version of BS 4/7 yes yes then would have been applicable at the time of construction of ground floor tower yes so you say it's not directly comparable with the 30 minute requirement at the time that's correct that's right yes
01:46:09 time that's correct that's right yes it's a more difficult test to pass if you will because of this the pressure they introduced a pressure differential in it was in the seventies yeah so positive pressure yes
01:46:22 seventies yeah so positive pressure yes against the door exactly and it's more likely the products of combustion would pass so we need to bear that in mind when we're looking at that test report yes we do
01:46:32 yes we do yeah and just to clarify so that was one of the stair doors from ground floor tower do you think that is a representative of the stair doors we're
01:46:43 representative of the stair doors we're concerned with between novice four and twenty three as far as you're aware so in in the BR eak test report I couldn't find information on the seal to the door
01:46:57 find information on the seal to the door they tested and that would that would be useful to know and then coupled with hopefully more information from relevant parties we could close out the matter of
01:47:09 parties we could close out the matter of what seal was there or not and I could make a more final conclusion on the actual fire resistance of the stair door noting that we I haven't observed
01:47:22 noting that we I haven't observed failure caused by the door in the staircase with respect to that damage I mentioned so I these are technical matters rather than something that might
01:47:34 matters rather than something that might change substantially change my opinion yeah again is it potentially relevant that we see varying damage of the stair doors still in situate our with some of
01:47:46 doors still in situate our with some of them only marginally damaged and perhaps seem to have yes held up reasonably well yeah is that correct that's correct and we're back again to this situation of
01:47:58 we're back again to this situation of the hazard in a location the conditions in that location and so what was imposed upon that door over time and then
01:48:12 upon that door over time and then finally finally on this subtopic you've highlighted in your report that if you compare these stare doors with the the current guidance in ADB 2013
01:48:26 the the current guidance in ADB 2013 current standards require a stair door to achieve FD 60 Minutes integrity that's correct for a firefighting stair protection so that's strictly the modern
01:48:38 protection so that's strictly the modern standard and doesn't take into account any non worsening principle non worsening in relation to the standard I'm not giving any of you I'm non worsening at the moment but the scary
01:48:49 worsening at the moment but the scary guidance at this time is for a 60 minute door to the firefighting shaft now again just some similar questions about stair
01:49:02 just some similar questions about stair doors to flat doors would you agree that they're never gonna provide indefinite protection against fire they're only ever going to last for if they're if they were upgraded doors 30 minutes if
01:49:14 they were upgraded doors 30 minutes if they were even if they're ADB doors 60 minutes and that they would generally be expected to fail at some point well you think that that's that's something we
01:49:25 think that that's that's something we need to bear in mind and I'm not sure because in def I don't know what you know I'd have to say what is the definition of indefinite protection there is a performance required for
01:49:37 there is a performance required for specific reasons this issue of not replacing doors and simply upgrading them without you know without having to
01:49:48 them without you know without having to contemplate anything else I don't understand so that guidance in the LGA so I don't I typically don't recommend myself
01:49:59 typically don't recommend myself notional fire doors for example in my own work and so in in my mind I understand in a major flashover fire at some point the door may fail but it's
01:50:12 some point the door may fail but it's actually of considerable importance for the time before that very severe heating occurs
01:50:19 occurs hence the X rating the door closer and everything else about a fire door about its function in the early middle and late stages of the fire again and do
01:50:34 and late stages of the fire again and do you think it'd be possible to estimate how much smoke might seep through a closed non compliant door as compared with a door which was compliant their original standards or modern standards
01:50:46 original standards or modern standards and would that exercise be relevant and helpful so there are very clever smoke modeling people out there I am NOT one of them and we that is in numerical
01:50:57 of them and we that is in numerical analysis that could be carried out if a person thought it would be relevant yes you have to know them manner in which the door was not compliant there you certainly would and you'd have to
01:51:09 certainly would and you'd have to understand the hazard posed to that door over time and is that something you consider would be useful for your work going forward I I don't feel the need to
01:51:21 going forward I I don't feel the need to do that at this time yeah and then finally on this topic and I think you you yourself mentioned it there is some firefighter evidence from the night that some of the stair doors when shut were
01:51:33 some of the stair doors when shut were fairly effective at preventing smoke from and entering the stairs yes there's a number of examples of that that we had in some of the oral and written evidence
01:51:44 in some of the oral and written evidence yes and do you think that that evidence is potentially significant when we consider the importance of any performance non-compliance is that you've found in the doors yes exactly so
01:51:57 you've found in the doors yes exactly so there is non-compliance and then there is performance during a hazard and yes that must be considered and that's why I just I keep saying what happens in each
01:52:09 just I keep saying what happens in each location will become very important
01:52:17 the site is different topic now the refuse chute doors I just want some very brief questions about the refuse chute doors so on each of the lobbies yeah
01:52:29 doors so on each of the lobbies yeah next to the stair door along from the stairs or to the other side of the service rider cupboard is a a door that goes on to a a refuge sheet that residents could use is that correct
01:52:40 residents could use is that correct that's correct and you note that CP 3 1971 set no standard for any refuge chute doors we made a door in the self yeah just for its location and the
01:52:54 yeah just for its location and the location of the shoot itself nothing in an escape route and the requirement for a permanent ventilation but not furred the door yep do you agree that based on
01:53:06 the door yep do you agree that based on your inspections at the tower that those wooden refuse chute doors appear to have fared better than the stair doors they do appear to because it's in the tower
01:53:21 do appear to because it's in the tower during my inspections I observed the cleanliness and lack of fire and smoke damage in nearly every refuse chute area
01:53:33 damage in nearly every refuse chute area it was very striking yeah do you think those refuse chute rooms could potentially have been used as safe places for residents waiting to be rescued I understand I know one has
01:53:49 rescued I understand I know one has those thoughts right you know I did have such thoughts myself on site but the reality is knowing where they are making
01:54:00 reality is knowing where they are making a decision about them being safe or not I just don't know how anyone could have made that decision during the fire and I understand that they appear to
01:54:12 and I understand that they appear to have been safe because of their post fire condition but I couldn't honestly say that it's something that that would have been reasonable to consider and also one or two of them actually are
01:54:27 also one or two of them actually are that were particularly at level seven there it happened there was one that was very severely damaged the other important thing about that area is there is actually mechanical ventilation
01:54:38 is actually mechanical ventilation apparently provided to that room I don't have enough information on it yet but I will be looking at the effect that had in terms of smoke and that I'll be also
01:54:50 in terms of smoke and that I'll be also but IIIi I couldn't say that it should have been considered and that it or it should be considered no a new topic now
01:55:04 should be considered no a new topic now and gas now your appendix K is serving as a effectively a briefing document for the specialist gas expert that the
01:55:16 the specialist gas expert that the inquiry is a point of mr. blodnik Hancock's is that is that correct that's correct now on that basis I've just a few questions for you on this topic the cleanest is going to be addressed in much more detail by mr. Hancock swen
01:55:28 much more detail by mr. Hancock swen here Pines yes in his written report but but one of the topics I want to ask you about is about penetrations that may be relevant to the gas works at the towers
01:55:39 relevant to the gas works at the towers and in particular about the penetration between the stairs and the lobbies which you've identified yes as potential reeks of smoke spreads between levels during
01:55:50 of smoke spreads between levels during the fire yes and now is it right that you've concluded that the wall of the stairwell which as you've explained is a it's a protected shaft the stairs that
01:56:03 it's a protected shaft the stairs that it was breached on 13 floors between the fourth and the 21st floor is that correct
01:56:08 correct are we able to show a photo yet on yeah okay my next exactly if we can look at your figure k23 that's BL as50 is 32 at page 424
01:56:37 yes and if we zoom in on k23 which is at the top of that yeah okay yeah you explain what we're seeing in
01:56:48 yeah you explain what we're seeing in this way so so this is on the lobby side so you you mentioned there on the stair side a protective shaft was built there is no information on its how it was
01:57:00 is no information on its how it was built and its fire performance and that would be useful to have and that appears though as I've said on my report to have performed effectively in the sense again
01:57:11 performed effectively in the sense again there is no significant heat damage or or you know damage to the concrete enclosure to the staircase in that area at the moment separately on the lobby
01:57:24 at the moment separately on the lobby side where this gas pipe leaves the staircase enclosure it breaks through the concrete and now we're out on on an
01:57:38 the concrete and now we're out on on an RB near flat wooden - yes but I don't know is cadence have said they were going to box this in the same way they
01:57:51 going to box this in the same way they boxed in the staircase those works hadn't taken place by the time the fire occurred they were due around that time but I don't know is if there's a fire
01:58:02 but I don't know is if there's a fire stopping material in at the back of this hole in the wall or not and I need to work very closely with the gas
01:58:13 need to work very closely with the gas expert and review his survey data to understand if that hole there were sealed now that wouldn't impact the
01:58:26 sealed now that wouldn't impact the stare because the stare is boxed in I don't know if we can oh yeah I stay - yeah maybe show that yeah what it does affect is that actually act as a link
01:58:38 affect is that actually act as a link from lobby to lobby because at the next pipe run above on the next nearest floor if the same poll is there smoke from one
01:58:49 if the same poll is there smoke from one lobby could travel up and out to the next lobby but I don't know that and I need that information about the fire stopping on the stair wall - lovey line
01:59:01 stopping on the stair wall - lovey line yeah so the staircase seems clear the lobby requires further attention yep just before we leave this this photo we will go to the one on the stair side in
01:59:13 will go to the one on the stair side in a moment yes so these were penetration yes through the wall to accommodate pipes refer to as laterals lateral so just running out and this was all part of the new right gas riser installation
01:59:26 of the new right gas riser installation for riser number two so they were I think is it five risers coming up and one of those risers was being replaced for the flags of change yes there were six coming up and this was the
01:59:37 six coming up and this was the replacement riser and it was run through the staircase and brought out through the wall of the staircase out onto the lobbies that required a gas supply it
01:59:49 lobbies that required a gas supply it looks like that and then you can see it entering the flat here at the wall there and again I don't know how that feel there yep so that let's look at what it
02:00:01 there yep so that let's look at what it looks like from the other side figured k22 I think on page 23 yeah yeah if we so you've highlighted these I think this
02:00:13 so you've highlighted these I think this is level 13 and level 21 is it right what we can see is the boxing in on the stairs side yes I think on the right hand picture you can app you can see the vertical
02:00:24 you can app you can see the vertical boxing in down the side and then the at the top of the wall yeah so here's here's the vertical Gaston boxed in on here because this is a floor of
02:00:35 in on here because this is a floor of where it's going to come out onto the Navi it comes across and then it goes out out time to the lobby side so what we were seeing in the other photograph was what's going on on the other side other side in a Lobby side yes you've
02:00:47 other side in a Lobby side yes you've highlighted these two photographs in particular because what you say is there a missing panel that's correct at the end of these but to be fair what you say in your report is they could have been taken off by somebody after the fire yes
02:01:00 taken off by somebody after the fire yes you're not clear at the mayor could be a part of some work by the police samples of materials have been taken by the time I got to sides yeah but but in terms of
02:01:11 I got to sides yeah but but in terms of it is it is a whole and the protection but if you just look again it's about looking at the damage around it you can see here at level 13 yes the light is
02:01:22 see here at level 13 yes the light is damaged but I explained that later on with regards to the door at 21 you can see there's no severe damaged for example to the concrete so at the moment I have no reason to believe they were
02:01:34 I have no reason to believe they were particularly relevant but it will be very helpful to get a proper explanation of those works yeah and the significance
02:01:45 of those works yeah and the significance just to be absolutely clear the significance is that potentially otherwise there's a compromising of the the stair compartment by where virtually of these holes those holes Lobby to
02:01:57 of these holes those holes Lobby to lobby it's what your spot but the ones I showed earlier it's a big smoke being able to flow from one Lobby to the next through the breaches on the stair wall throughout through the trunking we see
02:02:08 throughout through the trunking we see on the stairs what's the route for that if [Music]
02:02:14 [Music] it's a picture we don't have a seals one actually you sir if if if this was one of the seals trunk kings if there is
02:02:25 of the seals trunk kings if there is fire and smoke in the lobby and that fire stopping isn't there on the line smoke can enter this space and all of this is connected on every floor within
02:02:36 this is connected on every floor within the boxes space within in in the box it's it's connected they're not every floor within the box so it might break out onto the staircase book it could
02:02:47 out onto the staircase book it could flow through the box back out to another floor yeah and I know you want you've said you want to do further investigations are you able to give any
02:02:59 investigations are you able to give any opinion at this stage about the significance of this breach of complementation in terms of smoke spread on the night so with regards to the fire stopping on the lobby line if it was not
02:03:13 stopping on the lobby line if it was not there I would be very concerned about it as a route for a fire and smoke spread but I you know I I do I want I very much
02:03:24 but I you know I I do I want I very much want to get proper information about the fire stopping at that line before I stray into that territory
02:03:38 just on another topic linked to this question of breaches of complementation and then we might have a another break the ventilation ducts in the bathrooms
02:03:50 the ventilation ducts in the bathrooms yes so it's been suggested that there appear and I'm afraid I don't have any photographs but there appear to have been ventilation ducts in each of the six bathrooms in each floor that's
02:04:02 six bathrooms in each floor that's karai's that correct that is correct and is it right that they run in pairs vertically through the building yes that is correct yes I think in Paris yeah and
02:04:13 is correct yes I think in Paris yeah and it's been suggested that from level 9 the boxing in of those vertical rises appears to have been destroyed by fire is that I observed significant damage
02:04:26 is that I observed significant damage during my time on site yes have you conducted any detailed inspection of those I have I have my we me and my team
02:04:37 those I have I have my we me and my team actually tracked those risers and it's something that I will go to look at in the next stage of my work because like
02:04:48 the next stage of my work because like every other riser they connect every floor and my understanding from the limited information made available to me is there may have been some new
02:05:01 is there may have been some new ventilation provided through those risers also yep so do you think this is something that's important to
02:05:12 something that's important to investigate in terms of the spread of smoke throughout the building yes I do bring Thank You mr. chairman that's probably a good point a good point for another great yes thank you right
02:05:28 another great yes thank you right well we'll hold on the break now all right okay same rules before offered the usher and we'll come back at temples club yes
02:05:41 right ten past twelve please
02:18:17 right doctor they come here yes actually I thought I should probably clarify something you asked me why the laterals and verticals how they connect in within
02:18:29 and verticals how they connect in within what I wanted on make sure I understood was the the root of smoke transfer between lobbies on different floors yes was through the boxing the transacting I
02:18:40 was through the boxing the transacting I thought that yes was the route I just want to clarify that and the reason why it could happen is there is a stategy duty to ventilate that boxing and to
02:18:52 duty to ventilate that boxing and to provide ventilation to it in the gut in the relevant gas legislation and it's considered so important the fire safety legislation also makes that clear and
02:19:03 legislation also makes that clear and the only way the laterals and the the verticals can be ventilated as if they're fully open to each other so it will be useful to understand the
02:19:14 will be useful to understand the detailing around your abs thank you yeah yes Miss Granger yes thank you and just a few questions about that the hot zone or hot spot that you identified in your
02:19:25 or hot spot that you identified in your report so in your first report you found evidence of plastic the plastic stare lights on levels 1314 and also the half
02:19:37 lights on levels 1314 and also the half levels on 13 and 14 yes had been fully destroyed yep whereas the plastic stare lights above that on levels 15 1/2 level
02:19:49 lights above that on levels 15 1/2 level of level 15 and 16 say were deformed or just partially melted is that correct yes that's correct and you also found significant average of damn evidence of damage to the lobbies and the stair
02:20:02 damage to the lobbies and the stair doors on those levels as well where the lights were completely in general yes yes I did and and you considered that this was potentially significant
02:20:13 this was potentially significant evidence in terms of a hot zone or hot spot in the middle of the stairs at around levels 1316 is that correct yes where you say you think temperatures may have got above 150 degrees Celsius yes
02:20:30 now in your revised report and having heard the the factual evidence that you've heard you've highlighted a particular rescue operation described by
02:20:41 particular rescue operation described by firefighters DeForge around levels 10 11 with the stair door being held open after 2:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. possibly and you've also noted some
02:20:54 possibly and you've also noted some resident witness statements which indicate a lot of firefighter activity around level 14 at around the 7th at the same time is that a fact and you said that this stage in your report that the
02:21:07 that this stage in your report that the strongest evidence of the cause of the plastic light damage in this hotspot it's smoke and heat entering the stairs from open doors possibly due to this firefighter activity is that correct yes
02:21:19 firefighter activity is that correct yes that's correct does that remain your view based on what you've heard so far at this stage yes it is is it also possible that the reason
02:21:31 is is it also possible that the reason why there's a hot spot or hot zone might be explained for example by gas fires burning later in the in the piece do you think that's potentially another source
02:21:45 think that's potentially another source of those hot zones or hot spots so I presume what that's meant to mean is causing a heating beside the stair door
02:21:58 causing a heating beside the stair door so extreme it can radiate through the materials and melt the lights I have no evidence available to me that that is possible it as a function of how I
02:22:09 possible it as a function of how I understand the location of the gas risers in the flats so you think at the moment it's much more likely that this is due to firefighter actions that bit of the in that part of the building yes
02:22:21 of the in that part of the building yes and I think in in my April report and I put the timing after the change and put advice and but careful analysis of
02:22:37 put advice and but careful analysis of Resident evacuations shows that there is a period of time between about quarter to two and 25 pass to where no one
02:22:48 to two and 25 pass to where no one exited the tower from above that zone
02:22:53 but later on then evacuation from that zone and above occurs and that's how I've that at the moment that's how I've
02:23:10 I've that at the moment that's how I've honed in on the time I'm now going to turn to consider some of the active fire
02:23:22 turn to consider some of the active fire safety systems in the building and in general I think it's it right here we're looking at requirements B 1 and B 5
02:23:34 looking at requirements B 1 and B 5 means of warning and escape and facilities to assist the firefighters to save life and allow for fire engine access there's a the key parts of the building regulations a functional
02:23:45 building regulations a functional requirement that's wrong correct yep and I want to start just with some brief questions about the interface between fire detection and alarms and you have
02:23:56 fire detection and alarms and you have concluded in your report that there is no requirement to have a centralized alarm system is that correct in in in a building like ground fault that's that's
02:24:07 building like ground fault that's that's correct there is no there is no requirement to provide a Sat you know an alarm sound or a voice message in one or all of the parts that's correct
02:24:18 all of the parts that's correct and what you've said in your report is that there's a useful explanation in BS 5 5 8 8 1 1990 on the reason why there's no statutory requirement for a common
02:24:29 no statutory requirement for a common alarm system can we just look at that yes
02:24:31 yes so that's BL as50 is 15 at page 15 at the top
02:24:39 the top Paige so here it says there's no statutory requirement for a common fire alarm system to be provided in a building solely containing flats and/or
02:24:51 building solely containing flats and/or maze nets and in buildings designed and constructed in the courts with this code it is generally unnecessary and undesirable for a fire alarm system to be provided a common fire alarm system ought to be provided only in a building
02:25:03 ought to be provided only in a building in which some control can be achieved over the occupants so that a predetermined response leading to the evacuation of the building can be triggered and then it says in flats and
02:25:14 triggered and then it says in flats and maser nets in normal use this kind of response cannot be achieved nor is it necessarily desirable that evacuations should take place some areas remote from the fire unless these areas themselves become threatened by fire how to correct
02:25:29 and it you've obviously thought it was important in your report to highlight these particular yes features of that British standard in terms of why and all
02:25:41 British standard in terms of why and all out alarm it's not necessary it's not right anymore you want to say on that I think it's that concept about either accidental or malicious false alarms or
02:25:52 accidental or malicious false alarms or you know say people would have said before if someone burns their toast and one flats you don't want the whole building having to evacuate that that would have been the kind of general view
02:26:06 would have been the kind of general view and why that kind of all-out function hasn't been provided to date in residential buildings yes and you say in
02:26:19 residential buildings yes and you say in this context that it's important to understand what alternatives there are available for raising the alarm throughout the whole building which brings us to chapter 18 of your report
02:26:30 brings us to chapter 18 of your report which is about communication with residents yes correct yes so I'm going to ask you some some questions about that chapter that not very many but just just some some questions yes so in that
02:26:45 just some some questions yes so in that chapter of your report you consider the possible means available to the London Fire Brigade of communicating with residents during the fire once the stay-put strategy was formally changed is that correct that's
02:26:56 formally changed is that correct that's correct
02:26:57 correct and first I want to ask you about loudhailer x' you note that this is part of the LF p inventory equipment but you consider it impractical due to other
02:27:09 consider it impractical due to other background noise at the fire ground and the height and proportions of Granville Tower is that correct yep that's correct and I think you note that loud hailers were used but for very specific reasons
02:27:20 were used but for very specific reasons for example if there were concerns about people eople safety safety jumping on yes and sorry just cannot I just would really like to say that I've looked into
02:27:31 really like to say that I've looked into these features because the building design you know the provisions with the building itself provides nothing at all for communication and so I was trying to
02:27:44 for communication and so I was trying to find other methods instead but I want to emphasize the absence of any form of communication device not just a sounder in the building itself yep
02:28:03 firefighters knocking on doors that's another thing that you've considered you know the difficulty did with doing this it's done for the whole tower block and
02:28:15 it's done for the whole tower block and and I think you note that you would require significant resources and secured significant numbers of firefighters to be deployed to all floors yes that's correct and also logistical issues if you
02:28:28 and also logistical issues if you whether you break in if there's no answer that there may be all sorts of logistical - different difficulties you've sought to highlight exactly to do it mathematically in in such
02:28:40 it mathematically in in such circumstances and you've concluded that this issue of communication with residents and available methods should be explored further given a number of
02:28:51 be explored further given a number of other buildings with a staple at policy is that correct yes so the number of other buildings with the stay-put policy and an external ward that supports the spread of fire yeah and I want to ask
02:29:04 spread of fire yeah and I want to ask you about the option on the night for the lfb to use the door intercom system as Fatima elvez appears to have done to communicate with other residents now I
02:29:15 communicate with other residents now I think it's right that you've now considered that question in detail at section 18 point 8 of your report pages 21 to 24 yes and in particular is it
02:29:27 21 to 24 yes and in particular is it right you've sought to draw attention to the functionality of the intercom system in terms of what it could and couldn't do yes which you think is relevant to this is that right yes that's correct so
02:29:38 this is that right yes that's correct so I mean my understanding from the information I have about the intercom system it wasn't installed as a life safety feature a life safety feature requires backup power and other more
02:29:50 requires backup power and other more resilient features to make sure it will work during a fire and but in terms of using it on an ad-hoc basis I've looked into what the system could potentially
02:30:01 into what the system could potentially do I think the list on yeah I was gonna take you to paragraph 18 point 8.6 yes and that's be at as50 is 18 at page 20
02:30:12 and that's be at as50 is 18 at page 20 three
02:30:41 yeah yes I think that this is your summary here the intercom was not installed with the necessary of buffness to make it a formal life safety system
02:30:52 to make it a formal life safety system if firefighters wish to use the income intercom as an ad-hoc means to communicate with residents a flat number would need to be dard and the firefighter would need to wait until a resident answered that correct yes if a
02:31:03 resident answered that correct yes if a resident did not answer from the flat the firefighter would have no way of knowing if the flat was empty or the resident was incapacitated or not otherwise unable to come to the intercom or if the system had been muted for the night saying again have you noted that
02:31:15 night saying again have you noted that you can mute the yet in there is a exactly there is a muting function that you can program in and I have no information about how that operators our
02:31:27 information about how that operators our grant from Terra at this time yeah and then I think the last point that you've made is there are also other ways that use of such a system would not be effective such as if the communications cable was affected by the fires and that's correct and also there's other
02:31:40 that's correct and also there's other timing there's other timings programmed into the system in terms of how long it will ring ring the flat fire how long one is allowed to speak on the phone and
02:31:52 one is allowed to speak on the phone and all sorts of other functions again we don't have that information at the moment but all all of that contributes to it not necessarily being a robust
02:32:05 to it not necessarily being a robust means of contacting every single flat methodically yeah so based on what you know at the moment do you think that was a practical option
02:32:16 do you think that was a practical option for use on the night
02:32:23 I understand that it's something that could be done in the circumstances of Grenville terror I don't know how one would go about using it effectively as
02:32:35 would go about using it effectively as was required that night with the number of people waiting for rescue and you've also expressed concerns in that chapter as how as to how the limitations on
02:32:47 as how as to how the limitations on communications would affect those who require assistance to escape in the event of fire is that correct that's correct
02:32:54 correct that's something I'm you know actually very concerned about yeah can you just briefly explain your concern well the issue for any person who isn't fully mobile for whatever reason there
02:33:08 fully mobile for whatever reason there will be a category of person who lived a grandfa tire who who could never use the staircase or could only use the staircase of difficulty I think we might talk about lifts later there was no
02:33:21 talk about lifts later there was no proper firefighting lifts for evacuation and so when it came to rescue not being possible and self evacuation was the
02:33:32 possible and self evacuation was the only means to leave the tower that left that category of person in a very hazardous condition as I've been
02:33:43 hazardous condition as I've been mentioning earlier and there is no statutory duty at this time to provide such means explicitly set out and the
02:33:55 such means explicitly set out and the design guidance and I doubt very concerning to say the least
02:34:05 emergency emergency lighting and signage and you dealt with that in Chapter 15 of your report just a few questions on there yeah you say on lighting that
02:34:18 there yeah you say on lighting that you're not able to tell whether the system complied with a proof document B 2010 because the lighting is now damaged and you can't determine if it complied
02:34:29 and you can't determine if it complied with the relevant three our requirement for emergency lighting in sleeping accommodation that would be required in that guidance yes so I don't have any drawings actually or a specification I think it's probably worth explaining
02:34:41 think it's probably worth explaining emergency lighting only switches on if there is a power failure our official lighting is required at all times on the escape route so there's adequate
02:34:52 escape route so there's adequate lighting on the escape route and then in the event of a power failure that a certain number of lights can switch on and maintain the adequate lighting to the to the escape route I'm not aware at
02:35:05 the to the escape route I'm not aware at the moment there was necessarily a power failure and I I need more information to be able to explain if at the an
02:35:17 to be able to explain if at the an adequate quantity of lighting was provided on the escape route to give a view on its compliance so it's two things power failure but without para failure an adequate quantity of lights
02:35:31 failure an adequate quantity of lights or luminaires there is some evidence of a failure of lobby emergency lighting yes now you know that once the lobbies
02:35:42 yes now you know that once the lobbies filled with black smoke the lighting would have been a little use but would it potentially have been significant if the lights have failed earlier than they should have yeah so it will so if the
02:35:54 should have yeah so it will so if the lobby was filled with black smoke it might be that the light was on but because of its relative illuminance with the smoke particles it quite simply one
02:36:07 the smoke particles it quite simply one can't see it rather than it had sailed off or
02:36:13 off or the lighting in that Lobby in themselves may have failed during the fire given the difficulties that were experienced by the firefighters in reading the floor
02:36:26 by the firefighters in reading the floor numbers yes you go to a place directly beneath the lighting on the stairs are you able to comment on the lighting and
02:36:38 you able to comment on the lighting and the floor numbering in particular do you think the floor numbers should have been more clearly marked than they were so I actually I've observed that on some parts of the stair the emergency
02:36:51 parts of the stair the emergency lighting actually covers over the number and in other parts of the stair the number is present I didn't actually check if the number was correct yeah
02:37:03 check if the number was correct yeah when I was at the tower is there anything in any of the statutory guidance or other relevant no so that's what I was actually so so it's
02:37:15 what I was actually so so it's interesting that if you think about this adequate lighting on an escape route the absence of guidance aren't adequate
02:37:26 absence of guidance aren't adequate lighting on say a floor and number sign for orientation oneself as a firefighter that's not something that's a duty at this time but there is evidence from
02:37:38 this time but there is evidence from other fires to that that orientation of the fire fire firefighters can be very difficult so I think that is something that should be considered adequate
02:37:49 that should be considered adequate lighting with proper you know orientation information so firefighters can be clear about about where they are
02:38:03 I want to turn now to some questions about the fire main at Gregor tower and you've dealt with this in in chapter 2 and then 14 and 15 of your report to
02:38:19 and then 14 and 15 of your report to make sure you've got those to hand oh yeah I'm just it's okay keep going hope you're fine yep just too many papers on my desk now you want a moment no no I'd be okay I
02:38:30 you want a moment no no I'd be okay I tell you what I'm going after doc now you explained in your report that in modern design codes the regulations require provisions only for internal firefighting in high-rise buildings
02:38:41 firefighting in high-rise buildings that's correct and you've looked first at cp3 1971 the design guidance you think applied when grandpa was it constructed and you've
02:38:53 grandpa was it constructed and you've concluded that the rises I think were non-compliant because there should have been provisioned for a wet riser given the height of the building is that correct that's correct so Graham for tower is more than 60
02:39:04 so Graham for tower is more than 60 meters it was measured at sixty five point four nine using the relevant height criteria under CP 371 is that correct correct and what we have at
02:39:16 correct correct and what we have at Graham for tower is dry Rises yes can we just look again just to orientate ourselves as to what we're talking about here just look at some of the pictures of those dry risers that you have at
02:39:28 of those dry risers that you have at Graham tall tower in your report if you go to BL as50 sport een page 1 1 7 figure 14.5 6 so BL as50 is 14 at page 1
02:39:43 figure 14.5 6 so BL as50 is 14 at page 1 1 7
02:39:51 so there we have examples of the dry rises and we're going to come to this in a minute that these are in the lobbies aren't they yes and and basically these
02:40:03 aren't they yes and and basically these are places where the firefighters plug in their hoses to conduct the firefighting that's correct yeah and so and it looks like the particular type may have slightly kind of this particular details in different
02:40:15 of this particular details in different bits of the tower is that correct well this I think this picture is a little bit confusing because it shows the DeNooyer eyes for my favorite and we see the worth the level-2 level-3 leave the
02:40:27 the worth the level-2 level-3 leave the level 40 m23 so maybe and say the ones at the bottom level four looks like that level nine yeah and you you said that
02:40:38 level nine yeah and you you said that under modern design guidance that's approved document b 2013 a wet riser was also required can you just briefly explain for us the difference between a wet riser and a dry rise yes so a dry
02:40:51 wet riser and a dry rise yes so a dry riser
02:40:52 riser is empty in in normal use and the fire brigade arrived and pump the water from I call it the toe means with the water
02:41:03 I call it the toe means with the water then the area water supply through pumping equipment into the riser it pumps the water up through the riser and makes have been available for use on on
02:41:15 makes have been available for use on on any floor a wet rising main is what's called permanently charged by means of tanks and pumps in the building and so the only action for the fire brigade is
02:41:28 the only action for the fire brigade is to go to the floor and operate the system on the floor that it's needed and presumably top up the tanks in time to time
02:41:38 time necessary the tanks are connected to the town may no only direction that's the idea that's the idea and so they should be replenished if they're an empty car being used that's the idea yeah no I
02:41:54 being used that's the idea yeah no I just want to look at what you've said in your report or paragraph 15 point 8 point 17 that's the LA s 15 at page 37 of chapter 15 and here what you've done
02:42:09 of chapter 15 and here what you've done yes if we could zoom in on fifteen point eight point 17 you say that that this relevant design standard BS nine nine nine zero two thousand six gives us some
02:42:22 nine zero two thousand six gives us some reasons why you have taller buildings requiring wet farm aims so what it says they're wet fire main should be installed owing to the pressures required to provide adequate fire fighting water supplies at the landing
02:42:34 fighting water supplies at the landing valves at upper floors and also to ensure that water is immediately available at all floor levels yeah that's correct because in in a dry rising main that you know the taller the
02:42:47 rising main that you know the taller the floor you know the more difficult if you will it is to pump the water there it's entirely possible that it becomes more difficult with Heights and I want to go
02:43:01 difficult with Heights and I want to go to what you say and this is crystallizing your summary and conclusions chapter this is in Chapter two
02:43:08 two if we look at and the LA s6 zeros two at page 66 and it's paragraphs to point 3
02:43:19 page 66 and it's paragraphs to point 3 to point 23 point 24 and 25 those if we can make those big so you say they're in a wet rise of the system would already have been charged with a pump connected
02:43:31 have been charged with a pump connected when the LSP arrived there would have been no operations required by LSB to find external hydrants connect to their pumping appliance and connect to the riser Inlet therefore the provision of a dry main would have contributed to
02:43:43 dry main would have contributed to English
02:43:44 English increasing the time required by the lfp to get water to the initial fire event in flat 16 and then you say at the following paragraph there for a wet fire main it could have enabled to faster
02:43:55 main it could have enabled to faster initial response time to the fire in flat 16 which might have increased the chances of extinguishing the fire before it spread externally however it cannot be inserted it would have absolutely achieved this that's correct so I just
02:44:07 achieved this that's correct so I just want to to ask you some questions about this speed of setup okay yep now that is potentially consistent with what Watchmen a manager Dowden said in his
02:44:18 Watchmen a manager Dowden said in his evidence on day three from the 27th of June he said but generally as a rule of thumb it will increase our timing decrease the time to make up a compartment entry yes yes however do you
02:44:32 compartment entry yes yes however do you agree that the Chairman will also need to consider that the factual evidence more broadly about whether firefighters in fact had to wait to use the dry riser but do I agree yes I do agree yeah and
02:44:47 but do I agree yes I do agree yeah and you'll have to look at whether there's evidence as to whether they actually had to wait for the water and whether they were ready to go in any event yes I doubt not something I've analyzed at all
02:44:59 doubt not something I've analyzed at all yes and just on this and do you accept that the activity of connecting a supply to the dry riser and also the fire crews
02:45:10 to the dry riser and also the fire crews setting up at the bridgehead are likely to be simultaneous activities that's a matter for a firefighting expert to give a view on yep another topic on this is
02:45:22 a view on yep another topic on this is about the use of a wet main to cool the lobbies yes if we go back again within chapter 2 of your report to 220 3.26 that's chapter 2 be la s6 zeros to page
02:45:38 that's chapter 2 be la s6 zeros to page 66 and it's the same page we were just on if we can just zoom in on that paragraph 223 26 you know so you've said
02:45:49 paragraph 223 26 you know so you've said this they're a wet farm main could have enabled greater water pressure for firefighting on the four floors of ground-floor Tower which may have allowed lfb to use water to
02:46:00 may have allowed lfb to use water to cool lobbies and stair and therefore provide more assistance to people trying to escape yeah so this I'm from this is something I'm very interested in in terms of understanding hazards to people
02:46:12 terms of understanding hazards to people in specific locations because the design condition is to have wet rising main width which can cope with two hoses
02:46:24 width which can cope with two hoses operating at the same time and I just would like to here's some more about if that condition was present at Granville
02:46:35 that condition was present at Granville tower how it could have been used in the context of rescue the two hoses are very important
02:46:42 important because that's about protecting crews and and in the beginning it should be about extinction the fire and protecting the crew but I would like to understand later on if that provision had been
02:46:55 later on if that provision had been available a wet rising main were two functioning hoses and it could have been applied that way with two functioning hoses how that might have assisted protecting crews and dealing with
02:47:08 protecting crews and dealing with localized conditions in the lobby I would like to hear about that from a firefighting aspiration when you talk about to function hoses what exactly do you have in mind so the water supply is
02:47:20 you have in mind so the water supply is meant to be sufficient you know through the wet rising main to allow the full operation of two hoses simultaneously so I accept entirely that if you've
02:47:32 I accept entirely that if you've multiple hoses at the same time even with the wet risers and the situation changes but if one used it as it was designed if it had been provided how can
02:47:44 designed if it had been provided how can that assist protecting crews I'm dealing with a low blow collides firefighting to aid rescue only I can't take that off
02:47:55 aid rescue only I can't take that off the table as such okay can we just look and paragraphs fifteen point eight point two two and two three within the body of your report that's PLA s five zeroes fifteen twenty
02:48:08 that's PLA s five zeroes fifteen twenty eight and and here you give some some
02:48:19 eight and and here you give some some comparison calculations you say to compare the performance of wet and dry far main systems I've calculated whether the drive fire main in Grenville tower could provide an equivalent flow rate
02:48:30 could provide an equivalent flow rate liters per second and pressure of water bar to the design requirements for a wet fire main system in summary I've found that assuming two hoses operating in the building one in each at levels 22 and 23
02:48:42 building one in each at levels 22 and 23 the pressure and the outlet would be two point five seven bar this is 32 percent of the pressure required by a DB for a wet rising million is that correct yeah I wanted to try it that's I just got
02:48:54 I wanted to try it that's I just got there two simple theoretical analysis where all the water conditions are the same may decide to tear and it was just it for the purposes of comparing a dry
02:49:05 it for the purposes of comparing a dry and wet riser in that context to try and illustrate how it's different yeah and how it it would be potentially different in a building the height of
02:49:16 different in a building the height of Grand Hotel and then you go on to say similarly to deliver the equivalent pressure to a wet fire main on the highest floors the pressure required at ground level be fifteen point five bar
02:49:28 ground level be fifteen point five bar this is over fifty percent more than the maximum operating pressure that drive fire mains are designed for ten bar is that correct correct yeah so I think you've accepted and you did I think make
02:49:41 you've accepted and you did I think make this point in your original report that even with them wet main pumps and water supplies are not designed for multiple fire streams is that correct beyond - yep
02:49:53 yep [Music]
02:49:55 [Music] but I think understanding how to could have been used it is important so at Grenville tower and would any
02:50:06 so at Grenville tower and would any shortcomings which were encountered in respect of the water pressure for the dry riser potentially also have been encountered for the wet riser due to the number of hydrants which were in use
02:50:17 number of hydrants which were in use eventually but there is proper expert detail required to understand the impact of the firefighting on the time main and
02:50:28 of the firefighting on the time main and I would like to yes but yes that the the more water that was used internally in just very simple terms I presume it impacted the water available for
02:50:39 impacted the water available for internal firefighting and that proper analysis of network flows yep needs to be done and that's going to be done by probably I've been
02:50:50 going to be done by probably I've been storing our fees been appointed is that the water expert yes and and potentials presumably Steve McGurk the firefighting expert may need to look for that as well so so I accept because of all the ad hoc
02:51:02 so so I accept because of all the ad hoc firefighting that became required outside the building even though that's not what's meant to be required all the ad hoc firefighting will now have to be
02:51:14 ad hoc firefighting will now have to be reviewed in the context of the remaining water internally but the evidence shows the effectiveness of the external
02:51:26 the effectiveness of the external firefighting of the levels it was possible as I've explained in my report so on this basis once the fire has spread to multiple floors and they're
02:51:38 spread to multiple floors and they're doing firefighting in a large number of locations would you accept that the wet riser may not have made a material difference once it went beyond to new hose as as I said just moving to a
02:51:50 hose as as I said just moving to a slightly different point you've said that under a predock youment B 2013 the rises if according to those current standards have to be located within the staring closure and not within the
02:52:03 staring closure and not within the lobby's that's the you know that's if the current standards yes it is yes do you consider that the siting of the outlets in the lobbies rather than the protected stairwell may
02:52:16 rather than the protected stairwell may have affected the firefighting effort within grandpa'll tower well I observe and the evidence available to us that trying to get that distance to to the dry riser and in the
02:52:29 distance to to the dry riser and in the shape of the lobby as it was it did pose difficulties to London Fire Brigade as as they have said themselves and because
02:52:40 as they have said themselves and because of the conditions of the ground-floor Tower of fire the lobbies became a hazardous area whereas if the dry riser was in the staircase in those extreme circumstances that's something to
02:52:54 circumstances that's something to contemplate do you think that using a wet riser reduces the risk of compromise of the water supply caused by falling debris so I I couldn't answer that
02:53:07 debris so I I couldn't answer that question time yeah and in terms of fire spread on the external wall yes do you think that the presence of a dry risers rather than a wet riser made any
02:53:19 rather than a wet riser made any difference in terms of the firefighters ability to fight that external wall fire and again I actually don't understand that question because the clouding fire
02:53:30 that question because the clouding fire was dealt with from outside the building for several errors
02:53:40 not with a not with the dry riser so I don't think I don't understand the question yeah would you accept that in an extended incident such as that which was encountered at Greenville tower had
02:53:51 was encountered at Greenville tower had wet rise has been used the capacity of the tanks may have been exceeded early on in the in the fire indeed and I think the analysis of the network supply in
02:54:02 the analysis of the network supply in the area and around the build and therefore is a useful exercise to understand what impact that might have had to replenishing those tanks just at
02:54:14 had to replenishing those tanks just at that point if you have a wet riser you've got to draw water from the local mountains and if you've got a dry riser you're drawing water from the local mate
02:54:25 you're drawing water from the local mate so eventually exactly the difference is going to lie in the pumping capacity of the fixed pumps for the wet riser and the other absolutely and not exceed and
02:54:39 the other absolutely and not exceed and I keep saying two hoses not exceeding the design basis of the wet rising system which isn't ten hoses 20 hoses
02:54:50 system which isn't ten hoses 20 hoses it's two hoses that that's exactly the pumping equipment and staying within the design limits of the system and how one
02:55:01 design limits of the system and how one would do that systematically in an extreme event that's the kind of information you know an expert and firefighter would be right yeah thank you just just one set of questions on
02:55:15 you just just one set of questions on this on this topic now take the drivers as a dry riser do you have any of you seen any evidence that suggests it didn't perform adequately as a dry riser
02:55:26 didn't perform adequately as a dry riser as in don't think you've performed do you have any evidence that it didn't achieve the pressure that you would expect to drive rise to I should say
02:55:37 expect to drive rise to I should say when a dry riser is a dry riser you know the the early firefighting the evidence from early firefighting is that it performed effectively in their opinion
02:55:49 performed effectively in their opinion and there is evidence of an incident at level 20 very unfortunately I just can't bring the time to my mind right now it wasn't late on the fire where the
02:56:00 it wasn't late on the fire where the water pressure and flow rate at level 20 was was less if that's what you mean but that's the functioning of the dry rises going to be related to the functioning
02:56:13 going to be related to the functioning of the Fire Brigades pumping equipment correct there's nothing within nothing intrinsic to the Tri Rises that you're aware of yeah well
02:56:25 Tri Rises that you're aware of yeah well I don't quite understand the question cuz the dry riser is an empty pipe and it exists as an empty pipe in itself you could have had a problem for example at a level where you couldn't get the cap
02:56:39 I'm not aware that detailing of the physical infrastructure was a problem yeah this might help a little bit but it
02:56:51 yeah this might help a little bit but it said that the dry riser did achieve the 10 bar pressure that you were you referring earlier to remember between a comparison between the pressure that a wet riser you know is 15.5 and the dry
02:57:03 wet riser you know is 15.5 and the dry riser 10 yen dajjal's the requirement and it suggested that it did when tested achieve that 10 bar requirement have you considered that - no I have not no I'm
02:57:14 considered that - no I have not no I'm not aware that it did but it would be appropriate for probably another inquiry expert to consider absolutely any testing of the dry riser and how it's done
02:57:24 done replicating the exact circumstances of the external firefighting and condition of the water network around the tower on that night particularly
02:57:36 mr. Chairman I have no more questions on that topic and I'm about to move to a bigger topic which is about the lift so I think that needs a break at that point I think that would be an appropriate moment for a break and I would be happy
02:57:47 moment for a break and I would be happy to come back at to you sure I'm sure this Grange thinks it's safe to have an extra 10 minutes for lunch right we're going to break at that point then and we
02:57:58 going to break at that point then and we will resume at 2 o'clock ok so if you'd like to go in the usher and I'd remind you not to talk about your evidence thank you right two o'clock please