Station Manager Jason Olaf gives evidence about being officer of the day on the night of the fire. He describes arriving at Stratford control room (his first time as officer of the day), finding the TV broken, and his role in communicating FSG information via mobile phone. Discusses training gaps on control room operations.
00:00:16 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing I think we're going to hear from somebody new today is that right mr. minute that is right mr. chairman we're going to call Jason Olaf
00:00:27 going to call Jason Olaf now to give evidence good thank you
00:00:45 yes milady [Music]
00:01:02 thank you very much for the warning you like to sit down make yourself comfortable rather intimidating range of poses in front of you but constantly take you to
00:01:13 front of you but constantly take you to the bits that are needed and they should should be shown up on the screen next year yes just a minute yes mr. Olaf thank you very much for coming could you please give the enquiry your full name and can I say first of
00:01:30 your full name and can I say first of all thank you very much for coming to give evidence
00:01:40 despite the a momentary pause I think while we can see that the audio right that better that's much better thank you can I just say thank first of all thank you very much for coming to give evidence today
00:01:51 much for coming to give evidence today and assisting us with our investigations is it is very much appreciated my questions are supposed to be short and simple if they turn out not to be or you don't understand the question I've asked
00:02:02 don't understand the question I've asked you there's a lost it badly or something like that just ask you to repeat the question or put it in a different way and I will do if at any time you won't have a break we can have a break and a
00:02:13 have a break we can have a break and a problem with that just just say on we'll have a break and we will stop okay okay and there's water on your on your right there's also screen on your right on the desk which will display any document or any part of your witness statement we're
00:02:25 any part of your witness statement we're going to go to okay thank you um can I ask you then first of all about your statement which you should find in a little blue file in front of you that's had a or on the screen now it's dated
00:02:38 had a or on the screen now it's dated the 21st of February 2018 have you read it recently yes can you confirm that its contents are true and accurate yes have
00:02:51 contents are true and accurate yes have you discussed your statement all the evidence that you're going to give to doubt with anybody before coming here now also exhibited to your statement are a number of exhibits Jo two three four
00:03:05 a number of exhibits Jo two three four five six and seven I'm just going to read their numbers into the record your statement is a meaty triple zero one two seven nine one and you're contemporaneous
00:03:18 nine one and you're contemporaneous notes at Jo two are MIT triple zero one six nine one one Jo three is M et triple zero one six 909 the first whiteboard photograph at
00:03:32 909 the first whiteboard photograph at Jo
00:03:32 Jo four is MIT triple zero one six nine one two your second whiteboard photographed is mu T triple zero one six nine zero six there's a handwritten list of flats
00:03:46 six there's a handwritten list of flats and occupants at M et triple zero one six nine zero nine x j h 6j AO 7 is there as a phone bill a personal phone bill of yours m ET triple zero one six
00:03:57 bill of yours m ET triple zero one six nine one zero yes traditional personal bob is a year lana fabricate mobile phone right it's your it's your own - well she's a
00:04:08 your it's your own - well she's a brigade a suit but yes you to you personally yeah yes we'll look at that now in terms of your career if I can start with that you joined the London Fire Brigade in 1990 didn't yes correct
00:04:19 1990 didn't yes correct and have you served actively as a firefighter since then yes and you worked I think of numerous London fire stations yes could you just list them for us please I
00:04:30 could you just list them for us please I started off at Alfred Fire Station from there I started doing some temporary acting out to leading firefighter I'm sure educational
00:04:42 leading firefighter I'm sure educational green bow was promoted to leading firefighter hats bow from there I moved to Balkan white watch I was promoted to sub officer then
00:04:55 watch I was promoted to sub officer then when we went to rank to role I was in compulsory moves as a watch manager ie to still return for my station and then I've done a number of temporary roles as a watch manager be too late and and
00:05:07 a watch manager be too late and and Eastham I was didn't promote lead into a fire safety department from there after spinners fell in there I was transferred to Vulcan back to barking green watch
00:05:19 to Vulcan back to barking green watch where I was there for seven years before I went for promotion start doing temporary promotion to each station manager and she was finally promoted where I was to choose a consultant
00:05:30 where I was to choose a consultant that's where I'm now been transferred over have otamatone right and one can I just ask you to pull the microphone just a little bit closer to you so we can hear you have just a bit better yeah
00:05:41 hear you have just a bit better yeah thank you very much and I think you became a station manager in October 2016 is less correct chip right so on the night of the Grenfell tower fire it's 30
00:05:54 night of the Grenfell tower fire it's 30 14th June 2017 what was your rank of the lfb that was that was a station manager on development right on development yes when when you're initially promoted you
00:06:07 when when you're initially promoted you have to complete like a development period to show that you're competent appear to carry out that role okay and after grant fell when did you cease
00:06:18 after grant fell when did you cease being in development and assume the full role of the station manager that was on the 17th of May this year right now your work as a firefighter at what point did
00:06:31 work as a firefighter at what point did it involve work in the brigade control room when did you switch to that when I was initially promoted to station manager I was informed that one of the
00:06:42 manager I was informed that one of the takes that I would have to take on would be officer today take and that involved working at merchants control and creating with our resource management sent out and the control staff the
00:06:55 sent out and the control staff the office of watch right you say one of the tags that I would have to take on would be officer of the day tag what is that tank is a specialist role the senior
00:07:07 tank is a specialist role the senior officer for the London Fire Brigade has to take on as a station manager and they're supposed to have a minimum of two specialists takes that obviously is different roles across so you could be a
00:07:19 different roles across so you could be a tactical advisor rescue bot me to advise our officer today there's this numerous roles right an officer of the day is one that takes you into the control room is it he is yes right okay
00:07:30 it he is yes right okay and can you choose which tags to take on all the other distributors with regards to the officer day take that is a company's virtually compulsory take that
00:07:42 company's virtually compulsory take that station managers are the core to take on really okay let's say is it the case that every every officer of the London Fire Brigade who is promoted to SM station manager it never used to be with
00:07:55 station manager it never used to be with the the year that I was promoted because I think there was a shortage of people with that particular tag they made it a compulsory take that officers take on may give you an overview of how to London for the cage run as well so okay
00:08:08 London for the cage run as well so okay and in general terms what what is the balance of activities the sharing of activities between active frontline firefighting and control room activity
00:08:20 firefighting and control room activity that a station manager any station manager in London so you take when you refer to actually active involvement we've we've been in control it's only washed your officer today so you there
00:08:33 washed your officer today so you there is a rupture that you'll put on where you'll be officer a day for it can be anything
00:08:38 anything it's normally around about every four weeks you you you'll cover the role of officer the day one and then in between that you'll be given officer day two juries right and how
00:08:50 officer day two juries right and how much time do you spend as officer of the day how long is a an officer it's normally at 24 but when you want a 24-hour protocol right so would it be
00:09:02 24-hour protocol right so would it be the case that every station manager in active service in London would expect to be given 24 hours in the control room every four weeks well it's the you're not there for 24 hours it initially you
00:09:17 not there for 24 hours it initially you report there 8 o'clock in the morning you liaise with the resource management center coordinator and the officer to watch for control you get an overview of
00:09:28 watch for control you get an overview of the resources that are available for the London Fire Brigade at that time personnel appliances what instance have happened the night before what incidents of going on in that particular time this
00:09:40 of going on in that particular time this is an amount of duties that you carry out during the mourning period part of that I'll include an appliance off the run report that gets forwarded to principle managers once you've completed those duties then you can leave control
00:09:52 those duties then you can leave control so normally end up leaving control for around about midday right okay and then from that time you assume your operational role as well so you're
00:10:03 operational role as well so you're available by pager so if you're the nearest station manager to a particular large incident you can still get mobilized to it it's nicely okay and on average of within that 24 hour on call
00:10:18 average of within that 24 hour on call slot for the control room how often would you actually have to go into the control room and see it in operation so as officer the day a significant incident occurs if this
00:10:32 a significant incident occurs if this 6:4 appliance is attending an interesting you'll be paged so that you can monitor it if that incident in progress is to aid for appliances then you have to mobilize - - to control so
00:10:45 you have to mobilize - - to control so you books we call the booking status - so we mobilize we've blue lights and sirens to get there so that we liaise with the officer to watch the
00:10:56 we liaise with the officer to watch the control staff and the operational side okay
00:11:00 okay so just in general terms would it be the case then that any station manager indeed any station manager who attended Brent felt our fire on the night would have a significant degree of experience
00:11:13 have a significant degree of experience of how the operations that how the brigade control sends a word I would speak to the transept because not everybody whom he promoted before I was
00:11:24 everybody whom he promoted before I was would have the office of the Datak so that there are there are senior officer they were our station manager there who haven't had whoever got the officer that they take so they wouldn't have an overview of what those roles and duties
00:11:36 overview of what those roles and duties would would be quite okay and I just explore that a bit more when did the officer of the day tag come in as he were automatically for station managers the year that I got promoted I
00:11:48 managers the year that I got promoted I was told from that point on because I had a shortage of officers a day taster it was the London Fire Brigade he was looking at any of any people poke any person that was promoted from that time
00:11:59 person that was promoted from that time would take that role on okay so it wasn't retrospective and respected people who are station managers before that no some they were there were station managers before who had the office if they take but I couldn't cook I can't say without oscillation many
00:12:11 I can't say without oscillation many well I know all station managers never had the officer if they take do you do you know why London Fire Brigade brought in the new officer of the day tag policy for unlinking station managers I think
00:12:23 for unlinking station managers I think it was just the fact that they had a shortage of four station managers applying to take that that role on they see okay and prior to the fire 14th of June 2017
00:12:34 June 2017 do you know how many times you had been officer of the day that was the first time that I was officer today that felt that night at night yeah that day the fund I started officers a duty at our
00:12:48 fund I started officers a duty at our 800 hours
00:12:49 800 hours on the 13th right now can I just ask you to look at your statement and look at page 2 can I ask you to gauge the lidium
00:13:02 page 2 can I ask you to gauge the lidium page 2 summary we got some tissues inside something on your screen there's
00:13:13 inside something on your screen there's a great ward you know more useful
00:13:22 [Music]
00:13:48 they need to worry miss Provost it's a well-known hasn't for witnesses and counsel I was going to say beat me to it
00:13:59 counsel I was going to say beat me to it mr. mr. Oliver when you're ready are you okay to go can I just ask you to look at your statement in the middle of page two and as I said that's the look
00:14:11 page two and as I said that's the look you do on the screen on your when you're writing if that's not inconvenient you say my shift began at 800 hours there was a 24-hour duty on the normal circumstances I would have attended merton on this day as this would have
00:14:23 merton on this day as this would have been where the control center was based however Leavenworth was closed for repairs and as such I attended Stratford which is the brigades fullback mobilizing control center but no when I
00:14:38 mobilizing control center but no when I said it was closed he wasn't actually conclude they was carrying out updates and upgrades on the computer service and that merge and so whilst they're doing
00:14:50 that merge and so whilst they're doing that they they go to they transfer it to the fallback control which is on Stratford now this as you told this was your first time you had attended what
00:15:01 your first time you had attended what had been in the role of officer of the day does that mean that this was the first time you'd attended Stratford having worked pretty much most of my career in the northeast area I've been to been to Stratford quite a few times
00:15:13 to been to Stratford quite a few times I've seen the the full back control wedge at Stratford rifle was this the first time you did it and had attended it in the capacity of officer of the day yes right and on the previous occasions
00:15:25 yes right and on the previous occasions do you attended it did you have to undertake any operational roles no right so what would you be doing there what before yes before I just familiarize ocean visits but just a show show which
00:15:38 ocean visits but just a show show which what capabilities are okay before your attendance on the night of the 14th of June were you familiar with the individual officers the
00:15:51 individual officers the in control of them no I mean the control was very similar to fire station where they've got four things four or five different watches there's quite a large
00:16:02 different watches there's quite a large number of staff so you and again as a new office of the day I wasn't assertive familiar with with the control staff or health to the watch how do you worked with Joe Smith before I hadn't now what
00:16:14 with Joe Smith before I hadn't now what about Adrian Fenton I've worked with Adrian before year so he's our professional operation on the principle manager my work to him at at our levels runny before he was primary - okay what
00:16:27 runny before he was primary - okay what about Alex Norman do work with her before no now do you know when Merton closed for repairs and the operation of
00:16:39 closed for repairs and the operation of control moved to Stratford yeah which swats over that morning that morning yeah the 13th and do you know how long it was envisaged that Merton would be closed for now I didn't I wasn't into
00:16:53 closed for now I didn't I wasn't into your experience in your way in your experience was there any difference between the Merton and Stratford control rooms in terms of functionality or capabilities Stratford ish is slightly
00:17:07 capabilities Stratford ish is slightly smaller room they has the same capabilities as what what Burton has right now if we move to page three of your statements
00:17:20 your statements just below halfway down you say at a 125 I received another pager alert I think in fact you'd received but one earlier
00:17:35 in fact you'd received but one earlier is that right in relation to Granville no now that was the oh-oh-oh-oh 125 was the first page of message when I referred to receiving another page a
00:17:46 referred to receiving another page a message as office of the day you carry out a number of duties with regard to personnel issues resources within a father gate that you deal with and the
00:17:57 father gate that you deal with and the eyes with the results Management Center right that particular day was a very very busy day office the duty officer the watch so after the day wise but that
00:18:09 the watch so after the day wise but that was a 125 was the first page share message that I had with regard regards to the grand film and you say you were told it was a - it was a page alert to an eight pump fire that's correct
00:18:21 an eight pump fire that's correct in fact at that stage it had gone to a 10.5 temp on fire did you know that I I didn't know that time I say the initial my initial point your message that came
00:18:32 my initial point your message that came across and I think there was a not sure where I've taken a photograph of the actual initial page a message that I seen it was just informing me of an eighth pump fire at Granville with
00:18:44 eighth pump fire at Granville with regards to our player system sometimes the pager messages are slightly delayed so the initial page a message that could have come out pipe sonic on 10 you could have changed quite quickly
00:19:02 it's hard to tell from the photograph but could you just turn to will be showing your second exhibit Jiao to it @m ET triple zero one six nine one one
00:19:13 @m ET triple zero one six nine one one sorry can you break that I come here sorry it's actually for the documents director will bring it up on the screen that's Jiao to your second exhibit now it's difficult to to read it but we may
00:19:25 it's difficult to to read it but we may just try and do our best if you could just be shown in magnified form what's in the window of the pager this is this could surely I should ask is this a photograph of your pager yes at the
00:19:36 photograph of your pager yes at the moment you got the call that's that's the pager message that I received to informing me there was an a pump problems we was attending it and he says that it's up wait for your information we were attending an eighth pump fire on
00:19:48 we were attending an eighth pump fire on out 443 s ground and then they give you the incident number right okay and is there a time come on till the time on that there is a second picture of a
00:19:59 that there is a second picture of a pager which has the date and time and I believe that's a meaty triple zero one six 908 mister documents director I think which is Jiao three would that be
00:20:15 think which is Jiao three would that be is that's that's the best correct one twenty-five yeah that's the second pot you on the right-hand side of the page you'll see an up and down there like a scroll so
00:20:26 an up and down there like a scroll so the first part the message we've been up and then you scroll down and that bit comes up underneath yeah and
00:20:41 kiss-ass keep that photograph was that taken at the time you were paged all afterwards that was after whatever was in the relief that was in the morning at Stratford because as you can see the white notepad that's underneath it yes
00:20:56 white notepad that's underneath it yes so the pager recalls does it the message it out share and keeps it that retains it on yeah chilly until it gets deleted as I say
00:21:08 chilly until it gets deleted as I say that in fact it have just gone ten at that stage but you didn't know that not that song now okay then you then say in your statement that it's a three lines
00:21:20 your statement that it's a three lines down from that I telephoned the control center immediately after receiving the page alert they could only have been 30 seconds to a minute between the two events I was informed on the telephone at the far was on a 43s ground
00:21:32 at the far was on a 43s ground I was now 15 pump fire I remember thinking this was growing very quickly I showed myself status to with the control now what did you think was happening
00:21:47 now what did you think was happening with the speed of make out like that normally with that when it when it's an interesting progresses that quickly we've got quite a serious develop fire in the premises you try to make a mental
00:22:01 in the premises you try to make a mental picture of possibly what is going on at that particular time and I just thought it's a very large incident we're gonna need a lot of resources there and it's been a quite a lot of strategic
00:22:13 been a quite a lot of strategic coordination with regards to control and an instinct ground
00:22:23 can I just turn them to a slightly separate subject before coming back to the night itself and that's the question of training now as officer of the day going to the control center you were
00:22:34 going to the control center you were going in is this right to take responsibility for the control and handling of fast survival guidance calls Americans no now the when you get paged
00:22:45 Americans no now the when you get paged to a napalm fire you go to control one part of your juries is to liaise with the officer to watching the control staff and you act as a an assistant or adviser to the operational side and the control side so you may have to assist
00:22:58 control side so you may have to assist the control staff during particular duties or you may just the eyes with the operation of the fire ground and control with regard and definition okay just in
00:23:09 with regard and definition okay just in terms of advisor to control staff yeah s on your knee off to do with the operational side so they may be dealing with stuff and they might question you regarding operational procedures and
00:23:20 regarding operational procedures and stuff like that we might also assist with stuff like relief plans and and and gathering information we used to that particular time but the
00:23:31 we used to that particular time but the part that you see officer days did to get what was called a headline balled up and running so you'd have a whiteboard week with the incident number the address the last informative message of the officer in charge was etc stuff like
00:23:43 the officer in charge was etc stuff like that just just does just take a little bit more slowly first of all you mentioned assisting with stuff like relief plans you know what do you mean by relief plan well when we have a large
00:23:54 by relief plan well when we have a large incident obviously five firefighters that are out on the incident ground working extremely hard so the London Fire we got is policy in place where after four hours on the fire
00:24:08 place where after four hours on the fire ground fire crews normally relieved with fresh crews from other stations so they'll draw fresh crews from further away to come in and relieve the crews that they're actually on the interesting ground so that you could we've got
00:24:20 ground so that you could we've got constant use a constant cruiser there's any sense yes I see okay and does part of your function and responsibilities involve
00:24:30 involve assisting control room operators or operations managers with what advice to give callers not normally now does any
00:24:44 give callers not normally now does any part of your or does it follow from that but does any part of your function involve assessing or assisting operations managers to assess when a call goes from being an ordinary 999
00:24:57 call goes from being an ordinary 999 call as it were to a fire survival guidance call now fight the the control style make that tissue you might reach the fire survival violence call right they've had the specific training to
00:25:08 they've had the specific training to deal with that and if you had specific training to do with that not taking and not taking a 999 call as a fly survival guidance no were you ever trip were you
00:25:20 guidance no were you ever trip were you trouble at the time of the night of the fire had you heard training on policy 794 surviving by the golden screws I've read the policy numerous times be part
00:25:32 read the policy numerous times be part of the promotion part of promotion process the station manager you have to have a an overview a very very good knowledge of a number of the the fire brigade policies and I've read that a
00:25:43 brigade policies and I've read that a number of times as a watch manager mark my role was at watch made when I was a watch manager was to give training sessions knowledge training sessions to my firefighters in those particular
00:25:55 my firefighters in those particular policies so that should fly survival guidance call come in while she was attending the operations and those firefighters would know what the procedures were okay and we'll come back
00:26:07 procedures were okay and we'll come back to 1790
00:26:08 to 1790 but what about policy 539 just remind me which one that you say yes policy 539 is emergency call management yeah now what
00:26:21 emergency call management yeah now what about training that because that's that's to do with control starfish not to do leave operational side right okay and what about with whittler with the
00:26:32 and what about with whittler with the same apply to what mr. Smith last week called the rips the vas survival guidance operator and far survival guidance supervisor now precisely
00:26:43 guidance supervisor now precisely ratings information if I gain that that's specific to control operator staff okay and would you have had
00:26:54 staff okay and would you have had training or be familiar with the national guidance the generic risk assessment published by the Department for Communities and Local Government in February 2014
00:27:06 February 2014 you think questions sorry I think the answer baton maybe no a lot right anyway um were you familiar with the national guidance for high-rise buildings fire in high-rise
00:27:18 high-rise buildings fire in high-rise buildings GRA or generic risk assessment 3.2 published by the Department of Communities and Local have aware of the national guidelines regarding fire survival garden stay put policy but we
00:27:30 survival garden stay put policy but we actually the actual policy on your staying now okay you're aware you're you're familiar with the national principles of these yet okay
00:27:45 in terms of training you say you were aware of aware of a tread policy 790 yeah as part of your promotion to
00:27:57 yeah as part of your promotion to station manager was there any specific training on how to implement what the policy requires
00:28:11 as from the operational side of it where you're receiving fire survival guidance information from control yes from the control side of it I would say no no
00:28:24 control side of it I would say no no okay can I just explore this just a little bit if you go to policy 719 which is tab 5 of the policies bundle I'd like
00:28:35 is tab 5 of the policies bundle I'd like you to look at section 9 we'll come back to this in infancy ports in relation to specifics but just in general terms in sir page 5 internally section 9 could
00:28:48 sir page 5 internally section 9 could just be highlighted this is communication with control and just just looking at it is this this is part of 790 couldn't we take it you're familiar with with this
00:29:05 yes and looking at paragraphs paragraph 9.1 it says it is vital that control is kept informed of the actions being taken
00:29:16 kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG call the fact that control is aware that the actions being carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice given to FSG callers and then the third one well
00:29:30 callers and then the third one well stick with that one for the moment did you ever get specific training on how control can keep itself informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG
00:29:41 actions being taken to resolve each FSG call
00:29:49 normally the DeBoer the training the training in the policy states that any him once that once the fire survival guidance information have been passed to the operational or the fire ground there
00:30:01 the operational or the fire ground there any information so if this fire survival guidance has been passed and crews have then been allocated to go and deal with that vise of life or guidance that information is normally fed back and by
00:30:13 information is normally fed back and by the main scheme radio to control so that if control are still on the front of those people then they can inform that firefighters are on their way to rescue or to deal with the situation right so
00:30:27 or to deal with the situation right so okay you say the information is normally fed back via the main scheme radio to control just pausing there is that something you were trained in that the
00:30:39 something you were trained in that the method of the fire ground passing the information back to control all firefighters receive a certain amount of training with regards to using the main scheme main scheme radio normally at
00:30:50 scheme main scheme radio normally at significant incidents would have a incident command pump set up where there would be a instant command operator when a fire firefighter or junior officer would be allocated to be in charge of
00:31:02 would be allocated to be in charge of the instant command pump and information would be then be passed by the instant command pump to control via the main scheme radio might buy the main scheme radio on the Grantham on the
00:31:14 main scheme radio on the Grantham on the incident command pump order order for an initial and an issue attendance an incident command pump is normally set up as one of the fire engines and fire appliances is our president initial
00:31:27 appliances is our president initial command pump so that's your immediate your first level of command and control so that you have a radio link between the fire ground and the control room right is
00:31:39 ground and the control room right is what you're telling is something that you is has come to you through your own personal experience or has it come to you through training that's come through training areas of policy I'm setting up
00:31:50 training areas of policy I'm setting up interesting command pump yeah which firefighters are trained in right have you got personal experience or had you had personal experience as at the night of the Grenville tower fire of
00:32:02 the night of the Grenville tower fire of the the incident ground passing back to control the actions being taken to resolve a fire survive as a watch
00:32:13 resolve a fire survive as a watch manager I had been on the other side of the operational ground where we received fire survival guidance and we've dealt with the incident and sent informative messages back to control to say what
00:32:25 messages back to control to say what actions were taken yes you say sent informative messages back together is that the way that it would be done yes yeah so with regards to the main scheme right now there's a different number of
00:32:37 right now there's a different number of different types of messages we would send so first one might be a priority message where we request additional resources then we send an informative message to give an overview of the type
00:32:51 message to give an overview of the type of incident depending on how long the internet actually lasts there may be more than one type of informative message then at the end of the incident once we've sought will I have the interests and control we could do a fire surrounding or what I stopped message
00:33:03 surrounding or what I stopped message for that particular type of incident right but in would an informative message always provide tailor-made and space and specific about what was happening on the fire
00:33:15 about what was happening on the fire ground to resolve the FSG call that is part of the fire survival guidance policy that once once the for survival guidance information has been passed to
00:33:26 guidance information has been passed to the fire ground and that crews have been allocated to deal with that information then there should be an informative sent back to control to inform them to say
00:33:37 back to control to inform them to say what actions are being taken some times that informative message maybe the fact that fire crews have ascended to whatever particular floor and a number of people have then been rescued from
00:33:49 of people have then been rescued from that floor so that they know that the for survival guidance information has been dealt with would in your experience all training would the informative message being passed back from the fire ground to control always accurately
00:34:02 ground to control always accurately reasonably accurately provide control with enough information to be able to advise the caller as to whether or not it was safe to us safe to try to use the
00:34:13 it was safe to us safe to try to use the emergency exit from are you are you showing that the sorry can you repeat the question yes would the informative message coming back from the fire ground to control always be accurate enough to
00:34:25 to control always be accurate enough to be able to help the CRO advise the caller as to whether it was safe to use the escape route that information could be could be sent back yes in the but
00:34:39 be could be sent back yes in the but would an informative message do the job or would you need something a bit more tailor-made the normally on the fire ground the initial command unit is in the process do you mean to actually
00:34:50 the process do you mean to actually communicate and weave controllers wire main screen radio so any information that we pass baton would be by the main screen radio if from from my own personal experiences advice from from
00:35:05 personal experiences advice from from the fire Gambia regarding escape routes has never been passed back because normally fire crews are sent to deal with with people of come under the for survival guidance issues right okay and looking back at
00:35:21 issues right okay and looking back at the policy the second sentence of line one says the fact that control is aware of the actions being taken at being carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice given to FSG
00:35:33 greatly enhance the advice given to FSG callers you aware of the desirability of having the incident ground provide you
00:35:47 having the incident ground provide you in the control room with the actions being carried out on the incident ground are usually bad on the particular noise but on then on the night of the incident we was receiving so many fire survival
00:35:59 we was receiving so many fire survival guidance cause the the fight normally the fire survival guidance information comes by the main screen radio the pool operators were inundated with radio
00:36:11 operators were inundated with radio traffic and phone calls from people ins in within the tower block no I was actually passing the information via my mobile phone from the control room to the command unit and I did receive I
00:36:23 the command unit and I did receive I wouldn't say received specific information regarding every individual fire survival guidance called but I did receive some information back regarding some of the suffice arrival guidance
00:36:34 some of the suffice arrival guidance calls that had been had been dishing up thickness and okay well comfortable come to that energy core but in general terms then ignoring Grenfell itself in your
00:36:46 then ignoring Grenfell itself in your training were you were aware where you of the desirability of control knowing as much as possible as to what was happening on the control on the incident ground yes it was doing that make sure if we've got people that are trapped in
00:36:58 if we've got people that are trapped in their property whether it be a flat or house they can control can then pass that information to the occupants that are trapped to let them know that fire crews are on their way they're aware
00:37:10 crews are on their way they're aware where they are they know they are and that proves on their way to to rescue them right is there any other way of the fire ground communicated with control other than by the use of informative messages there on the on on
00:37:26 informative messages there on the on on larger incidents there would be a command unit on the command unit they have a telephone number which is logged into their their telephone which is a critical life information line which
00:37:37 critical life information line which goes is a priority telephone line that goes straight through to control there's a red telephone at the head table if the command units use that telephone line this is it if it's it's like a the
00:37:51 this is it if it's it's like a the priority lines and the officer watch can answer it so they can get specific life critical life information directly under the command unit and looking at
00:38:02 the command unit and looking at paragraph from nine point three of the policy the outcome of every FSG call must be communicated to control again would that be done by informative
00:38:14 would that be done by informative message normally or would it be done by the depending on the size of the incident that could be via the main main scheme radio or via telephone line fire the command unit when it says our
00:38:25 the command unit when it says our outcome of every at first you call does that what does that mean that means if the fire survival guidance call has been has been dealt with so far crews have gone up and rescued the occupants right
00:38:36 gone up and rescued the occupants right okay
00:38:38 okay and what if just in general terms what if the outcome of the call is that at the moment the crew is unable to reach the caller who is trapped being Wynette
00:38:54 the caller who is trapped being Wynette move with the exception of what happened on that night I've never been put in that situation I've never heard of that situation occurring fire crews have always been seen to deal with fire survival guidance
00:39:06 to deal with fire survival guidance calls and depending on the outcome with their rescue them or whether they unfortunately people lost their lives of I've never never known that information being passed back saying that we cannot
00:39:17 being passed back saying that we cannot get to him okay um in training terms do you have any any training after Latin or house on the lessons learnt from Latino house yes there was a case study that
00:39:31 house yes there was a case study that was was circulated that fire crews were taken through
00:39:43 and do you remember when you were showing that case study I don't know I miss a long time ago okay
00:39:58 right
00:40:10 can I ask you to look at but first of all are you familiar with an lfb report on the lessons learns and conclusions to be drawn from the lateral house fire
00:40:21 be drawn from the lateral house fire I've probably haven't read the report now you wouldn't have read it no let me just show it to you and has it this familiar and if you haven't read it I thought I would ask you about it that's
00:40:33 thought I would ask you about it that's the first page I was going to ask you about some specific paragraphs particularly paragraphs 2 9 3 2 2 9 6
00:40:46 which are
00:41:03 50
00:41:06 in turn yes 50
00:41:13 I'm Chuck just looking at him mr. LaVey don't have Dorothy spend time on this if you're not that you're not familiar with the report but just looking at paragraph two nine three expectations that callers
00:41:24 two nine three expectations that callers will be rescued and stay put advice just just looking at that briefly is that something you've seen before and in this form we see in this room is
00:41:35 and in this form we see in this room is this this report or a report like it on this subject
00:41:49 yeah I haven't read their report when that is in our part of our other policies as part of the advice the expectations of what control staff would
00:42:00 expectations of what control staff would be given to people who are in fire survival guidance that there's not four concepts okay just just looking at that they know now you haven't seen this before but do you think you've got training either in approaching station
00:42:13 training either in approaching station manager status or before that on the matters that are covered by that paragraph training with respect to but
00:42:25 paragraph training with respect to but in respect to anything covered by that paragraph but let me put it more specifically in the third line it says I was rescued by crews were not immediate
00:42:37 was rescued by crews were not immediate there is a question whether the CEO and all callers could have assessed the risk of attempting to escape from the flat and whether the risk of moving closer to the fire but escaping was less and staying put and awaiting rescue Co
00:42:48 staying put and awaiting rescue Co relied on advising callers to stay put expecting that this would keep callers safe from the fire and the question is did you ever after Lachman house get any training on that question or but on the
00:43:01 training on that question or but on the problems that arise from ce o--'s relying on callers i think the CEO refers to the call operator which is not part of the operational side of which is
00:43:13 part of the operational side of which is not part of the operation side of the firefighter training okay and then looking at two nine six which is about communication between the control and the and incident command it says there
00:43:25 the and incident command it says there is evidence of information passing from control to the incident ground at only one occasion when details of the threat that people trap is not passed in we're not passed in a timely way control supervisors regularly tried to obtain
00:43:37 supervisors regularly tried to obtain information about progress with the incident particularly in relation to call this
00:43:40 call this FSG in light of practice at the time there was much less information being passed from the incident grant of control about the progress of firefighting and rescue efforts it's not
00:43:51 firefighting and rescue efforts it's not clear if CA the if ce o--'s have been given information about progress that it would have influenced the advice given to callers so the lesson learned there seems to be that the incident grant
00:44:04 seems to be that the incident grant wasn't classy enough information back to control to able to be able to assist them in with their calls did you after Lac no house get any specific training
00:44:15 Lac no house get any specific training on how to improve communications between the fire ground and the control room so as to be able to help controller control room the defi survival Gardens policy
00:44:26 room the defi survival Gardens policy was brought out and people crews were trained in that as a watch manage we go go crews knowledge sessions with regards to the importance of passing information
00:44:37 to the importance of passing information backwards to control but as specifically of training wise now okay and you say you gave crews and knowledge sessions
00:44:48 you gave crews and knowledge sessions with regard to you yeah it's training sessions on the actual policy and about the information required that needs to go back to control right did you give them training on how specific to be in relation to a
00:45:02 on how specific to be in relation to a specific call in other words training them to pass clear and accurate information back to the control room about the actual progress at the moment I look at the information that knowingly goes back is is comes from the initial
00:45:14 goes back is is comes from the initial fire survival guidance information so you could be given in a survival garden it's from the information for a specific flat number that information once the person has rescued they write on the
00:45:26 person has rescued they write on the informative message flats are two people rescued by BAE crews who are internal staircase and they information then go back and how important would it be for the incident ground to have the
00:45:38 be for the incident ground to have the specific flat number particular when you've got a high-rise building for the for the for the information going to the fire ground that is that is very important because not only just a flat
00:45:49 important because not only just a flat number the floor number how many people are involved but for that information to go to the fire ground he is imperative because that information the the sector commander can then allocate crews to go and deal with that
00:46:02 allocate crews to go and deal with that particular information yes can they now go back to the question of the Stratford control room in on page 8 of your
00:46:16 control room in on page 8 of your statement we've got the policies away from to the moment on page 8 of your statement you say
00:46:27 the bottom of the page
00:46:31 Merton is close to repair as at the time
00:46:38 and that it says Merson her always has a large-screen television switched on and i believe this is an invaluable tool in decision-making when an incident like
00:46:50 decision-making when an incident like this is unfolding now why is it invaluable the DES screen at screens at
00:47:03 invaluable the DES screen at screens at Merton and they do have a screen at Stratford is normally one run screen is normally on Sky nose and Skye noses normally tends to be first on scene so you get an overview
00:47:15 first on scene so you get an overview picture of the type of incident is going on there is a second screen which can have a let's believe a downlink from the police helicopter so a police helicopter
00:47:26 police helicopter so a police helicopter can send pictures to the command room or Brigade Coordination Center so that the the principal managing the NGO Coordination Center can have a have a
00:47:37 Coordination Center can have a have a view of what's actually going on at the incident so for for personnel that are in the actual compare so for people that are actually in the control room you can
00:47:48 are actually in the control room you can actually you've got a a physical picture of the H Winston that you've been this being dealt with and you say in on page 9 of your statement I believe that having access to the images of this
00:48:00 having access to the images of this event as it happened would have assisted us the lfv in making assessments from our remote location how it could you just explain how seeing images like that
00:48:13 just explain how seeing images like that on the television our grammar felt our would have assisted the control room so from from from my point of view I wouldn't have had a keel fatheri authority to change decisions in the control room at that time but it might
00:48:26 control room at that time but it might have given the officer the watch or the senior operations manager or the Deputy Assistant Commissioner an overview of the development of the incident and they
00:48:38 the development of the incident and they may have been able to make an assessment they might be able to make an assessment to change stay-put policy what would
00:48:50 to change stay-put policy what would they have been able to see from the television images if the television had been on in the stratford control room which would have enabled the senior
00:49:02 which would have enabled the senior control room staff to change the statement they would have been out to see an overview of the actual incident heritage he was progressing the actions
00:49:13 heritage he was progressing the actions are different you wouldn't to me at Dorothy you've got to see the action of the firefighters but you'd been out today an overview of the actual and how how quickly it was developing and how how fast the fire was spreading what
00:49:25 how fast the fire was spreading what were looking at the television had provided the control room staff with that they couldn't get from direct contact by speaking to the incident commander or the control of the ICP or
00:49:36 commander or the control of the ICP or the CEO on the guitar graph I think it's an old adage of picture paints a thousand words I think you can you get an overview by seeing a television screen with a particular scene or
00:49:49 screen with a particular scene or whatever you you get it you'd get an overview awarded what what the firefighters the firefighters and the senior officers are actually on the interesting ground are dealing with from
00:50:02 interesting ground are dealing with from your experience what is the purpose of having a television on in the control room showing a 24-hour news feed again it gives an overview of specific
00:50:15 it gives an overview of specific incidents over if there's a breaking news story or a serious incident whether it be for hour or place related or and I related incident you can you can get an
00:50:28 related incident you can you can get an overview of what's going on right and in your experience of of control rooms such as it was is seeing news feeds of a
00:50:40 as it was is seeing news feeds of a major developing far something which does assist control room operators makes it when when you're in the control room that night and again at that particular time I had limited experiences because
00:50:52 time I had limited experiences because it was my first time as officer today if you your and when you're monitoring calls as well and you're listening for information by the main screen radios
00:51:04 information by the main screen radios you're trying to formulate a mental picture of the incident what actions that crews are taking how the how the incident is developing but having agent
00:51:16 incident is developing but having agent have it having a screen up in that control center as I said you know a picture paints a thousand words so give everyone in that room an overview of what what the London Fire Brigade and or
00:51:29 what what the London Fire Brigade and or any other emergency services were dealing with that night now Joe Smith when she came to give evidence last week said in on few occasions and just for the transcription it's day 21 page 95
00:51:41 the transcription it's day 21 page 95 and data day 22 at page 173 just for our purposes she said my paraphrase that the purpose of having the television on
00:51:52 purpose of having the television on normally would just be background and wouldn't be used as an information gathering tool to enable control room that that is true but again again this
00:52:03 that that is true but again again this just this was my common that I I made that based in and this is within hindsight of the actual incident taking place that that would have been an invaluable tool to have
00:52:15 invaluable tool to have at that particular time okay and what do you think and it's hindsight I paid and I take your point on that so there's only so far we can take it but what would it have given the control room
00:52:27 would it have given the control room operators of Yvonne's for busy so it's the general pictorial overview rather than the specific information I think for the that particular incident and
00:52:38 for the that particular incident and again it's been said a thousand times that it was unprecedented that you know an Eastern eye that has never been seen in London and I think that would have
00:52:49 in London and I think that would have given an overview of what how how stretched and how how under pressure the emergency services were that night now in your statement at the top of page nine we were just on it I jumped the
00:53:02 nine we were just on it I jumped the sentence deliberately but the sentence before the one I was asking you about says this when I arrived at Stratford one of the first things I noticed was that the television has switched off I
00:53:13 that the television has switched off I was informed that it was broken now you say one of the one of the first things I noticed was that the television was switched off I thought you've heard at the time yeah because as you walk
00:53:26 at the time yeah because as you walk into as you walk into the Stratford control room you put like a hit desk is basically straight in front of you and then this green is behind it and it was switched off okay and because as an
00:53:39 switched off okay and because as an essay from from my own personal experience any any particular major incident and this was quite clearly going to be one of those type of incident because the the way that the
00:53:50 incident because the the way that the incident was made up very very quickly the amount of resources that requested from the incident ground that would have been a especially for the centre of London probably a breaking news story in
00:54:01 London probably a breaking news story in some way shape or form so were you surprised that the television was not on I just noticed it was off and when I said to I think it was the officer to watch I was just involved
00:54:13 watch I was just involved spoken wasn't working right so the officer of the watch told you it was broken sorry the officer of the watch told you it was broken I'm not a hundred percent sir but I'm sure
00:54:24 not a hundred percent sir but I'm sure it was insane that there were our screen we have a Stratford there is downstairs where they normally sell that we go Coordination Center there are on our two screens but obviously as officers though
00:54:37 screens but obviously as officers though I stayed in the control and so I didn't have privilege to go down and actually view those screens who was the officer of the watch that night I can't remember name I'm sorry and did you try the
00:54:52 name I'm sorry and did you try the television for yourself no I didn't know now the the he it was immediate whereas as soon as I walked into the control room maybe it was evident that all the
00:55:03 room maybe it was evident that all the core the co-operators the hit table where the officer watched seats was was inundated with calls and information it was going on it was very very busy control room
00:55:24 and do you remember whether the television was ever turned on that night what does it stay on now it wasn't you mentioned the other screen and indeed on
00:55:36 mentioned the other screen and indeed on page nine you go on to say Merton there's a link to the helicopter images which is silly there's a facility that they have to be able to do it downlink it's the same as what they have without
00:55:48 it's the same as what they have without command unit yeah but I can't say whether that was actually put in place on the night though I didn't get these dicta BCC bit is downstairs underneath the control which in a different problem
00:56:00 the control which in a different problem well is that the hell eat any link yes
00:56:10 both ask you to look at the iron and iymp report which is tamp 30 of the documents this is this is incident
00:56:27 documents this is this is incident report that which was published after this if you look at
00:56:42 Paige to shake back tap 30 own oh yes tap 30 it'll come up on the screens but it's actually on the screen already it's much easier than that I give to have 32
00:56:53 much easier than that I give to have 32 need mister documents controller otherwise yeah so I should say when I
00:57:05 otherwise yeah so I should say when I give out a number or a tab it's it's just it's for now okay documents controllers benefit then he puts it up on the screen and then we can look at it together we want to look at it in paper form that's fine that's fine
00:57:16 form that's fine that's fine okay if you go to the second page it says under development second entry
00:57:23 there was no access to the helicopter downlink he'll eat any at Stratford control fall back review the equipment at our control fullback locations and
00:57:34 at our control fullback locations and that was what the conclusion of the incident review was do you remember that there was no access during the night at Stratford to the heli table well as I
00:57:45 Stratford to the heli table well as I say I mean I was in the control room all night and the screen that was right behind the head table was I was told was not working so there was no in the actual control room itself I wasn't
00:57:57 actual control room itself I wasn't aware that the screens downstairs they had no link to that right
00:58:05 okay now do you remember whether there were any other issues with the Stratford control rooms facilities on that night
00:58:16 control rooms facilities on that night not as far as I'm aware now it was just an extremely busy room everybody was working flat out in the control room do
00:58:27 working flat out in the control room do you do you normally have well can you get access to the operational risk database for a building you can you can
00:58:38 database for a building you can you can right I'm not sure about control I couldn't say whether he was whether you could or couldn't control right I know I
00:58:49 could or couldn't control right I know I know right a command units you can buy the fire appliances that are any incident grounds that you can couldn't say with you or you can do it control one up what about the contents of a
00:59:03 one up what about the contents of a mobile data terminal for a particular building it not as far as I'm aware okay
00:59:13 did you in your experience as given this was the first time this is a slightly stunted question but did you think on the night but it might be necessary to look at the operational risk database or
00:59:25 look at the operational risk database or ask somebody to do so in order to get more information about the tower that is normally done on the incident ground so part of the part of the incident
00:59:36 part of the part of the incident commanders role would be information gathering the part that would be to look at the mobile data terminal either via the command unit or by fire appliance together plans and information regarding
00:59:47 together plans and information regarding the building how normally would a control room operator or indeed the supervisors and operations managers in
00:59:58 supervisors and operations managers in the control room know of any given building whether a stay put policy was in place nor any any high-rise building he normally has a stay put policy
01:00:10 he normally has a stay put policy in place so that would be an assumption that stager would make here that is national guidelines okay and how would
01:00:24 national guidelines okay and how would the control room know about any escape routes or stairs and other active or
01:00:35 routes or stairs and other active or passive fire prevention measures in any given building control warden wouldn't know most rolls no as far as I'm aware that sort of information would be on the MDC or LRD which the incident commander
01:00:47 MDC or LRD which the incident commander should be made aware of so normally a six pump fire and above part of the officer cadre that would attend that
01:00:58 officer cadre that would attend that type of incident would be a senior fly safety officer and part of his role would be to look at plans and equip the fly precautions within a building so that he can advise the interested
01:01:10 that he can advise the interested commander of those facilities within a building in your experience would it be normal then for the control room whether the CRO of handing the call or any of
01:01:23 the CRO of handing the call or any of the supervising managers to know little or nothing about the layout of the building number of staircases or any active or passive fire survival or fire
01:01:34 active or passive fire survival or fire prevention don't say that's the case properly I would can't be a hundred percent certain but as far as I'm aware that that information is normally dealt with out on the actual fire ground right
01:01:46 with out on the actual fire ground right and so I'm not a I'm not a controller operator so I've been trading the operational side of it and not the controller operational side of it so when a control room operator is giving
01:01:59 when a control room operator is giving advice to a caller who is feeling the effects of heat smoke or fire in their flat how would the control room operator be able to assess the safety for the
01:02:14 be able to assess the safety for the caller of leaving their flat and utilizing the escape route that's that's a question for a call operator I'm not a call a pro I don't take the nine online course so I don't know how
01:02:26 nine online course so I don't know how they've been trained to to carry out that risk assessment to deem where it's safe or not if the control room operator and anybody in the control room doesn't have access to the operational risk
01:02:39 have access to the operational risk database or any information about the layout and structure of the building how can the control room operator give any kind of advice to a caller as to the means of escape there's standard
01:02:52 means of escape there's standard standard information that a call operator would give to a person who is who is deemed Treach in their flat about survival surviving within that compartment until fire crews reach them
01:03:05 compartment until fire crews reach them okay but before that that person is actually trapped and can't get a get out but is looking at their options they're affected by smoke heat or fire in their flat and there's a discussion going on
01:03:17 flat and there's a discussion going on between the caller and the control room operator about about getting out it can control it very well it discussed my question kind of josma question how can the control room operator give advice if
01:03:29 the control room operator give advice if he or she doesn't actually know about what the building contains in terms of escape routes I can't answer that question so say on my control operator I can only speculate and say that the control of the wait
01:03:40 and say that the control of the wait would question your coupon because the occupant would know the layout of the building then the occupant would lay know where the escape routes are and the
01:03:51 know where the escape routes are and the layer of the building themselves and if the if the occupant of that flat deems that they they can't escape from that flat then the control operator would go to the stay-put policy and start giving them advice about how to prevent smoke
01:04:03 them advice about how to prevent smoke entering a room the best place for them to be within their property
01:04:09 and this relative we've been going for more than an hour and I'm grateful to you mr. chairman it may be appropriate to have a break now well we could have a break now a fine thank you
01:04:20 break now a fine thank you we could fine I come to a natural point for a break we need one well I just wondering whether we could go on for another warned and have a longer break otherwise we have to braids yes we could
01:04:44 go on for coffin are now fine yeah we do that along the breakage somewhere near a couples to it yes let's do that
01:04:58 the page three of your statement is going back to that if I can astrology you we've covered this week we you said
01:05:09 you we've covered this week we you said you were paged at 125 and we've seen your pager had you ever heard of Grenfell tower I haven't now okay and you also say that as officer of the day
01:05:20 you also say that as officer of the day you would receive an alert in the event of a sixth bump fire normally yes yeah and what would you be required to do if you were told it was a six-month fire if I was if it was a six bump fire I'll
01:05:32 I was if it was a six bump fire I'll probably turn on my radio I've monitors what radio traffic was going back between the fire ground and the control room and I would probably also log on to
01:05:43 room and I would probably also log on to remote log on to the control system we've got Boston vision that would bring up the incident so that I could see where the incident was an avid overview of the actuators in itself and it's a
01:05:58 of the actuators in itself and it's a matter of record here that this fire at Granville Tower became a six pan fire 1:13 did you receive and I think the answer is no did you receive an alert that's not know the choice why not I
01:06:09 that's not know the choice why not I don't know I can't again I can only speculate in the shooting that the it went from 6 to 8 very very quickly by the time we got to our page and page in
01:06:20 the time we got to our page and page in which is a part of our amount which is part the control you staff it just came straight over as an 8-pound fire and you then showed yourself the status - you
01:06:31 then showed yourself the status - you say yeah we have listener to turn it turn it up but we have you calling in at 1:20 703 would that be about right yeah
01:06:45 1:20 703 would that be about right yeah if that's what a record show I do remember it be taking a while for the my phone call to be answered
01:07:01 yes and we have a we have a call then we'd levy schlep it's probably best if I show to you set for completeness could you please be shown page 42 of the
01:07:12 could you please be shown page 42 of the Orr
01:07:22 this is a the first time we've looked at this document this is a no we haven't yes I'm waiting before it comes up I'll tell you what it is this is a very detailed report put together by the
01:07:34 detailed report put together by the London Fire Brigade minute-by-minute attending part second-by-second based on information available to them and a third of the way down page 42 it says oh
01:07:45 third of the way down page 42 it says oh 127 83 station manager Olive who is the nominated officer of the day officer of the day one contacts the paging officer to acknowledge receipt of the apron fire he confirms the controller located at
01:07:57 he confirms the controller located at Stratford and States he will proceed to control sorry can you just confirm the charm again yes oh one I'm so sorry Jenny we've seen the right page we're not on the right page was page 42 I'm
01:08:10 not on the right page was page 42 I'm sorry I'm busy reading away no that wasn't on your screen I'm sorry so there's a 127 oh there we go three sorry
01:08:21 there's a 127 oh there we go three sorry mr. chairman opposite no chance they don't have it and there it's there station manager orders nominated officer of the day contacts paging officer acknowledge receipt of a plum fire and
01:08:33 acknowledge receipt of a plum fire and you confirm patroller located at Stratford he comes I think as the paging officer country confirms the controller vacated their Stratford and states you will proceed to control and the source
01:08:46 will proceed to control and the source of that is an admin call can you help with what an admin call is that's just where officer calls why they mobile found chicken to control Beijing right
01:08:58 found chicken to control Beijing right say this message did it go over your Brigade mobile yes okay in your experience I'll bring the brigade mobile calls recorded
01:09:10 calls recorded I'm not sure I'm not where do you carry an air wave radio don't you listen yeah it was it possible that in fact you you sent this message over your air wave
01:09:22 you sent this message over your air wave radio now I said miss messy charged my phone right but there should be a evident phone look right in my evidence here somewhere will that reflect the time of the phone
01:09:34 will that reflect the time of the phone call that mobile that you use for that call do you remember was it the same mobile that you used to speak to the control unit command unit time source during that during the course of the
01:09:46 during that during the course of the night how she yes right
01:09:54 and just came back to your statement at the bottom of page three you say in an alternate paragraph I made my way to the control center on blue lights in my own
01:10:07 control center on blue lights in my own vehicle I was no more than a mutt one mile into the journey when I heard over the air wave radio make pumps 25 yeah I was just when I stood up was into about a mile and into the journey I mean that
01:10:19 a mile and into the journey I mean that was that was just a guesstimate sure now they have a time stamp for make poms 25 but Oh 131 and 30 seconds I don't need
01:10:30 but Oh 131 and 30 seconds I don't need to show you that in the in the log so that's what it was at that time would that be about right in the answers of your departure time and the time you got
01:10:42 your departure time and the time you got that message Yeah right then you go on to say at that time I recall thinking the things have gone badly wrong somehow given the time frame the number of pumps and the fact that this was a fire inside
01:10:54 and the fact that this was a fire inside a flat that's correct he said you say you thought things had gone badly wrong somehow
01:11:01 somehow and he just expand on that what do you mean I'm just I mean normally we've regard to high-rise and fires in flats in and when he confined to the
01:11:12 in and when he confined to the compartment on rare occasions they do break out through windows and spread vertically to sometimes to the flat above sometimes
01:11:25 sometimes to the flat above sometimes the flat above it very rarely do they do they go past that it going listening to the the makeups without no informative you're trying to picture what's actually
01:11:37 you're trying to picture what's actually developing at that incident and for that amount of resources to be sent to a high-rise fire the incident was obviously developing very very rapidly right
01:11:57 and you're you're able to communicate via mobile phone you've also got an air wave radio and were you able at that time to
01:12:09 radio and were you able at that time to communicate with the incident commander if you wanted to not whilst on route now right Tom because I'm driving yeah
01:12:20 right Tom because I'm driving yeah and so officer that they would not directly liaise with the indistinct command out gonna fly around okay did you know who the incident commander was
01:12:31 you know who the incident commander was at that stage while you were driving in arts now at him okay if you'd wanted to know could you have asked anybody it when I arrived at control I could have found out who the indistinct amanda was
01:12:42 found out who the indistinct amanda was right okay we'll come to that in a moment
01:12:47 [Music]
01:12:51 in fact that that is where we get to mr. chairman that probably is a convenient moment for visit or a break yes it's just before them yeah sorry will he'll break now and come
01:13:02 yeah sorry will he'll break now and come back at half past 11:00 on the stroll if we're gonna have a break have to ask you please not talk about your evidence or anything related to it during the break right now if you go with the option now
01:13:13 right now if you go with the option now we'll start to get the top 11 thank you thank you very much good for celebrities
01:30:04 Thank You mr. chairman if we can have the witness back here instantly pains on his way
01:30:30 brightness throat if you're ready to keep going yes thank you thank you very much
01:30:34 much Israeli thank you for coming back to us foot of page three of your witness statements please ask you to look at that you say it took me about 20 to 25
01:30:47 that you say it took me about 20 to 25 minutes to arrive at Stratford mobilizing control I just want to get an idea of the timing you were paged 125
01:30:59 idea of the timing you were paged 125 and we've got you on route at the time when you heard over the air wave radio that pumps have been made 25 that's oh one 31:13 yep on that base is 20 to 25
01:31:15 one 31:13 yep on that base is 20 to 25 minutes that would put you arriving at the control room at about five to ten to one 10 to 2 or 5 to 2 grand about that Sonia roundabout no time there's a
01:31:27 Sonia roundabout no time there's a guesstimate as well yeah so he's around about that time okay and you know you don't recall any more precisely do what now have you arrived now
01:31:39 and when you arrived you say on page four at the very top I asked the Oh Oh W that's officer of the watch what I was
01:31:52 that's officer of the watch what I was needed to do I think you can't remember who the arrow W was is that right I could picture her face but I can't remember her name Joe Smith now Josh
01:32:03 remember her name Joe Smith now Josh Mitchell was the senior operational manager so right okay well we may have to explore that some other way and you say that you were
01:32:15 other way and you say that you were advised that the incident has recently been moved to a make pumps 30 I was asked to try and contact TAC new drawbridges now um do you know that this
01:32:27 drawbridges now um do you know that this was never a xxx fun fire it went from 25 to 40 I wasn't aware of that now I mean it I've just stated more I remember at the time right do you know can you
01:32:39 the time right do you know can you remember who advised you that the incident had been made up above 25 pumps I remember going into the control room speaking to the officer to watch and again offers him offering my assistance
01:32:51 again offers him offering my assistance and what what was what what was required at me well I wanted me to do the officer watch asked if I could try to contact the Assistant Commissioner Lee
01:33:03 the Assistant Commissioner Lee drawbridge because he was on recall I said I would do that so I went into one of the back offices knocked onto the computers and police phone number and try to call him right now
01:33:23 you think that that conversation happened with the officer of the wash but after the pumps have been upgraded and made up beyond 25 - any idea okay
01:33:45 in the if I can just ask you to look at the short incident log which is tab 23 of our documents bundle and go to page 21 at o2 o3 41 we have someone
01:34:06 21 at o2 o3 41 we have someone unhealthily but we have make up I UPG 2 7 1 make pumps 25 now in fact as I said before pumps 25 had been made o 131 yeah
01:34:21 before pumps 25 had been made o 131 yeah on the engine lock sometimes the did make up its get repeated further and even even though even though it was a lot earlier sometimes they get repaid on the interesting looks right
01:34:34 the interesting looks right [Music]
01:34:37 so if I ask you then just to look at another document which is time seven of our documents by the walk which is lfb
01:34:50 our documents by the walk which is lfb document number three and turn to page two in that just halfway down the page we have a this is an lfb record we have at o2 o4 o 9
01:35:09 we have message from incident cu8 make puns for tea now assuming that that's a correct time mark that makeup does that
01:35:22 correct time mark that makeup does that help you cut a time on the conversation you had with the officer of the watch when you asked her what was needed around about that time I mean but I'm
01:35:34 around about that time I mean but I'm not actually arrived at control their security gates to get in there security doors to go through about time you actually get up into the control room itself and say it was a very very busy
01:35:46 itself and say it was a very very busy control room the office of the watch was was again very very busy so by the time I introduced myself and asked what I could do he's probably on the same sort
01:35:57 could do he's probably on the same sort lines I may have misheard is a possibility that I misheard that from 30 to 40 right did you ask who the incident
01:36:08 to 40 right did you ask who the incident commander was no that time now it's how I'm up I could see that they was they was bent over I wouldn't say overwhelmed but they was extremely busy and what I could do to assist them and so part of that was I
01:36:20 assist them and so part of that was I was asked if I could try to reach recall Deputy Assistant Commissioner the jawbridge but leap drawbridge wasn't on the fire ground was it no no he wasn't
01:36:32 the fire ground was it no no he wasn't he wasn't he was what we called his on recall duty and I believe which is basically there what you're off duty and this major incident occurs and then you
01:36:44 this major incident occurs and then you can be contacted and recalled to carry out specific roles why was it more important to get hold of lis drawbridge and not to try to speak to the incident commander
01:36:55 commander that's that's not part of my role as officer today I wouldn't speak to the incident commander and you made an attempt I think to get hold of Libre drawbridge in fact no fewer than nine attempts to get hold of that's correct
01:37:06 attempts to get hold of that's correct yeah and they all failed you say yeah just went for it to answer fine is that is that normal I have nine failed attempts no I just I just carried
01:37:17 failed attempts no I just I just carried on trying one after the other there was no answer so I didn't know where you know what his location was I thought off that time he's not going to answer his phone so I'll then go on and carry out
01:37:29 phone so I'll then go on and carry out opportunities right and I think cottony long story short he went back to the iOW said you couldn't get hold of leave drawbridge yep when she said we'll try Danny Egan the officer now exactly know
01:37:42 Danny Egan the officer now exactly know the because of this situation that was going on in a control room and how busy it was as officers a day I thought that it would probably be prudent to get an additional station manager in there to
01:37:54 additional station manager in there to assist with opportunities that need to be carried out so I said to the officer to watch
01:37:59 to watch can we get od2 paged and so that we've got some further assistance in the control room and od2 for that new oil station manager Danny Egan
01:38:15 and as you say on page four of your statement a third of the way down you were informed that SM Egan had been mobilized to the incident did you did he
01:38:28 mobilized to the incident did you did he speak to station manager Regan at that well I didn't know now the officer but one the control operator said that mr. Egan had already been mobilized to the incident by then asked if station
01:38:40 incident by then asked if station manager Mark Lanegan had where he'd been mobilized ensign my sitting no he had and so knowing that Paul MacLean acun camps out in Dagenham which is
01:38:52 camps out in Dagenham which is relatively close to Stratford I asked if Paul McKenna can could be paid enough to attend the control center I see okay now did you know that station manager McClenathan was actually a a
01:39:06 McClenathan was actually a a FSG and a rescue specialist he has different tags he's also any to write at that / to tone interagency liaison officer and I which we called as an ILO
01:39:18 officer and I which we called as an ILO which is also at a would would have been an asset because he can then liaise with other agencies such as the police in the ambulance service did you know that at
01:39:30 ambulance service did you know that at about that time the incident the fire at Granville tower had been declared an a major incident I hadn't not the time for that is o 206 38 according to the
01:39:44 that is o 206 38 according to the shortness of that long we don't have a recollection that at that time I was in the command room I didn't have I wasn't I didn't have access to mainstream radio I wasn't listening to a mainstream radio
01:39:55 I wasn't listening to a mainstream radio it was amazing when the officer to watch right at that particular time you say just halfway down page for your
01:40:06 just halfway down page for your statements the head table of the control room was very busy with information coming incident can I just get a picture of what that means in terms of layout
01:40:17 of what that means in terms of layout first of all the head table of the control room where is that situated in relation to so a few of them if you want to take this room as an example so you'd have a head table which is here you'd
01:40:29 have a head table which is here you'd have a screen behind it and then control what operators desks are by the side of that right at the desk you have the opposite you only have two two - officer
01:40:40 opposite you only have two two - officer - watches and other staff there who normally sits at the head table that's normally officer two watches so you know we have two other to believe - officer 2 watches on duty anyone so on right and
01:40:51 watches on duty anyone so on right and then you have INF up control operator there and you mentioned a screen behind the yesterday and television screen which is the one which say we prefer - there wasn't on right and what about the holy tele link - little nervous because
01:41:03 holy tele link - little nervous because we know there was they say there was nothing there that night and the head table does that have telephones on it yes quite telephones computer screens there's a intercom which that particular
01:41:16 there's a intercom which that particular night was linked to the police helicopter and what telephone sets believe - telephone sets plus the critical information line telephone is that the red one that's the red one yeah
01:41:27 that the red one that's the red one yeah right
01:41:29 right and who has charge of the red telephone that normally comes the critical line telephone is normally comes from the command units surveys risk critical or
01:41:41 command units surveys risk critical or life at risk critical information commanders have a telephone number direct to that particular phone moving the control room and what about lines used or usable by
01:41:53 and what about lines used or usable by BT or buddy control rooms such as Essex in the North West would that come through on the red phone or or other phones that would probably come through another fan again not being a control operator I wouldn't doubt which which
01:42:05 operator I wouldn't doubt which which phones that I would use for that where they just come through on a direct line to our control staff okay
01:42:12 you know it's um you say the head table was very busy with information coming into them how does that information coming from that was coming from all directions that was coming from the
01:42:23 directions that was coming from the actual operators themselves with regards to for survival guidance it was coming from place Sheila Copps it was on the interlink there's a bucket anyway
01:42:38 interlink there's a bucket anyway microphone with the speaker there's information coming in from there right very very busy and in terms of the control room operators communicating sending information to the head table
01:42:50 sending information to the head table how do they do that there's control crates coming up to the head up to the desk must be key to the opposite of watching party pizza paper backwards and forwards with information
01:43:01 backwards and forwards with information on do you remember a radio operator in the control room a right thick tip on control operator radio operators right and we've heard quite a lot of evidence last week about Sharon Darby who was we
01:43:14 last week about Sharon Darby who was we were told the radio operator on the night in the control room all night do you remember that yeah I don't remember right now
01:43:21 right now do you remember anybody occupying the role of a radio operator no no I wouldn't be able to say who was there that night right okay well we'll come back to that topic shortly but just continuing with
01:43:35 topic shortly but just continuing with your statement you then in the next sentence say I was asked to take the information from the police helicopter during this event I spoke with the police helicopter twice first of all who
01:43:46 police helicopter twice first of all who asked you to take information from the police helicopters he offered a watch and you say I spoke with the police helicopter twice how did you how did you do that how did you get weave on on the
01:43:57 do that how did you get weave on on the head - there's a 10-hour system there's pressed button on the turn I and speak into the microphone unable to speak on the head desk when they transmit it came out and speak on that
01:44:09 out and speak on that right and you go on to say the first time I spoke with them I was receiving information from them about the fire and where the fire was spreading just
01:44:20 where the fire was spreading just pausing there how soon after arrival in the control room did you start to have or did you start to receive information from the police helicopter from from my memory and again there are few blank
01:44:32 memory and again there are few blank spots on arriving following the phone conversations we've all trying to phone the Deputy Assistant Commissioner I went back into the room I then requested
01:44:43 back into the room I then requested additional station manager be mobilized to control and then that was being my first instance of speaking to the the police helicopter I was asked to speak to them and take information from them
01:44:56 to them and take information from them how did you get hold them did you have a number to ring or a radio for to the put to the police helicopter no as I've said is done by an insert a noise system as a tenor microphone that was on the desk
01:45:08 tenor microphone that was on the desk and it was basically they was calling herself by then press the button spoke to the police helicopter came through it was almost like a radio system listen okay so there's a dedicated radio lines
01:45:19 okay so there's a dedicated radio lines yes helicopters yeah that's it and does that does that utilize the normal channels we've been hearing about channel 1 channel for now editions are separate this should be a separate channel direct from the helical place helicopter to the control room ok so
01:45:31 helicopter to the control room ok so this doesn't use it that like the main scheme link nah what about flan ops doesn't know that plan ops is our mind is our main scheme radio channels that we have ok and you say you're receiving
01:45:44 we have ok and you say you're receiving information from them about the fire and where the fire was spreading what were they telling you the first time I spoke to him they were saying that every sprit up yep again he said look we're vague that the the fire was spreading quite
01:45:56 that the the fire was spreading quite rapidly at the east side of the building it reached a certain I can't remember what floor we had particularly reached by acknowledge that I'd received their
01:46:07 by acknowledge that I'd received their information and then I asked I think it was the officer to watch to get that information passed by the airway rate to the command unity incident right we
01:46:19 to the command unity incident right we say spreading quite rapidly up the east side of the building today's anything about any other facade any other not not that I remember that no not that I remember at that time not that they gave me information about five
01:46:31 that they gave me information about five spread up the building and where it was going I took that information and then pass that so to under call operates to pass to the interested ground via the command Union what would that mean to
01:46:44 command Union what would that mean to you that the fact that the fire was spreading rapidly up the lease east face that information would be usual to the officers and the the firefighters on the interesting ground to know that they've
01:46:55 interesting ground to know that they've got that the fire was still spread initiative which still we're developing fire right so you passed that information to the incident ground but can I asked I asked the controller plate
01:47:06 can I asked I asked the controller plate to get a information pass to pass to the instant command the instant ground yes right um let's break that up a little bit first of all passing that to the command unit do you remember which
01:47:18 command unit do you remember which command unit it was at that stage I believe there was two command units on site there was Charlie uniform a in Charlie uniform seven Charlie which it was sorry do you remember which it was
01:47:30 was sorry do you remember which it was no much fun when he went hiding out from from my memory I passed it to the to passed it over to the call operator to pacify the airway radio I know that
01:47:41 pacify the airway radio I know that Charlie uniformed seven was doing all the was responsible for doing the fire Survival guidance information so currently I've got I can't speculate
01:47:52 currently I've got I can't speculate they went to Charlie uniform I right right just pursuing that a bit you say that you ask the call operator to pass it via the air wave radio past pasta operations you have to watch who's the
01:48:04 operations you have to watch who's the call operator last name for myself I gave the information to the officer to watch right and after they could if they could pass that information via the air wave radio so the opposite of watch women would have been given that into my
01:48:16 women would have been given that into my - - radio radio operator right did you did you see or hear that information being passed over the airwave raid I didn't know and did you then also pass
01:48:32 didn't know and did you then also pass that information to the other managers in the control room or the control room operators at that at that time I was young officer at that particular time
01:48:43 young officer at that particular time from what I remember I'm not sure they're just arrived I was the only officer seeing officer that was in the control room at that time to your knowledge was there any direct link between the police helicopter and the
01:48:55 between the police helicopter and the command unit I can't say I don't know would they normally be we had there is a facility for there's a heli heli telly downlink in communications that way but
01:49:07 downlink in communications that way but I can't say whether that was up and running at that time do you know why control room would be being used as a middle middle man a link in the communication chain between the
01:49:18 communication chain between the helicopter and the command unit if I can again speculate speculate is that that that that system wasn't set up and that was there any direct link to us via our control room right did you seek to find
01:49:33 control room right did you seek to find out why the control room was being used as a link in a communication chain in that way now I didn't
01:49:43 the second occasion looking at your statement it is where they that's the police helicopter just look at it we're informing me that are flat on the eighth
01:49:55 informing me that are flat on the eighth floor appeared to have sheets tied together being lowered out of the window and the occupants trying to climb out of the window to safety I was informing the arrow w of this information and in turn the arrow w
01:50:06 information and in turn the arrow w asked me to relay this incident to the control to incident control on the ground how long after arriving in the control room did you get that information from the police helicopter
01:50:17 information from the police helicopter that after the first first contact for police say there was a very short time after that I was literally went away comment we're waiting by came back within a couple of minutes and then the
01:50:30 within a couple of minutes and then the police helicopter was calling up again so again I've contacted the police helicopter the information was passed to me okay and you say vieo w asked me to relay this this instant this to the
01:50:42 relay this this instant this to the incident control on the ground did you do that I can't remember at this time up if the officer to watch it asked me to do it I would have done it probably by by my mobile phone right okay well we'll come to the means with
01:50:55 okay well we'll come to the means with which you communicated with the command units shortly
01:51:03 you think by your mobile phones so not by radio that's correct
01:51:10 do you remember whether in relation to that specific information you recorded this anywhere but now as I said at that particular time it was a very very busy time in the control room and looking and
01:51:23 time in the control room and looking and taking time timestamp anything that we was doing but just wasn't viable now you then go on to say of that DAC Fenton
01:51:36 then go on to say of that DAC Fenton arrived at the control and set up the bridge called Brigade Coordination Center BCC how soon after your arrival do you remember DAC Fenton arriving her
01:51:47 do you remember DAC Fenton arriving her it's got be a movie until about 15 20 minutes circuit and you then say I was instructed by DAC Fenton to take responsibility for the control of the fire Survival Guide was calls
01:52:00 fire Survival Guide was calls did he give you that instruction as soon as he arrived or not directly as soon as he arrived I think he came in he updated himself on a situational awareness he
01:52:11 himself on a situational awareness he came out to me said gonna be setting up the BCC and he asked me to take responsibility for the fire survival guidance cause he instructed me to use two whiteboards that were available in
01:52:23 two whiteboards that were available in the control room to use a recording device for for the fire a type of guidance course the two whiteboards you
01:52:35 guidance course the two whiteboards you say to use the recording device yet usually yes to any information that I got was to be recorded onto the onset of whiteboards right okay now just pausing there before you arrived
01:52:50 there before you arrived do you know who was in charge of the first survival guidance system that would have been there we've been in control control room would have been in charge here you'd remember who no was it the officer of the watch or somebody
01:53:01 the officer of the watch or somebody else at the officer watch would have it would have had an overview of it [Music]
01:53:08 [Music] but again I couldn't say who was who had specifically taken control of it was dealing with ill and do you know who was in charge of passing information from
01:53:19 in charge of passing information from the control room to the incident ground prior to your arrival so normal normal procedures and protocols would be that fire survival guidance calls would be communicated over the Airways from control to either command unit one
01:53:31 control to either command unit one instant command pumper that at the incident yes and prior to your arrival do you know or did you find out who was
01:53:45 do you know or did you find out who was communicating over the airwaves talking the incident ground now I didn't know that song okay did you when you arrived did you take any kind of handover from
01:53:57 did you take any kind of handover from who from the person who had been doing at that time well DAC fenton instructed you to take over the FSG did you take any kind of handover from the person who'd been doing it no would you know why again it
01:54:12 doing it no would you know why again it was just so busy in there everybody was was working flat-out and there was I was just instructed to take the trial to fly fly with guidance my role would be I was giving a briefing my
01:54:24 role would be I was giving a briefing my role would be to kill a fire survival Gardens information from the controller praised and then pass that to the to the engine of ground okay and when you took over that role did you seek to learn
01:54:36 over that role did you seek to learn what was happening on the incident ground to resolve each FSG called that particular time the amount of fire survival guidance information that course that were coming in didn't have
01:54:47 course that were coming in didn't have time to to ask certain questions it was literally a case of one fire survival guidance call coming in after the other and being on the telephone literally pass information constantly
01:54:59 literally pass information constantly for a number of hours to the to the command unit okay
01:55:10 and at the point at which you took over responsibility for handling the FSG calls in the way that you were did you take any steps to find out about the
01:55:22 take any steps to find out about the building its layout its construction again again with the amount of information that I was receiving from the the co-operators I are the only I
01:55:36 the the co-operators I are the only I all had time to concentrate on the information that I was passing over that particular information for me probably wouldn't would have been that wouldn't
01:55:48 wouldn't would have been that wouldn't have been good pertinence of what I was actually doing my role was to send risk critical life people who lose accuracy which four lives are in danger to the command unit so that actions could be
01:56:00 command unit so that actions could be taken on the fire ground right and in doing that exercise were you aware of any contingency plans fallback plans for evacuation total or partial for Grenfell
01:56:11 evacuation total or partial for Grenfell tower not that I'm not when I initially started now did there come a time when you did become aware of such plans and such plans for total or partial evacuation are you saying that
01:56:22 evacuation are you saying that pre-planned pre-planned evacuation of the build is no I wasn't aware of any any letter okay and did did the control room have available to it in some form
01:56:33 room have available to it in some form the history of the building the type of building materials used in it it's not program aware of cladding things like that not on the way off now right do you
01:56:45 that not on the way off now right do you think
01:56:50 did you know who the senior fire safety officer was on duty that night
01:57:00 we don't have one normally on each roti there's normally a number of station officers are given going back to the takes who would have a tag as a senior fire safety officer and I'm aware of
01:57:13 fire safety officer and I'm aware of that station manager Dan Egan is a senior fire safety officer take and when I was made aware that he'd been mobilized to that incident knowing that it was in Northwest London that that was
01:57:26 it was in Northwest London that that was probably ruled one of the reasons why he had been mobilized to it as a C but I wasn't sure that he had again is just making assumptions
01:57:43 and Inter is moving on them with your statement at the bottom of page four you say I after discussing the tasking that
01:57:54 say I after discussing the tasking that DAC Fenton gave you you say I utilize two white boards for this task and use them to record and chart all the information received into the control room and then you produce them let's
01:58:08 room and then you produce them let's just have those open in front of us I don't know whether we're cake we're able to do a split screen mr. documents director and have avenged a ao4 and jf5
01:58:21 it would be very easy to have them both on the screen at the same time as you can identify these to start with
01:58:43 okay that's um thank you see these are Jiao for and jo5 could you first of all just help us identify which
01:58:58 first of all just help us identify which one was where which one was to the left of the so the the left hand board was the the first board which I started where it says flat 182 right 21st floor
01:59:11 where it says flat 182 right 21st floor that was the first for our guidance information that I passed over to the command unit okay so these upper as it were blank at the same time again when I when I when I was pointed out to me by
01:59:24 when I when I was pointed out to me by that Fenton maybe just blip clear clear white boards okay and it did you fill them out simultaneously all one after
01:59:35 them out simultaneously all one after the other
01:59:35 the other now just one after the other side the one on the left was completely first and then went over to the one on the right hand side okay as further information came in did you update yeah next one
01:59:46 came in did you update yeah next one again because of the amount of information that I was receiving so if you have a look at I think he's the third entry down then he's got 133
01:59:59 third entry down then he's got 133 they've got information so if you come down a little bit it's a left hand side so if you go to the left yes so 1 3 3 is showing a little arrow to side same rescued and then and then 201 as you go
02:00:13 rescued and then and then 201 as you go to the right hand the very far right hand side is little iron it says now unconscious
02:00:24 see in terms of handwriting can you just identify his handwriting is that on the first one Jiao four that's mine but see all of this all of that is mine now okay there's a difference between the red pen over the green kind of a
02:00:36 the red pen over the green kind of a black pen is that why is that I don't know that is that is all my writing okay and then looking at the one next door to it JAF five again is that
02:00:49 next door to it JAF five again is that your handwriting yes all of it yes what about where it says 193 twenty-third ten people yes that's my hand watching and you account
02:01:00 that's my hand watching and you account for why you suddenly switched to green pick the I know who I've been trouble with one of the pins a couple of the pins started running out and so sorry
02:01:13 pins started running out and so sorry and a couple of times looking back at my call I at the time when I gave my statement I thought that I was constantly on the phone to the command unit but when I looked at there was
02:01:24 unit but when I looked at there was there was short breaks in between so there may have been times where like the I used we've called operators where they've given me for more information or I've received information back and then God spoke to the called operators or the
02:01:35 God spoke to the called operators or the officer to watch and then come back to the board I put the pin down and then picked a different pen up to to write the information on the board okay and Joe Smith gave evidence last week that
02:01:47 Joe Smith gave evidence last week that indepent the entry for 193 in green ten people was her do you remember do you remember whether that might be safe now don't know who else as far as as far as
02:01:58 don't know who else as far as as far as I'm aware I was the only person he was writing on those bulbs okay now you say at the bottom of page four of your statement that that would include the flat number floor number number of
02:02:10 flat number floor number number of occupants and conditions yeah when you look at the second one [Music]
02:02:24 you see that huh once you get to the fourth entry down 83 on the 11th you
02:02:37 fourth entry down 83 on the 11th you don't get number of occupants and similarly 123 on the 50 if you don't get the number of occupants and indeed 1 1 1 3 on the 14 on the on the on the sorry
02:02:50 3 on the 14 on the on the on the sorry to interupt on the information I was just putting if there was no number of occupants in there they know I hadn't received that information would it not be vitally important to obtain the
02:03:03 be vitally important to obtain the information as to the number of occupants at the time of complaint in these boards I wasn't in direct contact with the called operators I was being
02:03:14 with the called operators I was being given small pieces of paper with the information on it didn't have the co-operators name or identification who taken the call so it'd been very very difficult for me and time-consuming to
02:03:27 difficult for me and time-consuming to go back to the call operator to try and gather that type of information and because this information was coming in constantly from either the co-operators or I receive an information back from
02:03:38 or I receive an information back from the command unit I wouldn't it would have been to come time-consuming and to get the information to the command unit to say that these people were trapped is more important than finding out how many
02:03:51 more important than finding out how many people was in there so that we got crews up there to deal with to deal with the fire survival gardeners course ok now in terms of the source of information on these boards where were you getting this
02:04:03 these boards where were you getting this information from so the the calls were coming into the co-operators the call operators were then approaching me I was given the small pieces of paper with the flat number what floor it was on an
02:04:16 flat number what floor it was on an information regarding the people inside the property and all conditions inside that that that premises okay now let's just take this a bit more slowly call operator is on the phone to the caller
02:04:28 operator is on the phone to the caller yes and get let's take let's take for example the first first entry on the first page this is the very first one you write down left-hand board flat 180 220 first floor
02:04:41 left-hand board flat 180 220 first floor three children to adults leave I think it says no yeah that information you wrote that as you said using the green pen here you say that it comes from the control room operators and what do they
02:04:55 control room operators and what do they do there on the phone while they're on the call are they writing like I could only assume I mean I was I was a cooperator came up to me like different people come up to me give me pieces of
02:05:06 people come up to me give me pieces of information on little on little squares of paper or little pieces of paper with the flat number the floor number and some additional information and then I then pass that directly to the command
02:05:17 then pass that directly to the command unit and then I recorded it up on the board in terms of the people coming to you were you at the head table no no I was in the corner of the control room the corner controller
02:05:28 the corner controller yeah so the head table the head table was here and I was in the corner on the far right-hand side the head table was
02:05:36 there was just too many people there there's too much information going backwards and forwards you had the senior senior operations manager officer to officer watch is that your fence and was there so to be able
02:05:49 your fence and was there so to be able to communicate that and clearly and concisely to the command journey I had two two whiteboards over in the far corner of the control room that was up on the wall control crate staff knew
02:06:00 on the wall control crate staff knew that I was over there so did any fly survival guidance information came over to me was passed to me I passed it to command JUnit and recorded it up on the balls boards no just just picking apart
02:06:12 balls boards no just just picking apart does this little bit of detail the control who are the individuals do you remember who are bringing you the pieces of paper as far as I'm aware they're controlled operators so had they finished their calls when they brought
02:06:25 finished their calls when they brought you the pieces of paper or were they able to continue the calls while bringing you the pieces of paper they wouldn't have been of course that would have been on a course but again with our fire survival guidance policy because of
02:06:36 fire survival guidance policy because of the amount of calls they come in at that state that they can terminate those calls if the situation changes if they if he stays the same and they need to take further calls then they can go on to have a course I'm not sure I
02:06:48 go on to have a course I'm not sure I can't say whether the person who persons or persons you kept out to me with runners but as far as I'm aware that was controlled upright staff right you do you think they might have been runners
02:06:59 you think they might have been runners no no coach I don't have hope they have runners hell I would say there was a controller prior staff does that mean that they would have had to have finished their calls before they were
02:07:12 finished their calls before they were able to leave their desks with the pieces of paper and bring them to you at the whiteboard I can't answer that I don't know but from what you were seeing and experiencing on the night was that was that I had a lot of different people
02:07:23 was that I had a lot of different people come up to me we've we've we've information on bits of paper we fly survival guidance information that was passed to me and then I pass that information on if a control room operator in the in the
02:07:36 if a control room operator in the in the course of a an ongoing call to a caller told them that they were they were informing the crews now of the situation I'm sending a message to the crews how
02:07:52 I'm sending a message to the crews how would they do that while still being on the call I can't answer that question so say I'm not the cooperator all I can say is what I did on the night is and say I
02:08:03 is what I did on the night is and say I was in the in the corner of room with the two whiteboards and I was receiving information from control operator staff with the fire survival kindness information I can't say directly whether they was it was not directly on for
02:08:17 they was it was not directly on for survival guidance course but and can you help maybe you can't but can you help with any any communications between control room operators and the radio operator now it's not part of my mark
02:08:29 operator now it's not part of my mark morale did you know that the radio operator like a no to try something that's slightly different could you please go to the short incident and go to for example page 21
02:08:50 [Music] I'm going to show you a message which was sent at a time when you were in the
02:09:02 was sent at a time when you were in the control room on the basis of what you've told us so far and the foot of the page you can see at o2 Oh 908 a service request created our
02:09:13 o2 Oh 908 a service request created our Tea for Two g27 one fire in corridor floor 12 call attract flat 95 and then that service request is completed at o2
02:09:28 that service request is completed at o2 1021 just a minute or two half will say later do you see that yeah no this is from the short incident or can you help us answer this question how did the
02:09:45 us answer this question how did the person s ad complete that service request and then log it in that way I cut I can't answer that question Joe
02:09:57 cut I can't answer that question Joe Smith told us that this kind of process was was where a control room operator on the phone sent a message or on the computer to the radio operator and then
02:10:09 computer to the radio operator and then the radio operator contacted the the relevant command pump yep with the message that was the gist of that would be to say that that looks like that's
02:10:21 be to say that that looks like that's gone over the the air wave radio to you instant command but I wasn't aware of that that that message has gone no not maybe in relation to that message but
02:10:32 maybe in relation to that message but were you aware then generally that while you were passing messages from your white board to the command unit someone else in the control room was passing the
02:10:43 else in the control room was passing the same similar or different messages over the radio it's quite it's quite possible it's possible okay did you know that at the time none
02:10:58 and say a normal normal protocol was for spire survival guidance is that they would be passed by the air wave radio but again as this was an unprecedented
02:11:09 but again as this was an unprecedented incident the amount of fire survival guidance information that was coming in it was it was passed over to me to pass the information to command unit okay um
02:11:20 the information to command unit okay um we're going to get to that in an integral in due course a little bit more of a run-up though before you started the white board system what system was
02:11:32 the white board system what system was in place do you know in the control room for recording the kind of information that needed to be passed to the couldn't be incident ground so if normal procedures again at the
02:11:45 so if normal procedures again at the time of the incident I wasn't aware that any was in place but normal procedures for fire survival guidance is that the cooperator will contact the instant command pump or the command unit they
02:11:57 command pump or the command unit they would then transfer that information the the radio operator on the instrument pump whether the command unit would then record that information and what's called a control of information form it seen quadruple it's a crunch will
02:12:09 seen quadruple it's a crunch will quadruple fat form 1b is kept on the interesting command bit and then the other freer passed that ran the interesting ground normally one goes to the fire survival guidance coordinator
02:12:20 the fire survival guidance coordinator one goes to the bridgehead where the search sector commander is so that they've they're aware that they've got fire survival guidance even they know where to direct crews to right and just
02:12:31 where to direct crews to right and just so we're absolutely clear about this this is contained in policy 790 tab 504 C's bundle number two control information form on
02:12:42 number two control information form on page eight can I just ask you just to see that to verify that we're talking about the same thing is that what you are referring to yes correct yeah and that's all that's used in the command unit as in come on unit audience in
02:12:54 unit as in come on unit audience in command to take initial fire survival guidance information okay okay you say one bit is kept on the incident command you yeah so you'll see in the top left hand corner it says white copy ICP yes I
02:13:06 hand corner it says white copy ICP yes I see piece that's Vince command prompt roads or vehicle and you say I think that your last answer that one that one goes to the far survival guidance coordinator yeah and one goes to the
02:13:17 coordinator yeah and one goes to the bridgehead now who would be the site level guidance coordinator to whom one copy of this would go also the the whenever we have a fire survival guidance incident a station manager
02:13:30 guidance incident a station manager would have been mobilized to that incident and he would be given the role as fire survival guidance coordinator so that when he arrived at the instant he would also mobilize a separate command
02:13:41 would also mobilize a separate command unit to deal with all the fire survival guidance information and he would coordinate all the information with regards to fly a survival guidance between the command unit the control unit and the the firefighters ordered
02:13:53 unit and the the firefighters ordered control of the bridgehead okay and from the time you started dealing with the FSG calls who was the called the fast survival guidance coordinator I don't
02:14:06 survival guidance coordinator I don't know even formation I was speaking directly to the command unit staff so the again you would utilize the command unit staff to to gather information or take information from the command unit
02:14:17 take information from the command unit and then as that fire as a philosopher then you would then pass that information on to the search coordinator okay and you also said no a number of answers ago that one of these copies
02:14:29 answers ago that one of these copies would also go to the bridgehead yeah I've been there the preacher appreciate is is the focal point from where the operations will be taking place with regards to high-rise premises and at
02:14:41 regards to high-rise premises and at that universe of a fire sector commander and you normally have a year search sector commander as well so that if you get that information you can be eyes with a sector commander so resources can be deployed to rescued
02:14:54 resources can be deployed to rescued people in that for survival guidance information so in the normal course of things you would expect the a copy yellow blue or green to go to the bridgehead yes from the command unit yes
02:15:08 bridgehead yes from the command unit yes and how would normally how would that piece of paper be taken from the command unit to the bridgehead well we that information can be passed of our handheld radios from the FSG to the
02:15:21 handheld radios from the FSG to the search coordinator at the bridge they may have or they should have a what's called is a frequent forward information recording ball so that information can then once the information has been transferred by a handheld radio you'd
02:15:33 transferred by a handheld radio you'd have a record on the forward information board to say where the fight for survival guidance calls or information is how many people etc so that again resources can then be deployed to that
02:15:44 resources can then be deployed to that area and then a physical copy could then be passed by a runner through the bridgehead so you would you normally then have a dual system of FSG information coming from the command unit
02:15:56 information coming from the command unit or incident or ICP one by piece of paper through a runner and the other by the initial information would have been passed for our handheld radio and then backed up with a hard copy so that any
02:16:08 backed up with a hard copy so that any information that so that no information is actually missed I see so so that I'm absolutely clear the normal method of communication between the command unit
02:16:20 communication between the command unit and the bridgehead in relation to an SSG call is by handheld radio that's fire ground radio as it's fire ground radio yeah okay that's the quickest the most expedient way of transferring
02:16:31 expedient way of transferring information on the fire ground whether that happen or not because the again I shouldn't speculate but again I can only imagine of the handheld radios were extremely busy that night so in them
02:16:43 extremely busy that night so in them situation as other channels can be used to use but this if that is the case then it may have been quicker to pass the fire Survival Guide and see information via the form right so but not just in normal in terms of normal operations
02:16:56 normal in terms of normal operations handheld radio is the primary method of communication yeah
02:16:59 yeah is that right and then the the appendix to craf control form their copy is the as it were back up wash it back up and easy she sets up belt and braces yes yes
02:17:10 easy she sets up belt and braces yes yes example in braces is a good expression alright is the control information form ever used in the in the control room brigade control room no I'm aware of now
02:17:21 brigade control room no I'm aware of now right
02:17:39 I think we were on the system in place in the control room before you Institue to the white board system for recording FSG details we may have deviated a
02:17:50 FSG details we may have deviated a little from that topic can you just just came back to that can you just help me answer that question what was the system in place before you started the white board system for recording FSG information so standard procedure for
02:18:01 information so standard procedure for fire Survival guidance information is to pass the information by the air wave radio to the incident command vehicle so would it be recorded at all in the control room or would just go about
02:18:12 control room or would just go about putting recorded on the I believe that would have been recorded on the incident look you've got lucky but whenever the informations passed why the handheld right now it's normally it's normally in recorded in the incident log where you
02:18:25 recorded in the incident log where you showed them once before and it's on the incident log that that shows it's been been passed by our air air wave radio right okay let's take perhaps take an earlier example then before you before
02:18:36 earlier example then before you before you got involved if you go back to the short incident log at page 18 again this is an example as I don't want people to
02:18:47 is an example as I don't want people to think of I'm asking all the questions I have about a specific call but at 131 38
02:18:55 there is a service request PD which we now know is peak duddy creates a service request RT for to G 271 further call to
02:19:08 request RT for to G 271 further call to save far on 20th floor also people trapped now we don't know the flat number all the numbers of people but but that message going to the controls going to the incident ground you say we do you
02:19:21 to the incident ground you say we do you that that would have gone directly from the control room operator who was managing the call straight to the incident ground there were convoy a variety out right yeah okay
02:19:37 and you say via the radio operator is that a different person in the control room from the person handling the call again because on the operational side I'm not sure of the control operators
02:19:49 I'm not sure of the control operators procedure for passing that information to the radio operator right so you can't help me with with whether there was a as
02:20:01 help me with with whether there was a as I say a parallel or a different system but radio I can't say why can say it looks like that there was a number of bits of information that was passed by the air wave radio to gulf 271 with
02:20:16 the air wave radio to gulf 271 with regards to further information that was coming in regards caused to two fires within the building and what was was anything insufficient about that system
02:20:27 anything insufficient about that system of using the air wave radio direct from the CRS how can you be there yes well when you check let me try it a different way when DAC Fenton instructed
02:20:38 different way when DAC Fenton instructed you to start using the whiteboard system to record the information was there anything wrong with the system that was being used before the the airway for
02:20:49 being used before the the airway for idea is one channel and there was a lot of radio traffic going backwards and forwards from the incident it would have tied up a lot of air wave
02:21:00 it would have tied up a lot of air wave radio time giving all that information over to the command unit by the air wave radio okay
02:21:14 you then start communicating information on your whiteboard to the to the incident ground at the in the early stages of that what method of communication did you use as soon as I
02:21:26 communication did you use as soon as I started with the the whiteboards I was using my locate mobile phone did you ever use your air wave radio to communicate out the incident ground and is there a reason for that yeah because that's not my role this
02:21:38 yeah because that's not my role this officer today's and not to have direct contact with a fire ground variety air wave radio and who did you who did you ring charlie uniform 7-7 yeah not eight
02:21:52 ring charlie uniform 7-7 yeah not eight not aware now I'm sure it was Charlie uniform seven right so I could I could be wrong I know there was to command
02:22:03 be wrong I know there was to command units here and I was definitely speaking to one on the other and who which individual was they on see on the see you that you were speaking to it would have been one of the Kamara prior Starfighter acting have his name okay
02:22:15 Starfighter acting have his name okay does the word does the name Daniel Merrick mean anything to you no now again at the time of the incident formalities of taking people's names
02:22:26 formalities of taking people's names just the people didn't didn't didn't happen okay so let's look at your phone records we can these exhibited J
02:22:44 which is ne T triple zero one six nine one zero and see if we can get it and a detailed picture
02:23:04 first of all that's just terrific in time the calls we've got them on this CD
02:23:17 time the calls we've got them on this CD as a third page of that sorry mr. documents directory if we can just put up the third page there and then if we can highlight those that are highlighted
02:23:28 can highlight those that are highlighted in yellow towards the bottom of the page
02:23:33 I could just be clear about these these are all of them there is a second or I should say last page of this bill but it doesn't have any relevant calls on it
02:23:45 doesn't have any relevant calls on it now we've got a time for the first of the relevant calls at o2 o6 the redacted
02:23:57 the relevant calls at o2 o6 the redacted part of the number but we can see other than the partially redacted number the duration of the call and the happy fact
02:24:10 duration of the call and the happy fact that it doesn't cost you anything was that the first call do you think you made round about that time Oh 206 so
02:24:21 made round about that time Oh 206 so just caught up a little bit sorry now there's one [Music]
02:24:32 we've got the last yeah and I'm just looking because they the first previous I think is that the first previous nine would have been the the phone course to Deputy Assistant Commissioner Lee
02:24:43 Deputy Assistant Commissioner Lee jawbridge and then from there I went on to the the command unit that's that's very helpful also as well if you look at the 2001 25 that would have been the
02:24:57 the 2001 25 that would have been the call once I'd been paged to control right okay well we haven't we've redacted days in and out of an instance of caution but I can tell you that the
02:25:08 of caution but I can tell you that the calls from a 157 - o - o - R - the st. they're on nine of them and they are to the same number yeah that would have been that would have been typically it's just in commissioning the jawbridge right and
02:25:21 commissioning the jawbridge right and then there's a called oats o 127 - an a2 a3 number yeah I think the initial called I made to control when I was paged was o 2001 25 yeah I think it was
02:25:33 paged was o 2001 25 yeah I think it was extremely busy so but it's I might and tried and tried it or try it again whose over 127 yeah but some they answered and on book stays - but when you really did your statement to the for the police
02:25:44 your statement to the for the police presumably you had this to document in front of you not other time now do notice I'm think the police I requested the record after I'd given the statement okay did when having seen the records
02:25:56 okay did when having seen the records did they confirm what you said in English yeah okay now looking down at the time mark of o2o6 for 15 minutes and 58 seconds would
02:26:10 o2o6 for 15 minutes and 58 seconds would that be the first call to the heat to the command the relevant command unit yes and again that could have put the information again that could have been initial information regarding the information from the police helicopter
02:26:22 information from the police helicopter okay
02:26:23 okay now can I just ask you to get back to the short incident log and look at it in we are very much so yes say we gonna
02:26:34 we are very much so yes say we gonna flip around a bit page 22 the short incident log for the time start time mark of Oh 22333 and it says there s ad
02:26:49 mark of Oh 22333 and it says there s ad we know that to be sure and of a key see you seven run all FSG calls via Cu so that that would have been the command unit that I would have been firing him right that would that mean that prior to
02:27:01 right that would that mean that prior to Oh 223 you weren't speaking to see you something now that but that would have been older still been speaking to them that there's just that charlie uniform sevens just confirmed that they are
02:27:13 sevens just confirmed that they are dealing with all the fly survival guidelines calls okay they was probably dealing with it before that message went all that message came out right
02:27:28 okay
02:27:33 now
02:27:39 that you just to be clear you think that this cool at 2:06 is the first call to the NCAA I can't again I can't actually remember the
02:27:51 again I can't actually remember the first call whether that was the information via the police helicopter or whether that was the initial first for survival Gardens call okay okay now it
02:28:04 survival Gardens call okay okay now it lasts for as you see 15 15 minutes and 58 seconds which would take you to about one about to 21 to 21 oh I would say
02:28:18 one about to 21 to 21 oh I would say because of the time that I was on the farmer that would have been the force of all the violence called yeah now I just want to flip back I'm afraid I'm sorry to do this to you to the short incident log at page 21 I just asked you about
02:28:33 log at page 21 I just asked you about the calls we looked at a minute ago at o2 o9 you can see a toe a 908 you can see PD feet daddy making a service
02:28:46 see PD feet daddy making a service request our Tea for Two G 271 far in corridor floor 12 caller track flat 195 and then that's completed as we saw it
02:28:57 and then that's completed as we saw it to 1021 do you know whether or do you remember whether while you were on your mobile to the command unit other people
02:29:10 mobile to the command unit other people in the control room were also passing fast survival guidance details to the insulin ground via the radio I I don't I didn't know I wasn't aware of that none okay
02:29:21 okay would it surprise you to learn that that was happening with regards to what was going on in the command come on Jim command so in the control room now when
02:29:32 command so in the control room now when surprised me was there'll be an over that time of they would probably been an overlap time of information going by that the airwave radio to to what I was doing
02:29:44 radio to to what I was doing did anybody tell you or discuss with you in the control room as you started this fire survival guidance communication with the fire ground to that you should
02:29:55 with the fire ground to that you should liaise with the radio operator to make sure that you weren't operating a parallel system none okay now
02:30:08 prior to your arrival did you know how FSG calls were being passed to the incident ground again fire survival guidance policy would normally be that
02:30:20 guidance policy would normally be that that information would have gone via the air wave radio did you know whether
02:30:29 there were being passed to one unit or more than one unit again going back to our policy normally when we receive for survival guidance information a separate
02:30:40 survival guidance information a separate command unit and a station manager immobilized specifically to deal with for survival guidance information so that as soon as that command unit is in
02:30:52 that as soon as that command unit is in attendance as confirm that they're taking over then they would they would receive all the information by regarding for our survival guidance okay now
02:31:14 [Applause]
02:31:18 in the control debrief notes which I'm going to show you these are l FB 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 3
02:31:28 3 1 1 3 can we just open those up
02:31:43 if I can show you page four of those please
02:31:51 I should just tell you what this document is to start with these are notes handwritten notes taken by we you think the chair of a controlled debrief
02:32:04 think the chair of a controlled debrief meeting
02:32:05 meeting Andy Hearn which took place on the 24th of July 2017 so can you ship a couple here I think what kitc that yes these are handwritten notes we think taken by
02:32:17 are handwritten notes we think taken by the chair of the meeting Andy Hearn of a meeting which took place on the 24th of July 2017 to debrief the control room and you can see the attendees there I don't think you're
02:32:30 attendees there I don't think you're present but present were Debby real Peter may Keith Dimond Joe Smith Adam who has been on our to be Adam Crimean
02:32:41 who has been on our to be Adam Crimean Alex Norman and Adrian and that's an Adrian Fenton you think and then if you look at the fourth page of this document
02:33:01 it says hot just before halfway down the page SM Olaf arrives offers help opens up line with see you I just wanted to
02:33:14 up line with see you I just wanted to ask you that about that when you opened up a line with see you I think you've said you only used your mobile yes just a communication line right was there not
02:33:26 a communication line right was there not a line open to the see you before that I can't my car so that I don't know do you know before you arrived where the fire survival guidance messages were
02:33:37 fire survival guidance messages were being passed to the incident control pump or to us see you Oh given any information regarding out the charm right and is that because you didn't have a handover from the person
02:33:48 didn't have a handover from the person who was in charge of passing FSG information to the control again so a product is that because you didn't have a handover I can't I can't say where I
02:33:59 a handover I can't I can't say where I had Ahad organizers say the the-- the actual control room that annoy was everyone was was a force team they date there's a full capacity there was everyone was working very very hard time
02:34:14 everyone was working very very hard time for normal policies and protocols were there wasn't time for a lot of it it was basically giving a job get on to it and
02:34:27 basically giving a job get on to it and the notes also says them just for completeness I'll show this to you all FS G's passed this way mobile phone personal mobile no other way now
02:34:39 personal mobile no other way now obviously you didn't write this and I'm making an assumption that that's describing what you did but that looks like it said it says that all FS G's were passed by you on your mobile and not by any other means would that be
02:34:52 not by any other means would that be consistent with your recollection yes right on that basis can I then ask you to look at one or two of these cool I want you to look please first at the short incident log at page 21 and keep
02:35:06 short incident log at page 21 and keep keep your phone records if they can be kept on the board with a split screen we can may be able to do this by split screen
02:35:13 screen we succeeded before this morning so fortune favors the brave mr. document direction brilliant it can be done now can I then ask you to look
02:35:26 be done now can I then ask you to look at the entry on page 21 at o2 o 555
02:35:53 so we've got
02:35:59 well let's actually try better one let's try o2o6 o6 this is pretty zero one zero two zero six zero six we have service request made by HJ f which is Heidi Fox
02:36:12 request made by HJ f which is Heidi Fox we discovered service request created RT for to see you ain't further call x two adults and one child trapped inside flat 82 on floor in effort and that's at o2
02:36:28 82 on floor in effort and that's at o2 as I say Oh 206 so that would be just about the same time as you start your call you see that yep which lasts for 15
02:36:39 call you see that yep which lasts for 15 minutes did you yeah and now if we look across to the white board the first white board we just pass backed out and
02:36:53 white board we just pass backed out and end ask whether we can do triple split screens but if you look at the first one [Music]
02:37:04 yeah we've got
02:37:11 yeah Michael that wrong with the first bolt bumping the one on the right-hand side
02:37:15 side well I was going to ask you yes the first one looks as if yeah first one would have been the right hand side so that's 82 yeah that solves that at the airstrip but you've got the details up
02:37:28 airstrip but you've got the details up there written in black pen 82 11th bed front door what is that you help with that know what they say they get serene it says is it bed front door outside front door
02:37:44 it bed front door outside front door there's two adults one child fire was outside the front door okay oh I see but before that it says bed front door well bad front door can you
02:37:56 front door well bad front door can you do you know what that says
02:38:01 or might be behind front door might just been a little abbreviation I used to be my front door okay it's an I think probably an unimportant detail the point I want to ask you about is you've recorded flat 82 11th floor got those
02:38:13 recorded flat 82 11th floor got those details down there is that a call that you sent by mobile yes right and do you know and you said it took command unit youth yes can you then explain why at
02:38:26 youth yes can you then explain why at the same time we've got the same message being sent sir we go back to the call log we can go back to the cool dog is he
02:38:38 log we can go back to the cool dog is he can absolutely so the what I'm seeing
02:38:49 can absolutely so the what I'm seeing there is that the initial call from that coming out 206 at the time that I was taking over for the Vai survival guidance because that's putting require
02:39:00 guidance because that's putting require a computer request to the radio operator there may have been a delay of that being sent oh it's the commanding by the air wave radio so it's just an overlap of the control operator staff and myself
02:39:13 of the control operator staff and myself okay taking over the defy survival guidance right and it says RT fall to see you 8 and with her Joe Smith off on
02:39:24 see you 8 and with her Joe Smith off on last week explaining that it was see you 8 would does that help you with your recollection and now March command you
02:39:36 recollection and now March command you that you were talking my recollection was I was talking to Charlie uniform 7 right which I think had been allocated as the device of life of guidance command unit right now then just looking
02:39:47 command unit right now then just looking at the short incident log from o to 24
02:39:55 on page 22 go to 24 11 just it just running your eye down from o to 24 11 a
02:40:06 running your eye down from o to 24 11 a third of the pay way down the page we've got a number of calls running 2 3 10 51 and that's over 3 pages and we just I
02:40:20 and that's over 3 pages and we just I just picked them up we've got
02:40:30 [Music] what flat 183 and abbreviate and then again Oh 225 32 and then again at o2 2704 flat 194 so flat 94 and then again
02:40:45 2704 flat 194 so flat 94 and then again and yeah it looks like it looks like there was that they were still sending information to charlie uniform 8 right okay that's what I was wondering we're just focusing on flat 94 as a service
02:40:58 just focusing on flat 94 as a service request created Heidi Fox at o2 2704 to see you eight and that's then completed for 44 seconds later by Sharon Darby
02:41:11 for 44 seconds later by Sharon Darby flat 94 on the 12th floor to other are still trapped inside you see both of those yep
02:41:16 those yep now that's still let's just look like it's just after your first pool but
02:41:27 it's just after your first pool but perhaps during your second point which is only two minutes but but I just want to ask you if you go back to your whiteboard I'm sorry to ask you to juggle send the documents but if you you
02:41:38 juggle send the documents but if you you can actually or whiteboards we don't find a record of flat 94 on either board
02:41:46 how can I say that I never received that information it might it be the cat and I don't want you to speculate but is it possible
02:41:56 possible it's a course invites speculation of do put it this way do you recall instances of flats not making it to the whiteboard but nonetheless being communicated to the now over here everything that I
02:42:07 the now over here everything that I received for the co-op writers order the control staff are passed to the intern Amy called each strike on the board right can you explain why we see a message going from control Sharon Darby
02:42:21 message going from control Sharon Darby in relation to flat 94 at that time which doesn't make it onto your whiteboard there's a the only explanation I can give is that I never received any information I never got past a call information informing me of
02:42:34 past a call information informing me of flack 94 right and to be fair to you there are then instances of other flats which both of both the subject of radio
02:42:46 which both of both the subject of radio messages on these shorted to the log and do go on to the whiteboard so for example
02:43:00 flat one for two
02:43:10 if you go to the top of page 23 you can see that an ode to to 29 31 we have a service request created rt4 to see you 8
02:43:21 service request created rt4 to see you 8 flat 1/4 to 17th floor 5 adults including two elderly persons inside and then lateral that is a service request completed a couple of minutes later
02:43:34 completed a couple of minutes later that's flat 142 we go to your white board and go to Jo 6 sorry J a 5 it does
02:43:46 board and go to Jo 6 sorry J a 5 it does a little bit faint but two-thirds of the way down the white board we can see 1 4 to 17 5 hours and it's not that clear
02:44:01 to 17 5 hours and it's not that clear after that
02:44:08 looks like it says five adults to two adults
02:44:16 talk today but can you read that for us I think one for two is five adults and then 173 is two adults okay an additional information came in that was in the stairwell right there
02:44:27 that was in the stairwell right there Kunz that's a different flat but one for two what you don't get on the whiteboard and you do get in the short incident log is that the included that the information includes two elderly persons
02:44:38 information includes two elderly persons inside the flat C say when you're recording your FSG calls are you capturing all the information that the
02:44:51 capturing all the information that the control room operator is gathering from the caller I was recording what was passed to me on patient of paper right and when you were passed a piece of paper that simply said five adults what
02:45:07 paper that simply said five adults what assumptions did you make about whether that information was complete why wasn't obvious I was taking it that that was the information that they had been given right can you also can you
02:45:19 been given right can you also can you explain how you pass this information over but at the same time it seems the information is also going it with a little bit more detail to the incident
02:45:30 little bit more detail to the incident ground by radio by RT 4 so as you explained how at the same time as you're writing up that information and passing it to the command unit by mobile it
02:45:41 it to the command unit by mobile it looks like from the short incident log that it's also going by radio Mike I can't answer that I can't ask why everything that was written up about that ball was passed to me on on small
02:45:53 that ball was passed to me on on small pieces of paper and that's that's why they're bold any information I got back from the command unit or from the call operators I recorded on that bold right okay and I'm I just got one more
02:46:04 okay and I'm I just got one more question to which I suspect the answer may be the same if you get to the short incident log at page 22 there's a call at a 2704
02:46:20 so that we looked at before which says service request RT for to see you ate flattened 94 on the 12th floor two adults still trapped inside and then that is completed a minute or two later
02:46:37 that is completed a minute or two later by or 40 seconds or so later by Sharon Darby we see
02:46:52 yes I'm sorry I think I've covered a specially
02:47:05 do you remember any discussion about which command pump you should be talking to whether it should be G 271 cu8 or senior 71 all I can remember is I was
02:47:18 senior 71 all I can remember is I was talking to Charlie uniform 7 right
02:47:22 do you remember any discussion a brat about prioritization of calls now that would have been a fire ground 5 ground decision-making can I just ask you to
02:47:36 decision-making can I just ask you to look at the short incident log at page 8 sorry the ORR at page 81
02:47:48 but the top of the page 150 49 we see
02:47:59 but the top of the page 150 49 we see that control room operator Adams telephone is the Cu believed to be cu8 and watch manager Mary answers the phone
02:48:11 and watch manager Mary answers the phone CRM Adams relays the following FSG calls information flat 133 416 and flat 182 21st floor now this is before you arrived in the incident in the control room yep
02:48:22 room yep but I just want to show this to you and then ask you a question about it see you request an idea of priority from control to confirm the following and then you
02:48:34 to confirm the following and then you see some detail and then in the last sentence it says see you asked if control can prioritize calls based on smoke density going forward now do you
02:48:45 smoke density going forward now do you remember when you started running the FSG calls in the way we've been discussing whether anybody told you that control had been asked by the Cu to
02:48:56 control had been asked by the Cu to prioritize calls based on smoke density no no I was given no no hand over corporate regarding that right was there any discussion that you had with anybody
02:49:07 any discussion that you had with anybody in the control room or anybody at the incident ground about the control room prioritizing calls based on smoke density and that so far as you were
02:49:20 density and that so far as you were concerned
02:49:22 concerned was there any prioritization of calls as far as I was aware I was given information regarding for survival guidance information course and then I was passing that over to the command
02:49:33 was passing that over to the command unit by a person he was not prioritizing which calls to where the information that I was passing over some information was saying that there was fire outside
02:49:44 was saying that there was fire outside front doors or post persons believed to have gone unconscious they would have been prioritised on the fire ground right
02:50:01 okay mr. Genworth we have sort of mid topic ish it may be a convenient moment for a break I know that Australia has been going for a while yes we could do we could probably afford steak yes for
02:50:14 we could probably afford steak yes for ten minutes can we over German yes we can yes well I'm gonna stop now for moment Australian will carry on at two o'clock and please don't talk to anyone about your evidence over in the break
02:50:25 about your evidence over in the break alright thank you very much
02:50:34 very good - talking please