Deputy Assistant Commissioner Fenton gives evidence on control room operations, stay-put advice change, and communication with incident ground
00:00:13 mr. chairman we cannot have mr. Fenton's back yes
00:00:27 representin written to carry on yes spirits Thank You mr. Penton um can I take you to your witness statement again and go back to page six and I want to
00:00:44 and go back to page six and I want to just take you to the middle of page six which sits in a part of your statement after the first part of page six which deals with your brief to Jason Olaf and
00:00:56 deals with your brief to Jason Olaf and you can see in the first part of that page that you cover your brief to him white boards etc and then he described it the procedure and then you come in
00:01:10 it the procedure and then you come in the middle of that page to say this I was advised by control or Jason Olaf I'm not a wish that crews were struggling to get beyond the 15th floor of the tower now
00:01:23 caius asked me when you think you were told that by control or Jason Olaf quite early in the time in the morning that I
00:01:36 early in the time in the morning that I was there so quite shortly after my arrival
00:01:39 arrival shortly after you're right okay sorry I didn't phrase that probably easiest no the second guys want to try get a time frame for that and are you sure that it
00:01:51 frame for that and are you sure that it was the 15th floor yeah I'm pretty comfortable is the 15th all right the Joanne Smith says she thinks it might have been the 18th floor
00:02:02 thinks it might have been the 18th floor but accepts that it could have been the 50th floor do you have a recollection I mean that from memory of it sighs the 15th thought but I could could be wrong right now you've then say in the next
00:02:15 right now you've then say in the next sentence there is a small television in the control room John Smith said she didn't want it on due to the stress with all the FSG calls and did wanted distracting her staff I went with
00:02:27 wanted distracting her staff I went with that decision there was no necessity for the control room officers to see what was going on at the same time I knew that there would be a television downstairs in the BCC for me to get a
00:02:38 downstairs in the BCC for me to get a visual picture as the Deputy Assistant Commissioner now
00:02:48 what would the television in the control room usually be used for if we are paid to control it Merton and there's two I
00:03:02 to control it Merton and there's two I think two large screens top of my memory and that is from memory and they would just be on in the background so one I think one of the TV screens normally has
00:03:15 think one of the TV screens normally has an updates says that strategic resource has been released or that you know information of what's happening with aren seeing that day-to-day running the
00:03:27 aren seeing that day-to-day running the resources and some and sometimes I've been down there and the other televisions been on and it said news in the background and other times it's been or it hasn't been on at all right with
00:03:38 or it hasn't been on at all right with the television being on be useful to control room officers and control room supervising officers and managers in the carrying out of their functions as in
00:03:49 carrying out of their functions as in what aspect but would seeing what is on the television on the newsfeed took part of the television be useful to assist
00:04:00 of the television be useful to assist control room officers or supervisors to carry out their jobs so it wouldn't be for me to say not knowing exactly their jobs in their roles however I had that conversation with Joey Joey Joey and
00:04:14 conversation with Joey Joey Joey and said that it wasn't necessary she didn't want the control staff to have the television on and further distressed them well that was what they were doing that's her environment and she runs the
00:04:26 that's her environment and she runs the control so I went with her decision okay now myself being an operational officer I'm not used to being remote from an incident and personally I wanted
00:04:38 from an incident and personally I wanted a give myself a big jewelry with you and that's why I wanted to have a look television dem states right did Joe Smith tell you that the TV was broken
00:04:49 Smith tell you that the TV was broken no darn right did he get the impression that he wasn't broken but that she just decided that it shouldn't be on there was no question whether the TV was broken or not broken no one that was not
00:05:01 broken or not broken no one that was not raised or mentioned in any conversation okay when you say in your statement there is no necessity to the controller officers to see what was going on that was that your decision or thought at the
00:05:12 was that your decision or thought at the time or was that what Joanne Smith told you was her view now that was the view of what Joe was saying for the control officers right so that's obviously their
00:05:23 officers right so that's obviously their protocol okay now can I get back to this question of the white board and what was a lot of what wasn't not which we looked
00:05:34 a lot of what wasn't not which we looked at shortly before the lunch break in your in your statement on page six just go back above the paragraph where we look at between they said a minute ago
00:05:46 look at between they said a minute ago and you say a quarter of the way down I told him that's Jason Taylor's to sit by the boards and we would bring in information to it he would then write the information on the board to tell the
00:05:58 the information on the board to tell the command unit at the same time and then you say the information included flat numbers floor numbers amount of people inside the flat including the numbers of adults and children and any progress
00:06:09 adults and children and any progress that came from the calls coming in just taking that list in order was it important for the information being recorded on on the white board to to
00:06:21 recorded on on the white board to to record flat numbers particularly so the information priority the most important part is that the right information goes
00:06:33 part is that the right information goes to the incident ground yes so but yes it is beneficial to ensure that the information what is correct and also the amount of people inside the flat that would that
00:06:44 people inside the flat that would that be important for the instrument ground to know yes yes and so would that reflect the fire survival guidance
00:06:56 reflect the fire survival guidance information gathering that you would expect a control operator to gather from the caller it's my perception that yes that is part of the information
00:07:08 that is part of the information gathering but a control operator will do this
00:07:26 and
00:07:31 you did tell us earlier that you're not familiar with policy 539 but so I went I went to put it to you but would you know
00:07:44 went to put it to you but would you know from your training or experience that relevant information to be passed to the incident ground should include should include number of persons involved condition of the location so smoke heat
00:07:57 condition of the location so smoke heat fire etc and proximity to the fire location of caller within premises and the latest FSG advice things like that
00:08:09 the latest FSG advice things like that yes there is relevant information right and going to a policy you said you were familiar if I can just show you policy
00:08:22 familiar if I can just show you policy 790 again which is in tab 5 of the policy's bond board I just want to look at show you that we looked at it earlier mr. Fenton's I just want to go back to parrot tip to this and this time look at at paragraph five point four and five
00:08:38 at paragraph five point four and five point five
00:08:43 on page four
00:08:53 yes it's 300 page three now five point four says control will contact the initial command come by CP and pass the
00:09:05 initial command come by CP and pass the information below by appliance radio for each separate FSG call and passing this information control will reference the information using the relevant flat or house number now never mind and by radio
00:09:19 house number now never mind and by radio for the moment we've covered that just looking at the list of information in five point five that must be passed to the ICP by control it says this control
00:09:31 the ICP by control it says this control will attempt to gather all the information on the control information form appendix two and relate this information to the incident as and when it becomes available and then you see a
00:09:42 it becomes available and then you see a list number of flat house number of persons location of color within premises and access point condition of their location heavy smoke and slight smoke proximity of fire if known latest advice given by control time of FSG call
00:09:55 advice given by control time of FSG call and time updated on the night were you aware is it in your mind that control had to gather that information from the callers if if though if they could yes
00:10:08 callers if if though if they could yes there is the information that's in policy and that's information you'd expect them try to get right and them to use the control information form at
00:10:20 use the control information form at appendix 2 we can look at the appendix in doing that I don't know the protocol which control the newly utilize of do so
00:10:32 which control the newly utilize of do so unfortunately no I can't I can't answer that when you tasked JSON Olaf with the whiteboard job if I can use a shorthand did you remind him of the need to ensure
00:10:44 did you remind him of the need to ensure that all those items of information listed in paragraph 5.5 were gathered by the control room operators and recorded
00:10:55 the control room operators and recorded on the whiteboard so I gave Jason only first we said a brief knows what was needed to divert I can't recollect word for word exactly what the brief was and
00:11:06 for word exactly what the brief was and what are told him but other decide that it was along that lines yes right when you looked if we can just now have the litany two whiteboards up on the screen seven
00:11:17 seven so 68 and 69 M times 68 and 69 of the documents bundle there they are when he looked at the information as it was going down onto the whiteboard were you
00:11:28 going down onto the whiteboard were you satisfied that the control room operators had gathered all that information required by policy and passed it to Jason Olaf so I'm satisfied
00:11:39 passed it to Jason Olaf so I'm satisfied that the information was going across however not like I stated previously it's not my role to get involved with the control operators or to speak to the control operators so that this was an
00:11:50 control operators so that this was an additional system that we put in place to cover on the night so far as I'm I was wearing the night the right information was going across by Jason only now what steps did you take to
00:12:04 only now what steps did you take to ensure she's taking it in stages yeah what steps do you take to ensure that the control room operators gathered all those items information the policy
00:12:15 those items information the policy requires number of threat persons involved etc I didn't make those steps because as I said it's not my role so I wouldn't have checked with the control
00:12:26 wouldn't have checked with the control operators to check what information they're gathering so normally I wouldn't be working in control this was over and above and outside my normal role so I was there assist II and it wouldn't be
00:12:37 was there assist II and it wouldn't be my role to normally go around the control operator whose role would it be it be down to Joanne Smith and child to control and when you are connects question them did you get a chance during your observations to check to see
00:12:51 during your observations to check to see what the information was being corded by control room operators all the pieces of paper that you saw being carried to the whiteboards so so now
00:13:03 carried to the whiteboards so so now because like if I can set a scene again and warranty back to the position that I was in there back time and on the night there was multitude the phone calls
00:13:14 there was multitude the phone calls people requesting information from myself asking for updates on resources the BCC all different parts of information I tossed the job to be over
00:13:26 information I tossed the job to be over done done by a station manager and that's the tiles go expected to be performed something looks like ya know why did you oversee the way in which he
00:13:37 why did you oversee the way in which he was carrying out that task at times I were to come over and confirm and say is the information governance the right information going across that's as far
00:13:48 information going across that's as far as that property went at that time because as I said it's very dynamic and everyone was completely filled with the task with numerous calls and information
00:13:59 task with numerous calls and information coming in non-stop looking at these whiteboards and let's just take the very first entry we see on the very first of
00:14:10 first entry we see on the very first of the whiteboards 82 11th floor now I tried the Jason Olaf threat yesterday to read this it looks like bed front door
00:14:22 read this it looks like bed front door or bad front door can you help with that no okay two adults one child outside something if
00:14:35 adults one child outside something if that was the totality of the information that Jason Olaf was given was that dill did that reflect controls attempt to gather all the information that policy requires so I would say that the
00:14:47 requires so I would say that the information on the board is not necessarily the information that was passed over on the brought over on the mobile phone so I spoke to Jason and he confirmed that everything all be for
00:15:00 confirmed that everything all be for information that needed to go across was going across by phone whether the boards have changed through the night so whether some information has been updated changed or removed through the
00:15:13 updated changed or removed through the course of the instant of ring can give you that information
00:15:22 and it's clear from this that although we get the floor and the flat we don't get location of color within premises of access point which is one of the items of information to be gathered and sent
00:15:33 of information to be gathered and sent to incident that's right isn't it just looking at the whiteboard don't you if you were to take what's listed on the board yes not nor do we get a proximity
00:15:45 board yes not nor do we get a proximity to fire if known if that's the information that control wouldn't normally gather in orangie the latest advice given by control over time of the FSG call something could you pain or the
00:15:58 FSG call something could you pain or the latest advice given by control you don't get sorry so we don't see from the whiteboard either that we get the latest advice given to the caller by yes like I
00:16:10 advice given to the caller by yes like I say yeah I can't I can't tell you why or what the voice or what was written on the board the information came across on the pieces of paper and in the board was
00:16:21 the pieces of paper and in the board was used as a recording process to say what information had gone or that the flat had actually been sent across what instruction did you give to JSON Olaf to
00:16:34 instruction did you give to JSON Olaf to recalled the detail of any given call such as far coming through the window thickness of smoke occupants unable to breathe what general instruction to be
00:16:45 breathe what general instruction to be given to recall others as I mentioned previously I gave Jason Olaf the task of parsing the fire survival Gardens information to the fire ground and recording the information on the
00:16:58 recording the information on the that control was passing over - right
00:17:05 let me let me work this then through vai by means of an example and it is just an example if I can flat one nine four if
00:17:19 example if I can flat one nine four if you take the clutch of documents that you produce we looked at this morning that the bits of paper you gathered up
00:17:30 that the bits of paper you gathered up at the end of the night and put in the envelope you then gave to the police I just want to show you two of those one seven three nine Oh page ten
00:17:51 that says next two one nine four twenty-second heavy s which that must be smoke okay and then is another document like this referring to flat one nine four at page
00:18:04 referring to flat one nine four at page 19 you just go to that same leak the same relativity document page 19 flat one nine four twenty second floor no reply from friend now in fact there were
00:18:20 reply from friend now in fact there were there were three calls made in respect of that flat to control and then will
00:18:31 of that flat to control and then will you look at the whiteboard for that flat on the left-hand whiteboard
00:18:47 should be the left hand white with one nine four you get 22nd floor heavy smoke one adult it looks as if it's hard to
00:19:03 one adult it looks as if it's hard to tell where one adult comes from because we haven't seen the reference to one adult in the pieces of paper but the first question I suppose I have to ask you is do you think the pieces of paper
00:19:14 you is do you think the pieces of paper were complete when you swept them up and put them in the envelope no I would certainly say that I didn't gather that was just the fight pieces of paper though I managed to locate by the board
00:19:26 though I managed to locate by the board so so do you can you help us with where Jason Oh they've got one out old from no
00:19:37 Jason Oh they've got one out old from no I'm over I can't okay and it on the piece of paper on the right of the screen you seem no reply from friend it
00:19:49 screen you seem no reply from friend it looks like some new information it doesn't look like it's recorded on the whiteboard against that flat so you can
00:20:01 whiteboard against that flat so you can help with that yeah about why that might be I mean I wasn't privy to seen all these pieces of paper I wasn't stained by the board and putting the information on the board and so the Balch was continuously updated
00:20:15 so the Balch was continuously updated information was coming across and as I said I had other roles and other jobs that I was dealing with at the time Jason Olaf been sort of allocated that
00:20:26 Jason Olaf been sort of allocated that role he's a station managers a competent station manager and I would have expected him to perform that role if that was the totality of the information about flatten not one nine four and
00:20:37 about flatten not one nine four and Israeli an example by Jason Olaf based on the two pieces of paper we've seen it is it the case that control was not
00:20:48 is it the case that control was not gathering all the information and relaying it through Jason Olaf - I can't come on that question for you can I do you think that the gathering of information well let me ask you this way
00:21:00 information well let me ask you this way what what instruction did you give to jason Olaf to ensure that all the information in in accordance with policy should be gathered and so mentioned
00:21:11 should be gathered and so mentioned previously I gave Jason a brief asked him to gather the information that control passed across to put onto the drive white board and to make sure that the information went across to the fire
00:21:23 the information went across to the fire ground directly now the board could have changed the information could have changed for the night there could have been no additional pieces of paper I was in multiple locations with multiple
00:21:36 in multiple locations with multiple roles and multiple decisions to make and I did not stand by the board for the duration of that night excuses when you gave the instructions to mr. Olaf yes
00:21:47 gave the instructions to mr. Olaf yes did you tell him to check that the information he got from the control room operators covered all the heads of information that the policy suggests
00:21:59 information that the policy suggests they should have included so the control operators weren't bringing the pieces of paper now my question is did you give him instructions not to check up on the control nobody so I'd know I wouldn't
00:22:12 control nobody so I'd know I wouldn't have asked Jason to double-check we've controlled because of my expectation is that the right information would have been coming across otherwise that would have caused the further delay with another double-checking the information
00:22:24 another double-checking the information so you'll have any information come one way then you could check in going back the other way before you realign the information the process thinking now this is the system to record information
00:22:36 this is the system to record information coming or going to that the incident graph yes do you know what if any information was coming from the incident ground I was not made aware of put any
00:22:48 ground I was not made aware of put any update or information came from the fire ground apart from where I mentioned don't floor yes that very prescribed didn't get past assistant yes but that
00:23:02 didn't get past assistant yes but that you say came from control or Jason Olaf yes by the incident round but do you know who it was on the incident graph who sent that information into the control room it would have come I would
00:23:13 control room it would have come I would take the assumption from the command unit so all information or all correspondence will go by command unit to control did you take steps to ask
00:23:27 to control did you take steps to ask Jason Olaf or anybody else in the control room to press the incident ground for what was happening happening operationally at the incident ground not
00:23:39 operationally at the incident ground not not at the time so I would affirm I was waiting or an informative message is the way that we give updates on Ian's and ground so I would expect informative
00:23:51 ground so I would expect informative message to come back from Utzon groans give us an update would an informative message system be useful or appropriate given the volume of fire surviving
00:24:03 given the volume of fire surviving guidance calls and the number of people in the building needing assistance so an informative on the night I would suggest that everyone was fully engaged in
00:24:15 that everyone was fully engaged in operations and to have time to formulate to get that message back as a nod to surmise it because I wasn't on the incident ground but but it took time for
00:24:26 incident ground but but it took time for before the interim commander was in the position to send that back
00:24:33 we have in the short incident log an example of a an informative message or just show to you yeah it's tab 23 paged
00:24:45 just show to you yeah it's tab 23 paged page 23 of the short incident log
00:24:55 this is I think the
00:25:02 second in 30 informative message we've got on the night the second one being abandoned and group manager Wells but at
00:25:17 abandoned and group manager Wells but at 240 303 informative and they you can see it it's a list of document Alistair in I suppose evidence on fattest sup cu8 from
00:25:29 suppose evidence on fattest sup cu8 from da CA Lachlan a residential block of flats 27 floors 25 metres by 25 meters far along floors from 2nd 27th floor large number of persons involved
00:25:42 large number of persons involved FSG calls being dealt with major incident declared high-rise procedure implemented TL a LP e DBA main control FSG grandmum as a 5 jet safety cordon in place tactical mode oscar now as a
00:25:55 place tactical mode oscar now as a summary of everything someone like you would be able to interpret that how useful with with informative message like that as a system of communication
00:26:06 like that as a system of communication be in order for the incident ground properly and fully to tell control what was happening in respect of each far
00:26:17 was happening in respect of each far survival guidance call for the number of coops that we had on the night I think there would have been none present I don't think that would have been feasible for them but fightin that first
00:26:28 feasible for them but fightin that first of all got going schools were coming in so foot thick and fast then I don't think if there'd been an opportunity for them to give us an update and like I say
00:26:39 them to give us an update and like I say I wasn't audience in Graham so I'm only making their surmising of what they positioned they were depending on mini disintegrates putting yourself in the shoes and using your experience of being
00:26:53 shoes and using your experience of being an operational officer on the incident ground did you have any thoughts on the night as to what sort of information you as an incident commander would have
00:27:04 as an incident commander would have wanted control to know about fire survival guidance in in progress to pay have started the time and on the NOI there was a thought
00:27:15 and on the NOI there was a thought process of we were so busy just dealing with the incoming calls and the number of calls coming in that I've just don't think anyone had time till you step back and think of anything else apart from
00:27:27 and think of anything else apart from dealing with what was coming interesting the amount of information and the amount calls coming into control that's just relentless certainly my question really is is is this though because you had
00:27:39 is is is this though because you had operational experience and you told us a number of times not not really control room experience but from an operational point of view being in the control room did it occur to you at any time to think
00:27:51 did it occur to you at any time to think to yourself I need to know what's going on on the ground so that I can tell the cook but most of the staff in the control room to tell the caller's what's happening so yes I was after a visual
00:28:04 happening so yes I was after a visual picture of what was happening on the Indian ground so that's why I went down to look at the monitor screen in the PC scene to get that vigilant it's not
00:28:16 scene to get that vigilant it's not really all questions in this familiar if you're really asking mr. Fenton to imagine that you're the incident come on yeah mostly were what information you would like control control room to have
00:28:30 would like control control room to have them do so in an ideal world I would have as an integral father yes I will not control to have an update on where all the forest survival garden scoops
00:28:41 all the forest survival garden scoops worth yes I can't say how things and grime or where the Instagram was to be able to do that or not do that instead of waiting to receive informative messages such as that what was to stop
00:28:55 messages such as that what was to stop you thinking in that way picking up you're using your air wave radio or some other means of communication and saying get me the incident command I want to know what's happening with the
00:29:06 I want to know what's happening with the crews so it wouldn't be appropriate for being my problems and contact Dean's and command will need some great so anything that there is a command to chain and how we're command child works
00:29:17 chain and how we're command child works the incident deals with the incident my role where I am remotes and in the PCC and ending control wouldn't it's not for
00:29:29 and ending control wouldn't it's not for me to contact unison Command Authority the needs of Carter has many spans of control
00:29:37 control loads of information coming in if remote officers start phoning the incident commander that scheme must have tracked and inform jockeys trying to deal with the incident brown so and I wouldn't use
00:29:48 the incident brown so and I wouldn't use the air wave radio to contact into commander because that would block the airway for further traffic going on so control have a I believe an alert that
00:30:00 control have a I believe an alert that comes up on their system which would then tell them to ask the instant grains of an informative of an update did you not ask yourself how it was the control
00:30:12 not ask yourself how it was the control room operators could accurately advise callers without actually knowing what was going on on the incident ground at the time so at the time we were dealing
00:30:23 the time so at the time we were dealing with the information that had come in and like I say it wasn't it wasn't for Moya
00:30:28 Moya for me to start prompting intsagram for an update on where we were on the incident at the time we would like I said we've just inundated with information coming in so we were dealing
00:30:39 information coming in so we were dealing with that we say it wasn't for you who was it for that would be for the monitoring officer or biocontrol okay
00:30:51 monitoring officer or biocontrol okay who was the monitoring officer the monitoring officer on the playground so to ensure that the right information is coming back so it was your way of thinking as to leave it to them to
00:31:02 thinking as to leave it to them to volunteer the information to you know because it wasn't something that crossed my mind at as I said because we were so busy dealing with what we were dealing with at the time so it's not something a
00:31:13 at the time so it's not something a consideration that crossed my mind at the time you were very busy sending information to the fire ground did it did you not want to know what was happening to it
00:31:24 happening to it yes and that is so I went I went down and like I said I was trying to gather a vigil picture myself to get an understanding that what was happening on the innocent ground that's a visual
00:31:36 the innocent ground that's a visual picture that you looked at on the television downstairs in the control room but that's that would have given you a visual picture of what the outside of the building yes what would it have
00:31:47 of the building yes what would it have told you about the smoke fire heat conditions within the building no it wouldn't to give me that information that information could only couldn't it have come from the incident ground so yeah I didn't I didn't ask the instant
00:32:00 yeah I didn't I didn't ask the instant grand and Linkedin arson two grand for that information why if why really the question I think I've got is why he given that you were interested to know what the building looked like from the outside why weren't you interested to pursue
00:32:11 why weren't you interested to pursue detailed information from the incident ground as to what was happening on the inside as I said at the time I can only say that I was we were tasks orientated with what was happening and that wasn't
00:32:24 with what was happening and that wasn't something across my mind at that time I think we told that the crews couldn't access the building above the 15th floor do you did you seek to find out why that was so we were told that crews can see
00:32:35 was so we were told that crews can see get above the 15th floor and that is the actual time and period that me and Joe had that discussion and we trained we discussed changing the mistake oh yes my
00:32:47 discussed changing the mistake oh yes my question was why did you find out did you seek to find out why crews couldn't access the building above the 15th floor so I took the assumption they can access
00:32:58 so I took the assumption they can access any further because of the fire itself you assume that but did you not take steps actually to ask the question of those who are present on the incident ground no why is that they didn't come
00:33:09 ground no why is that they didn't come across the deep to me to ask that question at the time and as assuming that it was the fire as you call it would that mean just
00:33:20 you call it would that mean just thinking about it would that mean fire in the stairwell itself in the means of escape so we were told that they couldn't get through but the tip they thought because of the heat and smoke
00:33:31 thought because of the heat and smoke though as as far as the information I had come back from the integrand at the time and you didn't see to interrogate it I didn't pursue it now can I just ask
00:33:43 it I didn't pursue it now can I just ask you a specific question so supposing a resident had called from a particular flat but then had been moved by fire
00:33:54 flat but then had been moved by fire crews into another flat on earth on the same floor or a different floor suppose that had happened was there a system in place by which the control room could be
00:34:06 place by which the control room could be updated as to the physical location of that person so yet yet again you're asking me a question but I wasn't involved in that process so yes if the fire ground came back or the control got
00:34:20 fire ground came back or the control got told that there was a change of the voice change of the location I would have expected that to come from the control operator to the josa nobody to
00:34:31 control operator to the josa nobody to put up onto the board and relay that information back to the void room what you would have expected that but did you give Jason Olaf instructions to tell the incident ground that that is what they
00:34:42 incident ground that that is what they should be telling him so I wouldn't I wouldn't expect to tell Jason only he he's a qualified station manager and I was expect him to perform that role so he would have gone to the he would have
00:34:54 he would have gone to the he would have give him that information across right
00:35:01 say was there a system was there a system I'm talking generically in the control room with the whiteboard key information recording to record
00:35:12 information recording to record movements of individual occupants from one place in the building to another so as I said so the information came to Jason and it was changed I would expect
00:35:25 Jason and it was changed I would expect Jason to have update it'll change the board and relayed that information back to the in some ground right
00:35:45 can I then ask you to look at page seven [Music]
00:35:52 [Music] of your statement a third of the way down you say wild feathers in the BCC when Steve was setting it up I saw that the television was switched on it was the first time that I had a visual picture of the tower from Sky News one
00:36:05 picture of the tower from Sky News one side of the tower was fully engulfed in fire flames coming outside the windows it had escalated from the flat fire to a building fire very quickly and the television switched on was it's on when you arrived no it wasn't on when I
00:36:17 you arrived no it wasn't on when I arrived but when I came down to the BCC to check on the state to see how he was getting setting up that's when he had Sky News on over did he put it on TV I taught you something and you okay that
00:36:37 taught you something and you okay that last just to get a time point on that Steve this is Steve leader yes I'm assuming Steve leader but he I think arrived on incident control do you know
00:36:54 arrived on incident control do you know when he arrived timing my statements yeah I couldn't be specific where that timing came from so yes you say the I
00:37:07 timing came from so yes you say the I mean just they need to get back to who's bottom of page six you say at 2:30 our Steve leader arrived at Stratford so I'm assuming that that's right is did you look at the television only after he
00:37:19 look at the television only after he arrived ie only after 2:30 it would have been after two in the plane window statements down there but okay so we can type we can pinpoint reasonably well the time at which you
00:37:31 reasonably well the time at which you saw what you saw on the television yeah now you say it was fully engulfed in fire and escalated from a flat fire to a
00:37:44 fire and escalated from a flat fire to a building fire very quickly is that when you saw the television is that the first time you were aware of those things I was very surprised to see the
00:37:58 was very surprised to see the external envelope of the building the amount that was a lie I've never in my career seen a fire travel or move that fast around the external and you say
00:38:13 fast around the external and you say very surprised we do you mean you were surprised at the do you mean that this is the fact that as it were career first experience first or are you surprised that you've not been told before that it
00:38:28 that you've not been told before that it was a career first for me to see I at this stage are probably I think of under being probably there five minutes just recently arrived and you then go on to say this in the next paragraph I went
00:38:40 say this in the next paragraph I went back up to the control room and she told Joanne Smith what I'd seen on the television with it's showing the tower fully engulfed in fire we also had the
00:38:52 fully engulfed in fire we also had the information that crews were unable to go above the 15th floor and you then go on to say and we'll come to it in some more
00:39:03 to say and we'll come to it in some more detail in a minute that do that sir you you changed the staples advice is it what you saw on the television that if
00:39:14 what you saw on the television that if effectively operated on your mind to agree with her to change the advice it was it was a combination so it was that crews couldn't get past the tipping floor
00:39:25 floor it was my pictorial view and understanding of what was actually happening on the into and also with the information that Joe
00:39:37 and also with the information that Joe was getting paid with her so I don't the amount fire survivor guidance coming in and she also meant who mentioned the length of call right now you say at that
00:39:50 length of call right now you say at that time that had not be you go under your staple say not being an informative message from the incident ground and just going back to the short incident
00:40:02 just going back to the short incident log we can see the informative we looked at it a minute ago page 23 coming in at 0 to 40 203 so can we can we pinpoint this discussion with
00:40:15 we can we pinpoint this discussion with Joe Smith you have about stay put at between 2:30 which is when Steve leader arrives you say in your statement and 242 a 12 minute period I would suggest
00:40:28 242 a 12 minute period I would suggest so yes right that's very helpful so you then go on to say Joanne isn't his experience at FSG calls that has experienced from the lack of fire so I
00:40:41 experienced from the lack of fire so I asked for her advice and views
00:40:48 and that's how it was was that you you said to her Joe at Giant sir you're experienced control operator has worked in control a long time I know she was
00:41:00 in control a long time I know she was had involvement in the lake and on fire and has involvement had involvement with of our survival Gardens calls at that time we had been her environment I was
00:41:12 time we had been her environment I was after her experience and her understanding right coupled with the information that I was also bringing okay and you go on to say following us
00:41:23 okay and you go on to say following us discussion around what I saw on the TV the information on the cruise unable to get above the 50 and a large number of FSG calls have been taken by control we both agreed that the advice needed to be
00:41:34 both agreed that the advice needed to be changed it was at that point that the advice changed now just in terms of those three ingredients discussion around what you saw the TV information
00:41:46 around what you saw the TV information on the cruise being able to get above the 15th and large number of FSG calls let's just take each of those as it were in reverse order you is it right that you knew about the large number of FSG
00:41:59 you knew about the large number of FSG calls when you arrived so I know yes that there was a survivor guidance cause he already needs that and you told us
00:42:10 he already needs that and you told us earlier that the information on the cruise being able unable to get above the 15th floor something that you learnt pretty soon after arrival if not on arrival pretty close to pretty close to
00:42:22 arrival pretty close to pretty close to arrival so would it follow them that it was what you saw on the TV that tips you over the edge as it were to go to Joe Smith and say what is your advice on stay put so it was the catalog of all of
00:42:37 stay put so it was the catalog of all of these informations coming to get yeah I heart was the pictorial view of the incident and that's when I went straight upstairs right from the BCC to
00:42:48 straight upstairs right from the BCC to speak to Jolie in control right that's where we had that discussion my question really is was seeing what you saw on the TV the the the influencing factor that
00:43:03 TV the the the influencing factor that led you to go and seek her advice for me that are not for an operation officer that pictorial view yes so without seeing the television view of the guitar on fire would you have gone
00:43:16 the guitar on fire would you have gone back to Joe Smith and said I think we need to change the advice or what's your advice about mistake for diverse I've
00:43:27 advice about mistake for diverse I've gone out so that question no I mean that that's the events that happened on the annoy yeah I'm really asking the same question a different way is seeing what you saw on the television something that made all the difference
00:43:38 made all the difference yeah but they type that T to a yes
00:43:52 now
00:43:59 Joanne Smith gave evidence and she says that it was she who made the decision to change the policy and change the
00:44:13 change the policy and change the statement advice do you remember that so we we had the discussion and we'd mutually discussed the information that we've both had together and we both
00:44:25 we've both had together and we both agreed that the advice needs to be changed I suppose you could say in her role as the control in charge of control that's her
00:44:36 that's her Rowan decision to be made right I helped come to that conclusion not suggest at my information and advice helped come to
00:44:48 my information and advice helped come to that final decision right what advice did you give her it's we just set about the 15th floor about having a few of my overall view so
00:44:59 about having a few of my overall view so Deb's the information we've just discussed did Joe Smith do your way did you know whether Joe Smith knew or didn't know about the 15th floor I Tom I
00:45:10 didn't know about the 15th floor I Tom I can't honestly remember I may not mentioned it to her whether she was aware of that or not aware of that at that time I can't remember suction
00:45:27 you then say it was at that point that the advice changed on making the decision Joanne went round the control
00:45:38 decision Joanne went round the control were haven't told all the control room officers of the change in advice and to tell people to get out of the tower first of all is that sentence describing the change in advice no that's probably
00:45:51 the change in advice no that's probably how odd I've written that what the voice Joe told her control operators I don't know the exact advice what she's told them so she went round and dealt with
00:46:02 them so she went round and dealt with and I think Alex Norman is with us or involved at that time as well so I think between Joe and Alex there that the control operators are their staff so
00:46:13 control operators are their staff so they would have gone round the room and spoken to their staff right do you remember sorry yet do you remember
00:46:25 remember sorry yet do you remember [Music]
00:46:27 [Music] calling the incident ground about whether or not to change the advice so I
00:46:38 whether or not to change the advice so I know on the night I made absolutely numerous phone calls coming in and going out and I do have a memory of calling
00:46:49 out and I do have a memory of calling the fire ground and asking the fire ground how they felt about changing the advice and they they agreed and when I say they unfortunately I've come
00:47:01 say they unfortunately I've come honestly can't remember who I called and who I spoke to you but I would suggest it would have been cu8 which is the command command unit and that night cu8
00:47:14 command command unit and that night cu8 not cu7 no cu7 would have been dealing with the FSGS that information was still relate to 37 however to start with it would have been a discussion I would
00:47:26 would have been a discussion I would want to have with the incident commander Webber I spoke to the integral mod a direct I would suggest not but I mean I might be told it was different by phone
00:47:37 might be told it was different by phone records I'm not sure but my memory is and what protocol would be for us to speak to the command unit who the using command rose on so that it keeps the
00:47:49 command rose on so that it keeps the spangs control and the funds not ringing or Vincent commander so that this command unit would pass that information straight to the incident commander otherwise beans and Commander could be
00:48:01 otherwise beans and Commander could be inundated with phone calls from the numerous external staff asking for any information right now
00:48:22 there is a that there are some evidence that the aquarium's received which we haven't yet looked at yep from a group
00:48:33 haven't yet looked at yep from a group manager Stephen West first of all do you recall the involvement or any involvement of group manager west on the night of the fire I don't remember
00:48:45 night of the fire I don't remember speaking Steve West I do know Steve West as I'm sorry I can only apologize the amount of phone calls I had that night I can't sit here and regulate and go
00:48:57 can't sit here and regulate and go through every single conversation it must have been in hundreds of meant that phone calls are received I understand and this is not a memory test but yes let me see if I can just jog your memory
00:49:09 let me see if I can just jog your memory a bit another group manager West who recalls and says he recalls I would obviously have to explore this with him when he comes to give evidence if he comes that he took a call from you
00:49:23 if he comes that he took a call from you seeking permission from the Commissioner to the actual commissioner Danny cotton just to change the stay-put advice that's what he remembers do you remember
00:49:34 that's what he remembers do you remember that I don't remember that call but I'm not saying that call didn't happen I just
00:49:38 just unfortunately Carnot's bring that back to memory right and he says and again this may trigger something that maybe not but he says that he was in a meeting with the commissioner with Assistant
00:49:51 with the commissioner with Assistant Commissioner of Rome and some other people when he took that call does that help you remember like a site that there's just so many numerous calls on the night and I'm pretty sure that did
00:50:03 the night and I'm pretty sure that did happen but there are parts of the evening of course all right well let's see we may be able
00:50:15 all right well let's see we may be able to use your your statement for this if you go back to page 7 of your statement and look at the paragraph we were
00:50:29 and look at the paragraph we were looking at before two-thirds of the way down the page this time after your reference to Joanne going around the control room you say at the same time I asked a control operator to speak to the
00:50:41 asked a control operator to speak to the incident ground via radio to inform them that the advice from control and duty DAC as you was that we needed to change the stay-put advice now that's what you
00:50:53 the stay-put advice now that's what you put in your statement yes see you do have a recollection about that communication at least do you so yes so when me and Joanne came to that
00:51:06 yes so when me and Joanne came to that decision
00:51:07 decision there were spoke I know I spoke to the internal ground but I can't confirm that it was State West and I can't confirm homeland that was I did ask a radio
00:51:18 homeland that was I did ask a radio operator and I think it was Peter might but I can't be hundred percent because I was standing quite close to him at the time to make sure that information went across to the in some ground I told
00:51:30 across to the in some ground I told Jason Olaf to ensure that that went across to the CEO that he was dealing with right and also I spoke to a see
00:51:41 with right and also I spoke to a see Richard Mills who was in the commissioners group so he made which is not to mince and grant by the way is at headquarters and to make sure that he was aware so he could have informed the
00:51:53 was aware so he could have informed the commissioners group that that is the decision had been taken right you saw it was lot of information about their don't just there my recollection of so you had
00:52:06 just there my recollection of so you had your own call did you with Richard Mills so I spoke to Richard Mills and there where the Richard Mills and I spoke continuously throughout he was when he made was ringing him
00:52:17 he was when he made was ringing him whether it was just happened that he rang me at that time and I said by the way I was about to read this is what's happening or it was a specific call that I rang him to say I think I had over a
00:52:29 I rang him to say I think I had over a hundred phone calls coming in and out that night okay recall individual ones unfortunately before three o'clock where I'll start devil obesity's where was Richard Mills
00:52:41 devil obesity's where was Richard Mills based throughout the night when he was taking quarters right in the commissioners group okay and how did you speak to him what mechanism we gave a
00:52:52 speak to him what mechanism we gave a party a society for those calls would they be recorded no no okay so you say you spoke to him you say that the D at the bottom of the page and I
00:53:05 the D at the bottom of the page and I come back to the paragraph above in a moment but you say the information was then relayed on to assistant commissioner handy Road by the command unit I have found out since that auntie
00:53:17 unit I have found out since that auntie Rae made the same decision at a similar time that that information didn't come to me on the night of the fire the decision to change advice between myself Joanne and Pandy must have been within minutes of each other now just on
00:53:29 minutes of each other now just on relaying it how was the information relayed to Assistant Commissioner Ray so as I mentioned before I would suggest and I believe is through the
00:53:40 and I believe is through the conversation it would have been through the conversation I had with Charley uniform 8:00
00:53:46 speaking to the operator whether it was state west who was a group manager and was on the command unit or whether it been a command unit operative I couldn't
00:53:57 been a command unit operative I couldn't confirm so apart from speaking to Richard Mills about the change in state of advice there anybody else outside the control room that you spoke to about that change no apart from the control
00:54:10 that change no apart from the control operator to send the information I spoke to the cu8 command unit I spoke to Jason Olaf to see for it to go to see you seven and mr. BIMM so I
00:54:23 go to see you seven and mr. BIMM so I would suggest at that point that they were the four so when you say the information was then relayed on to Assistant Commissioner Andy row by the command unit do you have first-hand
00:54:34 command unit do you have first-hand knowledge of that or is that an assumption no that's a deception that one second and once do you give the information to the command unit the command unit would rely that straight on to the Lincoln commander right before
00:54:47 to the Lincoln commander right before the advice I'm sorry before the actual final decision was taken to change the state of the place was there any discussion with either Assistant
00:54:59 discussion with either Assistant Commissioner ray all the commissioners group about whether the advice should be changed not conversation I had none it was a conversation that you knew about to that effect now in a similar vein did
00:55:13 to that effect now in a similar vein did you or anybody else to your knowledge have any discussions with Assistant Commissioner ro or anybody else on the incident ground about how the change in advice would be communicated to people
00:55:27 advice would be communicated to people still in the building no not that I'm aware of
00:55:35 but apart from the information came from us in control and that the advice from which I believe the message was that we
00:55:47 which I believe the message was that we will be the advice from controllers that we will be telling residents if they came to leave the leave the building do you know did you know as it that as a matter of policy whose
00:55:59 as it that as a matter of policy whose ultimate decision it would be to change advice to FSG callers believe in 790 Beck's controls decision however an
00:56:13 Beck's controls decision however an incident commander can make that decision Lee in correspondence with control
00:56:24 if you look at 790 we can't just for a moment
00:56:27 moment synthesis ist's
00:56:38 it's a tag five of the top five of the abundant policy bundler it's not a look at paragraph eight with you which you'll find on page five and they're looking at
00:56:52 find on page five and they're looking at eight point seven it says in exceptional circumstances and a and IC incident commander may consider informing control that their advice to FSG callers should be altered for example to attempt to
00:57:04 be altered for example to attempt to leave their property the IC should remember that this advice may be contrary to national policy to control staff on FSGS and liaison with the officer in charge at the control will be
00:57:15 officer in charge at the control will be required for agreement to change the prescriptive advice it it looks from that that in fact the decision to change the advice is one made by the incident
00:57:27 the advice is one made by the incident commander but that it should be changed with the Lakeland through liaison with the officer in charge in control so it's so yes so we communicated we set the
00:57:41 so yes so we communicated we set the advice from controllers that we're going to we want to change the state policy and can as I say dick become socialite with the command unit that the OIC at
00:57:53 with the command unit that the OIC at the time was comfortable over us doing that right so that was that was part of that conversation that may be the conversation you mentioned with Steve West like a sailor I really can't
00:58:06 West like a sailor I really can't confirm till I had that conversation right so in the normal course of things if you were following policy is this right that actually it would be for the incident commander to decide to change
00:58:17 incident commander to decide to change the stay-put advice say it's in exceptional circumstances yes yes I want in in normal exceptional circumstances yes you see what I mean you know there's exceptional circumstances contemplated
00:58:28 exceptional circumstances contemplated by the policy it would be for the incident commander to tell control that the advice should change but that that would then be done in liaison good control yes yeah and it wouldn't be
00:58:39 good control yes yeah and it wouldn't be for control to make that decision that themselves no but at the NACA sign we spoke to the interim commander and they were happy with the advice that we were
00:58:51 were happy with the advice that we were giving you and that that was them the decisions we made
00:59:03 now just just finalizing in this particular run of questions if you look at the bottom of page 7 you say I have since I found out since the NGO came to
00:59:15 since I found out since the NGO came to loose I'm so sorry I have found out since that Angelo made the same decision at a similar time but that information did not come to me on the night of the fire
00:59:24 fire can you tell us what you're referring to about and Eros separate but identical decision so following after the incident
00:59:35 decision so following after the incident so this is several weeks after after hadn't at this discussion with a Nero himself that decision was locked on the
00:59:46 himself that decision was locked on the command unit and that heretofore a TV had made that decision himself as well so that was information that I'd received right after speaking to him
00:59:58 received right after speaking to him direct
00:59:59 direct why didn't have you concluded that it was the same decision at a similar time as opposed to simply him logging the decision that he made based on your
01:00:10 decision that he made based on your input so just I have no specific timelines I had no specific of look for that period of time and I just looked at
01:00:23 that period of time and I just looked at what Andy rose done what we've done in control and they seemed similar tone so I'm not saying they were done exactly at the same time I'm saying they were done they're similar times whether when I
01:00:37 they're similar times whether when I made that phone call to see you late and see you later spoken to and Ebro then Andy Rose agreed with that and said I'm going to make the same agreement and make that same decision it was looked right but like I say at on the night at
01:00:50 right but like I say at on the night at the time that this is informational receipt
01:00:54 receipt right and you say seven lines up from the bottom of page seven this change in advice which is the change of advice
01:01:06 advice which is the change of advice that you have taken in the control room this change in advice was logged on our command unit at o2 47 hours first of all what do you mean by our command unit
01:01:19 what do you mean by our command unit ours is in London Fire Brigade not correct
01:01:22 correct probably good terminology so see you at our website of leniency wait so you're saying see you eight right now how do you know that the change of advice was logged on to see you ate at 2:47 because
01:01:37 logged on to see you ate at 2:47 because that was a conversation that I had after the incident before making my statement who where did you get the time 247 from do you know I can't remember it anyway
01:01:50 do you know I can't remember it anyway did somebody tell you that summary did somebody tell you yes someone's told me there was logged on the command and so talking said and so whether I'm not sure where or what gave you that information
01:02:03 where would it be logged on the command unit I would suggest by Andy Rose personal August if he had a locust on me
01:02:15 personal August if he had a locust on me did you know about a personal August I knew he had a locust of obviously speaking to officers on those some of the roles that some of the officers played or took part in after the
01:02:29 played or took part in after the incident did you see the log created by his locust no
01:02:38 no did you know you know hit them up the name of his knowledge dinar lie down does the name Jackie McCulloch you ring any bells
01:02:44 any bells I know Jackie mechanically but I wouldn't know is she with the locust not long enough looking at the shores incident log at page 23
01:03:04 you can look at that page we can see this of o2 44:18 there's an informative
01:03:15 this of o2 44:18 there's an informative message from Cu acre Assistant Commissioner row is now I see but we don't see any message at 2:47 or indeed
01:03:27 don't see any message at 2:47 or indeed at all about changing the FSG advice and departing from statehood do you do you know why that might be no I don't do you
01:03:38 know why that might be no I don't do you know why the change would be logged there might be logged on CUA by the personal August of a cero but not make
01:03:50 personal August of a cero but not make its way on to the incident no no I mean I wouldn't been party to that conversation so I'm not sure whether that information came back to the
01:04:02 that information came back to the control or whether that was looked on the command unit or web that was have that information come across now you came back to your statement are we going to another topic
01:04:14 to another topic we're finishing off this one if that's when mr. chairman can I just give there finish this off we can take a short break that's all right you say in the
01:04:25 break that's all right you say in the last sentence of that paragraph we've been looking at on page 7 of your statement I do feel that the actual decision in control was made earlier earlier than 247 but there was a delay
01:04:36 earlier than 247 but there was a delay in recording this decision due to communications with the command unit radio traffic and logging do you remember there being a delay between your discussion and decision as between
01:04:47 your discussion and decision as between you and Joe Smith and speaking to the command unit about stay put and changing it no so the discussion I had with Joan Smith I know it was quite shortly after
01:04:59 Smith I know it was quite shortly after I arrived at control so two other two thoughts of seventies in my memories far too late in the timings of where I came where I say that delaying the court
01:05:13 where I say that delaying the court this decision due to communications it's just purely by the time million job that this conversation they're not spoke to the control operator then or spoken to the command unit at the time the
01:05:24 the command unit at the time the information has gone through the relevant bets the debate to lighten the communication something right we put the conversation earlier when you and I were discussing this between 2:30 and Steve
01:05:35 discussing this between 2:30 and Steve leader turning on and you seeing Steve leader and the television being on downstairs and 242 which was the informative message to that 12 minute period which is wait which is when you have the discussion if the decision
01:05:49 have the discussion if the decision really was logged at 247 on cu8 as as you say then the delay would have been no more than 5 minutes it's possible right ok so we've got the decision
01:06:02 right ok so we've got the decision really down to in terms of timing sometime between 2:30 and 247 as the outer limits but that's the ELSA units
01:06:14 outer limits but that's the ELSA units outside as failure correct mr. chairman is that a convenient moments yes it suits you thank you I think we'll have a short break now
01:06:25 we'll return at 20 past 3:00 you just have to stay over 10 minutes please don't talk to anyone right thank you very much give the usher
01:06:41 Thank You 25 sweet please
01:06:52 you
01:19:43 breakfast fintan yes very good millet you all ready yes Thank You mr. chairman um mr. mr. Fenner can I just ask you one or two little little detailed questions
01:19:55 or two little little detailed questions first of all on the subject we were on a minute ago do you remember seeking the commissioners permission or agreement to
01:20:06 commissioners permission or agreement to change the statement advice no I don't do you remember thinking that you might need to seek the commissioners permission to change the statement adverse no that would have gone for the incident commander right I see that who
01:20:20 incident commander right I see that who was who
01:20:21 was who Andy ray yes if the timing was a right yes right so was your thinking that the
01:20:33 yes right so was your thinking that the state would advise needed to be changed you needed the permission of the commissioner but only the incident commander could seek it now I didn't
01:20:44 commander could seek it now I didn't cite that on they did the permission of the commissioner our city would have been safe or done in conjunction with the incident commander so okay so any
01:20:55 the incident commander so okay so any decision to involve the commissioner in that decision who would have made that decision he's a bad question come up
01:21:06 decision he's a bad question come up just rephrase the question yeah who would have been involved in any decision to involve the commissioner in the ultimate decision to change the statehood advice if it was to be
01:21:17 statehood advice if it was to be escalated to the commissioner it would have been the instant commander who were debating it ice icy road so they would affect that discussion but I don't remember having the conversation with
01:21:29 remember having the conversation with the commissioner or regarding the statement that force do you remember any delay in being told yes the stay-put has now changed because of we're having to
01:21:42 now changed because of we're having to wait for an update from the incident ground no my recollection is that we had I had that conversation with cu8 and as
01:21:54 I had that conversation with cu8 and as I say whoever that was on there and the conversation was that in some ground had agreed with their decision right
01:22:05 going back to your statement and above about the 15th floor on page 6 of your statement in the middle of the page you
01:22:16 statement in the middle of the page you say that you say that you were advised by control or Jason only I'm not sure which the crews were and then you use the words struggling to get beyond the 15th floor of the tower and on the next
01:22:29 15th floor of the tower and on the next page on page 7 you say in the middle of the page that the crews were unable to
01:22:40 the page that the crews were unable to get above the 15th floor I think some people are interested in whether there's a difference where they struggling but could or were they completely unable to I think that's just the words that I've
01:22:52 I think that's just the words that I've used in a statement that I've used two different words within for the signing sentence right - sorry they express what the wealthy at the far as I have to remember the information that I was sent
01:23:04 remember the information that I was sent back that crews were struggling to get past but if think floor so we're unable I think that should be struggling soon do you mean some could but most couldn't
01:23:15 do you mean some could but most couldn't or none could or what I had no further information other than that statement
01:23:25 [Music]
01:23:32 in terms of the system for whiteboards and recording the information was there a system do you know that was in place for what would happen if a child called
01:23:44 for what would happen if a child called seeking assistance is that something that you recorded specifically it was that something that you asked Jason Olaf to inst Institute to record but I wasn't
01:23:57 to inst Institute to record but I wasn't made aware of the night that there was any children actually making the course or on the phones right
01:24:15 after the decision was made to change the stay-put advice
01:24:24 did you ask for any update or advice from the incident ground as to the conditions in the lobbies under stair no not that time so I spoke directly to as
01:24:37 not that time so I spoke directly to as I so see you right past that information closely after that time I probably spent a bit started to go down to the VCC as well because that was starting to come
01:24:48 well because that was starting to come up right deep the effect according to your statement the effect of changing the stay-put advice was that now people would be told to get out of the tower
01:24:59 would be told to get out of the tower that is effectively what you say three quarters of the way down at page seven
01:25:06 now I don't to be unfair to you is I mean that's what you say in your statement is that right that's what my statement so the like I've mentioned previously so Joanne Smith and Ellen
01:25:18 previously so Joanne Smith and Ellen would have gone round to their control operators spoken to their control operators given them the that we have changed the state and they would have
01:25:29 changed the state and they would have given them the advice on how to speak to the individuals on the end of the phone so I wouldn't have been party to that no to your understanding though the gist of
01:25:40 to your understanding though the gist of the advice was get out of the tower if you can get out the tower get out to tell well if you can't get out well that sounds as if you're giving callers or your understanding was the cause were being given a choice my understanding
01:25:53 being given a choice my understanding are calm I can't give you the information that was given across by control order how that was working in control so my understanding was that we change changing the state per advice so
01:26:05 change changing the state per advice so those they could leave the tower were told to leave the tower if there was further information or further discussions with the FSG information that would have taken past part between
01:26:16 that would have taken past part between the control operators and the individuals I wouldn't have been party to that information okay assuming that the gist of the new advice change
01:26:30 that the gist of the new advice change was get out of the tower did you think that it would be important or at least helpful to the control room operators giving that new advice to know
01:26:42 operators giving that new advice to know what the conditions were in the building lobbies and stairs particularly to be able to assist callers get out I would cite they were probably getting that voice by the phone call but not advice
01:26:55 voice by the phone call but not advice they were getting that information from the people on the upper end of the phone I mean yes if we could to be able to give a control operator the information
01:27:08 give a control operator the information of every single floor area flat how dense where the smoke is how I think it's a virtual impossibility you're talking 24 floors X amount of flats no I
01:27:22 talking 24 floors X amount of flats no I don't think anyone's got that information to pass that information back so far as you were aware were CRA is being instructed to ask the callers
01:27:34 is being instructed to ask the callers to describe the conditions they were encountering once they lucked out cuz you're asking any questions I reckon sorry I can't give you those answers because I'm not I wasn't party to that part of control I was not with them
01:27:47 part of control I was not with them called operators right
01:27:52 were were you able to get information from the incident ground as to how crews were going to be able to assist FSG
01:28:05 were going to be able to assist FSG callers get out of the tower pursuant to the new advice that in for Mike that would have been worked out onions and ground by the command unit and the
01:28:16 ground by the command unit and the incident commander that's the strategy that they would have done on the incident right yes and having arrived at the strategy on the incident ground did you get any information from the
01:28:28 you get any information from the incident ground about what be a whereas now II D be a wearers we're going to be doing by way of assisting people to get an out
01:28:37 an out did you not think that information was important to get out from the incident ground it wasn't there it wasn't information that was coming back to us so it wasn't been it's it as a duty
01:28:49 so it wasn't been it's it as a duty jacket and the role in the position I played it's not a Robin that I would be asking Instagram for updates and information like I say my job was to run the BCC I was working additionally to
01:29:02 the BCC I was working additionally to assist in the position of the fire survivor guns but it's not a role that I would be asking Instagram for updates on the positions and where they are it's not the role that the debt repaid all
01:29:15 not the role that the debt repaid all right but you were there in the control room on the night and super supervising mr. Olaf's communication with the incident ground did you not think that
01:29:28 incident ground did you not think that it would be important for him or somebody in the in the control room to get information from the incident ground as to what the EDB a wearers were doing
01:29:41 as to what the EDB a wearers were doing so that in relation to particular calls that advice could be passed on to assist people get out so that information could have been coming back to control it could have been coming back but I wasn't
01:29:54 could have been coming back but I wasn't privy to that information at the time because like I say it is position over the first open
01:30:07 right now
01:30:14 in terms of communication systems have you ever heard of a CSS a command support system yes did you know that on
01:30:25 support system yes did you know that on the night the or a command support system on one of the c u--'s failed no you didn't know that - no but as a adds
01:30:36 you didn't know that - no but as a adds up mentioned before in my role in the BCC that information would not be coming back to me it's not protocol for that information operational information from the Instagram to come back to the gym today
01:30:49 Instagram to come back to the gym today it's not he wouldn't he wouldn't float back to me would the command support system be useful in assisting the fire
01:31:03 system be useful in assisting the fire ground to communicate with the control room if it was working no I don't think so because community communications would have comfort across the air wife right
01:31:20 can I didn't get back to a different topic that when we looked at a little bit earlier which was the dangerous structure engineer now we looked at the short incident log earlier if I could
01:31:33 short incident log earlier if I could just ask you to get back to back it's chapter 23 tab 23 of the documents bundle and asked you to look at page 23
01:31:57 No
01:32:03 but we looked at the message earlier I think at o2 38 for the dangerous structure engine structure engineer and I think you said you didn't know about
01:32:14 I think you said you didn't know about about that message not at that time no and then there's another one through three 1532 which you see on page 24 3:15
01:32:26 three 1532 which you see on page 24 3:15 32 cu8 request urgent attendance of dangerous structure engineer and stress this is a matter of urgency the urgency and priority did you see that message do
01:32:41 and priority did you see that message do for now I didn't say that message but I as I mentioned I'm not sure at the time and someone in control requested that was I happy in the role of the deep deck
01:32:53 was I happy in the role of the deep deck and BCC for a dangerous structure engineer to be blue lighted to the Instagram which is what I agreed to be done
01:33:07 right side and then as witness sorry to cut cross that wouldn't meaning either I am a police to run them to the instant
01:33:20 am a police to run them to the instant ground or for us to find it officer so take them to the instrument I'm not sure which one it was finally agreed [ __ ] principle I agreed for it to be done there's another message of oath 330 104
01:33:34 there's another message of oath 330 104 we just look at that another service or is this says service request completed AG EMG cu8 request Davis structure engineer do you remember that request
01:33:48 engineer do you remember that request the only request regarding the dangerous structure engineer that came to me is the one via a verbal conversation down in the base CC from a member of control
01:34:00 in the base CC from a member of control to blue light then someone to be in some ground unfortunate that is my only dealing with the danger structure engineering and I'm sorry too later this a bit but look at the next page page 25
01:34:12 a bit but look at the next page page 25 it says Oh 337 32 key EMG see you a reference dangerous structure engineer
01:34:23 reference dangerous structure engineer can we have an ETA and a contact number to speak with them directly and to let us know if they need blue light assistance to get to the user as they are
01:34:32 are priority did you see that message no is that the at the time does it help is that the time do you think that you were
01:34:43 that the time do you think that you were first asked potentially I don't know what time I've pooped is that I think the goat you refer back to my statements I had a locust at that time and I believe so if my August had put that in
01:34:57 believe so if my August had put that in that that time then that would be the period or the time that I authorized it however once it's come to me to authorize then I wouldn't be following it up after idolised it it would I would
01:35:09 it up after idolised it it would I would expect someone to action it and for it to take place when you were asked to authorize the blue lighting of a dangerous structure engineer to Grantham town would it were you made aware that the request for a dangerous structural
01:35:21 the request for a dangerous structural structure engineer had been outstanding for some time no okay if you go to page 26
01:35:31 26 there is another message at odhh 401 27 NRG responded and informed to contact
01:35:42 NRG responded and informed to contact Kensington and Chelsea Reber us of a dangerous structure engineer now this is just after 4:00 a.m. do you know anything about that no did you know that someone had had had
01:35:58 no did you know that someone had had had said that Kensington and Chelsea needed to be tucked it's against a dangerous structure engineer there so as a previously said you're lucky your ass could be a lot of information by the incident look however
01:36:11 information by the incident look however unless it comes to me in my role as the bread brigade cool to a team manager in the BCC I wouldn't be aware of the operational or some of the operation of
01:36:22 operational or some of the operation of decisions because I'll be dead running the BCC if that helps and you say your
01:36:36 the BCC if that helps and you say your statement on page eight the third of the way down that you authorized the engineer to be blue light to the scene and has that time in response aliens in
01:36:47 and has that time in response aliens in Recife in effect in response to the informative message at 3:20 so my question is having Shane even that the
01:36:58 question is having Shane even that the message of a 401 did you did you follow up what happens to the dangerous structure engineer no it wouldn't be a role for me to fight so I'm there to
01:37:09 role for me to fight so I'm there to help resource the incident and the incident asks for a resource or arson to be blue lighted on there to help provide the resources not to make operational
01:37:20 the resources not to make operational decisions or not to follow up decisions on the integrins OSI okay so pain as as if it's a beam of the boats the decisions and the operational decisions
01:37:31 decisions and the operational decisions are made by the instant commanders and the command join on some grand right
01:37:57 now when there's one point of clarification that I've been asked to to just put to you about a particular piece of information which I asked you about earlier enriched to a particular flat
01:38:08 earlier enriched to a particular flat which was flat 194 and to be fair to you is shown full story about it if you go to imq five zeros one nine five this is
01:38:27 to imq five zeros one nine five this is an admin call time at OH - OH - o'clock
01:38:38 an admin call time at OH - OH - o'clock and 33 seconds relating to a series of flats one of which is one nine four and if you scroll down have scroll down the pages to page five
01:38:58 that this is a an admin caller recording of somebody speaking to see you ate but just after 2 a.m. and there's flat one
01:39:12 just after 2 a.m. and there's flat one line for operator flat 194 cu8 can you do that mate right and then operator that's a pensioner with heavy smoke there so you said that's floating floor 22 what was that that's a pensioner
01:39:24 22 what was that that's a pensioner heavy smoke it's flat 194 now I put flat wonderful to you based on the pieces of
01:39:35 wonderful to you based on the pieces of paper so when you say operator sorry if I can ask the question you are you two made a control low price yes yes I do and I've got a couple of questions about
01:39:47 and I've got a couple of questions about that I just want to make sure I put fairly to you the evidence we have on flat one line for although I use it as an example if you go to the white board
01:40:01 and look at the bow we were using the left hand side which I think it's the second one to be to be filled in which is some one six nine one two page one
01:40:15 you can see flat one line for information one line for 20 seconds long have you smoked one adult nothing on the board there about a pensioner but it
01:40:26 board there about a pensioner but it does look from the admin call that was made to see you ate that the identification of that individual as a pension that did get through now having
01:40:39 pension that did get through now having seen that
01:40:42 given that it doesn't seem to be that information on the pieces of paper that we've seen nothing about pensioner in
01:40:53 we've seen nothing about pensioner in 194 on the piece of paper or on the whiteboard can you help in explaining how that piece of information about the occupant being a pensioner got through I cut out
01:41:08 being a pensioner got through I cut out meme it was taken before I was even in control the original information you say exert two o'clock in the morning but now in terms of the system that you came to
01:41:19 in terms of the system that you came to when you arrived yes we can see this particular Colin look it looks as if it's an operator speaking to see you aid yes over something that is recording their conversation but is not a radio
01:41:30 their conversation but is not a radio can you help with what that system was no sorry I don't know what control would use I mean if it was over the RT which
01:41:43 use I mean if it was over the RT which is airwaves channel for I believe this record the board s put onto the system if it wasn't there unfortunately no I don't know what system what about the brigade landlines telephone the
01:41:58 brigade landlines telephone the telephone lines are those maybe record two boolean control but I've we don't know knock aside not been my environment and where I work I wouldn't have that detail right okay well thank you very
01:42:11 detail right okay well thank you very much mr. Ali if you'll be relieved to hear that I have no further questions for you no I'm just painting I hope not mr. Allen I'm so sorry mr. forever mr. Fenton's of course I'm sorry about that
01:42:22 that nonetheless I'm still very grateful to you for enduring my questions and enduring getting your name wrong at the last moment and thank you very much for your assistance it's been extremely helpful thank you
01:42:31 thank you Thank You mr. Fenton it just remains me to thank you very much the world for coming along I don't suppose it's been entirely because of the experience but no but I hope you'd say what's in that hope it certainly has its nothing else
01:42:42 hope it certainly has its nothing else and we're very grateful to you for coming along so thank you very much indeed on that [Music]
01:42:58 no missed a minute yes mr. chairman now then we did have as people I think no Angie gots a control room operator
01:43:09 Angie gots a control room operator scheduled to give evidence tomorrow unfortunately we've discovered that she is unwell this week and cannot attend we hope to be able to have her come along
01:43:21 hope to be able to have her come along at some stage or to give her evidence in some way and that will obviously have to be discussed and a schedule and the schedule revised in order to be able to use the day productively mr. chairman we
01:43:32 use the day productively mr. chairman we are going to propose that a number of statements get read into the record five of them namely Alexandra Norman Debbie rial Peter May Peter dotty and Sarah
01:43:46 rial Peter May Peter dotty and Sarah Russell I should just make one point clear that's and that is that by reading these statements into the record that doesn't preclude the witness from giving evidence in due course and indeed the
01:43:58 evidence in due course and indeed the inquiry is actively considering this question at the moment the statements are being read into the record tomorrow so as to provide the necessary context for that evidence from other control
01:44:09 for that evidence from other control room personnel we were going to come later and the evidence that has been heard over the last few days from Miss Smith mr. Olaf and mr. Fenton we are
01:44:20 Smith mr. Olaf and mr. Fenton we are also going to hear from mr. King tomorrow live and should we take mr. Keane who first at ten o'clock is no take mr. Keane first at ten o'clock yes were and you'll have my colleague mr.
01:44:31 were and you'll have my colleague mr. Kenya taking mr. King through his evidence right otherwise yes mr. chairman that's the business for the day yeah thank you very much well thank you very much well we're
01:44:42 well thank you very much well we're gonna break nothing will resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow when we was generally before we do I'm so sorry there's a signal from the floor which I in my usual way
01:44:54 usual way - take one no we didn't we didn't like the recently noted is it daddy's now it right well as I said that we thought
01:45:06 right well as I said that we thought right now and will resume at ten o'clock tomorrow when we shall hear from mr. key yes include thank you very much