Watch Manager Richard Merrick, driver of Command Unit 8, gives evidence about intercepting FSG calls from control and the overwhelming scale of fire survival guidance information.
00:00:06 Good morning everyone. Welcome to today's hearing. Uh we're now going to hear from a different witness I think. Is that right Mr. Yes. Good morning Mr. Chairman. Yes. We're now going to hear from Daniel Merik.
00:00:16 Merik. Thank you. If you could please be called.
00:00:35 Right. Would you repeat the words for me? I do solemn, solemnly, sincerely, and truly I do solemnly, sincerely, and truly declare and affirm
00:00:47 declare and affirm declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth shall be the truth the whole truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth and nothing but the truth. Thank you very much, Mr. Merrick.
00:00:59 Thank you very much, Mr. Merrick. Yes, Mr.
00:01:00 Yes, Mr. Yes. Um, good morning, Mr. Merik. Um, first of all, could you please give the inquiry your full name? Daniel James Merrick. And uh can I just say first thank you very much for coming here today to assist the investigation
00:01:13 here today to assist the investigation uh of the matters uh in our inquiry. Um it really is very much appreciated. My questions are intended to be short and simple. They don't always work out that way. If at any stage you don't
00:01:24 way. If at any stage you don't understand the question or don't hear it, I'm very happy to repeat it or to put it in a different way just say. Okay. Okay. Um similarly if you want to sit down or at any stage you want a
00:01:35 sit down or at any stage you want a break just signal and we will take a break.
00:01:37 break. Okay.
00:01:39 Okay. Um could I ask you please to start by taking your statement your witness statement dated the 27th of October 2017 and that is ME quadruple07760
00:01:52 and that should be in the little bundle in front of you. Um, you also have on your desk in front of you to to your right a screen uh on which uh your statement and any other documents I'm
00:02:03 statement and any other documents I'm going to show you will be exhibited. Uh, and if you want also you can look at the screens at the back of the of the room. Um, it's up to you. And so when we go to a particular passage, what tends to happen is that the documents director
00:02:15 happen is that the documents director who's in there um will highlight a particular passage in yellow and we look at it close up. Um, have you read your statement recently?
00:02:25 recently? I have.
00:02:25 I have. And can you please confirm that its statements are true? It is.
00:02:29 It is. It is. And have you discussed your statement or your evidence that you're going to give today with anybody before you came here? No.
00:02:36 No. Um, you also have some contemporaneous notes dated the 16th of June 2017. Uh, which are at me quadruple05459. And we may need to look at those as
00:02:48 And we may need to look at those as well. They should also be in your in your file. There's a tab B, I think, in your file and you'll probably find the notes behind that. Yeah,
00:02:57 Yeah, but they they'll come up on the screen as well.
00:02:59 as well. Okay.
00:02:59 Okay. Yes, in fact on the screen at the moment. So, do you just confirm for us that those are yours?
00:03:06 Um, I haven't had the chance to review my contemporaneous notes recently. Um just
00:03:19 well let's not take time on that on that now. Yeah. I I I may go back to the notes as we go. I may not. And if we if we go to the notes and there's anything in there that you disagree with or you want to
00:03:30 you disagree with or you want to correct, that's not a problem. Okay. Okay. Can I just start by asking you about your career? When did you join the London Fire Brigade? July 2003.
00:03:41 July 2003. And what is your present rank? Watch manager. Right. And as at the 13th 14th of June, were you a watch manager? I was.
00:03:49 I was. And were you at Fulham? I was.
00:03:51 I was. Right. Uh and what did that role involve?
00:03:54 involve? I was a command support officer. And what's that? Uh command support officer um rides the command unit. Um command units are called to uh 4.5 fires and above and uh
00:04:08 called to uh 4.5 fires and above and uh um special service incidents and any incident that um an incident commander would require the facilities of command unit
00:04:19 and the command unit was that kept or held at at Fulham Fire Station? It is. Yes. Right.
00:04:27 Now, on the call out to Granfell Tower, you you say in your statement uh at the bottom of page one, uh that uh on Wednesday the 14th of
00:04:38 uh that uh on Wednesday the 14th of June, 2017, I was on duty at 1:15 a.m. when I was mobilized to a six pump fire along with watch manager Kentfield at Fulham Fire Station to Grrenfell Tower in
00:04:50 Station to Grrenfell Tower in Kensington. Now, uh, watch manager Kentfield, he he's also or was also watch manager at Fulham with you. Yes, it was the two of us riding the command unit that night. Right. And was he also a command support
00:05:02 Right. And was he also a command support officer?
00:05:02 officer? Yes.
00:05:03 Yes. Right.
00:05:04 Right. And who was the senior of the two? We're both equal. He was the designated team leader for the shift. I was a designated driver. Right.
00:05:12 Right. Um, it doesn't necessarily mean that he was in charge. It's just the role that he takes for the shift and the role that I take.
00:05:19 I take. Right. And how is that role uh distributed? We decide between ourselves, usually alternating, right? Okay. And is there a station manager at Fulham that you or he or both
00:05:31 manager at Fulham that you or he or both of you report to? Yes, there was a station manager at Fulham. Um
00:05:38 the station as a command unit, we work as a team. We um work between ourselves to to make the decisions but any reporting up the chain
00:05:49 decisions but any reporting up the chain will go to the station manager. This the station manager though isn't uh command unit trained so doesn't know the intricate details of the command unit.
00:06:00 intricate details of the command unit. I follow who was the station manager on duty that night? I'm just trying to think cuz we we had a few changes. Um, but I believe it was um,
00:06:12 bear with me, Jason Jones. Station manager Jason Jones.
00:06:17 Jones. Right. Thank you. Now, you say you were mobilized to Granfell Tower at about 1:15 a.m. or at 1:15 a.m. Um, did
00:06:28 1:15 a.m. or at 1:15 a.m. Um, did anybody else go with you apart from watch manager Kenfield? No, just the two of us on the command unit.
00:06:33 unit. Right. And Cu8 is your command unit. Yes. Right. And that has a comm normally a two-man crew. Um minimum of two maximum of four. Right. And could you just explain in
00:06:46 Right. And could you just explain in very brief terms if you can what a command unit does? Essentially it supports the incident commander with the command and control of the incident. Um on arrival at an
00:06:59 of the incident. Um on arrival at an incident the team leader would d their fire gear and go and leers with the incident commander. They then agree if the command unit was to take over as the incident command pump. Even though it's
00:07:10 incident command pump. Even though it's not a pumping appliance, it's still referred to as an incident command pump or ICP. On doing that, the team leader would then relay that message back to in this case me as the driver staying on
00:07:23 this case me as the driver staying on the unit. Um I would then inform control that Charlie had become the ICP. Um so all messages to control would then go through the command unit. Um other
00:07:36 through the command unit. Um other things that we do we would map an incident generally. Um we have four PCs on the command unit with various functions. We have access to brigade
00:07:48 functions. We have access to brigade policies, procedures, um whiteboards for noting down things. Um there's a a downloadable uh link uh through to
00:07:59 downloadable uh link uh through to police helicopter so we can get aerial views if there's a police helicopter in the area. Um yeah and various functions on the PCs themselves. Okay. And um what about a CSS command
00:08:12 Okay. And um what about a CSS command support service? That that's the um one of the computer systems,
00:08:16 systems, right? And what does that do? Um again that can be used for mapping. Um it and on that you can show sectorization where um not not
00:08:27 sectorization where um not not individuals are. Well you can show where individuals are but obviously individuals move around all the time but certainly uh u sectors machines ladders things like that. Um it records all
00:08:41 things like that. Um it records all messages to control. So if you need to refer back to anything that's already been sent
00:08:47 been sent um
00:08:50 um you there is an organizational chart which is essentially a plan of the structure of command at an incident. The monitoring officer, the incident commander, uh sector commanders
00:09:04 incident commander, uh sector commanders and various operations that are taking part underneath those individuals. Um,
00:09:12 Um, you can download images onto there. Sorry, I'm just trying to work my way through all the different things. Um, there's conferencing um facility to be
00:09:24 there's conferencing um facility to be able to um exchange dialogue with the people at control. Uh, and there's the ability to video uh record video and audio on the unit itself.
00:09:36 audio on the unit itself. Right. And um you mentioned a minute ago that the CSS would uh record messages sent to control. Yes. Would it also record messages received from control?
00:09:47 record messages received from control? Yes.
00:09:48 Yes. And how would they come up? Would they come up on a on a screen? Would they? Yes.
00:09:52 Yes. And the messages that were coming from control, let's say by radio transmission, would they would they appear on the screen or would they have to be sent by control through a different system?
00:10:03 a different system? All all messages to and from control control type out and it's recorded and then transmitted from there. Right. Uh so just can you just tell me?
00:10:15 Right. Uh so just can you just tell me? So it's sorry to interrupt but so that can take a couple of minutes for them to type up the messages. I see. Okay. So they so control types up a message. Is that is that on the vision system?
00:10:27 system? Uh from the control point of view I believe it is but I'm afraid I'm not the expert on that. Right. And so, all right. So, so I'm just trying to get a feel for what the CSS system receives,
00:10:38 feel for what the CSS system receives, but it's a typed message which comes from control. Yes. I see. Okay. And then you have when you're sending a message back to control using the CSS, is somebody in the
00:10:49 using the CSS, is somebody in the command unit also typing? Uh I I don't know if we're getting it crosswires. All radio um messages from the command unit to control.
00:11:00 from the command unit to control. control will type hub and then we have access to those type messages. I see.
00:11:05 I see. Um there is a separate facility for sending and receiving messages which is very rarely used. In fact I have never used that facility but with the you you do like I say have access to the radio
00:11:17 do like I say have access to the radio messages that have been sent. So the CSS system just so I've got it in my head clearly is is a system for rec whereby control records that the radio message
00:11:29 control records that the radio message which comes from the control unit. Yes.
00:11:32 Yes. And they type it up and record it and send it back to you essentially as a written confirmation of the message you've sent them. Yeah.
00:11:38 Yeah. I follow. Um, do you also have um well, what other meth what other methods of communication does a command unit such as CU8 have with brigade control?
00:11:50 as CU8 have with brigade control? There's two fixed phones. There's the mobile phone. Um, there's a main scheme radios. There's handheld radios. You can't uh
00:12:01 handheld radios. You can't uh communicate with control with that. So, yeah, the main scheme radio, the fixed phones, and the mobile phone. What about air? What about airwave radios? No, we I mean airwave works as main
00:12:14 No, we I mean airwave works as main scheme. So that's essentially the same kind of thing. Okay. Now, um does the command unit require specialist training?
00:12:25 training? Yes.
00:12:26 Yes. Okay. Did you you've had specialist training?
00:12:28 training? And can you just explain what that training involves? I think it was an 8-day course which I uh undertook in March 2015. Um, it's essentially dealing with the
00:12:41 Um, it's essentially dealing with the functions of the command unit. So, you wouldn't necessarily do training on specific types of incidents. Right. I see. And did did you get training
00:12:52 training at all on how to manage fire survival guidance calls from within the command unit?
00:13:03 Um,
00:13:08 I'm afraid I I really can't remember. Right.
00:13:13 Uh as a watch manager, uh would you have had training in any event
00:13:22 event a as to incident command
00:13:27 and the policies around incident command? Um
00:13:34 Um in my previous role as a crew manager um then yes I'd had training on incident command right uh and various scenarios high-rise
00:13:46 high-rise incidents being one of those we did as a command unit we did training amongst ourselves refreshing ourselves on policy and being familiar with our role um at
00:13:58 and being familiar with our role um at the incidents themselves. uh the way we would um the roles that we would take at at the high-rise incident. Right. Okay. Did you have any training specifically on policy 790 which is fire
00:14:11 specifically on policy 790 which is fire survival guidance?
00:14:18 Yes. Um the training would be the certainly the refresher training that we would do would be a case of going through the policy ourselves, refreshing ourselves as watch managers. We were we were
00:14:30 as watch managers. We were we were allowed to train that way. I see. Just just so that we're we're clear entirely. Can I ask you to be shown um policy 790 which is in tab five of the policies
00:14:41 which is in tab five of the policies bundle we've got here. Uh and um this is entitled uh classified guidance calls and it's the it's the policy current as of April 2014.
00:14:54 Uh and uh just there there's the first page. I don't know whether that prompts a recollection of of this particular policy from your train and just I'm not going to run you through the detail at
00:15:05 going to run you through the detail at all. I just wanted to show you um paragraph five which is a lengthy paragraph dealing with information transfer to the incident. Mhm.
00:15:14 Mhm. Uh and if you go to paragraph five which is on page two internally at the bottom of the page and then just over the next page just just scan it. I'm not going to ask you details. Um if you go to the
00:15:27 ask you details. Um if you go to the next page, uh you can see that there's a long list of things that uh control has to do by way of gathering information, contacting the initial command pump, uh and then um what the ICP radio operator
00:15:39 and then um what the ICP radio operator should do at 57 and then 59 all FSG call information must be passed to the IC who will decide what information to take etc.
00:15:50 etc. uh and uh
00:15:53 uh and uh uh
00:15:55 uh matters like that. Is that something that you remember being trained on? It's something I'm familiar with. I can't remember my training exactly. I I will have had training on this. Right. Um and just paragraph nine
00:16:10 Right. Um and just paragraph nine or eight and nine actually. Um a eight is the advice to fire survival guidance callers and nine is communication with control.
00:16:21 communication with control. Uh and
00:16:24 Uh and nine particularly if it is vital that control is kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG call. The fact that controllers is aware of the actions being carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance the
00:16:36 incident ground will greatly enhance the advice given to FSG callers. Just in general terms, were you were you trained on how to go about adhering to that policy?
00:16:44 policy? Yes, you were. And as at your role in the Granville Tower, was that training something you had in your mind as to how to go about keeping communications
00:16:56 to go about keeping communications going?
00:16:56 going? Mhm.
00:16:57 Mhm. Yes. Okay. Um can I then ask you um go back to the night itself um you say at the top of page two um you say the third line as I was the driver of the fire
00:17:10 line as I was the driver of the fire vehicle call sign CU8 I never had the chance to read any mobile data terminal information um do you know whether watch manager Kentfield looked at it I'm afraid I don't doubt now
00:17:21 I'm afraid I don't doubt now okay did you have any discussion uh with watch manager Kentfield on route as to what as to what to expect when you got Uh, as we were approaching, we approached from the south.
00:17:33 approached from the south. Um, I believe it was along Sdar Road and we could already see the tower in bits, just in gaps between the houses and um, between about 8 and 10 floors of the
00:17:44 between about 8 and 10 floors of the tower already, right?
00:17:46 right? So, we already had an idea of what we were expecting when we got there, right? What did you think when you saw that?
00:17:55 Not only did we have a big fire, but immediately I realized this is something that neither of us would have dealt with before. Right.
00:18:05 Did you hear any radio messages as you were on route? Yes, we heard the the initial call was to uh six pump fire. Um often high-rise incidents will
00:18:19 fire. Um often high-rise incidents will go straight to six pumps even if they're only small fires. So, we didn't think it'd be anything out of the ordinary. Uh however it was made up a number of times as we were on route which instantly tells us this is something quite
00:18:30 tells us this is something quite significant.
00:18:34 Right. And were you getting um mult what what we call multiple calls? Could you hear the multiple calls on route?
00:18:42 on route? I can't remember that message being sent.
00:18:44 sent. Right.
00:18:45 Right. It may have been. I I just can't remember.
00:18:47 remember. What about persons reported? You remember that?
00:18:53 I I'm I'm sure it did, but I can't actually remember the message. All right. Um, was there anything in particular that you as the driver of command unit 8 would be listening out
00:19:04 command unit 8 would be listening out for given the role that you would be playing?
00:19:07 playing? Yeah, all the messages really to get an idea of what to expect when we get there.
00:19:11 there. Right. Were you or would that include um FSG information specifically? Did you hear any any FSG information or FSG calls?
00:19:22 FSG calls? No. Um,
00:19:25 No. Um, the first FSG information I remember hearing was after we arrived when watch manager Kentfield rigged and went to lies with the IC. Uh, I got onto the
00:19:37 lies with the IC. Uh, I got onto the back of the command unit to start readying the functions on there and I could hear control trying to contact the ICP cuz we hadn't taken over by then. um they couldn't get through and having
00:19:49 um they couldn't get through and having seen the fire already and assuming that all personnel were most probably involved in other roles, I intercepted the message and it was FSG information
00:20:00 the message and it was FSG information that was coming through. Right. So I collected that information. Okay. I'm going to come to some specifics about that um later because that's something I do want to ask you about. But but just on the on route um
00:20:13 route um uh you you of course were the first command unit to be mobilized to the incident.
00:20:18 incident. Yeah.
00:20:19 Yeah. Did did you know that? Yes,
00:20:20 Yes, you did. So in terms of the system that you would expect to be in place for managing FSG information before you got there.
00:20:28 there. Mhm.
00:20:28 Mhm. Um what were you expecting? It depends on what the IC wants us to do. the first uh CU would usually take over as the ICP, but often with FSGS just because of the level of priority
00:20:39 just because of the level of priority that they are, the incident commander can request that we're just we become we would become the first CU would become the designated FSG command unit.
00:20:50 the designated FSG command unit. It it depends on what the IC wants us to do.
00:20:53 do. Okay.
00:20:57 A and just going on in your statement um you you you say something to that effect at the top of page four of your statement you say brigade policy we just
00:21:08 statement you say brigade policy we just look at it together brigade policy is that one of the pumps first pumps in attendance will be designated ICP by the IC until relieved by a command unit at which stage the incident commander would
00:21:19 which stage the incident commander would normally be based on the command unit for the majority of the time. Um and then and in the third paragraph
00:21:30 in the third paragraph you you say um
00:21:35 um the standard practice would be when trap residents call 999 control would relay the information to the ICP who would then relay this information to the firefighters. Um were you expecting that to be the
00:21:48 Um were you expecting that to be the case here? Yes. And did you manage to find out anything on your way because we're still on route at the moment to the incident about whether that procedure was being followed at that time?
00:22:03 I'm sorry I don't quite understand the question.
00:22:05 question. Okay. On the way to the incident, yeah,
00:22:07 yeah, did you find out whether the procedure you've described here in uh the third paragraph was being followed? So whether control was passing information to the
00:22:19 control was passing information to the ICP on scene at the time. Yes. I I I wouldn't know. Okay.
00:22:23 Okay. I I don't remember hearing FSG information being passed on route. Right. And did you find out which appliance had been designated ICP
00:22:34 appliance had been designated ICP before?
00:22:35 before? I heard it. I heard the call sign cuz I heard control trying to contact them, but I can't remember which one it was. Right. And did you know who was manning it and taking and taking FSG information? No, I I wouldn't know. Okay.
00:22:48 No, I I wouldn't know. Okay. Now,
00:22:51 on arrival, I just want to focus on a moment of arrival with you if I can. Um, we have your arrival time as 0130 and 48 seconds. Um, would that sound
00:23:02 and 48 seconds. Um, would that sound about right to you? Yeah.
00:23:03 Yeah. Okay. Now, at the bottom of page three of your statement, uh you you say that you um cited the command unit on Bowmore
00:23:14 um cited the command unit on Bowmore Road Junction with Granfell Road where the vehicle I was driving was parked up and remained for the duration. Um I wonder if we can just identify where that is. I'm going to show you a a
00:23:27 where that is. I'm going to show you a a map that isn't uh isn't yours. Um but
00:23:36 um we may be able to use it. Sir,
00:23:43 Sir, of course. Yes. I'm sorry. The usher normally would done that for you, but I think you can manage. I think I can do. Yeah.
00:24:02 If I could just ask you to look at um me triple013034
00:24:12 and it'll come up on the on the screen. This is a a map. Um in fact, this is an exhibit to an earlier firefighter witness statement, Mr. Abel's witness statement. It's quite a good map um
00:24:24 statement. It's quite a good map um showing the tower and the north, east, south, and west orientations. Um roughly where do you think you parked CU8? If I may, it's not actually on this map.
00:24:37 If I may, it's not actually on this map. Yeah,
00:24:37 Yeah, but it would be uh I believe this is Brent Road here. Yes.
00:24:42 Yes. Uh and Bow Bowmore Road runs down here. It's lower down. We were on the junction just off the map.
00:24:48 map. Right.
00:24:48 Right. Right.
00:24:49 Right. Okay. Okay. Well, I can show I can show you I can do better actually if you if I can ask you to be shown. ME triple013078
00:24:58 um which is an exhibit to uh Justin A. Burns witness statement that that's a less clear map. Um you've
00:25:10 that that's a less clear map. Um you've got the tower.
00:25:15 That's the tower there. Yeah. Yes, that's the tower there. that is actually looking sort of north to south as you go up. Um Oh, right. Yeah, as you go up the page. It may be the wrong way round. In fact, it is more.
00:25:27 wrong way round. In fact, it is more. So, we
00:25:27 So, we Yeah, we're just going to move around. I think we can just turn it round so that it orientates north to south and then we could probably see Baymore Road a bit more clearly.
00:25:39 a bit more clearly. Yes, that's that's that's very good. Right.
00:25:43 Right. Abel Road is to the is to the is to the southeast
00:25:47 southeast just there. Right. So where it says A. Yeah. Where where is the cycle higher station?
00:25:55 station? Okay. And that's where you parked C7. Yes.
00:25:57 Yes. Thank you very much. Okay. That's that's very clear.
00:26:05 Now I roughly how long do you think it would take to walk from where you parked just there to the tower?
00:26:16 A minute, 2 minutes, right?
00:26:19 right? And after you parked, did you leave the command unit or did you stay with it? No, I stayed with it. Watch manager Kempfield went to leaz with the IC. I stayed with the command unit. Okay. When you when you parked, did you
00:26:31 Okay. When you when you parked, did you maybe you were too far away, but did you see a watch manager uh working on the bonnet of a car with a forward information board? Uh not to my memory. No. No. And did you speak to the incident
00:26:42 No. And did you speak to the incident commander yourself? No.
00:26:43 No. So that was that was Kent that was watch manager Kentfield was. Yes.
00:26:46 Yes. And do you remember who the incident commander was at the time you arrived? No. Um
00:26:54 usually all messages sent No. Usually all informative message in messages start with the name of the incident commander. Had an informative message sent I would
00:27:06 Had an informative message sent I would have heard it. Um I can't specifically remember hearing it at that time. Also another thing that we're in the habit of doing there's a
00:27:17 we're in the habit of doing there's a poster on the command unit which is another organizational chart like I was describing earlier on the PC but this is um one on the whiteboard. I'd write with a um a marker the name of
00:27:28 I'd write with a um a marker the name of the IC there. I can't remember if I specifically did it then, but it's something that I mean that we were in the habit of doing at every incident that we went to. Okay. And
00:27:37 Okay. And did you manage to locate the appliance that was acting as the incident command pump?
00:27:42 pump? Um it wouldn't have been my job to do that. I wouldn't have been looking for that.
00:27:45 that. I see. Who whose job was that? What manager came for? Well, he he wouldn't have gone directly to the ICP. He would have gone directly to the incident commander. Yes, I believe that's what he did. Anyway,
00:27:56 I believe that's what he did. Anyway, okay. Now, um on page four of your statement, if you look at p paragraph two,
00:28:07 if you look at p paragraph two, you say in the second or f first line and second sentence, I set up the various command support system functions CSS
00:28:18 and you've described what those are for us. Um, how long did it take you to set up those systems? Um,
00:28:27 you turn the generator on, which takes seconds. You turn the PCs on, and then it takes a while for the PCs to warm up as it does with most PCs, right?
00:28:36 right? Um, the lights, um, there's a mast that needs to go up. And like I say, with the organizational chat on the wall, I'd start filling out the details of that. It it's not a case of from start to
00:28:49 It it's not a case of from start to finish. It's pretty much an ongoing process as the information starts coming in. Then you you start gathering that. But if it just to get the thing turned on, all the computers on it can take a
00:29:02 on, all the computers on it can take a good three, four, maybe five minutes. It also computers being computers can depend how long they decide they want to take to turn on. Yeah. Yes.
00:29:13 Yeah. Yes. Uh,
00:29:15 Uh, did you have any problems with the CSS on CU8?
00:29:20 on CU8? Um, in general or on that night? On that night? Not that I can remember. Okay.
00:29:26 Okay. I I'll I'll be honest though, I used very little of the computers that night because almost as soon as I was starting to get everything ready, I could hear control. I intercepted the
00:29:38 could hear control. I intercepted the call from control to the ICP. Right.
00:29:42 Right. Do you do you remember whether your computer your CSS crashed on your CU? I don't I don't know. I don't remember that happening. Right
00:29:56 now on your on arrival uh before you did the intercept, do you know what system was in place for the management of FSG calls?
00:30:07 management of FSG calls? What the crews would have been doing on the ground? Yeah. You remember what they were doing? I I don't know what they were doing specifically, but I know what the procedure is. Right. Okay. Um well, let's just see how
00:30:19 Right. Okay. Um well, let's just see how we go in terms of what actually happened. Did you make contact with the ICP to find out what uh FSG information was coming into it? Um no, but then I wouldn't at that time,
00:30:30 Um no, but then I wouldn't at that time, right?
00:30:35 Uh who would watch manager Kentfield would would leaz with the IC and any information like that would be passed on to him. Okay. Would he also pass it back to you? Uh yes.
00:30:46 Uh yes. Okay.
00:30:47 Okay. Um
00:30:50 to be honest actually not necessarily in the greater scheme of things yes you would. But obviously it's a very dynamic incident. Uh things are taking course as
00:31:01 incident. Uh things are taking course as a matter of priority. So the calls coming in were the priority. The calls that the incident ground would have already had would have been passed on. That's information that they got and later with collecting the information
00:31:12 later with collecting the information when we're trying to get around a picture. Yes, we we'd want that then. But at the time the calls coming in and the information going to the bridge head is a priority. If they've already got that information, then there's no point
00:31:23 that information, then there's no point at that time, it's not a priority at that time to pass that information back to me.
00:31:28 to me. Right. Um, was it important though for you when setting up and and as it were coming into an already dynamic situation to find out what the existing system was
00:31:42 to find out what the existing system was for receiving information on the fire ground from control about FSG calls and then how it was being communicated to the bridge head. Like I say, almost as soon as I was starting to
00:31:53 starting to um get the functions ready on the back of the CU, I could hear control trying to contact the ICP. I I didn't have time to find out those other bits beforehand. Right
00:32:05 Right now, in his contemporaneous notes, watch manager Kentfield says that uh he helped set up the fire survival
00:32:17 he helped set up the fire survival guidance system or communication system with watch a watch manager called Saddler um on the bonnet of a car between CU8 and the tower. Do you
00:32:28 between CU8 and the tower. Do you remember do you remember that happening? And you said you couldn't see it happening, but do you remember the the fact that he was doing that? Um, all I can say is not long after
00:32:39 Um, all I can say is not long after watch manager Kefield left to see you, I was receiving the FSG information and then passing it on to him on the incident ground. H how he was going about doing that, I never asked him,
00:32:50 about doing that, I never asked him, right?
00:32:51 right? I never asked him because it wasn't a priority for me to know that information. Okay.
00:33:00 Okay. Uh, I see. So, as soon as you started getting FSG information from control, you passed it to watch manager Kentfield. Yeah. On the handheld radios on channel
00:33:13 Yeah. On the handheld radios on channel 10. Uh, channel 10 generally is used between command support officers. So, we wouldn't be interfering with the fire ground uh messages which are on channel one.
00:33:23 one. Right. Okay. I didn't realize they say CU officers have their own designated channel. Yeah.
00:33:29 Yeah. Did you ever have any communication difficulties in using channel 10? Not not that I remember. Right. And so you communicated with
00:33:40 Right. And so you communicated with ease, did you with with watch manager Kentfield throughout the night? Um it Yeah, it it wasn't it was just in the um beginning stages of the incident that I was passing that information on
00:33:51 that I was passing that information on to him. Things changed shortly afterwards, probably within the first half hour, the process changed. Can you just tell us in brief terms how that process changed
00:34:02 that process changed as we come back to it and explore it in some detail? I suspect I was taking information from control. I was writing it down. I was passing it on to watch manager Kentfield. Um, and then
00:34:13 to watch manager Kentfield. Um, and then almost as soon as I do that, control will get back to me with more information and I'd follow the same process until um, at a given point, and I'm afraid I
00:34:25 um, at a given point, and I'm afraid I at a very rough guess 10 15 minutes into the incident, the command unit mobile phone, which I was carrying and I would have done as a driver, um, that rang and it was station manager Olif at control
00:34:37 it was station manager Olif at control who then started to pass the information via the mobile rather than the main scheme radio. So I carried on the same process with passing that information to watch manager Kenfield
00:34:48 watch manager Kenfield until um Charlie inform 7 Wembley's command unit arrived with watch managers Peckham and Harrison they and then station manager Egan as
00:35:00 they and then station manager Egan as well and shortly after um group manager Goodall
00:35:05 Goodall from then on we all worked as an FSG team the rest of the night I was collecting the information they would then pass it on. So at a point, and I'm afraid I can't remember what it was, I
00:35:16 afraid I can't remember what it was, I stopped passing the information on to watch manager Chemfield. I would give it to them and they would deal with it. We then moved onto um Ching form 7, which became the designated um FSGCU.
00:35:30 became the designated um FSGCU. Right. Charlie, you say Charlie form 7, Wembley's command unit. I I follow. Right. Um now that in terms of how you initially received messages
00:35:42 of how you initially received messages from brigade control uh to CU7 right at the start you say it was by radio was that main the main scheme radio is it right that's channel one channel four
00:35:53 channel four channel four so I see because we see references to RT4 uh in the short incident log we're going to come to that would be channel four would it
00:36:03 would it right now Um,
00:36:07 on page four in paragraph 2, we've just been looking at the the um CSS. You say in the second line, within moments of arriving, control were trying to contact
00:36:19 arriving, control were trying to contact the incident command pump to pass on fire survival guidance information.
00:36:27 Uh, and then you say, "Due to the heavy radio traffic, they were struggling to get through. I intercepted the calls from control, but I never took over as ICP at any time." Um,
00:36:42 how did you know that control was struggling to get through? Nobody was answering the radio on the ICP. They were calling them, but nobody was answering it. Who was telling you that?
00:36:53 Who was telling you that? I was listening to it. It's an open radio channel. So, so I can hear all all the radio messages sent on channel 4. I would have been able to hear. Everybody would be able to hear on that channel. Yes, I see.
00:37:05 Yes, I see. And
00:37:05 And and could you also see the fact that they were sending messages to the incident command pump on the CSS computer screen?
00:37:16 computer screen? No. No.
00:37:18 No. No. Um,
00:37:21 Um, no. on the CSS it only shows the uh messages between yourself that that vehicle so in our case Charlie form 8 and control it wouldn't show every message
00:37:32 wouldn't show every message I understand I understand okay so in terms of what you were hearing you could hear control radioing the ICP but not getting anything in response and who at control do you know was doing
00:37:44 and who at control do you know was doing that was it people who were actually on the other end of a call a 999 call or was it um a supervisor Uh just a I don't know. It was a control operator.
00:37:55 know. It was a control operator. Right. Uh
00:37:59 Right. Uh and that's on channel 4. Yes.
00:38:01 Yes. Right.
00:38:08 And how did you intercept the calls as you say you did? As they they called a number of times, two, three, maybe four times. they
00:38:20 two, three, maybe four times. they weren't getting an answer. Um, and because we were there, we were going to be taken over as the ICP. And I think to be honest, I probably had an idea what the information was going to be.
00:38:32 what the information was going to be. Um, I answered the radio and I can't remember what I said, but words to the effect of we're in attendance. Is there any information we can take? Right. And do you remember who you spoke to?
00:38:43 to? The control operator. I wouldn't know who that was. Okay. Now, can I just show you something? um in the ORR the operational response report. Now this is just so you know what it is. It's a document
00:38:54 know what it is. It's a document compiled by the London Fire Brigade in May this year which is a detailed timeline of the first hour um at Grenell Tower. And I just want to show you page 59.
00:39:13 And in fact, we we we've got a transcript as well, which I'll also show you, but this is a summary of it. So, let's just take it slowly. Um at 13524 at the bottom of the page um there is a
00:39:26 at the bottom of the page um there is a record that um uh control manager Norman uh rings team leader watch manager Daniel Merrick on CU8 who had booked in
00:39:38 Daniel Merrick on CU8 who had booked in attendance at the incident at 013048. She said she needs crews to go and check some flats. The CU say they're in the process of setting up. Watch manager Merrick also asks if the message has
00:39:50 Merrick also asks if the message has already been sent by radio. Norman says she doesn't know. Then she says that it's the 18th floor, referring to the question about radio message. She says, "Oh my god, there are so many." She says it's going to be every floor. And then
00:40:02 it's going to be every floor. And then over the page, we see some information passed to CU8. Sorry. Is that what the operator said to me? Well, I'm going to show you the transcript because yes, we have a we have a transcript of that call. Um, so
00:40:13 have a transcript of that call. Um, so but but just first of all in general terms, do you remember this conversation? I don't remember those words, but I remember the conversation. Okay. Um, do you remember whether this was a call to you uh on the radio, the
00:40:26 was a call to you uh on the radio, the mainstream radio, or or was this on the mobile already? I'm afraid I I'm pretty sure the only person I spoke to on the mobile phone was station manager Olive. Right. Um, like I say, I can remember
00:40:39 Right. Um, like I say, I can remember intercepting the radio call, taking FSG information. I can then remember spending most of the rest of the night on the mobile phone, but I I can remember very little of exact words that
00:40:50 remember very little of exact words that were exchanged. Right. I'm going to show you the transcript um of that call which is in tab 72
00:40:59 tab 72 of the documents bundle and it's in Q501
00:41:08 94
00:41:17 and and and just so you know what this is and can help us with it. It's a a transcript which uh has been created from the an admin line call
00:41:31 been created from the an admin line call and it's timed at 01 3524
00:41:37 and you can see it says control FSG information flat 111 and flat 175 CU8. Um and it at page two at the the start
00:41:49 Um and it at page two at the the start it says unknown something is occupied going on and then cu Charlie uniform 8 and then control says hire it's control here listen I need I know you just got there but I need some flats to be
00:42:00 there but I need some flats to be checked at this at this place sorry sorry to interrupt this is a radio conversation yes this is what we understand to be well this is one of one of my questions actually um we've got this recorded in
00:42:13 actually um we've got this recorded in the operational respon response report uh as uh a a radio uh message. Um an ad well an admin call. That's what
00:42:25 an ad well an admin call. That's what we've been told it is. It's an admin call and it's a transcript of an admin call. And one of my my question my first question was going to be how would this have been transmitted to you? Would it be a radio call?
00:42:36 be a radio call? Uh the phrase admin call is not something I'm familiar with I'm afraid. Right. Okay. Um, if you go through it, it might bring something back. Well, let let's do that and let's see if it does bring something back. Uh, she
00:42:48 it does bring something back. Uh, she says uh a quarter of the way down the page, "Hi, it's control here. Listen, I need I know you just got there, but I need some flats to be checked at this place." And you say, "Yeah, I know. I Somebody CU8 says, yeah, I know. I could
00:43:00 Somebody CU8 says, yeah, I know. I could hear you trying to get through to 271. We're in attendance. We're in the process of taking over." And and then she says, "Right, can I just give you these flat
00:43:11 "Right, can I just give you these flat numbers, please, for you to go and check because we are inundated with calls over here."
00:43:16 here." And you and Cu says, "Sorry, say that again." Control, I need you I need you to get the crews to go and check people in flats that are trapped in flat. Yeah, go ahead. What flat numbers? Just
00:43:28 go ahead. What flat numbers? Just pausing there. Do you remember this initial or early conversation with control?
00:43:34 control? Yeah, like I say, I remember having the conversations. Um, the first conversation I remember having I remember having was on the radio with control,
00:43:44 control, right?
00:43:45 right? This doesn't sound like radio conversation. This sounds like a phone conversation. I see.
00:43:52 I see. It may not be. I don't know. It just radio conversations tend to be a bit more formal than that. But it may not be right. I I I yeah I can remember being on the radio
00:44:03 yeah I can remember being on the radio taking information. This is how I remember it. Whether my mind playing tricks with me, they may have called me on the phone first. I don't know. But this sounds more like a phone conversation.
00:44:14 phone conversation. And you say that because there there's none of the formal radio speak. Yeah. Unless words over um channeling for this is control, whatever. Unless that's been left out
00:44:25 whatever. Unless that's been left out this message, it doesn't sound like a the radio conversation. Can I just ask you if you go to the next page
00:44:33 page um about halfway down you see CU8 is recorded as saying one in 111 question mark and then somebody's put in
00:44:46 question mark and then somebody's put in overspeaking. Is it possible to oversp speak on a radio communication? No.
00:44:52 No. Right.
00:44:53 Right. No, only one person can speak at a time. Yeah.
00:44:57 Yeah. Thank you. Okay. So on on the basis of of of that you would would you con conclude that this was a telephone conversation and
00:45:09 this was a telephone conversation and not a radio discussion. All I can say is it sounds more like a telephone conversation. Right. Okay. Um
00:45:21 you say let's and let's just push that a little bit further. Uh
00:45:35 [Applause]
00:45:40 uh that
00:45:52 in um
00:45:56 Yeah, that's Right. On page two, you see CU8. You say this is third of the way down. Yeah, I know. I could hear you trying to get through to 271.
00:46:08 We're in attendance. We're in the process of taking over. Uh that reference to control trying to get through to 271, is that a reference,
00:46:19 get through to 271, is that a reference, do you remember, to what you heard on the radio to start with? I'm sure it will be. Yeah. Okay.
00:46:32 And then at the bottom of page three, still on the subject of these communications, uh, the penultimate entry, CU8. Okay.
00:46:43 uh, the penultimate entry, CU8. Okay. Can you just confirm? I think I've heard your colleague just transmit that message. Do you know if that is the case? That's a reference to people trapped by the smoke in 111. when you
00:46:54 trapped by the smoke in 111. when you say I think you you I heard your colleague just transmit that message. How how would you have heard that? Uh can we read through the a little bit before it just to put it in a bit more context please?
00:47:06 context please? Yes. Well, I I'll read I'll read it from the bottom of page two where you ask flat numbers. Control says right. So, I've got flat number 111. 111, which is on the 14th floor. 14th floor. And
00:47:19 on the 14th floor. 14th floor. And number 175, 175. Number 175, which is on the 20th 20 floor. 20th floor. Yeah. They've both got a lot of smoke coming in. So, they're all stuck in. They can't. There's five people in 175. Five
00:47:31 can't. There's five people in 175. Five people in 175, one in 111, one in 111, and then there's oversp speaking. Control then says, "Yeah, but they're all trapped by the smoke. Okay. They've all got smoke coming into their premises." Okay. Can you just confirm? I
00:47:43 premises." Okay. Can you just confirm? I think I've heard your colleague just transmit that message. Do you know if that's the case? Just pausing there. Um h to repeat my question now I've shown you the the longer context. How do you think you
00:47:55 longer context. How do you think you heard control's colleague transmit the message?
00:48:00 message? And this is definitely the first conversation that took place between myself and control. Is it? I don't know that. Uh and I'm I'm I'm it may not it may well not be. Uh and the
00:48:11 may not it may well not be. Uh and the reason I say that is let me just take you back a tab to a different document since you're asking me fairly whether it is the first conversation. If you go to
00:48:24 is the first conversation. If you go to uh a document entitled LFB quadruple03078 which is in tab 71 of the documents bundle.
00:48:34 Just while that's being looked up, an earlier question of yours has been answered because I do at one point say I I heard you trying to talk to 271. So I would have known at that point who the IC was. Right.
00:48:48 And this document is a a transcript of something uh timed at uh 0 uh 1437.
00:49:01 something uh timed at uh 0 uh 1437. Now whether that's that looks that looks like a later conversation uh or 01450 similar um and it's an RT if you look at
00:49:13 similar um and it's an RT if you look at the legend at the very top uh and and it says caller FN this is Charlie uniform 8 we're in the process of setting up here is is there any information you want to
00:49:24 is is there any information you want to pass to us operator yeah um now that that sounds like my inter intercepted message, right?
00:49:34 right? So, by starting by saying FN FN is how you how you'd address uh um channel 4 uh control staff, right?
00:49:42 right? Essentially, there's there's two channels that are generally used. Um channel 4 FN in the north of the river, south of the river, it's FS, channel 2. So, I'd be addressing them as FN. This
00:49:54 So, I'd be addressing them as FN. This is Charlie for mate. That sounds like a a radio message. Um and and it sounds like that was my message intercepting
00:50:05 like that was my message intercepting their attempts to call Golf 271. I see. Okay. It may well be that the timing isn't quite right at the top of that. But but but you think that's the interceptor message and that would be by
00:50:16 interceptor message and that would be by radio, do you think? Uh yes, I think so. Right. On channel 4. Yes.
00:50:20 Yes. Right. And FN N is north. I suspect F is what? What does FN stand for? Um, I'm not sure. Okay. I couldn't tell you for all right.
00:50:31 you for all right. Um, now just going back to the next transcript which we were looking at a minute ago. Uh, she then goes on
00:50:43 Uh, she then goes on to
00:50:48 um say at the bottom of page three. I don't know to be honest with you. We've got loads of calls going on. loads of calls waiting on all sorts. Uh, and then there's a bit more
00:50:59 Uh, and then there's a bit more conversation and it's CU and then CU8 says on page four, it's just radio traffic is going to be a bit of a nightmare because we've already got about two people and then
00:51:11 already got about two people and then there's overspeaking. Do you remember what that might be about?
00:51:18 about? I don't. I mean, you asked earlier about people
00:51:22 people talking over each other on the radio. Um, what can happen is people pressing the press to talk switch pretty much at the same time and somebody finishes a statement and then
00:51:34 somebody finishes a statement and then somebody else is talking over when they realize that they can't actually get through. So maybe I'm referring to that. Okay. And then she goes on to say there's another one. That one's on the 18th floor. Cua say there's one on the
00:51:46 18th floor. Cua say there's one on the 18th floor as well. Question. And then control says we've got one on the 18th floor. Hold on. 18th floor. Oh my god, there's so many. Top floor, adults and eight adults and eight children. Smoke
00:51:57 eight adults and eight children. Smoke coming in. I don't know what number that is.
00:52:01 is. And cu you. Sorry, is that the 18th floor, but you don't know the number? No, there it's just there's a flat on the top floor. Query top floor and two adults and eight children. There's smoke going in going into the flat. So there's
00:52:12 going in going into the flat. So there's no flat number. They left the call. And then over the P and you say, "Okay, all right, mate." And there's oversp speaking. And then at the top of page five, you control says, "And there's one on the 18th floor, but we don't it's
00:52:24 on the 18th floor, but we don't it's going to be every floor, but we haven't got a number for that either." CU8 says, "One on the 18th floor." Okay. All right. Okay. Thank you. Cheers. And the conversation ends. Now, I've read to the end, um, Mr. Merrick, because I just
00:52:36 end, um, Mr. Merrick, because I just want to ask you a couple of general questions about it. Do do you remember this particular call? No, I don't. Like I say, I remember having the conversations. I cannot remember any of the details of the
00:52:47 remember any of the details of the conversations. that I can remember um
00:52:54 from from immediately taking the calls being aware of just the numbers and if that was a conversation that took place and I was I'd been told before I got any information that there was a lot of
00:53:06 information that there was a lot of them. Um normally we control FSG we record FSG information on the information control pad. Um this is a pad which the pages are in
00:53:18 Um this is a pad which the pages are in quadruplicate. You fill out all the details. One copy is retained on the command unit. Three of the copies can be um distributed wherever they're needed on the incident ground. Uh I realized
00:53:31 on the incident ground. Uh I realized straight away with the amount of calls that this wasn't going to be practical. There was just going to be paper everywhere. So I I just got a blank piece of paper and I was recording the flat number, the floor the flat was on.
00:53:42 flat number, the floor the flat was on. I think I was recording adults and children involved and then conditions within the flat to make an order of the priority. Um, if there's heavy smoke logging, then that would be more of a
00:53:55 logging, then that would be more of a priority than if there's light smoke logging.
00:53:57 logging. Right. And that's how I remember remember it the details um of conversations. Now I can't remember.
00:54:05 remember. No. Okay. And can you remember first of all, what was your general impression of the scale and number of the FSG calls? It was huge. And I I could tell it was
00:54:18 It was huge. And I I could tell it was going to get a lot bigger because I could see the fire. I could see what was going on. And bearing in mind the time of day most people were going to be in bed, I'd realized this was going to be
00:54:30 bed, I'd realized this was going to be um yeah, something else. Okay. Now, in terms of recording the information that we've just seen recorded in this call or or information like it, you say you wrote it down. Did
00:54:42 like it, you say you wrote it down. Did you write it down on a on a on a um an FSG information pad? No. As I said, I realized that that just wasn't going to be practical. Right. I see. Um so it was just a blank piece of paper. I recording on a blank piece of
00:54:53 paper. I recording on a blank piece of paper. Um when watch managers Harrison and Peekom arrived from Charlie Charlie inform 7 Wembley's command unit they were then starting to record that information on the whiteboard and and
00:55:05 information on the whiteboard and and helping to make more of a sense of it and help me to pass it on. Okay. Having written down the information such as the information we've just seen passed to you by um uh by Alex Norman. Um, what did you then
00:55:20 uh by Alex Norman. Um, what did you then do with the pieces of paper
00:55:27 when we moved over to Charlie form 7? Everything went with us. Um, like I said, watch managers Harrison and uh um, Peekom were recording it on the whiteboard. We didn't take the
00:55:40 the whiteboard. We didn't take the We do have most of the whiteboards are fixed to the wall, but sometimes we do have loose whiteboards. I don't think they took one across. Um I think we took photos of what we'd already written down
00:55:52 photos of what we'd already written down as well as well as any loose pieces of paper.
00:55:55 paper. All the paperwork that we could transfer across did go across to charity form 7 before you got to that stage. Uh then in terms of the information that you'd recorded on these blank pieces of paper,
00:56:07 recorded on these blank pieces of paper, what what was your next step with that information? What did you do with it? Next,
00:56:11 Next, as I said out in the very first stages, I was relaying that to watch manager Kentfield. Right. And did you relay that um all in one chunk or did you do it call FSG by
00:56:23 one chunk or did you do it call FSG by FSG?
00:56:24 FSG? The way I remember it, I was getting a handful of calls. I'd pass that information on. Control would then almost be straight back to me with a handful more calls. I would pass that on. So, um it wasn't one at a time. It
00:56:38 on. So, um it wasn't one at a time. It it wasn't dozens at a time. Um, it was in smaller chunks, but the numbers I couldn't give you, I'm afraid.
00:56:48 afraid. Right.
00:56:53 Um,
00:56:57 can I then ask you to turn on to page 70 of the ORR, the operational response report?
00:57:15 Now, at the bottom of that page at uh 0140
00:57:20 0140 and 50 seconds, we have a record of a priority radio message being sent by radio by control to G271,
00:57:32 which is North Kensington's pump lad ladder, which doesn't respond. Uh
00:57:43 and and page 73, if you just look on at 014307, 3 minutes or so later,
00:57:57 3 minutes or so later, that shows that a radio message was sent by you
00:58:02 by you in CU8 back to troll
00:58:08 where you or you're recorded as saying that you're offering to take the FSG calls information on behalf of G271 who are not responding to the priority call from control.
00:58:23 Do you remember that? Yeah, I think this goes back to um the unanswered call from control to Gulf 271 when I intercepted the uh message.
00:58:35 when I intercepted the uh message. Right. So going back that may tie it up then for us. If you go back to tab 71 of the of the documents bundle and that very short radio transcript we saw earlier then perhaps the time is
00:58:46 earlier then perhaps the time is correct. This is LFB quadruple 03078.
00:58:51 Is is that what you're referring to? Yes.
00:58:54 Yes. Right. I see. So we can tie those together. So then the time 014307 is is the link with the OR and that's correct. But before that it seems that
00:59:05 correct. But before that it seems that you were having conversations already with control because we've seen the transcript at the next tab 72 at 0135 uh 24 um taking um quite a lot of detail
00:59:19 uh 24 um taking um quite a lot of detail about fire survival guidance calls. So the qu the question is in terms of timing did it looks from this as if you um were agreeing to take FSG calls
00:59:33 um were agreeing to take FSG calls um for intended for 27 G271 a little bit of time after you started actually getting details of fire survival calls direct from control. Would that be right? All I can say is as
00:59:45 Would that be right? All I can say is as I remember it, which was the first time I can remember taking FSG information from control. The first communication that I can remember having appears to be this first one. This is Charlie from 8.
00:59:57 this first one. This is Charlie from 8. We're setting up. Is there any information we can take over the main scheme radio? That's the first conversation I can remember having. Right. I was then I was then passed information via the main scheme.
01:00:08 information via the main scheme. Sometime later that changed to the mobile. that that first conversation that you've shown me. Yes.
01:00:16 Yes. I'm not saying I didn't have that conversation, but it's it's not ringing any bells with me. I don't I don't remember having that conversation. Certainly not before that that RT
01:00:27 Certainly not before that that RT message, the the main scheme radio message
01:00:29 message saying, "Can we pass on information?" Is it possible? Uh don't and if you don't know don't speculate and I'm inviting you to but is
01:00:40 speculate and I'm inviting you to but is it possible that that watch manager Kentfield
01:00:44 Kentfield didn't leave CU8 immediately but stayed with you while you set up.
01:00:52 Yeah. I mean you got to get from the not that it's a great journey but you got to get from the cab onto the back. Um, it may be that if that's a mobile conversation, he he took the call. He
01:01:05 conversation, he he took the call. He took that information and then whilst I was getting onto the back of the machine, if that happened, I have no memory of it. Okay.
01:01:17 And you don't remember him telling you that he'd taken an a set of FSG call information from? I don't remember him saying that, but that doesn't mean to say it didn't happen,
01:01:25 happen, right? I'm afraid. Okay. And just in terms of the mo the the mobile telephone that was on CU8 as opposed to uh the the radio which would
01:01:38 opposed to uh the the radio which would use RT4. Where would that physically be be located? Would it be in the cab or would it be in the the CU8? It would it would be on my hip. I'd have had it on my belt. It can if I'm driving
01:01:49 had it on my belt. It can if I'm driving I I can't answer it. So it could be that I pass it to him. This does occasionally happen happen. So, I may have handed it to him. Parking was tricky. I mean, like it showed on the map, there's a cycle
01:02:00 it showed on the map, there's a cycle park there and cars everywhere. So, it was a bit of maneuvering to get it in the space. I was concentrating on that. It it there is a chance the phone rang. I passed it to him and he took information. I I'm afraid I just have no
01:02:13 information. I I'm afraid I just have no memory of that happening if that was the case.
01:02:15 case. Yeah. I mean, your status 3 arrived at just just literally just after 1:30. This call is at 13524, right? two minutes later. Yeah, I I I
01:02:26 right? two minutes later. Yeah, I I I don't know. We're just exploring that as a possibility. You either way, you definitely don't remember having this call on an admin line. Uh which you can't help us with. No, I don't remember that.
01:02:37 No, I don't remember that. At 13524. Okay. But you do remember this radio transmission the takeover. Um, do you remember that at the time you did
01:02:48 do you remember that at the time you did the you you took over um or rather you told control through this very short radio message that you're in the process of setting up. Do you remember whether
01:02:59 of setting up. Do you remember whether information was already was being sent to to G271 but not getting through? No, I don't know. Okay. Is it is it do do you remember whether
01:03:11 Is it is it do do you remember whether you at CU8 were using both the radio RT4 channel and the brigade mobile at this point?
01:03:18 point? At at which point sorry at this point 143
01:03:23 at the point going back to the top of page 43 of the OR 73 of the OR at 14307 when you contact brigade control and offer to take the FSG calls which is
01:03:34 offer to take the FSG calls which is what we've just looked at at that point did you know uh were you using both the radio and the brigade mobile when I offered to intercept the
01:03:46 when I offered to intercept the information that was was on the main scheme radio. I was I would have had the brigade mo the command unit mobile phone then but I wouldn't have been using it then.
01:03:53 then. Okay. Right.
01:03:58 Can I take you back then to the bottom of page 60 of the operational response report document.
01:04:12 And I'm sorry to take you back in time. Um, but in in the light of where we've got to, it may make some sense to do this at this stage. Um, at the bottom of page 60, you'll see a time mark of
01:04:24 page 60, you'll see a time mark of 013554.
01:04:29 Uh, and that says Golf 261 Actton's pump ladder interrupt the CRO attempting to pass the radio message to Golf 271 North Kensington's pump ladder saying that
01:04:41 Kensington's pump ladder saying that they will take the priority message on behalf of Golf 271 North Kensington's pump ladder who have not responded. The CRA passes FSG call information to Golf 261 Actton's pump ladder saying
01:04:53 Golf 261 Actton's pump ladder saying they have a caller on the 18th floor with thick smoke in their flat. individuals on the 22nd floor with smoke in their flat and a further call to fire on the 20th floor. In flat 82, people
01:05:04 on the 20th floor. In flat 82, people are also trapped. Uh Golf 2761's action pump ladder are still on their way to the incident and they state they will pass on the information to Golf 271,
01:05:15 pass on the information to Golf 271, North Kensington's pump ladder when they arrive. First of all, do you remember hearing over the main scheme radio um that discussion? No, I don't. To be
01:05:26 that discussion? No, I don't. To be honest, as far as I was I can remember the first FSG information I heard being recorded was by me was that the information I got on the radio message
01:05:38 information I got on the radio message from control when I intercepted that the their attempt to contact G 271. Right. And that may answer my next question, but I'll still ask it to see how far we get if you don't mind. In the
01:05:49 how far we get if you don't mind. In the next paragraph on the top of page 61 of the OR
01:05:54 the OR um it says during the phone conversation that Norman had at 03524 with CU8 and that's the the one with the oversp speaking in it that looks like it was done on the mobile. the CEO can be heard
01:06:08 done on the mobile. the CEO can be heard sending the information to Gulf 261's Actton's pump ladder and and obviously you don't recall that conversation but do as as a prompt do do you remember
01:06:20 you remember having a conversation with the control uh control room during which the control room officer can be heard sending information to G261 actton
01:06:32 information to G261 actton no I don't remember that Okay.
01:06:41 Do you remember in general terms having a picture in your head that control was sending FSG messages to CU8, G271
01:06:52 sending FSG messages to CU8, G271 and G261
01:06:54 and G261 uh at the same time? Control sending FSG information to those three different places? No, like I say, as far as I can remember, um I thought
01:07:05 as far as I can remember, um I thought all the uh FSG information was coming to me.
01:07:11 Right. Uh now, if I can ask you then to go forward in time a little bit and forward in the OR a little bit to page 73 of the ORR.
01:07:23 And this is just after the radio very short radio conversation about interception that you we we talked about at 014307.
01:07:34 about at 014307. And this time we're looking at 014313.
01:07:41 I'm I'm sorry, 014307. Top top of the page. I'm so sorry. Um that's that's the message we looked at with a transcript at page two at tab two
01:07:52 with a transcript at page two at tab two at tab 71 where you say we're in the process of setting up and then immediately below it to give you the context 14313 uh CRO Derby contacts CU8 and passes
01:08:06 uh CRO Derby contacts CU8 and passes passes the following message following information about fire survival calls they have recently been received and then a source is given radio message and then there is a summary of
01:08:18 and then there is a summary of information underneath it um with some seven floors and numbers of people in some cases and some remarks and the floor numbers are 10 23 12 14 17
01:08:32 and the floor numbers are 10 23 12 14 17 12 and 18.
01:08:36 Do do you first of all do you remember receiving information like that from Sharon Derby in the control room? As I remember it, this was the first FSG
01:08:47 As I remember it, this was the first FSG information I received. Right.
01:08:51 Right. Do you know how she contacted you? Main scheme radio.
01:08:59 And was And did you record that information? Yes. On a blank piece of paper, right? And that's what you remember? Yeah.
01:09:07 Yeah. Okay. And what did you do with that information? I contacted watch manager Kentfield via the handheld radio on channel 10 and I passed on the information as I had it. Right.
01:09:19 Right. Did you form a view at the time about whether the information that Sharon Derby was giving you was sufficient without the flat numbers and in many
01:09:31 without the flat numbers and in many cases the numbers of persons? Sorry. Say that again. Yeah, let me try it a different way. You'll see the summary of the information. In some cases, you're not given a flat number and in some cases,
01:09:43 given a flat number and in some cases, in fact, all cases except two, you're not given numbers of people. Did you form a view about whether that was sufficient fire survival guidance information? Um,
01:09:54 information? Um, I think that's the wrong section we're looking at, isn't it? You want the top box, don't you? Yes, that's right. The top box. We're looking at 14313.
01:10:07 The uh control information pad that I referred to earlier has a number of different boxes to record as much information as you can possible to to paint as clear a picture as possible.
01:10:18 paint as clear a picture as possible. Understanding the weight of calls that were coming through, I realized it wasn't possible to get all that information. I just wanted the most pertinent pieces of information. I don't know if you got a transcript of the exact conversation that took place
01:10:29 the exact conversation that took place between me and control, but I I think they were relaying and bits that weren't relayed. I was asking for specifically the flat numbers and at the top one where well there's a few where it's not
01:10:40 where well there's a few where it's not given.
01:10:41 given. My assumption is that they probably didn't have the flat numbers at the time, but that that's what I was asking for was the flat numbers, the floor numbers, the amount of people, and by remarks I mean the conditions within the
01:10:54 remarks I mean the conditions within the flat. Um,
01:10:56 flat. Um, normally, like I say, we'd we'd be exchanging more information. Control pass more information. I'd be asking for more information, but I could tell the amount of calls that were coming through, that was the priority. Those
01:11:07 through, that was the priority. Those details were the priority. Right. Okay. And did you tell her anything? Did you or you just received the information, write it down, and pass it on? Like I
01:11:19 write it down, and pass it on? Like I say on a couple of points I I do remember where certain information wasn't given whether it was conditions or whatever I would ask that um but
01:11:30 or whatever I would ask that um but about specifics I don't know and and that's why I say when I look at these flat numbers where it's not given my assumption is at the time control weren't given those flat numbers but that is just an assumption right and
01:11:44 right and was any of this information recorded uh on the CSS do you I think no not not at that time right um CSS probably hadn't even started up by then you like a normal computer
01:11:56 by then you like a normal computer program you start the computer up you wait until it's going and then you open that specific program and I'm sure it was before that had had a chance to happen that this was coming through and I standard practice is not for us to do
01:12:07 I standard practice is not for us to do that as we're recording the information anyway the standard practice is to record it on the control information pad right
01:12:15 right um and then relay it on as I said The only thing I didn't do with regards to standard practice was use the control information pad. It was just a blank piece of paper. Yes. Okay. And just just so we're
01:12:26 Yes. Okay. And just just so we're absolutely clear about what you mean when you refer to the control information pad. Can you please be shown uh
01:12:36 uh it's it it's it's the FSG policy 790 tab five of the policies bundle appendix two.
01:12:52 uh which is on page eight internally of that policy. Um is that what you mean when you refer to control information? Yes.
01:13:01 Yes. Right. Okay. Just just to be clear and as I said that is um that form is in quadruplicate as it says at the bottom the white copy, yellow copy, blue, green. And I I realized that there was
01:13:13 green. And I I realized that there was going to be paper all over the place. We did subsequently, I say we, I didn't, but other people on the um FSGCU, as far as I'm aware, complete all of
01:13:24 as far as I'm aware, complete all of these forms where necessary, but at the time I I couldn't practically do that. No, that's very that's very helpful. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, it's almost 11:15. Yes. And we've been going
01:13:36 almost 11:15. Yes. And we've been going for an hour and a quarter time. I'm not nearly finished this particular line. There's there's more there are more questions along this theme for a while. So,
01:13:43 So, but even so, that would be a convenient moment as any, I think, for a break. That's all. Yes. Well, Mr. Merrick, you might like a break as well. We probably all would. Um, so we'll stop now for about quarter an hour, resume at half 11.
01:13:56 an hour, resume at half 11. Okay.
01:13:56 Okay. And excuse me, I must ask you not to talk about your evidence or anything to do with it during the break. All right. Okay. Right. You like to go with the usher? She'll look after you. Thank you.
01:14:13 Half past 11 then please. Thank you.
01:29:27 Right. You can have a minute to settle down because we're running a minute early, surprisingly. Sneaking in a witness. What?
01:29:35 What? Sneak in a witness. Yeah.
01:29:38 Yeah. Is Mr. Merrick there? I hope he is. Yeah.
01:29:42 Yeah. Yes. Come on. I'll shut my eyes. The curtain has gone up.
01:29:51 Right,
01:30:01 Mr. Mer, you happy to carry on? Good, sir. Good. Well done. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Um, Mr. Mer, can I just ask you one or two questions to go back over a little bit of material we've covered
01:30:12 little bit of material we've covered before this morning? Um, you say that, um, uh, watch manager Kenfield went to find the incident commander. Did were you aware that he
01:30:23 commander. Did were you aware that he found him or not? I believe he did. Yeah. Did he tell you that? I'm I'm pretty sure he did. Right. How would he have told you that? He wouldn't necessarily The procedure
01:30:34 He wouldn't necessarily The procedure isn't necessarily that he would um meet the IC, then radio back to me to say, "Yep, I've found him." He would go there, speak to the IC. We're here. What do you want from us? And then he'd relay
01:30:47 do you want from us? And then he'd relay back any information to me. Mhm. Um I think it it may well have been watch manager Kfield would have been gone from the CU moments before that call was before I intercepted that call
01:30:59 call was before I intercepted that call and was then taking FSG information. So okay,
01:31:02 okay, um I remember watch manager Kentfield came back to the command unit at some point. I
01:31:10 point. I I'm afraid I can't remember exactly why that was.
01:31:12 that was. Okay. Now, um, you
01:31:19 told us a little bit or gave us an impression of this computer system, uh, gearing up, and you said it took a few minutes to gear up. Do do you do you
01:31:32 few minutes to gear up. Do do you do you know whether that's normal? Is it normal on arrival at an incident for a command unit's computer systems to take a while to warm up and get ready for use? It's just like any computer, any any PC takes
01:31:45 just like any computer, any any PC takes a few minutes to warm up, right?
01:31:48 right? Um
01:31:50 Um Okay.
01:31:53 Okay. And um this system, is this system capable of doing video conferencing or Yes,
01:31:59 Yes, it is. Okay. And what about um um taking video footage? Is is that a facility that's available on the CU? Only within the CU? Yes. With within the CU? Yeah. Okay. It's not
01:32:11 With within the CU? Yeah. Okay. It's not something that you can take out onto the incident ground. No. Okay. Um, going back to where we were in terms of fire survival guidance, we were we were looking at page 73 of the ORR. And
01:32:25 looking at page 73 of the ORR. And perhaps let's just just have it up again. 014313 is the um FSG information that Sharon Derby sends to CU8 by radio message. And
01:32:38 Derby sends to CU8 by radio message. And there are the details. And you've told us about that before. And you said that you passed that on to watch manager Kentfield on the incident ground by radio. Yes.
01:32:48 Yes. That's that's right, is it? Yes. Now, do you know what he did with it? No.
01:32:52 No. Okay. Did he come back to you and say received and understood? Uh so that you were sure he'd he'd got it?
01:33:01 it? Yes.
01:33:01 Yes. How do you know how he recorded it? There's quite a lot of detail there. No, I don't. Right. standard procedure when you pass information, especially something um as critical as that as was done in the
01:33:14 critical as that as was done in the conversation between myself and control, is you would confirm it back. So, I'd read some of the details out, he'd then confirm it back to me. Right. I can't remember that exactly taking place, but that's our procedure. Did you get an impression from what he
01:33:27 Did you get an impression from what he was saying back to you that he was recording it or or saying it to somebody else who was recording it? I I couldn't tell. Right. How did how did you think what did you think he was doing by way of
01:33:38 did you think he was doing by way of recording this important information you were giving him? Uh it would have been written down. It would have been um well I just can't think of any other way he would have recorded it other than writing it down. Whether he was relaying it to somebody
01:33:49 Whether he was relaying it to somebody else to write down I'm afraid I don't know.
01:33:51 know. Okay. Now, um,
01:33:56 if if we look at the short incident log, which you'll find in tab 23 of the documents bundle, I'd like you to go to page 19 of that
01:34:10 I'd like you to go to page 19 of that um that document.
01:34:15 And at at that page you'll find next to time stamp 014319
01:34:28 um a message
01:34:36 and this is close to or as close as I can get to the the message recorded in the O R at 014313
01:34:47 the O R at 014313 that we've just been looking at that bunch of messages that you recorded. And now here we have 014319. So just a second or two later in the middle of the page PD
01:35:00 middle of the page PD sends a service request service request created RT4 to G271 people stuck in flats on 10th floor.
01:35:14 Uh, now it looks like it was sent to G271,
01:35:20 but it also looks as if if we can just flip back to page 73 of the ORR. And I'm sorry to jump between documents. If the documents director just highlights the first entry in the table under 14313,
01:35:33 first entry in the table under 14313, you can see flat number not given floor 10. Floor number 10 remarks people stuck. So it it looks as if it's the same message. Um but it looks as it's as
01:35:46 same message. Um but it looks as it's as if this one's going to G271 and not to the command not to command unit 8. Uh can you help me with that? Was that message that goes to 271 the same
01:35:57 message that goes to 271 the same message that came to CU8? I couldn't I couldn't say that. Um can I ask you to go back to the previous one that was highlighted? Uh yes to the
01:36:09 one that was highlighted? Uh yes to the previous to page 73. And if you can just remove the highlighted section. Thank you. So is that the document you want to look at?
01:36:18 at? Yeah, that's good.
01:36:23 This is from our bos boss mobilizing system and it will relay all messages all um
01:36:30 all um all actions taken by controls and it lists everything and I'm afraid on a on a on a standard small incident you can have reams of paperwork that comes through and a lot of it doesn't
01:36:43 comes through and a lot of it doesn't make a great deal of sense to myself or most other people in my position just you can pick the odd um bits out when um
01:36:53 um when in in um informative messages, priority messages, things like that come through. But I'm afraid I don't know exactly what that is stating by that. Right. Uh okay, let's see if I can get
01:37:06 Right. Uh okay, let's see if I can get it this a slightly different way. You can see the message 014319 in in this log, which is the short incident log um created by the LFB. Um, if you look
01:37:17 created by the LFB. Um, if you look further down the same page, just looking at the entries, you can see there are numerous service requests from 13 143 um 58 onwards
01:37:30 um 58 onwards on RT4
01:37:32 on RT4 to G271. So there's one at 14358, there's one at 14456, 14501, etc. All the way down the page. In fact, I think every single entry on
01:37:45 In fact, I think every single entry on the rest of that page and indeed over the to the next page messages RT4 to G271 providing fire survival guidance call information in
01:37:56 survival guidance call information in relation to different flats and different floors. Um my question is did you know at the time around this time so after you'
01:38:07 time around this time so after you' taken over receipt of the FSG calls into CU8?
01:38:10 CU8? Mhm. that FSG calls were continuing to be sent to G271 by control. As as I said earlier, as far as I was aware, from when I started taking FSG
01:38:22 aware, from when I started taking FSG calls, um I thought all the FSG calls were coming to me. You can only have two people speaking on anyone, you can only have one person speaking on any one channel at a given
01:38:33 speaking on any one channel at a given time. So, if control uh passing information to me on channel 4 um and then I'm answering to them, nobody else could be passing information on channel
01:38:44 could be passing information on channel 4. Now, when I'm relaying information to watch manager Kentfield on the handheld radio, another conversation would have been could have been taking place. I I think that is highly unlikely. I
01:38:55 think that is highly unlikely. I certainly can't remember. I would have cuz I would have heard it. I would have been sat by the radio. um other conversations taking place certainly not other conversations passing FSG information. So as far as
01:39:07 passing FSG information. So as far as I'm aware from when I took over on Channel 4 I was the only person who was collecting FSG information. Right. Um just exploring then that a little bit further. Um, if you continue
01:39:20 little bit further. Um, if you continue down on page um 20 of the short incident log, all the way down
01:39:29 way down uh to
01:39:31 uh to halfway down page 21, indeed about 2/3 of the way down that page. Um you can see that
01:39:43 page. Um you can see that uh the
01:39:45 uh the um first
01:39:49 um first RT4 to CU8 entry is at 20555.
01:39:56 Sorry, I'm so sorry. 20236 um is is is um is RT4 to CU8. There's a message immediately before that which
01:40:07 message immediately before that which looks like a longer message being passed to CU8 at approximately 150. That's it that looks like a recorded earlier message which has been typed in. But the first service request
01:40:19 typed in. But the first service request created we have I think is at 020236. Do you see that? Yeah. RT4 to CU8. Two persons trapped in flat 74 on the 10th floor level.
01:40:33 flat 74 on the 10th floor level. uh and
01:40:34 uh and until that time or apart from the one of O2143
01:40:39 O2143 which relates to an earlier message anyway it looks as if all of the service requests are going via RT4 to G271
01:40:50 requests are going via RT4 to G271 and don't go to CU8 until 020236. Can you explain that? No, I'm afraid I can't. All I can say is from when I was taking the calls
01:41:03 from when I was taking the calls at a time that I couldn't give if he's been recorded correctly or not. I don't know.
01:41:09 know. Is it is it I mean do to the best of your recollection were FSG messages continuing to go to G271 via RT4 for a good half an hour after you um had taken
01:41:20 good half an hour after you um had taken over or 25 minutes after you taken over? No. No. As far as I'm aware, I I was uh I recorded from when I intercepted that message,
01:41:28 message, right?
01:41:29 right? All FSG calls were coming through me to the best of my knowledge. I'd be very surprised if that wasn't the case because I was I was on the radio. I was using the radio most of the time.
01:41:41 using the radio most of the time. So for for other messages to be passed on channel 4 um would be very unlikely. Can I just ask could you hear the messages going to 271? Yeah, we would do. Yeah. Um
01:41:52 Yeah, we would do. Yeah. Um because it was it was a message a priority message. Yeah. Going to G 271 that wasn't answered that I then
01:41:59 I then I'm just wondering whether you whether you as it were treated them as being sent to you even though they've been sending them to 271 because we don't see um messages being sent to CU 8 until
01:42:12 um messages being sent to CU 8 until later.
01:42:13 later. So are you talk you saying that it may have been recorded as being going to Golf 271 where is it actually going to char form 8? Well, it might have been sent to 271 and you might have heard it
01:42:24 sent to 271 and you might have heard it going to 271. Is that possible? Um,
01:42:30 I spoke to control to confirm that I was Charlie form 8 and then when they passed the message I when they were passing the FSG information I was recording that as
01:42:41 information I was recording that as Charlie form 8.
01:42:46 So, it wasn't as if it wasn't as if they were passing the information to Golf 271 and I was just overhearing it and recording it as they were passing it to Golf 271.
01:42:56 Golf 271. Yes. All right. Thank you.
01:43:06 So, just so that I'm I'm I'm clear, and I'm afraid I can't pick that up on the screen because my screen's frozen, but when you were sitting in CU8, did you hear over the overarchy for calls
01:43:17 hear over the overarchy for calls destined for G271? The only call that I heard was the initial priority call. Yeah.
01:43:24 Yeah. The Golf 271 didn't answer. I then stated Golf 27 challenge form 8 contain the information. From then on, I didn't hear any further calls to Golf 271.
01:43:35 hear any further calls to Golf 271. Okay. Um, now going back to page 21 of tab 23, which is the short incident log. Um looking at the time mark of 020143
01:43:47 Um looking at the time mark of 020143 which I'd showed you a minute ago in passing
01:43:50 passing uh you got um it says key and then a set of FSG messages
01:43:59 messages uh which you can you can see there all calls it says at the end passed to CU8 at approx 150. Um f first of all, do you know why that
01:44:10 Um f first of all, do you know why that would appear in the short incident log about 11 minutes later? No. Okay. Um if you
01:44:21 if you turn and again it may be difficult to keep these two open at the same time, but just just if you note the the details. It's flat 161 23rd floor 10 persons sorry 10 persons flat 204 on
01:44:35 10 persons sorry 10 persons flat 204 on 23rd floor one person flat 14 one person flat 92 adults three children one in wheelchair flat 175 20th floor five persons inside all calls passed um just
01:44:47 persons inside all calls passed um just looking at those details now if I can ask you to turn to the ORR the operational response report um at page 78 eight.
01:45:00 I'm afraid I I I'm not sure it's possible to have these two documents up at at the same time. Mr. Documents director, if we can do that, that would be tremendously helpful. So, page 21 of the short incident log at
01:45:14 So, page 21 of the short incident log at the same time as page 78 of the ORR. If we can split the screens. Yes. Um and and and if I can just ask you to look at the bottom of page 78 of
01:45:26 you to look at the bottom of page 78 of the OR time marked 014744.
01:45:31 It says Norman Ring CU8 and passes over a request for the flats below to be checked
01:45:38 checked and the source is vision. And then you can see flat number 161, floor 23,
01:45:46 floor 23, number of people 10. And there's a remark about 161 not being on the 23rd floor.
01:45:54 And then over the page you can see more details. Flats 204,49 and 75.
01:46:04 And that looks as if it corresponds with the details which were are recorded in the short incident log which are passed over to C8 at approximately 150.
01:46:16 passed over to C8 at approximately 150. So having put those two together, do do you remember how
01:46:22 how that that message would have been sent to CU8?
01:46:27 to CU8? I'm afraid no. Would it have been might it have been by brigade mobile or by RT? Uh I uh if it was from an operator then it most
01:46:38 if it was from an operator then it most probably would have been via um radio cuz I'm pretty sure that the only person I spoke to on a mobile phone was station manager Olif. Right.
01:46:51 I see. And who have you any idea why the short incident log would not record that message or those messages as having been sent by RT4? No.
01:47:02 No. Okay.
01:47:03 Okay. And in relation to this particular information, do you know what you in CU8 did with it? As I say, I I was recording it on a blank piece of paper and then passing it on to watch manager Kenfield.
01:47:14 on to watch manager Kenfield. Right. again until um with the specifics of those calls. Um I don't know if by then I'd been
01:47:24 been Yeah, I I don't know if then I'd been joined by uh watch managers Harrison and Peekom who then were assisting with passing on the information. Okay, we're going to come to their arrival shortly, but but I think to
01:47:36 arrival shortly, but but I think to answer your your question, um they they arrive at about 2:00 and you say that in your statement. Okay. Okay. So, if that was before 2:00, then it would have been me passing the
01:47:47 then it would have been me passing the information via handheld radio to watch manager Chemfield. Uh, and spec just so you're clear in your mind specifically, we do have arrival times for Goodall as 0204 and Egan as 0158.
01:47:59 Egan as 0158. So, it looks as if that would have been before that. Yeah. Okay. Um, now, um, if you go to your statement of page four, can I just ask
01:48:11 statement of page four, can I just ask you to look at the second paragraph on that page?
01:48:18 We've looked at it uh before, but I just want to come back to it. Uh you say at the very end of that paragraph in the last sentence, I intercepted the calls from control, but I never took over as ICP at any time.
01:48:31 ICP at any time. Can I ask you why was that? Why didn't you take over as ICP? As I say, um the standard procedure is that the um team leader would leaz with the incident
01:48:42 leader would leaz with the incident commander, ask if they wanted us to take us over. In this situation, the answer would have been yes. He'd relay that back to me and then I'd pass that information on to control. um that never
01:48:54 information on to control. um that never happened probably because as short as that dialogue would have been and the um the communication needed to transfer that information um it was low down on the order of
01:49:08 um it was low down on the order of priorities. I I I can't speak for what happened to watch manager Kentfield when he met with the incident commander but like I say almost as soon as he left the command unit I was receiving FSG calls.
01:49:20 command unit I was receiving FSG calls. Right. Okay. And did the fact that you never actually took over as incident command pump uh mean that control was still
01:49:31 uh mean that control was still communicating with G271, which was the initial command pump? Like I said, all radio communications to them would most likely be on channel 4 because we were north of the river and
01:49:42 because we were north of the river and and I was, as far as I'm aware, I was taking all of those calls, right?
01:49:47 right? And it was all FSG. Okay. I'm just I I see. Okay. Now, in the
01:49:56 the last paragraph of page four of your statement, the foot of the page, uh you say, uh that
01:50:09 um after CU7 arrived, CU8 uh remained as the ICP.
01:50:20 Can you just square that with your statement earlier in on the same page in paragraph two which we've just looked at where you said I never took over as ICP at any
01:50:31 said I never took over as ICP at any time.
01:50:32 time. Yeah, as far as I'm aware officially it was never made the ICP. That from me that message wasn't sent. Whether it was sent later in the incident, I don't know. Um
01:50:42 know. Um my assumption is that control assumed that we taken over as the ICP. I don't know. But whether it was or not officially, it was certainly dealt with as the ICP on the incident ground and at
01:50:54 as the ICP on the incident ground and at control.
01:50:55 control. What CU8 was? CU8 was CU7 was the um FSG command unit. Sorry, I don't know if if I or if this this is being explained, but um when
01:51:07 this is being explained, but um when there's FSG calls, there will automatically be a command unit that is sent specifically to deal with that role of FSGS.
01:51:15 of FSGS. And that was CU7. That was CU7. Okay. So, just so I'm clear, CU8
01:51:24 CU8 wasn't the ICP. Never became the ICP. I never made it the ICP. whether it was done after I left because I moved on to CU7.
01:51:33 CU7. Yes.
01:51:33 Yes. I couldn't I don't know. I see. I was going to ask you about that after you moved to CU7. After you personally moved to CU7, what what use was made of CU8? I'm afraid I don't know. I I was wrapped
01:51:45 I'm afraid I don't know. I I was wrapped up with the FSG information. I I was most of the time on the mobile phone, so I don't know. Um, staying with page four, looking at the third paragraph, and again, we've
01:51:56 the third paragraph, and again, we've looked at this a little bit before, but can I just ask you to look at halfway down that paragraph, you say, um, as the usual FSG recording methods were impractical, I had to improvise by
01:52:08 were impractical, I had to improvise by noting the floor numbers, flat numbers, and numbers of people and conditions. I then passed this information to um, watch manager Mark Kenfield via radio, highlighting the priority calls. I think
01:52:19 highlighting the priority calls. I think we've covered this in in in uh in some details. Um uh
01:52:27 uh in terms of priorities,
01:52:31 were you the one who was doing the prioritization?
01:52:37 I was passing the on the information as I was given it. So if if and like I say, I can't remember the specifics of any calls. If um a room a flat was heavily
01:52:48 calls. If um a room a flat was heavily smoke logged, I would be saying it's heavily smoke logged. If a room was lightly smoke logged, that was likely smoke logged. It's um I wouldn't be saying this is your priority, then that
01:52:59 saying this is your priority, then that one, then that one, then that one. It it's understood if the flats got heavy smoke logging, that would be the priority over one with light smoke logging. I I see. Because when you say highlighting the priority calls,
01:53:10 the priority calls, stating the conditions within the flats, right? And and were you expecting um Mark Henfield to do his own prioritization on the basis of the information you were giving him? That would be down to the incident
01:53:21 That would be down to the incident commander or whoever the incident commander's delegated to oversee uh the committing of the crews. Right. Okay.
01:53:32 And again similar question to the one I asked earlier in terms of priorities. Do you know to whom Mark Kentfield past the priority
01:53:43 whom Mark Kentfield past the priority details?
01:53:44 details? No, I don't. Okay.
01:53:49 Was there a system in place still at the time of CU8 before you moved to CU7 for ensuring that the results of any search and rescue mission which were
01:54:02 search and rescue mission which were initiated in response to an FASG call that you were passing on was being monitored? Sorry, could you ask a question again? Yeah. Was there any system in place for ensuring that the results of a
01:54:14 ensuring that the results of a deployment in response to an FSG call that you had handled on CA the feedback from committed crews? Uh no.
01:54:22 Uh no. Um and there wasn't any throughout the incident. Um later in the incident um we were asking from the FSGCU. We
01:54:33 um we were asking from the FSGCU. We were asking for feedback. Uh we asked on a number of occasions. we weren't getting any any and all of us on the I believe all of us really I can
01:54:44 on the I believe all of us really I can only speak for myself certainly I assumed that the reason why we weren't getting any feedback was because there wasn't the personnel there wasn't the line of communications there wasn't the physical space within the building
01:54:56 the physical space within the building to be able to deal with a second line of communic um a second line of communication the priority was to get the information out get the crews committed make sure they knew where they were
01:55:08 were As much as everybody would have wanted that line of comm communication to come back,
01:55:14 back, it wasn't practical. Right. Who are you asking for feedback? Uh,
01:55:20 Uh, we were discussing it between ourselves on the um FSGCU. I was only dealing with receiving the information from control. I didn't pass
01:55:31 information from control. I didn't pass any messages on to anybody else. And I'm afraid I I couldn't say who was passing those messages on.
01:55:52 Can I just on the subject of priorities just go back a minute or two in your evidence and about about the how priorities were done. Can I ask you please to look at pageuh 81 of
01:56:05 please to look at pageuh 81 of the ORR
01:56:09 the ORR and this is a time mark of 015049. So just shortly after the passing to you o of the bunch of information at 0143 that we saw and at
01:56:21 information at 0143 that we saw and at 0150
01:56:23 0150 which might be the same. Um here at 015049
01:56:28 015049 we see it records uh CRO Adams telephones the CU believed to be CU8 and watch manager Eric answers the phone.
01:56:40 Eric answers the phone. CRO Adams relays the following FSG calls information flat 133 floor 16 and flat 182st floor. Ju just pausing there. Um, that's a
01:56:54 Ju just pausing there. Um, that's a record of a telephone conversation. Does that help you recall at what time you started using the telephone? That sounds about right. It if we arrived at 0130, it was roughly 20
01:57:08 arrived at 0130, it was roughly 20 minutes later um
01:57:12 um that we changed from receiving the information via the main radio to the mobile. right now. Earlier you said that the only mobile the only person in the
01:57:23 the only mobile the only person in the control room you spoke to by mobile was Jason Olif. Yes. To the best of my memory. Obviously this contradicts that. It does. And it may well be that I spoke to somebody else.
01:57:34 somebody else. To the best of my mind I only remember speaking to one person, but it could have been cuz it although I spent most of the night on the mobile there calls were cut off every now and again. So we'd we'd end a
01:57:46 every now and again. So we'd we'd end a call and then there'd be another call. So it may be that this if this was the first call or not, I spoke to somebody else and I just assumed later that it had been the same person I've been speaking to the whole time. Right. Okay. But okay.
01:58:02 Right. Okay. But okay. Uh and the next paragraph
01:58:06 um says see you request an idea of priority from control who confirm the following. 133 not too panicked smoke coming in told to block door flat 182
01:58:17 coming in told to block door flat 182 can't stop smoke coming through front door so has moved to living room see you ask if control can prioritize calls based on smoke density going forward do you remember doing that remember asking them to prioritize in that way
01:58:29 them to prioritize in that way yeah like I said earlier um a a bit of I do remember asking for clarification on levels of smoke just so we could prioritize them so I again just for me
01:58:40 prioritize them so I again just for me to clarify it's me asking control which do we do first which do we do second um if you can give us an idea of conditions then we can know the order
01:58:51 conditions then we can know the order that that we send people right so so I'm clear you wanted to prioritize or rather you wanted to get information so that prioritization could be done yes and you asked control to give you
01:59:02 and you asked control to give you details of of conditions in flats so we could then prioritize so you could then prioritize to the best of your recollection did control then start passing passing on information
01:59:13 start passing passing on information based on smoke density or other things that allowed you to prioritize um
01:59:18 um from that point. Yeah. Uh as I said earlier that the main things that I can remember either being told or asking for were the uh flat numbers, the floor numbers, the amount
01:59:30 numbers, the floor numbers, the amount the numbers of adults and children and the conditions within the flat. Right.
01:59:37 Right. And looking down at this information that we've still that we've got there is for those two particular flats 13316 smoke coming in and then for flat 182 on
01:59:49 smoke coming in and then for flat 182 on floor 21 can't stop smoke coming through front doors so have gone into living room. Was that enough information to allow you or or Mark Kenfield to be able to prioritize?
02:00:01 to prioritize? No, not really. And I don't want to speak for control, but if that's the only information that they've been given, that's all that they can pass to us.
02:00:08 us. Yes. Did you at any stage tell control that that wasn't sufficient to allow you to make a proper prioritization?
02:00:18 I can't remember, but like I've already said, we were trying to get an idea of conditions so that we could prioritize. So I would have thought that I would have, but I don't
02:00:29 thought that I would have, but I don't remember saying it in those exact words. Right. Do you remember at any stage going back to control while you were on CU8 or indeed on CU7 and saying to them, "We need more, we need better
02:00:41 "We need more, we need better information about smoke, fire, heat in order to be able to prioritize." Certainly, as the incident progressed, um that was becoming apparent from the
02:00:53 um that was becoming apparent from the information that they were passing to us. we weren't needing to ask that that we were being told. Um, almost with the very first set of information that was passed to me, that
02:01:05 information that was passed to me, that was when I'm pretty sure I did ask, can we have an idea on conditions? I I wouldn't have said so we can prioritize. Oh, well, I may have done I I don't remember saying that, but
02:01:17 remember saying that, but I would have seen that as a given that that's why I'm asking for conditions. Okay.
02:01:32 from the time when Mark Kentfield left you on CU8. Um, were you alone on the on CU8? Yeah.
02:01:42 Yeah. And that was until the CU7 personnel turned
02:01:45 turned No. Um,
02:01:46 No. Um, or or well, when did you stop being alone if I could put it that way? I I was alone I'm and I'm pretty sure until the first um FSG started coming in and
02:01:58 the first um FSG started coming in and then other people started coming on to the command unit as they would do with any incident for a number of reasons um being very focused on trying to get that
02:02:09 being very focused on trying to get that information recorded and passed on correctly. I wasn't taking a great deal of notice of who else was getting on. Okay. Um let's just see if we can take this slowly. First of all,
02:02:22 when roughly do you think you were joined by other personnel on CU8 after
02:02:28 after timewise? I have no idea. I mean, you from what you've shown me, it looks like it was 20 minutes from arrival to me taking um FSG information via mobile for
02:02:39 taking um FSG information via mobile for the first time, which sounds about right, but if you'd asked me for the the figure, I would have said between 15 minutes and 30 minutes. the time my timeline for the whole night is all over the place. Uh as it was just
02:02:51 is all over the place. Uh as it was just in those first few minutes. Sure.
02:02:55 Sure. People coming and going. I'm concentr I'm looking down at the desk that I'm sat at recording that information. There's a couple of things that I do remember. I remember group manager Welsh getting on to see you. I think he asked
02:03:07 getting on to see you. I think he asked me to um make pumps 25. Um I'm sure he asked me to uh declare a major incident and to declare that he was now the IC.
02:03:20 and to declare that he was now the IC. Apart from that, there's no specifics certainly of times or orders of people getting getting onto the CU because I was very much focused on recording that information.
02:03:34 Right. And and Welch joining you. Was that on CU8 or Yes. or when you went to CU? This was CU8, right? Okay.
02:03:45 right? Okay. And the others joining you on CU8, can you identify them? Do you The only The only other people that I know that got on uh watch managers, Peekom, uh Harrison,
02:03:56 Peekom, uh Harrison, and I I later find out that station manager Egan and um I don't know what time group manager um Goodall joined us if he came on to see you and we all moved over together. that
02:04:08 you and we all moved over together. that they actually because we all moved across as an FSG team, they moved across with all the information information they had and then I followed later. I think that was because I was on the
02:04:19 think that was because I was on the phone taking information at that point. So when I walked across, I walked across on my own. They'd already gone across and started to utilize CU74
02:04:31 and started to utilize CU74 FSG.
02:04:31 FSG. Right. Okay. Now, just to just to pick up in in in terms of time what you just said a minute ago about about Richard Welch coming to CU8.
02:04:44 about about Richard Welch coming to CU8. Um, we have Richard Welch um as status three at 157. And then if you go to the short incident
02:04:55 And then if you go to the short incident log at page 21
02:05:05 uh you can see
02:05:11 um at 20420 informative CU7 GM Welch now IC. Can you just explain that message for us? No, I'm afraid I can't. I I'm
02:05:24 us? No, I'm afraid I can't. I I'm I'm very sure I send that from CU8.
02:05:36 Uh and just above that at 20341,
02:05:42 uh it says makeup IUP G271 make pumps 25.
02:05:48 25. Uh,
02:05:50 Uh, do you think that's correct? Do you do you recall that? It may it may not have been. Um, no. The
02:06:01 No, maybe maybe I made it 40. Maybe I didn't make it up at all. I certainly remember um um sending a message that group manager Welsh was now the IC. And I I'm I'm
02:06:13 Welsh was now the IC. And I I'm I'm pretty sure I remember say sending major incident declared. I thought I sent a makeup as well, but I may I may that may be a false memory. No. Uh
02:06:26 No. Uh it may very well be that the reference to 25 is should be a reference to 40. It could be because that's about the right time. But but in terms of a makeup to a major incident or declaration, um if you look down the page, page 21 to
02:06:39 um if you look down the page, page 21 to 020638,
02:06:42 020638, you can see makeup IUP CU8 from GM Welch. This is a major incident.
02:06:49 incident. Yeah, I I definitely did not go over to CU7 to declare group manager Welsh is the IC and then come back to CU8 to make it major incident. So we think so we think the reference at 020420 to CU7 GM
02:07:02 think the reference at 020420 to CU7 GM Welch now I see is a mistake for CU8 which is consistent with 020638 major incident. Uh okay. And and yeah.
02:07:13 major incident. Uh okay. And and yeah. All right. Now, um in terms of when you were on your own and before you would join, do do you think you were able to cope with the volume of FSG information coming through
02:07:25 volume of FSG information coming through CU8?
02:07:30 Um well,
02:07:35 you can only record one thing at a time. they can only pass on one piece of information at a time. If there had been more lines of communication, then the then we the information would
02:07:46 then the then we the information would have been collected and passed on quicker. Um, in terms of if I was able to cope,
02:07:53 to cope, I'm very confident that I collected all the information and passed on all the information.
02:08:01 I I suppose what I'm really asking you is would it would do you think did you think at the time that you would have been uh better served and helped by having more people on CU8 with you to to receive the FSG calls and pass them on.
02:08:13 receive the FSG calls and pass them on. If there'd been more people on the CU like I say only one person can be on the radio at a time. So one person would have been doing that. Yes. More more people to help with collecting the
02:08:24 people to help with collecting the information with I could have been on the mainstream radio collecting the information. somebody could have been on the handheld radio passing on that information that yes in that sense it definitely would have made it a lot easier also like I
02:08:37 have made it a lot easier also like I said earlier there's multiple roles that the CU carries out somebody else we could have done with a dozen people on the CU in those first few minutes
02:08:48 the CU in those first few minutes carrying out different roles now I just want to turn to the subject of FSG runners in his contemporaneous notes and I don't I won't show them to you unless you want to see them. But uh
02:09:00 you unless you want to see them. But uh watch manager Kentfield says that he he got more people to act as runners for the passage of information from the FSG command unit. Do you remember runners
02:09:12 command unit. Do you remember runners coming to collect FSG information from the door of CU8? I'm afraid I don't. Okay,
02:09:21 Okay, that doesn't mean that it didn't happen. It it Okay, maybe I didn't have anything. Maybe I was just collecting it, giving it to somebody else who passed it on. I just don't remember running his I was going to ask you do do you have a recollection of what happened to the
02:09:32 recollection of what happened to the pieces of paper on which you were writing the FSG. Well, like I say, I I was recording information speaking to watch manager Kempfield over the radio. As more people came on to the CU, I was passing the
02:09:43 came on to the CU, I was passing the information on to them. I was just and then just dealing with collecting the information. Right. I see.
02:09:52 Do do you remember when this when a system of giving FSG information to runners started or rather did it start when you were based in CU8?
02:10:04 were based in CU8? No, I don't know. Okay. Do you remember it starting at all?
02:10:08 all? No.
02:10:09 No. Okay.
02:10:12 Do you remember whether any any runners would come back and provide you in CU8 or indeed CU7 with information that they were getting from the fire ground?
02:10:23 were getting from the fire ground? As I said earlier, I don't remember any information coming back from the fire ground um regarding committed crews to FSGS.
02:10:30 FSGS. Yeah. So, as far as you were concerned throughout your involvement, all the FSG information was one way, was it? Yes. Right. Okay. Was
02:10:41 Was there a system for keeping track of what information that had been passed to the runners which Mr. Kentfield refers to? Yes. All information that was collected was recorded as well as being passed on.
02:10:53 was recorded as well as being passed on. Where was it recorded? On paperwork on whiteboards across CU8 to start with and then CU7 afterwards. Okay. Well, we're going to look at those shortly.
02:11:05 shortly. Uh,
02:11:09 was there any you may have answered this question before, but let me ask it again because it's a slightly different question, but was there any system in place for you to keep track of what action had been taken in relation to the
02:11:21 action had been taken in relation to the FSG messages that were coming out of CU8?
02:11:27 Sorry. Uh, were we keeping track of what we had recorded? No. Were you keeping track of what action had been taken in response to the effort? to whether crews have been committed or not. No, like I said, it was it was a one-way line of communication. We weren't getting
02:11:39 communication. We weren't getting information back. It's the same same answer, right? And then yeah, speculation now there may have been feedback on a couple of specific um
02:11:51 specific um rescues, but no, I I was just consumed with collecting the information, so I'm afraid that's just guess.
02:12:02 Okay. Now coming back to your statement of page four um you
02:12:10 you say in the second last paragraph on that page that approx at approximately 2:00
02:12:19 2:00 CU7 arrived from Wembley with watch manager Norman Harrison and watch manager Tony Pekin along with group manager Tom good and station manager Dan Egan.
02:12:30 station manager Dan Egan. Now, just in terms of times, we have I don't think we've got a recorded status three for CU7 arrival, but we do have their status 2 um mobile to incident at
02:12:44 their status 2 um mobile to incident at 12315.
02:12:47 12315. So, that would that would mean it would take them 30 minutes or so, 35 minutes to get from Wembley to Granfield Tower. Would would that be about right? It could be. Um
02:13:00 It could be. Um because it's not just the time it takes you to drive there. Uh I I don't know what the pumps would be made at that point, but clearly there was a lot of machines around and then they've got to
02:13:11 machines around and then they've got to find the ICP when they get there. So when I put down zero 2 hours, that's an estimate. Well, approximately I I certainly don't know for definite what
02:13:23 certainly don't know for definite what exact time they arrive. Now that's that's helpful. Now, now you then say in that same paragraph, they began assisting me collecting the FSG information. And I again, I think you've
02:13:34 information. And I again, I think you've answered this already, but they started off, did they, by coming to CU8. So they parked CU7 and then came to CU8 to see you. Yeah. As it were. Yeah.
02:13:43 Yeah. Okay.
02:13:44 Okay. Yeah.
02:13:44 Yeah. Um and and you then say by this time we'd stopped using the radio. I was receiving FSG information from the officer of the day, station manager, Olive, via the brigade mobile. Uh, and
02:13:56 Olive, via the brigade mobile. Uh, and that's by the time CU7 arrived, is it? So, we've got a time mark. It was It was They were near enough the same time. Um, to be honest, I don't know which happened first, whether they arrived and then I went on to the mobile
02:14:07 arrived and then I went on to the mobile or whether it was the other way around. Okay.
02:14:10 Okay. And, and so, so do do you do you remember how long you'd been using the mobile for to communicate with control prior to the arrival of CU? Okay.
02:14:21 Okay. Now,
02:14:23 Now, we we we've Um,
02:14:28 Um, we've got records of radio messages continuing to go from control to CU8 uh even after 2:00. If I can just show you going back to the short incident log
02:14:40 you going back to the short incident log of page 21. We we looked at these earlier, but I just want to pick these up with you. Um, for example, uh, at 020555,
02:14:57 this is page 21 of the short incident log, tab 23 of the documents bundle. We have O25 O255
02:15:09 We have O25 O255 service request. Service request completed. RT4 to CU8. Two persons trapped in flat 174 on 10th floor level. And then again at 020606
02:15:21 020606 service request created RT4 CO8 further call times two adults and one child trapped inside flat 82 on on floor 11. So there's just two examples of how after 2 a.m. we get we're still getting
02:15:34 after 2 a.m. we get we're still getting radio calls on RT4 to CU8. Is that is that as you recall it? It it could be it could be after that time that I well you got previous documentation that shows I was on the mobile before then. I I I I
02:15:46 was on the mobile before then. I I I I don't remember. I remember being on the radio and then going onto the mobile. I don't remember being backwards and forwards between the two. Right now
02:15:57 Right now I mean looking at that and looking at the fact that we've also got messages by mobile which we've been look which we've been looking at as well. Is do you remember having two methods of communication with control? one via RT4
02:16:09 communication with control? one via RT4 and one via the brigade mobile. Not at the same time. It was one as I remember it was one then the other. Right. But looking at looking at this document that would suggest otherwise. Yes.
02:16:19 Yes. I see. And right and having looked at this document which suggests otherwise does what does that how do you remember it?
02:16:28 it? No, I still remember it the same way. Okay.
02:16:33 Were you even though you were using the brigade mobile while still on CU8, were you continuing to monitor RT4? Yes.
02:16:40 Yes. Okay. And what could you hear on RT4?
02:16:45 I I don't remember hearing anything. I suppose this goes back to what I was saying earlier about any further FSG information. I'm sure I would have heard it. Um
02:16:57 I'm sure I would have been aware of it. That said, because of the importance of FSG information, when that was being passed over the mobile, I would have been very focused on getting that information right and passing it on correctly.
02:17:09 correctly. So, with that said, there is a possibility that messages could have been passed via the main scheme. But I I'm sure at least I would have heard the noise of it even if I couldn't pick up what the message was, right?
02:17:19 right? And I don't remember that happening. Don't remember that happening. Was it Do you remember whether you
02:17:30 you were writing down messages over which you were collecting over the mobile from control room and and and not collecting information that was coming at the same time over the over RT4 the radio
02:17:44 time over the over RT4 the radio like I say there is a possibility but I'm sure I would have at least been aware of it right and if you had been aware of it what would you have done would you have gone back to control mobile control by
02:17:55 gone back to control mobile control by mobile and said I heard a message over RT4. Could you repeat it? Yeah. Um, and and I'd just be very surprised that they're sending FSG via two lines of communication
02:18:09 to do to two different sources as well.
02:18:17 Yes.
02:18:27 When you switched from communicating with control by radio to communicating with control by mobile, was there any change in how the information coming in
02:18:38 change in how the information coming in from control was recorded by by you? As I referred to earlier, communication over the mainstream radio tends to be fairly formal. Um, mobile conversation
02:18:49 fairly formal. Um, mobile conversation is just a regular conversation. In many ways, it's a lot easier to pass information via a mobile. Um, so the passing of information would have been
02:19:01 passing of information would have been easier over a mobile phone. Yes.
02:19:03 Yes. The the details of it, flat number, floor, the rest of it would have been the same.
02:19:09 the same. And would you have recorded it in the same way as you had when you were on on the radio? Okay.
02:19:14 Okay. Now, uh, you say in uh, sorry, sorry, just to stop you there at that point. I would off it did change later when we went on to see CU7. I'm about to come to that. Absolutely. I understand. Um just just on that then um
02:19:26 understand. Um just just on that then um in the
02:19:29 in the uh
02:19:42 second last paragraph you list the people who joined you on CU8. We've been through that. Um Harrison, Peekom, Good and Egan. Do they all come at once as a group of four?
02:19:53 all come at once as a group of four? I doubt very much they would have done. Um
02:19:55 Um do you remember how they arrived? Uh
02:19:58 Uh watch managers Harrison and Peekom came on the same machine. So they likely would have come on at the same time, but not not necessarily. One could have been perking the machine while the other came
02:20:09 perking the machine while the other came to us. So I I don't know. Okay. And do you remember whether Mr. Good. Station manager Goodall, sorry, group manager Good arrived later.
02:20:21 group manager Good arrived later. Um,
02:20:23 Um, no, it was it was again as I said earlier
02:20:29 um certainly watch managers um Peekom and Harrison
02:20:36 Harrison moved across to Charlie form 7. I then later went across and it was from there group manager good um it was apparent that he was the uh FSG coordinator so in
02:20:48 that he was the uh FSG coordinator so in charge of the FSG command unit and we realized we it was told this is the team that we've got we're all going to be working on the FSGS and that's when we established that. So, um,
02:21:00 established that. So, um, yeah, they went across and I I I can't I can't remember exactly when station manager Egan or group manager good came onto the CU and when they
02:21:12 good came onto the CU and when they moved across, but I'm pretty sure they were on CU7 by the time I got on there. Right. Um, station manager Egan said that
02:21:23 station manager Egan said that group manager Good took over about 45 minutes after he did. Once once they were on was you were all on CU7. Is that is that how you remember it? Certainly he took over on CU7. Yeah.
02:21:35 Certainly he took over on CU7. Yeah. Okay. But about that period of time after
02:21:38 after a after
02:21:40 a after after when after Egan had been on CU7. Um
02:21:49 difficult to say. To the best of my memory, I'd not been on CU7 that long when it was apparent that group manager good was in charge of us,
02:22:00 group manager good was in charge of us, right?
02:22:00 right? Um, again, I'll have to point out that for the majority of this time, I was on the mobile phone collecting information and I would so I just been very focused
02:22:11 and I would so I just been very focused on that. There were things happening around me that I was not taking any notice of
02:22:19 when uh
02:22:23 uh Norman Harrison arrived with Tony Pekkham.
02:22:28 Pekkham. Do you remember whether he told you and indeed everybody else present in CU8
02:22:35 CU8 that he thought the advice being given out to control operators to callers needed to be changed? No, that's not a conversation I had with anybody at that time. Right.
02:22:47 Right. You don't remember Mr. Harrison saying anything like that? No.
02:22:51 No. Okay. Was there a was do you remember any discussion about the need to change the advice that control room operators were giving callers before you left CU8 to go to CU7? Um there certainly when
02:23:03 to go to CU7? Um there certainly when you say discussion it it it sounds like you're saying did we all have a conversation between ourselves and there certainly wasn't a time for that. We were things may have said between
02:23:14 were things may have said between certain individuals I I don't remember having a conversation like that with anybody
02:23:20 anybody where we were all being given a designated role so we tend not to speculate. You do it. You do think about other things that are going on in the job, but you're very much focused on what your role is within that job and
02:23:33 what your role is within that job and concentrating on on getting that done properly. Right. Do you recall hearing anybody Harrison or anybody else saying that they thought the advice being given
02:23:44 that they thought the advice being given out by control room operators to 999 callers should be changed? No.
02:23:49 No. Okay.
02:23:55 Do you remember Mr. Egan being asked to take over the management of FSG calls? No, I'm afraid I don't. Do you remember anything about
02:24:07 Do you remember anything about uh
02:24:09 uh well, let me ask it this way. Do you remember a station manager called Brett Loft?
02:24:14 Loft? No, I I know the name Brett Loft, but no, I I I don't remember his involvement at the incident. Right. So you don't remember having anything to do with him about FSG calls? No.
02:24:25 No. Right.
02:24:36 And when just going back to your statement in the penultimate paragraph, you say in the second line, they began assisting me collecting the FSG information. That was that was on CU8
02:24:48 information. That was that was on CU8 was it at that at that point? At that point, yes. Right. And what system did they adopt when they began
02:24:59 system did they adopt when they began assisting you? I don't know. I was recording information myself and I was passing it on to them. What were they doing? I don't know. I don't know. I was just passing it on to them and then I was
02:25:10 passing it on to them and then I was focusing on the next call that was coming through. Okay. So, so just to be clear, when you say they began assisting me, what did they do to assist you? I was passing the information on to
02:25:21 I was passing the information on to them. Um, I believe they were recording it on the whiteboard, right? But in what format? I'm afraid I don't know.
02:25:27 know. Okay.
02:25:35 Okay. And do and in terms of whiteboards, can you help me with this? Do do you remember whether the whiteboards or the whiteboard and grid system uh was it was implemented on CU8?
02:25:48 system uh was it was implemented on CU8? No, CU7.
02:25:49 No, CU7. It was CU7. Okay. So, so at this stage on CU8
02:25:53 on CU8 they were recording it. What were they doing with the information that you were you were recording? Um to the best of my memory they were just um writing out in a similar way as I was on the paper but all I knew was I
02:26:06 I was on the paper but all I knew was I was aware of them writing the information out. I wasn't observing how they were writing it out. And you did you observe what they did with the information? No.
02:26:14 No. Okay.
02:26:15 Okay. No. I again I was consumed with recording the information I was being given either over the radio or over the mobile phone. Yes.
02:26:26 And do you remember whether any of those others uh while on CU8 Harrison Peekham good and and if if if so Egan and and good um do you remember whether they
02:26:39 good um do you remember whether they took calls or radio messages themselves from control? Um very sure they didn't. So the only person taking calls or radio messages from control on CU8 was you? Is
02:26:50 messages from control on CU8 was you? Is that is that right? Right.
02:27:00 Now, if you go back to the short incident log, please at page 21, tab 23 of the documents bundle, um, we've got a rough time of arrival of
02:27:12 um, we've got a rough time of arrival of CU7
02:27:14 CU7 of
02:27:16 of about 2:00
02:27:23 And if you turn to page 22,
02:27:36 uh you just and I'll come back to this in a moment, but halfway down page 22, you can see next to the time mark of 02233,
02:27:45 02233, it says CU7 run all FSG calls via CU7. Do you remember that roughly that time that message coming through?
02:27:57 that message coming through? Sorry, Mr. Which message are we looking at?
02:27:59 at? Uh 22333,
02:28:02 Uh 22333, Mr. Chairman. Should be it should be highlighted. It is now.
02:28:05 is now. Sorry, I hadn't noticed that it hadn't been highlighted. Just the wrong word, right? Uh yes. So So it says key CU7 run all FSG calls via CU7. Yeah, I don't
02:28:17 all FSG calls via CU7. Yeah, I don't remember it specifically, but it would have done as a matter of course right now. So do do you know why
02:28:28 do you know why um that message was sent only at that stage and not immediately CU7 arrived at about 2:00 um
02:28:36 um if that's the right time of arrival because it takes time for these things to be um the jobs to be uh delegated and then to establish first of all you got to collect the information from CU8 first of all before moving over and
02:28:50 first of all before moving over and going back to what I said earlier It's often the case that the initial um command unit takes over as the FSG command unit. So with everything that was going on, it may just take a little
02:29:02 was going on, it may just take a little bit of time to establish CU7 is what we're going to use, transfer all the information over and then once we're ready on CU7 for that to take over. And this is probably comes back to why I was the last person to move over there
02:29:14 the last person to move over there because I was the one receiving the information. Once we're ready, then we'll send a message to control to say CU7 is now the FSG command unit. Yes, I follow. And just to continue on a
02:29:26 Yes, I follow. And just to continue on a bit of a similar theme that we looked at before, if you look at the bottom of page 21, and please have highlighted first of all 020908, this is the page before
02:29:37 this is the page before still within the incident short incident log.
02:29:42 log. 020908
02:29:49 that says service request created RT4 to G271 firing corridor floor 12 caller trapped flat 95 and then again the same message at 02 1021
02:30:04 message at 02 1021 two entries below that
02:30:11 it looks as If at that time 0209 and 0210
02:30:16 0210 FSG messages were still being sent by radio RT4 to G271.
02:30:23 Do you remember that that was happening? As I said no I mean and and the message in in between those two messages is to CU8.
02:30:32 CU8. No idea why that would be. It looks from that you're absolutely right. There's a sandwich G271 CU8 G271 same message that that two
02:30:43 CU8 G271 same message that that two separate FSG messages were being sent by RT4
02:30:47 RT4 simil more or less simultaneously uh one to G271 and one to CU8. Do you remember that happening? Now ju just just to show you point out the times the
02:30:58 just to show you point out the times the one the second message there the one in the middle 02109
02:31:04 you've then got 12 seconds later the message being sent to G 271. It would take more than 12 seconds for control to send that middle message to
02:31:15 control to send that middle message to Cu8
02:31:16 Cu8 have that information confirmed and then come back to G 271 with a further call. Uh I I
02:31:24 Uh I I What does that seems It seemed your speculation is as good as mine on that one, I'm afraid. Right.
02:31:31 Right. Right. Okay. That's something we'll have to proceed with somebody else. I suspect my my question I think was simply though whether you were aware at the time. I wasn't aware of it. Now after CU7 had arrived that nonetheless
02:31:43 after CU7 had arrived that nonetheless messages were still being sent both to CU8 and to G27. No. No. Like I say, as far as I was aware, all the calls were coming into May.
02:31:54 May. Right now, at the bottom of page four of your statement, you say,
02:32:02 you say, "I remained on the phone for some time as the information was coming pretty quickly. At some time, we were instructed to use CU7 as the FSG command unit.
02:32:14 unit. I would say it was around 20 to 30 minutes of our arrival. we physically move from CU8 to CU onto CU7. At this stage, CU8 remained as ICP. Now, um
02:32:29 just to be clear on timings, we've got your your arrival CU8's arrival at about 1:30. We looked at that earlier and you told us you thought that CU7 arrived at about 2:00. So, when you say here that
02:32:42 about 2:00. So, when you say here that you were moved to CU7 um around 20 to 30 minutes after um after your arrival.
02:32:52 Is it of our arrival? Do you mean 20 to 30 minutes after CU7's arrival or after CU 8's arrival? Well, looking at it now and knowing the
02:33:03 Well, looking at it now and knowing the timelines that I know now, it was more like 20 to 30 minutes after the arrival of CU7.
02:33:07 of CU7. Okay.
02:33:09 Okay. So, around 2:30 a.m. Yeah.
02:33:14 Yeah. As I've said before, my timeline for that night is all over the place. So, it doesn't surprise me that you show me that it was um 23 minutes past 2 or
02:33:25 me that it was um 23 minutes past 2 or whatever it was correct.
02:33:26 correct. Yeah.
02:33:27 Yeah. Right. Okay. But does that help your recollection or are you are you still uh It puts a figure puts a time on it which I I wouldn't have been able to
02:33:38 which I I wouldn't have been able to remember.
02:33:39 remember. Right.
02:33:41 Right. Okay. Now, do you remember where CU7 was located?
02:33:45 located? Yes.
02:33:47 Yes. Where?
02:33:47 Where? Grrenfell Road. Grrenfell Road. Was that closer to the tower than CU8? Yes,
02:33:51 Yes, it was.
02:33:54 it was. Do you remember how it was able to get closer to Grrenfell Tower than CU8, even though it arrived half an hour or so later than CU8? Uh, well, as I was on the back of CU8 at the time, I can only guess the the road was
02:34:06 time, I can only guess the the road was clear enough for them to drive down, and it was the first space they saw. Right.
02:34:12 Right. Um uh the reason I didn't get any closer on CU8 is because uh there were so many people all over the place and I found a convenient space. Um we tried to leave
02:34:26 convenient space. Um we tried to leave entry and exit routes for ambulance usually for for ambulance service. Um and I didn't want to go down the road, find there was no spaces and block the
02:34:37 find there was no spaces and block the road off completely. So that's why I parked on the junction of uh Bulmore Road
02:34:42 Road right now
02:34:45 right now after the move to CU7 and you're right G to to to take 02233 because that's what's in the short incident log on page 22. Can I just ask
02:34:58 incident log on page 22. Can I just ask you was C did CU8 continue thereafter to receive FSG calls to your recollection? All
02:35:07 All FSG calls that I'm aware of came to CU8 early on. And when I moved across to CU7,
02:35:15 CU7, no more calls went to CU8 that I know of.
02:35:19 of. Right.
02:35:21 Right. Um
02:35:23 Um yeah, I was collecting all the information. I I took the mobile phone across with me and that was this this is what it was um CU8 mobile phone that I had on CU7. So all the calls were coming
02:35:36 had on CU7. So all the calls were coming into that but so no more once I pic once I started on the mobile phone I wasn't taking any more calls on the main scheme radio. So when I moved across control
02:35:47 radio. So when I moved across control kept that same line of communication that same mobile phone.
02:35:53 Okay. Then can I just ask you if you look please first of all at short incident log page 22 and then we'll look we'll look onto the next page.
02:36:05 next page. uh as well. And the page after that, um we have calls still running RT4 to CU8 with FSG calls uh at look at the bottom
02:36:16 with FSG calls uh at look at the bottom of page 22 uh at 0227. And then if you look at page 23, let's just I'll take a bit more slowly. O22748.
02:36:32 Uh and and you can then continue on this page that we've got up on the screen. You'll see O229, RT4 to CU8, and then 0238
02:36:45 0238 um sorry O2401 RT4 to CU8 caller states fire is now in flat 152. And then the next entry 241 40
02:36:56 flat 152. And then the next entry 241 40 27 update RT4CU8 and so on. And then even as late uh as uh 031051
02:37:07 uh as uh 031051 on page 24 of the short incident log
02:37:14 031051
02:37:18 a bit lower down. No it's 03 10 Yes. 03 1051 service request completed. CU8 RT4 persons in flat 153. So it looks as if as late as
02:37:32 flat 153. So it looks as if as late as 310,
02:37:34 310, so some 40 minutes after you you thought you moved across to CU7 that CU8 was still getting far survival guidance messages via the radio.
02:37:45 messages via the radio. If that's what that means, then yes. And I would have no I have no knowledge of uh of that happening. Right. Who was operating or running CU8 after you moved to CU7? Do you know?
02:37:57 after you moved to CU7? Do you know? I'm afraid I don't know. I I know at some point uh Mark Kenfield went back on to CU8.
02:38:03 to CU8. Uh but I don't think he was back on it by the time I left.
02:38:21 Okay. Um, how long do you think it took you physically to move from CU 8 to CU7? A minute or two, right?
02:38:33 right? And what did you need to take with you? You, I think you mentioned earlier, pieces of paper. What else did you take? Yeah, the mobile phone. And I think that was it.
02:38:40 was it. Right. What about whiteboards or I didn't take any whiteboards. Um, whiteboards may have been taken across. I'm not sure.
02:38:51 I'm not sure. Now, at the top of page five of your statement, you say
02:38:59 you say that group manager manager Good and station manager Egan had by now established communications with the bridge head to pass on the FSG information.
02:39:10 information. I'll just pause there. C can you explain what that system was that they had established? No, I'm afraid I can't.
02:39:22 How did you know that group manager Goodall and station manager Egan had established communications with I was collecting the information of the calls? I was passing it to them and they were passing it on. Um I I know runners
02:39:34 were passing it on. Um I I know runners were used. I I know radios were used but in what way it wouldn't be fair for me to elaborate on.
02:39:41 on. And once this is once you were on CU7, is it?
02:39:44 is it? Yes. And once you were on CU7, how were you collecting um the information and recording it? It's still on the mobile phone. Uh on the mobile phones, um
02:39:56 the mobile phones, um certainly as soon as the the grid was created, um that was how it was being recorded by myself. I was physically writing on that
02:40:07 myself. I was physically writing on that board. Um
02:40:13 the control information pad was then be being used for every caller I believe and so I was passing the information on to uh watch managers uh Harrison and
02:40:24 to uh watch managers uh Harrison and Pekkham.
02:40:27 Pekkham. Right. Just to focus again on what you say in your statement. You say group manager
02:40:34 manager Goodall and station manager Egan had by now established communications with the bridge head. Let me just take it in stages. What do you mean by by now?
02:40:45 As far as I was aware, by the time we got on to CU7, they had established a chain of communication to the bridge head.
02:40:55 Okay. Uh now so so this this line of communication whether it was through them through watch managers Harrison and um
02:41:06 watch managers Harrison and um uh Pekkham I'm not sure but there was already a line of communication from me passing the information to watch manager Kempfield
02:41:13 Kempfield when I was then receiving help on CU8 other people were then passing on the information I I wasn't asking how they were passing it on that it wasn't a need to know basis for me it was a need to
02:41:25 to know basis for me it was a need to But I didn't need to know it. Um, so we already had that link before we moved on to CU7.
02:41:30 to CU7. Yes.
02:41:31 Yes. When we got on to CU7, as far as I'm aware, that passage of information just continued. If it changed in some way, it may have done. I wouldn't have been aware. I was just dealing with
02:41:42 aware. I was just dealing with collecting the information and then passing it on to my team. Okay. Uh, right. So you can't help us, I think, in in expanding further on what this the
02:41:55 expanding further on what this the system of communications was with the bridge head. No, I'm afraid not. Goodland established. Right. In terms of recording the FSG information coming to you, I think you say you were still receiving it on the brigade mobile. Mhm.
02:42:06 Mhm. And was that coming um that was coming from the control room from Jason Olive, was it?
02:42:12 was it? Okay. And once you got into CU7, did you start recording that that information? Yes.
02:42:18 Yes. Uh on what? Eventually onto the um the um the grid system that you referred to earlier. We'll we'll look at that shortly. But just at the very start of your um of
02:42:31 just at the very start of your um of your stay on CU7, what were you doing to record the information? In all honesty, I can't remember exactly how I was recording it. whether I was still writing it down in the same way I had been on CU8 or whether I was just
02:42:42 had been on CU8 or whether I was just passing the information directly to other people within the team and and they were writing it on the whiteboards or the information um control information pad. I'm afraid I can't remember that period of time.
02:42:54 remember that period of time. Right.
02:42:56 Right. Okay. Um Mr. Chairman, I've got a few more questions and I'm about I wouldn't say to change topic completely but to take a slightly different um line within the same topic. Is that a convenient moment?
02:43:07 convenient moment? Well, it could be. It is to me. Is it to you? Is it to the witness?
02:43:11 witness? Well, you probably quite like a break now, wouldn't you? Uh, I'm I'll go along with whatever. Oh, very accommodating. Yes. Thank you very much. Well, um, we're making very good progress. Uh,
02:43:21 Uh, if we were to break for lunch now, um, can you give can you give us any idea of how long you might need the witness after lunch? Uh, it would only
02:43:34 witness after lunch? Uh, it would only be an idea but and not more than an hour. Well, you might derive some encouragement from that. You might. All right. Um, I think then we can
02:43:45 All right. Um, I think then we can probably afford the break until 2:00, can we?
02:43:47 can we? Yes, we can. Slightly longer. Yes, we can. Right. Um, well, Mr. Merrick, we'll have a break now. You can have a chance to get some lunch. Um, we'll start again at 2:00.
02:43:58 2:00. Okay. And um please don't talk about your evidence or anything to do with it over the vote. Okay.
02:44:04 Okay. All right. See you at 2:00. Thank you very much.
02:44:12 Uh thank you. 2:00, please.