LFB control room supervisor testimony on Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) policy, communications between control and incident ground, and decision-making processes during high-rise fires. Key admission: policy requiring control-incident ground liaison was 'never tested' before Grenfell.
00:01:04 [Music]
00:01:20 [Music]
00:02:21 [Music]
00:04:36 [Music]
00:05:10 [Music]
00:12:02 [Music]
00:12:20 yes sir it will the witness will be along in a second I think right
00:12:42 right yes yes mr. min thanks for coming coming back we were on the subject of fire Survival guidance calls and I'm going to come back to that subject in a
00:12:54 going to come back to that subject in a moment and explore it in some more detail by reference to policy before I do can I just take a very short detour back to a subject we were looking at the for lunch which was calls and how they're recorded admin calls our
00:13:07 they're recorded admin calls our telephone conversations yes I think and those admin calls are between is this right between Brigade Mobile in the control room and another telephone no no
00:13:21 control room and another telephone no no no we gave mobile sorry just a telephone call from it Brigade control or being received by Brigade control not through a nine nine nine nine I see sorry I've
00:13:34 a nine nine nine nine I see sorry I've already introduced a confusion I'm sorry about that so a an admin call is this is a lattice landline to landline in control yes in controller okay so
00:13:46 control yes in controller okay so there's a specific telephone set is there in Brigade control there's some specific telephone numbers connected to or X there are four admin use right and
00:14:01 or X there are four admin use right and who would have access to those all control staff who logged on to the mobilizing system okay and to those admin calls where a call is made on an admin line would they include calls made
00:14:16 admin line would they include calls made to or from that admin telephone from a mobile yes so if somebody was calling Brigade
00:14:27 so if somebody was calling Brigade control on that number from a robot it would be an admin call em would be recorded yes right and similarly a call from that from Brigade control on that
00:14:39 from that from Brigade control on that line with to a mobile would also be recorded yes that's great now we've got some evidence I think to come from mr. olive and mr. maryk yesterday
00:14:51 from mr. olive and mr. maryk yesterday gave evidence about phone calls he was receiving on a mobile that was attached to his belt yes of those admin calls or
00:15:03 to his belt yes of those admin calls or would they be different so I believe um Jason Ali was using his personal or his Brigade issue mobile phone right to make
00:15:14 Brigade issue mobile phone right to make contact with the command unit yes and then there would have been two reasons for that
00:15:19 for that I he wouldn't have been able to log on to our telephone system in control because it's just the control room operator access so he wouldn't have been
00:15:32 operator access so he wouldn't have been able to direct Dahl to one of the command units or to the instance in ground using that method and secondly and I think he was tasked by om Norman
00:15:44 and I think he was tasked by om Norman and to pass on that information it is very quick by voice and also with him doing it
00:15:50 doing it it freed up one control officer to remain taking 909 calls right and just in terms of the equipment available in the command unit or in any command units
00:16:03 the command unit or in any command units yeah we heard mr. maryk speak of his mobile his mobile but is there also a telephone in the command unit yes I
00:16:14 telephone in the command unit yes I believe so and we have the command unit to the phone numbers on our mobilising system so we can darlin right and uh those mobile network telephones are there a
00:16:25 mobile network telephones are there a radio telephone mobile network telephones and does the command unit or a c'mon unit unit also have a main scheme radio yes I see so if I was in a
00:16:38 scheme radio yes I see so if I was in a command unit and I wanted to make a call-out or receive a call in from brigade control it could be done is this right in through one of three routes
00:16:49 right in through one of three routes mobile to mobile such as Olaf to mer yes rt4 for the radio the radio or brigade telephone to command you at
00:17:03 brigade telephone to command you at telephone through the designated number yes okay and that that's common practice that an incident when a command unit is on say we would call the command unit direct and speak to them and of those
00:17:15 direct and speak to them and of those three methods of communication which ones are recorded the radio traffic yes that would go and the the admin call
00:17:27 that would go and the the admin call dialing out from our X so the command unit right and finally on this question of communications and recording if a senior officer used his or her air wave
00:17:39 senior officer used his or her air wave radio to speak to another senior officer on their air wave radio would that be recorded no can I turn them back to the
00:17:50 recorded no can I turn them back to the question of stay put and I'll show you a document you may or may not have seen before can I ask you to turn to tab 28 or lfb quadruple zero one nine zero five
00:18:03 this is a document called organizational overview produced by the London Fire Brigade on the 9th of April 2018 can I ask you first of all miss Smith
00:18:15 can I ask you first of all miss Smith are you are you familiar with this document yes I have seen it you've seen it did you have any any part in compiling it no okay um can I ask you to turn to page 9 page 8 internally page 9
00:18:29 turn to page 9 page 8 internally page 9 of the relativity reference and look at paragraph
00:18:32 paragraph 8
00:18:36 I think the page before since page 8 eternally page 9 that's it and under paragraph 8 you can see the rubric stay put and fire survival guidance I just
00:18:49 put and fire survival guidance I just want to show you the first two paragraphs 8 1 & 8 2 then it says the stay put
00:18:55 stay put the stay put and fire survival guidance that FSG advice is normally provided by brigade control staff when a caller indicates that they are trapped by a fire and are unwilling to leave the property without assistance the advice
00:19:08 property without assistance the advice given in these circumstances is based upon the nap established national stay put principles which are predicated on the expectation that a residential high-rise premises are constructed and
00:19:19 high-rise premises are constructed and maintained in accordance with statutory fire safety and Building Control requirements and then you've got a reference to the National stay put
00:19:30 reference to the National stay put policy in the local government group guidance which i think is gr a three point two and it says it's takes para twelve point one page 20 but when a fire
00:19:42 twelve point one page 20 but when a fire occurs within one dwelling or less likely in the common pass it is normally safe for other residents to remain within their own flat this principle is undoubtedly successful in an overwhelming number of fires in blocks
00:19:53 overwhelming number of fires in blocks of flats now first of all I mean I obviously are not familiar with this document so I'm not going to ask you about the document but I just want to ask you about the principles my first
00:20:04 ask you about the principles my first question is do you agree from your experience with what is set out there in paragraph 8.1 I would have rephrase that a different way and made it a bit
00:20:16 a different way and made it a bit clearer so I would have said fire Survival Guide and services provided by Brigade Control but when a caller indicates they are trapped by fire and I'm willing to leave the property and with regard to high-rise the question
00:20:29 with regard to high-rise the question that is on our policy 539 that you are usually safer if you're not affected by hot fire heat or smoke but if the situation changes call us back rather
00:20:42 situation changes call us back rather than
00:20:43 than closing it as a stay put blanket stay put
00:20:46 put advice that's very helpful thank you that's quite it that's very helpful um
00:20:56 so I think you're saying that it actually that the move from stay put to evacuate is a is a more subtle case specific one yes right what is your
00:21:11 specific one yes right what is your understanding of what advice should be given to callers who calls from a high-rise blog once the control room operator knows that compartment ation
00:21:24 operator knows that compartment ation has been compromised elsewhere in the blog elsewhere in the block yes I would say the advice would remain the same that we would speak to the caller we
00:21:35 that we would speak to the caller we would assess the situation we would ask if they have been affected by fire heat or smoke we would ask if they could leave the premise and they would normally say that they couldn't because
00:21:46 normally say that they couldn't because of smoke in the corridor or another means that stopping them leaving and then we would give advice and try and protect the caller right and that would
00:21:58 protect the caller right and that would depend depend then again on the assessment being made by the caller as to the conditions they were experiencing yes rather than on anything known or seen or heard by the control room
00:22:11 seen or heard by the control room officer CRA yes that would be on information from the caller so even though and a change or moved to a different room or try a different tactic
00:22:22 different room or try a different tactic would depend on what the caller was saying to the control operator about the conditions within their premise right now given what you've said about how you might change or qualify paragraph 8.1
00:22:34 might change or qualify paragraph 8.1 this question I'm about to ask you is hypothetical but nonetheless I'd like to get your your experience if you can help me with it and what would a control room
00:22:46 me with it and what would a control room officer advised a caller who was calling and saying well I'm not at the moment affected by heat smoke or fire in
00:22:57 affected by heat smoke or fire in but-but-but-but-but the cop at the control room operator knows that the fire is spreading very rapidly through the building what happened then so the advice would be that you're usually
00:23:08 advice would be that you're usually safer to remain where you are and but if the situation changes then da 909 and call us back right so the change in the situation would be again coming back to the same point something to be assessed
00:23:20 the same point something to be assessed by the caller yes not by the control room operation yeah right Kai just take you back then to paragraph eight point
00:23:31 you back then to paragraph eight point two of this document we're still on and the reference there to the local government group guidance fire safety and purpose-built lots of flats they usually I should ask you directly are you familiar with that local government
00:23:42 you familiar with that local government group diamonds I don't know when that was updated I'm familiar of the local government guidance which was issued in 2009 after the lackin or litigation 2006
00:23:57 2009 after the lackin or litigation 2006 to 2011 okay we may be we may be looking at the same thing you may not can I just ask you them to be show the GRA generic
00:24:09 ask you them to be show the GRA generic risk assessment of 3.2 tab 7 of the policies bundle which is LFP quadruple for one two five five
00:24:20 and the front page of that
00:24:32 is I think it's maybe a different document but it is my first question is are you are you familiar with this document I'm not familiar with it I've seen it but I wouldn't know the detail
00:24:43 seen it but I wouldn't know the detail of its content okay that's very but I'm not going to ask you about the document if you're not familiar with it I'm not going to ask you about the document itself but I just want to ask you one or two questions about it about the principles in it if I
00:24:55 about it about the principles in it if I can just ask you to be shown page eighteen internally so I'm not asking you about the language or or how the
00:25:06 you about the language or or how the document came about or anything like that just the principles and can we highlight the foot the passives and starts fast survival guidance full paragraphs down that's it and all four bullet points
00:25:17 bullet points it says far survival guide that's call arrangement should include and then there are four bullet points details of how calls will be passed to and record about the incident their impact on resources in mobilizing a revaluation
00:25:29 resources in mobilizing a revaluation process to ensure the balance of risk to the public is reviewed if circumstances change which may result in a change to the advice previously given and then how information will be exchanged between
00:25:41 information will be exchanged between callers fire control and commanders of the incident now first of all and I should have shown you that the date of this policy was 2014 are you aware were you aware in June
00:25:55 are you aware were you aware in June 2017 that those principles should apply to fire Survival Guide was called arrangements yes I was aware of the
00:26:06 arrangements yes I was aware of the principles I wasn't aware that that was written in that document okay okay in terms of the principles I wanted his focus on the third one the revaluation process to ensure the
00:26:18 revaluation process to ensure the balance of risks the public is reviewed as if circumstances change would you agree that it is important to reevaluate faster
00:26:28 faster a guidance advice that's being given as you go yes and I believe that would have come from one of the outcomes of the local investigation and that would have
00:26:40 local investigation and that would have been - yes and we saw that from policy 539 some reassess so that's that's what you would be familiar with his reassessment in policy 539 yes um regards to the brackets which may result
00:26:53 regards to the brackets which may result in a change to the advice previously given yes and that was an item that control wanted to be placed into policy seven nine zero and was it regarding yes
00:27:05 seven nine zero and was it regarding yes changing the advice to call us in high-rise building right we'll come to that very shortly and maybe taking this out of all of it that change in advice
00:27:19 out of all of it that change in advice my question is what circumstances would you as a control room officer or supervisor consider would require the advice to be changed from stay-put to
00:27:33 advice to be changed from stay-put to evacuate if you can and for a control room operator I wouldn't expect that decision to be theirs I would expect them they're busy dealing with calls
00:27:45 them they're busy dealing with calls talking to the caller's come in those callers down providing advice that is current at the moment I wouldn't expect that to be a decision that they would have made the supervisors especially if
00:27:56 have made the supervisors especially if we were referring to the night and were again trying to assist with call handling trying to mobilize a vast number of resources and make cover moves ensure that everyone that needed to know
00:28:09 ensure that everyone that needed to know was informed so with regard to two individuals they will work in their a task orientated I will have expected them to have an overview of what was
00:28:20 them to have an overview of what was going on with the whole control room whilst control officers are very good at listening talking to a caller and over here in other conversations so they're
00:28:31 here in other conversations so they're able to keep an eye on what's going on overall in the room I would expect it to that with that huge core volume coming in that anyone would have had an overall
00:28:42 in that anyone would have had an overall picture of what was going on specifically and providing specific advice to individuals yes but not overall picture of what was happening hopefully okay just going back in a
00:28:57 hopefully okay just going back in a little bit into that answer and going back to this principle a re-evaluation process which may result in a change to the advice first of all who in the
00:29:08 the advice first of all who in the construct taking the control room first of all who would be responsible for deciding whether there should be a change in the advice I was denied you I
00:29:21 change in the advice I was denied you I was you know on that night yes is that that's ordinarily the cases it was the senior operations not you I would have expected and it's come from one of the
00:29:32 expected and it's come from one of the brigade senior managers thing yes we're going to come on later to how that decision did come to be made but it's just in terms of the moment one is looking at policy and how things are normally works if you say you would
00:29:44 normally works if you say you would normally be an som who would make that change make that decision in conjunction with the with the operations manager yes and that's the next question that reevaluation process would be done with
00:29:56 reevaluation process would be done with would it by the som in conjunction with the control room officer all the things actually doing the handling the call I would read that that the re-evaluation process would happen on every call with
00:30:07 process would happen on every call with every control room officer talking to that caller providing fire survival guidance and but it would only be and some supervisors if they weren't involved in mobilizing additional tasks
00:30:20 involved in mobilizing additional tasks or the ops mate operations manager or myself and that would be able to get an overview of what individual control room offices are advising and telling callers
00:30:31 offices are advising and telling callers in the situation okay
00:30:35 and you may have answered this already but let's see if I can just get it at a slightly different way if if I'm a control room officer I'm handling a 999
00:30:46 control room officer I'm handling a 999 call which isn't being listened in on by an OEM or an SMA or an errand I'm on my own what information am I looking out
00:30:57 own what information am I looking out for from the caller which might trigger a change in advice what flag with regard
00:31:08 a change in advice what flag with regard to fire survival body else yes so the worsening of conditions having to you know was there there reassuring if they
00:31:19 know was there there reassuring if they keep really evaluating they're checking on the condition so maybe it would have been heavily smoke look when they started or maybe light smoke logging and but during the time those conditions have worsened they may be able to hear
00:31:31 have worsened they may be able to hear different noises such as the fire they may report signs of flame that write sort of and with those sorts of things be something that a CRO would be trained to listen out for yes yes they would
00:31:46 to listen out for yes yes they would listen to all the information the callers providing to them right so you listen to of course it's based on experience but yeah but but really what I'm trying to get at is are there any special indicators which would take
00:31:58 special indicators which would take during the re-evaluation process which would take a CRO over the line as it were from saying well you can you can stay put you're still safe to stay where you are to putting their hand up and say
00:32:11 you are to putting their hand up and say I need help here I think we may need to change the advice there's no specific like that would be triggers it would be a deterioration of the conditions and and again not
00:32:23 and again not typically for high-rise but with domestic dwellings low-rise on the corners trapped in fire on the first floor they have specific instructions
00:32:34 floor they have specific instructions how to be rescued on how to help self rescue yes okay
00:32:45 rescue yes okay now
00:32:51 that's just staying with that question of change to the advice previously given you've covered the control room what if
00:33:03 you've covered the control room what if with the incident ground play any role in a decision by you as som to change the advice previously given yes
00:33:14 the advice previously given yes what would I would say that that would be a joint discussion on how they are progressing on the incident ground and what in control we are experiencing on
00:33:27 what in control we are experiencing on what conditions the callers are experiencing okay now that discussion I think we can find the mention of that in policy 790
00:33:38 find the mention of that in policy 790 we could just look at that it's time five at the policy wall bundle and can we go to paragraph eight point seven on page five internally
00:33:53 so this is this is policy 799 I know you're familiar with this eight point seven which sits within the paragraph starting advice to fire survival
00:34:05 starting advice to fire survival guidance callers as we can see it says in exceptional circumstances an icy incident commander may consider informing control that their advice to FSG callers should be altered eg to
00:34:17 FSG callers should be altered eg to attempt to leave their property the IC should remember that this advice may be contrary to national policy for control staff on FS cheese and liaison with the officer in charge at control will be required for agreement to change the
00:34:29 required for agreement to change the prescriptive advice so when you were referring a moment ago to joint discussion with the incident ground is that is that the policy that you're
00:34:40 that is that the policy that you're referring to yes now in practical terms that suggests that the the incident command and control make the decision essentially jointly yes I mean I've
00:34:54 essentially jointly yes I mean I've suggested that but is that actually right
00:34:56 right do they it's a joint decision or or is it the decision by control based on what the in Simon Graham is telling you well the policy says it's the decision by the IC at the incident I think when it was
00:35:08 IC at the incident I think when it was first drafted we had that it should be a decision between the IC or the officer in charge of control depending on those circumstances right okay um in terms of
00:35:22 circumstances right okay um in terms of how this policy we can read the policy but in terms of how its carried out in practice when a change to FSG advice is altered from say stay put to escape is
00:35:37 altered from say stay put to escape is that is that is the ultimate decision made by the control room or is it a decision made by the incident commander or is it a joint decision in practice
00:35:48 or is it a joint decision in practice in practice it's only ever been done once and one to my knowledge and it was a decision made by control that the instant ground agreed with right and and
00:36:04 instant ground agreed with right and and that's your own personal experience is it yes and which which an incident was that are you able to remember that have been grateful no that's just though I see right okay
00:36:20 so do I take it from that that in that prior to grenfell this paragraph eight point seven that was never tested in practice yes that's right that's great
00:36:32 practice yes that's right that's great right okay
00:36:43 and it just before I leave that point does that mean that in an ordinary case no sorry
00:36:49 no sorry does that mean that there's never been a change as contemplated by by the policy to FSG in your experience yes there's
00:37:00 to FSG in your experience yes there's never been a change okay right now can I then turn to what happens with FSGS in in practice in terms of what CRA s do
00:37:14 in practice in terms of what CRA s do when a call is determined to be an FSG call what action do you expect they CRA to take federal terms they will take the address find that address on
00:37:28 take the address find that address on our or gazetteer they will type in some additional details of what the call is saying they will decide on the incident type they will mobilize those resources
00:37:40 type they will mobilize those resources and this is why they're all still on the telephone call to the caller they will mobilize the additional fire survival guidance PDA that we have they will
00:37:55 guidance PDA that we have they will alert a supervisor or they colleague next door and those colleagues will carry out some additional actions such as informing the ambulance service and
00:38:06 as informing the ambulance service and notifying some officers of senior officers and they will also be able to access the reference information file that's available to them right okay now
00:38:19 that's available to them right okay now look I'll come to that in a moment you mentioned the address and what about numbers of persons involved is that is that something that a CRO should have yes they will do that during the course
00:38:31 yes they will do that during the course of the telephone conversation that's not unusual and but that probably wouldn't be an initial action whilst they're carrying out the assessment of it that would be part of their questioning and then they would create a service request
00:38:44 then they would create a service request and pass that information to the on roof resources right I think it may be an easy way for me to do this and can I ask you to look at policy 790 which is at at
00:38:57 you to look at policy 790 which is at at five of the policy bundle and look at paragraph five point five which sits within a section of this policy called information transfer to the incident and
00:39:14 but five point for the uses where we should start this is to take the page before yes just near the top of the page
00:39:27 before yes just near the top of the page you see says five point four controller will contact the initial controller command pump ICP and parse the information below and by appliance radio for each separate FSG call by passing
00:39:41 for each separate FSG call by passing this information control will reference the information using the relevant flat straight house number and then in five point five it says control will attempt to gather all the information on the control information form that's appendix
00:39:54 control information form that's appendix two which we have seen before and relay this information to the incident as and when it becomes available and then there's a list of pieces of information below it which we can see would it be
00:40:08 below it which we can see would it be normal for a CRO when gathering information from a caller to take all that information in any event and
00:40:20 that information in any event and I think that the trouble with lists and having those information that is ideally what we'd like together but the call handling when we call handle it's not a linear process you wouldn't go through
00:40:31 linear process you wouldn't go through step by step asking those questions you'd be able to respond to what the caller was telling you and if they needed reassurance for a minute or two then you would provide that rather than carrying on at record las' with the
00:40:45 carrying on at record las' with the questioning so yes that would be obtainable we would attempt to ask obviously the number of the flat of the house to get the address the number of people that are inside and involved and
00:40:56 people that are inside and involved and the location but sometimes just because of what the call is saying in our engagement with them that doesn't always happen it happened or they're reluctant to give that information because they
00:41:07 to give that information because they want to tell you about something else's occurring okay and would this information be obtained or sort by the CRO only once the call had become FSG or
00:41:21 CRO only once the call had become FSG or in any case once the call has become a fuss survivor Gardens call yes they would they would ask some similar questions on just property fires or they
00:41:34 questions on just property fires or they would ask if they believe there's people involved in things okay and there's a reference here as you can see to appendix 2 which is the control information form yes we can just go to that if we can just for a second its
00:41:46 that if we can just for a second its appendix 2 which can be found internally in this document on page 8 so can we just have a look at that please
00:41:58 just have a look at that please now this form which is becoming familiar again it's in quadruplicate white yellow blue and green who in the control room
00:42:11 blue and green who in the control room would would fill that out so we have copies in the control room but we don't use that because we put all that information on to our mobile icing
00:42:22 information on to our mobile icing system and onto the instant lock right okay I was going to ask you as a matter of practice does that mean you never use this form in the control room we may
00:42:34 this form in the control room we may have done once or twice but again we can put all the information in the relevant information onto the mobile icing system okay and that's the that's the incident screen is it yes we don't lock on vision
00:42:45 screen is it yes we don't lock on vision yes I see okay and would that will Inc would that include as as per this
00:42:56 would that include as as per this information form number of persons within a vacation yes if we had asked that and been given that Network okay say can we take it this the scheme of
00:43:07 say can we take it this the scheme of information required on the control information form is the kind of information that you would ordinarily expect a CRA to obtain from the caller when managing an FSG call yes it was
00:43:19 when managing an FSG call yes it was created and as a control information form to use for fire survival guidance and but I was involved in its creation and it was also created in case we had another incident where we needed to take
00:43:31 another incident where we needed to take details of callers and but not necessarily in a an MSG situation so which why we have access point written on there right what does that mean
00:43:42 on there right what does that mean access point is that so that would be if we took a call to say an underground train crash and we were receiving calls
00:43:53 train crash and we were receiving calls from people in different carriages things like that we could use and the crews could use those forms to pass the
00:44:01 these control information forms are they are they never used because you you can download type in the information yes it would it would be like double kyun we
00:44:12 would it would be like double kyun we would write it on here and then we would also put it into the incident log so it's quicker for us to write it on our mobilizing system but they are used on
00:44:23 mobilizing system but they are used on appliances they use on appliances yeah ok darling you are saying they're not using the controller no ok um now
00:44:37 going back to paragraph 5.1 in this policy I say back to 5.1 go back to paragraph five and looking at five point
00:44:50 paragraph five and looking at five point one that says go back to the previous page page two in tournament page two the document as soon as control has
00:45:03 document as soon as control has confirmed that an FSG call is in progress they were contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details at this stage it is lighted lead to be basic information relating to the number of persons
00:45:14 relating to the number of persons involved on their location within the property how would or what by by what means of communication would that
00:45:25 means of communication would that initial set of initial details be transmitted to the incident ground by the writer for the main screen radio right and is that policy or is that practice practice right and in fact in
00:45:42 practice practice right and in fact in fact I should show you this I think I've got the answer here anyway the paragraph five point four just setting the page says control will contact the initial command pump and pass the information
00:45:53 command pump and pass the information delay by appliance radio for each separate FSG call so so taking those two paragraphs together and your answer radio it is the norm that as soon as
00:46:05 radio it is the norm that as soon as you're you've got an MSG call control will use the radio RT for if you're north of the river yes to send that information to the initial command pump
00:46:17 information to the initial command pump yes
00:46:18 yes so that would be whilst the resources are enroute so before they arrived it wouldn't be uncommon to start receiving and dealing with a fire survival garden
00:46:29 and dealing with a fire survival garden school right and whilst they've lost the appliances are enroute okay and in 5.1 there's a reference as you can see at the beginning to confirming the net
00:46:40 the beginning to confirming the net FSG call is in progress what does control do by way of a confirmation that an FSG call is in progress so again two
00:46:53 an FSG call is in progress so again two actions they mobilize the FS g additional attendance and they would inform not the attending resources by
00:47:04 inform not the attending resources by radio the NFS g call is in progress and is is it the supervisor who confirms that an FS g call is in progress or is
00:47:15 that an FS g call is in progress or is it the call control nestle handler the control operator taking a cup okay and who does the call handler confirm that with is there a process of confirmation no they would confirm that by what the
00:47:27 no they would confirm that by what the caller has indicated and then providing advice to the caller right and so if it's a call handler who's on the telephone to the caller yes and the call
00:47:38 telephone to the caller yes and the call handler determines that that's an FS g yeah do they send that message no need to send that message by radio do they send that message to the radio operator in the control rooms yes what you described before and then that radio
00:47:50 described before and then that radio operator will send the message to the ICP yes they were also alert their supervisor or their colleague right to
00:48:01 supervisor or their colleague right to tell them that okay
00:48:06 and what's the purpose of communicating that initial information to the fire ground so that they were never aware
00:48:18 ground so that they were never aware aware of what that we are talking to a caller that is in the building that cannot leave right and what would you
00:48:30 cannot leave right and what would you expect the incident grant to do with that information I would expect them to write it down on the control information pad and that the
00:48:42 the control information pad and that the incident commander would receive that right the incident commander would receive what that information about the first survivor guards is cool in process
00:48:53 first survivor guards is cool in process okay and the would that be the piece of paper that you would expect the incident commander to receive and it's really not my field of expertise going into instant commands
00:49:04 commands I wouldn't from from a control room point of view our aim is to pass all relevant information to the scene of operations right as quickly as possible okay would you have any expectation or
00:49:20 okay would you have any expectation or experience of how once that initial FSG call information has got to the incident ground via the radio what would happen
00:49:31 ground via the radio what would happen to that information next all right now you mentioned the Rif can I can we look
00:49:42 you mentioned the Rif can I can we look at that together I think there may be two in fact there is should be one for control operators and one for supervisors yes and
00:49:58 can we I'm gonna start if I can with the supervisors
00:50:17 which is in tap nine of the policy bundle which is the first time I think we've looked at this it's lfb quadruple zero three five four one I think was out
00:50:30 zero three five four one I think was out there before I finished under is this the document that you're referring to yes by the supervisors riff yes and why
00:50:44 yes by the supervisors riff yes and why do you call it a riff or is it so it's called a reference information far okay it's what was described you know old mobilising system and we've just carried it through right and did you have any
00:51:01 it through right and did you have any role in compiling or creating this guidance yes I have authorized several
00:51:12 guidance yes I have authorized several versions of this but I'm not sure that's one I thought the price right okay well if okay let me show you the end of this I hope we're on the right one this is if you go to the very last page which is
00:51:24 you go to the very last page which is the third page of this document this one is I can see at the very bottom it's approved by som Danielle maybe that's the right way of pronouncing it that
00:51:35 the right way of pronouncing it that that would be back no a third of April 2014
00:51:43 updated second of April 2016 is this the most recent version of that document yes
00:51:52 now
00:51:55 I just want to ask you one or two questions about the contents of this first of all on page two
00:52:07 in the bullet points there you can see what is supposed to happen
00:52:18 what is supposed to happen so the first bullet point is CRA regularly reassesses the situation by asking questions as specified in FSG operate a RIF and I have looked at those I think they're the same as those that
00:52:29 I think they're the same as those that are set out in the in the policy policy 790 yes okay and then supervisor all nominated person to consider the number of things dedicating a supervisor to act
00:52:40 of things dedicating a supervisor to act a sole contact point between control and ICP see you on oh man on officer nominated by I see to parcel relevant information now not sure it's very well
00:52:51 information now not sure it's very well laid out but does that mean that a super but once an FSG is in play a supervisor in the control room nominates somebody
00:53:02 in the control room nominates somebody to be the sole contact point between control and the incident ground for the FSG yes right what about multiple FSG use the same prints forward apply oh
00:53:14 use the same prints forward apply oh yeah so you're gonna have one person as the sole contact point between control and years of it grandly do you know who that was on the night of grünfeld tower that would have been Jason Ola clothes dress not right now fan it says using m2
00:53:28 dress not right now fan it says using m2 f h or Fon Opie s one floor mops one if sufficient staff available where a large number of FS g calls are being received as this will free up the main scheme
00:53:40 as this will free up the main scheme radio what is m2 f H so it's just an old analog callsign for our radio channels that we have in London Fire Brigade
00:53:59 and was that on the in use on the night of the Grenville terrified no we were using em to FN which was channel for judge okay right and what about law mops
00:54:12 judge okay right and what about law mops one so films one it is another channel it's just a channel one that we don't use for general messages right and radio
00:54:23 use for general messages right and radio communications and so it's a spare channel that we can use and to free up practice though to free up the other channels so all northern appliances are
00:54:36 channels so all northern appliances are on that channel said the different incidents will all come through that channel and that radio operator and I think what they're indicating here is that if we were busy with other incidents and we had a large amount of
00:54:48 incidents and we had a large amount of information to pass regarding FSG course we could move that on to channel one and pass it in that information that way we wouldn't be disturbed by the other incidents OAC say that obviously
00:55:00 incidents OAC say that obviously do you did you use floor lamps one on the night of the grand felt out no did why is that purely because we had established a really good communication system with Jason Olaf speaking directly
00:55:13 system with Jason Olaf speaking directly to the command unit yeah no Jason Olaf you said was the sole contact point between control and the ICP yes I thought my first question is did you
00:55:24 thought my first question is did you appoint him the sole contact no do you know who did yes if that was Om Malik Stillman person no oh we have Jason
00:55:36 Stillman person no oh we have Jason olive arriving in the control room and about two o'clock yeah it's not an exact time but about two o'clock which i think is before you arrived yes do you know how well what the
00:55:51 yes do you know how well what the water-type do you know who if anyone was the sole contact point between control and
00:55:56 and prior to Jason Olaf's appointment to sell contact point that would have been the radio operator Sharon Darby shown Darby yes so it all the information
00:56:07 Darby yes so it all the information would have gone via the radio before we switched to telephone I see and and and who if anybody appointed Sharon Darby is the sole contact point between control
00:56:19 the sole contact point between control and and the incident ground she was the radio operator one channel for that night for the whole night I see and did she have particular skills or was you just over she appointed as
00:56:31 or was you just over she appointed as part of a roll call yes just as part of rock covers
00:56:46 just going back and I'm sorry to go back to this bullet point about and make em to a fatal flaw offs was there a need at any stage during the night to free up the main scheme radio
00:56:59 night to free up the main scheme radio no okay
00:57:06 we're going to come back I think to the riff shortly I just want to get back into if I can policy 790 I'm sorry to dot around these policies if you look at
00:57:19 dot around these policies if you look at 790 which is in turn five of the policy bundle and go please to paragraph seven point eight
00:57:37 [Music] if you can just have that highlighted and that says control and I should search it just tell you this this sits within the section of this policy that
00:57:50 within the section of this policy that said is entitled recording and sharing of information it says set control has a command unit critical phone line which has a higher priority and calls to the officer of the watch this number is
00:58:02 officer of the watch this number is programmed into Cu phones must only be used for passing life critical information we discussed earlier today the different methods of communication
00:58:13 the different methods of communication and lines between the control room and the incident ground yes this is which one of those is is the command unit critical phone line so that would have
00:58:25 critical phone line so that would have been that would have been a call into so an admin call would have come through an admin line into our X to be answered it would have been labeled to command unit critical and office the watches
00:58:40 unit critical and office the watches supervisors would have prioritized the picking up of that telephone number or that telephone call rather than normal office the watch course right so that's a line between
00:58:52 course right so that's a line between the command unit and control is it yes is it another designated line or is it yes so the command unit phones have a designated number programmed in that
00:59:04 designated number programmed in that would come through to our X and show that it was a command unit critical so in normal practice in relation to this
00:59:16 in normal practice in relation to this policy when the CEO the FSG Cu is established we would expect that them to ring control using that telephone number
00:59:30 ring control using that telephone number right
00:59:34 and that's that's exactly that's from the command unit telephone itself not the radio not the mobile it's the same phone line but a different number was
00:59:45 phone line but a different number was that right it says it's a different telephone number it would come through on our communications of integrated
00:59:56 on our communications of integrated communication system and
01:00:04 who would it go to who would pick that arm supervisor right and who would determine the priority
01:00:19 and who would determine the priority so I'd say ask that question in every way that the paragraph suggests that that line is to be used for calls that
01:00:32 that line is to be used for calls that have a higher priority than calls to the officer of the watch what are calls which have a higher priority than calls
01:00:43 which have a higher priority than calls that would be made to the officer of the watch so I think that's just the terminology it doesn't mean that we're we that's a hot beats being prioritized that calls to the office of the watch
01:00:54 that calls to the office of the watch could come from any way they just admin cause they could be officers just wanting an update they but obviously if the command unit is phone leanness we have critical information to pass them
01:01:05 have critical information to pass them and they want to share that with us so it would we would just prioritize it in the control room to pick it up first rather than an officer the watch cup that's okay do you know if that not that
01:01:16 that's okay do you know if that not that command unit critical phone line was used on the night of breath oh no it wasn't because I think I believe we preempted that and and Jason only rung the command unit and before the command
01:01:27 the command unit and before the command unit I had a chance to ring us right I see okay and then you were operating by mobile and I think Jason honor to see you eight directly
01:01:42 now while a call is progressing and a CRO is is on a 1909 call with a caller how does the call handler the CRA
01:01:53 how does the call handler the CRA simultaneously can we communicate with the incident ground so they do that via the radio operator so whilst they're talking to the caller they will create a
01:02:06 talking to the caller they will create a service request and put that information on and then send that to the radio operator who will then pass that to the ICP I see so it's essentially typing
01:02:18 ICP I see so it's essentially typing while talking yes can I just see if I can illustrate that with you by a number of examples can I ask you to go to the short incident log just put the policy
01:02:30 short incident log just put the policy bundle away
01:02:33 chat 23 of the document you can see on page 23 we just go to that I'm so sorry
01:02:48 page 23 we just go to that I'm so sorry page 19
01:02:53 and this is again it's just an example we can see an entry at oh one forty forty seven HJ f service request I think
01:03:13 forty seven HJ f service request I think there's a Heidi Fox yes okay service request service request created our Tea for Two g27 one fYI seven people in flat 205 on 23rd floor persons unable
01:03:26 in flat 205 on 23rd floor persons unable to leave property
01:03:31 that message is attributed to hjf have a fox
01:03:37 fox would she be the call would she be the call handler the CRO call handler would she be the the radio operator no she'd be the call handler right talking to those people okay
01:03:49 those people okay and so while she was talking to those people at that time just explain to me the process whereby the service request is created in the system which put produces so while she was talking to
01:04:01 produces so while she was talking to them she would have called up a service request and she would have written in a box those details with regard to the seven people in flexi zero fives on the
01:04:12 seven people in flexi zero fives on the 23rd floor and and then she would have closed that request and it would have gone into a list for the radio operator on channel 4 to pick up so Sharon died
01:04:26 on channel 4 to pick up so Sharon died away right and then Sharon Darby picks it up from her screen yes and then talk me through the next steps and then relays that to the instant command point
01:04:37 relays that to the instant command point by writ by radio like radio yes and you say it would have gone into a list for the radio operator what does the radio operator see on his or her scream Sharon
01:04:49 operator see on his or her scream Sharon Darby in this case so it would be the same as control operators have seen there is a box on the we talked about the instant list they also have a service request list and everyone is
01:05:01 service request list and everyone is able to access that list right at em but the prefix as I said RT for would have meant that it was to go out to the radio operator right and does have a fat pride
01:05:16 operator right and does have a fat pride e Fox right in our Tea for Two g27 one yes so it's the call the call handler who decides if you like which incident
01:05:30 who decides if you like which incident command pump we'll see you gets entered into the request which is then sent to the radio operator yes but I think with regard to
01:05:44 operator yes but I think with regard to go up to 71 she put two golf 271 because she knew that was appliance in attendance there I'd say the radio operator would have relocated it if the incident
01:05:54 incident come on pump had changed so he's going so if it had become cui then the radio operator would have passed it to see you eight okay okay we're going to come I
01:06:07 eight okay okay we're going to come I think some some of this in some detail just in terms of the process I think you're saying that it's Heidi Fox who inputs g27 one there yes
01:06:19 inputs g27 one there yes and then that message goes to Sharon Darby is the radio operator but Sharon Darby would know whether the incident command prompt was still gt7 one on her change yes because she would have been
01:06:31 change yes because she would have been taking all the radio messages from the incident so at some point they would have declared and it's a new incident command point so she would have been aware of that we're just drilling down on that where
01:06:43 we're just drilling down on that where would Sharon Darby get that information from from this same from the instant grant the instant message she would be dependent on somebody on the incident ground saying to her don't send radio
01:06:54 ground saying to her don't send radio messages to g27 one anymore send them to see you eight oh yeah a more simplistic version they would have said to see you eight is now ycp and that message would come to Sharon Darby over what system yeah wife right
01:07:07 Darby over what system yeah wife right yeah the main scheme radio the main the main scheme radius so back through RT for yes right that would be recorded with it yes okay okay
01:07:20 with it yes okay okay and would Sharon Darby then input that change into the vision system yes she would record that message okay all right
01:07:44 looking at this log of this page
01:07:58 the messages go from rc4 to juice g27 one in that example if and it isn't if the incident ground pump or incident
01:08:14 the incident ground pump or incident ground command unit had changed you we wouldn't know that from this log would we yes you have a message that would say CUA is now ICP well we are not sure we
01:08:32 CUA is now ICP well we are not sure we do
01:08:33 do we certainly do see messages a little bit later than arts and for messages go to see you ate but let me try my question in a different way if Sharon Darby is seeing a message come from
01:08:44 Darby is seeing a message come from Heather sorry I keep calling a Heather Heidi Fox which says Artie for two g27 one but Sharon Darby knows that actually g27 one is now not the right pump it's
01:08:55 g27 one is now not the right pump it's supposed to go to a command unit she makes that decision herself but we don't see that recorded in the incident log we don't see the message going to g27 der
01:09:07 don't see the message going to g27 der two's to command unit wait no it would remain as going to go seven one you would just see when Sharon heard her told the ICP because you would have
01:09:19 told the ICP because you would have service crew request completed yes okay so so I see so this incident log the short incident log is it doesn't tell
01:09:30 short incident log is it doesn't tell you actually where the radio message went which is the message that we see against the name of the control room operator you could confirm that by
01:09:44 operator you could confirm that by listening
01:09:45 listening sit their recordings absolutely okay that's very helpful and another example at 1:45 10's ad service request and
01:10:06 at 1:45 10's ad service request and again our t42 g27 one FYI seven people in flat 205 on 23rd floor persons unable to leave property
01:10:23 that's the same message that we saw Heidi Fox sending to Sharon Darby yes when we see this one at a 1:45 10 what
01:10:36 when we see this one at a 1:45 10 what is happening there is that because this is Sharon Darby this time yes and and that tells us that she's completed and sent that message via voice right to the
01:10:50 sent that message via voice right to the incident and would she be able to correct the reference to the incident command pump if in fact she was sending it to a command pump which was not g27
01:11:03 it to a command pump which was not g27 one I'm not sure if you can change service requests right no I would
01:11:14 service requests right no I would imagine she could but I wouldn't imagine that it would be a detail as you can see the timeline Sharon is constantly on the radio talking to the command point at that
01:11:25 talking to the command point at that point and and in control we would know that it was going to the designated place because and the reason I ask is
01:11:37 place because and the reason I ask is because by this time it's it's would be possible that cu8 was receiving information by raid by but by mobile actually directly from or by telephone
01:11:50 actually directly from or by telephone at least by telephone sorry but from the control room I'm Jason Olaf no because he wasn't there by night till two o'clock
01:12:01 but if command unit 8 was receiving information by telephone from the control room would that be reflected in this message at oh one 45 10
01:12:16 or not no right so am I right in thinking this the insurance of the loan is only reflecting messages sent by radio no there will there is it does
01:12:28 radio no there will there is it does show some additions to the instant log that wouldn't go through a service request I believe it would it would it show information being communicated from
01:12:40 show information being communicated from the control room by telephone so not automatically it would mean that a control room operator or a supervisor would update the incident log with their actions which they they do normally do
01:12:53 actions which they they do normally do so there would be an entry in there to say that they had contacted the command unit and passed details to them okay um
01:13:04 unit and passed details to them okay um mr. shows that a convenient moment I think it is yes I'm so slightly midstream with this but I think it's probably convenient right now it's 25 plus 3
01:13:25 twenty five four three
01:13:36 you
01:21:33 [Music]
01:22:12 [Music]
01:23:13 mr. chairman yes committee heard witnesses
01:23:26 let's carry on yes yes what's thrill it this meant thank you very much for for coming back to us can I just continue then with my examples and a study of the short
01:23:39 examples and a study of the short incident over again we've got Sharon Darby we were looking at this one at 140 Oh 145 10 and she's
01:23:50 at this one at 140 Oh 145 10 and she's on the radio is she just to go back to this is she the one who creates this message and inputs it into the system
01:24:00 the 145 10 No right so that would have been the previous that would have been the service requests created and that would
01:24:12 service requests created and that would have been from Heidi Fox that's how I see I see okay and when so when we see Oh 145 10 s ad service request service
01:24:24 Oh 145 10 s ad service request service of us coming deleted what is Sharon Darby's role in in generating that message she would have passed that message on to the incident
01:24:35 passed that message on to the incident command pump right and once I'd been sent she would have completed that service request right now where we see and just I think you said this before
01:24:46 and just I think you said this before just that I'm cash and avi was the radio message operator all night at Granville was she yes okay so where we see s ad next to a message can we be cut in this document can we be confident that that
01:24:59 document can we be confident that that message was either typed in by her or approved by her it would have been typed in by her and created by her or she
01:25:10 in by her and created by her or she would have passed that information right over to the c'mon pump to allow it to be completed so where we see here as we do service requests completed our Tea for
01:25:23 service requests completed our Tea for Two g27 one next to Sharon Darby's name can we be confident that she communicated with or sent to G 271 the message we can
01:25:34 message we can that I wouldn't be confident that she sent it to go over to 71 she could have passed it to go to 71 but I would imagine she would have directed it to the incident command pump or whoever
01:25:47 the incident command pump or whoever we'd last received a message from right would she had coming back to a point I asked you about it but I think just a little before the break would she have any means of correcting the message so
01:26:00 any means of correcting the message so as to show that the message she'd sent by RT for radio was sent no longer not to g27 one but two cu8 which he made
01:26:11 to g27 one but two cu8 which he made meant to make no yes yes she could have she could she could have done that but I wouldn't have said that would have been that's really irrelevant and in regard
01:26:22 that's really irrelevant and in regard to our documentation and our communication we know it was said we know it would have been sent to the incident ground and to the ICP right now
01:26:38 can I just ask you then to look at page 21 and and just to look at to two examples
01:27:02 we have
01:27:06 the service requested this is at page 21 of time to 206 oh six service request and this is again Heidi Fox rt4 to see
01:27:19 and this is again Heidi Fox rt4 to see you eight further call times two adults and one child trapped inside flat 82 or 11 now that's clearly a message being sent to see you 8 pi d fox handling the
01:27:31 sent to see you 8 pi d fox handling the call shandar be on the radio yes and we see that that's it that's the creation of that and we see the completion of that is at o2 1009 you see that yes and
01:27:44 that is at o2 1009 you see that yes and that is again RT for to see you eight and I think that on what you told us before is Heidi Fox handling the call sends the message to Sharon and Darby Chow and are being radiator cu8
01:27:57 Chow and are being radiator cu8 and she then sends the message which is completing the service request yes now between those two between the creation
01:28:08 between those two between the creation and the completion of that service request we've also got a new service request from PD just above it at o2 a
01:28:19 request from PD just above it at o2 a 908 service request created art equal to G 271 far in corridor floor 12 call attract lat 95
01:28:29 PD would be the was here it would be the cup would be the CRO yes panting the 909 call yes and again he would send this right he would send that message to
01:28:40 right he would send that message to Sharon Darby who would then create this message this radio message yes that's correct
01:28:45 correct would Sharon Darby realize at least by that time that radio messages were being sent to two different command comes one
01:28:56 sent to two different command comes one g27 one on the other c u8 no you'd have to confirm with the radio traffic I believe Sharon would have been aware from the beginning of where to send the
01:29:09 from the beginning of where to send the radio messages so even though Pete daddy's courses Golf 271 and the other
01:29:20 daddy's courses Golf 271 and the other one says to Charlie uniform eight they would have both gone to Charlie uniform eight okay and then one two ten twenty one we see Sharon Darby's service request completed our team for two g27
01:29:31 request completed our team for two g27 one given that she's just 11 seconds before 12 seconds before completed a service request Artie for to see you age do you know why she creates a service
01:29:42 do you know why she creates a service request to G 271 she doesn't she just completes that service request right and why doesn't she correct the destination
01:29:53 why doesn't she correct the destination of and well if you just have a look at the instant know them so their service requests have created and completed she's passing all that radio traffic right she's also receiving to make up messages in between that time and
01:30:06 messages in between that time and processing those and sending out her own service requests to get those actions and again if you've heard the radio traffic it's quite a formal process of where we pass short bursts of
01:30:20 where we pass short bursts of information and then their points and repeat those back to confirm understanding so it's not a very quick action you know and the amount of actually she's doing in between two oh
01:30:31 actually she's doing in between two oh six and two eleven and combined with the fact that she would have sent it to the incident command point I don't think she sees any need to I've but I would understand that and
01:30:44 I've but I would understand that and when we see service request completed our defaulted g27 ones we do it to 1021 s ad deep with the system the cherrim
01:30:55 s ad deep with the system the cherrim Davi was operating would she have got a confirmation back from G 271 no I believe she would have passed it to see you eight right and and they would have
01:31:06 you eight right and and they would have acknowledged that can I just clarify this the picture I'm getting from this series of answers is that in a case like this take this on we've been looking at PD formulates a service request and he
01:31:22 PD formulates a service request and he may or may not know where it's gonna actually going to be sent to but he thinks it's going to g27 one so he formulates it in that way and Sharon Darby simply copies it as it stands that
01:31:35 Darby simply copies it as it stands that sends it I think you're telling us to where it ought to go yes and when she gets a confirmation she confirms that the message as originally formulated has
01:31:46 the message as originally formulated has been the subject of action but she does not say actually I send it to see you eight is that is that what you're yes yes yes I'm saying so that the pertinent
01:31:57 yes yes I'm saying so that the pertinent information will be to get across the firing the corridor or twelve yeah and I'm not no one no one reformulates the original form of the message and just
01:32:12 original form of the message and just one or two more questions check thinking is through a little bit later into the night on this same or similar topic if you can please go to page 22 it says o
01:32:25 you can please go to page 22 it says o 22333 s ad ki cu7 run all FS g calls
01:32:33 do you see that yellow 22333 figure must have that highlighted there that's clear she creates that message but and if we
01:32:44 she creates that message but and if we look lower down at o2 fit 25 32 and it's maybe the same answer that the Chairman
01:32:59 maybe the same answer that the Chairman asked you about there's a service request completed rt4 to see you ate an
01:33:12 request completed rt4 to see you ate an actor looks like it completes a service request that Heidi Fox has created in respect of that flat flat 183 at o2 24 11 to see that the Muslim is sort of
01:33:25 11 to see that the Muslim is sort of slightly backwards but I'm because I'm starting with with Sharon dolly but it looks from that is that although FSG calls were now to be run via cu7 as
01:33:36 calls were now to be run via cu7 as Sharon Davi has recorded other people in the control room such as Heidi Fox handling calls are still creating messages as if they're going to go to see rate and Sharon Davi is completing
01:33:48 see rate and Sharon Davi is completing them on that basis but you think they're actually being sent to see you 7 yes Sharon would have received that message from cu7 to say run all FSG calls via
01:33:59 from cu7 to say run all FSG calls via cu7 so she she would have heard that message coming from Cu 7 and typed that on the incident log right I'm Heidi who was cool taken and not near Sharon maybe
01:34:12 was cool taken and not near Sharon maybe wouldn't have heard that message to pick up on that but still believes it's going to see you 8 or so however once Sharon completed that she would have sent that to see you 7 yes I see thank you so I
01:34:23 to see you 7 yes I see thank you so I think we can get from this discussion and adjourn this question that that what you don't get out of the incident law is the precise incident command pump all see you - which Sharon
01:34:36 command pump all see you - which Sharon Davi is sending the radio messages because she will have corrected them as she went even though it went even though when she was completing the messages she was completing messages created by controlling operators yes I see okay can
01:34:50 controlling operators yes I see okay can I get back then to a slightly different question which is far survival guidance advice given by CRS two corners one of
01:35:02 advice given by CRS two corners one of the things we saw one of the four things we saw in the policy 790 was reassurance
01:35:10 is it quite common for CRA s to reassure callers by saying the crews are on their way
01:35:19 way yes okay in your experience does offering that reassurance have an effect on the mind of the caller in terms of
01:35:32 on the mind of the caller in terms of how they then go about assessing the risks to themselves of fire smoke and heat I don't think I could answer that competently it would depend on the
01:35:45 competently it would depend on the caller every call is different and we would try and reassure them and again we could say that the fire crews were on the way which which would be factual and we would tell me that they were on the way or they were on route sometimes we
01:35:57 way or they were on route sometimes we tell them how far away they are and to try and lay their fears and but it would be to depend on the individual operator as to what they say with regard to reassurance next we can exchange names
01:36:10 reassurance next we can exchange names and put them in a karma position and to make them feel like you know that we're a lifeline to them while we're waiting for the crease to turn up as well right
01:36:21 for the crease to turn up as well right I wouldn't be able to say if we loved them
01:36:24 them no a position of safety no and forgive this question but I feel I must ask it but is there a chance or risk that when
01:36:35 but is there a chance or risk that when when a CRO says to a caller that the crews are on their way that might induce a full sense of security and the caller said that they wouldn't actually be able to go about assessing the risk of smoke
01:36:47 to go about assessing the risk of smoke fire and heat they were drop in and out of assessment reassessment and reassurance so they wouldn't go through the stages they might say they're very
01:36:59 the stages they might say they're very assuring they're on the way and then they might ask how the conditions are doing next and so it would it would depend on on those answers
01:37:15 Kyah take you back to policy 790 and ask you to look at the paragraph of 9.1 this is tab 5 of the policy bundle and I want
01:37:31 is tab 5 of the policy bundle and I want to discuss with you communication is between the incident ground and the control room I think we've probably covered quite a lot of this already but I just want to see if I can get back to some specific questions
01:37:43 can get back to some specific questions in the policy section 9 of this policy is entitled communication with control and 9:1 says it is vital the control is
01:37:55 and 9:1 says it is vital the control is kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG called the fact that control is aware of the actions being carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice given to FSG callers in the
01:38:11 advice given to FSG callers in the normal course of things how is control kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve FSG points so in a normal
01:38:22 to resolve FSG points so in a normal course of a survival guide it's cool and we wouldn't have much and liaison with the instagrams we know when they were in attendance they might send a message
01:38:35 attendance they might send a message within the first five minutes but it is norm to know that the first sign that we know that the individuals are being rescued is to hear the firefighters in
01:38:46 rescued is to hear the firefighters in the background or the caller tell us that they can hear firefighters in the background right now it looks from this section of the policy that the intention is that control is given quite a lot of
01:39:02 is that control is given quite a lot of information by the incident ground and and on a continuing basis is that your experience yes I would agree with that's what I had the policy rates right that's
01:39:14 what I had the policy rates right that's how the policy breeds and in your experience is that how the policy is carried into effect
01:39:21 not as know we are very rarely kept informed to the actions being taken to result fly survival guidance comes right
01:39:33 result fly survival guidance comes right in my experience okay
01:39:42 how would a CRO who is on a call with a caller know what has happened or know
01:39:53 caller know what has happened or know what's been happening what know what is happening on the ground the incident ground that's so as to be able to enhance the advice that that can CRO is
01:40:04 enhance the advice that that can CRO is giving to an FSG caller said they wouldn't it would come in through the radio I would imagine for the mainstream radio that's the radio operator that
01:40:17 radio that's the radio operator that information will be directed to the supervisor and a supervisor may then pass it on right to the control officer they might hear it if they were sitting close by to the radio button paragraph
01:40:32 close by to the radio button paragraph nine point two says informative messages from the incident ground should also contain an update on progress relating to those specific FSG calls by both a flat house number to avoid confusion
01:40:45 flat house number to avoid confusion informative messages are a particular kind of message I think yes there's just helped me understand that I think we discussed this before they're sort of
01:40:56 discussed this before they're sort of standard format only yes and we've seen it some examples of that in this in the short incident Lord would you expect any other kind of messages to come from the incident ground other than informative
01:41:08 incident ground other than informative messages in regards to fire Survival Guide vehicles and on occasion they might pass additional information
01:41:19 might pass additional information regarding if they've managed to reach individuals but as I've said before if we're on the phone to a caller we would be able to hear that in the background
01:41:30 be able to hear that in the background that they are reaching them and that they're trying to break in or rescuing right and how had an informative message be communicated to the to the CRO and
01:41:42 be communicated to the to the CRO and Nakul so it would come from the incident commander fire usually by the mainstream radio to the radio operator right who
01:41:54 radio to the radio operator right who would then log that call log that message through and highlight it to supervisor okay and highlighting it to the supervisor
01:42:05 and highlighting it to the supervisor how would that be done by message or by that would be done by service request by service request even within the control room yes okay and that's you say
01:42:17 room yes okay and that's you say supervisor is that the officer of the watch or yes if it's the watch should possibly watch okay and
01:42:31 at nine three says the outcome of every FSG call must be communicated to control how would that normally be done if at all I've never experienced that happening right okay say can I take from
01:42:48 happening right okay say can I take from your evidence that from 19 relation to nine one nine two and nine three that's the policy but the practice is very different
01:42:59 different I've never been in the control room when that's happened okay
01:43:05 can I now turn at last I think probably to your role on the night now on in your witness statement and we can get go to
01:43:16 witness statement and we can get go to it at page one
01:43:26 you say in the third paragraph you were in the witness in the third line you were the on call management on the night
01:43:38 were the on call management on the night of the fire what does what does that mean what does that involve so we provide 24-hour senior management cover for the control room and it's betting into a rotor and
01:43:52 room and it's betting into a rotor and on the nights of that I was the brigade what we call the brigade duty control manager so I have a there's a certain criteria and for control operators and
01:44:04 criteria and for control operators and supervisors to follow and about informing us of incidents staff welfare issues mobilized existing problems and
01:44:15 issues mobilized existing problems and incidents so they would have paged me right and
01:44:26 you say when you're on call
01:44:31 this is the last sentence of the first paragraph you say we respond to pager communications and phone in to assess situations in the first instance before deciding whether attendance is necessary
01:44:43 deciding whether attendance is necessary yes what criteria determine whether your attendance is necessary it really depends on the situation so we have a basic criteria of attending the control
01:44:56 basic criteria of attending the control room above it for instance above 12 pumpkin appliances and but it would depend on the severity such a if there was a mobilizing issue with our system
01:45:07 was a mobilizing issue with our system it would depend on that the severity of that and we would assess that during a phone conversation to the office of the watch I see is there a particular makeup which would automatically trigger your
01:45:18 which would automatically trigger your attendance at the control room yes 12 pumps in above or above 12 pumps are above 12 yeah
01:45:32 and who would paid you in for example in the case of a 12 pump 13 pump fire probably didn't have 13 but fun but in the case
01:45:44 didn't have 13 but fun but in the case of an attendance above 12 who would paid you it would be a plan item on an incident and it would be one of the offices of watches that would page me
01:45:55 offices of watches that would page me nice okay
01:45:57 nice okay and once you decided that you must attend are there any norms or targets which say how long you should take to get to the incident to get to the
01:46:10 get to the incident to get to the control room I believe at one time there was about an hour and a half right time journeying in journeying in but I'm not sure if that still exists anymore right
01:46:21 sure if that still exists anymore right at the time of Grenfell what was what was there an operational target no okay when you're at Merton I mean they tell us please where you live but when you're
01:46:32 us please where you live but when you're at Merton columns that usually take you to get to the control room five minutes right and Stratford 30 minutes and is it
01:46:44 right and Stratford 30 minutes and is it right the attendance at the control room is a matter of urgency for you once you're paged yes with blue light trains and we journey on blue lights when were changed okay
01:46:56 changed okay now on page three of your statement you
01:47:05 say that
01:47:14 this is the top of the page on the night of the 13th 14th of June I was working a normal day shift but was on call that night and approximately 150 now as I
01:47:25 night and approximately 150 now as I received a page regarding an eighth pump fire normal procedure is that anything that is eighth pump or more requires senior operations managers to be notified right now
01:47:37 notified right now you said a minute ago that you would be normally notified at 12 and above twelve attending at 12 but notified of eight oh I see okay right now in fact we have
01:47:51 I see okay right now in fact we have this incident going pumps 8 at 119 or so yes I think it was more like and I'll pass one more like a fast one okay
01:48:05 and where were you when you got the pager at home I don't asleep yes and
01:48:22 what at that stage when you you got the page what tasks or responsibilities do you have what did you have sorry I'd contact the supervisor the officer
01:48:34 I'd contact the supervisor the officer watch at the back of the room and ask some details they'd probably provide me instantly with some details about the incident and how the control room was coping with that that would I'm sure
01:48:47 coping with that that would I'm sure each of us have a different sort of questions to ask when we ring up and respond to the pager message right I like to know how it's impacting in control and and if I mobilizes system is
01:49:00 control and and if I mobilizes system is performing effectively right know who did you speak to when you called in do you remember I think initially I spoke to Pete May
01:49:13 I think initially I spoke to Pete May right
01:49:17 can I just ask you to look and this is just a time triangulation if I can to verify this can I ask you to look at the operational response report page 48
01:49:46 and at oh one 2941 we can see bravo charlie
01:49:52 charlie Oh to Senior Operations Manager som John Smith who is the duty Brigade control senior manager is paged and notified of
01:50:03 senior manager is paged and notified of the incident now you said about how fast one I think yes that's that's what as you record it yes right now at that stage and in fact
01:50:18 yes right now at that stage and in fact did you know that the fire had just been made up to 20 pumps no ok did you find that out after that yes so I think when
01:50:30 that out after that yes so I think when I'm on my way when I'm on routes my Patriot strikes again right do you know why you were paged only after the makeup
01:50:42 why you were paged only after the makeup had reached 20 it would have been an action that they would have been processing and a pump fire but the rapid
01:50:53 processing and a pump fire but the rapid makeup obviously they were getting the resources the immediate resources to the incident first and carrying out a number of paging tasks and and then they would
01:51:04 of paging tasks and and then they would have got down to paging the program control duty manager right
01:51:18 we have we have make pumps 8 @ o1 1908 yes so in your experience would it would it take it ordinarily take 10 minutes to
01:51:32 it take it ordinarily take 10 minutes to be paid for the page to come through to you it it could do and on this occasion and between the mate pump site and
01:51:43 and between the mate pump site and completing the action lists I believe they had a number of other makeups that they needed to prioritize yes okay so
01:51:56 would it be right to say that in fact you should have been paged 10 minutes earlier when it was well it was at eight pumps and not but no 129 when it had reached 20 no I think it would have been
01:52:10 reached 20 no I think it would have been right and proper for them to as they did prioritize and descending and mobilizing of resources to the incident they can only do one action at a time with three of them undertaking those actions I
01:52:21 of them undertaking those actions I think they did pretty work to poach me within 10 minutes then you say on page three that I called in I could hear
01:52:35 three that I called in I could hear background noise that indicated the control room was incredibly busy and you say you called in what did you call it on and I rang one of the admin lines it goes speaks to the officer the watch
01:52:47 goes speaks to the officer the watch okay did you call them your personal mobile that's okay can I have your Brigade mobile okay in terms of your personal radio communications equipment
01:52:58 personal radio communications equipment what have you what did you carry with you that night you had your Brigade mobile I had two Brigade mobile phone and we are issued with air wave radios handhelds same as senior offices okay
01:53:11 handhelds same as senior offices okay and is there a reason why you used the brigade mobile to call in and not the wave radio because most senior officers when they're responding to a page will
01:53:23 when they're responding to a page will ring in the office of the watch and to talk to them about the incident prior to and being ordered on so they would only communicate with the radio if they were
01:53:34 communicate with the radio if they were booking status to status 3 yes I see that can alright and you can have a conversation on the telephone you can't have an already it much easier yes I said ok and do you remember who you spoke to that you said Pete Mae is that
01:53:45 spoke to that you said Pete Mae is that right
01:53:46 right I believe I spoke to Pete May first when he informed me that come fire and and when I rang up again I believe I spoke to Debbie room okay and did on the
01:54:01 to Debbie room okay and did on the initial call what did Pete mate any do you remember not specific data I believe he said he had gone up to ten maybe but I would be getting okay can we just
01:54:14 I would be getting okay can we just continue in this document the ORR and look at page 68 and here we have a
01:54:25 look at page 68 and here we have a another call just sorry is it and wait for it to come up this is oh one 3908
01:54:33 som Smith calls brigade control for an update she is told by Aon rail that it's going absolutely crazy
01:54:45 rail that it's going absolutely crazy and they are taking lots of FSG calls Sol Smith asks if there are any long FSG calls where people are on the line she's advised om Norman is on the line to
01:54:57 advised om Norman is on the line to someone a service myth also checks if the vision system is caping in instruct a om real to prioritize the FSG calls over the resource management log notifications and confirms who will be
01:55:09 notifications and confirms who will be attending Stratford
01:55:14 is that the second call yang burnt yes that was made on right now I think in fact we we've got the transcript of that call so we can look at more precisely what he was what'd you say
01:55:26 precisely what he was what'd you say there but do you remember you remember making that call yes okay the transcript is no you oh you were right yes thank you so much what's that quit
01:55:37 yes thank you so much what's that quit saying look Rui you okay to look at a transcript yes of a call on the night okay let's let's do that it's in the master documents bundle at tab 65 and
01:55:52 master documents bundle at tab 65 and the reference is inq1 nine eight zero
01:56:04 and this is a transcript and at the top it says control admin line at oh one 3908 from vco2
01:56:21 and it's only a pet it's only a couple of pages and we can see that and officer of the watch is debbie real yes
01:56:33 of the watch is debbie real yes okay and she says you say it's Jo and she says oh all right it's going absolutely crazy and you say I know that me are you in
01:56:44 and you say I know that me are you in charge whereas Chris when you say I know Debbie didn't you did you already know that it was as it were going crazy I must have or I could hear it in the background okay on the on what up uh-oh
01:56:55 background okay on the on what up uh-oh in the control in the control room we could hear feasibly hear the noise right when you rang in did it sound unusual to you yes it sounded extremely busy right and Debbie says to you in the
01:57:12 busy right and Debbie says to you in the next part
01:57:13 next part Alex is in charge we're getting loads of calls faster Bible doughnuts cause it's gone just got absolutely manic you know you know it's a 25 pump phone now either I did hear yes about that just for
01:57:25 I did hear yes about that just for information is about 130 ones that have just just gone 25 and then you ask just below halfway down okay are we all right
01:57:36 below halfway down okay are we all right have we got any long ones and you asked the same question
01:57:47 a little bit lower down have we got only ones that are prolonged are we on the phone my question is why were you asking about long calls and just in my
01:58:00 about long calls and just in my experience they are the most difficult they are quite traumatic and and it gave you a sense of what was happening so it
01:58:11 you a sense of what was happening so it gave me a bit of situational awareness before I had got to the control room yeah okay
01:58:20 yeah okay and is there a particular length of time in your head it was there that was significant for a court yes so part of our first survival guidance training and
01:58:32 our first survival guidance training and we instructed to have a session about building construction and fire behavior and again it's that compartment being
01:58:43 and again it's that compartment being able to withstand roughly an hour and that was in my mind okay can I just complete the evidential picture by showing you something just as I think I think there's something you should look
01:58:55 think there's something you should look at which make just complete the picture document terms if you go to tab 20:54
01:59:08 document terms if you go to tab 20:54 it's the control debrief manuscript documents that's what we looked at earlier and a page five so so this is lfb 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 at page 5 and I'm
01:59:28 lfb 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 at page 5 and I'm interested in your your last answer just want to pin it down to a document you can see 2/3 of the way down that page and just to remind you this is the this
01:59:39 and just to remind you this is the this is the manuscript note of the of the reviews the control debrief it says next to a bullet point has Lacan all in mind one hour time lag what's that
01:59:55 one hour time lag what's that what is that a reference to do you think so the one hour time mark yes it is the compartment ation beginning to break down as I've already said and and Lacan all in mind was that in a way that our
02:00:07 all in mind was that in a way that our control had been in a similar situation with alecko incident right so they've been on the phone for a prolonged period of time talking to callers in distress
02:00:19 of time talking to callers in distress okay say so if somebody has been on a fast survival guidance call for an hour what does that what does that tell you as a as a supervising officer for me it would tell me that the
02:00:32 officer for me it would tell me that the crews are having difficulty putting out the fire or reaching that caller and and that we would have run through everything we could have done to help that caller and that we would have given
02:00:43 that caller and that we would have given them and tried to protect them as much as we could
02:00:58 you all right to continue for another yes ten minutes isn't yeah how you getting on this afternoon I mean if
02:01:09 getting on this afternoon I mean if you've got a I think now I'm getting on very well and we're going to continue into tomorrow and we are in any event in any event so I'm certainly not going to finish I'm afraid we went we weren't planning to so on the time I didn't know
02:01:25 planning to so on the time I didn't know because I wonder whether we're getting towards the end of the day for this we are saying if we stopped if we stopped now that would be no there would be no
02:01:36 now that would be no there would be no difficulties as far as I'm concerned attendant have you reached a sensible point we could know right five minutes or so ever though since you quite like to break off wouldn't it five minutes is
02:01:47 to break off wouldn't it five minutes is fine I'll be happy to well it is this a sensible point in your question to mr. not not completely well would you like
02:01:58 not not completely well would you like to make finder completely or more completely self simply for sensible point yes but not more than let's say five minutes in absolutely no on your in
02:02:13 five minutes in absolutely no on your in your witness statement on page three you refer to this conversation with Debbie Rio who says and you say who informed me that they were dealing with multiple
02:02:24 that they were dealing with multiple FSGS at the scene and I advised her that I would be in within thirty minutes
02:02:37 when she told you that that's a summary obviously when she told you that
02:02:51 what did you what did you think you were going into face an extremely busy controlling and noisy but it was demands
02:03:04 controlling and noisy but it was demands being made of all our control officers and our supervisors and to mobilize resources and to provide information
02:03:16 now what this transcript and what your statement doesn't I think record is watts of our survival guidance is actually being given to the control room to to callers by the control room staff
02:03:29 to to callers by the control room staff do you remember did you know what that fast survival guidance would have been yes that they would have spoken to each
02:03:40 yes that they would have spoken to each individual color and that caller would have indicated that they cannot leave their premise and then they would have provided advice depending on the location of that caller okay so is it
02:03:53 location of that caller okay so is it right that at that stage you you were assuming that the practice based on the policy would be being followed by the CRA yes I see okay and given that there
02:04:06 CRA yes I see okay and given that there were lots of people trapped in their flats who were being given FSG advice what did that tell you about how the fire was behaving if anything and I
02:04:18 fire was behaving if anything and I didn't really focus on how the fire was behaving if I'm honest I was more focused on what advice we could give to those callers and how we could assist those as as where our control officers okay so with regard to smoke and the
02:04:32 okay so with regard to smoke and the impact of that fire yes we were considering that but not what the fire behavior was at the time now we don't see either in the ORR or in the transcript of the call
02:04:45 the ORR or in the transcript of the call anything about asking what the operational plan was at the scene did you have any thoughts at the time about finding out what was actually going on on the ground no not at the time while I
02:04:57 on the ground no not at the time while I was on route I didn't know okay and say you had your you had your Brigade mobile with you you could you also had your your airway friendly because you hear on
02:05:08 your airway friendly because you hear on the air wave radio what was happening yes but listen to me I didn't listen to it all the way through okay all right I think that is a public video good yes
02:05:19 think that is a public video good yes thank you very much well this was I'm sorry that we haven't been finished or evidence today I'm gonna have to ask you to come back tomorrow okay but I think if we tried to finish it tonight we being here for a
02:05:30 finish it tonight we being here for a very long time is much longer than you'd like to be here so I'm going to ask you to leave us now and we'll resume at 10 o'clock is that I hope not very inconvenient 10 o'clock tomorrow then
02:05:43 inconvenient 10 o'clock tomorrow then and your evidence thank you very much give me the other
02:06:00 very good mr. two minutes to give give us a little bit of a hint as to where we going to be we will be most of tomorrow but I'll have another look at my notes overnight
02:06:10 overnight do you think mr. tomorrow with this witness I do think so and I should just also say that that it is very likely that some core participants will have further questions as a result of today's
02:06:23 further questions as a result of today's evidence and questions as we go during tomorrow and it's right that I should give them an opportunity to collect those and give them to me so that I can
02:06:34 those and give them to me so that I can consider them yeah shall be something very important witness yeah in that sense so well it might be sensible at various points to have and we tried the usual breaks anyway yes absolutely and
02:06:46 usual breaks anyway yes absolutely and it may be that it would be convenient when you get to the end of the questions that you currently want all to have a another break yes so that so there can
02:06:57 another break yes so that so there can be some consideration further questions absolutely we have been trying to do that as we go at on each each individual witness but decided with this one is particularly important I think it's also important not to rush rush this evidence
02:07:08 important not to rush rush this evidence so if we do end up taking all day tomorrow I do not think that that will affect the timetable adversely good very well thinking 10 o'clock tomorrow please