Deputy Assistant Commissioner Fenton's evidence on his role establishing the Brigade Control Center at Stratford and setting up the whiteboard system for recording fire survival guidance calls.
00:00:14 Good morning everyone. Welcome to another day's hearing. Mr. Millet, we're going to hear from another witness. We are, Mr. Chairman. Yes. Um I'd like to invite uh DAC Adrien Fenton to come
00:00:25 to invite uh DAC Adrien Fenton to come now to give evidence. Yes. Thank you.
00:00:40 Yes. Take the book in your lap. I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give
00:00:52 that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth shall be the truth the whole truth the whole truth and nothing but truth and nothing but the truth you thank you very much indeed good morning
00:01:03 thank you very much indeed good morning Mr. Fson
00:01:03 Mr. Fson good morning right sit down make yourself comfortable there's water there on the table if you would like it thank you
00:01:09 thank you and um Mr. Then Millet will be asking you questions. If at any stage you feel that you need a break, just indicate and we'll take action. Right. Okay. Thank you.
00:01:20 Okay. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Millet. Good morning, Mr. Fenton. Could you please give the inquiry your full name? Adrien Patrick Fenton. Thank you. Uh and uh can I just say
00:01:31 Thank you. Uh and uh can I just say first of all, thank you very much for coming along to attend today and help us with our inquiries. We do appreciate it. Um I'm going to be asking you quite a few questions. If you don't understand any of them or um would like me to
00:01:43 any of them or um would like me to repeat them, I'm very happy to do so or to put the question in a different way. Uh similarly, if at any stage you need a break um we can take a break. It's not a problem.
00:01:52 problem. Okay. Thank you. Okay. Thank you. Um now you've provided the inquiry or rather you provided the police with a statement dated the 4th of January 2018 and it's relativity
00:02:04 January 2018 and it's relativity reference is ME quadruple 080569 which should now be there on the screen. We've got two screens at the back of the room and a screen on your desk which you're looking at. Um so best to use
00:02:17 you're looking at. Um so best to use that. Have you read it recently? Yes, I have. Yes. Okay. And can you please confirm that its contents are true and accurate to the best of your belief? Yes, they are. And have you discussed your statement or
00:02:28 And have you discussed your statement or your evidence that you're going to give to the inquiry with anybody before coming here today? No, I haven't. Okay. Now we also have a note uh which is ME quadruple05290
00:02:42 um which um says that it was compiled by you on the 14th of June uh which is a uh document we now have on the screen. Um it's a fairly long
00:02:54 the screen. Um it's a fairly long document um but I'm not going to show it all to you but um you say I think that you compiled this from contemporaneous notes you made on the 17th of June 2017. Yes. That's right. Is it?
00:03:05 Yes. That's right. Is it? Yes.
00:03:05 Yes. Yes. And the records were made by your logist watch manager Lee Small on the 14th of June. Yes. Yes.
00:03:14 Yes. Okay.
00:03:15 Okay. And I think there's also a voice record made by yourself by mobile on the 18 on the 18th of June 2017. Yes, that's correct. Have you had a chance to review this
00:03:26 Have you had a chance to review this this note recently? Yes, I have. You have? Okay. Now, we've also got some documents. I wouldn't call them formal exhibits to your statement but they are documents uh which um have two separate
00:03:38 documents uh which um have two separate relativity numbers. Let me go to those straight away. Um these are ME trip07094
00:03:48 and triple017390 [Music]
00:03:52 [Music] and each of those uh is a separate um
00:03:58 um clutch of documents uh which I want to ask you about. Let me ask you about them now so as to get them not out of the way completely but at least to be able to identify them. If we start with the first of those ME017094
00:04:14 and that's the first page which is the um the police um evidence identifier and if we can turn to the next page. This is it looks like the outside of an
00:04:26 This is it looks like the outside of an envelope.
00:04:29 envelope. Yes, that's uh that's my writing on that envelope. Yes. Okay. And it's it's entitled FSG details from control collected by DAC Fenton OIC in control BCC on the night of Grenfell
00:04:42 in control BCC on the night of Grenfell Tower.
00:04:43 Tower. Yes. So OIC would be in the BCC but not the OIC of control that would have been Joe Smith. Yes. And if you then go to the next page and the pages that follow, can you just
00:04:55 and the pages that follow, can you just identify for us in in in outline terms what these documents were are? And there's the first page which is page three. The details of flats and people and floors. Do you know what these
00:05:07 and floors. Do you know what these documents are? These were the um documents that control staff were um taking the FSG information on and then this was passed over to um
00:05:19 on and then this was passed over to um Jason Oliff who was in the corner writing the information up on the um dry white boards. Right.
00:05:26 Right. um on the day or on in the morning there was a pile of documents and I just picked the whole pile up. So I could I couldn't go through it individually and
00:05:38 couldn't go through it individually and say each individual one was they were just in a pile on next to the dry whiteboard. So I just put the whole lot in one envelope. I see. And they were already piled up, were they?
00:05:49 were they? Yes.
00:05:49 Yes. Okay. And you just picked them up and put them in an envelope. Yes.
00:05:52 Yes. Okay. And what time did you do that? Do you remember? Um, I would say that's probably
00:05:57 probably around between 0600 and 0700 on the on the morning. Okay. Uh, and uh, you were there two piles or one pile?
00:06:08 piles or one pile? I can I can give you they were just on the floor by the dry whiteboards. Right. Okay. Well, we'll look through these in in in due course. Can I just show you the other the other I wouldn't
00:06:19 show you the other the other I wouldn't call it exhibit but the other group of documents uh which is oh um which is me017390
00:06:29 uh that looks like a continuation or a continuation in kind of these documents uh and just flipping through the if we can just flip through the pages Mr.
00:06:40 can just flip through the pages Mr. documents director. I'll come back to that document in a moment. But moving forwards,
00:06:46 forwards, that's page two. Moving forwards again, looking at that page. Uh and then the next page, page, that's page four, page five. That's on its side again. Is are
00:06:57 five. That's on its side again. Is are these what are these documents? So not familiar with the content. However, they are the pieces of paper. They look very familiar to all the pieces of paper that were utilized on the night that I picked up at the end of
00:07:09 the night that I picked up at the end of the um on the end of the shift in the morning.
00:07:12 morning. Okay. Um and in terms of the size of these pieces of paper, were they all A4 or were they smaller pieces of They were completely varied. They were completely varied.
00:07:23 They were completely varied. Yes.
00:07:24 Yes. Mr. Olif yesterday came to give evidence and I showed him these pieces of paper and he said that although he he he said the pieces of paper he was getting were were were smaller pieces of paper they
00:07:36 were were smaller pieces of paper they weren't generally or weren't A4 pieces of paper. What's your recollection about the actual physical shape and size of the pieces of paper that you picked up? My recollection that there was a mixture of pieces of paper that were by the dry
00:07:48 of pieces of paper that were by the dry whiteboards that I picked up. So, a range of um full April sheets to pieces that were ripped off to half sheets really. So, a complete variation.
00:08:00 really. So, a complete variation. Okay. You have a clear recollection of that, do you? Sorry.
00:08:03 Sorry. Do you have a clear recollection of that?
00:08:05 that? Yes, that that's what was on that's all the papers that I've put in that envelope were all the papers that were on the floor by the dry white boards. Right. We'll come to look at the details
00:08:16 Right. We'll come to look at the details of those then later on. Um, I said I'd come back to the second page of this second group of documents. If we can go back to that ME017390,
00:08:27 back to that ME017390, page two.
00:08:30 page two. Um, this is a a list of flats, floors, adults, children entitled fire survival guidance 14th of June 2017 with the incident number on the right. Uh, can
00:08:42 incident number on the right. Uh, can you identify the writing at the top? Yes. uh current 0720 my signature um and I wrote that. So I asked Jason Oliff to collect that information off the dry
00:08:54 collect that information off the dry white boards and then I wanted to sign it so that there was currency at what time that was uh signed and detailed. Right. So just to summarize what you've just said to us that that is a that is
00:09:06 just said to us that that is a that is Jason Oliff's summary of the fire survival guidance in terms of flat floor adults and children that he took from the whiteboards at the end of the night. Yes, that's correct. And then you signed it off. When you
00:09:17 And then you signed it off. When you signed it off, did you verify that written list against the content of the FSG whiteboard? No, I didn't. I as I took Jason's work that he done that is competent officer and I shouldn't have to check that.
00:09:28 and I shouldn't have to check that. Okay. Well, we'll come back in in in in due course to to these documents, but thank you very much for identifying. Um, can I go back to the beginning as it were? Um you are a deputy assistant
00:09:40 were? Um you are a deputy assistant commissioner with nearly 24 years experience now 25 years experience I think.
00:09:45 think. Uh and I think you were made a DAC uh in March 2016. Is that right? Yes, that's correct. Okay. Now on page two of your witness statement if you um look at it please
00:09:58 statement if you um look at it please twothirds of the way down page two or threequarters of the way down page two. And I'm sorry these statements don't have paragraph numbers and often quite a lot of block text. So, we have to navigate our way through it. But what
00:10:10 to navigate our way through it. But what we'll do is throw the statement up on the screen and use a yellow highlight to focus on the passage. Um, it it says, "Throughout my career," this is threequarters of the way down that page.
00:10:23 threequarters of the way down that page. 3/4
00:10:25 3/4 the way down that page. Keep going. Yeah. Uh throughout my career I have trained in dealing with fire survival guidance FSG as an operational officer.
00:10:38 guidance FSG as an operational officer. Um just pausing there. Did did your training
00:10:44 training include lessons learned from the Lacel House fire? So, I've done the Lacanel House fire um online um uh
00:10:56 the Lacanel House fire um online um uh development program that was put forward for all staff. Right, pausing there. Um an online development program put forward for all staff. Uh when did when was that put forward?
00:11:07 forward? Um I can't remember exact date. It was quite a while ago, but I think it'd be in my training records. I see. And you do an how does an online development program work? It's it's an
00:11:18 development program work? It's it's an online system that um staff go on to. It's I think it's within something called Big Learning and it's it's like a CBT,
00:11:26 CBT, right?
00:11:26 right? Computer-based training. And how often did you do that after it came out?
00:11:32 came out? Um it was allocated to all staff um to complete um I couldn't give you a date when that was, but that was um it was action for all all operational staff,
00:11:44 action for all all operational staff, right? all operational staff as far as I'm I'm aware. So, right. So, from or from from frontline firefighters to the commissioner
00:11:56 firefighters to the commissioner um I couldn't be 100% sure. So, I I don't know. I'm not part of the training department would have allocated it out. So
00:12:03 So in terms of big messages and it's it's difficult to ask you questions without the that that online program in front of us but in terms of big messages what do you remember was the were the big takeaway messages from that online lacel
00:12:15 takeaway messages from that online lacel house training I I couldn't give you those answers that training was done several years ago I right was it I see several years ago right well has it been was it repeated
00:12:26 right well has it been was it repeated after the first time you did it no I haven't repeated it okay how how soon Before the Granfell House fire, did you do your online lacal house training? Do you do you remember?
00:12:38 house training? Do you do you remember? No, I can't give you those stats. Did that training specifically include communications between the control room and the incident ground in relation to FSG calls?
00:12:50 FSG calls? So, with the training package, unfortunately, as I've mentioned, it was done several years ago. I don't know the date of when I've completed that and I couldn't I couldn't recollect what the content was to give you details of what
00:13:02 content was to give you details of what that was.
00:13:03 that was. Let's see if we can get it this in slightly different way. Can I ask you to look please at tab 52 of our documents bundle
00:13:12 bundle which uh is the LFB's official report main report into the role and actions of LFB control
00:13:25 into the role and actions of LFB control at the Lakal house fire dated November 2012
00:13:30 2012 and there is also tab 53 for completeness uh a a a length lengthy set of annexes. Um, annex A is about lacor and annex B
00:13:44 Um, annex A is about lacor and annex B uh is a comparison between national guidance and LF policy and training. Uh, I don't know if they help terribly much. Uh, what I want to show you uh is the conclusions about the handling of
00:13:56 the conclusions about the handling of the fire lacel uh on page 50. And I just want to ask you to look at paragraphs 293 to 296
00:14:07 paragraphs 293 to 296 uh of that. Before I do that, can I just ask you, are you familiar with this report at all? I'm aware of that report, but I haven't read it.
00:14:14 read it. Right. Okay. Let's see if see how far we get then. Um if you look at page paragraphs 293 to 296 on page 50, they're there. Um, can I start just by asking you about 293
00:14:27 asking you about 293 expectations that callers would be rescued and and stay put advice? Uh, and in the middle of the paragraph, um, it says, well, I start the
00:14:38 um, it says, well, I start the paragraph, cos had a clear expectation that fire crews would reach the callers quickly. Uh, their experience was that fire appliances arrive quickly and that people are rescued by the brigade. Just
00:14:50 people are rescued by the brigade. Just just pausing there. In your experience up to the time of the Grenfell tower in in June 2017, um that expectation, was that something that persisted? Do you think that that
00:15:02 that persisted? Do you think that that the control room operators continued to expect that fire crews would reach callers quickly? I would say that would be an expectation, but with the caveat that
00:15:14 expectation, but with the caveat that that would be probably a single fire survival call. Right. Okay. And similarly, their experience was that fire appliances arrive quickly and
00:15:25 fire appliances arrive quickly and people are rescued by the brigade. Was that a a continuing or persisting expectation up to the time of the Grenfell Tower? Yes. Oh, so yes. And then it goes on in the middle of the paragraph,
00:15:38 the middle of the paragraph, as rescues by crews were not immediate, there is a question whether the CO uh and or callers could have assessed the risk of attempting to escape from the flat and whether the risk of moving
00:15:50 the flat and whether the risk of moving closer to the fire but escaping was less than staying put and awaiting rescue. COS relied on advising callers to stay put, expecting that this would keep callers safe from fire.
00:16:04 callers safe from fire. That sharing of assessment of risk between CO and callers or CO or callers, is that something that persisted up until the night of the Granfell Tower
00:16:16 up until the night of the Granfell Tower fire in your experience? Yes, I would suggest that a control operator would um be comfortable that the stay put would be the safest place with compartmentation in place.
00:16:28 with compartmentation in place. Right.
00:16:29 Right. Do you know whether the lessons learned from lack in the house led to an improvement or change in the way in which control room operators
00:16:40 which control room operators assessed or assisted the caller to assess the safety of escape? I I couldn't give you that answer because I don't know how control operators have been trained or how their
00:16:52 operators have been trained or how their training has been changed. Right.
00:16:53 Right. I'm not involved in um the control side. Okay. Um,
00:17:00 Okay. Um, so
00:17:02 so okay, if you go then to 295,
00:17:07 well, sorry, let me look at 294. You may say the same thing, but let me just put it to you. 294, escape alternative escape routes. Many callers mentioned that there was smoke outside their flat or that there was smoke in the corridor
00:17:19 or that there was smoke in the corridor preventing escape. This may have caused cos to move straight into the protect phase of FSG and not explore alternative escape routes with the callers. First of all, can you help us in your experience
00:17:31 all, can you help us in your experience and knowledge having had the training you say you've had, what what does moving straight into the protect phase of FSG mean? Yet again, that that is a call operators
00:17:42 Yet again, that that is a call operators um role um and that wouldn't have um fully that wouldn't have been part of my training. But my understand phase would be the four principles that control operators would utilize.
00:17:54 control operators would utilize. And those four principles are um
00:17:59 are um set out in the in um the policies are they?
00:18:04 they? Yes.
00:18:06 Yes. Right. and and and those are the basics of far survival guidance, are they? That that's the principles that control operators would use. Right. And just to just to be clear what
00:18:17 Right. And just to just to be clear what we're talking about, can I just ask you to I'll just follow this up by reference to a policy. Um can I ask you to look at policy 539,
00:18:29 Um can I ask you to look at policy 539, emergency call management, tab three of the policies bundle. uh and look please at appendix three.
00:18:42 Uh f first of all my question is are you familiar with this policy this LFB policy?
00:18:49 policy? I'm aware of that policy but yet again it's a control policy so it wouldn't be one that I would be um I would have read.
00:18:56 read. Would you not have had training on this? No.
00:18:59 No. I see. Because when you say in your statement throughout your career I have trained in dealing with fire survival guidance as an operational officer. Operational officer. So on the operation side so that's been on the incident ground not in control.
00:19:11 ground not in control. I follow.
00:19:12 I follow. So they're two completely different aspects.
00:19:15 aspects. I see. Oh I see. So you're dealing with fire survival guidance on the incident ground not on the incident ground not in control. Okay. Well bear bear with me then. We may may be able to take this much more shortly. Um but just looking at appendix
00:19:27 shortly. Um but just looking at appendix three so that we're familiar with that. We're talk with the four principles you're talking about. We know what they are. That's appendix 3, page 16 of of 23.
00:19:39 of 23. Uh and the four principles, am I right in thinking, are set out there at the bottom of the page. So, um essentially escape,
00:19:50 essentially escape, identify a safe alternative escape and then if that's not possible, assess by asking questions and then begin to protect by providing current fire safety advice, reassure the caller and reassess
00:20:03 advice, reassure the caller and reassess the caller situation. Uh yes,
00:20:07 yes, are those the four principles? So I'm aware of those four principles that are in there policy 790. Right now
00:20:16 Right now you're aware of those, but you say from an operational not a control room point of view.
00:20:19 of view. Yes. Going back if we can then please to paragraph 294 of the Lacor House report. Um
00:20:30 in in your experience from the operational point of view,
00:20:35 was there a change after this report in the way in which callers um a way in which control room operators explored alternative escape routes with callers?
00:20:48 alternative escape routes with callers? Was there a a change to the culture or the policy or the training? Do you know? I can't I couldn't recollect going back to that period of time what the change was and like I say not being involved in
00:21:02 was and like I say not being involved in control operators training or in their roles I wouldn't be able to really give you that answer. Right. Just a couple more questions on this and I and I I fear I'm going to get the same answer but I just I think I
00:21:14 the same answer but I just I think I need to just try it with you. Um, in the last sentence of 294, it says, "There's a real risk in attempting a self-evacuation from a building on fire that the occupant will move themselves
00:21:26 that the occupant will move themselves into a position of greater harm rather than than waiting in a safe location for rescue. that risk did the did that risk change or the assessment of that risk change to your knowledge uh as after Lac
00:21:40 change to your knowledge uh as after Lac House.
00:21:50 So not sure if that's changed from lacon or house but as for ourselves we would always look that compartmentation of a building will keep members or people
00:22:03 building will keep members or people safe within their premises until the fire brigade can get there to rescue them.
00:22:07 them. Right. But at a point where uh the building is on fire a and a caller says there's smoke in my corridor outside my flat.
00:22:20 flat. um say that the risk of an unsafe evacuation had to be assessed. Was there a change in the way in which that risk was assessed as a result of lacklouse?
00:22:32 result of lacklouse? I'm sorry I can't give you a full comprehensive answer on that because it's not something that I've been involved with with control. Right. Uh and then let me just try one more question on
00:22:43 let me just try one more question on 196. On one 96, two lines, sorry, 296, effective communication between control and incident command, there is evidence of
00:22:54 incident command, there is evidence of information passing from control to the incident ground and only one occasion when the details of a flat with people trapped were not passed in a timely way. Control supervisors regularly tried to
00:23:05 Control supervisors regularly tried to obtain information about the progress with the incident, particularly in relation to callers being given FSG. In line with practice at the time, there was much less information being passed from the incident ground to control
00:23:18 from the incident ground to control about the progress of firefighting and rescue efforts. It is not clear that if cos had been given information about progress that it would have influenced the advice given to callers.
00:23:30 the advice given to callers. My question is having seen that do do you know whether as a result of lackl house and the training and and experiences of it there was a change to the practice of how much information
00:23:43 the practice of how much information came back from the incident ground to control about the progress of firefighting and rescue efforts particularly in relation to FSG callers. So as as mentioned before going back to
00:23:55 So as as mentioned before going back to Lacano I can't exactly pinpoint for you when or how that change came into place as in my own memories. However, as an operational officer I know that the
00:24:06 operational officer I know that the information back from the incident ground is something that an officer will try and do to keep control informed of progress.
00:24:15 progress. Right.
00:24:17 Right. Okay. We'll come I think to a policy that may cover that in a moment to be to be fair to you to put that into a policy context.
00:24:28 context. Uh in fact let's I'll do it now actually. Um, uh, could you look at policy 790,
00:24:38 which you'll find in the policies bundle of tab five and I'd like just to show you the first page of this first of all again like 539. Is this a policy that you're
00:24:49 539. Is this a policy that you're familiar with or was were trained on? Yes.
00:24:51 Yes. So, so you were trained on this one. Is that right? Um, yes, I'm familiar with that policy and I've had training in certain aspects of that policy. Okay. Now, this one, as you can see from
00:25:03 Okay. Now, this one, as you can see from this front page, was reviewed as current on the 17th of April, 2014. So, this was the, as far as we know, the upto-date FSG policy within the LFB as
00:25:17 upto-date FSG policy within the LFB as at the time of the Grrenfield Tower fire. And I just want to show you um There's lots of it. It's relevant, but paragraph nine, communication with control,
00:25:29 control, par 91,
00:25:32 par 91, it it says, "It is vital that control is kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG call. The fact the control is aware of the actions being carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice given to FSG
00:25:44 greatly enhance the advice given to FSG callers on the on or as at the night of the Grenfell Tower fire. Were you aware that that was a policy?" Could you say that first bit of question again? Sorry, just on the on the night as at the night of the
00:25:55 on the night as at the night of the Grenfell Tower fire, were you aware that this was this was policy? Yes, I was aware at the night of Grenfield Tower, this was policy. However, I would just like to say on the night of Grenfield Tower, this relates
00:26:09 night of Grenfield Tower, this relates very much to a single or maybe two fire survival guidance going on. That night was unprecedented. the numbers and the information coming in can change how
00:26:21 information coming in can change how that policy could have worked on the night.
00:26:23 night. Right.
00:26:25 Right. Okay. You say a single or an uh
00:26:29 an uh It's very unusual to have more than one or two maybe top three fire survival guidance calls in one go. Not the amount that we had on that night. Do you know how many fire survival
00:26:40 Do you know how many fire survival guidance calls there were at Lacal House?
00:26:43 House? Not the top of my head. More. It was more than one though, wasn't it? Yes. More than just that. There was multiple. Yes, there was multiple. Yes. But not on the scale of Greenfield. No, I understand that. Okay. So, so are you saying that this
00:26:55 Okay. So, so are you saying that this policy is fit for in your experience fit for one or two? No, I wouldn't like to put an exact figure, but it's not fit for multiple numbers of the nights that we had at
00:27:07 numbers of the nights that we had at Grenfield Tower. That was unprecedented. and the numbers coming in to cope with that amount of information coming in was not something that is easy to be resource or manage.
00:27:19 to be resource or manage. Right. And then looking at 92 informative messages from the incident ground should also contain an update on progress relating to those specific FSG calls by both the
00:27:31 specific FSG calls by both the flatstroke house number to avoid confusion. Again, were you aware that this was policy on the night as at the night of the grand? I was aware and again I'll relate back to my last answer.
00:27:42 answer. Yeah.
00:27:42 Yeah. Uh without repeating it, it relates to exactly the same thing. Mhm.
00:27:47 Mhm. And 93, the outcome of every FSG call must be communicated to control again. That's clearly exactly the same. Yes. All right. Okay. Well, we'll examine examine this in a bit more
00:27:58 examine examine this in a bit more detail, but I think the answer is you would it fair to summarize your evidence this way that you were aware that this was policy? Yes. But but to put it into practice put it into practice was are you saying
00:28:09 put it into practice was are you saying not possible because of the volume of practical
00:28:11 practical not practical but we can like you say you want we can explore that can't we okay
00:28:19 okay now
00:28:22 putting policy away for the moment uh I just want to ask you one more general thing about um on the same subject in your statement
00:28:33 um on the same subject in your statement of page Three, you
00:28:37 you um say at the top of the page, three lines down, you say this. With regards to the stayput policy,
00:28:48 regards to the stayput policy, it is advice that may in capital letters be given in to an individual who is trapped by fire. The call operators may in capital letters tell a caller to remain in a flat and await rescue from
00:29:01 remain in a flat and await rescue from crews. Now you your this this reflects your understanding does it of of the statep put policy and its implementation. So I'm not sure why May is in capital
00:29:13 So I'm not sure why May is in capital letters. I'm not something of no no recollection why that is emphasized to at that point. Right.
00:29:25 Right. Okay. Um would you like I mean would you correct this sentence all these two sentences in any way then? Yeah I would say that uh with regards to
00:29:36 Yeah I would say that uh with regards to stay put policy is advice that would be given to an individual who was trapped by fire the operator will tell a call caller to remain in the flat and await rescue from cruise.
00:29:47 rescue from cruise. Right. I was going to ask you because looking the use of the word may would indicate that there was some kind of choice or discretion that a call a call operator had but you're saying not you're saying not are you a call I mean like I say the why it's in
00:30:00 a call I mean like I say the why it's in capitals and emphasized to that point I'm I'm really not sure why that's written like that in my statement um but there is always a choice stay put policy is something that we look for
00:30:12 is something that we look for compartmentation however it depends on what the fire is what the incident is. If you're talking about a fire survival guidance within um
00:30:23 about a fire survival guidance within um say a house for example, the call operator may ask that they can lower themselves out of the first floor window. So that advice isn't set in stone in that aspect. I understand. And then it go on to say a
00:30:35 I understand. And then it go on to say a fire should be contained within a compartment by fire doors and the construction of the building i.e. concrete floors which will assist in preventing fire spread. It's usually safer for people to stay where they are to prevent a mass exodus and and panic.
00:30:48 to prevent a mass exodus and and panic. I don't know how long the stay put policy has been in place, but it is well known to be national policy. Uh now just just on on that um what do you know what your understanding of stay put as you've expressed it there is based on
00:31:01 expressed it there is based on as in could you rephrase that as yes what what is your understanding that you've expressed there based on is it based on a document or training or so if you're saying about a fire should
00:31:12 so if you're saying about a fire should be contained in the compartment that's from training com um all resident or all flats um we we as the fire service. We
00:31:23 flats um we we as the fire service. We um expect the building to react to compartmentation and that the fire would remain in that compartment allowing the fire service the time to attend to the
00:31:34 fire service the time to attend to the building, gain entry to the building, put the fire out and rescue the persons involved.
00:31:40 involved. Yes.
00:31:40 Yes. So that is where what I mean by comp compation
00:31:46 compation within the building. Yes. Uh and where a building might where a building's compartmentation might fail, would you
00:31:57 compartmentation might fail, would you expect the building or the building owners to have any contingency plans or or training um for what to do in in
00:32:08 or training um for what to do in in order to affect a partial or total? Why would you have an expectation that it would fail? That's a rhetorical question. I I can't answer the rhetorical question. asked me the same question. You said why? If I if
00:32:20 the same question. You said why? If I if it was to fail, why? Well, a better question possibly might be
00:32:26 be whether anyone should foresee the possibility and if that was foreseen as a possibility, take any or have any plans for dealing with it? So if that was a
00:32:37 for dealing with it? So if that was a possibility then the building should be built to suit um full evacuation with a PA system and systems in place to allow um the residents or the occupiers of the
00:32:50 um the residents or the occupiers of the building to know that a full evacuation is needed. It would have to have a fire alarm. You would have to have many other fire safety points in place to support that within the building.
00:33:01 that within the building. Right. If you take an in your in your experience, just following that up, if you take a a high-rise building where all you know about it is that a stay put policy is in place, that's all you know
00:33:14 policy is in place, that's all you know about it. Would you expect there to be in place also a contingency plan for ma m for total or partial evacuation? No,
00:33:25 m for total or partial evacuation? No, not necessarily because if if the building has compartmentation, the fire should not be spreading it out of the compartmentation. So there wouldn't be an expectation for a full or phased
00:33:38 an expectation for a full or phased evacuation within that building cuz it wouldn't be required cuz the fire should not be spreading outside of the compartment. In your experience, have you ever in your many
00:33:50 experience, have you ever in your many years of frontline firefighting encountered fire spreading out of the compartment of origin or smoke or heat only from possibly one floor to the next
00:34:01 only from possibly one floor to the next floor and that's uh what we call the coander effect where it may come out of a window and hug the side of the building and go back inside a window in
00:34:12 building and go back inside a window in the next floor but not um not as it behaved on the night of the 14th. No. Right. Um were you aware generally or from training or intelligence within the
00:34:23 from training or intelligence within the LFB being quite senior uh of a fire called a fire at Shepherd's Court in August 2016? So I was aware of that fire but I did
00:34:34 So I was aware of that fire but I did not attend that fire. No. Were you aware of any learning or um education internally within the LFB about the lessons learned from that fire? Not that I could recite sitting
00:34:47 fire? Not that I could recite sitting here without looking into it. Right. Let me just show you a document to see if you're familiar with it. Can I ask you to look at the master documents bundle tab 10?
00:35:02 [Music] Uh now
00:35:13 [Music] this is a slideshow which runs to some 25 odd pages. Sorry, 38 odd pages. Um it's dated or it
00:35:25 Sorry, 38 odd pages. Um it's dated or it appears to be dated the 13th of July 2016. In fact, that's a wrong date. It it it was eventually produced in October 2016 after the shepherds caught fire in the August of that year. Uh my first and
00:35:39 the August of that year. Uh my first and perhaps only question is have you ever seen this this before this slideshow before?
00:35:45 before? It does seem familiar but I I couldn't recite its content. Right. Uh if we can just flip through the pages, the first two and three pages
00:35:57 the pages, the first two and three pages to see if this is familiar to you. If you go to page two,
00:36:06 um you can see three photographs of tall buildings with exteriors on fire. Grojny the address Dubai and Tamwheel Tower in Dubai. Are you familiar with uh first of
00:36:20 Dubai. Are you familiar with uh first of all are you familiar with those fires? Um I'm not aware of them. No, not I mean I've seen those pictures before, but I couldn't tell you the detail of the fires. No,
00:36:31 fires. No, no, I you say you've seen those pictures before.
00:36:34 before. The slide the slide looks familiar, so I would suggest I've seen this, but I couldn't recite or give you the exact detail.
00:36:41 detail. Right. So the slide looks familiar. Okay, let's see if we can just push a bit further and see if how familiar. Next page is page three. Same sort of thing. Exterior fires in
00:36:53 Same sort of thing. Exterior fires in Shanghai and Baku in Azabai Janal in 2015.
00:36:58 2015. Looks like the 15th of December 2015. Again, are these photographs familiar from an LFB slide? Not necessarily. No. And then
00:37:10 And then running through there's one uh other slide for photographs of fires at Basing Stoke and Garnic Court. Um and then page five, if I can show you
00:37:23 then page five, if I can show you that,
00:37:25 that, that is a slide entitled external fire spread
00:37:29 spread um with
00:37:31 um with um a diagram which shows a primary fire up upward spread to secondary fires up the building, rapid fire spread on in the
00:37:42 building, rapid fire spread on in the left hand box and and the point of the slide is in bold on the bottom. right hand side where it says it is important that the facade does not contribute significantly to the fire spread. Do you
00:37:53 significantly to the fire spread. Do you remember seeing a slide like this within a slideshow sitting here? No, I'm not familiar necessarily with that particular slide. Right. Okay. Um just looking at the
00:38:05 Right. Okay. Um just looking at the conclusions and see if we can take this quite quickly. If you go to page 25, general conclusion, I'll just show you this and see if it rings a bell as a
00:38:17 as a page 25.
00:38:29 There's the general conclusion in the slide. I just want to see if this triggers a recollection. As a general principle, the external envelope of the building should not contribute in bold to the fire spread along the facade. And
00:38:40 to the fire spread along the facade. And then in bold, new construction material and method of construction are being used in facads with a bold limited understanding of their bold fire behavior straight performance. There is
00:38:52 behavior straight performance. There is a bold need to understand. And then it says what products are being used in the facade system and their fire behavior and if they are used appropriately and meet the relevant guidance. these could affect the way fires develop and spread
00:39:04 affect the way fires develop and spread in a building. Now, that was a slideshow or conclusions of the slideshow put created by the LFB in we think October 2016. At any rate, after the Shepherd
00:39:15 2016. At any rate, after the Shepherd Court fire, do you remember these general conclusions or anything like them being trained on, discussed within the LFB? I would be aware of the
00:39:27 within the LFB? I would be aware of the conclusions there, but I'm not familiar or don't remember seeing that actual slide.
00:39:32 slide. Right.
00:39:33 Right. So, I'm not 100% I couldn't 100% sit here and say I've seen that slideshow. Now, you say you're aware of the conclusions there. Do you know where that awareness comes from? When did it
00:39:45 that awareness comes from? When did it originate? Do you think I think that's general experience looking general principles external of the envelope should not contribute to fire spread as we say with a high-rise building we'd expect that um
00:39:57 building we'd expect that um compartmentation would remain in the building and that why in principle why would someone put a cladding on the outside of the building that would contribute to fire spread I think that's
00:40:09 contribute to fire spread I think that's probably a common sense now you mentioned cladding as at The night of the fire. Okay. Clay north facade. Okay. But as at the night of the fire in
00:40:24 Okay. But as at the night of the fire in your experience was the fact that facades cladding if you like as a as a type of facade uh were at risk of
00:40:37 type of facade uh were at risk of uh contributing to fire spread up the exterior of the building. Were you aware that that fact was that fact known or that risk known to
00:40:48 fact known or that risk known to frontline firefighters that there was always a risk that you could be aware that something could contribute? But however, as if we're talking about the building in general as
00:40:59 talking about the building in general as in Grenville, no, I was not aware that what Grenville was clad in or what what was around it. In more general terms, uh, as at the night of the Grenfield
00:41:10 uh, as at the night of the Grenfield Tower fire, would you have expected frontline firefighters to be aware of the risk of fire spread up the exterior, an igniting exterior of a high-rise?
00:41:22 an igniting exterior of a high-rise? Not not to the magnitude that it happened on the night. No, at all.
00:41:26 at all. No, not not to that extent. Not to travel from the fourth floor to the 24th floor in I mean, and I'll pick a timeline, 30 minutes. I' I've not got that detail, but in the rapid spread
00:41:39 that detail, but in the rapid spread that that fire went around the around the building, no, it would not be an expectation. Right. That's that that covers the extent and speed. But just in terms of the risk in the abstract, just to repeat the question in a slightly different
00:41:50 the question in a slightly different way, as at the night of the fire, would you have expected frontline firefighters to be aware that that there was a risk in any high-rise building uh that the exterior could ignite?
00:42:02 exterior could ignite? To a certain extent, as in like a coander effect or a gentle spread from one floor to another, but not throughout the whole building. No. Right.
00:42:37 Um, can I then ask you um to look at page two of your statement?
00:42:45 Um, and I just want to ask you about um the
00:42:49 the um who was on duty. Uh you say on page two uh in the a third of the way down um that in the
00:43:00 a third of the way down um that in the role of DAC whilst on 24-hour duty, there would be two operational DAC's and one recall DAC. Um, do you know who were the the operational dac's on duty apart
00:43:11 the the operational dac's on duty apart from you?
00:43:12 from you? Yes, it was me and Andy Olllan. Andy
00:43:16 Andy and Andy Olan uh was also the duty dack that night. So, it's a dual role. Right. Okay. And who was the recall DAC on duty?
00:43:26 on duty? Um, that would have been Lee Drawbridge. Right. And why is there a recall DAC on duty? So should um we be in a position that something escalates or should both
00:43:37 that something escalates or should both DAC's be called out to two incidents then we would um recall the duty DAC to cover the operational rotor or to give
00:43:48 cover the operational rotor or to give further cover should it be required. Okay. And you just a little bit further down you say the duty DAC provides strategic direction and support with issues that arise via control and
00:44:01 issues that arise via control and resource management center as DA duty DAC I would deal with the issue or if felt necessary escalate it to the to the duty and then I can't understand what it says an assistant
00:44:13 understand what it says an assistant commissioner could you just explain that um who would you escalate an issue to assistant commissioner Right. Okay. And um you say that the duty DAC provides
00:44:24 um you say that the duty DAC provides strategic direction and support with issues that arise via control and the RMC. Um could you just explain a bit more about what that means? What are issues that arise via control and
00:44:36 issues that arise via control and resource management center? So that would be predominantly looking at short-term and long-term planning looking resource management center would look at how we dis distribute our
00:44:50 look at how we dis distribute our firefighters across um L pan London to ensure that we maintain our core strategic aims and objectives which is providing a frontline service. Sometimes we do don't have the right officers in
00:45:02 we do don't have the right officers in the right place. Sometimes we will need to move officers and firefighters around the organization to ensure that we keep the appliances on the run. And sometimes
00:45:13 the appliances on the run. And sometimes the officer of the day control or resource management would require further direction on choices and which direction to take this. And this is
00:45:24 direction to take this. And this is basically to ensure that we maintain and maximize our frontline service during during that shift. Right. Uh and um you
00:45:35 during that shift. Right. Uh and um you need software, I think, to do that, don't you? You need a computer program to be able to smooth out peaks and troughs.
00:45:42 troughs. Not nec um what as in So could you confirm as in the duty deck or as in an RMC officer or who? Well, the the process of making sure that you've got the right resources in the right part of London would would
00:45:54 the right part of London would would require a software program. So there is a software program called the standby module which is utilized by the RMC the resource management center and that is a module that links to stars and a lot of
00:46:07 module that links to stars and a lot of our other systems to ensure that we have the right skills the right firefighter in the right place to ensure that we provide the service. Do you remember whether that was working
00:46:18 Do you remember whether that was working efficiently on the night? So I wasn't the duty deck at the beginning of the night. So Andy Aloan was within that role. Um I had not been told that there was any issues with the
00:46:29 told that there was any issues with the SPM. So no I wasn't aware. Right. Okay. Now um on page four of your statement, if I can just turn to the topic of your role on the night, you say
00:46:42 topic of your role on the night, you say um there uh that uh you were called at 1:25
00:46:47 1:25 on the Wednesday evening. And you say, "I was in bed when I received a call from the duty dak Andia Lachland." Uh, who and he said, you say he informed me that he was attending an eight pump
00:46:58 me that he was attending an eight pump high-rise incident. Uh, was that the first you've heard about the fire at Granville Tower? Yes.
00:47:06 Yes. And as one of the DAC's on duty, would you be expected to be notified of the fire uh at 8 pumps or sooner than eight pumps? I'd be notified at 8 pumps
00:47:17 pumps? I'd be notified at 8 pumps because um a DAC would then attend and they'd be attending in the role of monitoring the group manager. So whether that came via normally we internally as
00:47:29 that came via normally we internally as the DAX would phone each other and speak to each other and communicate to ensure that we're all aware um where each other are.
00:47:38 are. Okay. And you say that the DAC will go on to an eight pump fire in a monitoring a monitoring officer's role for the group manager who will be in charge at that point. So just taking it it in
00:47:49 that point. So just taking it it in stages. First of all, at eight pumps, is it right that a group manager is the incident or should be the incident commander? That's correct. Right. And what does it mean to take on a monitoring officer's role? So the DAC
00:48:03 a monitoring officer's role? So the DAC would attend to monitor and help advise and assist the group manager in the role of incident commander, but also should the incident escalate, then we've
00:48:16 the incident escalate, then we've already got the next tier of officer on route and at the incident ready to take charge. And then should the DAC take charge then an assistant commissioner
00:48:28 charge then an assistant commissioner will turn up and monitor and that continues all the way through the instant command chain. At the moment when you were mobilized who was the group manager that you were
00:48:41 who was the group manager that you were going to be monitoring as monitoring officer.
00:48:43 officer. No. So you're incorrect there. So the DAC was mobilized as in Andio Lachlan and he was the um DAC that attended the
00:48:54 and he was the um DAC that attended the incident and he was the one that would be monitoring the group manager not myself. So Andy Olllan just informed me to say that he was going to the incident and could he pass the duty deck role
00:49:06 and could he pass the duty deck role over to me so that I could then take that role from him because he was now going to be attending the incident. I follow.
00:49:15 I follow. At that point though, who was the group manager in charge? Do you know? Um, at the time I didn't know, but I do now. Um, it was Richard Welch. So, I
00:49:26 now. Um, it was Richard Welch. So, I knew by the time I was in my car and on route to Stratford that I heard that it was Richard Welch then, but at that period of time, no, I wasn't aware who it was.
00:49:36 it was. Right. Uh, we'll we'll we'll we'll come to that in a moment. Um, so, so, um, at the at the time when you got this first call from the duty dak,
00:49:49 got this first call from the duty dak, Anddio Llin at 125, do you know or did you know who the incident commander was? No, I didn't. Did you ask? No, cuz I wouldn't ask cuz I wouldn't be attending the incident. That would be
00:50:01 attending the incident. That would be down to that be Andy Lockan's role as the D attending the incident. Ground. Now you then say um in the next paragraph again about a
00:50:13 in the next paragraph again about a third of the way down the page on page four of your statement, I also turned my airwave radio on to listen to what was happening at 0131. The incident went to a 25 pump fire with multiple fire
00:50:25 a 25 pump fire with multiple fire survival guidance calls. Um
00:50:30 Um where were you at that point? I was still at my campout location. Right.
00:50:36 Right. And uh
00:50:41 how did you discover that at that time the incident had become a 25 fire? Um I can't be 100% sure whether that
00:50:52 Um I can't be 100% sure whether that would have been via the airwave radio or whether I was paged. Unfortunately, I can't remember um how I was informed, but I would have been paged at some stage by control to say it had gone a 25
00:51:04 stage by control to say it had gone a 25 pump fire, but I may have already gleaned that information prior to control getting the opportunity to page me by turning on my air rave radio and listening to the incident.
00:51:16 listening to the incident. Right. You go on to say with multiple fire survival guidance calls. Um h again h how did that message get to
00:51:27 Um h again h how did that message get to you that there were multiple files of I would have heard them on the radio. I'm taking the assumption from when I wrote that that I was listen I picked them up on the airwave radio so I can I have the opportunity to turn my radio on
00:51:39 have the opportunity to turn my radio on and listen to airwave traffic between control the incident ground and the incident commanders and I would be able to pick up information that was being
00:51:50 to pick up information that was being transmitted. So it's is almost like a listening post. Yes, I see. And being like a listening post, did you hear somebody say there are multiple
00:52:02 hear somebody say there are multiple fire survival guidance calls or did you actually work out that there were multiple fire survival guidance calls from the traffic? I could hear fire survival calls going over the radio at the time and I'm
00:52:13 over the radio at the time and I'm taking that assumption that's why I've written it at that period of time. Okay. Can you give me an example of a kind of fire survival guidance call you heard in the way you've just explained
00:52:24 heard in the way you've just explained it?
00:52:24 it? It would have been control contacting the incident ground to say that they're receiving a call with the detail of the call.
00:52:32 call. Details being what? Can you I couldn't recite what I heard on the night. over the kind of thing it it would have been it would have been from um control to say the flat the
00:52:43 from um control to say the flat the floor and the number of persons and why and how they're trapped right
00:52:48 right or what what what the reason is for the call as in whether it's heat smoke and
00:52:56 and do you know who in the control room was sending those messages to the incident ground? I wouldn't I wouldn't have any I wouldn't know who the control operators are.
00:53:08 know who the control operators are. Okay. And did you know to whom they were being sent? Could you hear the other who was receiving? I can't I can't remember where they were being transmitted. They would have either gone to an ICP or to a command
00:53:19 either gone to an ICP or to a command unit, but I couldn't be specific at that time. Do you remember hearing again in general terms whether the ICP or the CU receiving the messages by radio
00:53:32 receiving the messages by radio responded saying confirmed or or or No, because by by this time I'll be get myself ready to actually leave my premises and get into my car and attend. So the the the radio will be on for me
00:53:45 So the the the radio will be on for me to listeners in background to try and gather information going forward. But at that time I was probably getting ready to leave the um leave my house. Right. And and being the listening post
00:53:57 Right. And and being the listening post and hearing these numerous FSG calls being radioed from the control room to the incident ground. What were your thoughts about the kind
00:54:08 What were your thoughts about the kind of incident that you were going to? um for for it to go from my recollection from an eight and I didn't hear in between to a 25 it's obviously a
00:54:22 between to a 25 it's obviously a escalating incident of some form at this is the very early stages for me as in me being informed. So, at that stage, I'm I'll be looking to try and gather
00:54:33 I'll be looking to try and gather information, but my information was limited at that stage cuz I've only just been remotely informed and I'm about to call control as well. So,
00:54:45 call control as well. So, yeah. And you did call control as you say. I phoned our control room and told them that I would attend control to set up a BCC, a brigade coordination center. Control informed me they would show me a status 7 and attached to this incident.
00:54:58 status 7 and attached to this incident. Um, first of all, just clear this one out of the way. What is status 7? Status 7 is a status that a officer can use that takes them out of the
00:55:09 use that takes them out of the operational Carter as in control can no longer use them to send them to an operational incident. So vision or our mobilizing system would automatically
00:55:20 mobilizing system would automatically then pick me up and send me to the incident. Um so it's a way of attaching me to control and the incident but ensuring so if it escalated and asked
00:55:31 ensuring so if it escalated and asked for another DAC it wouldn't send myself because I already have been assigned a role.
00:55:37 role. Okay. And a brigade coordination center um what is that? So a brigade coordination center can be set up um it
00:55:49 coordination center can be set up um it would normally be set up um at headquarters or at Merton where control normally are but it can be set up wherever deemed necessary. Um a BR
00:56:02 wherever deemed necessary. Um a BR brigade coordination center is set up to um put extra management and governance in place for a large incident or event
00:56:15 in place for a large incident or event internal event or a pandemic. Um and it's to ensure that whilst the event or incident is running that the brigade can
00:56:27 incident is running that the brigade can maintain its strategic aims and objectives which is to basically in simple terms make sure that we provide our core business front line whilst the incident
00:56:39 business front line whilst the incident is running and going. So it would be looking at long and short-term planning for reliefs, communications not on the incident ground but externally with media that we'd set up
00:56:50 externally with media that we'd set up um potentially four cells pending what is required um and depend on the incident or the event or the pandemic or the reason could be for a business
00:57:01 the reason could be for a business continuity reasons. Okay. And is there a particular pump or makeup number which would trigger the establishment of a BCC? So a BCC can be
00:57:12 establishment of a BCC? So a BCC can be set up for it doesn't have to be an incident. So it can be um an internal business continuity reason, right?
00:57:20 right? So the um BCC is at the discretion of the commissioners group and the duty AC uh assistant commissioner. However, um
00:57:32 uh assistant commissioner. However, um as a duty DAC, um I could see that that's the direction of travel and it needed to be set up and confirmed that with the GTAC on the night. Okay. And was it your decision uh to set
00:57:45 Okay. And was it your decision uh to set up the BCC at Stratford? Yes.
00:57:47 Yes. Okay.
00:57:49 Okay. And what led you to that decision? Um, so I'd received a pager message as an operation officer during the day to inform me that control who are normally
00:58:02 inform me that control who are normally located at the lock at Merton had relocated to our fullback control at Stratford and that they were located there.
00:58:11 there. My decision to not go to Merton and not go to HQ was based on the rationale that control would be at Stratford. Um, having worked at Stratford over numerous
00:58:24 having worked at Stratford over numerous um, roles and positions over the years, I was fully aware that Stratford had the facilities to um, facilitate a BCC. And so I made the decision that it was best
00:58:35 so I made the decision that it was best to be at the same location as control abate. It'll be the floor below and the room below because we don't necessarily set the BCC up with control because it
00:58:46 set the BCC up with control because it doesn't have to be allocated with control cuz as I say it can be for an event or a pandemic and that was my experience and operational decision on the night.
00:58:57 the night. Right. It sounds as if the you had a choice to set it up at Mertton but decided not to. I thought Merton was closed. Was that not so? Well Mertton there was I don't know what was happening at Mertton. So whether
00:59:09 was happening at Mertton. So whether they were having maintenance that night or it was a general normal fallback position, I'm I'm not aware. But Merton can facilitate the BCC. Okay. Now that's very helpful. But
00:59:21 Okay. Now that's very helpful. But partly my question wasn't as good as it should have been. And my question should have been what led you to set up a BCC at all?
00:59:30 at all? um because it at that stage it was at 25 um pumps and so I would I knew we would need um a relief plan. We would need um
00:59:42 need um a relief plan. We would need um to look at how we were going to do short and long-term planning for the future to ensure once you take 25 pumps out of service delivery out the front line, we
00:59:53 service delivery out the front line, we need to make sure that we still have strategic cover across the brigade and that we maintain the resources and also the incident ground would ask or via and
01:00:06 the incident ground would ask or via and this will come via control not to the BCC but via control. um whether there was resources or um things that we could assist with um on the incident ground.
01:00:18 assist with um on the incident ground. So we wouldn't get involved in the operations on the actual fire ground, but we would look at how we could support the incident and um ensure as I
01:00:29 support the incident and um ensure as I say that we maintained our core business and strategic aims across the brigade. Yes, I see. And later on in your statement of page 12, um you say
01:00:41 statement of page 12, um you say it's just below the top of page 12, three third line, three lines down, you say the BCC was still in raw format. It was not how I would have liked it, but
01:00:53 was not how I would have liked it, but we did not have the staff needed to set it up fully. Um,
01:00:59 can I just ask you what didn't you have when you set the BCC up that you would have liked to have had? So, the BCC would be run by myself. I
01:01:11 So, the BCC would be run by myself. I would normally be down in the BCC to run the to run the brigade coordination center and then I would have officers in place um to support me and to run the
01:01:23 place um to support me and to run the cells within the BCC that were required on the night um I had to rep prioritize my role and my position and could see that I needed
01:01:35 my position and could see that I needed to remain in control which isn't a norm which isn't a position I would normally um being and also at numerous times I
01:01:46 um being and also at numerous times I had officers that were facilitating the sales in the BCC but I had to strip them out to prioritize what they were doing and get them to do some other roles that
01:01:58 and get them to do some other roles that required the BCC would more come into play um further down into the incident as in supporting going forward as We
01:02:10 as in supporting going forward as We went in, we had 40 pumps there. At that stage, we would have gone into putting 20 further pumps in. We would have had to look at half past 9 the next morning to change a shift. Where were the staff?
01:02:22 to change a shift. Where were the staff? Did staff turn up? They had no fire engine then cuz it was now at the incident ground. We had something we called standbys, direct and indirect standbys, which is part of RNC moving
01:02:35 standbys, which is part of RNC moving staff around. So without drilling really into the detail of what the BCC would do, it's looking at the logistics, the resources and what is needed to maintain
01:02:47 resources and what is needed to maintain our business during the incident, but also supporting the incident with the resources that they needed without stripping out the um fire brigade fire service.
01:02:57 service. Okay. Now, you've mentioned a few times the idea of cells and you said there were four cells. Uh and one of the things you said was that you didn't have support officers to run the cells within BCC. What are cells?
01:03:10 BCC. What are cells? So they are four cells. They have um four functions. You don't have to set them all up. You set what up what is required on the night. So you would have
01:03:21 required on the night. So you would have a communication cell um resources and logistics cell, operational cell and a planning cell. I see. And these four cells will support
01:03:32 I see. And these four cells will support the brigade depending on what the requirements is because every BCC would be different because it depends what the requirement is and what it's been set up for.
01:03:44 been set up for. And would any of those cells, for example, communication or operational assist the communication between the control room and the fire ground? No.
01:03:53 No. Right. Um, looking at page four of your statement, uh, can I take you to the last paragraph and you say there at the same time,
01:04:05 and you say there at the same time, let's run back to page four
01:04:10 at bottom of the page. At the same time, another colleague of mine, Steve Leader, heard my radio noise and came in to speak to me, you say. Um, and you say, you gave him a quick brief,
01:04:21 you gave him a quick brief, uh, told him there was a 25 pound fire. Then you say, I asked Steve to open my laptop and look at our boss system. Uh, to now
01:04:35 Uh, to now did you ask him to communicate the information from the boss system to you? No. So the boss system is a remote part of vision. So vision is our mobilizing
01:04:47 of vision. So vision is our mobilizing system and boss is a system that um senior officers and other members of staff can remotely access. It is a view
01:04:58 staff can remotely access. It is a view point only. So you can't change it, alter it or put any information into it. It's purely for data for us to look at and we can gather. So if you were as a
01:05:10 and we can gather. So if you were as a remote monitoring officer, you could gather information of how the incident was progressing, what what size the incident was, location, just it's it's
01:05:21 incident was, location, just it's it's purely for data only. Okay. Now, at the at the time you asked Steve Leader to open your laptop, where were you?
01:05:28 were you? Um I was still at my campa house getting ready to um leave. Right. I see. I was going to ask you why couldn't you open your laptop and use boss to look at what was on the because I was getting ready to leave the premises to attend Stratford and I was
01:05:41 premises to attend Stratford and I was utilizing Steve as he was there to gain as much information as I could without delaying my departure from my campaign base.
01:05:49 base. So he opens his laptop looks at the boss system and that would have that would have enabled you to look at what was on vision. Is that right? Uh yes to a certain extent. Um, but in that circumstance, to be honest, I'd
01:06:01 that circumstance, to be honest, I'd left the premises before I'd gained cuz um I needed to get away. I was just trying to utilize every avenue to gain as much information as possible.
01:06:12 as much information as possible. Yes. Okay. And and you you go on to say, um,
01:06:17 um, this is at the bottom of the page. This is to get an overview of the incident and I can look at the system remotely from my laptop, which is what I did. So just to be clear, did you look at your laptop or did Steve look at your No, it was my laptop and Steve was
01:06:29 No, it was my laptop and Steve was opening my laptop to get the information for me whilst I was getting ready to leave the premises by the time he had logged onto the system. Um I hadn't gained much more information and so and
01:06:42 gained much more information and so and I had left the premises by then. Okay. Cuz when you say I can look at the system remotely from my laptop, which is what I did, did you? No. I so as I said went to open the opened the laptop turn it on put the
01:06:54 opened the laptop turn it on put the system in place Steve Leader went to open it by the time we'd got the system up and running I'd not had the time or did not sit there and look at the information it would have been more for
01:07:05 information it would have been more for him to open it up and relay it to me as I was leaving the premise but no no further information. Okay. And did he relay uh information to you as you were leaving? No,
01:07:15 No, he didn't. Okay.
01:07:19 So, at what point did you leave, do you think? Uh, you you we let me ask it a different way. How soon after being told that there was a
01:07:31 soon after being told that there was a 25 park fire in progress? Did you leave your camp out? Um, I couldn't give you a specific time scale. Um there would have been a phone
01:07:43 scale. Um there would have been a phone call to control, a phone call to Andy Row um to inform him that my decision to do the BCC and head uh to do it at Stratford and head to Stratford. Um he
01:07:55 Stratford and head to Stratford. Um he told me he was attending um I would have got dressed um grabbed uh my Airwave radio keys and bits and left the premises. Right. Okay. And what did you use? What
01:08:10 Right. Okay. And what did you use? What communication device did you use to to call control? Um, it would have been my mobile phone. Your brigade mobile, I would s suggest. So, unless I asked
01:08:21 I would s suggest. So, unless I asked Steve to phone them on his mobile, I really couldn't confirm cuz he was assisting me as he was there to leave the premises. And that call would have gone through to what communication line or device within
01:08:33 what communication line or device within the control room. It would have um I would have either phoned one of three. It would have either been the paging which is the admin line, office of the
01:08:44 which is the admin line, office of the watch which is an admin line or gone to um control itself. Sometimes I will phone the office of the watch as um duty AC because the normal control and paging
01:08:55 AC because the normal control and paging lines are normally busy with um them dealing with other officers trying to book in.
01:09:00 book in. Right. At at the moment you left, do you know whether you knew who the incident commander was? I would have known that Andy Olan would have been on route. I'd known it'd gone
01:09:12 have been on route. I'd known it'd gone to a 25 pump fire, which means Andy Olan would have taken over when he got there. However, at a 25 pump fire, then Andy Row would have taken over when he got
01:09:23 Row would have taken over when he got there. So, at that stage, I didn't know that Richard Welch um was even on scene. I didn't know who the group manager was at that stage. Right.
01:09:41 Right. Okay. And at top of page five of your statement, you say, "A short while later, I sorry, I should just go back. I'm so sorry. You
01:09:52 I should just go back. I'm so sorry. You say at the bottom of page four, I called Assistant Commissioner Andy Row to let him know what I was doing to attend control and set up a BCC." Um why did you call him?
01:10:04 why did you call him? So I've now been given the role of duty deck and he was AC1. So knowing the size of the incident uh AC1 as a assistant
01:10:15 of the incident uh AC1 as a assistant commissioner one he would have been going to the incident. So I was just informing him that I would be setting up a BCC to support the brigade.
01:10:29 a BCC to support the brigade. um
01:10:30 um throughout the um duration of the incident.
01:10:33 incident. Okay. And again, did you call him on your on your mobile? I would suggest so yes. You don't remember precisely? No, I I would I would suggest at that time I'm at that camp out. So it would have either been via my mobile or Steve
01:10:44 have either been via my mobile or Steve Leers, but I'd suggest it would be mine or Andy Ro could have called me. Okay. And
01:10:52 Okay. And you then say at the top of page five, a short while later I left my camp out base and whilst on route AC2 Richard Mills called me. Um who is he?
01:11:03 Mills called me. Um who is he? So as with the DAC DAC system, we have two operational decks and as mentioned one is duty DAC and then also we have a recall the same with the assistant
01:11:15 recall the same with the assistant commissioners. So they will have AC1 who is you could say in simpler terms like the duty AC but would also attend the incident and AC2 can be stood up should
01:11:28 incident and AC2 can be stood up should AC1 attend an incident and then they stand into the role of the AC1. Okay. And then you go on to say um
01:11:39 Okay. And then you go on to say um he uh was did he call you on your mobile or did he call you did he speak to you over the airwave radio? No, we wouldn't have conversation over the airwave radio because that is for the operational
01:11:50 because that is for the operational incident and we would take up airwave traffic. Okay. Which would be needed to be prioritized by the incident ground. Right. Was your airwave on? Sorry.
01:12:00 Sorry. Was your airwave radio on and receiving messages?
01:12:02 messages? I would say it was on. However, if I'm on the phone, then I would have turned it down to um do the phone call. In the
01:12:13 it down to um do the phone call. In the first sentence of the next paragraph, five lines down from the top of page five, you say, "During the journey to Stratford, I had my radio on and could hear the incident escalating." Um, what
01:12:24 hear the incident escalating." Um, what radio was that? Was that your airwave or That would be my airwave. So, a senior officer's airwave is um a handheld radio about so size with an aerial so it's portable so that you can listen to it
01:12:37 portable so that you can listen to it whilst mobile. And you say I could hear the incident escalating. What could you hear?
01:12:42 hear? Um I could just hear a lot of radio traffic to and fro. I couldn't be specific um what was coming back, but you can generally pick up that um um an
01:12:53 you can generally pick up that um um an incident is escalating by radio traffic to and fro control and the incident ground.
01:12:57 ground. Right. Could could you hear that traffic between the control room and the incident ground on your airwave radio? Yes,
01:13:05 Yes, you could. That so that's the same listening post you described earlier. Yes. So my airwave radio is what I described as a listening post at my camp.
01:13:13 camp. Would that include messages being sent by control to the incident ground on RT4 channel?
01:13:20 channel? Yes, that would have been RT4. So that's that's the airwave. That's the listening. That's what I was listening to.
01:13:25 to. Okay. Could you if you wanted to speak to control on RT4, could you? I could do, but it wouldn't be appropriate because RT4 can only you can only have one conversation at the time and the
01:13:38 one conversation at the time and the priority has got to be the incident ground and the appliances that attending and dealing with the incident. So for me to do an admin call or a call on RT4
01:13:49 to do an admin call or a call on RT4 would not be appropriate. Okay. Is that so? Yes. You say you can only do one call at a time. That's true. Is it of RT4? Sorry, could you say that again? You said you said in your last answer that
01:14:00 said you said in your last answer that you can only have one conversation at a time on RT4. Yes.
01:14:06 Yes. That that is that the same for channel one as well? Yes.
01:14:10 Yes. I see. Now when you say I could hear the incident escalating, do you mean so Phonops channel one? Yes, I think it is Flops. Yes. On the airwave, right? Yes. On the Okay. You say I could
01:14:23 right? Yes. On the Okay. You say I could hear the incident escalating. What could you hear about the incident that was escalating? Um, it's just general radio traffic. So, that time in the morning and it's just I
01:14:34 that time in the morning and it's just I can't I really can't be specific because I can't remember what the traffic was at that time, but there was a lot of radio traffic going on. And that's when I say escalating, I'm talking about my journey
01:14:47 escalating, I'm talking about my journey in general from my camp out base to arriving at Stratford. So that's over a probably a 20 30 minute period.
01:14:55 period. Yes, we'll come to that after the break. Just M Mr. Chairman, if I can let us ask one question. You can go a bit longer if you want to. All right. Thank you. Um do you mind if
01:15:06 All right. Thank you. Um do you mind if we go as long as we have a break in about 10 minutes? I'm more than happy. Are you quite comfortable still? Yes, I'm Let's continue. Thank you. Um Yes. So you left just to try to get a
01:15:18 Yes. So you left just to try to get a time frame on this. Yes.
01:15:21 Yes. after it had become a 25 pump fire which we know was at 131. Yep.
01:15:26 Yep. And it took you say 20 to 25 minutes to get to Stratford. So I wouldn't say I walked straight out the house at 0131 at that period of time. So I left the premises and at
01:15:39 time. So I left the premises and at whatever time it took me to get ready and walk out and leave. Right. Uh and then it took you 20 to 25 minutes to get to Stratford. So that would
01:15:48 would that that is an estimated time. So I I couldn't be 100% and like I said there were a few phone calls that I made um with control with Andy Row prior and as
01:16:00 with control with Andy Row prior and as as I was leaving. Okay. Um do you remember hearing uh that group manager Welch was now incident commander? So on route I did hear make pumps 40.
01:16:14 So on route I did hear make pumps 40. Right. And that did come from group manager Welch. Yes. So I heard that um probably in between trying to make phone calls on the way um whilst the
01:16:25 phone calls on the way um whilst the radio was on. And how close do you remember you were to Stratford when you heard make pumps 40 and and Welch being? I would suggest
01:16:36 I would suggest probably on the A13 and that's just a guess.
01:16:41 guess. That's just a estimate in my mind. Okay. On the A13, I'm not sure that quite does it for me. Can Can you Can you Can you specific enough? No, it doesn't. How long before you
01:16:53 No, it doesn't. How long before you arrived do you think you heard the message make pumps 40 and group manager Welch? Now I see. So I I would I would suggest that's quite early on to me leave um getting in
01:17:06 quite early on to me leave um getting in my car and being going going up the road. Um
01:17:11 road. Um uh probably 5 10 minutes. Okay. And and to be and I've got to be completely honest, that is purely a guesstimate. I really can't pinpoint and I wouldn't want to pinpoint times for you because I can't be specific on that.
01:17:22 you because I can't be specific on that. I understand. I mean, we have in the short incident log a time mark for those messages of 020341 for pumps being made 40 and 020420 for group manager Welch
01:17:36 40 and 020420 for group manager Welch being sorry, what time commander? O23, right?
01:17:40 right? And 0204 roughly. Okay. Okay. So before 5 2 uh in the morning. Um uh now before that did you hear while you were on route um fire survival guidance
01:17:51 were on route um fire survival guidance messages going from control to the incident ground? Um whilst on route that I was making several phone calls at the time. So I was I was heading to the BCC and I was
01:18:03 was I was heading to the BCC and I was trying to mobilize other officers and other staff to ensure that I had them there as early as possible to assist. So my radio at some stages was probably
01:18:16 my radio at some stages was probably turned down while I was doing these calls.
01:18:18 calls. Right. And you were making calls on what device?
01:18:22 device? So hands-free device. Handsree. Okay. All right. Uh, so your radio was turned down. Did even though it was turned down, you say in your statement you could hear the incident
01:18:33 statement you could hear the incident escalating. Yes. And then that's as I've said. So I would have heard a fire survival guidance or some as I was going. I would have heard make pumps 40. There was a couple of bits that you can pick up as
01:18:45 couple of bits that you can pick up as you're making calls in between. However, my radio was turned down at that time because I was trying to mobilize other staff to get to the BCC so that I could
01:18:56 staff to get to the BCC so that I could get things up and running as quick as possible to support. Okay. Can I ask you to look at the in the short incident log, tab 23 of the documents and turn to page uh
01:19:10 documents and turn to page uh 19.
01:19:14 And I'm not going to take you to any specific messages, but we can see um throughout page 19, which starts at the top at 013536.
01:19:25 the top at 013536. So after pumps made 25, which as I said before was at 0131. Um, so you're get either you've left or you're getting ready to leave. We can
01:19:36 you're getting ready to leave. We can see if you scroll right down the page, you can see numerous messages passing from the control room to the incident ground
01:19:47 the control room to the incident ground and we see that on this document as service requests created and completed. Do you do you see that? Yes. F f first of all, would this be the sort of information that you would have
01:19:59 sort of information that you would have been able to see if your laptop had fired up in time and you could use the boss to look at the vision system? Uh yes, it would have been that sort of information, but obviously that would have meant I was remaining at my
01:20:11 have meant I was remaining at my premises and not making myself mobile and attending where I was um ordered to attend.
01:20:19 attend. Yes. But and then looking at that page and then turning to the next page, page 20, running from 0146 to 0155 and so on onto page 21. Again, loads of
01:20:32 and so on onto page 21. Again, loads of messages. Um, are these the kinds of messages that you remember hearing even in the background on your airwave radio on route to the incident?
01:20:44 on route to the incident? Yes, I I would summize that that I would have heard some of those messages, but as I as I said, you know, making the calls and speaking to officers and staff on on route, I was
01:20:56 officers and staff on on route, I was prioritizing what I needed to do for my role, which was to set up the BCC. Yes. And that that is the role that I'd been mobilized for and tasked to um set up
01:21:07 mobilized for and tasked to um set up and do.
01:21:08 and do. Right.
01:21:09 Right. So that that was my immediate priority at the time. Were you aware at that time or during that journey that the Metropolitan Police had called a major incident?
01:21:21 Police had called a major incident? No.
01:21:21 No. Okay.
01:21:23 Okay. Now, in
01:21:26 Now, in um your witness statement on page five, uh you say, "A quarter of the way down, on my way to Stratford after mobilizing myself, I took the decision to self-mobilize Steve Leader,
01:21:39 self-mobilize Steve Leader, asking him to perform the role of setting up the BCC." Um, what does self-mobilize mean? Um uh yeah, probably not the right terminology, self-mobilized, but so all officers or
01:21:53 self-mobilized, but so all officers or all staff that are mobilized to an incident are all done via control. So our control, so it's all done in one place and one person or one uh that is
01:22:04 place and one person or one uh that is in control has that overview of where all our operational officers are. Oh, I see. I could see that I needed to get staff there as quick as possible to set up the BCC. Steve Leader is a
01:22:16 set up the BCC. Steve Leader is a competent group manager. I've known him quite a while. I knew that he could facilitate and set up a BCC. So, I phoned him up knowing his location
01:22:28 So, I phoned him up knowing his location to the incident that it was unlikely that he was to be mobilized by control. I phoned him up, told him to mobilize to Stratford um to assist him setting the
01:22:40 Stratford um to assist him setting the BCC up. Um told him that he could come on the blue light, that I'd given him permission to do that. However, should control page him during his journey to
01:22:51 control page him during his journey to Stratford, he was to prioritize the call from control and go to the incident, but to let me know once he'd prioritize that control with control and then I would
01:23:02 control with control and then I would reallocate that role to someone else. and knowing how busy control were with the makeups and the FSGs, I was trying to take some of the work away from them
01:23:15 to take some of the work away from them to and also to set up the BCC at the quickest and most expedient way. Now, you say in your statement that you took that decision to mobilize
01:23:26 took that decision to mobilize self-mobilize uh Steve Leer on the way to Stratford. Yes. Had anything changed between your being paged initially and leaving the house or the camp out base a
01:23:37 leaving the house or the camp out base a a and being on the way to Stratford that meant that you now thought you needed Steve Leader uh in in the role of setting up the BCC? No, nothing specific apart from as as I
01:23:49 No, nothing specific apart from as as I say the general escalation that is the po points that we were speaking about. So I don't think there was any particular trigger just in my own mind.
01:24:01 particular trigger just in my own mind. I wanted to get the resources there as quick as possible and I knew control would be busy and so I decided to take do that off my own back and authority.
01:24:12 do that off my own back and authority. Did you make that decision to mobilize Steve Leader before or after you'd heard that the fire had been made up to 20 to 40 pumps? I couldn't confirm.
01:24:25 40 pumps? I couldn't confirm. Okay. Uh, and what about before or after hearing that group manager Welch had become incident commander? I only knew that group manager Welsh was in charge when I heard make pumps 40. Right.
01:24:36 Right. That was the point that I knew he was in charge.
01:24:38 charge. What I'm trying to get a feel for is what was it about the escalation that led you to decide that you needed Steve Leer to set up the BCC? It did. So, the incident was rapidly
01:24:50 It did. So, the incident was rapidly made up. There were multiple fire survival guidance calls and I could just see that it was an escalating incident. I had no detail of the incident, but I
01:25:02 I had no detail of the incident, but I just could see that there was going to need be a need for the BCC to support the incident going forward because you left your campout base at a time when it was already 25. Yes. Didn't
01:25:13 time when it was already 25. Yes. Didn't go 40 until 02043
01:25:18 while you were still on route. I just wonder what it was about the incident that led you to say to yourself, well, I need Steve Leer now to set up the BCC. So, it was like I say, it it was the
01:25:29 So, it was like I say, it it was the number of FSGs coming in, the escalation, the rapid escalation of the incident going up to 40 pumps and also it was just in my own way of working, I
01:25:42 it was just in my own way of working, I wanted to be as efficient as in getting the officers there as quick as possible. And
01:25:48 And Mr. Milit, I'm wondering if we're getting to a good point. Are we? Uh, not really, but we can stop now. Yes, I think probably diplomatic. I think we might all benefit from a short break.
01:25:59 short break. Certainly that. Um, M Mr. Fenton, we're going to have a break now. Thank you. Um, please don't talk about your evidence or anything related to it while you're around. Okay.
01:26:08 Okay. Thank you much. You like to go with the usher?
01:26:09 usher? Yeah.
01:26:10 Yeah. We'll resume at 20 to 12, please.
01:42:18 Good.
01:42:31 [Applause] Right, Mr. Fenton ready to carry on. Thank you, Mr. Fenton. Thank you for coming back. Um, can I just ask you about an earlier answer that you gave to to to the
01:42:43 answer that you gave to to to the inquiry when I was asking you about compartmentation and the contingency plan or a contingency plan for full or partial evacuation. As you remember, we had an
01:42:55 evacuation. As you remember, we had an exchange this morning about a rhetorical question and at it's page 25 lines 6 to 12 of the current transcript. I just want to revisit your answer where you
01:43:06 want to revisit your answer where you say um that um and the gist of it is that if the building has compartmentation then fire shouldn't be spreading and you therefore wouldn't have an expectation or you say there
01:43:17 have an expectation or you say there wouldn't be an expectation. I haven't got it up at the moment. No, you haven't. And I'm not sure it's possible for me to display parts of the transcript at the same time, but take it from me that you said that there wouldn't be an expectation for a full or
01:43:29 wouldn't be an expectation for a full or phased evacuation. Um, I just want to be able to explore that a little bit. Um, are you saying first of all that it is a
01:43:40 are you saying first of all that it is a general assumption by incident commanders that because high-rise buildings uh are built on the basis that any fire would be
01:43:51 on the basis that any fire would be contained in a compartment. So fire shouldn't spread out of it. An incident commander would not expect to have to undertake full or partial evacuation.
01:44:03 undertake full or partial evacuation. That that is correct because first of all, how would the incident commander communicate that information to every um person or occupant within the
01:44:15 um person or occupant within the building to actually inform them that we were doing a full or phased evacuation? Um secondly, is the building suitably um
01:44:27 Um secondly, is the building suitably um built to facilitate that? And if the building is built to facilitate that, I would suggest that it would have an intercom or it'd have and a fire alarm and it'd have the facilities there to
01:44:39 and it'd have the facilities there to actually be able to facilitate a full or phased evacuation. Well, those are valid questions uh that arise. But in terms of
01:44:50 questions uh that arise. But in terms of general expectation uh you you ask the questions I think rhetorically in in in answering my question uh negatively. In other words,
01:45:01 question uh negatively. In other words, you would not expect there to be a full or phased evacuation because otherwise you have these difficulties. Yes. Can I take you to policy 633 which is in the policy bundle at tab 4
01:45:15 which is in the policy bundle at tab 4 and I just want to show you one part of this
01:45:27 just just show you the front page if I can to start with this is high-rise firefighting policy 633 and this was current as at 1st of June in 2015. So current as at the night
01:45:40 June in 2015. So current as at the night of the Granville Tower fire and can I take you to well first of all can I ask you are you familiar with this policy? Yes I am. Can I take you to page 14 internally and paragraphs 745 and 746
01:45:55 internally and paragraphs 745 and 746 under the rubric evacuation? And the policy says the IC should consider
01:46:02 consider following the evacuation plan devised as part of the occupier's fire risk assessment unless the fire situation dictates otherwise. It may and 746. it may be necessary to
01:46:15 It may and 746. it may be necessary to undertake a partial or full evacuation in a residential building where a stay put policy is normally in place. Now this policy indicates that that is something that an incident commander
01:46:26 something that an incident commander should be considering. Um in the light of that policy is it really right to say that there wouldn't be an expectation on
01:46:37 that there wouldn't be an expectation on the part of an incident commander to have to undertake full or partial evacuation. I would say uh partial evacuation depending on what we call partial
01:46:48 depending on what we call partial evacuation depending if we're talking a floor or we're talking two floors that's probably a feasibility. Um depending on the size of the high-rise, depending on
01:46:59 the size of the high-rise, depending on the size of the fire, um depending on the situation, then yes, where a full evacuation if possible could be implemented. But it would depend on the
01:47:11 implemented. But it would depend on the building, the size, the size of the fire, all the considerations and all the factors that the incident commander would have to put into play. So should I
01:47:22 would have to put into play. So should I was looking at the situation with the actual incident on the 14th and how we would have communicated that to all residents at the time. I'm not sure, but that would have been as we say a
01:47:33 that would have been as we say a consideration for the incident commander who has all that information at the time. So I think the answer you're not you're you're actually giving me is that actually an incident commander would
01:47:44 actually an incident commander would have to be alert to the need to undertake either a p full or a partial evacuation. It could be a consideration but as I did say and I will say again it depends on
01:47:57 say and I will say again it depends on the situation the circumstances the size of the building number of floors where the fire is and what the situation is at the time. Would your expectation be that
01:48:09 the time. Would your expectation be that any high-rise building would have an evacuation plan devised as part of the occupiers fire risk assessment? Um, that is a possibility. I I wouldn't
01:48:21 Um, that is a possibility. I I wouldn't know what every building or what their risk assessments are. In terms of your understanding of policy 745, which refers to the evacuation plan devised as
01:48:33 refers to the evacuation plan devised as part of the occupiers fire risk assessment, in your experience as a DAC and having had the training and and knowing about this policy, would it be your expectation that a high-rise
01:48:44 your expectation that a high-rise building such as Grenfell Tower would actually have an evacuation plan? Not for the entire tower block. No. Right. because I don't I mean in my just
01:48:55 Right. because I don't I mean in my just in I mean in my understanding I don't know how you would communicate a full evacuation to 24 floors of the tower block
01:49:04 block but 746 says that it may be necessary to undertake a partial or full evacuation and as I mentioned previously it would depend on the size of the building the
01:49:16 depend on the size of the building the the height what facilities are also there is there an intercom is there a um other twin stairs staircases it every building would have and can yes there
01:49:28 building would have and can yes there can be for a building but not necessarily how it would be implemented in every building right so in the case of a building uh where there may be difficulties
01:49:39 uh where there may be difficulties in undertaking a full evacuation what would you expect an incident commander to do or to consider if if um if an incident commander was to
01:49:51 if if um if an incident commander was to consider consider full evacuation of a building. They would have to consider the escape routes, what routes, how would we get the personnel out of the fire? Where is the fire? Would the would
01:50:03 fire? Where is the fire? Would the would we put be putting um people into a more dangerous environment? Where where is the smoke travel? Where's the heat? Every situation would be slightly different. Is there a single
01:50:15 slightly different. Is there a single staircase? Is there a dual staircase? Would the um firefighters would they be actually in the escape route or not the escape route wrong word would they be in
01:50:27 escape route wrong word would they be in the staircase actually doing firefighting operations? So all all these would have to become part of the incident commander um plan to put that into a considered
01:50:40 um plan to put that into a considered option.
01:50:40 option. Yes. And in order to form part of the incident commander's plan, would you expect all the answers to the questions you've just listed to be immediately
01:50:52 you've just listed to be immediately available to the incident commander on the fire ground? Um, it's it's a possibility. Yes. I mean, the it depends yet again where they are and what the premises are. So
01:51:03 they are and what the premises are. So there are um that information can be gathered by the incident commander. Would you, you say it's a possibility, but would you not then expect that an incident commander would immediately
01:51:14 incident commander would immediately have all the answers uh to those questions at his or her fingertips in order to be able to consider alternatives to firefighting? Yes, he they would need them at their
01:51:26 Yes, he they would need them at their disposal to make those decisions. They would. And where would you expect an incident commander to get that information to answer all those questions from? So it um they could look
01:51:38 questions from? So it um they could look at the operational risk database depending what information is on there. They could look at a premise um information box on the side of the
01:51:49 information box on the side of the building. There could be information on there and also potentially from um the um lo if there was local building management in place
01:52:01 was local building management in place they would be able to give further information. So it's all about information gathering
01:52:09 and so are you saying that the operational risk database or a premises information box or both would or should normally
01:52:21 box or both would or should normally provide information which would answer all the questions you listed for us a moment ago. It could do. You say it could do. It could do because I can't be specific because I don't know what's on every single OAD or every
01:52:34 what's on every single OAD or every premise information box. So yes, it should be some form of information will be in there, but I can't give you the details of every single premise across London and what information is in there.
01:52:46 London and what information is in there. as a matter of of practice in your experience as at the night of the fire, would it be your expectation that uh a high-rise building and the plans for it
01:52:57 high-rise building and the plans for it and the OD information for it would contain that information so as to be able to equip an incident commander with the relevant information there there would be information in there. Yes,
01:53:08 there. Yes, would be or should be. Should be. Yeah, there would be information within the both. And uh while we're on this page, can I just ask you to look at paragraph 7.47,
01:53:19 just ask you to look at paragraph 7.47, second sentence? Evacuation can be made more resource inensive if the occupants have an impaired ability to make their own way to safety. For example, disabled persons
01:53:32 to safety. For example, disabled persons uh or those under the effect of alcohol or drugs may need greater assistance. Uh again, I I would you expect as at the time of the fire, would you expect an
01:53:44 time of the fire, would you expect an incident commander to be able easily to put his h or her hands on information that would assist them in evacuating the building partially or fully if that were
01:53:55 building partially or fully if that were needed?
01:53:57 needed? Well, are are you saying um the if there's impaired ability to make their own way out to safety? Yes.
01:54:04 Yes. Yes. So the information should be available to the incident commander in that situation should they need to consider an evacuation. Mhm.
01:54:17 Mhm. Yes.
01:54:19 Yes. Now,
01:54:20 Now, can I just go back to something else that you referred to in your in the earlier part of your evidence this morning? That was uh computer-based training um post lacal house.
01:54:47 Can I ask you to be shown um LFP quadruple 03751?
01:55:00 [Music]
01:55:07 And I think this is actually um
01:55:13 um the monitoring and action plan that came in as a result of Lac House. Can I just ask you first of all, are you familiar with this document or or anything like it?
01:55:23 it? No, I'm not. Okay. Can I just I'll take this very briefly. Can I just ask you to look at paragraph three
01:55:32 um which is on I think the next page page two
01:55:41 uh sorry page fish around in this page three I'm so sorry
01:55:51 right uh and uh this is about uh incident command training
01:55:59 And if we just enlarge it uh
01:56:08 do and if you look at paragraph 3 sub paragraph 3 um paragraph 3 starts the brigade review its policies and procedures concerning incident command having regard whether it's effective for
01:56:19 having regard whether it's effective for the choice of IC to be tied closely to the number of types of of appliances attending an incident and training to be given to IC's to enhance on their training in relation to the following. Okay. And then if you look at three
01:56:33 Okay. And then if you look at three to anticipate that a fire might behave in a manner inconsistent with the compartmentation principle. Now uh you you you you can
01:56:46 principle. Now uh you you you you can then see uh across the page that there's some text quite a lot of text about how that was going to be implemented by Babcock
01:56:55 Babcock uh with management training uh and uh in the last paragraph of the first main column underneath the yellow it says the lack house training package that specifically address the
01:57:07 that specifically address the recommendations is formally managed by the learning and development team directly with Babcock. First of all, Babcock, can you do you can you tell us about their involvement in LFB training? Um, Babcock are um an independent
01:57:22 Um, Babcock are um an independent um provider of our training. Right.
01:57:25 Right. So, they're um an independent company that we pro um we pay to provide our training.
01:57:31 training. Right. And do they comprise do their training teams comprise members or ex-members of the LFB? Yes, they can do this. They do. Or do they? They can do. But do they? Well, certain teams have have got
01:57:42 they? Well, certain teams have have got ex members of LFB and it's a it's quite a big department or team. So, yes. Do do you remember getting does this prompt a recollection of getting computer-based training from Babcock on the subject of
01:57:55 training from Babcock on the subject of what would happen if compartmentation? No, that that document doesn't I'm not familiar with that document. Okay. You're not familiar with the document. Okay. Uh right. Well, I won't pursue that. It's it's a long and
01:58:06 pursue that. It's it's a long and complicated document and not an easy read but we may look at that with others. Um can I then turn back to where we had got to uh just before break
01:58:17 we had got to uh just before break uh which is your arrival uh at the um brigade control center. Now, in your statement, you say twothirds of the way down page five,
01:58:28 down page five, [Music]
01:58:31 uh, well, sorry, just below halfway down page five is where the paragraph starts. Uh, at 0149 hours, I called the recall DAC,
01:58:41 DAC, Lee Drawbridge, and told him that he was to stand up as the recall uh, DAC.
01:58:47 uh, DAC. Uh, now you say 0149 hours. How can you be so precise about the timing of that call? Do you know? Um because Lee Drawbridge um informed me afterwards that he'd had missed calls on
01:58:58 afterwards that he'd had missed calls on his phone and that was the time that I called him. So when you did your statement, where did you get that very precise information from? Do you know? From Lee Drawbridge. Who told you that? What was he looking at to give you that?
01:59:09 at to give you that? His mobile phone. His call.
01:59:12 His call. I've either got it off my mobile phone or um from Lee Drawbridge saying that I did. That's the time I called him. I see. Okay. Have you provided your mobile phone records to the police? Yes, you did. Okay. Right. Uh now, um
01:59:28 you did. Okay. Right. Uh now, um you say I couldn't get through at first and when he called me back, the incident was made up to 40 pumps with many FSG calls in progress. Looking at the short incident lodges we have and we saw that 40 pumps was at 0203
01:59:41 40 pumps was at 0203 uh uh thereabouts. Um that would mean would it that this discussion you had Lee drawbridge was after that. So we can time we can time that discussion to after 0203 can we?
01:59:54 after 0203 can we? Yes.
01:59:54 Yes. Yes. Okay. Um
01:59:59 uh and you asked him you say to log on and see if you could contact the operational resilience support officer also and mobilize them to the BCC. What is an also?
02:00:10 is an also? So an operation resilience support officer are watch managers who are trained in setting up the BCC brigade coordination center and they would be in
02:00:21 coordination center and they would be in charge of particular cells or as mentioned before or they would assist in whatever role was required in the BCC. So they're um should I say they're very
02:00:34 So they're um should I say they're very good officers to get there early because they will assist in setting a BCC up and knowing I was doing it at Stratford which isn't a location normally I wanted to get them there as quick as possible.
02:00:45 to get them there as quick as possible. Right. And would they be particular people with current operational fire ground experience? They're they're watch they're operational watch managers. However,
02:00:56 operational watch managers. However, they are not working currently at a fire station. So, they wouldn't be attending incidents at the moment, but they would work in a department up at headquarters, but they are qualified to the role of a
02:01:08 but they are qualified to the role of a watch manager. Right. And did did you succeed in mobilizing and also to the BCC? Lee would have mobilized those also for me. Yes.
02:01:15 me. Yes. Who who were they? Do you know? Um I can't I there was four that came all together, but two to start with. um they are on my list in my um uh
02:01:27 they are on my list in my um uh statement. So to be honest, I can't remember which two came first. Right.
02:01:34 Right. You you say you refer to them in that in your statement. Yes. So in my statement it says the staff that I had in the BCC. Okay. Um now you um then go on to say
02:01:47 Okay. Um now you um then go on to say that you arrived if you go to page three your of your statement. That's what I was looking for. Page three of your statement. There's a a little list.
02:01:59 statement. There's a a little list. There's the list of names. Yes. Um so we've got we've got four watch managers. Wilson, Small, Malone, and Rex.
02:02:07 Rex. And they they were the four, weren't they?
02:02:09 they? Yes, they were the four. So Steve Leader would have arrived first. Um Lee Drawbridge would have mobilized the two that were on recall that night. So there's only two on recall. And then
02:02:21 there's only two on recall. And then later on uh at some stage in the um that night I authorized for the two who were not on recall to be contacted at home
02:02:32 not on recall to be contacted at home off duty and ask if they were willing to step up and come in off duty, which they did. Yeah. Then you go on to say uh 2/ird of the way down page five, the
02:02:44 2/ird of the way down page five, the journey to Stratford from my campower base is only 20 to 25 minutes depending on traffic. Between O2 100 hours and 0220 hours, I arrived at Stratford Fire Station. We we've discussed that before.
02:02:56 Station. We we've discussed that before. Yes.
02:02:56 Yes. On the basis of what I've shown you, do you still think that's that's correct? It it looks like it was after 0204 though.
02:03:02 though. Yes. So, I arrived um after Joanne Smith. Um and unfortunately, I can't pinpoint my arrival at Stratford to a
02:03:13 pinpoint my arrival at Stratford to a specific time cuz I obviously I wasn't looking at me watch at the time. So, did Joanne Smith was there when you arrived?
02:03:19 arrived? Yes.
02:03:20 Yes. Okay. And uh she says that she'd arrive about 2:15 or so. So, would that help you be more accurate as to your timings? So, it would have been after 2:15 then
02:03:31 So, it would have been after 2:15 then because Joe was already there and up in control and in the room when I arrived. Okay. Uh, and do you do you remember whether Joe had been there for long or
02:03:42 whether Joe had been there for long or or she'd just arrived or what? Um, I couldn't be very specific, but I think she'd probably been there 10, 15 minutes.
02:03:49 minutes. What What was she doing when you arrived? Do you remember? Um, she was talking to um her control officers. She was working the room, going around the room and speaking to
02:04:00 going around the room and speaking to her control officers at the time. Okay. Now, um you say at the bottom of the page, uh in the middle of the room was officer of the day, Jason Oliff, who was on the
02:04:12 the day, Jason Oliff, who was on the phone and senior operations manager Joanne Smith was going around the room speaking to call operators trying to assist and support her staff. That's what you saw, is it when you first went into the control room for those two particular officers? Yes.
02:04:24 for those two particular officers? Yes. Yeah. Do you remember who was officer of the watch? Yes. Alex Norman. Alex Norman. Yes. Right. Okay. And uh what what do you remember was her role when you arrived?
02:04:36 role when you arrived? Um I can't remember what where she was or what she was doing at the time. So I would always go to the most senior person in the room to start with and that's how I remember looking around
02:04:48 that's how I remember looking around looking for Joanne and seeing where she was. And also Jason would have been the only other operational officer in the room um other than control officers. So
02:05:00 room um other than control officers. So that's probably why I pinpointed those two officers to start with. Right now at the top of page six of your statement, you say this. After introducing myself, I told them that I
02:05:12 introducing myself, I told them that I was going to set up the BCC downstairs on the ground floor. Did you say you introduced yourself? Did you did you know Joe Smith? Yes, I know Joe Smith and Jason Olive.
02:05:23 Yes, I know Joe Smith and Jason Olive. So, I know them both. Right. Okay. So, I've worked with Joe P. Okay. Uh, and you say you were going to set up the BCC downstairs, but you then go on to say, "My role was to set up the BCC, but I could see my priority now was
02:05:37 BCC, but I could see my priority now was going to be assist with coordination of FSG calls and control and that the priority was to record all the fire survival guidance information without it
02:05:48 survival guidance information without it being lost or duplicated.
02:05:51 Why did you see that as your priority?" So if I set a bit of a scene of when I've arrived. So I've arrived at Stratford. Um so Stratford controls on
02:06:04 Stratford. Um so Stratford controls on the first floor and the um BCC or as it it's not a specific BCC but it's the northeast area team offices but it can
02:06:16 northeast area team offices but it can facilitate a BCC should you require. So, first of all, I've gone straight upstairs to inform Joe just as common court curtsy to say I'm here and I'm
02:06:27 court curtsy to say I'm here and I'm going to go downstairs and I'm going to start setting up the brigade co uh coordination center as as was my role and what I was paged and mobilized to do
02:06:38 and what I was paged and mobilized to do when I entered the room. Um so, Stratford control is slightly is a smaller room than Merton. Um the footprint is a smaller room and
02:06:50 footprint is a smaller room and the uh noise the noise level you could see that every single operator was was fully engaged in the time when I first walked in. I don't didn't realize were
02:07:02 walked in. I don't didn't realize were were FSGs but was fully engaged on the phone on the radio or everyone was fully engaged and working and there was quite a lot of noise in the room controlled
02:07:13 a lot of noise in the room controlled but it was a noisy you could see it's an active room and there was a massive amount of information coming in and seeing that once I gained the
02:07:24 and seeing that once I gained the information that they were looking or they were dealing with the number or vast number of FSG calls and my concern was to look at a system of and assist
02:07:38 was to look at a system of and assist Joe in her role um and look at a system of how we could record and get the information across to the fire ground as the most expedient way.
02:07:49 the most expedient way. Right.
02:07:52 And in in coming to that conclusion that FSG information and it's recording it accurately was is your your priority.
02:08:05 it accurately was is your your priority. Were you drawing on any prior experience? So I've had no prior experience of working in control and dealing with FSGS, but I could just see the pure
02:08:16 FSGS, but I could just see the pure amount of information coming in. Normal protocol would be for this information to go over the airwave radio. Um I can probably looking at the amount of air
02:08:29 probably looking at the amount of air airtime traffic that would have taken for all that information to be passed over the airwave and that would release another operator to do another roll rather than concentrating and sending
02:08:41 rather than concentrating and sending that over the airwave to the fire ground. And also it would give everyone a visual picture in the room having it up on a whiteboard that everyone could
02:08:52 up on a whiteboard that everyone could see what the information was on the board and the numbers of calls we were receiving. Yes. Now by 2:00 a.m. or so the number of FSG calls that had been received by the control room uh it was more was over
02:09:06 the control room uh it was more was over 115. Did you know that? No.
02:09:09 No. Would that surprise you that? Yes. That's a hell of a lot. Yes. Yes. hell of a lot. Uh a and um when you arrived in the control room and you could see all the CRO's
02:09:21 could see all the CRO's busy on the phone, did you form an impression as to whether those were active FSG calls properly socalled or whether they were just what I might call ordinary 999 calls?
02:09:33 ordinary 999 calls? No, I would say they were active FSG calls.
02:09:36 calls. How did you know that? um just the information I gave straight away from Joe and looking around the room and seeing so I w I went straight to Joe first of all and had so I didn't walk
02:09:47 first of all and had so I didn't walk into the room and just make that decision there was some information gathering I spoke to Joe first she told me what was happening where we were and looking at the situation at the time
02:09:59 looking at the situation at the time that was a decision that I made but having spoken to Joe and at that time Alex Norman on what my view of what we could do
02:10:10 on what my view of what we could do gleaming on their experience because they are the experienced control staff and they were happy with that decision. So then we moved that forward.
02:10:21 So then we moved that forward. How was the FSG information being recorded
02:10:27 recorded uh at the time you arrived? Normal protocols. So which would have been from a control operator passing it to a radio operator who would have put it onto the system and spoken to the
02:10:39 it onto the system and spoken to the fire ground. Right. Just just pause there and let's just break that up and look at it a bit more closely. So when you arrived normal system in operation, how did what was the um
02:10:52 operation, how did what was the um control room operator doing him or herself to record the information that they were getting? control room operator.
02:11:02 operator. Well, in general, all of them. So, they were write at the time they were writing on pieces of paper, right? And was that a standard form of pad or was it just a bit of paper by the
02:11:13 pad or was it just a bit of paper by the No, they were the pieces of paper that you showed me or part of the pieces of paper that you showed me earlier on. Okay. And so, they wrote that down during the call or after the call was concluded. Do you I couldn't give you that detail. Okay. And what did to your what on what
02:11:26 Okay. And what did to your what on what you could see, what were they doing? What were the control room operators doing with those pieces of paper at that time? I I don't know. Okay. Did you see them getting up from
02:11:37 Okay. Did you see them getting up from their desks and taking the pieces of paper to somebody? No.
02:11:40 No. Do you know how those pieces of paper were being collected when you at the time of your arrival from the control room operators? Not at my time of arrival. No. Do
02:11:51 Do how at the time of your arrival do you did was the information being which was being gathered by the CRAS from callers being communicated to the radio operator.
02:12:02 operator. Unfortunately I can't give you that information cuz that's a control oper that's a role within control and I'm not sure how control would or their systems how they would do that. Sorry.
02:12:13 how they would do that. Sorry. Do you know whether it was Do you know and I think whether it was um by typing it into the system and sending it to the radio operator? I would suggest so yes. Right. But do you know that?
02:12:24 Right. But do you know that? No, not 100% because I don't work with the control operators and I don't have a complex understanding of how a control operator would um work. I have a basic
02:12:36 operator would um work. I have a basic understanding but I'm I'm not trained to um or I've not gone through the control operators role and
02:12:50 were you at the point of arrival before the whiteboard system started? Um how let me ask it this way. H how was each FSG message being communicated to
02:13:02 each FSG message being communicated to the fire ground? Um, I would suggest that was being done by the airwave radio. Right. You say you would suggest it. Did you see it? No. The everyone the room. So, if I set you
02:13:14 The everyone the room. So, if I set you the scene, you've got the room. Every single operator is on either a headset with a phone call or a headset for the radio. I wouldn't be able to tell you that's the radio operator, that's a FSG
02:13:26 that's the radio operator, that's a FSG operator that I don't know their roles and where they sit and how they work. So, you're drilling for my level probably too far down into the detail
02:13:37 probably too far down into the detail for me to give you a confirmed answer. Probably.
02:13:40 Probably. Fair enough. Okay. Was anybody making sure at the point of your arrival that FSG information wasn't being lost or duplicated?
02:13:51 being lost or duplicated? Yes, I I would definitely say so. And you would need to speak to a control operator to confirm that. Right.
02:13:58 Right. Something broken. Can I just ask for a momentary pause? Do you want to pause? Yes, of course. No, there's a I think some of the right on the screen's on screen.
02:14:09 screen's on screen. Let's stop the pause. Um,
02:14:15 yeah. Right, Mr. Carry on. Yes, I see. Okay. Um, were you aware of any calls coming in from other control rooms?
02:14:27 from other control rooms? Not at that period of time. No. Did there come a point later in the evening when you became aware? Yes, later on in the evening um Joe Smith um informed me that other control uh rooms were supporting us.
02:14:39 uh rooms were supporting us. Did she tell you how many? No.
02:14:41 No. Okay. Did you tell you did you tell you which?
02:14:43 which? No, but like I say, that wouldn't have come under my remitt or under my role. Joe was just giving me the overview so I had an understanding of what was happening.
02:14:54 happening. Right. Um, when a message was sent from the control room to the incident ground at the point you arrived, do you know how the fact that that message had been sent was being recorded? No.
02:15:04 No. Did you know whether it was being recorded?
02:15:05 recorded? I would suggest that it would have gone onto our system as in normal protocol with what how control work. But as I've explained previously, I'm not trained in
02:15:16 explained previously, I'm not trained in that arena and I wouldn't have that understanding of how they would normally record their systems. But I do know that fire survival guidance would be recorded on a system that they use.
02:15:28 on a system that they use. Okay. And at the point of your arrival, did you have access either downstairs or in the control room to the um uh the vision system? I would never have access to vision
02:15:39 I would never have access to vision because vision is controls and I wouldn't have access to that. Should I um had wanted to leave the control room and go and find a remote computer
02:15:50 and go and find a remote computer somewhere to log on and then log on and have a look. Yes, I could have looked on to boss if that was what I needed to do. Okay. Did I mean given that you had
02:16:01 Okay. Did I mean given that you had decided that your priority was to assist with coordination of FSG calls in control and to record the FSG information um was it not important to you to log on to vision and see what
02:16:14 you to log on to vision and see what messages had already been sent and recorded in that system so as to get a picture of of of what of the flow of information and the detail. So I was aware that FSGS were going on. I was aware that control were recording
02:16:26 I was aware that control were recording them in however they would normally record them and I offered an alternative system to due to the multitude and number that was happening to try and
02:16:39 number that was happening to try and relieve
02:16:40 relieve the pressure in the room to make sure that it was more streamlined for the number and the amount coming through. I I wouldn't have the understanding like I've said previously of how or where or
02:16:52 I've said previously of how or where or what control do because it's not a role I perform. Did any did anybody say to you Joe Smith or Jason Nolith for example the system we're using at the moment to record information being sent to the incident
02:17:04 information being sent to the incident command uh incident commander is is not working.
02:17:09 working. No. No one said at any time it wasn't working. So, so was the solution that you'd come up with to use whiteboards um that was a solution to was that a solution to a problem that you were
02:17:20 solution to a problem that you were facing or or not? It was just a solution I offered up to the room as the way we could deal with the um vast number that was coming in
02:17:31 the um vast number that was coming in and to try and assist with keeping that data going through that one channel. So Jason was um on the mobile phone at the time and that is when I came up with the
02:17:44 time and that is when I came up with the idea of him standing with these whiteboards and to write all the information on the whiteboards as he was relaying it to the incident ground. Right. You came up with the the solution
02:17:56 Right. You came up with the the solution but my question is really was there a problem to which this was a solution? No, that not that I'm aware that there was a problem apart from the vast amount and number that was coming
02:18:08 vast amount and number that was coming in and potentially I I suppose you could say there was a potential for it be um control staff to become overwhelmed right
02:18:17 right with the number to come in. It it was a solution that I put forward and it was a solution that was agreed with the between me Joe and Alex and in their
02:18:29 between me Joe and Alex and in their experience as control operators if they're happy with that then I will look work on their experience and I was happy to proceed it. Do you know whether
02:18:41 to proceed it. Do you know whether Joe Smith or Alex Norman or Jason Oliff for that matter informed the control room staff generally that the new whiteboard system was going to be used
02:18:53 whiteboard system was going to be used to record FSG information being sent to the fire ground? Yes. So that would have been something that Joe and Alex would informed her staff that that's the process we would
02:19:04 staff that that's the process we would start we were starting to do. Do you know whether the radio operator was specifically told to stop sending messages to the fire? I couldn't give you the I wouldn't know
02:19:15 I couldn't give you the I wouldn't know the detail of who or what individual they spoke to at the time. Okay. So I I couldn't drill into that depth of detail for you. And at that early stage
02:19:27 detail for you. And at that early stage after you'd arrived, seen the control room, talked to Joe Smith and and Jason Oliv, do did you know or get a feel for the kind of advice that was being given by control room operators to callers?
02:19:39 by control room operators to callers? I was aware at that time the advice was to stay put, right?
02:19:43 right? But I was um I didn't listen into a call or stand with an operator at that stage and listen to the call that they were giving. When you say the you were aware
02:19:56 giving. When you say the you were aware that the advice was to stay put but didn't listen to a call or or stand with an oper operator. H how were you aware that that was the nature of the advice? Um I couldn't give you a specific who
02:20:09 Um I couldn't give you a specific who told me but I would take an assumption that it would have been Joanne who told me at the time. Right. Was it I was going to ask you was it an assumption you made or was it something you think Joe Smith told you?
02:20:20 something you think Joe Smith told you? No. No. That would have been part of their discussion and the discussion that we would have had. Right. Okay. Part of the discussion and in part of that discussion which you discussed stay put. Was it what was the actual nature of the
02:20:33 Was it what was the actual nature of the advice that Joe Smith told you was being imparted? Was it stay put at all costs or stay put if No, there was no detail. She wouldn't have given me the detail of the advice. That's the controls role and her role.
02:20:45 That's the controls role and her role. She just told me that the state she was keeping stay put where it the advice as it was and I'd say I'll take I can't remember that actual conversation. I'm just saying that is how I would take the
02:20:56 just saying that is how I would take the assumption I got that information. Right. Just just just help me with something. stay put is you explain what that was in your statement and you told us earlier this morning but if someone's
02:21:08 us earlier this morning but if someone's trapped in their flat and is and is getting FSG fire survival guidance they haven't got a choice have they have to stay put because they can't
02:21:20 they have to stay put because they can't get out
02:21:22 get out depending on the circumstances if they are trapped in their flat by but it depends on what calls and the so there was numerous calls that went on that night and like I said I didn't get
02:21:35 night and like I said I didn't get involved in the detail of what control operators or what their advice they were giving at that stage so I wouldn't know the detail of any of the calls. I've not listened to any of the
02:21:46 calls. I've not listened to any of the calls.
02:21:47 calls. No. And did Joe Smith tell you that um about the general flavor of the advice that was being given? I would say as part of the stay put advice as part
02:21:58 as part of the stay put advice as part of the stay put advice I would say not at that stage because we're talking at the very early stages of me probably walking through the door right could you just help with something then in general from your experience and
02:22:09 then in general from your experience and training we we we have stay put as a concept and we have FSG as a concept at what point in the development of a fire or or a caller's experience of a fire
02:22:21 or or a caller's experience of a fire does the advice become fire survival guidance advice Yes. So stay put fire survival guidance is given when a
02:22:32 survival guidance is given when a individual is trapped within their premise, their flat, their house, their wherever they are through smoke, heat um or fire.
02:22:43 smoke, heat um or fire. Right. So
02:22:47 Right. So would that would it mean that as a matter of logic at least uh in your experience you wouldn't be giving or need to give stayput advice to someone who was trapped because they were put anyway.
02:22:57 anyway. No. Stay put and fire survival are different. Yeah.
02:23:01 Yeah. Yeah. So it's fire survival guidance is not given to someone who needs to be told to stay put. It's given to someone who can't escape even if they wanted to. Yes.
02:23:09 Yes. Am I right? Yes.
02:23:10 Yes. Yeah. So
02:23:12 Yeah. So or or is it a case of someone who says he can't escape? Yes. It depending right. So is surviv just working this
02:23:23 right. So is surviv just working this through a bit more and drawing on your experience if we may. When survi a fire survival guidance call is in process, is some or all of that an attempt by the
02:23:35 some or all of that an attempt by the operator to work out whether or not there is a safe means of escape or is it simply advice as to how to survive in circumstances where there is no escape.
02:23:46 circumstances where there is no escape. So you you're you're talking of specific training for a call operator and what a call operator's advice and what they give. I I've no input or had no training
02:23:57 give. I I've no input or had no training in what a call operator or what their advice they would give. That's a control role. Right. But going back then to the discussion you had with with
02:24:09 discussion you had with with Joe Smith and you you you got the impression from her at least that she was saying that the advice was stay put. I'm just trying to work out what that meant to you
02:24:20 in what context. Well, in the context of your arrival, lots of FSG calls in progress, your concern that you needed to prioritize them and your discussion with Joe Smith in that context.
02:24:32 with Joe Smith in that context. So, as I said, I can't remember a specific conversation or discussion, as I previously said, with Joe. I'm taking the assumption that that's where I gained that information. So, there was a
02:24:45 gained that information. So, there was a lot happening within a short period of time. The control room's very, very busy. There was a lot of conversations and a lot of information flying around and I'm just saying that somewhere or
02:24:58 and I'm just saying that somewhere or somehow I was aware that we were still given or we were still following the stay put advice right
02:25:10 you were still following the stay put advice and I'm sorry to keep worrying or control control and what does that what did that mean in practice still following the they put advice.
02:25:21 they put advice. So if and this again is an assumption because I don't know what control would say or how they would speak to staff because I'm not a control officer and
02:25:32 because I'm not a control officer and it's not an environment I would normally work in. So I'm taking the assumption that if this was someone who was in their flat and that they were phoning up to say that they could see there was
02:25:43 to say that they could see there was smoke outside their window or something, control would still be in the position of saying stay where you are. the fire service will come to you. Right. Okay. But you're asking me to give details of
02:25:56 But you're asking me to give details of something that probably I'm not privy to and I wasn't aware of that detail on the night.
02:26:02 night. So to your No, but I am asking you about your actual understanding in the actual night. And am I right in thinking from what you've just told us that from your discussions with Joe Smith and from what
02:26:14 discussions with Joe Smith and from what you understood the advice was still you are going to be rescued.
02:26:19 rescued. Yes.
02:26:20 Yes. Right.
02:26:20 Right. At that stage at that stage. Yes. Okay. Now, um,
02:26:31 so can we take it then, and this may be fair or unfair, that the expression stay put advice is shorthand for you are going to be rescued.
02:26:42 going to be rescued. You're safer to stay in your compartment and if and when, if necessary, the fire service will come to you. However, every circumstance is different and as as I
02:26:55 circumstance is different and as as I said, so in a normal flat high-rise situation, the fire wouldn't be leaving the compartment as it did on the night, and
02:27:07 compartment as it did on the night, and it wouldn't be spreading around the envelope of the building as it did in the night. And so, normal stayput advice would would be the advice to begin. Would it be perhaps fairer to say that
02:27:19 Would it be perhaps fairer to say that the stay put advice is an answer to the question by the person who's caught? Should I stay where I am or should I try to get out?
02:27:30 to get out? Yes.
02:27:30 Yes. Having described the conditions in the immediate area. Yes.
02:27:37 But as as I say, I can't give specifics on each individual conversation or each call. As you said, there were absolutely numerous calls on that night and I
02:27:50 numerous calls on that night and I wasn't aware of the detail of a conversation or any of the conversations held.
02:27:56 held. No, you made that very clear. Um, it's just a I think we're we're seeking to get an understanding of what you understood at that moment of what stayut meant and you've answered the chairman's question. uh
02:28:11 and we'll come back to it in in in in due course. Can I just ask you this? Were you aware on or around the time of your arrival at the brigade control
02:28:22 your arrival at the brigade control center that the incident ground had asked for a dangerous structure engineer to be called? Um I was made aware I think it is logged
02:28:33 Um I was made aware I think it is logged and minuteed quite a bit further down um through the um the following morning. I couldn't give you a specific um time
02:28:44 I couldn't give you a specific um time but not not at that stage. No. Well, I I can if you go please to the short incident log tap 23 and go please to page 22
02:28:57 at 02736. You see Mr. Phantom, we have a service request,
02:29:06 request, EMG,
02:29:08 EMG, CU8 request, dangerous structure engineer, gas and electricity board and local authority liaison officer. Leave aside gas and electricity and the and the l
02:29:20 the l does th this log entry prompt a recollection. So I wouldn't as the DAC for the brigade coordination center that is not
02:29:31 coordination center that is not information that would be given to me and it's not information that I'd be expected to know. That is for the operational staff or officers on the fire ground and
02:29:43 staff or officers on the fire ground and that be a request that comes to control for control to utilize the request and make sure that they got a dangerous structure engineer to the in ground. So it's not information that I would have
02:29:55 it's not information that I would have been given. It's not within my role. Okay. Um taking it in stages. First of all, why would an incident commander request a dangerous structure engineer?
02:30:06 request a dangerous structure engineer? You'd have to ask the incident commander that.
02:30:09 that. Uh you've been an incident commander, I am assuming, in your long career at the LFP.
02:30:14 LFP. Yes. But I can't answer what their rationale was, what their thinking was, and why they as an individual requested that. you would have to ask the individual who requested it.
02:30:26 individual who requested it. Well, my question was why would an incident commander request a dangerous structure engineer? So, perhaps I could put it slightly differently. In any given circumstances, in any given at any given fire, why would any given incident
02:30:39 given fire, why would any given incident commander in the LFB request a dangerous structure engineer? Because they would have concerns over the structure of the building, right? So, that's why they would request one.
02:30:50 So, that's why they would request one. Okay. potential. And what would that tell you? What would the fact that the incident commander had concerns over the structure of the building tell you about the seriousness of the fire and the
02:31:02 the seriousness of the fire and the consequences for the people still in the building?
02:31:05 building? So, as I said earlier on, I wasn't aware of this information and I wouldn't have been given that information in the role that I was performing. It wouldn't have come to me. Now, it doesn't answer my question, I'm
02:31:17 Now, it doesn't answer my question, I'm afraid, Mr. Fenton. My f my my question is
02:31:19 is so was this a hypothetical question rather than specific to the night? It it it is a hypothetical question but what I'm trying to gauge is using your experience what what that information
02:31:32 experience what what that information would tell the control room about the seriousness of the fire and the consequences for the people still in the building. So, it would tell control um as limited as that is just a line of
02:31:46 as limited as that is just a line of information they've been given, it would tell control that there's potential concerns with the structure of the building. But in what levels or how in
02:31:57 building. But in what levels or how in to what stage um I don't think a control offer operator would um perceive and also a control operator would be there to
02:32:09 to um facilitate the request. So it's a request to a admin control operator asking for a dangerous structure engineer. So then they would have gone onto the system and
02:32:23 onto the system and ordered or found a dangerous structure engineer to attend the incident.
02:32:29 You say you didn't know about that message. Um but um would that have been useful information to you in uh recording and taking charge
02:32:43 to you in uh recording and taking charge of fire survival guidance? Um it it's a piece of information that I could have known about but like I say the the role of the knights um I
02:32:57 the the role of the knights um I wouldn't have said I took charge of the fire survival guidance. I said we I would have we put a system in place jointly me and Joe on how the fire survival guidance could be recorded. The
02:33:09 survival guidance could be recorded. The fire survival guidance would have remained in control. We were just looking at a system of how we could make sure it got to the fire ground the quickest way and was recorded um
02:33:20 quickest way and was recorded um efficiently on the on the board. Now, on page eight of your statement, just below halfway down, sorry, I'm so sorry. um a third of the
02:33:31 sorry, I'm so sorry. um a third of the way down
02:33:34 way down it said at 0320 hours control received an informative from the incident ground requesting a dangerous structure engineer as soon as possible. Um was that the first time you learned
02:33:48 Um was that the first time you learned that the incident ground requested a dangerous structure engineer? Yes, that was and if I remember rightly the reason I was informed of it of um
02:33:59 the reason I was informed of it of um was I um happy for the dangerous structure engineer to be blue lighted. So the decision that came to me as the BCC
02:34:09 BCC um was would was I happy for um a blue light uh to had the authorizing for it to be blue lighted to the incident ground.
02:34:19 ground. When you learned that a dangerous structure engineer had been requested, did how did that did that affect your thinking as to the seriousness of the
02:34:30 thinking as to the seriousness of the fire and the consequences for the occupants of the building at that time? At 0320
02:34:37 At 0320 um and I'm taking the assumption that's the time on there. So what the seriousness of the fire and the was already I was already aware of the
02:34:48 already I was already aware of the develop development of the situation by then.
02:34:51 then. Yeah, I'm going slightly backwards in this. You say at 320 you re the control received an informative from the incident ground. What is that? Um it's a request. Um so it's a it's an
02:35:03 Um it's a request. Um so it's a it's an information messages basically. It's a request for from the incident to control. So anything that the instant ground requests um they will send a message into control. So uh as soon as
02:35:16 message into control. So uh as soon as possible. So I'm taking the assumption they were already asked for a dangerous structure engineer and that's where they've asked for it to be blue lighted to the inagram which I authorized. And
02:35:27 to the inagram which I authorized. And to be fair to you, if you go to page 24 of the SIL short incident log tab 23 of the documents bundle and turn to page 24 and look at um the time mark uh for
02:35:41 look at um the time mark uh for um 31532.
02:35:46 You can see that there the radio operator creates a key. EMG CU8 requests urgent attendance of dangerous structure engineer and stress. This is a matter of urgency and priority. Is that the
02:35:58 urgency and priority. Is that the informative message that you're referring to in your statement? Um I can't remember where and exactly time or what message. Um my record um my
02:36:09 time or what message. Um my record um my memory of that night was that I was asked was I happy for a dangerous structure engineered as I've said to be blue lighted to the incident which I authorized immediately. Right. Do you know, maybe you don't, but
02:36:20 Right. Do you know, maybe you don't, but can you help us with why you would have learned the need about the need for a dangerous structure engineer at 320 as per that message at 3:15, but not the
02:36:31 per that message at 3:15, but not the one uh at um be because as I said, my my role as being in charge of the BCC, it it wasn't I wouldn't have been informed of every message and messages
02:36:43 informed of every message and messages coming from the fire ground. Right. So did somebody at 320 tell you that the incident ground wanted a dangerous structure engineer or were you looking at the radio? No, someone requested. So someone physically as I said came up to me
02:36:55 physically as I said came up to me whether I was in control or the BCC and physically requested was I happy to authorize for the dangerous structure engineer to be blue lighted to the incident ground which as I said I
02:37:07 incident ground which as I said I authorized and said yes. I see. Okay. So, um, okay. You then say, if you go back to page, uh, six of your, uh, statement,
02:37:18 uh, statement, uh, that, and this is four lines down, that you identify two whiteboards. You say, I dragged them to the corner of the room and spoke to Jason Duff. That should be Olive. Olive, I imagine,
02:37:31 should be Olive. Olive, I imagine, who was on the phone to a command unit at the time. And then you say once off the phone I briefed him to keep a phone line open to the command unit regarding the fire survival guidance calls. I told him to sit by the boards and we would bring the
02:37:43 sit by the boards and we would bring the information to him. He would then write the information on the boards and tell the command unit at the same time. Just pausing there. Was that the totality of your instruction to Jason Oliff?
02:37:54 your instruction to Jason Oliff? No, it that's me writing it. I gave him a brief of where what he was to do, where he was to sit, how and the reason why we were doing it and to keep an open
02:38:06 why we were doing it and to keep an open line at all times and that he was to be the sole person that the um information was to go through. Okay. It looks from the way you phrased this that he was already using the phone
02:38:18 this that he was already using the phone system to speak to the command unit uh before the system of whiteboard recording was established. Is that right?
02:38:29 right? Jason Oliff was on the phone at the time. Um I'm not 100% sure what information or what that conversation was, but that is when I said to keep that open line with the command unit.
02:38:41 that open line with the command unit. Right. Um but my question was really that he is it the case that from what you could see he was already using the phone system I can't confir to speak to the command unit before the white
02:38:51 white he was speaking to the command sorry I overpoke sorry I'll just put the question again from what you could see was he already using a a a phone to speak to the command unit and pass on messages to the command unit
02:39:03 and pass on messages to the command unit before the whiteboard recording system was established so yes he was on the phone I can confirm that um I can't confirm what conversation was with the command unit and what he was passing over to them.
02:39:16 and what he was passing over to them. No, I can't and your reference to phone. What kind of phone was that? Um, that would be his brigade mo mobile. Right. Okay. And do you know how long?
02:39:27 Right. Okay. And do you know how long? Maybe you don't, but could you see or tell or know how long he had been using his mobile to speak to the fire ground before the whiteboard instruction as it were was given? Before you told him, do
02:39:38 were was given? Before you told him, do you start using the whiteboards? No, the room was, like I said, the room was so busy, every single person was on a different phone or a headset. I wasn't standing next to Jason to and that was
02:39:51 standing next to Jason to and that was far from my priorities to um see how long he was on the phone or who was on the phone to. Right. Do you know which command unit he was speaking to at that time? No.
02:40:02 at that time? No. No. Did you know CU7?
02:40:05 CU7? So at a later date I confirmed he confirmed with me that he was speaking to CU7. That's when the dry whiteboard or the whiteboard was set up and that system was in play.
02:40:16 system was in play. Right. Do did you know whether he ever spoke to anybody on CU8? No, I can't I can't confirm who he's spoken to or who he didn't. Okay. Just going back to the short
02:40:27 Okay. Just going back to the short incident log. Um at page 22 we have an a a key message at 02233
02:40:40 uh just after the dangerous structure engineer actually uh 0222 um
02:40:50 33
02:40:53 that's wrong uh sorry my fault um 0223
02:41:01 33
02:41:05 uh and that says CU run all FSG calls via CU7. Do you think you um well do you remember that message being sent to
02:41:16 remember that message being sent to be being um input into the system? No, because I had no access as I said to the messages and I wasn't looking at the messages.
02:41:24 messages. Right. Do you think well did you know even if not by looking at the system that that message had been sent and that now FSG calls had to go via CUN. Okay.
02:41:34 Okay. Um
02:41:36 Um uh I mean 02233 is either at the time you arrived or shortly after I think the time you arrived.
02:41:45 arrived. Um so do you remember any messages going to CU8 at all? I would no I wouldn't have been aware of who was talking to who. Okay.
02:41:57 Okay. Now when you saw Jason Olif using his mobile to speak to the command unit, was that normal procedure or was that not normal procedure? Um it it wouldn't be a normal procedure
02:42:09 Um it it wouldn't be a normal procedure for what we would um for an FSG that would have like I said gone through. me in normal procedure for fire survival guidance me and Jason wouldn't even be in the room we wouldn't even be there so
02:42:22 in the room we wouldn't even be there so it would solely been in control who would have dealt with fire survival guidance due to the unprecedented number the scale of the incident that's when the BCC was put into place and hence we
02:42:35 the BCC was put into place and hence we were there due to them being overwhelmed and the number coming in that's when I decided that I would help and assist wherever I could at the time because
02:42:47 wherever I could at the time because that was obviously the priority. And seeing Jason Olive on the mobile, did that uh trigger a thought in your mind about whether the calls he was making would be recorded?
02:42:58 making would be recorded? At what stage when I first came in or when the dry white board was set up when you saw him on his phone to the command unit as you say uh in your statement at p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
02:43:09 statement at p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p page six fifth line down, you say you spoke to Jason Duff who was on the phone to a command unit. You told us it was a mobile. My question is did you did you have any thoughts about whether his calls would be recorded? Not
02:43:21 whether his calls would be recorded? Not at that time because um his conversation I don't know why his conversation would it wouldn't be necessarily a recordable conversation. No. Did you know that brigade mobile telephone calls are not recorded?
02:43:33 telephone calls are not recorded? Yes, I am aware of that. And did that fact influence your decision to establish the whiteboard recording system? Not not at the time. No, at the time it it was just purely how can we prioritize
02:43:44 it was just purely how can we prioritize the calls and get them over to the incident ground as you said. And do you know do you remember whether Alex Alex Norman was still talking to the incident ground?
02:43:56 incident ground? Um I can't recall what individual officers were doing in such a dynamic situation and a dynamic room. Um I wouldn't be able to recall where she was or what she was doing.
02:44:08 or what she was doing. Right. Can I just take you to your contemporaneous notes which we read into the the number of which we read into the record at the beginning of your evidence this morning. And can I show you page three?
02:44:22 Um second paragraph on that page and you describe the instruction you gave to Jason Oliff um to sit by the boards whilst keeping
02:44:33 um to sit by the boards whilst keeping an open line with the CU. You say I recall it was CU7. All FSG information was then recorded on the whiteboards whilst JO relayed this
02:44:44 the whiteboards whilst JO relayed this information to the CU. This ensured no information was lost and went via one dedicated route ensuring no duplication or confusion. Now just to be clear are you were you
02:44:56 Now just to be clear are you were you satisfied having set up that system that there was no duplication no parallel provision of information to the fire ground? At that time I was not aware
02:45:07 ground? At that time I was not aware that it was going via any other form. Did you subsequently become aware that it might have done um only after seeing um the inquiry um
02:45:18 um only after seeing um the inquiry um to when Joe was in here recently? I see. Okay. Well, let's just finish that little point off and then maybe we can have a break. Mr. Chairman. Yes. I think so. Um right. Um if you go
02:45:31 Yes. I think so. Um right. Um if you go to um the short incident log um
02:45:39 uh we'll pick it up from 02 2333 on page 22
02:45:48 um which says CU7 run all FSGS by CU7. We've still got calls being recorded messages being recorded.
02:45:59 recorded messages being recorded. um
02:46:01 um such as for example at 022532 we have service requests completed for flat 183. Uh and then at 0227
02:46:12 Uh and then at 0227 [Music]
02:46:13 [Music] we've got service request created for flat 94 which is completed 40
02:46:22 40 or 4 seconds later um by Sharon Derby. And then going on we've got at 0229 a service request created for flat 142
02:46:34 a service request created for flat 142 which is completed at one at 231. Um
02:46:41 Um and indeed at 241 we've got a sorry 2401 we've got uh service request created
02:46:53 we've got uh service request created uh for flat 152 which is completed at 0241.
02:47:00 Just looking at the timings, do you think that those services messages were being completed and created while Jason Oliff was on the phone to
02:47:13 phone to the command unit? I would suggest the dry whiteboard was definitely set up at that period of time. However, um these logs on on here, I can't confirm control have entered
02:47:26 I can't confirm control have entered them. Whether they've entered them for recording purposes or I'm not I'm not sure. So, I wouldn't as far as I was concerned, all information was coming via Jason via the board and going to the
02:47:38 via Jason via the board and going to the fire ground. Right. To be fair to you, the references to CU8 in those instances I've shown you, I I asked Miss Smith about and she confirmed that actually that was CU7 and
02:47:49 confirmed that actually that was CU7 and that in fact message messages that had been sent by Sharon Derby were CU7. We we verified that by reference to the records of those messages. But does it but even having
02:48:02 messages. But does it but even having told you that does it surprise you to see that these messages are being sent at that time? I wasn't aware by radio. I wasn't aware they were being duplicated in simple radio. Okay.
02:48:37 Now, the idea was, as we've seen from your contemporaneous notes, that all FSG information, as it says, all FSG
02:48:48 information, as it says, all FSG information was to be recorded on the whiteboards. Um, whilst Jason Olif relayed that information to the command unit. Uh,
02:49:01 Do you know how the command unit would have recorded that information at the other end? I would have um No, I'll be summising. So, no, I didn't at the time know and I
02:49:12 So, no, I didn't at the time know and I wouldn't have known because that's on the incident ground and remote to where I am.
02:49:16 I am. Right. Okay. Did you ask Jason or Joe Smith how they thought the information was being recorded in the command unit? No, cuz that would
02:49:27 in the command unit? No, cuz that would have been down to the commander, not the incident commander, but the commander, whoever was in charge of that part of the on the incident ground. Right now, going back to, if I can go back to your contemporaneous note, page
02:49:39 back to your contemporaneous note, page three, where we were looking before at the second paragraph, and just below the second paragraph, you've got four bullet points. information recorded was
02:49:51 points. information recorded was the flat numbers and floor they were on and then the amount of people that were inside the flat. Adult stroke child progress and updates from the calls coming in and advice that was given by
02:50:04 coming in and advice that was given by the control staff. Now when you say information recorded was is that a reference to the actual information that was recorded or is that a reference to what was intended by the
02:50:16 a reference to what was intended by the system you established? That was the uh intention of the system. Did it succeed? Um so the information I was went across
02:50:28 Um so the information I was went across to the fire ground. Some of the information um possibly didn't go onto the board but the board wasn't a reference. It was only a reference point to know that that information had gone across to the fire ground.
02:50:44 Can we look at the whiteboards which you will find in
02:50:56 the master documents bundle uh at tabs, excuse me, tabs 7 68 and 69.
02:51:10 And just to orientate you in terms of your recollection, we've set them up now on duplicate split the screen here. The one with the um the one on the left I
02:51:23 one with the um the one on the left I think is in fact the one that was done second and the one on the right was the one that was done first. So you'll have to read right to left if that's all right. Um,
02:51:35 right. Um, first of all, do you do you remember who held the pen for the whiteboard? So, I I um Jason Oliff would have
02:51:47 So, I I um Jason Oliff would have predominantly scribed on the board and done the writing. However, there were occasions that other staff while Jason was on the phone um put information up
02:52:00 was on the phone um put information up while Jason relayed that information to the fire ground. Right. And Joe Smith told us on uh Thursday, I think it was last week,
02:52:13 uh Thursday, I think it was last week, uh that where on the right hand screen you see 193 22nd floor, 10 people in green. She put that up there. She was very definitive about that. Do do you
02:52:24 very definitive about that. Do do you remember that? I would not remember any specific entries because I wasn't by standing next to the board to put them up. However, I do know that Joe and other
02:52:36 However, I do know that Joe and other staff did participate and scribe on the board, but I would say 95% was Jason Olive. However, other staff did participate. How much of this process
02:52:47 participate. How much of this process did you actually see going on in terms of the information coming from the control room office um operators to to the whiteboard and then the whiteboard being
02:52:57 being predominantly my time was spent in control. However, I did go down to the BCC at times to facilitate some of the parts in the BCC and I did spend a lot
02:53:08 parts in the BCC and I did spend a lot of my time. Not sure if we're aware of the layout of the room, but standing by the
02:53:15 the um uh what could we call it? The officer of the watches desk, I think is probably the best terminology. The head desk or right
02:53:24 right where the officer of the watch stand. That was Alex Norman as you said. Sorry. That was Alex Norman. Yes. Alex Norman. Okay. So there's a head desk which has has phones on it,
02:53:35 head desk which has has phones on it, doesn't it? Yes.
02:53:36 Yes. Okay. Uh I think one of them is a red phone. Isn't Do you remember that? Uh, it's a critical phone. Yes. Right. Did that ring when you were there?
02:53:43 there? Um, I can't loads of all phones were ringing cuz I I don't answer the phones or I wouldn't have picked one up or I wouldn't I wouldn't have known. Okay. Uh, I mean there is some evidence
02:53:56 Okay. Uh, I mean there is some evidence which from Miss Got in her statement who remembers that that red phone rang incessantly. Miss who? Sorry. Gots.
02:54:04 Gots. Gots.
02:54:05 Gots. No. Right. Okay. The name does the name not mean anything to you? No. Right. Okay. Um, all right. Never mind that. Do you remember the red phone ringing incessantly? Like I say, I wasn't necessarily
02:54:16 Like I say, I wasn't necessarily standing next to where the red phone were and there was numerous phones and a lot of noise in the room and I wouldn't have picked up on any particular one phone ringing more than any other. Okay. Um,
02:54:29 Okay. Um, now you mentioned earlier about the process by which the information comes to Jason Olif or perhaps Joe Smith or other staff writing on the whiteboard and you said it was by the through these
02:54:40 and you said it was by the through these pieces of paper which we looked at right at the beginning of your evidence. Yes.
02:54:46 Yes. Um,
02:54:47 Um, did those pieces of paper come to you at all?
02:54:51 all? No.
02:54:51 No. Right. So, did did you have a good view from where you were standing by the head table of those pieces of paper being carried across the room to Jason Olive by the whiteboard?
02:55:02 by the whiteboard? I I saw pieces of paper coming across the room. Um, and like I say, to set the scene, the room is very dynamic. It's busy at the time. I'm receiving numerous phone calls. I'm being asked numerous to
02:55:13 phone calls. I'm being asked numerous to make decisions by se several different people in different directions. And so my vision or overview of standing by the board or watching numerous different
02:55:25 board or watching numerous different staff took pieces of paper across the room to Jason. But who and how? I know Alex did at times. I know Joanne did at times.
02:55:34 times. Right.
02:55:35 Right. And to be honest, probably right at the beginning, I probably took a couple of bits over to Jason just purely to get it up and running as a as a runner. Right. Did you have any designated
02:55:47 Right. Did you have any designated runners during the course of the run? There was no staff. Every everyone was had a role. Everyone was constant. Everyone was on the phone dealing with the calls coming in that like I said, every single person in that room was
02:56:00 every single person in that room was fully engaged in a role or a job. Do you remember whether any control room operators themselves took their headsets off and ran across the room with a piece of paper to Jason? A control operator.
02:56:12 A control operator. I saw I saw control operators taking them across too. But whether they were what role they were doing at the time and who they were I couldn't I couldn't but give you that detail. Now when the whiteboard system was
02:56:23 Now when the whiteboard system was started was it started in blank with the first entry which I think is 82 111th floor being written up in response to a specific piece of paper or was it
02:56:34 specific piece of paper or was it started in response to a batch of information which was sitting there and then recorded as a as a list. Yet again I couldn't give you that. I wasn't standing with Jason directly when
02:56:46 wasn't standing with Jason directly when he started. So I detailed him to set the board up and left him to perform that role and Joe and Alex would tell the control room staff that that's the process and what we're doing.
02:56:57 process and what we're doing. Right. And can you just help me with the or Okay, maybe again you can't the order of things. The the information comes on a piece of paper. Yes. To Jason Olif. He then writes it on the whiteboard. Yep.
02:57:08 Yep. Does he then make a does he he then communicates it by mobile phone? So he he had an open line, an open phone and he's continuously doing that as as he's writing the information up on the
02:57:19 he's writing the information up on the board or as I said on occasions when someone came over they would highlight the piece of paper to him the information and they'd write it on the board for him as just purely as a
02:57:30 board for him as just purely as a scribe.
02:57:30 scribe. Right. And what about repeat calls? What if there was a second or third or fourth call to the control room uh where there
02:57:41 call to the control room uh where there had been a development um of the fire or heat or smoke in in the flat or a change in the advice would that get recorded on the whiteboard? Um so would have been made aware of repeat
02:57:53 so would have been made aware of repeat calls as I say and I'm sorry sometime as my role I would have been standing back and overseeing what was going on and dealing with the BCC. So I wouldn't have
02:58:05 dealing with the BCC. So I wouldn't have known if there were repeat calls and how they would have um put them on the board. So if someone had if a control operator went over to Jason and said this is a repeat call um if there was an
02:58:17 this is a repeat call um if there was an upgrade on that call then he would have passed that information over. Okay. Uh for example
02:58:29 Okay. Uh for example can can I just put one example to you? Uh at page ME we can go to this MET trip 017390
02:58:41 page 12
02:58:47 we've got um a message which says flat 204 23rd floor one person. Just note the expression one person.
02:59:00 Just note the expression one person. And then when you go back to the whiteboard, the left hand whiteboard,
02:59:08 it says 204, just four up from the bottom.
02:59:12 bottom. Sorry. Which board are you looking at? The left hand white board. Yeah.
02:59:16 Yeah. Two up, four up from the bottom. 204 23rd floor, one disabled male. So it looks as if the message um one person has has evolved into
02:59:29 um one person has has evolved into something more detailed, one disabled male. Can you help with how those messages evolved or that message might have evolved in that way using that as
02:59:40 have evolved in that way using that as an example? So, as I said earlier, and that's making an assumption that a control operator has now come or a piece of paper's come back over to um Jason on
02:59:51 of paper's come back over to um Jason on the board and the information is now been updated from the previous time and so he's updated the board and would have passed that information over to the
03:00:02 passed that information over to the command unit. Right. And this is a question I suppose I should have asked him, but do you remember whether he deleted information or rubbed it off the board uh and replaced it with fresh information as it came in to him?
03:00:14 came in to him? Um I I I couldn't answer what he actually done. Do you do you remember whether that happened?
03:00:20 happened? No, I don't. I mean it says one disabled male and the previous said one adult male. So I would take the assumption that that's been changed and updated.
03:00:31 changed and updated. Right. Okay. All right, Mr. Chairman, is that a convenient moment?
03:00:36 moment? Yes, I think it is. Thank you very much. Right,
03:00:38 Right, we're going to have another break now, Mr. Fenton. Um, have to ask you again not to talk to anyone about your evidence or anything related to it over the break and we'll resume at 2:00.
03:00:49 the break and we'll resume at 2:00. Please
03:00:53 like to go to the usher. Thank you.
03:00:57 [Music]