Control room operations testimony covering fire survival guidance procedures, communication systems, and the challenges faced during the Grenfell Tower incident including buddy control room coordination
00:00:11 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing and I think we're about to hear from another witness is that mr. Miller yes mr. chairman good morning we're now going to call Joanne Smith thank you
00:00:37 but in the water
00:00:50 thank you
00:00:55 I just some nice sincerely and truly declare and declare and affirm that the evidence flesh would give shall be the truth should be the truth the whole truth the whole truth thank you very
00:01:10 truth the whole truth thank you very much you're comfortable standing up to give your evidence yes if you want to change your mind at a new stage of course you may thank you yes good
00:01:21 course you may thank you yes good morning miss Smith and thank you very much for coming today to the inquiry to help us with our investigations we really do appreciate it and can I just also start by saying that my questions
00:01:34 also start by saying that my questions are intended to be short and simple but they don't always work out that way so if there's anything you don't understand about my questions or you want me to repeat very happy to do it or ask ask in a different way and if you need a break
00:01:46 a different way and if you need a break at any time just signal and we can you can take a break and also if you're more comfortable sitting down then again you can do that at any stage can I then start by asking you to give us your full
00:01:59 start by asking you to give us your full name John Nicholas me all right and you've got a statement in front of you which is dated the 10th of October 2017 the reference to which is M et triple
00:02:10 the reference to which is M et triple zero seven seven six six now there's a screen on your left on your right and on your left is a big screen on the back of them at the back of the room what we normally do is throw out bits of the
00:02:22 normally do is throw out bits of the statement that we're looking at together and screens so you can see them clearly and the documents manager highlight stays in yellow so we can all focus on the relevant passages together and the
00:02:34 the relevant passages together and the same with documents that we'll be looking at okay okay yeah you say in your statement at the very beginning in the second paragraph I am a senior operations manager for the London Fire
00:02:45 operations manager for the London Fire Brigade for 23 years experience of incident management and for the last 10 years at Senior Operations level and can I just ask you that what was your role
00:02:56 I just ask you that what was your role when you first started at the London Fire
00:02:59 Fire I first started in 1995 in Essex fire service as a control operator but when I moved to London Fire Brigades
00:03:10 moved to London Fire Brigades I was a assistant principal controller and we went through a role change in 2011 I became a senior operations manager right and you're a senior
00:03:22 manager right and you're a senior Operations Manager som now yes and were you in that position on the night of the Grenville tower fire I was on the 13th 14th of June 2017 you were and are you
00:03:35 14th of June 2017 you were and are you based in the control room alone or are you do you have other areas of operation we're based at the control room in Merton and overall my responsibility is
00:03:47 Merton and overall my responsibility is management of London Fire Brigade control room its staff it's policies and procedures it's training right and also we have an on-call responsibility to
00:03:58 we have an on-call responsibility to respond to incidents right and who is your immediate line manager or who was your immediate light manager on the night of that that would be the principal operations manager Scott Hayward Scott Hayward and could you just
00:04:11 Hayward Scott Hayward and could you just turn explain to us what is the role in outline terms of an S mm so is the day-to-day management of the control room ensuring that its staff and are
00:04:26 room ensuring that its staff and are okay and managed in the control room I'm in charge of six operations managers that work in control room on a daily basis it's policies and procedures its
00:04:39 basis it's policies and procedures its delivery of training to control staff but we also be A's with different departments in London Fire Brigades with regard to changes and are over to put
00:04:50 regard to changes and are over to put control room viewpoint from there we manage the mobilizing system
00:04:56 right and you say you're in charge of six operations managers are those control room operators or are they people senior to control room operation
00:05:07 people senior to control room operation there are people see anything to control them operated right so we have six watches in the control room yes the operations manager is in charge of a watch that they have a number of
00:05:19 watch that they have a number of supervisors below them and then we have some control on the protis control room operators so just breaking you down a little bit and you say six watches and that provides a 24 hour cover yes and is
00:05:32 that provides a 24 hour cover yes and is does each watch work for a four hour period now each watch works a 12 hour day right and then a 12 hour shorter shift and then a 12-hour nights and then
00:05:43 shift and then a 12-hour nights and then through row 2 days off I see okay and is that the same for senior management as well no we do office hours right I see okay you say you do office hours so
00:05:55 okay you say you do office hours so anyone at your level som would work what 9:00 to 5:00 yes right I see I'm what about nights well that's where we have an on-call so between the three of us there is another
00:06:06 between the three of us there is another Senior Operations Manager and the principal operations manager we work at an on-call writer right okay now your som immediately below you in terms of
00:06:17 som immediately below you in terms of the hierarchy there's is that om yes questions manager so for example Alex Norman is an om we see over 30 okay and how many o ends do you have under you
00:06:29 how many o ends do you have under you six he says six so that's the operational managers and under under then we've got what assistant know an assistant oppression and how many's assistant no Eames have we got at this fall on each watch four on each watch
00:06:41 fall on each watch four on each watch and each assistant oair AOM is responsible for supervising harmony the control room operators is it yes so
00:06:53 the control room operators is it yes so eleven control room operators all right but they're not individually so if you were a supervisor or an assistant operation manager and our grocery manager as far as managing the room on
00:07:05 manager as far as managing the room on the day in the control room that you would be responsible for all of them just certain individuals I see okay so it's right at any one time or rather then he yeah at any one time
00:07:16 or rather then he yeah at any one time 24 hours you've got 11 CRS on at Merton so we have a minimum staffing level or a model staff 11 of 11 on duty yes so that
00:07:30 model staff 11 of 11 on duty yes so that can be a mixture of control room operators and aom's and an RM I see and normally how many CR O's would you have on duty of an
00:07:43 O's would you have on duty of an ordinary watch that can just depends on who's in so we like I so we have 11 so if we have three supervisors so three
00:07:55 if we have three supervisors so three aom's and the rest would be CR OS I see okay
00:07:58 okay but are there minimum numbers of CRS at any one time not minimum numbers of saros now just minimums members of staff but mostly so all social point out that
00:08:09 but mostly so all social point out that assistant operations manager although they do a different role in the control and they are able to take course as a CRO I see okay
00:08:23 and in terms of roles how is your role different to that of an a om so the OM is aom's and CR OS are based in the
00:08:34 is aom's and CR OS are based in the control room and carry out the controlling function or a drew on their shift
00:08:38 shift I'm office based and so therefore liaison with other departments about improvements about changes in policies and procedures right okay no more
00:08:49 and procedures right okay no more strategic overview right I see and is the same is the same true also in relation to op o ends so you've got you've got six aliens under you yeah so
00:09:01 you've got six aliens under you yeah so their shift base and they manage their watches yes and you essentially supervise them yes okay would you
00:09:13 supervise them yes okay would you normally handle a 999 call yourself
00:09:19 would an ops manager handle a 999 call yes occasionally they would occasionally I was going to say occasionally but not
00:09:31 I was going to say occasionally but not often no not often yes and a owns I'm assuming from the way it's grouped that they would often handle 999 calls with a yes so the oven
00:09:44 handle 999 calls with a yes so the oven and aom's would carry out a supervisory function yes and and when they were carrying that out would tend not to or maybe answer one or two emergency calls throughout that their shift
00:09:58 okay now did you complete any training to be as an SOA and specifically not
00:10:09 to be as an SOA and specifically not specifically to their senior precious manager okay did you receive training before you were but any asset this way you became a
00:10:20 but any asset this way you became a senior operations manager before you are a senior operations manager were you an Operations Manager yes right I say it because there I was in Essex Fire Brigades
00:10:30 Brigades and it had a different role structure oh I see okay let me ask it this way there have you had any specific training in
00:10:41 have you had any specific training in the supervisory roles that you undertake as a a senior operations manager yes so I've had numerous training courses on
00:10:52 I've had numerous training courses on call handling supervisory training I was detached to the operation command assurance team in ethics as a non
00:11:03 assurance team in ethics as a non operational station manager and completed the station manager managing incidents right and the training on call handling when was the most recent training you had on call handling prior
00:11:15 training you had on call handling prior to June 2017 do you remember 2005 2005 so would that mean that you yourself didn't have any
00:11:28 mean that you yourself didn't have any training ons on call handling after Lakmal house I haven't had any specific training on call handling I have been involved in the design of our training
00:11:40 involved in the design of our training packages that we've delivered to other control staff okay okay right I'll come to
00:11:46 to in relation to training on your supervisory function when was the last time prior to June 2017 which you had that training that would have been just
00:11:57 that training that would have been just same time 2005 and were you with Essex at that stage yes I see however I have been involved in numerous incidents and experiencial learning from
00:12:08 incidents and experiencial learning from those incidents such as you mentioned I cannot have okay during um can I ask you this when did you transfer from Essex to lfb 2007
00:12:21 you transfer from Essex to lfb 2007 second right okay and at the point of transfer into the lfb what what position did you take up senior preciousness it was SOA yes like yeah and was that a
00:12:33 it was SOA yes like yeah and was that a promotion yes it was and from 2007 to June 2017 a ten year period did you receive any training on how to train
00:12:45 receive any training on how to train people yes I have received training on how to train people although I don't deliver the training myself I've been more involved with the course content and I also spent two years at the chief
00:12:57 and I also spent two years at the chief viruses association seconded to support control rooms of crap around the UK and ran a number of seminars on poor handling right okay
00:13:12 can I ask you to look at a document in our documents bundle tab 52 this is the and I'll give you the reference it's hom
00:13:24 and I'll give you the reference it's hom 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 and that would come up on the screen it is a report done by the lfb into the fara Plaquenil house in
00:13:37 lfb into the fara Plaquenil house in july 2009 and the report is dated November 2012 first of all can I ask you are you familiar with this report yes yeah did you have any input into writing
00:13:51 yeah did you have any input into writing this report yes right do a great deal right
00:14:02 can I you say a great deal can you tell us in outline terms what your role was in in assisting with the production of this report so it was really to focus on
00:14:15 this report so it was really to focus on and investigate the roles and actions of lfp control room during that incident in the control room right did you conduct interviews with the call handlers no we
00:14:28 interviews with the call handlers no we didn't but it was mainly referring to the policies and the procedures and making recommendations okay did you how did the London Fire Brigade burn collating this report go about
00:14:39 collating this report go about collecting the personal individual experiences of cool handles on the night of the latin on house fire they were interviewed by different departments but
00:14:50 interviewed by different departments but you didn't do the interviews yourself no okay can I just ask you to look first of
00:15:03 okay can I just ask you to look first of all at page 1 1 2 4
00:15:12 which is section F of the report staffing and f1 staffing in the control room
00:15:18 room sorry it's page I'm so sorry page 33
00:15:23 staffing in the control on 3rd of July 2009 green watch and we've got a list of individuals who are in the control room on that night the control room itself
00:15:38 on that night the control room itself that oh man like was was where was it Merton
00:15:41 Merton no it was a doctrines doctor yeah it was called GBP okay and is that control I'm still operating no we've relocated to Merton I see when
00:15:54 no we've relocated to Merton I see when was the relocation to Merton early 2012 right and I will come to this in due course but just while we're on that
00:16:06 course but just while we're on that answer
00:16:07 answer where was Merton a better control room than the Docklands control room very different so the Merton control room was
00:16:18 different so the Merton control room was built as part of a fire control project a government led project and and it had been built and available and our location at GBP we needed to vacate
00:16:29 location at GBP we needed to vacate because with the Olympics right coming it was too near and too much of a threat really I see okay so it says it's a better and more resilient building or
00:16:41 better and more resilient building or resident building in terms of functionality and capabilities though as a control room was it different from the doctrines control room yes in Norway it's much larger higher ceilings and so
00:16:52 it's much larger higher ceilings and so the desks are spaced out quite a lot room and doctrines we had a large display screen where we could see all our resources and
00:17:03 our resources and haven't got that at Merton haven't got I don't know so that's a less good thing is it we've managed to work without it that's quite a subtle answer we'll come
00:17:15 that's quite a subtle answer we'll come back to
00:17:16 back to we'll come back to that in due course just on this document they can I just look at the list we've got name down the left-hand side and there are some permit things that are familiar even to me
00:17:28 are familiar even to me can you help identify any of those individuals who were on in the Stratfor control room on the night of the Grenfell tower fire I think we know
00:17:39 Grenfell tower fire I think we know about Debbie Rio yes Debbie real right Angie goats right what a Heidi kid yes hi to get her face okay Heidi kid Angie goats tonight you two met at the bottom
00:17:54 goats tonight you two met at the bottom anybody else
00:17:59 no neg say in addition to you we've got four control rooms staff members who are
00:18:10 four control rooms staff members who are on at groennfell who are also on the night of the lack of house fire looks like yeah from that were there anymore any other names you can give us who were in the Stratford control room on the
00:18:21 in the Stratford control room on the night of the ground felt our who were also honored lack not and I was just looking at this if this is on that lap no I thought of on Adams was there too but she may not be right if on Adams
00:18:40 okay now
00:18:51 if you go to page 49 of this document we see the start of the section f6
00:19:02 see the start of the section f6 conclusion about handling of a file at Latin or 3rd of July 2009 and we can see what the conclusions are is divided up
00:19:13 what the conclusions are is divided up into different topics workload premises layout situational awareness information gathering I don't want to turn the page to page 50 and ask you about full paragraphs - 93 - two nights safes are
00:19:26 paragraphs - 93 - two nights safes are you finding it easier to read that speeds because you can read all that one of you know it easier on that one yes thank you okay say - 93 I just want
00:19:38 yes thank you okay say - 93 I just want to ask you about these four paragraphs 293 294 295 and 296 having had input into this report are you familiar with these that this text yes okay
00:19:51 these that this text yes okay um did you have input into this text if you have drafted and you know we drafted the version I believe before this this was given to another team to draft okay
00:20:02 was given to another team to draft okay and you say another team who was that in London Fire Brigade okay and with that
00:20:14 London Fire Brigade okay and with that team B what was that teams at an investigations team no I believe it was an individual from incident management that was asked to redraft the final document okay did you see the
00:20:26 the final document okay did you see the final document before it was published yes you did yeah did you will you ask whether you were happy with it yes I believe most of it was the layout
00:20:38 yes I believe most of it was the layout change
00:20:39 change okay well you were happy though that it reflected your input yes okay looking at page 15 paragraph 293 I just want to ask you some general questions about this
00:20:52 you some general questions about this paragraph expectations that callers would be rescued and stay-put advice and it says cos that's what control operator had a clear expectation that fire crews
00:21:05 had a clear expectation that fire crews would reach the callers quickly their experience was the fire appliances arrived quickly and the people are rescued by the brigade this is borne out by the fact that only rarely where FSG is given do people die in fires see
00:21:16 is given do people die in fires see section III and then it says this as rescues by crews were not immediate there is a question whether the CEO and all callers could have assessed the risk of attempting to escape from the flat
00:21:28 of attempting to escape from the flat and whether the risk of moving closer to the fire but escaping was less than staying put and awaiting rescue C has relied on advising callers to stay put expecting that this would keep called as
00:21:39 expecting that this would keep called as safe from the fire I just just pausing there will come to this in some detail I think later on but that that was a less that was a lesson learnt as he is this right from the lack
00:21:50 learnt as he is this right from the lack on experience yes it was but I mean our training other things the first question the control officers explore with callers is if they can get out and if
00:22:01 callers is if they can get out and if not if there's an alternative escape right and in the trip okay let's focus on that in the training ever since so
00:22:12 on that in the training ever since so just focusing on this particular problem which is a risk analysis is what your is what this is saying that the lesson
00:22:24 what this is saying that the lesson learned from the Lacan experience was that control operators pact of balance will have to had to get enough information to be able to advise callers as to how to assess the risk of staying
00:22:36 as to how to assess the risk of staying put and wait awaiting rescue or moving towards escape themselves no I think from what that's referring to is
00:22:47 from what that's referring to is actually on the initial call where control officers start to investigate whether they need advice to help them so it becomes a fire Survival Guide in
00:22:58 it becomes a fire Survival Guide in school that actually an important question is to ask whether they can leave the premise first rather than just assume they can't and tell them to stay put right and how in terms of in terms
00:23:13 put right and how in terms of in terms of the lessons learned from Latin or what were the difficulties in making the assessment on that call what cook or operators were finding about whether it was safe to escape
00:23:24 was safe to escape there wasn't any specific difficulties with callers it was just something that we weren't as focused on as we needed to be I see an in terment you mentioned
00:23:36 be I see an in terment you mentioned training as a result of this conclusion in this paragraph what new training came in so the training focused
00:23:50 in so the training focused it was PowerPoint training and a computer-based training package that we delivered after the Lucknow investigation but they both during the
00:24:01 investigation but they both during the assessment phase of survival guidance we made sure that we entered in that control staff should ask if Paula can leave the premise right and did that
00:24:14 leave the premise right and did that training then find its way into a policy yes policy five three nine five three nine
00:24:22 nine what about 790 790 was a policy that I helped drafts along with an operational department following that and that is
00:24:34 department following that and that is aimed at operational firefighters I see okay so control have a separate policy control in the second voice and the interest in terms of the training and
00:24:45 interest in terms of the training and the policy and the question release is simple what would they say the same thing yes I see saysay improvements and lessons learned as a result of this conclusion at LACMA at page 293 would
00:24:56 conclusion at LACMA at page 293 would find themselves into policy five three nine or four or seven ninety yes I see okay and can you can you summarize
00:25:08 okay and can you can you summarize without going to these policies which I'm afraid we will have to do at some state but can you summarize in simple terms what what what the new discipline
00:25:19 terms what what what the new discipline was that control operators would have to employ when assessing the risks of staying's opposed to leaving like I say
00:25:30 staying's opposed to leaving like I say I'm not sure it was in you and we are guided on our fire survival guidance policy by document a dear chief artists a letter 1093 which dictates nationally
00:25:44 a letter 1093 which dictates nationally what a fire survival guidance call is and the methods we should use during a fire survival budgets cult so rather than add anything new into it
00:25:55 so rather than add anything new into it we just reinforced the four principles that are contained in that document and provided our control self as an extra questioning right to support that I okay and do we do we find that in the rifts
00:26:10 and do we do we find that in the rifts the are is that we used on the night we don't write that's helpful we'll come to that in a moment or not in the moment I'm afraid at some point next paragraph
00:26:21 I'm afraid at some point next paragraph escape stroke alternative escape routes paranoid one to nine for many callers mentioned that there was smoke outside their flat although they were smoking the corridor preventing escape this may have caused CEOs to move straight into
00:26:34 have caused CEOs to move straight into the protect phase of FSG and not explore alternative escape routes with callers there's a real risk in attempting a self evacuation from a building on fire that the occupant will move themselves into a
00:26:45 the occupant will move themselves into a position of greater harm rather than waiting in a safe location for rescue that conclusion looks like a further detailing of the conclusion in the first
00:26:56 detailing of the conclusion in the first in the in paragraph two nine three to be looked at that be fair yes right it's part of the same theme and then the next paragraph two nine five assessment reassessment of the call stroke caller
00:27:10 reassessment of the call stroke caller some ce o--'s did repeat questions to find out what was happening at different stages of the call including trying to find rooms with less smoke national guidance FSC fifty four 2004 suggests a
00:27:22 guidance FSC fifty four 2004 suggests a model which has a review of assessment poor initial decisions built into it although this was not included in NF p training materials moving to protect advice with the intent of keeping the caller safe may not always be the best
00:27:33 caller safe may not always be the best solution and the call should be continually reassessed there may be a tendency to limit reassessment due to the protect ethos although there is evidence that some proactive call handling techniques did take place now
00:27:45 handling techniques did take place now there number of things in there as well to ask you about first of all where it says some ce o--'s did repeat questions to find out what was happening did does that mean that some weren't
00:27:58 I yes that was true of the night and like those you know there was a vast amount of course coming in and and some operators speaking to callers but we
00:28:11 operators speaking to callers but we found sometimes that they could have asked assess the situation again and again yes say is it would it be fair to conclude from that that the Lacan
00:28:22 conclude from that that the Lacan experience was that the reassessment
00:28:27 approach was patchy yes right although to be clear that the reassessment is not in the national guidance it's only assessment so after our investigation we
00:28:41 assessment so after our investigation we added the reassessment of the call I was going to ask you so in National Origins yeah prior to to the local fire and our training and the training that are
00:28:52 training and the training that are controlling operators to receive didn't cover a reassessment right so the new package of training that you designed after lack on house enshrined as it
00:29:03 after lack on house enshrined as it worded it or had contained in it a reassessment approach yes okay and then it says moving to protect advice with
00:29:14 it says moving to protect advice with the intent to keeping the caller safe it may not always be the best solution and calls should be continually reassessed in terms of continual reassessment how did the new approach after Latin or
00:29:26 did the new approach after Latin or through training do that how did it achieve continual reassessment so that's just in the questioning and when they provide an advice to the caller when they're supporting them trying to keep
00:29:39 they're supporting them trying to keep them calm that they will ask continually what the situations like has it got worse and in our reference information flow you quote there are some questions and that can prompt the control operator
00:29:51 and that can prompt the control operator to ask them right and in the last part of the last sentence where it says some proactive call handling techniques did take place but what does that what does that mean
00:30:02 that mean was that referred to Proactive I think that's just generally described what our core handlers do they are very products if they are thinking
00:30:14 are very products if they are thinking ahead and don't forget they are whilst providing advice talking to the caller keeping them calm they are trying to update the crews that are on scene they are trying to type and talk and provide
00:30:27 are trying to type and talk and provide all that information that goes to the crews to let them know what's going on okay and that's that's reassessment of the city of the situation within the fire building room or flat that does
00:30:44 fire building room or flat that does that depend upon the information being given by the caller to the control room yes what about information coming from the fire ground the incident commander or the bridgehead that might that may
00:30:57 or the bridgehead that might that may influence our decision and our call handling and what advice we give as well right
00:31:03 right it looks else else from elsewhere in this report that one of the problems experienced the national house was that there wasn't enough information coming back from the firefighters or the
00:31:16 back from the firefighters or the incident commander on the fire ground into the control room is that right yes okay
00:31:20 okay so in terms of assessment of reassessment under paragraph 1 9 5 that reassessment of the fire how much of that would need from now on from lacking
00:31:33 that would need from now on from lacking along to include information from the fire ground and not just the caller I think that would be a benefit but I
00:31:44 think that would be a benefit but I don't think it's it's needed on every occasion so we are trained to keep callers on the line to keep them calm and reassured and provide the advice
00:31:55 and reassured and provide the advice that we are given right so we continue to do that the protective or proactive call handling again it might be different
00:32:04 different techniques moving them into a different room and but it will stay within the framework of five survivor guidance 1093 if we had additional information from the crews that would say that they've
00:32:17 the crews that would say that they've rescued an individual hopefully we'd be hearing that on the telephone as well because we remain on the line to them yeah you say you remain on the line was there any suggestion as a result of
00:32:29 there any suggestion as a result of latinum house and particularly this paragraph that control room operators should call people back call callers back if the situation changed and they'd left the line no so after the local
00:32:41 left the line no so after the local house we do advise people if they're not being affected by fire heat or smoke to to remain in their building if and we tell them that if their situation
00:32:52 tell them that if their situation changes they need to call us back they need to call you back but what about you calling them back if you discover that the situation had changed somewhere else in the building that's a long-standing historic and
00:33:03 that's a long-standing historic and pasting pressure that control rooms don't read connect to the caller's right okay we will come back to that in due course can I then pass to the next
00:33:14 course can I then pass to the next paragraph which may may provide some more answers to similar questions I've been asking 296 effective communication between control and incident command
00:33:25 between control and incident command there is evidence of information passing from control to the incident ground but only one occasion when the details of a flat with people trapped were not passed in a timely way control supervisors
00:33:37 in a timely way control supervisors regularly tried to obtain information about the progress with the incident particularly in relation to call as being given FSG in line with the practice at the time there was much less information being passed from the
00:33:49 information being passed from the incident ground to control about the progress of firefighting and rescue efforts it is not clear that if CEOs had been given information about progress that he would have influenced the advice given to corners it is it right that one
00:34:06 given to corners it is it right that one of the experiences from life Haas was the control supervisors couldn't get information from the fire ground recovered that a minute ago it
00:34:17 ground recovered that a minute ago it looks like from that paragraph that was the case which we didn't receive any information with regard to and their rescue attempts to the corners we were
00:34:28 rescue attempts to the corners we were talking to do you know why that was why control room couldn't get information from firefighters on the incident ground and I can only surmise that they were extremely busy and that they were
00:34:40 extremely busy and that they were carrying out their tasks and perhaps didn't realize what needed to change what or what might have changed in the control room was the ring we were talking to callers was there a command
00:34:51 talking to callers was there a command unit present at Lackland house yes and what was there how was the communication
00:35:03 what was there how was the communication between the control room and the command unit and I wasn't in the control room at the time so I couldn't work on it but I believe from the reports and listening
00:35:15 believe from the reports and listening to the course and everything and it was very hard to get hold of the appliances and the command unit right and I know you've covered the the control information form which is why that came
00:35:28 information form which is why that came about right okay
00:35:34 it just breaking that down a little bit like my house experience first of all communications from the control room to the command unit all the incident command permit yes but what were they
00:35:48 command permit yes but what were they like good or not good frustrating at times when we couldn't pass as much survivor guidance information to the crew something you couldn't pass by a
00:36:00 crew something you couldn't pass by a survival guide this information what would happen when you couldn't we tried and appliances that will unload right do you remember weather from your office your involvement in Latin house in terms
00:36:12 your involvement in Latin house in terms of putting the report together whether there are instances of fire survival guidance
00:36:15 guidance detailed information which which didn't make it to the control the in the ICP all this the command unit I believe there was one that didn't make it as
00:36:27 there was one that didn't make it as soon as we we knew about it didn't ever call yes but yes and in terms of information coming back the other way from the command unit or the incident command pump back to the control room
00:36:39 command pump back to the control room was was that efficient or were there problems with that and I don't know if there were problems with it certainly not with radio communications it's just that we never had any messages sent back
00:36:50 that we never had any messages sent back to us to tell us the progress at all at all really we had in from it we had informative messages that's what we've called which detail how the incidents progressing but none relating to right
00:37:03 progressing but none relating to right now it says long way down this paragraph in line with a solid sorry I said none no messages regarding the attempts to rescue that callers thank you
00:37:16 rescue that callers thank you now in this paragraph 296 it says in Lima practice at the time there was much less information being passed from the incident ground to control about the progress of firefighting and rescue
00:37:28 progress of firefighting and rescue efforts
00:37:30 efforts what was that practice at the time that's referred to there so I think there was I think after the investigation into Lacan or and there
00:37:42 investigation into Lacan or and there might have been a realization that actually having that information about firefighters and rescue efforts would be of benefit to the control-room if they knew it right however it isn't in
00:37:56 knew it right however it isn't in general terms and we wouldn't normally expect to or receive information apart from informative messages or priority messages from incidents which would
00:38:09 messages from incidents which would detail their firefighting action or their rescue attempts right
00:38:14 um but but the practice at the time which resulted in there being much less information being passed I just want to understand what what what the practice
00:38:26 understand what what what the practice was which resulted in there being much less information coming from the incident ground to control again I didn't write that but I don't think that
00:38:38 didn't write that but I don't think that the practice changed as usual we are the ones that pass information to the crews and to the incident commander and to the instant command panel it's not really a
00:38:50 instant command panel it's not really a two-way channel we provide them the information and they deal with the incident on the ground if they require anything from us they will ask us and but it's not usual to receive very
00:39:02 but it's not usual to receive very detailed information about their firefighting or their rescue efforts all right now you you you you your answer just now is in the present tense so does
00:39:13 just now is in the present tense so does that mean that what you just said was the current practice even at the time of the Grenville telephone yes we are trying to make assumptions and to do
00:39:25 trying to make assumptions and to do some planning depending on and what we might think is happening at the incident but it would not be normal that we would receive that information on a given incident okay just taking a step or two
00:39:38 incident okay just taking a step or two back then and I'm sorry to keep pushing with this but the conclusion that we see in this paragraph about the practice at
00:39:49 in this paragraph about the practice at the time of Blackmore house that there was much less information being passed on the incident ground to control about the progress of firefighting and rescue efforts
00:40:00 did that conclusion result in any change to the practice post Latin all about the amount and quality of information coming
00:40:11 amount and quality of information coming from the control from the far ground to control
00:40:14 control we've regard to fast survival guides its course I believe it's written into policy right seven nine zero so would it be fair to summarize your evidence in
00:40:26 be fair to summarize your evidence in this way that one of the lessons learnt at Lacan all was the information coming from the fire ground to control was insufficient in terms of firefighting and rescue efforts and that more and
00:40:37 and rescue efforts and that more and better information had to come from the fire ground to control so as to be able to assist with quality fast survival guidance cause I would say in broad
00:40:48 guidance cause I would say in broad terms yes but looking back to that incident I'm not sure about if the information had been received what what
00:40:59 information had been received what what changed to advice would be given to coolness right okay I think that was in need so we'll follow then we'll follow this through them to go to the policies
00:41:11 this through them to go to the policies okay
00:41:16 and we'll do that as I say in due course but would it be before I leave that in general terms would it be fair at all to suggest things to you but would it be
00:41:28 suggest things to you but would it be fair to say that one of the takeaways from the lack of house experience was the inadequacy or insufficiency of information about firefighting or
00:41:39 information about firefighting or search-and-rescue coming from the fire ground to the control room it would be fair to say that it would have been valuable to know that and we weren't
00:41:53 valuable to know that and we weren't able to or firefighting and rescue attempts weren't able to reach the occupants fence during lectin all right thank you now coming back to your
00:42:12 thank you now coming back to your experience have you ever dealt with any major incidents in your role as som yes which ones and you can you give us an idea of just as senior operations
00:42:24 idea of just as senior operations managers have been involved in a number of multiple at first survival guidance come there was a fire at the Marriott hotel in Docklands and we are we attend
00:42:37 hotel in Docklands and we are we attend to the control room that's me and my colleagues attend the control room on fires above for instance above 12 pump in appliances right
00:42:48 in appliances right involved there replaced support well there how many FSG calls did that involve the merit hotel I think about six or seven rising in the scallop okay
00:43:01 six or seven rising in the scallop okay what's the what's them most in terms of numbers of FSG calls at a single incident that you personally have ever had to handle that would be the molecular incident prior to man yeah
00:43:13 molecular incident prior to man yeah grandma and when was the Marriott hotel
00:43:19 2010 right
00:43:31 can I just ask you now to turn to page 2 of your witness statement
00:43:43 you you explained in the first paragraph there the structure of the control room and the staff physically where would you
00:44:00 and the staff physically where would you actually sit or stand within the control room when let's say Merson to start with okay so if I could just clarify I think during the during the interview I began
00:44:15 during the during the interview I began to explain about our control structure and then went on to explain what roles control carry out on a shift by shift basis so they've merged those into one
00:44:28 basis so they've merged those into one yes okay and but I would stand I would sort of stand at the back of the supervisory position right so you would have a good view of what was going on yes and what when would you get involved
00:44:40 yes and what when would you get involved in a particular 999 call that was going on with one of your si Ras if they needed support and the supervisors were busy okay then I might be able to offer I will be able to offer some support
00:44:52 I will be able to offer some support okay
00:44:52 okay but mainly it's an oversight role and we take an initiative field of some calls for senior offices that might really in want in additional information the controlling the staff are very busy
00:45:04 controlling the staff are very busy responding to the incident and carrying out their own functions so we can take that pressure off them and we can support the operations managers decision-making if we're required or we
00:45:15 decision-making if we're required or we can make our those decisions for them and we can support the staff right usually one making a cup of tea um so the operations the CEO will CRO is
00:45:32 um so the operations the CEO will CRO is on a 999 call being assisted by an Aon the weirwood the IOM set stage Sri different general operations or
00:45:44 Sri different general operations or during the night brimful or fly survival guidance come quite right yes I may be clearer generally speaking at and take Merton because that's the normal place
00:45:56 Merton because that's the normal place operations we've got a CRO who takes a call from from a building which is almost which is on fire that CRO is assisted by no not necessarily the CRO
00:46:08 assisted by no not necessarily the CRO would are trained to take those calls and make the assessment about what resources need to send and mobilize those resources without support from a supervisor okay they are on hand should
00:46:20 supervisor okay they are on hand should you need them and they could raise their hand or someone that was my my next question if they decided they needed help yes what would they do they could raise a hand or maybe the person next to them would notice that and write it
00:46:32 them would notice that and write it alert supervisor okay and the supervisor would it be the supervisor or would it be the the a om so aom's are supervisors they carry out the Supervisory Rob
00:46:43 they carry out the Supervisory Rob basically but yes that as we talked before so they raise their hands the AOM is sitting next to them all stands by them how does it how does it work physically they can either monitor them or from their position so the
00:46:54 or from their position so the supervisors sit facing the control room and the control room operators they have the ability to monitor the call in their headset so they can listen in or they could go under stand next to them okay
00:47:06 could go under stand next to them okay I see okay so they can hear that they can hear the call at the same time they have a facility for activate right and then if the AOM needs help they go to the oh and they yes they can do
00:47:20 the oh and they yes they can do right and then it would be unlikely that they would need help they would be able to resolve issue right now on the night of the 13th 14th of June 2017 brigade
00:47:31 of the 13th 14th of June 2017 brigade control was way to based at Stratford not nursin and that was I think because there were some kind of works or something happening at yes just yeah
00:47:43 something happening at yes just yeah just routing security updates with our mobile Isis system right and because the interference we felt it was better to relocate to Stratford but we also like to exercise our resilience at Stratford
00:47:56 to exercise our resilience at Stratford every other month as well so it just coming sided okay and in terms of the
00:48:07 coming sided okay and in terms of the personnel setup on the night of the fire how many aom's did you have to a Owens and 100m from duty so you have to a ohms
00:48:18 and 100m from duty so you have to a ohms and one om and there were owners was Alex Norman we did night was there a resource management logistics officer on duty that night so the resource management logistics is one of the roles
00:48:29 management logistics is one of the roles that our control officer can do okay who was that who was occupying that role I don't think it was specifically given to anyone on that night it was just
00:48:40 anyone on that night it was just something that would have had to been undertaken had we needed to use that yes I'm notify and I think you also had people I'm sorry I'm sorry I'm sorry John - all right you think you also had
00:48:52 John - all right you think you also had three CR OS on and - doing overtime we were to take more than three Sierra's on so there were three supervisors to a OMS and one om wrote and promised would have
00:49:05 and one om wrote and promised would have been control operators and two of those were one over right okay it did the control-room have its full complement of stars yes there
00:49:17 its full complement of stars yes there were 11 and who was the officer in charge would have been Alex Norman the
00:49:28 charge would have been Alex Norman the Owen right and what does it mean to be the officer in charge so they are primary and managing London fire
00:49:39 primary and managing London fire controls of response or London Fire Brigades response to emergency calls ensuring that their mobilizations are correct and making sure that London has
00:49:50 correct and making sure that London has sufficient fire cover and I see and the officer in charge is that the same thing as the officer of the watch no probably gets a bit more complicated
00:50:03 no probably gets a bit more complicated so the supervisors are all known as officer watch so you were an officer built to watch no so if you were a supervisor right and IOM or an Owen and
00:50:14 supervisor right and IOM or an Owen and and you sit at the supervisory position you are known as a officer watch I see okay okay I think I've got that so when we pick up the phone to answer the call
00:50:26 we pick up the phone to answer the call and not an eye course but admin calls you answer it officer the watch right rather than your name and or your rank
00:50:37 rather than your name and or your rank I see so so that I'm clear an officer of the watch is an OEM or an IOM yes but not a CRO or an som no that's right that's correct
00:50:49 that's correct okay right
00:51:02 going back to the question of the control room setup you were working from Stratford because of routine security updates at Merton how long had control
00:51:15 updates at Merton how long had control been operating out of Stratford on that occasion they went across on the 13th right eight o'clock long okay and is that a is that a big move is a do you
00:51:27 that a is that a big move is a do you have to do a lot in order to move from Merton to Stratford and no we make sure everyone knows in advance and there are some phone lines that need to be transferred across but it's a well practice okay 13 and does it have the
00:51:43 practice okay 13 and does it have the same facilities as Merton yes more or less it's less positions it's smaller so there's only 16 mobilizing positions at
00:51:56 there's only 16 mobilizing positions at Stratford only six 16 only 16 as opposed to what at Mercer 22 in the main control room and additional 7 in our training suite and you say you've
00:52:08 our training suite and you say you've heard of mobilizing positions what are those so they are decisions which have our mobilizing system on them so you need to look into those and then you're able to take course and mobilize okay
00:52:20 able to take course and mobilize okay okay just explained you just give me a picture of what that looks like you sit down at a desk and you what have you got if you're a cro atom at a mobilizing position what have you got in front of you so you've got two screens in front
00:52:32 you so you've got two screens in front of you right and one that contains an incident list of incident list yeah so that's not least it's that are
00:52:43 so that's not least it's that are ongoing right that we're currently dealing with yes and and then there is another screen I mean change them but there's another screen
00:52:54 change them but there's another screen which contains a map right and then what we call a bingo card so they have all the stations listed on them and all the
00:53:06 the stations listed on them and all the offices on them a bingo card yes is that a piece of cut actually a card or is on the screens it's on the scrape right okay and you could call up this
00:53:17 right okay and you could call up this bingo card can you write and the incident list what what is that data there's two it's that list so there's a
00:53:28 there's two it's that list so there's a short version where you just see the address and then type that we're attending and and then there's a big one which will show you a bit more detail and is it dynamic does it update exams
00:53:40 and is it dynamic does it update exams yes okay
00:53:41 yes okay and this who inputs the messages to into the incident list as it so the instant list is formed of all the course that we
00:53:53 list is formed of all the course that we are that we have mobilized ten that we're dealing with right so you could take a call to a person shutting lift the control operator could take a call to a person shutting lift and when they
00:54:04 to a person shutting lift and when they mobilized that would go on to the instant list so the instant list it's made up of all the incidents we are attending right all that we've been asked to attend okay now when a call
00:54:18 asked to attend okay now when a call comes in first call of fire it comes to a CRO does it directly yes and they they answer the call and what comes up on
00:54:29 answer the call and what comes up on their screen it's called a cool collection form so a CCF as we know it
00:54:36 right and do they have - does it come up automatically older than I can bring it just magically on which screen the incident list screen or the map screen now you can change it but it comes up on the instant list screen right and it's a
00:54:48 the instant list screen right and it's a cool collection form of what what are the spaces on the form so it has a telephone number callers telephone number at details about other agencies if we need to inform them could put their reference numbers has
00:55:01 could put their reference numbers has the address of the incident or an address field where you can put the address at the insight you have to input that do you yesterday and what are the details the incident type code so what
00:55:15 details the incident type code so what incident we are going to I see so would high-rise have its own code yes okay there's a place to say grassland yes okay and that would then what that would
00:55:26 okay and that would then what that would have a PDA predetermined attendance yes so the operator would decide which instant type code to use there's the space to put further information so if they need to put any further information
00:55:37 they need to put any further information they would write that in there or type that in there and then they can press click a button which will give them the PDA which will offer them the PDA okay and how would they know what incident
00:55:51 and how would they know what incident type it would be that's just in in their training look and their experience they would know that how would they know whether a flat was a high-rise we tend
00:56:04 whether a flat was a high-rise we tend to ask callers the bring us about fires how defy the building is right that's quite a technical question to ask somebody living in a in a flat would
00:56:19 somebody living in a in a flat would they normally no they do not really know moving them so if there's any if it's more than five floors above five floors and the control operator would change
00:56:31 and the control operator would change the instant type code to be able arose attentive so say it's five floors is the magic that's not five dollars yeah that's the magic information is it not yes 50 meters or 18 meters no right now
00:56:45 yes 50 meters or 18 meters no right now okay and that's something that the controller officer would ask is it how many floors yes and then once that information has come up what happens next what does the CRO
00:56:58 up what happens next what does the CRO do next so they can click on a click on another button and it pulls the P do it displays the PDA remains in a histogram and will show the nearest resources to
00:57:14 and will show the nearest resources to the incident okay and then how does the CRO send a call to the nearest fire station a mobile once they are happy with that predetermined attendance and
00:57:25 with that predetermined attendance and don't need to make any changes they can press another button and and it will automatically be sent to the stations right to mobilize the appliances
00:57:39 and that would enable would would that enable the CRO to say they're on their way
00:57:44 way no they would only say they would say to a caller yes they were on their way with them and they mainly can mobilize and do mobilize and appliances whilst they're still talking to a Paula okay
00:58:01 still talking to a Paula okay as the incident then develops what further information comes up on the incident list I think you said informative messages what else yeah so
00:58:15 informative messages what else yeah so it's that list is an overview of everything that's going on in London the incident log and it's created for each specific incident and so on the incident log there would be further details if we
00:58:27 log there would be further details if we received any more calls that would go on to the incident log okay the resources booking status to status through would be entered onto those logs any informing
00:58:38 be entered onto those logs any informing of officers or other agencies would be entered into those logs right keep-keep don't let me interrupt you most incidents have what we call an
00:58:51 most incidents have what we call an action plan and there is a number of plan items that control staff and supervisors need to carry out as well they're also on them okay and now this
00:59:02 they're also on them okay and now this incident log where is it held its on mobilizing system on the incident right as a central as a central database yes
00:59:14 as a central as a central database yes and but there is a live feed from it to what we call boss and and that means that senior officers and stations can look at the incident right boss is a
00:59:28 look at the incident right boss is a viewing platform it is a viewing platform and the actual platform itself the incident log database is that got a name the information comes from vision
00:59:39 name the information comes from vision vision right so the contents of the vision database are visible to the CRA on the incident list screen right yes
00:59:52 on the incident list screen right yes okay I clicked on that but they're also viewable remotely by boss such as I said viewing plane okay um okay I asked you
01:00:04 viewing plane okay um okay I asked you to look at something and see if you can just help me
01:00:09 with it he probably heard that we've been working from something called a short incident log yes yes can I ask you just to look at it it's a tab 23 of our
01:00:22 just to look at it it's a tab 23 of our our bond ball and it's M et triple zero one three eight three zero it's a longish document even though it's called a short inserted logon there is a long incident log could you that's the
01:00:38 long incident log could you that's the start of it are you familiar with this type of of document yes right could you could you just help us but how is it compiled so it's compiled from our
01:00:49 compiled so it's compiled from our vision mobilizing system right but all the inputs on it are either generated from actions carried out in the controller right so just and we can see how its schematically set out let's just
01:01:03 how its schematically set out let's just go through it this shortly as we can all get to the whole thing but it's called a short incident log do you have these for every incident you can get them for every instant okay and is the
01:01:15 every instant okay and is the information in it it's because it's called short is it derived from a fuller database set of information yes so I think you can run a long report which contains every and action yes and now it
01:01:31 contains every and action yes and now it has at the start incident seven six zero to nine at the top left that that's the name number of 200 yeah and station G to G 27 that's North Kensington and that's what this is
01:01:43 North Kensington and that's what this is that always the first respondent station no not necessarily that's whose station ground that incident is I see okay
01:01:56 right might there be more than one it might have been more than no one station no there will only be one station's ground but you might not get golf 27
01:02:09 ground but you might not get golf 27 depending where the the instant is attending that station there might be nearer right station okay and what's what's the state is that fire fine okay
01:02:20 what's the state is that fire fine okay that's right oh so I think that's finished it's just a it's just a data when we close and complete incidents and call 0-0 54:29
01:02:33 complete incidents and call 0-0 54:29 I'm assuming that that's the first call
01:02:39 okay and then you've got original type a1 what's that so the original needs to type that the control operator put into the incident
01:02:51 control operator put into the incident to generate the mobilization was an a1 which is a fire hey what is that okay an additional types 10 PR 15 I think we can guess it what that is but the news tell
01:03:02 guess it what that is but the news tell us so those would have been instant upgrades as the instant progressed you can see six pump fire eight pump fire a 1hr which would be the high-rise
01:03:13 1hr which would be the high-rise attendance for survival guidance and g1 is a major incident PRS persons reported I see okay and then it goes up it's a
01:03:25 I see okay and then it goes up it's a forty pump fire right Miss Smith we've been going for just over an hour are you comfortable to keep going for another 10 minutes yes we'll have a break or would you like a break now ten minutes okay let's go let's keep going
01:03:38 minutes okay let's go let's keep going with this documents - chairman if we can if we can then you get repeat calls three four four what's what's that that's the number of calls we received it's in the control room that night
01:03:51 it's in the control room that night okay and then underneath it we have a long list of of numbers yeah could you tell us what those are so each call we
01:04:03 tell us what those are so each call we receive generates an instant number so they're all the other incidents and all the other calls associated with the main incident right now these numbers I mean
01:04:18 incident right now these numbers I mean we can see that most of them on the right hand side are 1406 217 which is clearly the date I'm guessing but that
01:04:29 clearly the date I'm guessing but that looks like the date and then the numbers on the left-hand side before the duct for the - are those telephone numbers or are they assigned at FB numbers no they just didn't assigned incident number
01:04:40 just didn't assigned incident number I see so and what would they be assigned to a particular call yes so each individual call would have its own incident number and then the control
01:04:51 incident number and then the control officer would take details of that call but obviously they wouldn't mobilize a separate attendance they would just add it to the main call right and the main
01:05:02 it to the main call right and the main incident okay I see okay and they're always six digit numbers are they started with a zero seven know that it just starts at zero at the beginning of the year I'm going
01:05:15 at the beginning of the year I'm going to start from there oh I see okay so it's just looking at the the first one there are a couple of curiosities there's what the very first one is oh
01:05:26 there's what the very first one is oh one a 22 a 17 yes just like a system anomaly right I see oh I see for the first one and what about that what about the second one Oh 806 8th of June again that's just
01:05:42 Oh 806 8th of June again that's just okay and then to keep the third 100 7683 to let me go on yeah 4 3 3 38 39 42 etc those are just there's a like serial
01:05:53 those are just there's a like serial numbers are they yes okay got it now moving on through them so you can know how many calls these are all individual calls are they yeah right
01:06:05 all individual calls are they yeah right even and some of them may be from the same caller or I see say three calls from the same corner would have three numbers of attached to it that's correct right so it can be told from that than that there were in total at grenfell 344
01:06:19 that there were in total at grenfell 344 calls received by CRS in the control room yes right and then over to page eight
01:06:28 eight you've got address and you've got summary and the summary would be applied into the into the database at what point because we could tell here it's got it
01:06:40 because we could tell here it's got it says 40 come fire so we know that that was after the make up to 40 yeah would it be immediately afterwards or or at the end of the incident no that would be generated by the stop message okay and
01:06:52 generated by the stop message okay and then additional detail so it's got about release to attend right
01:07:00 right and then we go into the details of appliances and I think that's self-explanatory but just say just just to be clear you've got callsigns
01:07:12 to be clear you've got callsigns station status 1 and status one is you could just explain to us what is status 1a very many station right and then you've got plus what does that mean so
01:07:25 you've got plus what does that mean so the the top would be the initial attendance the first attendance that we would send and and when they made the incident up anything else would show as
01:07:36 incident up anything else would show as reinforcements okay and with this and we got mobile which is status to and on scene what's your status 3 I think we've established that services and then available is that the time when they
01:07:49 available is that the time when they blocked off as it were yes but to why from the incident right now this information did we see them it's in this box here this is just the first page of it would this be available dynamically
01:08:01 it would this be available dynamically as it as it evolves to a control room operator on their screen in front of them yes it would look different but if that information is available to our interests oh okay and then you got
01:08:12 interests oh okay and then you got reinforce all the way down and relief etc then over on page 13 you've got officers callsign name assign mobile on
01:08:25 officers callsign name assign mobile on scene available again with this information be available to any control room operator yes okay and then we can see your name I just have the 3/4 of the
01:08:36 see your name I just have the 3/4 of the way down that list is B co2 is that brigade control number 2 yes right and it has used assigned at oh 1:29 41 yeah
01:08:48 it has used assigned at oh 1:29 41 yeah dude
01:08:49 dude while we're on it because those will come back to it but do you know why it doesn't have a time for mobile over on scene for you yes because I never attend
01:09:01 scene for you yes because I never attend the incident I just attend control rifle so it would be the assign would be an in formative page I see it's a control room
01:09:12 formative page I see it's a control room staff although they're listed as officers assigned with the time of assignment don't generalize go straightly no because we wouldn't be
01:09:23 straightly no because we wouldn't be attached to the incident because we wouldn't proceed to the incident no I see um that would be the same as actually if you look at press pr6 there
01:09:35 actually if you look at press pr6 there would be a notification there but she wouldn't attend the incident right okay that's that's look at that um page 17 that is where we have the start
01:09:54 of so I can I just ask you something I've just noticed in actually bottom of page 16 well all I'm on it it has additional additional data
01:10:06 it has additional additional data Bharara command areas electricity provider other agency call reference and water company there is that already on the database or doesn't have to be
01:10:19 the database or doesn't have to be inputted during an incident you know so the bara and the command area and the electricity provider will be on the incident dependent of the location of the incident as will the water company
01:10:30 the incident as will the water company or other agency call ref would be those agencies that we've contacted so sorry and would be one of them and we'd keep everyone was reference information
01:10:41 everyone was reference information reference so somebody in the control room would actually have to or somebody somewhere would actually have to update or input that specific data during an incident would be the other agency called reference when they typical or
01:10:54 called reference when they typical or informed another agency they would ask for their reference and exchange our reference number and they would put that in that field right during the incident yes right okay do you know who goes
01:11:06 yes right okay do you know who goes about that exercise is it somebody in the control room or somebody removed from the control room somewhat it would be a control officer right in the control room whoever spoke to another agency or received a call from the other
01:11:17 agency or received a call from the other agency okay now then we could turn to page 17 and we start the the actual if log of incidents as it were and it says
01:11:28 log of incidents as it were and it says narrative at the top and again this information as it as time goes on does that that or is that available on a control room officer's screen yes so if
01:11:41 control room officer's screen yes so if they want to see it they can see it can you just help me as to how that information gets in there so just taking for example oh one 1339 this is look at
01:11:56 for example oh one 1339 this is look at that it is an example si D that's the OP and I think I can guess who that might be but would you tell me Sherrod Alves
01:12:08 be but would you tell me Sherrod Alves makeup RUP g-33 one mate pump six and one HP now who inputs that information into the vision system and to start with
01:12:23 into the vision system and to start with so Sharon would have done that she was on the radio position that night and she would have taken a call she was taking a radio message from Gulf 331 to make the incident six and hp's one was if she
01:12:36 incident six and hp's one was if she would have typed them to the incident all right so the the makeup starts with the decision on the incident ground with the incident commander yes assume it gets radioed from and stop
01:12:50 yes assume it gets radioed from and stop me if I get this wrong it gets radio does it from the incident command pump or all the pumps sending the messages the case may be to the
01:13:01 the messages the case may be to the control room just pausing there what's that radio link what channel is that it depends if you're north or south of the river so channel to channel till Channel
01:13:12 river so channel to channel till Channel four and if you're north of the river channel 4 okay and is that on the main scheme radio yes okay and that radio link from the pump that that's contained
01:13:23 link from the pump that that's contained in the appliance is it yes can it also be sent from far ground radio yeah not a five-round radio now I see but err wife
01:13:35 five-round radio now I see but err wife radio which officers have and I think commands units have as well right they still mobile that's not all say so you can't send a message like that from your fire ground radio you can send a message
01:13:48 fire ground radio you can send a message like that from either an air wave radio which scene widget which officers have yeah all from the radio in the cab yes of an appliance
01:14:01 of an appliance and is that channel for sometimes called RT for yes okay right and then that comes into the control room and Sharon Darby or
01:14:13 control room and Sharon Darby or somebody in her position types that into the vision database right and then everybody who's got access to the vision database can then see it yes okay does
01:14:26 database can then see it yes okay does that message then get confirmed in a different way or additionally back to the fire ground so they are ready to our prices would repeat that message as soon as the message was given and so gold
01:14:38 as the message was given and so gold four three three one would make pump six and we as a radio operator you would repeat that back to confirm I see and so
01:14:51 repeat that back to confirm I see and so we is it right then that every time you see a message in here with an OP next to it which i think is invariably the case as we turn the pages we know who typed
01:15:02 as we turn the pages we know who typed that into the system mainly there are some computer generated one so system generated comments but they do have an operator's name next to them right I
01:15:16 operator's name next to them right I can't see one at the moment okay well as we turn the pages in this which we're going to do a little bit maybe we can pick up some examples um but that's that may be an appropriate moment mr. chairman for a meeting right
01:15:28 moment mr. chairman for a meeting right yes right we'll have a break now you ever want a chance to spit so let's have a cup of coffee we resume at half past eleven and I have
01:15:40 we resume at half past eleven and I have to ask you not to talk about your evidence or anything related to it during the break right thank you all right thank you you'd like to give the usher
01:15:58 good cut fast 11 countries
01:16:09 you
01:31:00 right have to carry on yes thank you yes just a minute miss me thank you um we were looking at the short incident long some further questions on it can I just
01:31:11 some further questions on it can I just go back a little bit there's often happens after breaks and afraid just to the bottom of page 16 of the same document where you can see additional
01:31:24 document where you can see additional data yes um two questions first of all you see sorry one two one one nine other agency Karev what did you just explain to me what
01:31:36 what did you just explain to me what that is a reference to so that would be a reference to Surrey Fire Brigades I would believe and their number and what would that before that would be four I believe they took a number of calls
01:31:48 believe they took a number of calls right I called him that night on that night yes what stage during the incident do you think that information would be entered in into in there that would have
01:32:00 entered in into in there that would have been entered in from the first call that sorry fathered the guy gave us right and and sorry would that be as a backup control room or just because sorry
01:32:12 control room or just because sorry happened to receive a 999 call relating to the incident I summary would have received a 999 call relating to the incident that just because we were
01:32:23 incident that just because we were experiencing a vast amount of calls in our control room and and then the BT operator would have looked to pass them to our buddy service which is northwest
01:32:34 to our buddy service which is northwest of our control and but we I spoke to the BT operator on that night or the BT exchange and asked them to pass them round to our neighboring Fire and Rescue Services as well why doesn't North West
01:32:47 Services as well why doesn't North West appear on that edit it probably would do that's probably a brief if you look to the incident would appear as well do you have fixed body control rooms or do you have to
01:33:02 body control rooms or do you have to hunt around for that on the night pork is available no so we have a MoU with Northwest fire control and Staffordshire almost meats okay control room where the
01:33:14 almost meats okay control room where the three biggest fire control rooms in the UK and we have a three-way partnership arrangement which we take calls for each other should we need to and we can also
01:33:25 other should we need to and we can also mobilize on behalf of them that body systems when did that come in we've always had buddy arrangements with
01:33:36 we've always had buddy arrangements with farm rescue sir with other Fire and Rescue Services I believe the Northwest and temperature and West meets was 2012 okay was that a as a result of latinum house no okay
01:33:48 house no okay ma'am the other thing I just wanted to ask you about under additional data is the other words Badcock rest and then you've got a number underneath that every one seven eight six one zero five
01:34:01 every one seven eight six one zero five two can you explain what that is so Badcock are the people that service our fire engines and so I would imagine that we contacted them at some point
01:34:13 we contacted them at some point and that's their reference right do you know why Babcock's had to be contacted it can be a range of information it could be a range of reasons sorry right and appliance might have broken
01:34:24 right and appliance might have broken down or we might have needed additional support it's not uncommon it's only common what kind of support to Babcock's off early long the fire brigade that would need a contact in the middle of an
01:34:37 would need a contact in the middle of an incident it could be a range of stuff like I say if an appliance wouldn't start or failed to start they could be called and it's not uncommon at all and
01:34:48 called and it's not uncommon at all and we would have contacted a large range of agencies that night so there would be a reference for in that place that London Ambulance Service the Kensington Chelsea fara yeah
01:35:01 Service the Kensington Chelsea fara yeah I mean in addition to things like mechanical breakdowns what other services did Badcock offer so I think they have some resources that if they're required at the incident we can mobilize
01:35:15 after I mean would they be human skills no so what kind of skills then so there'd be there be resources that it needs so not you know human mind so
01:35:27 needs so not you know human mind so they'd be at vehicles right the equipment yes ok and you know anything about the arrangements between the
01:35:38 about the arrangements between the London Fire Brigade and Babcock's a parent so far as supply of these services to vehicles and supply of equipment is concerned no that wouldn't be my area we would just know who to
01:35:49 be my area we would just know who to contact should the instant request them right do you recall any kind of problems with Badcock during the night about the supply of equipment or servicing no I don't thank you now before we just get
01:36:02 don't thank you now before we just get back to the shortens in the log we were talking earlier about air wave radios yes those are portable radios which are you said senior officers have above what
01:36:14 you said senior officers have above what rank or at what rank and above a station manager station and and those air wave radios can access the control room directly yes on channel 4 okay the are
01:36:27 directly yes on channel 4 okay the are the contents of those messages but on RT fall between air wave radio and control room recorded yes they are have you ever heard of something called
01:36:38 have you ever heard of something called an admin call yes and is that the same as a message over the air wave radio to control room no what is telephone conversation that's a telephone conversation and what's the telephone
01:36:49 conversation and what's the telephone what is the telephone where is that telephone
01:36:52 telephone so that would be on our integrated communications green so as I was explaining the control officer would have two screens in front of them with the vision terminals on them yeah the Matheny instant is and they would have
01:37:05 Matheny instant is and they would have what we call an X by the side of them which is an electronic touchscreen telephone pad right so I say and they would make a call from that and that would be classed as an admin code that's
01:37:17 would be classed as an admin code that's about men corner the admin call is made by the CRO by use of the screen to whom who would who wouldn't having called go to that would depend on who we were notified of an incident so it could be
01:37:29 notified of an incident so it could be made to a senior officer it could be made to a water company or the electricity board or to a command unit right but it would be made with it to a telephone or not a radio yes right so
01:37:41 telephone or not a radio yes right so admin claims lot of telephones airwave radios on our rt4 yes they're both recorded yes where are they recorded they recorded on
01:37:52 where are they recorded they recorded on the system they're available for control offices to play back on their mobilising system and then they go into a database which we are able to access right then we've got em the main scheme radio now
01:38:05 we've got em the main scheme radio now that's not a piece of portable equipment it could work well let me ask you what is the main scheme radio so that is the air wave radio right that's the same
01:38:16 air wave radio right that's the same thing as it yes and
01:38:22 okay so a company it does air wave describe the system of communication or the actual piece of kit you hold in your hand that's the piece of kit right so
01:38:33 hand that's the piece of kit right so the air wave radio allows you to access the main scheme radio system the my main screen radio is is just a historical term we still use so the words it air wave and main scheme are interchangeable
01:38:45 wave and main scheme are interchangeable yes I see now in the cab you've got a radio
01:38:48 radio yes what is that radio that's an airway Frady oh I see so all appliances have an air wave radio okay and and that's
01:39:02 air wave radio okay and and that's that's just a fixed version of the portable version that station managers and above have yes right and that has the same functionality does it as the air wave radio held by senior officers okay and so would it follow that the
01:39:19 okay and so would it follow that the radio in the cab would enable the incident commander for example or the driver to be able to radio control room
01:39:30 driver to be able to radio control room on our t4 if you're in North London and vice versa yes okay and then finally those calls are recorded yeah you say and then
01:39:42 are recorded yeah you say and then finally five ground radios those are took you just described days for us so I believe five gram radios are radios that are kept by crews and that to be used in
01:39:56 are kept by crews and that to be used in on the fiber and so we have no information we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those high ground ideas and ER they are those of calls recorded yeah right okay
01:40:10 going back then to the incident Lord
01:40:14 just want to ask you the question about the very start of the attendance if you go to a different document if you thought they would ask you to do that
01:40:25 thought they would ask you to do that with taps ever in the documents bundle is this is lfb document number three now
01:40:36 is this is lfb document number three now this is a an earlier efi document produced a thing for the inquiry but can I just ask you to look at it it says
01:40:48 I just ask you to look at it it says halfway down 0-0 54:29 first call to incident and then at 55:14 Pete predetermined attendance PDA for call to fire G two seven one two seven two and
01:41:00 fire G two seven one two seven two and three three one assigned to incident yeah so that's initially three pumps and then at 5912 just about four minutes later g36 to Hammersmith also assigned
01:41:12 later g36 to Hammersmith also assigned to the incident as part of PDA when high-rise incident ascertained do you know from your own knowledge about a four-minute gap between the initial
01:41:23 four-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the make up to four pumps because of discovery that it was a high-rise yes you do know about that reduce explain what happened so I
01:41:34 reduce explain what happened so I believe during the first call to brimful tower and dr. shaw officer asks how many floors there are and the cornices fourth
01:41:45 floors there are and the cornices fourth which he was obviously referring to where the fire was and so we mobilized fire attendance to the address which was three pumping
01:41:56 the address which was three pumping appliances okay and normally what would happen in order to ascertain whether it's a high-rise so the control operator would ask how many floors
01:42:07 would ask how many floors right are in the building okay that is to do control room operators get training in how to extract information from callers who who for whom English
01:42:19 from callers who who for whom English may not be their first language not specifically for call us English it's not their first language that we do have call handling training and that's done as part of their new entrance training
01:42:30 as part of their new entrance training when they first join us right okay so no training and what about training for words I say extracting for coaxing information from callers who may be in a panic and not really able to describe
01:42:42 panic and not really able to describe very very well what they're seeing or what they're experiencing is their training on that they have their nine week training but obviously it's all experiential they take numerous 9:09
01:42:53 experiential they take numerous 9:09 course every day when they're on shift and they have their supervisors to support them in that and and would help them out if they were having difficulties but patrol officers job is
01:43:06 difficulties but patrol officers job is very experienced yeah okay
01:43:12 and we obviously we can see here that originally there was no PDA for a high-rise now would that be would that been a frequent experience or there will
01:43:25 been a frequent experience or there will be occasions where the callers couldn't give a response or gave an incorrect response and I believe during this incident that one of our supervisors believed it was a high-rise had a check
01:43:38 believed it was a high-rise had a check and then certainly additional attendants right that would leave a lot to chance they wouldn't it unless the original call handler have actually specifically asked is it a high-rise easily over five
01:43:49 asked is it a high-rise easily over five is it like that yeah because which she did we had them we do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer which is our mapping aid and and our
01:44:02 which is our mapping aid and and our addressing tool and and they do have a number of high-rise buildings listed on them but not all rific yes
01:44:23 yes I mean it's easy to get confused if you're a caller isn't it when asked how many floors have you got there to give the floor you're on it can happen say it
01:44:37 the floor you're on it can happen say it say there's room for misunderstanding is that right between the caller and the CRO about how many floors are in the in the building as opposed to the floor the
01:44:48 the building as opposed to the floor the call is coming from yes that can happen at times and but again if it's registered and if it's registers as a high ride building on our gas attea we would have noticed that additional calls
01:44:59 would have noticed that additional calls were additional callers would have also been asked that information right and again showing how much them it's sort of teamwork or supervisors notice that immediately yes I guess what I'm really
01:45:14 immediately yes I guess what I'm really asking you is is our control room operators trained to be crystal clear in asking the question how many floors does the building consists of as opposed to what floor are you on yes they are
01:45:27 what floor are you on yes they are trained to ask right during flat fires
01:45:32 now coming back to the short incident log but long last here it is so I just want to ask you some more questions about how it how it comes to be made up
01:45:44 about how it how it comes to be made up you you said that it the messages are there they're inputted by controller operators and could you just help us even when it says informative and let's
01:45:58 even when it says informative and let's looking at Oh one 16:02 on page 17 yep and there's a list of information there what it what does that mean what what's informative so an informative message is
01:46:11 informative so an informative message is a message sent from the incident ground to inform control and other people monitoring the incident what's going on
01:46:22 monitoring the incident what's going on it's a structured message right and say that comes from the incident ground in that form or is that in that form in that form and is that that's by radio is it yes yeah usually if I write here
01:46:35 it yes yeah usually if I write here right
01:46:35 right I'd say the control operator records that somewhere yes they would record that and they would add that it's an informative message and they add the say
01:46:49 informative message and they add the say this up at the beginning in the SU P right so comes into the control room from the incident ground it comes over RT well we did well well it comes over the radio does it yeah and the radio
01:47:00 the radio does it yeah and the radio goes straight into the headset of the control room person yes so they they have a button on their radio right that they can push to talk and on the control
01:47:11 they can push to talk and on the control officers screen they will get a load alerted as to what course I'm right well she's to speak to them okay so the control room operator obviously can receive telephone calls from members of
01:47:24 receive telephone calls from members of the public yes such as the initial call it here but can also speak over the radio and receive radio messages yes what's the functionality that allows them to switch from one to the other they can so that would be in our X or
01:47:37 they can so that would be in our X or integrated communications system right however if you are a radio operator you are designated that for the whole shift so that task so you wouldn't necessarily then be a call handler as well right so
01:47:53 then be a call handler as well right so you would either do call handing and answering 999 calls or you would do the radio you wouldn't swap between the two no right so SAT sharing Darby 16 1 1602
01:48:07 no right so SAT sharing Darby 16 1 1602 she's on the radio yes ok and she gets the message over the radio on her headset
01:48:13 headset yes and she can type how does that recorded then she write it down in manuscript and then type it in or did you know in automatically and she would use what's known or what you've seen as
01:48:24 use what's known or what you've seen as a service request right and what is a service request so a service request is something on our own mobilizing system that allows the call
01:48:35 mobilizing system that allows the call takers and supervisors to share information with the radio operator and vice versa right a little bit lower down use a comment one 1818 p.m. use a
01:48:47 use a comment one 1818 p.m. use a comment what's the user comment so when an individual or control operator turns out an appliance or wants to add a comment and to a message box they would
01:49:00 comment and to a message box they would type it in right what they wanted so it's free text and if you can see one of the supervisors Pete May is turning out with message Informers ort so his
01:49:12 with message Informers ort so his patient officer the comment is system-generated to say it's a 6.5 Ariel's one and that's why he's been paged right and his comments he's written in forma so Artie okay we're
01:49:24 written in forma so Artie okay we're looking at the comment above that use a comment six pump fire arial times one high-rise procedure that information is already on the system because we've already got the make up yeah at 1:14 twelve to aerial and the informative
01:49:36 twelve to aerial and the informative message so what's the point of the user comment there that's because he's just paged an officer to inform him of that six pump fire so it would repeat it oh I
01:49:47 six pump fire so it would repeat it oh I see oh I see so it's going out yeah right
01:49:50 right I follow save the user comment and returning out of message cases as the same piece of information yeah and then
01:49:58 okay going through it just turning and will come to the detail I think later but turning to page 18 we see a tuo 131 38
01:50:18 turning to page 18 we see a tuo 131 38 service request pd service request created our t4g 271 yeah that's a record
01:50:33 created our t4g 271 yeah that's a record of what that is a record of one of our control officers and creating a service request and sending the message to the
01:50:44 request and sending the message to the radio RT for channel 4 and saying there's a further call to say the forest on the 20th floor now that information would have come to PD who inputted it
01:50:55 would have come to PD who inputted it into the system that information was created by yeah PD who put that into created a service request and added that information who is PD piece of daddy
01:51:07 is PD piece of daddy right Peter Tandy and he would have been on the he would have been on the radio no he was called take her on that night and he would have sent that so it's prefixed RT for to be sent to
01:51:19 so it's prefixed RT for to be sent to the radio channel for so there's a step oh I'm missing see Pete Peter daddy receives the message he's a call taker
01:51:31 receives the message he's a call taker so he does he handles the 999 call yes so he would have handled a 999 call where people were saying that there was fire on the 20th floor yes and that they were trapped right and he would have
01:51:42 were trapped right and he would have sent that message to sharon Darby on Rt 4 and so Sharon could then pass that on to
01:51:51 to the ICP right no let's just break that down a little bit if we can peep daddy takes the call he's on the call yes you
01:52:02 takes the call he's on the call yes you say he sends the message to Sharon Darby on our TV for how does he do that so he creates a service request on his screen on his screen while he's talking yes okay and he will type that information
01:52:14 okay and he will type that information into the service request right and so and it comes up on the screen looking like it does on the page of that no no it doesn't know he said it's a box with
01:52:25 it doesn't know he said it's a box with some drop-down menus and some free text spaces okay so he creates that request and then he sends it does he - Sharon Davi yes so he'll come he'll create the
01:52:37 Davi yes so he'll come he'll create the service request and and then on our mobile license system there is a list of all service requests so Sharon is on the radio
01:52:46 radio and will pick up any service request to P prefixed RT for oh I see I think I see sorry forgive me for taking this just a
01:52:59 sorry forgive me for taking this just a bit more slowly so he gets the information on the not on the by the telephone on the nine-nine he types in into them into the incident list but he's got on this screen as a
01:53:12 list but he's got on this screen as a service request yes he then sends that but by Teixeira Davi who's elsewhere in the incident room elsewhere in the control room yeah that
01:53:23 elsewhere in the control room yeah that he sends that remotely by computer does he
01:53:26 he yes then she has a screen and something comes up on her screen does it yes it comes up on all the control officer screen they all see the same information right okay but Sharon would have looked at that list and anything that was
01:53:37 at that list and anything that was pretty prefixed RT for that would have been for her I was a Selena came right to the resources on that channel and then what does she do when she sees that
01:53:50 then what does she do when she sees that message coming up from Pete daddy on her scream daughter she Dina says she will open that service request and and contact the incident and pass that
01:54:01 contact the incident and pass that information on right now
01:54:05 how does she do that so she's just looking at her screen she will see that a service request has appeared that it's prefixed rt4 says she will open up that
01:54:16 prefixed rt4 says she will open up that service request by clicking on it and she will call up the resources in attendance and pass the information and how does she pass that information on by
01:54:29 how does she pass that information on by radio okay and that's through her headset yes and what does she have to press to get we to get g27 ones and no she's contacting them so she can either
01:54:41 she's contacting them so she can either use a press or switch which is a foot pedal or she can press her ex screen right and communicate with them there's a foot pedal is that yes okay and so you
01:54:54 a foot pedal is that yes okay and so you but you by pressing the foot pedal that makes the radio live there's the radio okay all you could do it on the screen anything is that a touchscreen yes I see and that then makes the radio light and then what does Shannon say it would
01:55:08 then what does Shannon say it would depend who she was calling so in this sense she could say go for two seven one rush you could call them by their call sign you would use your call sign or the call sign that she's trying to contact and would she get a response or on
01:55:24 and would she get a response or on during normal incidents yes she would have right sure okay and when she's sending that message obviously in this example it says g27 one who decides
01:55:38 example it says g27 one who decides where to send that message to so Pete's daddy is the call taker would have put on the it's a message to go to Artie for them to go to Gulf 271 so the call
01:55:51 them to go to Gulf 271 so the call operated their control operator would have decided that so that call handler yeah and how would Pete daddy know that the message should go to 271 and they
01:56:03 the message should go to 271 and they would always tend to send it to the instant command pump so maybe at one time Pete has heard that the incident commander
01:56:11 commander pump is 271 and and hasn't heard that it's been updated since then giving the time right okay we gotta come to that I think in due course but the destination
01:56:24 think in due course but the destination of a radio message over RT for by the radio operator depends upon the state of knowledge of what the incident command pump is by the call handler creating the
01:56:35 pump is by the call handler creating the service request is no I've just said that it's not right so not necessarily so Sharon would have looked at the the request and because she was on the radio
01:56:46 request and because she was on the radio she would have known that the incident command pump had changed right so she wouldn't have given that to go over to 7:1 okay I mean at this point oh one 3138 I mean there's a question mark as
01:56:58 3138 I mean there's a question mark as to whether it had to change we can look at that but just in just in general terms is is it it sounds as if in the principal source of the information
01:57:10 principal source of the information about the right pump or command unit to send radio messages to through RT four would be the call handler and not a radio operator yeah I was if they wanted
01:57:24 radio operator yeah I was if they wanted to pass a message to the incident they would tend to choose the incident command pump to send it to Ed right if they knew it if it had been declared now we see various requests service requests
01:57:37 we see various requests service requests created service requests updated yes service requests in progress yes what's the difference between updated and in progress so when you
01:57:48 updated and in progress so when you create a service request you're the first person to create it and you will put in the details you want it goes into the list and then a supervisor or a control operator would pick it up and
01:58:00 control operator would pick it up and mark it in progress so no one else undertook those actions in the control room and then once they had completed it they would mark it's completed on completely whatwhat does that mean so that means the task has been before
01:58:13 so that means the task has been before performed so if our own rt4 after she's picked up service requests and she would have been marked it's completed once that message
01:58:25 marked it's completed once that message was passed on okay just by way of an example and it is only an example if I can ask you to look at page 19 we can see at 1:40 47 my stress
01:58:41 page 19 we can see at 1:40 47 my stress this is only an example service request created
01:58:58 excuse me I've got this one wrong but but I gotta take this one anyway service requested 140 135 is probably a better example service request completed 2 CH 4
01:59:12 example service request completed 2 CH 4 as channel 4 on the ceiling G 271 purses on the 22nd floor Schmitt coming into flat
01:59:19 flat what does completed mean in that context there it means that we would have passed that message to the incident ground to the channel full party for so so and who
01:59:32 the channel full party for so so and who inputs that message into the system the completed message so it's generated automatically once Sharon would have clicked on a completed button ok so that
01:59:44 clicked on a completed button ok so that would be the radio operator or the quartz sorry the radio operator ok so I think I've got this it in general terms is this right the call comes in the
01:59:56 is this right the call comes in the message is then sent by the call handler to the radio operator remotely in the way you've described the radio operator then sends a message to the incident ground both but by voice by pressing the
02:00:11 ground both but by voice by pressing the pedal or operating the screen and then speaking and then when that person is satisfied that the message has gone to the incident ground it says complete it then so it automatically generates a
02:00:23 then so it automatically generates a completed she will mark a button that says completed and it'll automatically generates on that incident okay mister stage say so he or she he will or expressly marketers completely at the
02:00:36 expressly marketers completely at the moment when they mark it as completed do they have confirmation back from the incident ground that the message has been received and understood yes how does that come that message so that
02:00:47 does that come that message so that would be in the radio transmission so that would have been Sharon would have called up past that message on and they would have confirmed that message so can we take you that in every case where we
02:00:58 we take you that in every case where we see and service message completed in this incident log the message that was created was not just sent but received and understood and
02:01:09 but received and understood and confirmed back to the control room yes right okay say so and how would that
02:01:21 right okay say so and how would that message come back to the control room from the incident ground of the outgoing message received right and that would be recorded on the
02:01:33 right and that would be recorded on the main screen radio yes would there be any case where you would complete a service message without having an express confirmation from the incident ground
02:01:46 confirmation from the incident ground that the message wouldn't had been received like that there could be occasions and and if we're looking specifically I believe that we had a different method of communication so we were talking on a mobile phone and not
02:01:59 were talking on a mobile phone and not passing information through over the radio at a certain period of time so Sharon might have Martin is completed and but we had we would have already
02:02:10 and but we had we would have already passed the information through a mobile phone right the information that we see on the short incident log here they that's coming up on the incident list in
02:02:21 that's coming up on the incident list in the control room and would also be visible to the radio operator in the control room as I think you said yeah would that be accessible to anybody on the incident ground no so if the
02:02:36 the incident ground no so if the incident commander for example Mike down here is the watch manager wanted to know what was on the vision system could he do so no right
02:02:48 vision system could he do so no right what if the officer in attendance was a station manager would he have or she have better access to that yeah okay what about in the command unit the
02:03:00 what about in the command unit the command unit does take a feed from vision right but I believe it's about personnel in attendance and informative messages I'm not the expert on on CS
02:03:12 messages I'm not the expert on on CS oh I know it takes a feed but I don't know what they did takes right but you think it doesn't take the full picture of the vision log no as per this short
02:03:26 of the vision log no as per this short incident on we've got yes right yes me yes meaning no yes you agree with me it doesn't I do it right okay now that was
02:03:37 doesn't I do it right okay now that was we're going to come back to this document but that that's very helpful so far thank you
02:03:48 can I didn't go back to the facilities at Merton as opposed to Stratford yes what facilities did Stratford not have
02:04:01 what facilities did Stratford not have that Merton did have do you know so we have at all that Merton control put a data capture tour DCT we refer to it
02:04:13 data capture tour DCT we refer to it it's a standalone system and and it enables some of our supervisors to view an overview of London and to see during
02:04:25 an overview of London and to see during an incident if they need to make some cover moves to ensure that we've got sufficient fire cover right I see so we didn't have that Stratford
02:04:38 I see so we didn't have that Stratford on the night okay and what does that I think you've explained it that that is this right it tells you where you need to provide extra cover tonight that will show and
02:04:51 extra cover tonight that will show and where our fire cover is lacking and that we need to send standby appliances there to cover so it's to smooth out demand yes okay and anything else anything else
02:05:02 yes okay and anything else anything else that doesn't have that it has a television and we don't have access to the heli telly in structural control but
02:05:15 the heli telly in structural control but it is available downstairs at Stratford in okay coordination centre right and actually it's very hard to get it
02:05:26 actually it's very hard to get it linking to our control room at the moment I had it anything yes into you into Merton controller ways that it's available upstairs in our
02:05:37 that it's available upstairs in our Brigade Coordination Center but not available on our TV feeds right and at Stratford same say yes in general terms was that a was that a problem on
02:05:49 terms was that a was that a problem on the night
02:05:49 the night why didn't notice that it was a problem and we had one of our radios and linked in with the police helicopter that was
02:06:00 in with the police helicopter that was up so we heard traffic from them yes
02:06:11 can I just ask you to
02:06:17 look at the notes that were taken of the debrief the control room debrief that
02:06:30 debrief the control room debrief that were taken at the in the aftermath of the fire and these are at tab 54 of the
02:06:44 the fire and these are at tab 54 of the documents bundle and this is lfb quadruple zero three one one three I'm going to come back to this document a few times during your discussion but I
02:06:56 few times during your discussion but I just want to shave this this is a manuscript often it's up there on the screen there is also a typed version of it which is slightly shorter first of all just in general terms do
02:07:08 first of all just in general terms do you remember attending a control debrief meeting on the 24th of July 2007 and 17 yes I did
02:07:15 yes I did and we could see who was in the chair Andy Hearn and I say IMS max dis in the Archy and the attendees there no I think the fourth one down J Smith senior Operations Manager do you know who who
02:07:33 Operations Manager do you know who who took these notes who's writing this is why don't I don't recall this isn't your writing yeah okay and in the top right hand corner there's a
02:07:45 in the top right hand corner there's a signature which I'm guessing is Andy Hearn but can you help with that no that's okay gain on to page four
02:08:06 of this document 3/4 of the way down
02:08:14 it's a timeline that three-quarters of the way down just after Oh to a six major incident declared fire cover p.m. a difficult at Stratford without IT
02:08:25 a difficult at Stratford without IT available in version or it could be without it available in mercy help me what was that de Scott do you remember a discussion on that subject yes that was referring to the DCT that's
02:08:39 yes that was referring to the DCT that's the DCT yeah do you remember what was can you help what what was difficult at Stratford without the DCT available so I would imagine people defend that
02:08:50 would imagine people defend that difficult to not have a visible talk that he could just glance at to see what fire cover needs to be put in place I see and it goes on with carried out with
02:09:02 see and it goes on with carried out with paper straight map straightening experience was what was carried out so salty now and working out which resources need to go into which stations
02:09:13 resources need to go into which stations to provide it overall fire cover London right
02:09:16 right whilst the incident progressed okay and climb and ask you to look at different
02:09:27 climb and ask you to look at different documents which is at ad 30 of our documents bundle which is the InP report of the lfb reference
02:09:41 is the InP report of the lfb reference for advance is LF b quadruple zero three one one four you've got it up there on the screen already come over sausage
02:09:52 the screen already come over sausage look please at first page three lines up from the bottom
02:10:01 it was sorry before I show you that Richard I Sasuke are you familiar with this document yes can you just explain in in general terms of what it is so the InP is add a space where and all
02:10:17 so the InP is add a space where and all staff I believe so it usually occurs after an incident where people have comments that they want to that and that they want to add to that and it's an operational database where you can
02:10:29 operational database where you can highlight trends and plant issues and good practice as well okay and at the top it says under general comments and then comment you can see there are two
02:10:43 then comment you can see there are two references to PLC one third of July chaired by John George and then the second one is PR OC covering the actions carried out by control staff held for 24th of July 272 2017 at the RAC and and
02:10:57 24th of July 272 2017 at the RAC and and that I think is a reference to the meeting for which we've just seen the manuscript dates is yes deficit that was a PRC we have it at control okay and rely three entries up from the bottom
02:11:13 it says this the control fullback facilities at Stratford should replicate those at the LSE Merson can you help with that
02:11:23 with that in what ways didn't they replicate so I believe that's referring to items like DCT having access to the heli tele right
02:11:34 DCT having access to the heli tele right and that's anything else and not that I can recall but I wasn't the supervisor on the night so I'm sure they would they
02:11:45 on the night so I'm sure they would they might have an idea of more tools that they needed and then second line or second entry down on the second page it
02:11:57 second entry down on the second page it says there was no access to the helicopter down there he'll eat Elliot's traffic control vol bag review the equipment at our control fallback locations was it a problem on the night
02:12:09 locations was it a problem on the night of Stratford that you couldn't access the heli tele we we actually made a conscious decision not to put the normal TV on so the normal the news now during the incident
02:12:21 normal the news now during the incident I'm not sure if if hello telling would have been of use but again you would have to ask the supervisors if they would have found it helpful right okay
02:12:33 would have found it helpful right okay I'll come back to that the question of the television and in due course that the Merton control room has has two
02:12:45 the Merton control room has has two televisions I think yes and Stratford any has one is that right yes so Melton has 278 televisions right attached to the wall and Stratford has a 44 44 inch
02:12:58 the wall and Stratford has a 44 44 inch TV right there just on the side or more of the televisions that Merton and the single television that Stratford normally used for so one displays 24-hour news row News Channel and and
02:13:10 24-hour news row News Channel and and the other one at Merton is used for displaying information operational information what's the purpose of control room operators and supervisory
02:13:22 control room operators and supervisory staff having access to a 24-hour news channel and it's usually just an awareness piece and I can't say it's it's on in the background it's not
02:13:34 it's on in the background it's not watched obviously controllers are concentrating the focusing on their there well it's just it's background it's just background yeah because 24-hour news channels will read cover
02:13:45 24-hour news channels will read cover necessarily news that is relevant to the functions being carried out by the rooms so it's just backgrounds yes
02:14:00 in terms of this television is it normally useful to provide the control room with a visual picture of an incident as its unfolding it's not
02:14:12 incident as its unfolding it's not something that we used to at all so I would say it's not required no and there
02:14:23 would say it's not required no and there are witnesses or people who have given with the states to the inquiry and Alex Norman and Devon Adams who who do say that it would help them would have
02:14:35 that it would help them would have helped them to have had a picture of what was going on a grünfeld tower to see how the fire was escalating in order to be able to inform their advice that they were giving to callers that can you
02:14:49 they were giving to callers that can you comment on that yes I think that's them that could be true if Alex and and everyone believes that that would have made their decision making different but
02:15:00 made their decision making different but there was I believe I talked to some of the supervisors and there was a conscious decision not to turn on the television mainly because we were overwhelmed with
02:15:11 mainly because we were overwhelmed with talking to those corners and our control stuff we're talking to them trying to keep them calm trying to support them and in horrific circumstances um a number of us felt it was detrimental to
02:15:23 number of us felt it was detrimental to have that on the screen whilst they were talking to callers okay let me take that with just a little bit more slowly and first of all kaijus asked you to look at
02:15:35 first of all kaijus asked you to look at your statement to page five and I want to look at with you at the second paragraph where you you say the third
02:15:51 paragraph where you you say the third line throughout the night we had made a collective decision not to turn all any TVs to what sky or BBC news this was a conscious decision to remain objective
02:16:02 conscious decision to remain objective for the job in hand the last thing we wanted to do was to cause panic or distress to the staff members who are still talking to the residents inside the flats whilst the building burned say
02:16:15 the flats whilst the building burned say first of all was it was the television actually working yes because some witnesses in planning mr. Olaf says that he asked the officer of the watch why it
02:16:28 he asked the officer of the watch why it wasn't on and he was told that it was broken
02:16:30 broken oh I believe it was work he was working say say if he was told that it was broken was that effectively a white lie
02:16:41 broken was that effectively a white lie I didn't hear I didn't ever hear that conversation
02:16:48 was the television on at an earlier stage of the evening prior to the call-out the first call-out I wouldn't know obviously in the control
02:16:59 I wouldn't know obviously in the control room and then return I believe it wasn't on when I entered the controller okay it wasn't on when you enter the controller and then we've got a time roughly about two fifteen or so until 15
02:17:11 roughly about two fifteen or so until 15 yeah we'll come to that just in terms of your collective decision when you party to the collective decision not to turn the TV on yes you are Duke Anita could you just help help me
02:17:23 Duke Anita could you just help help me as how that decision was made at festival who was who was that discussed among I think it was discussed a bit the supervisors I definitely remember having that conversation with with Pete May and
02:17:35 that conversation with with Pete May and ask both raising concerns about showing those images on the TV okay were you were you yourself physically party to that discussion yes
02:17:46 physically party to that discussion yes where were you when when that discussion was taking place I think I was facing the Supervisory desk so you were in the control room so the controller said the television wasn't on when you arrived
02:17:58 television wasn't on when you arrived it's as it was stayed off as a result of this decision is that right yes okay
02:18:06 and at the time when the decision was made not to turn it on how much information did you have about what was actually happening at grenfell so as to
02:18:18 actually happening at grenfell so as to be able to inform you that watching it would be detrimental to your staff I believe at that time so it wasn't as I
02:18:29 believe at that time so it wasn't as I walked in the control room it would have been later on and in the night and and I believe that one of our operations managers or one of what a member of staff had already seen some of
02:18:41 member of staff had already seen some of the images on Twitter for us to know that that would have been had somebody prior to your arrival or possibly prior to your involvement in other words prior to your being paged made the decision
02:18:54 to your being paged made the decision not to turn the television on do you know that no I don't okay
02:19:01 I think one of the questions is how we're not looking at the video of the outside of the tower on fire not assist
02:19:13 outside of the tower on fire not assist the decision-making my controller and staff I think you might need to rephrase that mr. Wilander released two negatives in that question right thank you
02:19:29 I'll try and resistant confine it took to one wood looking at why wouldn't looking at the video or visual images of
02:19:40 looking at the video or visual images of the town on fire not help your staff in making the decisions they had to make I think I'm going for 12 days and haven't
02:19:51 think I'm going for 12 days and haven't had a double negative okay let me try again
02:19:53 again wouldn't it help to see the fact that our on fire again it's not something we used to seen images from the incident or having official of the incident we would
02:20:05 having official of the incident we would always use the communication sent over by the incident commander and as our judgement of what was happening at the incident and obviously we were in a
02:20:16 incident and obviously we were in a unique position talking directly to those callers in Greenville tower so we had a good idea of what was happening right without needing to view me and
02:20:29 right without needing to view me and cause further distress and given that because you've told us and we'll come back to the control room wasn't getting feedback messages about the conditions
02:20:41 feedback messages about the conditions in the tower from the incident ground why wouldn't why wouldn't looking at images of the TAF yourself over the television have helped you why wouldn't tell us why would help I think as I've
02:20:52 tell us why would help I think as I've already explained in my statement the decision was taken as a collective and we felt that we were talking to call us or our control officers were talking to callers relentlessly about their conditions we knew what the conditions
02:21:04 conditions we knew what the conditions were like everywhere and that they also didn't need to see that image okay
02:21:25 just going back to the question of of body control rooms yes it's a question I should have asked you earlier are you ok would you like if you like a break I'm fine
02:21:34 fine yeah body control rooms when a body control room like sorry or Northwest get
02:21:45 control room like sorry or Northwest get involved do they get some kind of briefing as to as to the stage in which the incident was reached no not necessarily because it happens dynamic
02:21:57 necessarily because it happens dynamic it happens really quickly so the first we'd know about it would be a telephone call from BT on our critical line which is separate from our X and our other
02:22:08 is separate from our X and our other communication systems and they would ring us and tell us that they've had callers in a queue for a period of time and that they were then starting to
02:22:19 and that they were then starting to divert them okay
02:22:24 so you get a call from BT on your on your critical line what is that critical line I think it's the the first we've heard about that so it's a telephone in the control room we
02:22:36 it's a telephone in the control room we have one at Merton at one at Stratford right that has a unique single number that we provide to BT and to the Metropolitan Police should they need to contact us urgently and we'll say to the
02:22:47 contact us urgently and we'll say to the body control rooms no the budget control rooms have a different number that they can access them like just xs/s right and
02:22:58 can access them like just xs/s right and can those body control rooms communicate directly with the incident ground or do they have to go through in this case Stratford yes they have to come into the control room directly talk to the
02:23:11 control room directly talk to the incident ground yes I see and how do they get their information about the incident so sometimes the BT operator would explain during a handover process the London are busy taking calls to an
02:23:25 the London are busy taking calls to an incident explain what that incident is before passing it on to the body control room I see okay and if there are updates from the incident such as the incident
02:23:40 from the incident such as the incident commander declares a major incident or a make up of pumps how does that information get fed back to the body
02:23:52 information get fed back to the body control rooms that would be by our control it wouldn't happen on every occasion I see okay and how would a body control room know about any updates from
02:24:04 control room know about any updates from the incident about for example a change in the advice being given by Stratford to come to callers so that would be to have to inform them I see okay um mr.
02:24:21 to have to inform them I see okay um mr. Chen I'm about to turn to a different topic but it may be useful to have a short break now if we can yeah a little bit longer to lunch that's convenient to you and to into the witness well how you
02:24:33 you and to into the witness well how you feeling would you like to have a short break now probably a good idea won't it will take ten minutes out then back with 25 to one please and they talk to anyone
02:24:44 25 to one please and they talk to anyone while you're these are evidences thank you very much I'd like to go to the UH trophies
02:24:56 25 to 1
02:25:07 you
02:35:54 it's mr. Chen
02:36:10 right three two carry on yes mr. millet before we get going again what's going to suit through in terms of timing before we break for lunch I'm very happy to finish at one o'clock but I will either who arrived at a natural break or
02:36:23 either who arrived at a natural break or an unnatural break but unnatural brakes work for me just as well all right yes I thank you very much Miss Smith can I go back to the question of buddy control
02:36:35 back to the question of buddy control rooms if I can and I want to do this by way of an example if I can could you be
02:36:46 way of an example if I can could you be shown please the operational response report which is an lfb report data the 24th of May and go to page 79
02:37:00 and 79 oh sorry internal 17 religious page 80 in the relativity document and Oh 1 48 exactly you see it says the Essex County Fire
02:37:14 you see it says the Essex County Fire and Rescue Service control room receive the 100th 1999 9 call in relation to grant felt our a CRO from Essex takes the call from an individual who is
02:37:25 the call from an individual who is inside Grenville tower flat 193 22nd floor call duration 1 minute and 12 seconds source vision just just in
02:37:36 seconds source vision just just in relation to that caller just help me with the process they take the call what does Essex then do with that call so
02:37:48 does Essex then do with that call so they would immediately ring London control and pass that information to us no just on that first of all you say they would ring London control would
02:37:59 they would ring London control would that be on a telephone or by radio and would that be to the dedicated line used for BT or to the dedicated line used for Essex they could use ether but they would I would imagine I would presume
02:38:10 would I would imagine I would presume they used our direct line that we have with our neighbouring brigade so they would have come up and on AREX they would have appeared as Essex fire brigade and we've looked at sorry we
02:38:22 brigade and we've looked at sorry we talked about North West we've now got Essex do they all have access to the same single line or to the each of their own dedicated lines our surrounding pharmacy services have they dedicated
02:38:35 pharmacy services have they dedicated line they each have their own there's a specific number for Essex a different specific number for Northwest yes ok and they would ring who would answer the telephone a control officer control okay
02:38:49 telephone a control officer control okay so would that be one of the IC to any control officer I'm not a supervisor supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was was busy right
02:39:00 everyone else was was busy right and would that call come through to a physical telephone sitting on a desk or would it come through it would come through the the X so the communication
02:39:12 through the the X so the communication system we use so just like any other 999 call from a caller yes it would just be labeled that it would be from i-65 brigades I see okay and and in terms of
02:39:27 brigades I see okay and and in terms of the message that Essex CRO or CR would pass on where would they record what they'd heard or how would they record
02:39:38 they'd heard or how would they record that so they would record that on their mobile icing system right and then they were telephone and they would pass a message over orally verbally to write to
02:39:51 message over orally verbally to write to London control at London control a control officer would create an incident right and put the details down their ethics were providing us and would Essex
02:40:05 ethics were providing us and would Essex be able to send the message that they've recorded electronically to you or would it be they would rely on the telephone never to rely on the telephone okay and then the operator at the other end of the telephone would then create a
02:40:17 end of the telephone would then create a service message in the same way as they would with any other 999 call yes so they they'd create an incident they complete the core collection form and create an instance of it and then add
02:40:28 create an instance of it and then add that instant to the main the larger incident that the citizen control room officer receiving information from Essex
02:40:39 officer receiving information from Essex was essentially getting the 999 callers information as second hand what is what safeguards or systems are there to ensure that that information is complete and accurate
02:40:53 well with regard to the first survival guidance course again the document 1093 still extent and if the national guidance document for all control staff right so they should they will be all
02:41:05 right so they should they will be all asking the same questions and following the same four principles that's my crap that was my next question said say thee so Stratford Control would assume that the Essex control room operator would be
02:41:18 the Essex control room operator would be asking the same questions and providing the same guidance that he or she would be in Stratford if they were taking the call direct that is that right yes okay and would that include establishing the
02:41:31 and would that include establishing the numbers of people in the flat yes I would imagine that they were too fast the number of people inside you say you would imagine is that because that's
02:41:42 would imagine is that because that's required by the policy the policy mentions it and asks for that so imagine they would have followed that process if they were talking it's only 1 minute and 12 seconds the call it's not that very
02:41:55 12 seconds the call it's not that very long and duration to get all that information out no no it's not and what about information in relation to children in the flat or persons with
02:42:06 children in the flat or persons with mobility difficulties or other physical difficulties well again when according to all the policy 1093 asks and if the
02:42:17 to all the policy 1093 asks and if the caller can't get out why can't they get out and pop that is if they have mobility issues or if it's just smoke maybe that's preventing them right so we do explore that area and if it isn't it
02:42:30 do explore that area and if it isn't it if it's a hypothesis but if a control and operator in Stratford had thought that the control room operator in Essex have not got enough information from the caller what would they do so they could
02:42:45 caller what would they do so they could ring that caller back and it's not something we do so it's just as I talked about earlier it's a historic thing when we used to have landlines so we would never bring a landline phone
02:42:57 we would never bring a landline phone and call Perth a person back into a potential burning or a fire and but nowadays with mobile phones we we do if we didn't have enough information if we wanted clarity on the address or a
02:43:11 wanted clarity on the address or a different issue we could phone the caller back if it was a mobile phone okay you've got the information in a second hand so Stratford would ring Essex back to say I need more
02:43:22 Essex back to say I need more information you haven't got enough or yeah would strive to be able to ring the caller direct its jackford will be able to bring the caller direct how would Stratford know which number to call so
02:43:33 Stratford know which number to call so in the call handling process when it's handed from BT the BT operator to fire control room they exchange the telephone number that the call is using right so
02:43:45 number that the call is using right so oh I see so is it is it the case that
02:43:49 whenever a 999 calls in a call comes in from outside into Stratford whether it's from direct from the caller or from a buddy control room you always get the
02:44:01 buddy control room you always get the number yes of the corner record so you would then immediately be able to cut out the buddy control room and be able to deal with the caller direct which is my father and after that call comes in
02:44:13 my father and after that call comes in from Essex with with whatever details the Essex control room has been able to take what does the control room officer at Stratford do the information was so
02:44:25 at Stratford do the information was so they would have created an incident with that information to make sure that's locked and depending on what information was passed by Essex they would have either passed that to the radio operator
02:44:37 either passed that to the radio operator for a service request if it needed to go to the incident or actioned it themselves if it needed an additional mobilization right and would Essex it's an example only the would Essex then
02:44:48 an example only the would Essex then drop out of the picture altogether or they stay involved no so they would know of doing not be involved in here okay and what if calls were being handled by bt without without a control room so
02:45:04 bt without without a control room so that that's that's a bt don't call handle bt will just put that past the call through to the library
02:45:17 past the call through to the library control room that's required what they do they are very helpful when they listen in they do provide obviously we had callers awaiting and and they're getting frustrated with waiting they do provide i believe some update as to
02:45:29 provide i believe some update as to what's happening at the incident because they've overheard and are exchanged with the callers on occasions yes would be t get involved with the call itself in
02:45:44 get involved with the call itself in terms of the advice being given to callers or information being taken from callers not on a normally isn't but I
02:45:55 callers not on a normally isn't but I believe on on the night before town they did become involved they did become involved yeah I just wanted to ask you just a question or two about that and if I can take you back to the control D book manuscript document that we looked
02:46:08 book manuscript document that we looked at earlier at FB quadruple zero three one one three and go to page four
02:46:21 this is four-fifths of the way down the page it says critical line police and BT taking FSG and then there's an asterisk
02:46:33 taking FSG and then there's an asterisk it says did not know guidance other FRS did no FSG guidance can you do you remember the discussion of the control
02:46:44 remember the discussion of the control debrief about that subject not really I could have I could assume what those comments meant but I can't remember the the specific discussion
02:46:55 the specific discussion do you remember yourself and he did particular difficulties encountered on the night because BT and the police as it says that didn't know guidance so I I
02:47:08 it says that didn't know guidance so I I don't recall ever talking to the police and and hearing the police pass back information to our control room but that wouldn't be unusual I do recall talking
02:47:19 wouldn't be unusual I do recall talking to BT throughout the night during that incident I believe they were updating us as to where they were sending calls I had a conversation with him about redirecting of calls to other
02:47:32 redirecting of calls to other authorities and not not to Northwest anymore and because I thought they were overrun as well and but I don't recall any concerns with with how they were
02:47:47 any concerns with with how they were handling the course I did speak to them after we changed the advice and told the residents to leave their properties and
02:47:59 residents to leave their properties and to let them know because we were still receiving a vast amount of course did you have any discussions with bt themselves about bt handling the calls in substance yeah
02:48:14 I'm gonna just finish this off petite so I think you're saying you you weren't aware of a problem created by the fact that bt didn't understand the far
02:48:25 that bt didn't understand the far survival guidance methods you know as I say you would have to speak to it's a busy operator but in my experience and
02:48:37 busy operator but in my experience and they are extremely helpful when we have spake conditions and such as flooding in a control room and we can approach them about asking specific questions and to
02:48:50 about asking specific questions and to try and shore callers that we will get to them on and if they're dealing with a flood that we are aware of it right and but we didn't implement that in the night but I'm sure when they were handing over to other pharmacy services
02:49:03 handing over to other pharmacy services they were briefing them about the situation that we were experiencing yes
02:49:16 just in yes you refer to speak conditions that's an accepted expression yes I think in the LFP for lots of FSG calls nine nine nine call lots of nine nine nine calls in a prolonged period of
02:49:28 nine nine calls in a prolonged period of time so it's a it's a national fire control room turn right and a surge in numbers is something that you as an som would have to assess it yes and at that
02:49:47 would have to assess it yes and at that stage would you then liaised with bt we're gonna spate conditions yes that would be normal practice would it be normal practiced when you did liaison bt to tell bt what the conditions were like inside the building as you knew them no
02:50:01 inside the building as you knew them no not necessarily um but they would have picked that up like I say they do hang on they do make sure our calls are connected to the right service so they would have they would have picked up from people talking to them themselves
02:50:12 from people talking to them themselves what the conditions were like right and during spate conditions would it be the case that bt operators with themselves be handling calls giving FSG advice I
02:50:27 be handling calls giving FSG advice I tend to happen with flooding so if we had a large amount of flooding being experienced in one area we would bring them we would tell them that obviously that we're receiving calls to a large
02:50:38 that we're receiving calls to a large amount of flooding and we would ask them maybe to ask that call us a couple of questions to assess the situation obviously we when a caller rings up it just forms in a queue on our X and and
02:50:52 just forms in a queue on our X and and we answer it systematically so we don't know if they're ringing for flooding or they're ringing for a fire or they've got someone trapped so again it's really
02:51:04 got someone trapped so again it's really answering every call as quickly as we can it's awesome thank you can I then ask you to
02:51:13 look at your statement we were talk about FSG now at page 2 of your statement you explain what effort and our survival guidance is halfway down a
02:51:27 our survival guidance is halfway down a page to a little paragraph and you say
02:51:39 that
02:51:45 the by reference to the training for there are four four key principles assessing the situation offering advice protecting the corner and providing rescue options those are the four
02:51:57 rescue options those are the four principles what determines when they call if they call it is it FSG so when the control officer is on the phone to a
02:52:09 the control officer is on the phone to a caller and the caller indicates that they cannot leave right there premises by regular means due to fire heat or smoke and that's that's the next
02:52:20 smoke and that's that's the next sentence of your of your statement is it you say these principles come into force once the caller has indicated that they cannot get out of their home yes okay and would you rely on the caller to tell
02:52:33 and would you rely on the caller to tell you that they're trapped and can't get out of their home or with the with the control officer asked them and probe with the caller as to how what what the conditions are like and then we can
02:52:45 conditions are like and then we can escape in my experience the majority of callers with volunteer that information if they couldn't leave their premise if they felt they couldn't leave right but we would also ask them ok can we look at
02:52:58 we would also ask them ok can we look at some policy 790 which is one of the two you referred to this morning and that's in tab 5 of the policies bundle
02:53:09 in tab 5 of the policies bundle far survival guidance calls reviewed as a current 17th of April 2014 and can I ask you to look at paragraph
02:53:20 and can I ask you to look at paragraph two first of all fast survival diamonds cool definition and it's set out there
02:53:32 cool definition and it's set out there and what I want just to focus on is peridot two point three responsibility rests with control to determine that FSG is taking place and not the fire ground the fire ground will determine whether
02:53:43 the fire ground will determine whether an incident should be treated as persons reported not control now
02:53:54 control and in determining that an FSG is taking place relize looks like on that only on the caller yes that's right
02:54:07 that only on the caller yes that's right it sets check and the fire grounded set determines whether an incident we treated as persons reported not control what's the difference between an FSG and
02:54:22 what's the difference between an FSG and persons reported so a first survival guidance call is that actually the control operator is talking to the color and it's maintaining contact with a caller provides an advice a person's
02:54:35 caller provides an advice a person's reported incident could be a call to a fire where a neighbor has mentioned that the caller or the occupier is still in the premise right and fire survival
02:54:49 the premise right and fire survival guidance calls can come from any kind of building can they doesn't need necessarily to be a high-rise yeah and it's it is it simply one where the caller believes that they can't leave
02:55:01 caller believes that they can't leave their premises due to the effects of fire yes heat or smoke okay that then defines it as it as an FSG yes okay and
02:55:13 defines it as it as an FSG yes okay and then what happens next just that what does the control room operator do when they know that they are dealing with a
02:55:24 they know that they are dealing with a fire survival guidance call say the person is unable unable to leave their premises due to the effects of fire smoke or heat so a number of actions and all at the same time they still need to
02:55:35 all at the same time they still need to get their location confirm their address they still need to mobilize the fire engines whilst talking to that corner and relay in any personal information so
02:55:46 and relay in any personal information so any information that the call has given them and I'm volunteering to them they will record on the incident log they will mobilize an additional attendants
02:55:59 will mobilize an additional attendants if you've heard about the NF SG attendants so they will mobilize that as well I see and in terms of the guidance can I just
02:56:10 and in terms of the guidance can I just ask you to look at a different policy which is tap three this is the other one you mentioned this morning policy five three nine and go to appendix three in
02:56:23 three nine and go to appendix three in fact sorry that we will start with the introductory paragraph which is at the bottom of page 11 I'm so sorry which is paragraph 5.19 fire Survival Guide once
02:56:35 paragraph 5.19 fire Survival Guide once there at the bottom of the page detailed information advice and guidance for controlling officers are set out in accordance with fire service circular 1093 appendix a a guidance can be and
02:56:49 1093 appendix a a guidance can be and also be found in appendix 3 of this policy and reference information files spire survival guidance say that is in
02:57:00 spire survival guidance say that is in this policy and this policy is current as of March 2014 my first question is was that revised after latinum house yes
02:57:12 was that revised after latinum house yes in what way was was that part revised we reiterated the principles of fire service circular the four principles we've covered recurring and we provided
02:57:24 we've covered recurring and we provided additional questioning and the control officers could use right okay so just taking this instead in stages like if we go to appendix 3 which
02:57:35 stages like if we go to appendix 3 which is introduced by paragraph 590 that's on page 16 of this policy and
02:57:44 could you just help me identify the guidance that's supposed to be given I think it's I think am i right in thinking that we pick it up at the third paragraph down brigade control advised
02:57:57 paragraph down brigade control advised callers to get out and stay out and then however if a call is received from a high-rise building where fire heat and smoke are not affecting the caller LFP would advise that and then
02:58:11 caller LFP would advise that and then there's there's something underneath that it but it says you are usually safest to remain in your premises and less affected by fire heat or smoke if the situation changes you should leave
02:58:23 the situation changes you should leave your premises and down nine nine nine if you need further assistance and there's a visible it is a quote to mark I think at the end although there isn't at the beginning leaving aside the punctuation that sentence is that what we would call
02:58:39 that sentence is that what we would call stay put advice and yes you have referred to it as stay fit advice so in policy 1093 as I say my statement that
02:58:50 policy 1093 as I say my statement that whilst it provides assists and principles an assessment it's a situation and protection advice the rescue options are only for domestic
02:59:03 rescue options are only for domestic dwelling fires domestic dwelling buildings one floor so it tells the instructs the operator how to break a window and and how to provide advice to
02:59:16 window and and how to provide advice to that caller to lower themselves and from a first-floor window but it doesn't cover any protects or any rescue advice from a high-rise building all right but
02:59:28 from a high-rise building all right but the document does refer to their a form in those situations we would follow national government guidance for individuals living in high-rise premises
02:59:39 individuals living in high-rise premises which I believe is that statement okay now it's really the question of how far the high-rise qualification goes I think
02:59:50 the high-rise qualification goes I think you're saying it does apply to the advice which starts you're usually safest to remain premises that we're just highlighting now yes
02:59:58 now yes yes and then there's a bit underneath it which they should the call to be unable to escape an information file containing prompts are in place on the computer-aided mobilising system to assist the controller and officer in one
03:00:12 assist the controller and officer in one providing guidance to assist the call of a safety to provide timely and relevant information to the attending resources and three provide reassurance to the caller that help and assistance is
03:00:23 caller that help and assistance is forthcoming is that applicable to all buildings or just to high-rise buildings to all building buildings so it cannot
03:00:35 to all building buildings so it cannot just care if I eat this the call it beyond I'm just able to escape yes it's all built in yes it's for all building yeah okay but it would also apply in relation to high-rise buildings yes so
03:00:46 relation to high-rise buildings yes so you it might it be the case that there's a fire elsewhere in your high-rise building normally your safest to stay put but if but if you're if you're unable to escape then there are prompts
03:01:00 unable to escape then there are prompts yes now what would determine whether you are safest to remain in your premises sorry the artists start again for a
03:01:11 sorry the artists start again for a control room officer sitting in Stratford what would determine whether a caller was safest to remain or should be escaping if they were not affected by
03:01:24 escaping if they were not affected by fire heat or smoke right if they are affected by fire-eater smoke
03:01:32 what then determines whether they should be seeking to escape or not seeking to escape so if they felt that they
03:01:44 escape so if they felt that they couldn't leave the premises due to smoke right Oh fire okay so is this should the caller be unable to escape it is
03:01:57 caller be unable to escape it is addressing what is it addressing a situation where the caller is affected by heat or smoke I don't get that I cannot leave right what feels that they cannot leave you know okay no that that
03:02:08 cannot leave you know okay no that that that questioned affected by fire heat or smoke it is a question of degree isn't it requiring a judgment on the part of
03:02:21 it requiring a judgment on the part of the control room officer operator no I think we we would assume the judgment of the caller that says that they couldn't leave because of
03:02:32 says that they couldn't leave because of the smoke it kind of felt unsafe leaving okay how would a caller know whether they were affected badly enough by smoke heat or fire to to take them in to
03:02:45 heat or fire to to take them in to escape territory I I don't think they would they would have just had a visible picture of what and they would have felt that they they couldn't leave building because of the smoke I see
03:03:00 does the policy and say anything about how to assess escape routes before the
03:03:13 how to assess escape routes before the control room operator is able to give FSG advice so I think as part of the initial assessment and if a call has volunteered that they can't leave the premise you you could ask them if they
03:03:26 premise you you could ask them if they had an alternative means of escape that would be pretty wearing some most tower blocks and would the control room operator be dependent upon the caller
03:03:38 operator be dependent upon the caller making the assessment about the available alternative routes very much so very much so and with that they mean that the burden was on the caller to
03:03:49 that the burden was on the caller to look outside their flat at the corridor or lobby before making that assessment now so I think that just refers to
03:04:00 now so I think that just refers to sometimes in a in a panic if you think about it semester house people forget and because they're in a you know unusual situation and they they tend to panic that actually they've got another
03:04:12 panic that actually they've got another alternative excellent exit outside the back door or something like that so it's a control operator prompt just to try and remind them that they might have well it's not asking them to explore and
03:04:23 well it's not asking them to explore and put themselves into a dangerous situation it's just trying to remind them is the rest day is there anything in the policy which assists control room operators to Asit to help themselves or
03:04:37 operators to Asit to help themselves or to help the caller make an assessment about the safety of an alternative escape route no was that an issue that
03:04:48 escape route no was that an issue that arose at latinum house that the alternative escape routes the means of assessing the safety of an alternative
03:04:59 assessing the safety of an alternative escape route was that an issue that arose it back up yes it was and given that it was an issue that arose it lack nor do you know why there's nothing in the in this policy about how a control
03:05:13 the in this policy about how a control room operator would help themselves or help the caller make that assessment do you know where there's nothing in the policy about that so to be clear and we forgot to that acknowledged and that's
03:05:25 forgot to that acknowledged and that's why we introduced the reassessment so again there was nothing about assisting an individual out of an alternative exit it was about reassessing the situation or some of them to keep updated on the
03:05:40 or some of them to keep updated on the conditions right
03:05:45 why has the document not changed or why has not been added and I think we've as a group of fire control room officers
03:05:56 a group of fire control room officers across the country I believe and try to update the survivor agreement obviously it's dated in 1993 and technology has moved on as have our procedures yeah so
03:06:10 moved on as have our procedures yeah so we have been them and we will continue to try and get it changed and updated okay but at the moment that's the extent guidance that we should follow
03:06:24 yeah and we can see the rest of the questions for to set out on the under that appendix and I'm interested in the
03:06:35 that appendix and I'm interested in the first one it's escape process protect and rescue before I go on I'm so sorry I should just say it's just gone one
03:06:46 should just say it's just gone one o'clock mr. chairman well just the time then can you sort of finish this line of questioning I think these must break at 1:15 in any
03:06:57 I think these must break at 1:15 in any event we will turn alright are you all right to go on for about five minutes yes thank you all right now in appendix 3 it says octave below halfway down
03:07:08 3 it says octave below halfway down control room officers will always use the four principles of escape assess protect and rescue to provide guidance to these callers firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe
03:07:19 the caller to help identify a safe alternative escape route for them to leave their premises now in that assessment I'm sorry to focus back on it how would a control room officer help
03:07:30 how would a control room officer help the caller to identify in a safe alternative escape route so they would ask if they had an alternative exit what if they could leave by any other means
03:07:41 if they could leave by any other means and supposing alternative escape routes of supposing there is only one escape
03:07:52 of supposing there is only one escape route but the caller doesn't know whether it's safe to use it or not what happens then then I think whilst they were talking on
03:08:03 then I think whilst they were talking on the telephone to us that they would say they didn't feel it was safe so we would assess the situation and try and protect them
03:08:14 and then you've got if this is not possible assess the situation by asking the caller direct questions and we can set those you see those as set out
03:08:30 and and then it says protect a caller by providing current fire safety advice what sort of thing would that be current
03:08:41 what sort of thing would that be current fire safety advice so that would be a list of questions I don't know if they run to example so it would be about moving to the farthest room away from the fire or the smoke and just close the
03:08:56 the fire or the smoke and just close the doors in between the fire no smoke to stop the smoke from coming in around the door frames to put down towels or blankets to open a window if they could
03:09:07 blankets to open a window if they could get fresh air into their room to get down low if the smoke was coming into them the compartment that they were in to cover their mouths with a wet cloth and then reassure the caller and
03:09:21 and then reassure the caller and reassess the caller situation yeah in terms of reassuring the caller what would what would control room operators normally do or be trained to do so to
03:09:34 normally do or be trained to do so to reassure the corners to keep them updated on the situation so I think that they would say it's like we're on the way the fire engines are on the way the firefighters are on the way they're they're working just in terms of the
03:09:48 they're working just in terms of the firefighters are there in the building
03:09:53 that reassurance is it the case that that reassurance would depend on up-to-date information coming back from the incident ground from the building to
03:10:05 the incident ground from the building to the control room not necessary for firefighters we know when the firefighters are in attendance it is true that we don't know but what floors
03:10:16 true that we don't know but what floors they are what actions they're carrying out in the building but we would confirm with the caller and trying to reassure them that the fire crews are they we wouldn't necessarily need to hear
03:10:27 wouldn't necessarily need to hear anything back from the incident to use that phrase but all you would know is this right is that the the firefighters are at the premises you wouldn't know more precisely where they
03:10:39 wouldn't know more precisely where they were in the premises or how close they were to the apartment where the caller was yeah so in terms of giving you the reassurance is it the case that that reassurance is actually based on quite limited information I think it's it's
03:10:53 limited information I think it's it's based on the fact that in most incidents and especially the majority of our fire survival guidance calls that we take the firefighters are there and have made
03:11:06 firefighters are there and have made contact with the caller within 10 minutes of us being on the telephone to them sure I understand and then reassessing the caller situation we've got some questions that are there set
03:11:17 got some questions that are there set out
03:11:23 to what extent would the answers to those questions be based on the assessment made by the caller him or herself in in the room or flat or
03:11:34 herself in in the room or flat or building weather firewalls so that would be all the we would rely on the caller passing that information to us and how reliable with that information be given that the caller might be in a state of
03:11:46 that the caller might be in a state of panic or shock yes it's true they might be but that's our only source of information that we could gauge how that instant is progressing and what we need
03:11:57 instant is progressing and what we need to pass on to the incident ground and if we need to try and protect them some more and/or assist the caller with rescue and what if that person is
03:12:09 rescue and what if that person is somebody for whom English was not a first language with regard to regard indeed their ability to communicate a clear rational objectives a set of
03:12:21 clear rational objectives a set of information that would enable the control-room officer to make a an adequate reassessment so we could use a system called language line that we have and but that is quite long-winded and in
03:12:34 and but that is quite long-winded and in most circumstances when people are asking for fire survival guidance and that would be too long of a delay and to manage to get an interpreter onto the line and but we were trying to speak as
03:12:45 line and but we were trying to speak as clearly and concisely as possible sometimes often asking if there's anybody else that could communicate clearer with us the phone it is something I'll control stuff I used to they take over usually a quarter
03:12:58 used to they take over usually a quarter of a million calls from Londoners a year right so in summary is it the case that a control room officer who's handling a survival guidance call is very much
03:13:11 survival guidance call is very much dependent upon the clarity and quality of the information given by the caller and very much not able to depend upon information given by the firefighters on
03:13:24 information given by the firefighters on the scene
03:13:24 the scene so I'd say that with every 909 come we are very much dependent on what the caller tells us what their assessment of the situation is where they believe that they are on the location and what's going on into the incident that happens
03:13:36 going on into the incident that happens on every occasion Madison it's a convenient moment I think it's very convenient yes thank you mister we're going to break now until quarter past two and don't talk to anyone about your
03:13:48 two and don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything relating to it now please
03:13:51 please over the break and if you'd like to give the usher will you look after you Thanks thank you very much thanks very much
03:14:08 2:15 please
03:14:19 you