London Fire Brigade control room evidence about the critical decision to change from 'stay put' to evacuation advice on the night of the Grenfell fire. The testimony reveals communication challenges between control room and incident command, and the difficult decision-making process.
00:00:03 I'd have to carry on yes thank you very much yep thank you for you for coming back to us can I go back very briefly to a whiteboard picture that we looked at
00:00:15 a whiteboard picture that we looked at this morning I just want to ask one or two
00:00:17 two I hope simple questions okay that's met triple zero one six nine zero six
00:00:33 and it's the entry in green she said you rate in relation to flat 193 I just want to get an idea of the time at which we
00:00:44 to get an idea of the time at which we if we can at which you wrote that up on the on the board first of all can it help roughly with when you think you wrote that up judging by when the
00:00:55 wrote that up judging by when the whiteboard system started no I'm sorry I couldn't tell you whether that was when it initially started or later on okay now we have the there are three calls
00:01:06 now we have the there are three calls that came in to the control room from callers in relation to flat one nine three and I'll just give you the times okay
00:01:14 okay 251 Oh 903 Oh 206 and oh three oh five oh nine in relation to that flat does that help you fix a time in your mind as
00:01:28 that help you fix a time in your mind as to when do you rate that up there in relation to flat 193 and I I can only assume that it would have been one of the earlier calls and because after when
00:01:40 the earlier calls and because after when they've written totally flat if if that had happened at the same time I probably would have written that too
00:01:53 right okay they thinking we may have to check that by reference to the transcript oh not now now can I ask you to get back to your statement go to page
00:02:10 to get back to your statement go to page three
00:02:17 and you say on page three three quarters of the way down the page and it's just below halfway down the steel hovered on the third paragraph on that page you say
00:02:30 the third paragraph on that page you say I listened to and assess both Pam and Peter's calls both calls indicated that
00:02:42 Peter's calls both calls indicated that the situation was getting worse in terms of smoke and heat owing to the developing factors involved namely the duration and nature of the situation I became increasingly uncomfortable with
00:02:54 became increasingly uncomfortable with the stay-put policy the national policy for high-rises and just just pausing there I want to ask you about listening into these these calls first of all how
00:03:05 into these these calls first of all how many calls do you think you listened in to you say it was both Pam's and Peter's was it two calls so it that was initially yes the two calls so Adam I'd asked the
00:03:16 the two calls so Adam I'd asked the supervisors who had been on the calls the longest and it was really to go and support the CRO I was a controlling officer okay say my next question was
00:03:27 officer okay say my next question was why did you decide to listen to these calls and that was the reason to support the control of Circus they've both been on the course that were lost in a long time right now I wonder whether we can just find an
00:03:39 now I wonder whether we can just find an example of that can you tell us first of all before we show you an example how soon after your arrival in the control
00:03:52 soon after your arrival in the control room did you listen in to those calls within minutes even with that I would have gone to the back of the room I was spoken to the supervisors and I'm
00:04:03 I was spoken to the supervisors and I'm sure they would have been no they were very busy at the time but I would have said who what can I do and who's been on the telephone for the longest and and one of the mother said pan and pita
00:04:16 and one of the mother said pan and pita and as Pam was sitting nearest I went to pan festival right did you listen to the two calls as it were at the same time did you flip from one to the other or did you know each one all I haven't
00:04:27 did you know each one all I haven't moved to now so I went over to Pam and like you've mentioned before control stuff where a headset and if you're near in that proximity it's quite easy to hear what the other what the caller is
00:04:40 hear what the other what the caller is saying to him and I sat down with Pam and made sure she was okay and I asked her to ask her caller several questions about how the conditions were in the
00:04:52 about how the conditions were in the flap their location and where they were him and Pam did this and repeated them repeated the caller's answers back to me and that's that's the same with Peter
00:05:04 and that's that's the same with Peter they come in terms of the mechanism the actual mechanics of listening to the calls yeah you described a bit of that just now did you have your own earphone that you could now go through I was just
00:05:15 that you could now go through I was just next to her I say just yeah just close next time okay had you any means yourself have being able to speak to the caller no I could have I could have listened in
00:05:26 have I could have listened in electronically from another position right but it was easier and quicker to go direct and speak to them okay and how long did you listen to the calls for
00:05:39 long did you listen to the calls for starting with Pam how long do you you know enough for Pam to give me an idea of how what she'd been telling the caller and where they were and what
00:05:50 caller and where they were and what advice she'd been given and for them to ask if the conditions were deteriorating right okay and so nothing enough to give you an idea of those things roughly in minutes
00:06:01 idea of those things roughly in minutes how long was that a minute and a half oh right so that's sort of time and what about Peter the same the same right okay
00:06:12 same the same right okay and you remember who or what sort of people the callers were in terms of gender or age or anything like that I think Pam's call was male but I can be
00:06:27 I think Pam's call was male but I can be asked that way it was really to assess the situation with regard to what they the caller's were experiencing okay can I ask you then to look at another just a
00:06:40 I ask you then to look at another just a part of a transcript a you okay to look at a transcript that we're not look at the whole thing yeah l fe 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 7 I'd like to look at the first page
00:07:01 7 I'd like to look at the first page which tells you that it lasted 59 minutes and 44 seconds and I'd like to go to page 98 within it
00:07:16 so I said before you sorry before we move off that page you can just identify at the top of the page the call looks like that it starts at 0 1 38 38 now can
00:07:32 like that it starts at 0 1 38 38 now can we just then look at so that gives you an idea of what when it started so you went in the control room at that stage if we can go to page 98 we could see it
00:07:44 if we can go to page 98 we could see it last for just under an hour so lasts until 20 to 3 or so so you'd arrive during there in the control room during this call is that right that would be right at us the timings right okay in a
00:07:56 right at us the timings right okay in a page 98 person can go back to the previous page
00:08:09 we can see the conversation between corner and operator at the top page operators is you got to try and get out yeah call it pardon operator you gotta
00:08:20 yeah call it pardon operator you gotta try and get out caller try and get out of the building operator yes okay can you try can you try that for me call it inaudible operator if your dad your dad said there's no a safe
00:08:31 your dad your dad said there's no a safe left in the flat for you there's no more safe place here since the caller operator listen listen to me a minute caller yeah operator can you hear me right your dad said that it wasn't anywhere safe left in the building in
00:08:42 anywhere safe left in the building in your flat is that right listen yeah operator is there is it right that there's nowhere safe in your flat and then the next page caller but no there's
00:08:54 then the next page caller but no there's nowhere safe there's no way operator right if you're telling me then there's nowhere safe I need you to try sweetheart I need you to try to get out yeah and then other it's another voice tell them they have no choice they have
00:09:07 tell them they have no choice they have to those over speaking and then the operator says hello hello hello she they're gone are they okay thanks bye and then if you look at the next page think maybe the end of the call
00:09:34 yeah okay that is that is the end of the call and I won't just want to ask you about other can you help me with what's
00:09:45 about other can you help me with what's happening there when we see other tell them they have much no choice they have to over speaking so that would have been someone I would imagine in the background that that could have been made after that we've changed the
00:09:58 made after that we've changed the decision they could have been you it could have been me okay all right
00:10:12 all right now getting back to your statement
00:10:24 you say I only to the developing factors involved they knew the duration and nature of the situation I became increasingly uncomfortable with the state policy what had made you become
00:10:42 state policy what had made you become increasingly uncomfortable have you say owing to the developing factors duration nature of the situation yeah but what what do you mean by the nature of the situation so I think I'm trying to say here is that the duration of the course
00:10:54 here is that the duration of the course and the deteriorating situation right I was uncomfortable and I know it says stay put policy so that must have been something said but to clarify I was in
00:11:05 something said but to clarify I was in couple uncomfortable and the people were remaining in their flaps and we were trying to protect them in their slats when it was clear that that protection advice wasn't working and it was failing
00:11:17 advice wasn't working and it was failing I see did you have any views or thoughts at the time that that by that point compartment ation within grenfell tower was failing or had failed yes that was
00:11:30 was failing or had failed yes that was the consideration and like I said the 45 minutes and was an indication that it would be close to failing by then right did that have an impact on your thoughts
00:11:41 did that have an impact on your thoughts about the stay-put policy and it's the wisdom of holding to it yes right would that mean that you'd need to start getting people out immediately that
00:11:53 getting people out immediately that would mean that we would start to tell callers instead of asking them to find a clearer smoker less smokier place in their flats that we would actually be advising them to leave their premise
00:12:05 advising them to leave their premise right that's point when you became increasingly uncomfortable with the state of policy did you make ordinary of your colleagues in the control room make
00:12:17 your colleagues in the control room make any inquiry of the incident commander as to what their thoughts were on the ground about compartment ation failure and the wisdom of sticking to stay put
00:12:28 and the wisdom of sticking to stay put no so they they were all take cause they were all on the phone there wasn't anyone to contact the interesting ground but by that time see Jason Olaf
00:12:40 ground but by that time see Jason Olaf was on the phone to see you 7:00 and Adrian Fenton and were was having telephone conversations with officers at the incident if you had wanted to speak
00:12:54 the incident if you had wanted to speak to the incident commander directly could you have done that yes I could have rung him on my mobile phone we would have answered I can't be sure what about the
00:13:06 answered I can't be sure what about the airway okay so you know stages at this stage when you're becoming increasing uncomfortable how soon after your arrival was that 5-10 minutes okay
00:13:21 arrival was that 5-10 minutes okay did you know who the incident commander was at that stage
00:13:29 I Caprica okay did doesn't it does the name Richard Welch ring a bell
00:13:40 Richard Welch ring a bell yes in what way does it ring a bell I neither senior Forester
00:13:53 did you know that he sorry did you know that out at o2 o4 according to the short
00:14:05 that out at o2 o4 according to the short incident log he had been made incident commander the quiet of the log I know he made pumps for tea so it would have been I would have assumed that he was the
00:14:16 I would have assumed that he was the incident commander right you'd have assumed that he was the incident commander do you remember being told or finding out from the short incident log whether anybody had taken
00:14:28 incident log whether anybody had taken over as incident commander from Richard Welsh
00:14:31 Welsh no do you remember the involvement of a DEA Co Lockland I do remember that we
00:14:45 DEA Co Lockland I do remember that we had an informative message from him from him and what was that and what was that message to remember do you remember what no okay we do have in the incident log
00:14:58 no okay we do have in the incident log and there's no need to look at it unless you want to at o2 16:58 a makeup cu8 from da da co Lachlan make fr use 10 is
00:15:11 from da da co Lachlan make fr use 10 is that what does that trigger a regulation no I thought it was an informative message so a longer one with containing the building size okay right can I ask
00:15:23 the building size okay right can I ask you to look them so this is a very slight by version off off the theme we're on about changing the stapler but just just I try to put it in time at shortens of the long page 23
00:15:44 we have an informative message just following up on your and your your answer just now at o2 4203 we see informative s ad Sharon Davi sup s UPC
00:15:58 informative s ad Sharon Davi sup s UPC rate from da Co Lachlan and then there's it there's the rest of the informative message there what's I should have asked you earlier what's up su p it's just a
00:16:09 you earlier what's up su p it's just a code we use in the control room and to indicate that there's an informative or a message being sent that the supervisors should read oh I see ok so you'll see some makeups that have
00:16:22 ok so you'll see some makeups that have IUP you have an instant upgrade that's yes it's a way of prioritizing those messages and who they go to in the control room I see that's that's that's very clear so this message you would
00:16:34 very clear so this message you would have read was even been I believe I was standing and overheard it coming through on the radio ok and what would the fact that the message had the message said
00:16:46 that the message had the message said cu8 from da CEO Lachlan a residential block of flats etc etc what would that tell you about DAC allotments rolled I
00:16:57 tell you about DAC allotments rolled I would assume from that he was the incident commander at that time when he sent that message why would you assume that from those because that's how our messages are constructed so the message
00:17:09 messages are constructed so the message always comes nicely from the IC ok so right coming back to the point at which
00:17:20 right coming back to the point at which you begin to get uncomfortable with the stay-put policy was it possible for you to get on to the air wave radio to group manager Welch as the incident commander
00:17:33 manager Welch as the incident commander or DAC a Lachlan if he had become the incident commander by them and say to them what's happening on the incident ground because I'm not comfortable with
00:17:45 ground because I'm not comfortable with what
00:17:45 what from callers it would have been unusual to speak directly to them via the air wave or handheld I don't know what channel they were listening to but that
00:17:56 channel they were listening to but that I would imagine they would be using fire ground radios and talking on a command channel rather than over the mainstream radio so that would be an appropriate way to contact them and had I phoned
00:18:07 way to contact them and had I phoned them they might have left their telephone with someone on the command unit and because usually when we ring the command unit to ask the incident commander we don't speak directly to him
00:18:18 commander we don't speak directly to him someone takes the message and then we'll ask the incident commander directly and then they'll come back to us I see so it's not common practice for control to
00:18:30 it's not common practice for control to talk directly to the incident commander it can happen if they happen to be on the command unit at that time when we ring up and ask them a question and if they're not busy dealing with the
00:18:42 they're not busy dealing with the incident okay was it physically possible as a matter of mechanics for you to get on the or
00:18:53 of mechanics for you to get on the or air wave radio and and contact or at least attempt to contact the IC commander either Welch or a lot Lee I I could have physically tried but they
00:19:05 could have physically tried but they wouldn't I doubt if they would have responded right they weren't monitoring the main skiing radio channel for I don't believe right if you had wanted
00:19:16 I don't believe right if you had wanted to speak to either of those officers directly urgently to pass on what you were now seeing and hearing in the
00:19:27 were now seeing and hearing in the control room could you have done it yes well we did so Adrian Fenty was in the room and he was on the phone to several
00:19:39 room and he was on the phone to several senior officers that I could have passed that message on or he might have been talking to those directly right now
00:20:00 you say in your statement in the next sentence
00:20:06 sentence I spoke with Adrian Fenton the Deputy Assistant Commissioner responsible for Brigade the brigade Coordination Center and said that we should think about
00:20:19 and said that we should think about changing the policy whilst he was in the middle of speaking to ground crews first of all how long roughly if you can help
00:20:32 of all how long roughly if you can help with that
00:20:33 with that after Fenton's major inventors arrival did you have that discussion with him I'm almost immediately whilst the whiteboards are being set up and he was
00:20:45 whiteboards are being set up and he was on the phone to the insistent ground right so this discussion is this right pre predates pre times the start of the operation of the whiteboards we were
00:20:56 operation of the whiteboards we were thinking of I think they started it was already started so I think Adrian's first role when he came in he was moving the whiteboards around and writing up information and I arrived I think five
00:21:08 information and I arrived I think five minutes before him and I was speaking and I've gone over to listen to Pam it's cool and then Peters Peter was situated and in front of the whiteboards and
00:21:21 and in front of the whiteboards and that's where Adrian was based right so after I'd listened to Peters I could speak directly to Adrian okay and are you in the main control room yes this is not downstairs in the brigade
00:21:32 not downstairs in the brigade coordination no you know because of the number of course in the information asian-based the BCC to begin with in the
00:21:43 asian-based the BCC to begin with in the control room right in the corner okay and when you say I spoke with Adrian Fenton and said that we should think about changing the policy were those the words you used and I'm not
00:21:58 those the words you used and I'm not sure I said I think I said we need to right can you can you remember as best you can what you said to him reliving the moment I I think I said we need to
00:22:11 the moment I I think I said we need to change what do you know what honestly I don't even think I said policy I think I said we need to tell people to get out to leave okay from my recollection okay
00:22:24 to leave okay from my recollection okay and what did he say do you remember yeah I think we had a short discussion about how we may go
00:22:35 short discussion about how we may go about doing that and I think I'd overheard whilst I'd been talking to Peter or maybe it was slightly after Adrian had been on the phone to the
00:22:46 Adrian had been on the phone to the incident ground and he had relayed or was speaking to them about crews not being able to get past I thought it with the 18th floor so shortly after that I
00:23:00 the 18th floor so shortly after that I said to him
00:23:03 okay did he agree with you that just using the expression in your statement to start with the policy should be
00:23:14 to start with the policy should be changed
00:23:15 changed I don't recall having a decision where we said yes we agree and I think it's more of a coming together so with my
00:23:29 more of a coming together so with my experience with in control and fire Survival Guide let's call some callers and Adrian's knowledge of the incident grounds and I think it was a general own knowledge meant that that is how we are feeling in control and he would relay
00:23:42 feeling in control and he would relay that to the instant ground okay now you say okay yeah did you get a sense from him that he agreed with you
00:23:53 him that he agreed with you yeah that people should start getting out yes yes okay and from your knowledge what was the basis of his agreeing with you do you know why he agreed with you from your
00:24:05 know why he agreed with you from your perspective I think he was in control he could see and of course he could hear the volume and hear what people weren't and the callers he knew some of the
00:24:16 and the callers he knew some of the situations that some of the callers were in and so I think he might have picked up on that I realized that that was a very educated decision the control had made am so I was happy to agree with
00:24:28 made am so I was happy to agree with that and I also believe he might have seen images of of grenfell on fire yes right and you say in your statement
00:24:43 yes right and you say in your statement whilst he was in the middle of speaking to ground crews and you just told us the same just now do you know who Adrienne Fenton was talking to on the ground no I
00:24:54 Fenton was talking to on the ground no I don't know when it says ground crews I believe there were senior officers see you officers senior officers sorry senior fees do you do you know whether
00:25:06 senior fees do you do you know whether he Adrian Fenton was speaking to the incident commander and I don't I would imagine he would be able to to speak to the incident commander right and how
00:25:20 the incident commander right and how would he be able to do that he was doing that on his mobile phone on his mobile phone yes not radio yeah okay and wouldn't he made bail favor his Brigade Mobile yes okay would it record the
00:25:32 Mobile yes okay would it record the messages huh no right um now you say in your statement that he was informed that crew were unable to get past the 18th floor he I think says
00:25:43 get past the 18th floor he I think says that there was information about all you had information about not being able to get past the 15th floor do you remember whether it was the 15th or v18 that that could have been the
00:25:54 or v18 that that could have been the fifth it could have been the 15th through 15 right and it was that the first time you heard that yes what did you think about that
00:26:09 it was an awful situation what having been told that crews could not get past the 15th floor did you take any steps to advise the
00:26:23 did you take any steps to advise the control room officers operators actually handing calls as to what to say to callers when the change of advise when
00:26:35 callers when the change of advise when we changed the advice what are you saying that no state let me take it in in stages having learnt from Adrienne Fenton that he was being told by senior officers on the ground that crews
00:26:49 officers on the ground that crews couldn't get past the 15th floor or maybe the 88th floor gets the top of the building having been told that did you take any steps next to tell CR O's as to
00:27:05 take any steps next to tell CR O's as to how to advise callers calling in yes so that was all done at the same time the same time so it's the same time so which we'd hurt callers that had been on the
00:27:17 we'd hurt callers that had been on the call for a long duration and but spoken to Adrienne and I said about changing the advice he said that he'd heard from the into the ground that they couldn't get past the 15th floor so that decision
00:27:30 get past the 15th floor so that decision was made I see after that that's very clear say it's a the decision was based in part I think you're saying on the fact that you'd now learn the crews couldn't get past the 15th floor yes
00:27:41 couldn't get past the 15th floor yes right now a page four
00:27:48 of your statement in the first paragraph will first main paragraph on that page you say with resources struggling crews unable to get above the eighteenth floor and Adrian already engaged in protracted
00:27:59 and Adrian already engaged in protracted communications with ground units I made the quick time decision that policy was to change an advice for CRS was to start telling people to evacuate the building I derived a Stratford at
00:28:10 the building I derived a Stratford at approximately approximately 2:15 hours within 10 to 15 minutes the decision was made to change policy and that decision was mine this would have been at approximately 2:30 to 2:35 and then you
00:28:22 approximately 2:30 to 2:35 and then you explained the decision made being made due to a variety of factors now in terms of that decision was it you who decided
00:28:33 of that decision was it you who decided to change that state policy yes but again during that statement the police said who made the decision so I just said me but it was a it was the decision
00:28:46 said me but it was a it was the decision where we spoken I'd spoken to Adrienne and and together we'd agreed that that was the right decision okay so I'd
00:28:57 was the right decision okay so I'd raised the decision I'd raised that I wish to change it and together we decided that that was the most appropriate action to take right you say
00:29:09 appropriate action to take right you say you did this as a quick time decision and you give your reasons what do you mean by by quick time decision so within 10 to 15 minutes of arriving right we
00:29:23 10 to 15 minutes of arriving right we had decided to change that okay I think I see what you mean say in other words you made it you made it very soon after you arrived on the basis of the
00:29:34 you arrived on the basis of the information you saw it rather than spending hours cogitating every yes okay no
00:29:41 you say after that the vistas the decision was made into a variety of factors the duration of calls the content of the calls and the resources
00:29:53 content of the calls and the resources available these factors of my years have experienced formed the basis of my rationale and coincided with the recommendations following the Lakmal fire in 2009 in which certain questions
00:30:04 fire in 2009 in which certain questions were asked by the CRA regarding smoke and fire levels can you just explain how the recommendations following Lacan all
00:30:17 the recommendations following Lacan all played a part in how you came to make this decision yeah so the record one of the recommendations the LeCun all that you see in both policy seven nine zero
00:30:28 you see in both policy seven nine zero and five three nine is the fact that during certain circumstances we may have to change the advice and that came as a result of the lack no inquiry
00:30:44 I see okay and we saw yesterday in 790 and indeed in GRA three point two about the circumstances in which the advice
00:30:55 the circumstances in which the advice would have to change so do we do eet do we take it that the circumstances you've set out duration content resources those are all the factors which fed into the change in the in the in the advice yes
00:31:11 from where you were you derived in the control room 215 the decision was made 15 or 20 minutes later did you have any
00:31:22 15 or 20 minutes later did you have any thoughts at the time about whether that decision that you made could have been made earlier no not on that night when I
00:31:34 made earlier no not on that night when I was in the control room have I reflected on it later yes I'm not asking about your later reflections but um on the night I think you said no I think so you didn't say to
00:31:47 you said no I think so you didn't say to yourself why has that why am i making or why is this decision only being made now no okay
00:31:54 no okay did you discuss with anybody in the control room why the decision hadn't been made earlier no and I think I tried to
00:32:05 earlier no and I think I tried to explain yesterday and with the CRO is taking those constant calls and many very harrowing and distressful the supervisors were still mobilizing appliances they themselves were taking
00:32:17 appliances they themselves were taking calls as well it was very noisy in the control room we had a downlink that was on from the police helicopter so there was additional noise that we had the white board set up and that with them of
00:32:28 white board set up and that with them of communication the had started already and I wouldn't imagine that anyone could have an oversight and step back because they were all very task orientated which
00:32:40 they were all very task orientated which was rightly so to supply the incident with the resources they need so I didn't query why that decision had been made earlier I didn't think that
00:32:51 been made earlier I didn't think that that would be something that would be considered earlier I was the only spare person that arrives then that could then talk to individuals to find out what they were telling people just following
00:33:04 they were telling people just following up a couple of things than that you say that the control room was very noisy because you had a downlink on from police helicopter I thought and there's
00:33:16 police helicopter I thought and there's no justice for that no I just no understand but I thought that the heli tele link wasn't operating that's right no sorry so we were able to I think we receive a call from the police and they asked us to switch to
00:33:29 police and they asked us to switch to what was called an es channel and emergency service channel 3 and on our radio and so we can hear what the police helicopter is communicating right when
00:33:43 helicopter is communicating right when did you switch to the es channel that was on when I arrived it was on your road you know when that was switched on no what is this a call from the MIT
00:33:57 no what is this a call from the MIT police asking us to switch that on at some point during the incident okay now in terms of how that channel is heard it's audible to everybody in the clot in
00:34:09 it's audible to everybody in the clot in the control room is it yes it is because you say it's adding to the noise is there a speaker it comes over yes and what's that what recipient is that speaker attached to within a radio it's
00:34:21 speaker attached to within a radio it's it's what's called it's an air wave radio much similar to the ones that are in the firing G caps and it is on a desk
00:34:34 in the firing G caps and it is on a desk in between two supervisory positions right and what you say uses channel Emergency Service channel three is that
00:34:45 Emergency Service channel three is that one of the channels we've heard about channel one we've heard about Channel four we've heard about Channel six it's Channel three one of those that you can know I say so
00:34:56 can know I say so Channel three so there are there are different talk groups and different channels allotted to those took groups so channel emergency service channel is a channel where all the emergency
00:35:08 a channel where all the emergency services that are tending that instant canoes and it goes for our request for the plate from the place to set that I see okay and who where did the messages
00:35:19 see okay and who where did the messages come from to get broadcast into the control room through that channel so the police asked us to turn to es3 and we did that em and that was because the
00:35:31 did that em and that was because the helicopter that was up I was passing commute was passing messages I believe they were going to their own control room but we were able to listen him
00:35:42 room but we were able to listen him oh it's and I believe in the early hours of the morning and we were communicating with them about an individual's trapped on the 11th floor right okay and it's
00:35:56 on the 11th floor right okay and it's just a sir I'm clear I think I asked you where do the messages come from or get broadcast on on to that speaker and am i right in thinking from your answer that they are actually messages sent from the
00:36:08 they are actually messages sent from the helicopter to the police that you can even listen in to yes so it was that night it could be used for a range of incidents it just happened to be that the police helicopter was communicating on es3 that evening okay and do you
00:36:24 on es3 that evening okay and do you remember whether that method of communication all those messages were audible to the control room I think you said before you arrived they
00:36:35 I think you said before you arrived they were yes I'm pretty sent late it was on before alright thank you don't worry you don't know when they started yeah and where any of those messages that you could hear did any of those messages
00:36:47 could hear did any of those messages that you could have factored into your decision to change the policy and advice callers to get out no what did you learn if anything from
00:37:01 no what did you learn if anything from hearing those messages at Lux I think there was a number of messages I think we had reports of callers that were on the roof and that we maybe you'll have
00:37:13 the roof and that we maybe you'll have to confirm with one of the supervisors we may be asked and to confirm that because we'd had reports of that and I believe the police head so whether they were able to check that out and let us know that that wasn't the case and and
00:37:24 know that that wasn't the case and and again there was some communication between our control and the police helicopter later on or the in the early hours of the morning regarding someone attracting on the 11th floor
00:37:40 [Music]
00:37:48 you told us a moment ago and when I asked you about whether the decision to change the state cut advice could have been made earlier that there was no one essentially standing back with a note
00:38:00 essentially standing back with a note with an overview but I hope I haven't missed interpreted or mischaracterized your evidence but the question I have arising out of out of that is would they normally be somebody in the control room
00:38:13 normally be somebody in the control room who would be able to stand back and look at what was going on and make him make a big decision if there was one or two fire survival guidance course and I believe he showed it when you pulled up the supervisor if
00:38:26 it when you pulled up the supervisor if that they on there is an instruction for someone to support that CRO there's their call taking so that could have been a supervisor it could have been another member of staff but there's that
00:38:37 another member of staff but there's that support for them and they're able to process that information and take other instruction with what's going on in the room but because we were just overwhelmed with calls and actions from
00:38:52 overwhelmed with calls and actions from Union gets a say so I interrupted you know I was just saying just because the large-scale incident and the amount of course and everything that didn't take place until I arrived you know I I could
00:39:04 place until I arrived you know I I could have logged on to a position and got involved in taking calls but I made a conscious decision not to for that reason
00:39:20 and is it right that you reach that decision without seeing any media or TV images of the building on fire yeah I don't believe I'd say Danny that time
00:39:34 had you looked at any images at all from news apps or anything like that no I think the first time I saw that M is when both Adam and Scott arrived in the control room right that's when the
00:39:50 control room right that's when the discussion takes place with regards to the TV being on when you made this decision to change the advice being
00:40:01 decision to change the advice being given by C Ras to callers did you have any idea of the physical conditions inside the building in general terms I think we all knew they were dire and and
00:40:16 think we all knew they were dire and and that's why some of our advice when we talked to our control room officers we say that you know it would be corazón I'm really are very reluctant to enter
00:40:28 I'm really are very reluctant to enter worse conditions or smokier conditions and sometimes that would require us to be very forceful and run with them to get them through those conditions
00:40:44 said while star wasn't aware I could we could all hazard a good guess but it was luck would you like a break alright Carol for five
00:40:56 like a break alright Carol for five minutes or so you say I think should have one for too long that's a quarter to three not five minutes although it could be yes you say that last answer that you think we all knew they would
00:41:09 that you think we all knew they would die in the absence of any information where any detailed information coming
00:41:21 where any detailed information coming from the incident ground how did you how could you form a picture of the conditions of smoke heat and fire in the build within the building because it was
00:41:33 build within the building because it was obvious and the control operators faces that they had talked to colorless and that they could no longer contact anymore and that they could guess what had happened to them the smoke
00:41:44 had happened to them the smoke conditions were worsening did you get any idea of from the CRS conversations with callers that the callers had actually experienced the conditions in
00:41:56 actually experienced the conditions in the lobbies or in the stairwell as opposed to their own flats no so I believe during the initial course that people say they cannot leave because of the smoke logging in the corridor or
00:42:08 the smoke logging in the corridor or it's smoking in the corridor and but those conditions were entering those flats as well
00:42:16 and would it would it follow from that that when advising callers to get out you might be sending them into
00:42:28 you might be sending them into conditions which were smoked long-term and hotter yes we knew that and that's why we instructors all the control officers and to tell the callers to get blankets and
00:42:40 to tell the callers to get blankets and towels to wet them to cover themselves with them and just keep low and more importantly to hold hands as they left so they wouldn't lose each other because
00:42:51 so they wouldn't lose each other because visibility probably been nil and that they should just head to the stairwell yes and in terms of balancing the risk
00:43:04 yes and in terms of balancing the risk between staying and leaving in terms of the advice that is being given did you think that you had enough information about the conditions in the escape route such as it was to be able to give that
00:43:16 such as it was to be able to give that advice no I just knew the alternative
00:43:30 did you or any of your controlling colleagues seek information from the bridgehead or from the incident
00:43:42 bridgehead or from the incident commander through the incident commander about the conditions that the crews were experiencing no was that was that something that could have been done yes
00:43:57 something that could have been done yes we we could have done that you know I believe at that point and that was there that was the only alternative right so
00:44:08 that was the only alternative right so are you saying that there would have been no point was saying if we'd known the conditions in the stairwells and security we still would have been advising them to get out due to the
00:44:20 advising them to get out due to the reasons I gave earlier I see so I think what I'm getting from this is really there was not a positive question of a choice yeah
00:44:32 a big aside just agenda thank you I think we all have a break now like just just for five minutes all right you like to give the option right five
00:44:49 you like to give the option right five minutes please 10:00 to 3:00
00:45:00 you
00:51:41 all right I did carry on this mitt can I just get back up the step and ask you about earn the timing of the change of advice or your your
00:51:53 of the change of advice or your your personal decision in your statement if you get back to page four in the first paragraph five lines down from the top it says that you would have made that decision at approximately 2:30 to 2:35
00:52:06 decision at approximately 2:30 to 2:35 now I wonder whether we might be able to be a little a little bit more precise about that Jim if I showed you earlier on this afternoon a transcript of a long call which started at both 138 also ran
00:52:21 call which started at both 138 also ran for 59 minutes 44 seconds and toward towards the end of that transcript we looked at it there was somebody speaking other remember and you
00:52:34 somebody speaking other remember and you said that might have been you now on the basis that that call ends at about 237 do you think that the your decision was made after that time after you'd heard
00:52:48 made after that time after you'd heard that call and participated in it no I think it was made before so I think it was made before and we would have gone round to the all the control
00:53:01 gone round to the all the control officers Alex went round to all the control officers gave them the advice told him that and that it had been changed that we were now going to tell callers to to get out and to leave the
00:53:12 callers to to get out and to leave the building and and I would have then gone round and just to support the CR OS and one of them would have been Pam so that would have been where I would have said
00:53:25 would have been where I would have said right why do you think that you would have made that decision before the call before the end of that long call we looked at earlier as I said I wouldn't
00:53:39 looked at earlier as I said I wouldn't have told Pam to give that advice without speaking to everyone to ensure that we were all given the same as ice so I wouldn't have said to Pam on my own
00:53:51 so I wouldn't have said to Pam on my own tell them to get out or whatever if that was me and before I'd had that conversation with Adrienne and before I'd spoken to Alex when we looked at
00:54:03 I'd spoken to Alex when we looked at that call earlier I thought that but you had explained to us that that was one of the calls where you were listening in or might have been one of the calls that you were listening into and assessing
00:54:14 you were listening into and assessing yeah well that that wouldn't have been that time that would have been after so that you have if you have the transcript that would have been before when I was listening in like perhaps we were just
00:54:26 listening in like perhaps we were just to get back to the transcript it's some lfb quadruple zero six seven seven sorry quint equals zero six seven seven and the other this is right at the very end so we can time that at about two thirty
00:54:38 so we can time that at about two thirty seven and when you say or when it says other tell them they have no choice they have to the call ends just help me with and we are we can tell that the timing
00:54:50 and we are we can tell that the timing is I thought that that was one of the calls which you were listening to which helped you decide whether or not to change the statement policy is that wrong
00:54:58 wrong yes no that is right but earlier on in that Cole I see so I would have listened to it earlier on in that call then that bit I see okay why do you what why do
00:55:09 bit I see okay why do you what why do you say that what makes you confident that that is the case because Pam responds with certain questions sorry the caller and the operator asks certain
00:55:21 the caller and the operator asks certain questions that I've asked and and you could I'm sure you can hear that in the transcript earlier you're familiar with this this conversation then are you it's long call
00:55:32 conversation then are you it's long call I've listened to every cup okay alright thank you
00:55:37 thank you going back there to where I was which is pay page for second paragraph of your of your statement
00:55:49 we've now know what decision you made the basis for it and more or less the timing of it kaneda's to tell us how that decision which you came which you
00:56:02 that decision which you came which you made and then discussed with Adrian Fenton was communicated to the incident ground that would have been fire Adrian
00:56:13 ground that would have been fire Adrian bye Adrian do you know who he spoke to yeah
00:56:20 do you know why the change doesn't appear on the short incident log yes
00:56:31 appear on the short incident log yes because we never I never entered it I I didn't have a position to log on to at that and and as I say the supervisor Sabbath it didn't occur to us to log
00:56:42 Sabbath it didn't occur to us to log that change and the priority was to get round to all the control officers and let them know of the change which we did
00:56:53 would it not have been easier for somebody to be told to type into the shortened into the incident log as it was as it was being operated the fact that the change to the statehood had
00:57:04 that the change to the statehood had benefit and the statement advice had been made so that everybody could see it no because everybody wouldn't be looking at the interested log they were taking calls and writing details no one will be following that incident look it would be
00:57:16 following that incident look it would be too rapid to keep up with anyway and that's not the way we generally share information okay and when you say the
00:57:28 information okay and when you say the messages were then passed on by the CRS to ground units and residents during the 999 calls did you take any steps to
00:57:39 999 calls did you take any steps to ensure that the change in advice had been under received and understood by residents yes what steps were those so I
00:57:51 residents yes what steps were those so I I would have imagined you've shown an extracts of that call just going around
00:58:00 making sure that everyone's aware luck say Alex did first she went round and spoke to everyone individually Tilton the changes told him what advice we will give him now and that they should pass on to their callers and and then again I
00:58:14 on to their callers and and then again I just take on a more of a supportive role to those CEOs and that's probably if you can hear me in the back of Pam's call after that decision had been made okay
00:58:27 after that decision had been made okay did you take any steps to ensure that residents understood that rescue crews were no longer coming for them you know
00:58:39 were no longer coming for them you know why is that
00:58:43 because of the distress we perceive of that decision and that announcement would make to people and by giving them a change of decision and by giving them
00:58:56 a change of decision and by giving them the the new advice and actually the control operators felt more helpful I believe with doing that rather than telling them to protect themselves which
00:59:07 telling them to protect themselves which was becoming an impossible task and so a new plan to start telling them to evacuate start giving them some positive actions to carry out and that would be
00:59:19 actions to carry out and that would be detrimental by saying that actually crews can't get to you and but I do think some people some callers and some theorize do a plot do imply that during
00:59:30 theorize do a plot do imply that during their course now in terms of the change in the statehood advice would communicate it to the incident ground do you remember whether anybody in the incident ground actually participated in
00:59:42 incident ground actually participated in the decision or did they just receive the decision from the control room you and Adrian Fenton and I I couldn't answer that I don't know okay and
00:59:53 answer that I don't know okay and ultimately whose decision was it I I raised the decision with Adrian that we should tell people to get out right so
01:00:05 should tell people to get out right so in terms of responsibility responsibility for the decision did the incident commander have any responsibility for that decision
01:00:19 no it was the decision that came from control and was passed down to the instant grant okay do you remember there being any discussion between Adrian
01:00:30 being any discussion between Adrian Fenton and the incident commander or the command units about the decision I'm sure there was but again after we decided I spoke to Alex she went round
01:00:43 decided I spoke to Alex she went round to talk to or her control officers and make sure they are okay and then I took on a more of a supporting role okay can I ask you to look at a an FB document
01:00:56 I ask you to look at a an FB document which is tas seven of the documents bundle this is lfb document number three we looked at earlier today
01:01:11 and if you go to page three
01:01:22 it says in the middle of the page or just above the middle of the page in red Oh to 44:15 message from incident see
01:01:34 Oh to 44:15 message from incident see you ate a cero is now I see first of all do you remember Assistant Commissioner Road taking over as us as incident
01:01:46 Road taking over as us as incident commander I don't remember that the message coming through but I do remember later on him taking over is instantly so I didn't hear that message but I did know sometime shortly after and then it
01:01:59 know sometime shortly after and then it says two 45s from this time London Fire Brigade control operators begin advising those persons trapped in the building to self evacuate do you think that that's
01:02:12 self evacuate do you think that that's correct that the advice being given by control operators to self evacuate was given from about 2:45 or do you think it was earlier no I know it was earlier
01:02:23 was earlier no I know it was earlier right
01:02:32 and you give that earlier time in your statement as Oh - 30 - OH - 35 yes I believe the first time you hear a control officer advised and a caller to
01:02:44 control officer advised and a caller to get out is about - I'm 34 right
01:03:08 okay now
01:03:14 I think you said earlier that you went round the whole control room having made that decision to tell control officers what advice to
01:03:25 to tell control officers what advice to give now Alex did I had a conversation with home Alex Norman in the middle of the room
01:03:32 the room and she then went round smile everybody okay and did she do that straight away straight away you'd made your decision yes it was after you discussed it with Adrian Fenton yes and the page four of
01:03:48 Adrian Fenton yes and the page four of your states are coming back to that yeah you say in the third line advice I'm so it's the second main paragraph which
01:04:00 it's the second main paragraph which starts the messages in the third line we say advice was also given to the CRA s but they may need to use more forceful and blunt language to emphasize the necessity to evacuate the building this would not have been normal
01:04:12 this would not have been normal procedure but this was not a normal situation why did you think that it was
01:04:23 situation why did you think that it was necessary to be to be forceful and blunt as we just established so some of the callers have been on the phone for a long duration of time they've initially
01:04:34 long duration of time they've initially reported that they can't leave their flats because of smoke in the corridor that smoke has come in and they've removed from room to room with our control officers trying to give them
01:04:45 control officers trying to give them advice to protect themselves and to stop the smoke entering the room but that's not working and and the room is getting heavily smoked logs so as we've said before although we don't know and we
01:04:56 before although we don't know and we were the conditions in the hallways and the stairwell wasn't confirmed to us we knew that there would be pretty dire smoke yes okay were you able to track
01:05:07 smoke yes okay were you able to track what then happened in terms of the success of the people taking that advice so sometimes we do there is a family that stays on the phone to us and leaves
01:05:19 that stays on the phone to us and leaves their building that goes down to the stairwell and and he's met by firefighters coming up and a biscuit yes there is and was there a system in place after the decision was
01:05:33 a system in place after the decision was made to change the stay-put to all hours whereby control room operators could keep track of callers well I believe
01:05:44 keep track of callers well I believe several are talking to us in the stairwells you can hear the change and in the environment it becomes much more echoey and I think some of them do stay on the phone I think Heidi's caller as
01:05:55 on the phone I think Heidi's caller as well stayed on the phone to them and others you can hear the phone line goes dead and they or they abandon the call as we call it so they drop the call on this telephone and just leave what did
01:06:07 this telephone and just leave what did you have a system in the control of recording those who have managed successfully to you evacuate in those who for whom you have no further information no we just put on the
01:06:20 information no we just put on the whiteboard that they've been told to leave
01:06:29 now at the end of the third paragraph on page four of your statement you say you
01:06:43 page four of your statement you say you insured this is the middle of the middle of the line that's four lines up from the end you say insured BT ensured that BT were also spoken to and made aware of the change of device so the threes and
01:06:54 the change of device so the threes and speed they could advise residents what to do we also received a call from Surry F&S inquiring about the FSG we advised them of the change in advice and they kindly spoke to all other fire rescue
01:07:05 kindly spoke to all other fire rescue services on our behalf but did you know when you told BT about the change in advice was it different so I think that was shortly after devilment I had was
01:07:16 was shortly after devilment I had was walking around the room and and the critical phone that we talked about earlier the the red phone on the supervisors desk rung and it was bt i think they were passing information
01:07:28 think they were passing information about another call that they'd ever sent to the northwest or i can't recall the detail the conversation and i told them that we'd changed the advice and we were telling people to get out bt you know we
01:07:42 telling people to get out bt you know we spoke about yesterday connect connected some of the course meant for London Fire Brigade to other services and during that handover period could then inform them that we were telling residents to
01:07:55 them that we were telling residents to leave the building and I put the phone down and Surry rung so sorry Farm Rescue Service wrong and they told us about another caller they had on the telephone and I could look over and see the white
01:08:07 and I could look over and see the white board and check that we had the details of that caller and I then told them we were telling people to leave the building them before they hung up I
01:08:18 building them before they hung up I asked them if they would bring our other room services surrounding brigades to tell them right now in terms of ensuring that callers
01:08:37 now in terms of ensuring that callers into the control room either your control room or your buddy control rooms were kept up to date in terms of the change of the advice was there a system
01:08:50 change of the advice was there a system whereby you could call people back and say the advice has now changed you must leave no so we wouldn't have been able to do that because we were still dealing with calls coming in so our priority
01:09:03 with calls coming in so our priority would have been to answer those calls and we just ensured that bt were aware when they were handing over to other authorities and our surrounding control
01:09:14 authorities and our surrounding control rooms were also where I think I might have asked sorry to contact North West as well to tell them like right but they would be to your way of thinking they would be the ones that could pass on
01:09:26 would be the ones that could pass on that information to those callers but you say passing on passing them on they would only do that is this right if they were called not by way of callbacks no if they were caught right and they were
01:09:37 if they were caught right and they were still dealing with calls okay and that's how you thought of it is it yes okay and you said I think just to explore this a little bit more you said in your evidence yesterday that you don't as a
01:09:48 evidence yesterday that you don't as a matter of practice call people back on motor call people back even though you could do because you have people's mobiles and I can give you the transcript reference or give the
01:10:00 transcript reference or give the transcribers the transcript reference for that which is yes yesterday day 21 page 25 lines four to seven and page 107 lines nine to twenty-two that's just for
01:10:12 lines nine to twenty-two that's just for our record keeping and can I ask you to look at a document which is a witness statement of a control room operator in Essex called Russ white which is at MIT
01:10:26 Essex called Russ white which is at MIT triple zero one two nine eight four seven
01:10:35 I'm not going to show it all to you I just want to show you the part of it this is a statement that he gave to the police in March this year 11th of March and he is I'll just tell you a an
01:10:49 and he is I'll just tell you a an employee of Essex Fire and Rescue Services it looks like you may be familiar with Russ white he was a new recruit when I was in charge for watching Essex nice ok well we may need
01:11:02 watching Essex nice ok well we may need to explore a bit more about that but um can I just show you page four of his statement there's quite a lot of run-up to this which I'm not going to trouble you with but page four let's get to it
01:11:38 I'll give the number again it's MIT triple zero one two eight four seven
01:11:52 that's it can I just I just want to I'm not going to show you very much of this because he hasn't come yet to give evidence and it's new material but can I
01:12:04 evidence and it's new material but can I just show you something he says at the bottom of page four and he says at o2 48 hours I received an abandoned call from
01:12:15 hours I received an abandoned call from a mobile phone there's the number partly redacted and we know who that caller is the caller mentioned to the exchange operator that there was a fire at the
01:12:26 operator that there was a fire at the tower in London I informed the exchange operator that I would call this number back as per policy just just pausing there do you know whether Essex at this
01:12:39 there do you know whether Essex at this time June 17 had a policy of calling people back no I don't are you surprised to see that he says that they there
01:12:51 to see that he says that they there wasn't policy if that's what he means by as per policy no as I said it does happen
01:12:56 happen he's a historic thing not calling callers back in fire situations due to a landline and and assets could have created their own policy again we have
01:13:07 created their own policy again we have limited national guidance for control room so they could have improved their policy I mean it would have been a local policy okay
01:13:18 policy okay so do you know say just explore this a bit the London Fire Brigade does not have a policy of calling people back if they need to yes on occasion so we will
01:13:31 they need to yes on occasion so we will call abandon calls back but I was talking about then in a fire situation right I see okay
01:13:41 and do other fire and rescue services have policies about about callbacks yes
01:13:52 have policies about about callbacks yes I would imagine someday right I couldn't tell you who or what they contain but the policy might vary from FRS to FRS I would what you're saying I would be sure policy would vary from FRS to
01:14:03 be sure policy would vary from FRS to wherefores okay controlling right okay now um he then goes on to say that at Oh 250 hours
01:14:16 then goes on to say that at Oh 250 hours he tried to count I tried to contact that caller but it went through to us on the street I'm sorry oh it's up there mr. Chen yes I I dude so to start at the bottom of page four at 80 50 hours I
01:14:27 bottom of page four at 80 50 hours I tried to contact that caller but it went through to answer phone stating but the person I was trying to call was unable to take my call when he said that a 251 now as we received another call and are
01:14:38 now as we received another call and are controlling from the same mobile I spoke with the male caller who stated that he was in flat one five three Grenfell tower and said that the flat fire was all around him I asked if he could get to an emergency exit he replied you know
01:14:50 to an emergency exit he replied you know it's full of smoke caller stated that he was on the 18th floor and was unable to get out
01:14:59 and then if you look a little bit lower down the page after the reference to the contact with the London Fire Brigade you
01:15:10 contact with the London Fire Brigade you see just below halfway down a London operator said their advice was now to tell all callers to make every effort to leave the building as the fire had spread and it had started on the fourth
01:15:22 spread and it had started on the fourth floor I then informed the London operator I would contact the caller and ask him to leave the building the call then ended just pausing there do you remember Essex contacting your control
01:15:37 remember Essex contacting your control room about the fire in flat 153 no that would have been picked up by a control room operator okay
01:15:52 and then at over 80 to 54 hours I tried to call the I tried to contact the caller from flat one five three again calling his mobile there was no answer the message was left by myself informing
01:16:04 the message was left by myself informing him that the London Fire Brigade have asked for him to make every effort to exit the building go to the nearest fire exit and cover himself and his family in a wet towel and make their way to the fire exit as soon as possible so that's a message that's left and then Oh 256
01:16:17 a message that's left and then Oh 256 hours of 2 minutes later I called the caller from flat one five three calling his mobile notice again the same male answer the phone in a calm manner I told him that I had spoken with the London
01:16:29 him that I had spoken with the London Fire Service and they advised him to try and exit the building if he could cover them with wet bedsheets cloths and get to the nearest exit and then it's further discussion about about about
01:16:40 further discussion about about about exiting just just pausing there it looks from that as if Essex was able to and
01:16:53 from that as if Essex was able to and did call back this caller and advised him about the change in statement yes is that something that was that the London
01:17:08 that something that was that the London control room operators were were able to do you know purely for the volume of course I'm not sure how many calls Essex Fire Service received on our behalf right but it would not have been
01:17:21 right but it would not have been possible for us to begin to call back callers when we had such a vast volume coming in at that time still
01:17:34 we then have a page six mr.white saying at odhh 300 hours I make contact with London Fire Brigade control room pass details of the caller at 153
01:17:46 room pass details of the caller at 153 the London operator was male and had a Northern Irish accent and said they were already aware of the caller and his location in 153 just disposing that can you help identify who the operator was
01:17:57 you help identify who the operator was from that description male with the Northern Irish accent yes Peter Dutta okay I told them he cannot get out it has four adults five children with him the London operator said they were
01:18:08 the London operator said they were advising all callers to get out but I told the operators the male cannot get out I passed all the details to the London operator and asked them to contact the caller themselves as they know what's happening on the fire ground of where crews are positioned they may
01:18:21 of where crews are positioned they may have been in a better position to give the caller advice of their shows the London operator said that they were trying to call in the male say on the basis of that's an accurate summation by
01:18:32 basis of that's an accurate summation by mr. white above the call and we've checked it against the transcript and it is looking at that when the London
01:18:44 is looking at that when the London operator says they were trying to call the male was that a deviation from the general run of things a callback if if he felt with that information that he'd been given that that was the priority
01:18:55 been given that that was the priority and that peak he had time to do that then I would have said that was the right thing to do
01:19:11 it would have been slightly easier for him than going back over all the calls we had because I'm presuming ethics would have passed his telephone number over to Peter when he was taking the
01:19:23 over to Peter when he was taking the course a Peter it's just our that immediately after hanging up from the essex operator right now we've got that cool but russ white made to pete duddy
01:19:37 cool but russ white made to pete duddy at oath three zero zero and ten seconds and I'll give the reference but I'll be able to take time up taking you through the transcript but it's lfb Quinn tuple
01:19:51 the transcript but it's lfb Quinn tuple 0 5 5 7 s we want to see it and there is then a an admin call line a lab in line
01:20:04 then a an admin call line a lab in line called at oh three oh 2:35 so two and a half minutes or so later from control to
01:20:15 half minutes or so later from control to that mobile number and the transcript has got the corner and the operator the wrong way round that don't don't mind never mind about that the advice that is
01:20:29 never mind about that the advice that is given is essentially you need to get out use wet towels get to the stairwell and make your way straight out straight now
01:20:42 so it looks from the evidence we've just looked at that in summary mr. white gets leaves messages and then speaks to the
01:20:53 leaves messages and then speaks to the occupant of one five three and then passes that a London and then London peat daddy calls the occupant of one
01:21:04 peat daddy calls the occupant of one five three back so my questions are I think taking you through that long tour of the evidence did you know that control room operators were being
01:21:15 that control room operators were being asked by Asics or other supporting control rooms to call residents back no didn't did you didn't know that that
01:21:26 didn't did you didn't know that that that they were then therefore being given their numbers they would always be given their numbers when they passed a call overlooked into a step that was part of protocol we would always exchange telephone numbers of the caller
01:21:37 exchange telephone numbers of the caller was there a disk was there any kind of discussion in the control room about ringing callers back who had called in to update them as to the fire Survival Guide news that had now changed no not
01:21:50 Guide news that had now changed no not with me and but as I say that would have been very hard because it would involve the control officer going through the incident log trying to locate those calls and those telephone numbers of
01:22:01 calls and those telephone numbers of those individuals if you imagine by this time we've probably got 200 plus calls and call information on the screen to look through to then go back and find specific ones would it would have been
01:22:14 specific ones would it would have been extremely difficult I can understand and when we run callers back if they had abandoned and so if we'd been given a call by the bt operator and then the bt operator has told us we'd abandoned we could have
01:22:25 told us we'd abandoned we could have wrung them back then because we have the telephone number live in front of us and when Essex was passing us information they would have given you the number so it would be easier to ring back but again the calls were still coming in
01:22:39 but again the calls were still coming in they were just doing that as a different task that wouldn't have been unusual
01:22:47 was it the the policy that you described yesterday of not calling people back that stopped you calling people back to
01:22:58 that stopped you calling people back to tell them the advice had changed or was it the sheer volume of incoming calls it was the sheer volume of incoming calls but if I said it was a policy that we don't call call us back that that was
01:23:10 don't call call us back that that was incorrect it is a long customer practice that control do not call callers back and reporting the fire in the house in their dwelling right but we see the PT departs from the
01:23:23 right but we see the PT departs from the custom and practice as you call it on that occasion yes and and that's been done in the past it's been that's been done in the past as well on the night was Pete daddy's action in calling that
01:23:34 was Pete daddy's action in calling that not keeping back a one-off or a rarity
01:23:43 no like I say if the court if the control operator had had easy access to those telephone numbers and Essex had said that we'd call the caller back or give some given some other instruction
01:23:55 give some given some other instruction we would have followed that could there have been a system whereby in order to ensure that people who had called before
01:24:06 ensure that people who had called before and had been told to stay put could be called back and told the advice has now changed you must evacuate could there
01:24:19 changed you must evacuate could there have been a system that could alert if occasionally stopped answering all other 999 calls which some would have been for the same and building up for the same flats so it would have been a decision
01:24:32 flats so it would have been a decision that we would have had to take some call handlers off answering 909 calls and to get them to look for the incident and to phone callers back then what would
01:24:45 phone callers back then what would happen with the other calls that wouldn't go unanswered again you have to remember we don't get an identification about where these calls are coming from we could easily have picked up another
01:24:56 we could easily have picked up another incident
01:24:57 incident the persons reported fire and the other end of the count at the other end of London and and we wouldn't have been able to give them advice either or or get fire engines to them had we not
01:25:08 get fire engines to them had we not answered that so the priority is always to try and respond to no no no calls that are incoming what would happen to those callers who had called been told
01:25:20 those callers who had called been told to stay put prior to the change in the policy and it didn't by good fortune call back in again what would happen to
01:25:31 call back in again what would happen to them we well all I know is that we wouldn't have had contact with them and being able to tell them the change of advice
01:25:42 so how would they get to know that the advice had changed that they should now evacuate if they could I don't know we would have only been able to talk to call us that we were talking to on a
01:25:53 call us that we were talking to on a one-to-one basis we have no way of communicating with others and recontacting callers after that change of advice we wouldn't have been able to
01:26:04 of advice we wouldn't have been able to cope for that we wouldn't have been able to do that do you know whether anybody on the incident Graham knew that you weren't able to call people back and
01:26:17 weren't able to call people back and tell them that the advice had changed say that they on the incident ground could somehow communicate that in themselves no but I believe by this time we were aware that people were going
01:26:30 we were aware that people were going directly to the incident ground and reporting to the command units and handing them telephones when we'd heard that as well so some calls were being
01:26:42 that as well so some calls were being bypassed that's are our children
01:27:02 at page 5 of your mr. minute wondering whether it would be sensible to have a short break it was soon now you get into a different kind of - I am I I'm coming to my place
01:27:13 kind of - I am I I'm coming to my place on a last question oh well there could be four last questions Andy would it be sensible if you were a fellow counsel to ask a few more
01:27:25 fellow counsel to ask a few more questions at that point we will have a break because you may need a little time - I may consider whether there are other things that need to be wrapped up indeed we'll get the last question for the time
01:27:38 we'll get the last question for the time being at least last questions for the time being now in the in your statement on page five you say that you were
01:27:57 on page five you say that you were involved in bringing in more staff I just want to shave the top of page five you said the top I was also acutely
01:28:08 you said the top I was also acutely aware that we needed more staff and in particular supervisors to help assist I spoke with Adam and Scott and said we needed a ring for more supervisors and those who perhaps live near Stratford may who may be able to come in and again
01:28:20 may who may be able to come in and again calling staff those were not due to be working the following day shift and leaving messages to see if they were able to assist I left this job for Adam to continue while I was whilst I moved on to other tasks and what happened was
01:28:36 on to other tasks and what happened was that it was that successful did you manage to get yes we did how many new people did you get we got two supervisors who were they Pauline Warner and Kate Branson okay
01:28:56 is there a system in place to recall off Steve off-duty staff in the event that you have a major incident which requires mass attendance and control room staff no formal process now it's just the
01:29:08 no formal process now it's just the goodwill from us bringing them okay how long did it take Adam quinion to find the to further supervisors and I don't know I can't
01:29:24 supervisors and I don't know I can't recall I just knew that he had said to me or someone had said to me that Pauling was on her way here and Kate was coming in to him it was that long roughly what time did they arrive do you
01:29:36 roughly what time did they arrive do you think I would only be hassled in the guest to say round about 4:00 4:30 right okay and I know you're guessing but why
01:29:48 okay and I know you're guessing but why do you think it was then as opposed to earlier or later and maybe it was a bit before I seem to remember it being
01:29:59 quieter when they arrived right
01:30:28 mr. chairman I've come to the end of my questions I there are one or two more which I I think I just like to think about ever the very short break yes it's good to ask you it's five minutes can be long enough for this purpose or would
01:30:39 long enough for this purpose or would you rather have until 22 for I'm offering it on the basis that if we come back at 22 for you won't be too long on that condition I won't
01:30:51 that condition I won't well it's not that it's just that witness might like some encouragement yes is the answer 24 and and I can offer that encouragement that's a good thank you right well have a break now we'll
01:31:04 you right well have a break now we'll come back in 20 to 4 again no discussion of your evidence if you don't mind and you like to go with the usher thank you so we'll break until 22
01:31:17 usher thank you so we'll break until 22 for
01:31:25 you
01:40:14 yes most of it well have you discovered some more questions I have learned of some more questions and say and I will do my best to be as economical as possible with them all right thank you
01:40:26 possible with them all right thank you could we ask the witness to come back in please
01:40:43 well missus I'm afraid there are a few more misses it comes from these to ask you say okay I feel ready to go on thank you it shouldn't take too long first of all you say in your statement
01:40:56 first of all you say in your statement that you changed your changed the FSG advice to get out within 10 to 15 minutes of your arrival in the control room and in your statement you put it at
01:41:07 room and in your statement you put it at 2:30 to 235 before you arrived did anyone in the control room have the authority or the experience to change the advice from stay-put to evacuate
01:41:20 there were a number of experience control officers there and I don't think it's the case of having the authority or having the the experience the supervisors were very experienced as
01:41:32 supervisors were very experienced as were a large number of control officers on that night as I said I think it was just the overwhelming and amount of it instant details they were dealing with resources to mobilize and that was their
01:41:44 resources to mobilize and that was their focus right now I'm going to look at I hope this is okay with you look at three transcripts and parts of transcripts
01:41:57 starting with the first one at zero to thirty seven and they come they all come from the same flat although they come from different corners and the first one I want to show you is lfb quintuple zero
01:42:10 I want to show you is lfb quintuple zero three six six and if we look at the first page we'll just identify the time of it it's Oh - 37
01:42:24 and it this is about from flat 193 on the 22nd floor the Chu cares and if I
01:42:36 the 22nd floor the Chu cares and if I can ask you to look within the transcript to page five internally
01:42:52 and you know I actually probably pick it up at the bottom of page four just to give you a little bit more context at the
01:43:03 you a little bit more context at the bottom of page four it says is it just smoke coming in at the moment that's the operator and the command caller one says there's lots of inaudible
01:43:14 there's lots of inaudible I don't know inaudible far from next door and then the operator says yeah I understand that and we are trying to get to you as soon as possible and we're going to tell the farm and where you are caller 1 over speaking floor is going on
01:43:27 caller 1 over speaking floor is going on to what floor is it at please operator okay look I'm not I'm going to go now because we've got lots of calls coming in I'm gonna tell them where you are and you just try and keep yourself safe try
01:43:40 you just try and keep yourself safe try and stop the smoke coming in go to a room that's the least smoky and all stay together we'll get to you as soon as we can okay
01:43:47 can okay okay all right ring us back if it starts catching fire in your house and we're we're on and then lower down the page on page five it says I'm going to leave you
01:43:58 page five it says I'm going to leave you now okay now just looking at that advice that I've shown you was that stay put advice or was that evacuate advice no
01:44:13 advice or was that evacuate advice no that was not evacuate any nice can we conclude from that that that at 2:37 which is when this call starts and at
01:44:24 which is when this call starts and at least for a few minutes thereafter while this call is in progress stay put advise is still being given by control room operators to callers so I I can only assume that maybe when Alex and
01:44:39 can only assume that maybe when Alex and I were going around to talking to control operators that that control operator would have been on the phone at the time and would have immediately picked up another call and so not understood and we would have spoken to
01:44:51 understood and we would have spoken to her after well I can't I can't be certain okay okay so can we conclude from that that that
01:44:58 that at 2:37 or shortly after 237 you haven't managed to get around all the control room operators to tell them that the advice had changed again we would have spoken to everyone that we could have
01:45:10 spoken to everyone that we could have but if if that operator had been on the telephone talking to a corner at the time maybe they were focused on that caller and wouldn't have picked up I was talking to them in the background given
01:45:23 talking to them in the background given that this call was made and started at o2 37 is it is it possible to conclude from this that in fact the change in statehood advice was not made until
01:45:34 statehood advice was not made until after this call it was doubly and theirs cause prior to that that have the change of advice and then
01:45:53 okay now looking at another call same flat 193 this is a this starts of o2 43
01:46:05 flat 193 this is a this starts of o2 43 and this is at FB quadruple zero 376
01:46:16 you can see that this call starts at o2 4355 and if I can ask you to turn to
01:46:28 4355 and if I can ask you to turn to page four internally the operator says at the top of that page okay what you need to do if that fire starts coming in or getting worse you need to get
01:46:39 or getting worse you need to get yourself out now okay out where out where cover yourself get some out onto the corridors out your front door caller says we can't inaudible we are inside the house we
01:46:50 inaudible we are inside the house we can't get out the building there's smoke everywhere we can't see inaudible okay if you go outside your flat where's your nearest staircase left or right caller says when I get outside inaudible stairs
01:47:01 says when I get outside inaudible stairs for me but I can't get to any stairs because of the smoke we can't see and then the operator says okay well we are trying to get to you but it's very difficult so all I'm saying to you is that if it gets very very bad you need
01:47:12 that if it gets very very bad you need to get yourself out of those flats get all your eight people out cover yourself with wet towels wet sheets anything and try to get out okay all right now looking at just looking at that advice
01:47:24 looking at just looking at that advice is that how would you characterize that advice is that is that stay put or is that is that get out no I would say that's encouraging that caller in that
01:47:35 that's encouraging that caller in that flat to leave right the advice looks as if it's being if as if it's conditional though all I'm saying to you is if it gets very very bad you need to get
01:47:47 gets very very bad you need to get yourself out but that's not saying get out come what may now I think maybe some of the operators were scared that they would put them the callers into worser conditions right something that would be
01:48:00 conditions right something that would be a genuine thought running through the control officers mind and I think as we've discussed before I was brought up in the debrief there is a hope that fire
01:48:12 in the debrief there is a hope that fire crews would reach them before they had to leave their flats on their own and I think that's all going through control officers mind when they're talking to the caller
01:48:23 is this an example of what we discussed the first thing this morning is but I think I called stage two advice so not stay put not get out but if you're affected by smoke assess the situation
01:48:35 affected by smoke assess the situation again if you can they clearly were affected by smoke yes and as I say it and they've passed on information and to get out but again I think I think the
01:48:48 get out but again I think I think the operator that and all of them there's a feeling that they don't want to put the caller into a worse position right and so on every opportunity they would try and protect them as much as possible and
01:48:59 and protect them as much as possible and if the caller had indicated and that there was thick black smoke and they couldn't see in the stairwell and the operator rightly would assume that maybe staying where they were it's the safest
01:49:13 staying where they were it's the safest place for them right but by this stage so I depress this by this stage 243 you heard as you told us earlier definitely made the decision that they've got to
01:49:24 made the decision that they've got to get out yes would you say that this advice that we see two-thirds of the way down page for there reflects that decision some of that I think I think
01:49:36 decision some of that I think I think later on and if some encouragement don't forget this is this was the unique situation to us that decision has never been made before and we'd never put control officers in that position to
01:49:47 control officers in that position to tell callers to go into a possibly worser environment to have any chance of surviving so maybe there was some reluctance initially with some operators
01:49:58 reluctance initially with some operators that they felt uncomfortable with that and an uncomfortable with that decision and but they still have provided them with the information and and then asked
01:50:10 with the information and and then asked them whether that that decision to leave or not they felt comfortable with I think that happened several times and through several calls during the evening
01:50:22 through several calls during the evening after the decisions changed you can see the advice that's given there and you can see just towards the bottom of the page the operator says okay I'm going to leave you now you make the decision
01:50:33 leave you now you make the decision whether you think you need to leave or not all right okay do you think that reflects your decision that you made with Adrian Fenton that callers must now
01:50:46 with Adrian Fenton that callers must now be told to evacuate I think that each control officer would have assessed the situation and I've heard several examples of where individuals have tried
01:50:57 examples of where individuals have tried to leave and can't and in that case I don't think there was any and the operator felt that they couldn't then force them out again and that they were try and protect him as best they could within their their flats what
01:51:11 within their their flats what instruction did you actually give to the control room operators did you say tell them they've got to get out come what may what did you say to them I'll leave it to you to decide what advice to give
01:51:22 it to you to decide what advice to give them no I didn't say I'd leave it to you to decide I had a conversation with Alex Norman we said that we were tell callers to leave to get out the building and that advice that they should pass on to
01:51:34 that advice that they should pass on to call us however our controller control operators are made and are trained to make an assessment so if I give him the instruction to say regardless and a
01:51:46 instruction to say regardless and a caller had said that there was fire immediately outside their front door and I wouldn't have expected them to go through that through with that right
01:51:57 through that through with that right okay I'm just trying to get a handle on how accurately the advice that's being given on this call at 2:43 reflects the instructions that you gave the control
01:52:09 instructions that you gave the control room operators I think when I'm getting this and tell me if this is unfair is that although you told them they told them to tell callers to evacuate they
01:52:20 them to tell callers to evacuate they need to get out nonetheless control room operators were left with the impression that they still have to make an
01:52:31 that they still have to make an assessment themselves were asked the caller to make an assessment is that a fair summation yes right so in using blunt forceful
01:52:42 right so in using blunt forceful language it looks from this is that you didn't tell the control room officers to tell callers in blunt and forceful language to get out it looks like you
01:52:53 language to get out it looks like you left them with the idea that they needed to make a more subtle oh and I would say that was unfair as well so the conversation I had with Alex was about telling people to leave their
01:53:05 was about telling people to leave their properties leave their flats and get out and again how that's translated to someone and operators are very experienced so they would provide that
01:53:16 experienced so they would provide that advice like she did and yes forceful language would be needed that would be that wouldn't sit very
01:53:27 would be that wouldn't sit very comfortably with some some control officers that aren't used to that and they were try and go about it a different way but I think it's unfair I
01:53:38 different way but I think it's unfair I think you can at the end of Pam's call you can hear me saying that you think is me or someone saying that they've got to get out they've got to leave now they've got no choice so I think that message
01:53:50 got no choice so I think that message did get across right doesn't look as if they've got it across though at 2:43 two cares in respect of flat one no three
01:54:03 is that no they've definitely had that message because that's what they've given the advice
01:54:11 and then the final one I wanted to show you it's also flat 193 and this is FF be equal to 4 5 3 8 6 which is a 250 109
01:54:31 and this is not the two cares this is Naomi Lee who is also in flat 193 we can see that from page two this is a same
01:54:45 see that from page two this is a same flat and a different color and she says at the bottom of page two and then it's very smoky in the room and the operator says it's sandwiched it would be safer
01:54:59 says it's sandwiched it would be safer for you to make your way out or to stay where you are query I can't see you need to decide that for yourself and then over the page on page three the operator
01:55:13 over the page on page three the operator says a third of the way down okay listen you can do one of two things you can either make your way into a room and shut the door keep the smoke out and stay low or you can try and make your way out of the building you have to decide which is safer okay if you're
01:55:25 decide which is safer okay if you're going to make your way out the building and then it goes on just it does develop so don't want to pretend to you that's the whole of the call but at that point in the call is that is that the
01:55:37 in the call is that is that the communication of evacuate which you had instructed the control room operate operators to pass on no they've clearly felt uncomfortable of that and they've given a range of options right and again
01:55:50 given a range of options right and again can you explain why the control room operator was giving a range of options and circumstances where you had instructed the control room operator to tell callers to get out no
01:56:03 and then and then I'm going to do it there's as I did say to you to be fair to you that wasn't but totality the advice then it moves and if you gave
01:56:15 advice then it moves and if you gave then on to page eight that's quite a lot of discussion between the two it's clear
01:56:29 of discussion between the two it's clear that the discussion revolves and on page eight 2/3 of the way down the operator says ok this is after a discussion about towels and blankets when you've done
01:56:42 towels and blankets when you've done that I swear I'll wait for it to come up on the screen
01:56:52 it's on our screen is it on yours again we may have a problem we do have a problem we have a problem with the large screen is it on the smalls it's on the small screens it's not on
01:57:04 it's on the small screens it's not on the large screens at the back of the room well it's not as the witness couldn't see the screen I think that's the main well it is the main thing but there are it's also I think important as many people as possible well of course it can consider and and any whether it's
01:57:16 it can consider and and any whether it's on the livestream I think
01:57:24 if it's on if it's still on the live stream then we can continue i'm going to continue giving me out yeah I think sermon um if you look on the screen to yours
01:57:34 yours it's your right miss miss you can see that it says a third of the way down page eight okay and when you've done that get everyone one per person wrap themselves cover themselves up make sure
01:57:45 themselves cover themselves up make sure their heads they cover themselves yeah and try and leave the building okay there's lots of people inside and the firefighters are struggling to get to everyone okay so your best bet is to try and make your way out the building and
01:57:56 and make your way out the building and then it goes on halfway down the page your best bet is to try and get out there there's a lot of smoke coming in and the smoke is very dangerous okay and the caller says say what do you want do
01:58:07 the caller says say what do you want do you want us to go okay your best bet is to try to leave get outside okay and that is that is how the call essentially ends the operator says at the bottom are you gonna try and do that now now they
01:58:19 you gonna try and do that now now they need to ask you it's clear from that but by that stage in the call very clear evacuation device is being given by the caller to Miss Lee my question is now we've seen it evolve
01:58:31 my question is now we've seen it evolve this call starts of Oh 251 they're just after 10:00 to 3:00 in the morning can you explain why the call starts with the advice being given in the ronimal
01:58:43 advice being given in the ronimal optional way that it was that we saw on page 3 do one of two things it looks from this as if as if the message had
01:58:54 from this as if as if the message had got through to the operator that he or she had to tell the caller to get out during the course of the call well it it
01:59:06 during the course of the call well it it looks like that from the beginning if you go back to the beginning the advice they provide
01:59:14 yes at the beginning yes page two bottom of page two you just it would it be safer for you to make your way out or stay where you are you need to decide
01:59:26 stay where you are you need to decide that for yourself I thought this or an area where she gave and then pasted yes and then that's right page three she says okay listen you can do one of two
01:59:38 says okay listen you can do one of two things if you can either make your way into a room and shut the door keep the smoke out and stay low or you can try and make your way out for the building you wanted you have to decide what you're safer okay yeah now that we
01:59:50 you're safer okay yeah now that we looked at that at that stage and you said that's not the statement advice sorry it does not evacuate advice a mixture of five said she's given our option yeah again so if that decision
02:00:05 option yeah again so if that decision hasn't been made on I'm not sure she would have said try and make your way out the building not in her previous course you don't hear us say that right so I mean we can see what he meant of what the exchange was and I think your
02:00:17 what the exchange was and I think your question is whether the witness can explain why this will be an apparent change of emphasis part way through okay
02:00:32 change of emphasis part way through okay thank you thank you very much I've got one more question now this is about the television they're going to put to you
02:00:43 television they're going to put to you what one of the control room operators are said in a police statement and and obviously we may need to have to explore this with her this is Sarah Russell I'm
02:00:54 this with her this is Sarah Russell I'm not going to put the actual statement unless I'm missing the same becomes unfair not to I'll give the reference its M et quadruple zero seven six nine
02:01:05 its M et quadruple zero seven six nine eight and a page five Sarah Russell says that often a TV is on usually showing the news so that we know what is going
02:01:17 the news so that we know what is going on we're allowed to have mobile phones with us whilst we're at work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them she seems to say or suggest that the television is he is a
02:01:28 suggest that the television is he is a useful resource for her work as a control room operator so having it on helps in terms of handling calls would
02:01:40 helps in terms of handling calls would you agree with I don't believe she's saying that I believe that she's saying that the TV is often on with news that's going on but with regard to day-to-day business within the control room the
02:01:51 business within the control room the vast majority of incidents in fact it would be a rarity that we were dealing with an incident that would appear on the TV that immediately I don't know control officers are not trained to
02:02:02 control officers are not trained to interpret images from a TV screen and to assist the callers that's that's about the one-to-one interaction with the caller's okay Smith you'll be glad to
02:02:13 caller's okay Smith you'll be glad to know that I have no further questions for you can I just say I'm extremely grateful to you for coming along and having having the patience to endure my endless questions and extremely helpful and I'm very grateful to you thank you
02:02:25 and I'm very grateful to you thank you thank you well you'll be pleased to know that I didn't have any further questions I think but I do want to thank you very much for coming to give your evidence you have you should go away in the shore knowledge you've given us a lot of very
02:02:36 knowledge you've given us a lot of very helpful evidence and if I may say so you've given it in a very calm and measured and helpful way and one can't ask much more of a witness than that thank you very much indeed great do you
02:02:50 thank you very much indeed great do you like to get with you I'll show you all free to go as they say okay
02:02:58 well done mr. minute you're finished within the afternoon has excellent and I finished within the week as well which is let's see more of a trial even more welcome yes yes so we meet again if
02:03:09 welcome yes yes so we meet again if that's all right with you mr. chairman on Monday morning yes with our next witness and we've got a full program before day is next week and we do yes and our next witness our next witness
02:03:22 and our next witness our next witness will be Jason Olaf good thank you very much well as you heard will break there and we're not sitting tomorrow so we'll resume on Monday at 10 o'clock and I look forward to seeing most if not all
02:03:33 look forward to seeing most if not all of you them and thank you very much