London Fire Brigade Station Manager Michael Dowden gives evidence about control room operations during the Grenfell fire, including FSG call handling and the decision to change stay-put advice.
00:00:10 all right mr. Ellis is taking ready to carry on yeah thank you very much yes mr. Olaf can I ask you please to go to your witness statement at page 5 at the
00:00:21 your witness statement at page 5 at the top and you're talking about how the normal communication that is done between the control room and the
00:00:32 between the control room and the incident ground and you say at the top given how busy the head table was and the volume of information being received I use my mobile phone I contacted the
00:00:45 I use my mobile phone I contacted the command unit cu7 and I remained in always constant contact with cu7 up until 6:40 a.m. and then you exhibit the log or the phone
00:00:57 then you exhibit the log or the phone bill which the first of those calls and the number of questions about that first of all is this something you had ever come across before or done before that
00:01:09 come across before or done before that is speaking directly to a command unit by or Brigade mobile no no something that probably hasn't come out from this is that this was not a normal procedure
00:01:20 is that this was not a normal procedure normal procedure in dealing with fire survival guidance calls is that information is when we've passed to say command vehicles by the air wave radio
00:01:31 command vehicles by the air wave radio on this occasion because of the that the user near wave radio is normally suit were sufficient for a low number of high
00:01:42 were sufficient for a low number of high survival guidance calls but again because of again the unprecedent type of incident we was dealing with the amount of information that was being passed to
00:01:53 of information that was being passed to the control unit - sorry to the control room
00:01:58 room it was something that was basically adapted so that we could record the information to make sure that any Fleiss of wire guidance information was passed the command unit and dealt with by the fire crews on the ground do you do
00:02:10 fire crews on the ground do you do anybody advise you will tell you to use your brigade mobile rather than the air wave radio no no the one I didn't have access to an air wave radio to do that
00:02:21 access to an air wave radio to do that and certainly to use my brigade mobile phone was my decision why didn't you have access to an air wave radio because yeah we've I had my
00:02:32 wave radio because yeah we've I had my own personal one which I left in my vehicle when I arrived at the incident because part of my role as officers days not normally two to use or communicate
00:02:43 not normally two to use or communicate with the with the fire ground or instant commander directly is to the AES with the officer to watch in the command stop control officers staff and assist them
00:02:54 control officers staff and assist them injuries that is not my role is not to directly communicate with the fire ground as it is opposite of the surface of the day whose idea was it than the
00:03:07 of the day whose idea was it than the two for you to use your brigade mobile whatever that was my at the time I was briefed that I was to take a responsibility for fire survival guidance information by Deputy Assistant
00:03:19 guidance information by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Adrienne Fenton I was talked to use the two white boards to recall the information and then it was my decision to use my mobile phone to contact the command unit and pass the
00:03:30 contact the command unit and pass the information that way because I was in the corner of the room I could pass information and recalled information on the board at the same time also there
00:03:41 the board at the same time also there were instances where I was called over to
00:03:45 to control operators desks that were carrying out five-spice of local guidance information so I was still in concept with the fire ground and then if I needed survey to avert a call operator and then I could do that as well oh I
00:03:58 and then I could do that as well oh I see did you did you do that you actually went over to control there was all the operators whenever there was a couple that I did I got called over to because I was a steam there was some very difficult situations and I was asked to
00:04:10 difficult situations and I was asked to give advice or try and make a decision because - what - solar person it was on the end of the fireman right okay I didn't realize that so how many
00:04:23 didn't realize that so how many occasions would you say that occur that happened on at least twice walk there twice two or three times I thought okay we may come to an instance of a call a little bit later on but you say twice
00:04:37 little bit later on but you say twice two or three times okay and why those particular calls what was particular about the calls which I think okay well the co-operators were on the phone two people were inside the building
00:04:49 people were inside the building and I think they I'm not sure if there was a good regards to the advice that I was given exhausted me for what should
00:05:00 was given exhausted me for what should they should sell the actual people they were asking you were they yeah well I'm on one particular occasion there was one bit where the cooperate wasn't sure what to tell the people who were involved
00:05:12 to tell the people who were involved right do you know who that call operator was I I don't know the name off by heart now was it male or female to female do you know the flattening world the floor
00:05:23 you know the flattening world the floor the caller yesterday I think that was flat about regarding some isolate nothing is 183 on the 21st floor we'll come back to that we'll come back to
00:05:34 come back to that we'll come back to that one did in order to go to assist though was there anybody else who could have assisted in the canoes control room operators oh there was from from my
00:05:51 operators oh there was from from my recollection there were others officers in the control room but I was the nearest one because I was dealing with a fire Survival Guide and super mention then I was absent are there any were
00:06:06 then I was absent are there any were there any difficulties and disadvantages in using them your Brigade mobile as opposed to using for example your air wave radio or the dedicated telephone line on the head table so as I've stated
00:06:20 line on the head table so as I've stated before I don't actually have a part my role as office that they would not be to be in radio communications we have to fire ground in any way shape or form so
00:06:31 fire ground in any way shape or form so I wouldn't normally speak to the incident commander ordered command unit staff that is normally done by the control operator radio operates a fan from control decision the the benefits
00:06:45 from control decision the the benefits of me using my mobile phone was it enabled me to be mobile within the command G in the actual control center be able to record information up on the ball and not be tied to a landline desk
00:07:00 as I said before there was occasions where I was called over to a control operator who's on the phone giving for a survival garden since May he gave me mobility within the actual control
00:07:11 mobility within the actual control center it is one of the disadvantages of using your mobile that the calls you were making to the command unit were not recorded you could say that yes you
00:07:25 recorded you could say that yes you could say that's a disadvantage but at the time it was the most expedient way of transfer I found of transferring information that I was given to the command unit with the fact that I was
00:07:36 command unit with the fact that I was trying to get was given lots of information for small pieces of paper and say moving about and in the in the controller because I was in the corner of the control room before I needed to
00:07:47 of the control room before I needed to move about I still still able to talk to the colognian he said having to put a phone down walk across the control room and then come back and then start talking to the command unit again can I
00:07:59 talking to the command unit again can I ask you to look back at a document we looked at earlier this morning which was the incident report the InP tab 30 of the documents by
00:08:21 and collector Sasuke look at the first page of that third entry down next to development
00:08:33 and
00:08:39 the first item is one of two the sharing of fast survival guidance information between control and the fire ground was carried out by operational officers who was supporting control staff within the
00:08:51 was supporting control staff within the strap of control room clearly as you've explained in Australia if you were doing that but there's a reference set operational officer sir in the plural was there anybody else doing the job you
00:09:05 was there anybody else doing the job you were doing on that night once you've taken over FSG now one point station manager publicly nikken came up when if when he arrived at the control center he came over and we were still discussing
00:09:17 came over and we were still discussing what we was doing but then he was I believe given another another task to carry out another job to carry out so I remained and and pretty much did the force of a lot of gardening on my own you know the next item done to to the
00:09:30 you know the next item done to to the kit says this the communication link was by mobile to mobile phone not the dedicated line within PM 719 policy 790
00:09:41 dedicated line within PM 719 policy 790 therefore the conversations were not recorded and then the recommendation is reinforced FSG training reminding staff of the need to use the dedicated line which is secure and recorded it's my
00:09:52 which is secure and recorded it's my question is when you were told to take over the fire survival guidance caused by TAC Fenton was there a dedicated line
00:10:04 by TAC Fenton was there a dedicated line which was secured and recorded which you could have used that time not that I was aware of at the time I was I was given a task and a job to do and I've got on and done it to the best of my ability I made
00:10:16 done it to the best of my ability I made the decision to use my mobile phone because I thought it would be easier for recording information now me the freedom to to difference to move about and at the age we control operate staff within the control room
00:10:27 operate staff within the control room yeah my question was although he asked in a different way did you know that there was a dedicated line which was secure and recorded which you could have used now I didn't so nobody pointed that
00:10:39 used now I didn't so nobody pointed that out to you know that I'm not right
00:10:46 now did
00:10:54 just going can I just ask you to get back to your exhibit number seven your list of cause
00:11:10 that page would be documents
00:11:15 they appear the tip will just help if this is right to be outgoing calls from your mobile are awesome that's correct so does that mean you always call the
00:11:28 so does that mean you always call the command unit yes and they didn't call you no okay did they do they know how to get hold of you if they wanted to did the person in the command unit have your number I don't know I'm not sure Carter
00:11:40 number I don't know I'm not sure Carter when you call the command unit there is a there is a number there most of it's been redacted but what were you calling you using your my mobile what were you
00:11:51 you using your my mobile what were you what what line were you using I break that see chain latest mobile phone same latest mobile phone the team leaders mobile phone did you who gave you that number one of the I'm not sure it was
00:12:03 number one of the I'm not sure it was the officer to watch have someone from lose it was at the head table
00:12:13 and that number do you know what rang in the command unit was a mobile or was it a fixed line reception reception in the
00:12:24 a fixed line reception reception in the command unit itself I was just give him the phone I wasn't sure it was a mobile phone or whether it was a fixed phone relate to my unit the first two digits of the number
00:12:37 first two digits of the number oh seven nine does that does that help you remember whether it was a mobile you a regime of no said nine it would've been in my boss but that's an assumption yes an assumption so again I can't calm
00:12:48 yes an assumption so again I can't calm confirming did you find that you have frequent and easy access to that yes yeah if I run it they are straight away okay did you always speak do you
00:13:00 okay did you always speak do you remember do you walk did you always speak the same person I thought yeah sounded like the same person I can't confirm it was but it definitely sounded like the theast the same person he was answering the phone right
00:13:17 now at the time he took control of the FSG calls were you aware of how many had come in at that point No did you ask now I didn't know is
00:13:31 No did you ask now I didn't know is there any reason why you didn't ask again I can just refer back to how busy and how much information that was coming in I say I was given a specific job to
00:13:42 in I say I was given a specific job to do a task to do and that particular time is more important to to get the information that we were receiving and control-t to the command unit and fire ground so that the people at the fire
00:13:54 ground so that the people at the fire ground could take action to try and rescue two people who were trapped did you know what kind of advice that the CRO s were giving callers at the time you took over as a particular time I was
00:14:06 you took over as a particular time I was aware there was stay-put policy latest April policy was or information was given for people to stay in their premises and advice were being given out isn't there to try a safe whilst they
00:14:18 isn't there to try a safe whilst they was in there and who you say you were aware of that was how were you aware of that
00:14:24 that [Music]
00:14:30 I can't remember if I ever heard that they were those to the state staple policy but I'm no further in my statement I had a conversation with the person who was on the command unit and I
00:14:42 person who was on the command unit and I gathered information from him which I then passed to agent Finn and Joe Smith they were standing bought a head desk and I said this is this this is the information that I've just received and
00:14:54 information that I've just received and both of them were discussing about changing the stay-put policy to effect right okay we're gonna we're going to come to that we're just getting a little bit ahead they're just focusing on my question which was when you first started taking over them management too
00:15:06 started taking over them management too far survival guidance calls in the guideline - the quite artistic week we pledged assaults my question sorry cuz that's my question which is when you first took over how did you know that
00:15:17 first took over how did you know that the advice being given by the control room operators will stay put I'll remember I'll be a child but I can't remember who who might be who told me okay and do you know do you remember what conditions the callers were
00:15:29 what conditions the callers were reporting when when you first took over there was a number of number of calls of accompanying so there's smoke coming into flats people try to get if that's
00:15:40 into flats people try to get if that's the the lobby areas were heavily smoke logged there was another couple he would serve wrong where we had a reports of someone saying there was a fire directly outside their front door there was a vast array of different
00:15:53 door there was a vast array of different conditions and different flats right did you have a view at the time about whether the continuing to give the stay-put advice as you call it was the right thing to do or that it should be
00:16:05 right thing to do or that it should be changed after a time when I was dealing with the fire survival guidance information my main concern was getting that information to the command units and because the amount of information
00:16:16 and because the amount of information that was I was being given I didn't really have time to consider whether they should change the change to staple advice until I spoke to the remaining
00:16:31 advice until I spoke to the remaining seven and gained further information and that's when I approached Adrian necessary
00:16:37 necessary Debbie Assistant Commissioner agent Fenton and Joe Smith at the head table okay let's pick that up then if you go to your statement
00:16:53 you can go to page 5 where we are at the moment you
00:17:06 you say and this is the middle of the page
00:17:12 page I remember the television inside the control center wasn't working my latest this when I first walked into the control and I'd asked the officer of the watch why the television wasn't on I've
00:17:24 watch why the television wasn't on I've been informed it was broken and gates that now this is a build-up to this stay put you see them is that right you remember that it that you're told it was broken yes
00:17:38 this made it difficult for us to know and picture what was going on the incident itself then you say I recall asking the operator at cu7 where the bridgehead was vacated as I was trying to build a picture in my head of the situation now just pausing there
00:17:51 of the situation now just pausing there do you remember when you asked that question taking over taking over as passing the fire survival guardians were making information and I've been doing
00:18:02 making information and I've been doing it for a while but for a while I lost quite a lot of information over and I was trying to build a mental picture in my mind about what was happening at the incident our operational policy is that
00:18:16 incident our operational policy is that we normally set up a preacher two floors below the fire yes and I remember asking the control operator because of the amount of him for me the rival guidance
00:18:28 amount of him for me the rival guidance I hadn't heard any informant lives back from the incident with regards to how the fire were developed at that time because I was concentrating on the information asked him about where the bridgehead was located I was informed
00:18:40 bridgehead was located I was informed that the bridgehead was located on the ground floor at the building and
00:18:49 yeah there's on the ground-floor to build in that particular time I was then informed by the control operator that they was having difficulty getting fire
00:19:00 they was having difficulty getting fire crews who was getting ahead of myself a little bit sorry I'll come to that in a moment
00:19:06 moment good good well we are going to come to can I ask you this question you asked the question of the operator on this I'll see you certain where the bridge Houghton bridgehead was located why did
00:19:18 Houghton bridgehead was located why did you answer that question again I was trying to get a mental picture of what was happening at the incident and I say normally we operationally we set up a bridgehead two floors below the fire yet
00:19:30 bridgehead two floors below the fire yet we was having reports of fire on a lot of the upper floors so I was trying to try to get a mental picture of how far the actual fire had spread moving within the building look and what would you and
00:19:42 the building look and what would you and what what was the purpose of ask of having that information to try and find out normally we have a project within the actual building itself and to find
00:19:53 the actual building itself and to find out that the actual predict bridgehead was it actually been moved to the ground floor outside yeah means that it just showed it just put a mental picture in
00:20:05 showed it just put a mental picture in my mind that this this was it was it was it was a major incident what do you say you say I was told I was told that the bridgehead was on the ground floor outside of the building
00:20:16 outside of the building yeah this was unusual as the bridgehead is normally positioned two floors below the first floor what when you were told that what did you what did you do with
00:20:27 that what did you what did you do with that information well that this is where all the other information comes in with it because it was one conversation with regards to where the bridgehead was the information that the the command operate
00:20:38 information that the the command operate gave me with regards to my crew having difficulty getting to the upper floors [Music]
00:20:45 [Music] the information that came back due to the dangerous possible dangerous nature they lost ability to build in that had a gold me and the Commissioner was considering withdrawing the fire crews
00:20:56 considering withdrawing the fire crews so that that was all piece one piece of information right that I gathered looking once I received that information I thought it was person and to go an
00:21:07 I thought it was person and to go an Intel with Deputy Assistant Commissioner in Finland and Joseph Smith we were standing at the head table of in the control room okay let's try to take take this in
00:21:18 okay let's try to take take this in stages then in terms of the timing in this paragraph you you've given us information you got from the fire ground so bridgehead was two had moved to the
00:21:29 so bridgehead was two had moved to the ground floor and then fire crews having difficulty getting above the 15th floor and then information that a gold meeting had concluded and the Commissioner was
00:21:40 had concluded and the Commissioner was considering withdrawing the fire crews because of the dangerous condition of the tower block yeah those three pieces of information did they come in separate conversations everyone that was on one conversation right now looking at your
00:21:52 conversation right now looking at your phone log if we can just jump back to that a Jiao seven one six my mother
00:22:04 Jiki looking at the times of the calls we've got we've got 102 a six with 15 minutes 58 seconds and then a short one
00:22:16 minutes 58 seconds and then a short one at 223 two minutes and 40 seconds one at 233 eight minutes and 44 seconds and then one of 244 that lasts for an hour and 35 minutes old
00:22:28 and 35 minutes old which of if any of those calls do you think you got obviously the those pieces of information between a to 33 and the
00:22:40 of information between a to 33 and the to 44 okay I can't I can't be a hundred percent certain just so you think it was during the eight minute and 44 second conversation I don't think so I said he could have been there to 44 okay all
00:22:52 could have been there to 44 okay all right it could have been between the two we say between the two are there any other calls that are that you were literally within eight minutes you
00:23:04 literally within eight minutes you literally were in four minutes four minutes of the air on 44 so we're good so between two 33 and the two the phone conversation between two 44 so could it
00:23:16 conversation between two 44 so could it be neither of those constant and what what is it the prompts that recollection about that time period just him this
00:23:28 about that time period just him this year in sheer amount a number of fire survival guidance calls and information we would receive the incident ground right now you then
00:23:40 you set the bottom of page fired at your statement an informal meeting took place involving DAC Fenton and another DAC whose name I cannot recall that would be
00:23:52 whose name I cannot recall that would be Joe Smith that's Joe Smith yeah it was Josh yes Adrian Fenton and Joe Smith was standing at the head table having a discussion and I came over and gave him
00:24:03 discussion and I came over and gave him the information that I just gained gained on the phone okay and so this meeting was in the control room gives in the control and he say it was an informal thing I received that information and as soon as I got the
00:24:15 information and as soon as I got the information I approached that fencing and Joe Smith so that I could I could relay that to them okay and
00:24:28 do you know how long DAC fences have been in the control room for when he erected I couldn't say he he was backwards and forwards and say a lot of my time was concentrating on receiving
00:24:42 my time was concentrating on receiving information from the call operators and passing it to the command unit okay and so this informal meeting took place after you'd received these two pieces of information thank you they were standing
00:24:54 information thank you they were standing and they were standing in the hate desk having a conversation and as soon as I got that information I thought that was quite any important piece of him the information that I received I just wanted to make sure that they was aware
00:25:05 wanted to make sure that they was aware that that had gotten on the fire ground Rosa
00:25:13 if you then go on to say as a result of this latest information Dec Fenton informed me that the FSG advice would have to be changed whilst whilst we
00:25:24 have to be changed whilst whilst we understand in there there was there was a small conversation between Adrienne Fenton and josh josh smith but they look to each other we need to change the the advice that's being given on their fire
00:25:35 advice that's being given on their fire Survival Guide an expose right I put the statement to you and you've now said whilst we were standing there there was a small conversation between Adrienne Fenton and Joe Smith they looked at each
00:25:47 Fenton and Joe Smith they looked at each other can you remember what they said to each other we need to change the information the fire survival guidance information Joe Smith is given evidence
00:25:59 information Joe Smith is given evidence to get everybody out okay Joe Smith's given evidence the the decision to change the the advice and depart from
00:26:11 change the the advice and depart from the stay-put advice was her decision with which mr. Fenton agreed what can you comment on that that I would say that at that particular time there was a
00:26:23 that at that particular time there was a very that was having a conversation at the head table my approach to misinformation told him the information I'm not sure what they was talking about before
00:26:31 before I approached them by approach to my gave him the information and there was a very short confirmation where they grew up their short conversation whether it was like they both agreed that the the fire survival guidance information should be
00:26:43 survival guidance information should be changed from staple policy to to get everybody out right
00:26:51 and just to try to pinpoint the timing of that decision you very helpfully told us that it was either shortly after 2:30 3:00 or shortly after 2004 can I just
00:27:03 3:00 or shortly after 2004 can I just ask you to get back to the control debrief note which we've got in our it master documents bundle at tab 51 look
00:27:23 master documents bundle at tab 51 look at page 16
00:27:35 at the top of the page it says and just remind you and say sorry just to remind you what this document is in Australia if it's this is the 24th of July handwritten notes of Andy her and who
00:27:46 handwritten notes of Andy her and who chaired it a meeting of them a meeting to debrief from the control room and it says at the top of page six DAC Fenton arrived speaks to SM Olaf arranges
00:27:59 arrived speaks to SM Olaf arranges collection of FSG calls whiteboards paper gets SM McClellan to lieutenant to assist and then Oh 235 stay put advice
00:28:10 assist and then Oh 235 stay put advice changed info from incident grounds to port and see you via smle so I've only been with 233 phone calls it I got that
00:28:22 been with 233 phone calls it I got that information then right okay would you agree with it that that is correct about 235 Gekko and then a little bit lower down
00:28:31 it says Joe Smith aware of Lacan or one hour Joe Smith listening to Stratford control room and forming an opinion DAC Clinton wants to check the fire ground Joe Smith makes decision and tells a
00:28:44 Joe Smith makes decision and tells a norman advice the wet towels later mouth hold hands stay together get out could be last chance I've read you that already that is full do you remember any
00:28:55 already that is full do you remember any discussions between Joe Smith and Adrian Fenton or yourself about any of those matters no no I are literally approached a dream phone and Joe Smith gave him the
00:29:06 a dream phone and Joe Smith gave him the information there was a very brief we need to change staple policy to get out why they opted employ they went back to to carry on with the for survival guidance information policy so we've got
00:29:17 guidance information policy so we've got waiting for every information I'll carry on passing it over to the command unit do you remember any discussion the theof answered this but nobody asked it anyway
00:29:27 it anyway do you remember any discussion when what where by DAC Fenton says I want to check with the fire ground before we change the advice [Music]
00:29:52 do
00:29:56 immediately after that decision you heard be made did either DAC Fenton or Joe Smith tell you what to do with that information with regards to
00:30:09 do with that information with regards to change in a state policy no because I was I was just dealing with passing still passing the information for a price of libel guidance calls to the command unit I was aware announcement
00:30:21 command unit I was aware announcement was made in the control room to change the stay-put policy okay and did as far
00:30:32 the stay-put policy okay and did as far as do you know how control room operators informed of the change in advice I think it was just verbally so talking there was no phones or pagers I
00:30:43 talking there was no phones or pagers I think he was just a case of making sure that all will operate as new that the policy had changed how was that done by word-of-mouth did being child being to
00:30:54 word-of-mouth did being child being to face-to-face yeah verbally do you know do you remember who went round the control I know I don't know him telling lika cor Co now I don't do you know what they were told to say now do you know
00:31:08 they were told to say now do you know whether CR A's were able to give the callers any guidance as to how to assess whether it was safe to leave no
00:31:19 and going on to the top of page set a six you say in the third line the call operators had now been advised with the
00:31:31 operators had now been advised with the advice they were providing have now changed and that they should encourage occupants of the flats to make their way out of the building if it was safe for them to do so ask for a chair was that something you
00:31:42 ask for a chair was that something you heard did you hear that the advice that the call operator should be giving is to encourage occupants to make their way out of the building if it was safe to do so yes who did you hear that from
00:31:54 so yes who did you hear that from that was their desk um I'm sure that came from Joe Smith when when they change the staple policy did you hear Joe Smith telling the operators that I can't I can't hear a
00:32:05 operators that I can't I can't hear a hundred percent sir and I heard it but I know that was the advice that was given
00:32:14 did did you know whether she or any other CIOs had any information as to what kind of conditions cause would be entering if they did leave their flats
00:32:25 entering if they did leave their flats and try to make their way out striking her Peter did you know whether Joe Smith or any of the control room operators have had any information as to the kinds
00:32:36 have had any information as to the kinds of conditions that callers would face if they took the advice to get out and and use the fire survival guidance calls that were coming in they was aware that conditions in a lot of the lobbies and
00:32:48 conditions in a lot of the lobbies and the the stairwells were heavily smoke felt or there were fire conditions in some of the lobbies yes
00:33:01 even that you heard that to do but that it well the information that I was being passed there was a lot of information which stated that callers were saying that they were smoking their flax they
00:33:12 that they were smoking their flax they were smoking in in the in the in the areas outside their flats
00:33:28 now you go on to say the stairwell of a building should be a protected area this means it should be protected from smoke and heat for a certain duration in the event of a fire so if people were able
00:33:39 event of a fire so if people were able to get to the stairwell that was hoped that they could exit the building now do you remember having any conversations on the night at the time of the change of the staple policy about the likelihood
00:33:53 the staple policy about the likelihood of people being able to get out given the conditions in the lobbies understand no no did you hope do you ever have any having any thoughts about it at that
00:34:04 having any thoughts about it at that time when the information when the the policy was changed from stay-put to to get everyone out of the building that decision was made knowing that well I
00:34:17 decision was made knowing that well I interpret that is that that might be their only way out of the building if they make their own way out right
00:34:39 at the moment when the decision to revoke statehood was was taken you say I'm sorry to make them ask you to get back to page five you say that one of
00:34:52 back to page five you say that one of the pieces of information that you had from cu7
00:34:55 from cu7 and this is the third two-thirds of the way down page five was that a gold meeting had concluded and that cu7 had been informed that the Commissioner was considering withdrawing all the fire
00:35:06 considering withdrawing all the fire crews is that what you heard from that new seven that girl c'mon was considering it that's that's the information that I was passed from from
00:35:17 information that I was passed from from the operator from recap charleen from seven did how did you understand that did you understand that that decision had been made to withdraw the crews or there's just me he said that he was past
00:35:28 there's just me he said that he was past that I was considering one because of the dangerous there's the possible dangerous structure in the building okay
00:35:42 No
00:35:50 and mr. Merrick who was the watch manager who says he was the one in contact with you all night bye-bye mobile says and I'm summarizing his
00:36:02 mobile says and I'm summarizing his evidence that he asked that you asked him to confirm with the incident commander that the state put advise
00:36:13 commander that the state put advise could be changed do you remember I thought I asked yes they put rice could be changed remember that I don't remember that now okay he also says that he confirmed it
00:36:24 okay he also says that he confirmed it with assistant commissioner row and then told you that the state was advice had been changed my remember their mother that Janani came it was your
00:36:36 that Janani came it was your understanding well we do it this way what understanding did you have about the need for the incident commander to be involved in the decision to change
00:36:47 be involved in the decision to change the statement it was part of our policy that the the incident commander came in liaison with the officer what you're the officer in charge of control can change the staple policy it does state in our
00:37:00 the staple policy it does state in our policy that we'll be going against national guidelines but again that would be in exceptional circumstances
00:37:13 do you know whether DAC fentanyl Joe Smith was party to a conversation with the incident commander about stay put I don't know you don't know don't you don't remember it we don't know IIIi
00:37:25 don't remember it we don't know IIIi wasn't privy to any any of those types of conversation I if I if I got information that I felt was purchased then to some of the decision-making that went on in a controller and then I was going for
00:37:36 going for actually fence him and then I'll go back to my duties of passing information regarding the fire survival guidance after the decision was made that you
00:37:48 after the decision was made that you heard being maimed by Joe Smith and Daz Fenton did you speak to the command unit about that decision no you didn't know
00:37:59 about that decision no you didn't know did you speak to anyone on the fire ground about that decision now do you remember being told by mr. miracle or anybody else on the fire ground that the advice had already been changed at the
00:38:11 advice had already been changed at the scene
00:38:12 scene I can't recall that conversation now I'm not saying it didn't happen but I don't have a I can't recall it right
00:38:23 do you remember at the involvement of somebody called group manager Stephen West difficult-- - well rude with regards to the fire at Granville tower on the night i t'ought no no and he says
00:38:39 on the night i t'ought no no and he says and I'm summarizing his evidence and it will have to be explored with him because he hasn't had come to give evidence but he took a call from DAC Fenton who was asking for permission
00:38:51 Fenton who was asking for permission from the commissioner to change the stay-put advice do you remember anything about that I was on your position I wouldn't be privy to that conversation to say because I was Adrian Fenton and Josh before at the head table must be
00:39:03 Josh before at the head table must be most of the time and I was in the corner where you were where at all the DAC Fenton has attempted to or had in fact contacted the incident ground a seeking authorization or permission to change
00:39:15 authorization or permission to change the staffers and now I wasn't aware of it after the statement advice had been changed
00:39:24 what's manager Merrick state said that there wasn't a noticeable change in the advice coming through from control to callers that was his perception of it is
00:39:35 callers that was his perception of it is that you what was your perception of it say again sorry yeah I'm just gonna put this to you in his evidence watch manager Merrick yep said that after the
00:39:46 manager Merrick yep said that after the decision to change the stay-put advice and tell everyone to get out had been made he didn't notice any change in the advice being given by control room operators to callers but that was his
00:39:59 operators to callers but that was his perception of it what was your perception of it my perception was that when this once the decision was made he called up rights were trying to get people to evacuate the building
00:40:24 now and what to ask you about some of your evidence on pages 6 and 7 of your statement which you mentioned earlier
00:40:37 statement which you mentioned earlier which is a call from flat 183 now first of all I think we can correct something in your statement if you look at page 6 a quarter of the way down just after the beginning of the second paragraph you
00:40:49 beginning of the second paragraph you say I was called by called over by a female operator and I'm unsure of her name
00:40:55 name this operator was speaking with a male who was inside his flat with his family flat was number 182 182 located on the 21st floor now you earlier this morning
00:41:07 21st floor now you earlier this morning it's awfully early you said 183 you remember which flat number I I'm not sure it was one hr:183 I think I think take this from me that it was 183 yeah
00:41:19 take this from me that it was 183 yeah but that wouldn't jar with your regulation yeah yeah and it was this
00:41:30 regulation yeah yeah and it was this conversation or this event being called over by the female operator was that after the stupid advice had been changed yes
00:41:41 do you remember approximately what time this 10th place now things were things were whizzing time was whizzing because it was so much going on we use do you
00:41:52 it was so much going on we use do you wouldn't happen were you still on the on the mobile phone to the command unit [Music]
00:42:03 my car my car my man I think this may have been one of the times I come in revolt stood on the phone or not
00:42:19 is this something you'd ever done before I go up to a see our own give assistance as to what advice to give to a caller yes you had now this first time I've
00:42:30 yes you had now this first time I've done it yeah it was the first time you'd ever done it well it's the first time I was a officer that day so it was the first time that I had actually been in the control center as giving advice I've
00:42:43 the control center as giving advice I've done the training part of it but obviously now
00:42:55 if you go to Jay a size which is photograph of your whiteboard I think this is now first
00:43:11 and you did you can see about halfway down the page 183 little thing I believe
00:43:25 down the page 183 little thing I believe the screen or duck down but well eight 321st two adults brackets craig brackets three children stuck in flat so you
00:43:36 three children stuck in flat so you wrote that on the board there at what stage in the night do you think you wrote that on the board that that was reasonably early on that was when stapled policy was still still in force
00:43:47 stapled policy was still still in force and then when you say when you went to the control room operators decked the female control of operators desk to assist with the call was that long after
00:43:58 assist with the call was that long after yeah that was a house affair time after that fair time after that okay it is is that white board entry there 183 twenty
00:44:09 that white board entry there 183 twenty first two adult spray etc is that the call that you ultimately ended up assisting know about that was that was one that big hang me before that okay
00:44:20 one that big hang me before that okay but that's the same flattened size APL is it right
00:44:43 now in your statement you say
00:44:52 six lines down from the beginning of the paragraph when I approach this over five lines down when I approach the operator turned to me and said where are the firefighters now what did you do by way
00:45:09 firefighters now what did you do by way of response they'll say bye was the operator hood because we've changed the stay-put policy the operator had talked to the people in the flat - to evacuate
00:45:21 to the people in the flat - to evacuate she's managed to talk them into the staircase the cooperator at the time said to me she expected that there would be firefighters within the staircase and
00:45:35 be firefighters within the staircase and when when she caught me over she she said where are the firefighters and then she said I've got me into the staircase but my fault firefighters will be there and I said portman no the firefighters having difficulty getting above the
00:45:48 having difficulty getting above the thing of the 11 4:15 for those having troubles because the intensity of the fire and the conditions in now they was having trouble getting above that floor yes and you go on to say the male on the
00:46:01 yes and you go on to say the male on the phone had entered the stairwell as instructed but there were no firefighters to assist them in leaving the building the operator had anticipated that there would be firefighters to assist do you know
00:46:14 firefighters to assist do you know whether at them after you had been told by the incident ground that firefighters couldn't get above the 15th floor whether that information was passed to
00:46:26 whether that information was passed to the control room operators I can't confirm that now I don't know you don't know no is there any reason why that that information wouldn't have been passed to the control I remember cops
00:46:38 passed to the control I remember cops now say it was a conversation that conversation I had with Adrienne feminine and Joe Smith at the head table when I passed the information over to them
00:46:49 them I uh I don't know whether though that would have been passed on to the controller to the co-operators right
00:46:59 now you've gone to describe in summary the experience you had of the call can I just ask you how you heard what was going on on the call
00:47:10 going on on the call where were you first my role in understanding basically next to the call operator okay did you have an earpiece in turn I didn't know I was listening to basically what she was telling me but could you hear what was being said it
00:47:21 could you hear what was being said it from the other end by the call now she was just explaining it to me whilst I was standing now right so when you go on to say the mail was informing the
00:47:32 to say the mail was informing the operator that the stairwell was smoke logged but he was having trouble breathing is that something you heard from her yes okay what did she do she repeat that so you can hear it just yeah right and did you stay with the operator
00:47:46 right and did you stay with the operator until the call ended yes you did and then you go on to say I consider the options this is the last paragraph on page six this was a highly stressful
00:48:00 page six this was a highly stressful situation and I did not have the luxury of deliberating over the choices and then you say this having seen the events unfolding at Grenfell tower on the television and having knowledge of the
00:48:11 television and having knowledge of the conditions in the stairwell I thought it unlikely that the male would be able to make it back find his wife and still make it out of the building with all of his children now first of all when you
00:48:23 his children now first of all when you say have you seen the events unfold in the control tower saerom television what what television are you referring to so when earlier on in my statement there was a part where I mentioned that station
00:48:35 part where I mentioned that station management clinic and arrived and came in and asked me if I'd seen what was going on at the incident and then he showed me a news article or a news clip
00:48:47 showed me a news article or a news clip that was on his he had on his mobile phone which was obviously a distance to show they'd like the whole tower block that was on fire I see see that to be fair to use at the
00:48:58 see see that to be fair to use at the bottom of page five of your statement so just to be clear that's the reference to that is it yes yeah pictures on his on Steve McClaren McClellan's Paul MacLean of course yeah
00:49:09 McClellan's Paul MacLean of course yeah he came in and said have you seen what's going on in others life or no and then he showed me a very brief clip of the actual incident right on a news clip on he's on his mobile phone and did you think that what he showed you by way of
00:49:21 think that what he showed you by way of a clip on his mobile was it helpful to you in assessing the situation that's it that again that was the time that are we
00:49:32 that again that was the time that are we taking over the fire survival guidance calls but it gave me allow me to see what we was actually up against and the conditions that crews on the ground were
00:49:43 conditions that crews on the ground were dealing with well you say that was at the time you'd normally taken over the fast survival guide in schools but can I just get this deep point of detail in timing at what point did Paul McClenahan
00:49:56 timing at what point did Paul McClenahan to show you the pictures of his almost can't remember exactly oh no I've taken over the device of idol God as I'm sure the pretty much most of the half or at
00:50:08 the pretty much most of the half or at least the first whiteboard that I was completing had been completed then he came in he came to perceive aspects of books he was doing upper tasks so he came in and asked me if I thought
00:50:19 so he came in and asked me if I thought that I was seeing what was actually no it was upon and then he showed me a clip of it which I was quite a mom must admit I was quite quite astonished do you
00:50:30 I was quite quite astonished do you remember whether you saw the pictures on his phone before or after the stay-put advice has changed that would be possibly before that very close it would have been close around the time that it
00:50:43 have been close around the time that it was right around that time yeah okay now you then going back to page six you say
00:50:54 you then going back to page six you say the same sentence have you seen the events unfolding at Grand Hotel the television which isn't this big one thing and having knowledge of conditions in the stairwell so that's my question
00:51:10 in the stairwell so that's my question where did you get your knowledge of conditions in the stairwell from so the you've missed part of the the actual part my statement which is you see is further up where the actual now and a
00:51:21 further up where the actual now and a telephone was describing to the call operator the conditions within the staircase and that he was find any difficult to breathe okay before you heard that the the call or before you
00:51:34 heard that the the call or before you heard what the control room operator is saying about about what she was being told did you have any any other knowledge or any other source of knowledge about the conditions in the stairs of the lobbies well again the
00:51:46 stairs of the lobbies well again the fire survival guidance information that always being parsed described that there was there was heavy smoke knocking on the landing zoning staircases okay
00:52:05 now
00:52:10 do you remember where which do you remember the origin of the call about that family on the 21st floor so how'd I
00:52:24 that family on the 21st floor so how'd I get depression yeah when you wrote on the whiteboard he had seen a minute ago flat 183 21st floor and then the details of the family do you remember where that originally
00:52:36 do you remember where that originally weather information originated again and most of all of that information that was on the whiteboard there was a small pieces of paper that were handy to me with with with the the the flat number what thought I was on
00:52:47 the flat number what thought I was on how many people and some some some of the bits of paper describe the conditions within the flower all outside of the flower and I was didn't okay
00:52:59 do you remember whether Essex fire service had any involvement in any calls not Essex came no Athens go you don't remember no I'm not from Essex I
00:53:11 remember no I'm not from Essex I remember there was a we received again quite late on received information came to me that they'd had a call from Kent Fire Brigade saying the relatives had
00:53:22 Fire Brigade saying the relatives had received a phone call from occupants within the tower 1 and then came fire brigade to them pass that over to the London control yes and if you look at page 7 of your statement 3/4 of the way
00:53:36 page 7 of your statement 3/4 of the way down that page you say we received a call from Kent Fire Brigade at one point that this happened because a family inside the tower had called a friend or family member who in turn contacted 999
00:53:47 family member who in turn contacted 999 because there reside in Kent the call got passed to us through Kent when you took on responsibility for the FSG calls
00:54:00 took on responsibility for the FSG calls having been instructed to do so by DAC Fenton we were where that there were other control rooms outside London taking taking 999 calls in respective Grenville tower with the exception of
00:54:12 Grenville tower with the exception of came out right ok I did I do remember a number of control operators coming up to the white boards looking at the white boards to see whether the information
00:54:24 boards to see whether the information they had with was up on the board there's a couple of times where co-operators they date they've been given further fire Survival Guide in which they check the whiteboard to see that they what the information was
00:54:35 that they what the information was already up there gave me the pieces of paper and then - they control disks
00:54:44 and when the Kent call came in how did it come in which would show line to come in on that I'm not sure which telephone I know I was informed by one of the
00:54:56 I know I was informed by one of the control operators that had had a call regarding that inflammation but we had already had that up or now we already at the fly survival guidance information up on that board right I don't know before
00:55:07 on that board right I don't know before he knows why the command unit the incident so you don't know how is this right you don't know how that fire service concept can Fire and Rescue Service communicated with the controller
00:55:18 Service communicated with the controller now now I know they contact it contacted under control part by phone did you know that there's a designated line rule with all of the buddy control rooms to be able to contact the lfp control remote
00:55:29 able to contact the lfp control remote as I've said before I control operator so I don't I'm not sure of the procedures of policies with regards to that I know we do have some direct line to major research within the London area
00:55:42 to major research within the London area that we do not airports and stuff like that I wasn't wasn't aware we've regards to above the gates okay so you were put in charge of FSG calls but didn't know
00:55:54 in charge of FSG calls but didn't know that they were buddy there were buddy control rooms who were going to be handling FSG calls and passing the through how I was in a way to our other public age will be being they'll even have a fire a lot of garden
00:56:06 they'll even have a fire a lot of garden schools now so when you got this call from Kent through the CRO what were you surprised that they were not shot well now I mean the information I was given a relative said I'm fruity
00:56:19 relative said I'm fruity because I was in King we've gone through because they lived in Keene they'd found no no I would she's gone through chicane control and then cane control had gone straight through to a contacted London I see
00:56:31 to a contacted London I see so I see did you have any information at all about other control rooms providing FSG assistance to Stratford because of
00:56:44 FSG assistance to Stratford because of the sheer volume our calls being received by Stratford no obviously I was the only thing I was aware will to suppose the information that I was given by co-operators I wasn't aware where the information had come from right a lot of
00:56:55 information had come from right a lot of the times I I assumed the information I was beginning was being given had come from residents within the tower block so nobody during the night giving you information said to you there are two or
00:57:08 information said to you there are two or three other in fact five other services taking calls in respect of Grantham town no I think the main part the fact was
00:57:20 no I think the main part the fact was that we was getting the important information regarding the people trapped within the tower block to the fire ground and I think stuff like the information where the call had come from originated from wasn't higher on the
00:57:32 originated from wasn't higher on the priority list of passing through it was more about knowing where people were trapped and where we needed to send the fire crews can I just ask you to maybe you can't help with this because I just
00:57:43 you can't help with this because I just asked you to look at a document which is lfb zero zero zero zero three six two five
00:57:54 [Music]
00:57:58 and it's it's a question I could I could I suppose I should have asked you earlier on in your evidence but since we're talking about non London Fire Service is it it comes up now this is
00:58:11 Service is it it comes up now this is this document is a lot an incident log kept by Essex Fire and Rescue Services and it's in reverse chronological order so it starts at 2045 on 14th of June but
00:58:24 so it starts at 2045 on 14th of June but as we scroll down to page three if we could there's a time mark of two fourteen and at 214 there there's no
00:58:41 fourteen and at 214 there there's no past eight at 214 I can just ask mr. documented to highlight the text there
00:58:53 it says
00:58:57 on the grenfell town regeneration there is a emergency fire arrangement paragraph their policies states to stay put unless otherwise advised grenfell
00:59:09 put unless otherwise advised grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards each front door for each flat can withstand a fire for up to 30 minutes now we may need to explore how
00:59:20 minutes now we may need to explore how Essex came by that information to what it is but can you help do you from your experience of the night do you know what that means
00:59:31 that means I've no clue where they've got an information from this dish is something that I would not have seen do you know what some when you arrived and started taking over FSG calls were you aware
00:59:43 taking over FSG calls were you aware that there it was an emergency fire arrangement paragraph whatever that is no and were you told or did you discover that grenfell was designed to rigorous
00:59:55 that grenfell was designed to rigorous safety standards to be fair most high-rise tell rocks should be should have fire five most most flats in high-rise buildings should have an
01:00:06 high-rise buildings should have an hour's fire resistant C to be able to contain the fire can you explain why Essex
01:00:12 Essex we would have that information to be able to put a dollar on that okay
01:00:21 all self a subject of non lmv call handling were you aware when you took on responsibility for fire survival guidance that Alexandra Norman in the control room had asked BT operators to
01:00:34 control room had asked BT operators to take FSG calls and I wasn't aware then what did you ever become aware during the night and that fact I say my primary role at the control center was to take
01:00:47 role at the control center was to take information from the call operators and then just pass it to the command unit yes and
01:00:57 now we've seen you doing that with the white board and the mobile phone and the logs you from the logs it looks as if
01:01:08 logs you from the logs it looks as if you're on your mobile for one instance an hour and a half from 244 to the about 450 yeah
01:01:17 450 yeah during that long call do you remember ever getting any information back incident well let me just finish the question from the incident ground about
01:01:29 question from the incident ground about what far what VA deployments were happening and how successful rescues were no no I did their work they were a couple on the white board where I got
01:01:41 couple on the white board where I got information back saying that they'd been rescued there was only a couple that I recall but now I didn't get any information regarding how bi was all she's been deployed given the policy
01:01:54 she's been deployed given the policy that we looked at together this morning specifically policy 790 paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 which are about information coming back to the control room from the
01:02:05 coming back to the control room from the incident ground did you press the command unit for any detailed information about how specific FSG calls
01:02:16 information about how specific FSG calls were going or how specific rescues were going no I didn't know is there a reason why you didn't it's just a simple fact that it and again I will mention this
01:02:27 that it and again I will mention this dish was not a usual incident issues arose and press it against unprecedented incident that no one in land see the it's just you just was out of
01:02:43 see the it's just you just was out of the normally say no and normal fire supply for guidance procedures are that's all done over the airwave radio so for it to be taken away and given to myself and to whiteboards and passed
01:02:55 myself and to whiteboards and passed information by mobile phone was was something that I've never seen or heard have been done before the amount of information that we was being passed over to the commands units I would
01:03:07 over to the commands units I would imagine that the the the fire crews on the ground was extremely stretched and any information that they did get back they could any information they did have with regards to people being rescued that they would send back when they had
01:03:20 that they would send back when they had the time to do so did you not think though that it was critical in order for in order for the CRA s to be able to give the best advice they could to the callers when they were handling the FSG
01:03:33 callers when they were handling the FSG calls to press the incident ground for detailed information as to deployments to that flat or that floor so if you want to have a look at my call records again yeah if you wanna get my call
01:03:45 again yeah if you wanna get my call records up
01:03:51 that's jasa third page
01:04:00 I just I just want to confirm for the record that the times that I was on that farm authority the command unit I was passing information over to the command unit regarding for survival
01:04:11 command unit regarding for survival guidance information that was a constant stream of information that night there wasn't really I didn't really have time to sit down and start questioning what
01:04:23 to sit down and start questioning what was being done with regards to this fiberglass core what's going on with this well it's a large bones called the amount of information that was being passed over at that time I didn't really
01:04:34 passed over at that time I didn't really have time to start questioning the commanding staff with regards to what's being done with regard to this flat and this particular flat that when you have a look at the actual times that I was on there and then how long over that period
01:04:46 there and then how long over that period from 0-5 to nearly 6:14 and what I mean that was that was dealing with fire information that I was giving to the command unit right so the can be summarized evidence yeah but they're
01:04:58 summarized evidence yeah but they're really in this way that your role really that this incident was to gather FSG information collated recorded on the whiteboards and pass it by Brigade
01:05:09 whiteboards and pass it by Brigade mobile to the command unit yes and that's it that was it yeah mr. Joey they've a convenient moment for a break there are one or two that suggest that is unfortunate I could tell you um there
01:05:22 is unfortunate I could tell you um there are all want to further questions I think I have to follow up with and there may be some others yeah some other straight questions to say it would now be a convenient break I think it would it's ten minutes going to be long enough
01:05:33 it's ten minutes going to be long enough for this purpose if we make it 15 I think that would enable us comfortably to finish mr. Elias evidence thus after New York all right well as you gonna say 25 pass which is a
01:05:45 well as you gonna say 25 pass which is a over 10 unless the theater loses it surely we're gonna have a break we'll resume the 25 past 3 and please don't talk train on about your evidence during the break alright thank you very much
01:06:04 right 25 plus 3
01:06:08 you
01:23:11 all right mr. Olaf and think just a few more questions yes mr. alias can I ask you please to look at page six of your statement and I
01:23:25 look at page six of your statement and I just want to take you back to the discussion that you were having with the control room operator who was talking to the gentleman from flat 183 just one or
01:23:36 the gentleman from flat 183 just one or two questions about this in the middle of the page you say I explained to the operator that firefighters were having difficulty in getting past the 11th floor I told the operator that the
01:23:48 floor I told the operator that the family needed to keep going and try to reach safety now I just want to ask you about difficulty getting across the 11th floor first of all do you know what the difficulty was in firefighters getting
01:23:59 difficulty was in firefighters getting past this so referring back to what we discussed earlier when I received information from marching command unit that I was given the information that firefighters were finding difficult to
01:24:11 firefighters were finding difficult to get past the 11th I'm sure there's the 11th floor due to fire conditions he and smoke do you know where you got that information from that came that came from the person I was
01:24:23 came that came from the person I was speaking to in the command unit he informed me that all part of the same conversation with regards to the
01:24:34 conversation with regards to the bridgehead fire fires having difficulty getting partly living floor and the Commissioner considering evacuating fire crews because it's a dangerous structure so would it be right then that during
01:24:45 so would it be right then that during that that those calls or perhaps during that very long call you had with the officer in the command unit you did get some information about what was happening on the fire ground yeah I did
01:24:57 happening on the fire ground yeah I did say that I mean they work there were instances where I had small pieces of information come back if you put a white board up there's a couple on there where there
01:25:04 there might remarks next two flat numbers where it said that had been rescued right just just so I'm clear the difficulty in getting past the 11th 11th floor yes that's that's later than the
01:25:16 floor yes that's that's later than the district a difficult difficult getting past the 15th floor yeah at 11 for 15 for they were seduced on on the first part of it I can't quite remember I remember him saying I thought it was
01:25:27 remember him saying I thought it was 11th for who may have been 11 from 15 when you explained at the bottom of half way down page five you said that
01:25:39 half way down page five you said that you're told by cu7 the fire crews are having difficulty ascending above the 15th floor that's one of the things that led to this this type of policy being changed we looked at the time for that
01:25:51 changed we looked at the time for that the this is this looks like it's later and I'm asked how it was the same it was killed I think in my mind I wasn't sure where it was they're looking for the 15 pursue okay but the information came
01:26:04 pursue okay but the information came from the command unit stay in the fire crews are having difficulty getting to the upper floors from from 11th 11th or 15th up c-c-come is the effect of what you're saying that when you were
01:26:17 you're saying that when you were standing next to this year it's the controller and operator giving the advice that you were remembering what the command unit have told you about difficulty accessing the building yes earlier on yes I see
01:26:29 building yes earlier on yes I see so it could be the 15th floor coping yeah now you say that difficult you say the difficulties were just focusing all
01:26:40 the difficulties were just focusing all the difficulties but what was that there originally if you look at the statement on page 5 if you say the fire crews are having difficulty ascending get this up
01:26:51 having difficulty ascending get this up ascending above the 15th floor due to the intensity of the fire yep yeah the same conversation it's the same conversation so the what would that mean
01:27:05 conversation so the what would that mean in terms of being able to go up the stairwell well that would mean that the this stairwell was probably heavily smoked right
01:27:16 smoked right not far not no fire in the stairwell again I was on TV I was only repeating back what I've been so abiding by the command crew right if
01:27:27 so abiding by the command crew right if firefighters by this stage we're wearing EDB a what would the difficulties be in ascending up the stairwell I can't
01:27:38 ascending up the stairwell I can't confirm we were fire crews at that point well we're in AEDPA right I wasn't I wasn't I didn't have any knowledge of the actual operations that were taking place at the time okay
01:27:56 now can I then ask you to look at your whiteboards again this is Jiao 4 and J AO 5 and let's have them both up they're honest at the same time
01:28:15 it's metrical zero one six nine one two and one six nine zero six
01:28:37 first of all we could see what's on the whiteboard did you record anywhere repeat chorus no so we could say not on
01:28:51 repeat chorus no so we could say not on the whiteboard but not anywhere else over if there was a repeat Kol if there was a repeat called then and then we already had the fire information up on that bowl that I would confirm with the command unit that was received
01:29:04 with the command unit that was received further course of that address I wouldn't then double it up but I was already had it recorded that we who's already aware of that for survival guidance information okay I see so is
01:29:15 guidance information okay I see so is there any way than a written record of a repeat information back to the sea you know right what what was there a system
01:29:29 know right what what was there a system in place for dealing with repeat calls from a particular flat or particular caller no I mean if I got any any information here different any
01:29:40 information here different any additional information or they was a change in circumstances if I already had it recorded up on that board then I would change change some of the information that was there and pass that over to the command unit as well yeah
01:29:54 over to the command unit as well yeah but but okay and was there a system for calling callers back if information about them changed or as when the state would pass
01:30:07 changed or as when the state would pass change because I wasn't actually dating with the direct telephone calls with the occupants I can't answer that do you from your own knowledge you don't know is that I don't know whether they was called back game back just to look
01:30:21 was called back game back just to look at the whiteboard Jo for so the one on the left just to the right of the redaction mark there's some fake handwriting that looks like it says SN
01:30:32 handwriting that looks like it says SN Yates AC Mills and then something on that was already on the on the whiteboard and wouldn't come off before I start at the actual recording right so
01:30:44 I start at the actual recording right so that's a historic yeah that's dope that was sometimes on the end he wouldn't come off I'm not I'm I've done it in the permanent marker and it stayed on there right okay um now can I show you some documents that
01:30:55 now can I show you some documents that are exhibited to mr. Fenton's statement
01:31:00 these are at M et triple zero one seven zero nine four
01:31:12 and it's a run of documents I just want to say that if you if you recognize these that's all I'm not going to take you through every single one but I just just in terms of
01:31:24 single one but I just just in terms of the type of documents he says these are pieces of paper that he took from the control room and I just wanted even if wonder if you can help with them and I'll take a couple of random but first of all can you be showing one
01:31:36 of all can you be showing one 7:09 for page three
01:31:46 and
01:31:49 it's a little bit faint well if it could be made clearer but just looking at that piece of paper is that something you recognize you know in terms of its type you know now I the information that I
01:32:01 you know now I the information that I was given was on small basically bits that are being torn off of a by four pieces of paper okay bits a living piece of scraps yes scraps of paper okay just looking at
01:32:12 yes scraps of paper okay just looking at that page we've got a reference to flat 150 280 floor four persons three children children from panic from police
01:32:24 children children from panic from police I think it says looking at Jo for the first whiteboard page one says 1 5 to 18 for adults three children left flat now
01:32:38 for adults three children left flat now can we make could you help us make a connection between what what is written on the whiteboard there one 5 to 18 and what's written on this piece of paper so
01:32:52 what's written on this piece of paper so the information I can shove it a whiteboard please yes sorry about this so one fight to look at was very boss at the first question I suppose
01:33:03 the first question I suppose one five two that would have been the information that we've been passed to me that there was it was originally for adults and three children in flat but they have now left the flat right that
01:33:14 they have now left the flat right that information may have changed they may have been trapped in that flat but then I may have been updated to say that they've now left the flat once that that could have happened after the stable
01:33:25 could have happened after the stable policy was changed now let's just look at another one but can you please go to page 17 so it is any t triple seven triple zero one seven zero
01:33:37 triple seven triple zero one seven zero nine four page 17 [Music]
01:33:49 I'm so sorry 60 say sorry wrong page page 60 page before
01:34:00 now if I can be expanded if you look at the lower part about piece of paper it says 23rd floor flat 201 believed to be something and then the word unconscious
01:34:12 something and then the word unconscious appears again see that yeah and then if you look at the left hand whiteboard Jiao for third entry down just just note
01:34:25 Jiao for third entry down just just note miss Bennett you gotta be fast that's ok look at 2:01 23rd floor so third entry down to that ye old 11 people now
01:34:37 down to that ye old 11 people now unconscious do you remember how the information on the piece of paper had got onto the whiteboard saggin sorry do you remember how the information we
01:34:48 you remember how the information we sealed a piece of paper I was I was passed a piece of paper right with that information on okay I save all the pieces of paper I was given was supposed to like corners that were drawn up with
01:34:59 to like corners that were drawn up with a four pieces so it may have been didn't been written down again and then passed to me mister documents manager I wonder whether we can have that FSG brought up at the same time as page 16 of met
01:35:11 at the same time as page 16 of met triple zero one seven zero nine four just to make a comparison to see whether the information on the whiteboard is derive from this piece of paper
01:35:25 now if you compare the wording the the word unconscious is misspelled in on the
01:35:37 word unconscious is misspelled in on the in both places and in fact the handwriting looks quite similar but that's not for me to say can you explain how the information including information about unconscious and the spelling mistake goes from the piece of
01:35:49 spelling mistake goes from the piece of paper onto the whiteboard that that might again that may have came on a piece of paper that I was given right and that's how I wrote it out writing from the piece of paper so can we conclude from that that at least page 16
01:36:02 conclude from that that at least page 16 that the piece of paper was something that was handed to you while you were at the whiteboard that that piece of paper wasn't because I say the Auden piece of paper that I was given with smaller
01:36:13 paper that I was given with smaller pieces of paper right that was like commoner stifle ICC so the piece of paper at page 16 you say wasn't a piece of paper that you were handed not if that's if that's a 4 a 4 piece of paper
01:36:25 that's if that's a 4 a 4 piece of paper I wasn't given any full a 4 pieces of paper mine which is corners it saw enough of other a 4 pieces of paper okay right can you explain how the same spelling mistake came to be made on both
01:36:37 spelling mistake came to be made on both the piece of paper honed on the whiteboard that would have been where I've just questioned the company of this snippet of paper that I was given okay so you do so do you think that that's the piece of paper we've got on the right hand side of the screen it is a
01:36:49 right hand side of the screen it is a photocopy of something you were handed and then recorded onto the whiteboard that looks like a full piece of a4 paper it does it's given to me but I would I didn't receive any a four pieces of paper I just received the coolness to
01:37:02 paper I just received the coolness to the torn off
01:37:16 finally can I ask you to look at j AO 6 which is it was M et triple zero one six nine zero nine
01:37:34 Oh [Music]
01:37:49 this is a list of flats floors adults and children do you know what this document is yes that's at after 6040
01:38:01 document is yes that's at after 6040 when there was no further for survival guidance information I was approached by Adrian Fenton and asked to just formulate a document just to just to say
01:38:13 formulate a document just to just to say what what flats and floor numbers and people amount of people estimating amount of people that we dealt with through the fire Survival Guide missed calls
01:38:24 no it just asked me to connect some information from the whiteboards to say what what fire survival guidance phone calls we've dealt with what flats they was in what floor how many people we
01:38:36 was in what floor how many people we estimated always put on put on the information that we was given okay and can you help with some of the manuscript on it again splat 70 floor on the floor
01:38:49 on it again splat 70 floor on the floor ten adults to and there's some writing next to the - do you know what that says that's we could have it enlarged making way out making a little Titus but if
01:39:01 way out making a little Titus but if making make him start making way out something where I think that's when I first started doing it and I was gonna start putting what was up on the whiteboards but what I realized he
01:39:15 whiteboards but what I realized he wasn't after they were just after how many voice of wildfires causes would say what flat they was from what floor I was on how many adults were involved in how many children involved
01:39:29 and opposite number 83 floor 11 adults 1 as a piece of handwriting clean can you dislike to that
01:39:41 [Music]
01:40:00 now I couldn't tell you I've actually seen the document I couldn't area but in general terms I think your because it would this be right though the information that you collated on this
01:40:12 information that you collated on this piece of paper in this list was derived from the white board to white board chair between the two language can I just then get back finally to and what I was showing you before mr. Fenton's exhibits Jason fences exhibits I just
01:40:24 exhibits Jason fences exhibits I just want to ask you to look at em et1 7:09 for pages 23 and 24
01:40:46 first of all do you know what this is have you seen this piece of paper before I haven't now might she be able to assist with what the tics mean against each number and now at that moment was
01:40:58 each number and now at that moment was there any system that you had in the control room for being able to tick off flats that had been cleared or instances where deployments of BA
01:41:09 or instances where deployments of BA whereas to FSG callers had been successful the only the only way that I dunno if I received information back from the command unit if you have a look at the whiteboard is a couple where I
01:41:20 at the whiteboard is a couple where I show for them with an arrow saying rescued or they've left the flat right
01:41:28 do you know did you know at the time of the system of recording FSG calls on the command unit do I know if the system yes
01:41:44 you talk about like the headline or like a whiteboard or utility Nick come on well let me show you the information I don't to show you a document if you can't help me with it but my general question is did you know on the night of what system was being used on the
01:41:57 what system was being used on the command unit to record the information you were giving you so as I say a member policy is there any any price while quite information initially goes on the control of information form actually
01:42:11 control of information form actually what system they was using on the come on you know I don't know you don't know okay and if if flats were cleared or other ba deployments were successful sorry if flats were cleared or ba
01:42:22 sorry if flats were cleared or ba deployments were successful were you told about it I again I only received very minimal information back one one or
01:42:35 very minimal information back one one or two flats to say say to to maybe for me the outcome
01:43:02 and can I ask you to look at page 9 of your statement
01:43:16 and
01:43:20 in the last sentence that you say I was present in the control room when this
01:43:31 present in the control room when this was discussed that's the changing of the advice but I'm not certain if this would be detailed in a written decision log within the control room normally any key decisions are recorded in a decision log
01:43:42 decisions are recorded in a decision log held on the ground not in the control room do you do you know whether there was a written decision log retained that can kept in the Stratfor control room on
01:43:53 can kept in the Stratfor control room on the night an hour I've been pushing aware of there I know that if a key decision is made on the fire ground then actually taught it on the command support system one of homogeneous but as for control I wasn't wasn't aware
01:44:05 for control I wasn't wasn't aware whether they were support they have a system in place to to record key decisions yes thank you very much and mr. Jim Lowe got no further questions
01:44:16 mr. Jim Lowe got no further questions for mr. only mr. Ellis thank you I've I've never other questions for you and I just want to say thank you very much for coming here today and assisting the inquiry with these investigations thank you very much thank you well I tried my
01:44:29 you very much thank you well I tried my things for sturdiness and it probably hasn't been terribly agreeable come and give evidence but we're very grateful for your doing so because it provides us a lot of valuable material in pursuit of
01:44:40 a lot of valuable material in pursuit of our investigation so thank you very much do you think we together
01:44:55 mr. chairman we have reached the end of the oral evidence for today mr. Fenton's DAC Fenton is coming tomorrow to give evidence between now and then I'm urging
01:45:06 evidence between now and then I'm urging us to Kenya that there are some material that needs to be read into the record yes and he knows more about it than I do so I think he will now take over that exercise sir snap propose to read into
01:45:22 exercise sir snap propose to read into the record the evidence of two witnesses are the first of which first of whom rather is alex de de st. Alban and second of whom is mr. Danny bills and so with your permission first of all mayor
01:45:33 with your permission first of all mayor formerly read into the record the statement of mr. decent Alban and the reference is met triple zero one two four six four together with this contemporaneous note met double zero
01:45:46 contemporaneous note met double zero double zero double five three zero the reference for mr. Daniel bills as evidence is met quadruple zero five four nine zero yes thank you
01:46:01 that was quick send it to channel I think that concludes the the work of The Inquirer for today good thank you very much so we will resume tomorrow at ten
01:46:12 much so we will resume tomorrow at ten o'clock
01:46:12 o'clock so another witness we do go thank you well as you hear that's what we've got to do today we will break now and resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning before seeing you all there thank you
01:46:23 before seeing you all there thank you very much