Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Further LFB evidence (24 September 2018 Pt 1 of 2)
00:00:01 Good morning everyone. Welcome to today's hearing and we're going to continue hearing evidence from firefighters. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Yes, we are. Um, so our next witness is DAC Andrew
00:00:13 Um, so our next witness is DAC Andrew Olan. Can he please be called? Thank you very much.
00:00:33 Please take your right hand and repeat after me, please. I swear by Almighty God
00:00:38 God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth shall be the truth the whole truth whole truth and nothing but the truth and nothing but the truth. Thank you very much Mr. Lockley. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Le.
00:00:50 Yes, Mr. Le. Mr. Enley, could you please give the inquiry your full name? Andrew Francis Olan.
00:00:56 Olan. Now, can I start by thanking you very much for coming here to give evidence to the inquiry? It is helpful that we should hear from you to assist us with our investigations. Um, if I ask a
00:01:07 our investigations. Um, if I ask a question which you don't understand or you'd like me to repeat, I'm very happy to do so. And if you need a break at any stage, please just indicate and we can take a short break. Can I start by asking you please to take your witness
00:01:19 asking you please to take your witness statement which you will find either in the blue file in front of you on the lectern there or more conveniently on the desk monitor on your right on the desk or as we use it on the screen at
00:01:30 desk or as we use it on the screen at the back of the room. Um it's dated 8th of March 2018 and it was given to the MPS and it's ME012563.
00:01:41 Uh have you read it recently? Uh yes I have. Can you confirm that the contents are true? Uh yes they are. Now you've also done uh contemporaneous notes uh the reference to which is ME
00:01:55 notes uh the reference to which is ME 0000005213
00:01:58 which is appendix A uh as you've called it. Um first of all can I ask you when did you write that? Uh that was the within the week of the incident.
00:02:08 incident. In the week of in the week of the incident.
00:02:10 incident. Yes.
00:02:10 Yes. Um how soon after the incident did you start writing it? So probably on the following Monday. On the following Monday. Actually I did some notes when I returned from the incidents but they were this was then I put those into
00:02:21 were this was then I put those into those notes. I see. I see. And did you start writing the notes immediately after the incident or only on the following? I started typing them up and then I was too exhausted to carry on. So Right. And what did you do with those
00:02:32 Right. And what did you do with those original notes? Uh they were cut and pasted into that. They were cut and pasted into that. So you didn't do them in manuscript. You did them on a laptop. They were on a laptop and this is the continuation of that. I see. Okay.
00:02:43 Now, can you confirm? Well, first of all, have you read this recently, this document?
00:02:49 document? Yes.
00:02:50 Yes. And can you confirm that its contents are true?
00:02:52 are true? Yes. Um, we also have some exhibits to your statement, and I'll just read those into the record. Um they are ME015702
00:03:02 which is AF 10 which is a map 15703 which is AFO6 which is the FSG whiteboard in CU7.
00:03:13 which is the FSG whiteboard in CU7. uh5705
00:03:14 uh5705 which is AFO8 or a CU7 whiteboard 15706 which is AF12 which is an ARC form AF12
00:03:25 which is an ARC form AF12 which is your organization chart that's 157075708
00:03:30 157075708 is AF4 the deployment timeline 1579 AFO3 the type note of incident AF7 FSG whiteboard in CU7 AF5 5 timeline and
00:03:44 FSG whiteboard in CU7 AF5 5 timeline and that's 15710 and 15711 and then 15713 AF9 GT elevations. Uh now those are formally now in the record. We can refer to them if we need to. Have you
00:03:55 to them if we need to. Have you discussed your statement or your evidence that you're going to give to us with anybody before coming here today? No sir.
00:04:01 No sir. Right. Can I begin then by asking you some questions about your position and your career? You are as at today I think a deputy assistant commissioner or DAC. That's correct. And your call sign is
00:04:12 That's correct. And your call sign is echo6.
00:04:13 echo6. Yes, it is. Yes. And you say in your statement that you are DAC for strategy and inclusion. Can you just tell us briefly what that means?
00:04:21 means? Uh at the time it was strategy inclusion. It's now strategy and risk. So it uh deals with the um the strategy strategic direction of the organization. It advises the commissioner and the commissioner's board. Uh it's divided up
00:04:32 commissioner's board. Uh it's divided up into various strands which includes how we approach our London safety plan which is our integrated risk management plan. Uh alongside that we oversee the brigade's risk management structure and the risk management um of the organization putting in place uh
00:04:45 organization putting in place uh measures to counter that. Alongside that we run the program management office which is the portfolio of uh programs and projects that we run in the organization. Uh in addition to that we have some specific roles in such as our
00:04:56 have some specific roles in such as our operational risk. So how we deploy our appliances across London for example would come within our department. Um it then covers also business continuity and business continuity arrangements. Alongside that, we also cover inclusion
00:05:08 Alongside that, we also cover inclusion and engagement. And
00:05:11 And sorry, Mr. Minute, can I interrupt? Are you getting clear enough signal over there?
00:05:15 there? Yes.
00:05:15 Yes. Yes.
00:05:16 Yes. A little bit fast. Oh, right. I'll try to slow down. Yeah. Right. Thank you. Sorry. Thank you.
00:05:22 you. And that role, is that a role strategy and inclusion or now risk that you held on the night of the fire, 14th of June 2017?
00:05:31 2017? Yes, it was. Um, now looking back in time, you joined the LFB, I think, in 1988. Is that right? 1989.
00:05:38 1989. 1989.
00:05:38 1989. January 1989. 1989. January 1989. And you have been a DAC, I think, since, is this right? March 2016. That's correct. Yes. Uh, and I think you were in development
00:05:50 Uh, and I think you were in development and then signed off as competent in that role in March 2017. That's correct. Yes. Yes. And in March 2017, you passed the assistant commissioner assessment.
00:06:01 assistant commissioner assessment. Is that correct? Yes, sir.
00:06:03 Yes, sir. Does that mean that you could then operationally respond to incidents at an AC level?
00:06:08 AC level? Yes, sir.
00:06:10 Yes, sir. Now, can I ask you some questions about lacanol? In your statement, you say on page one that in 2009 and 2010.
00:06:19 Uh, this is three lines up from the bottom of the page. You were attached to the lacel investigation. Yes, sir.
00:06:26 Yes, sir. Can I just ask, were you actually at the lackl incident? I didn't attend the fire itself. No, I went to the building twice within the following six months as part of the investigation. Right. And what was your role in the
00:06:38 Right. And what was your role in the lack of investigation? So, at the early stages, it was assisting the police with their their interviews. So, what we found quite early on was the police didn't necessarily know the types of questions to ask firefighters. So, we assisted in
00:06:49 to ask firefighters. So, we assisted in the types of questions they may wish to ask. Um, following on from that, there was then I wasn't the lead for developing the timeline, but I assisted in taking some of the interview evidence and putting it into the timeline. Um
00:07:01 and putting it into the timeline. Um that was the main role for me in the f in that sort of nine months to a year that I think I was in the team. Right. Were you aware of the coroner's recommendations when they were eventually produced by the coroner?
00:07:12 eventually produced by the coroner? Not in detail. No. Not in detail. C can I ask you this question? Did you know that one of them one of the recommendations was to anticipate that a fire might behave in a
00:07:23 anticipate that a fire might behave in a manner inconsistent with the compartmentation principle? Uh that was something we found out during the lacel. Yes. It's I think I probably was aware that that was a coroner's recommendation.
00:07:34 coroner's recommendation. Can can I ask you to uh look at that in in just a little bit of detail? Can I please ask you to be shown LFB 000000 357
00:07:47 1 3571
00:07:51 And can I ask you to go to page three please?
00:08:07 Now uh you will see there that in the left hand column it says the brigade review its policies and procedures. This is the recommendation by the by the coroner. The brigade review its policies
00:08:18 coroner. The brigade review its policies and procedures concerning incident command.
00:08:20 command. I think that's quite difficult to read. We can't do that. Yeah. Can can we expand it? I don't know whether it's easier to read on the small screen or the large screen. You can choose, but I think we're all going to
00:08:31 choose, but I think we're all going to need it blown up a bit. Yes. All I want to show you is the left hand column for to start with. See how we go. Can you see that now? Can you read that clearly?
00:08:42 read that clearly? Uh Mr. Lockin, can you read that? Uh yes, I can. It's probably easier on here for
00:08:46 here for I'll I'll read it out so people know where we are. The brigade review its policies and procedures concerning incident command having regard to whether it is effective for the choice of IC to be tied closely to the number or type of appliances attending
00:08:58 or type of appliances attending attending an incident and training be given to IC's to enhance their training in relation to the following. And can I just ask you to go down or ask the documents director to go down to
00:09:12 the documents director to go down to number four, sorry, to number three to start with to anticipate that a fire might behave in a manner inconsistent with the compartmentmentation principle. And then four, to be aware of the risks
00:09:25 And then four, to be aware of the risks to those above. And if we can just go over the page
00:09:40 adjacent to the fire flat.
00:09:45 Now just focusing on the recommendation by the coroner to anticipate that a fire might behave in a manner inconsistent with the compartmentmentation principle.
00:09:56 with the compartmentmentation principle. Seeing it there in print, did you have any involvement in examining that recommendation and taking it forward within the LFB? No, I did not. You didn't.
00:10:10 Uh, can I ask you to go to pa back to page two of this document?
00:10:26 It's I'm so sorry. It's page three. The bit I want is actually on page three. It's quite difficult to navigate this document on the screen, but we have we have it there. Can I ask you to look at the third column and look under the
00:10:39 at the third column and look under the second paragraph under stationbased training where it says over the past couple of years, let me just expand that a bit.
00:10:51 Over the past couple of years, the brigade has taken every opportunity to exercise high-rise operations at realistic venues. This has resulted in a number of large-scale exercises being held in high-rise premises, including
00:11:03 held in high-rise premises, including the Shard, a residential tower block in Suk, and most recently a derelic tower block in East London. These training opportunities, which have included the involvement of the casualty union, have enabled operational staff to practice
00:11:15 enabled operational staff to practice high-rise operations and command in a realistic environment. My first question is, were you involved in any of these large-scale exercises in high-rise premises? No, I was not certain that
00:11:26 certain that right.
00:11:28 right. Do you know even if you weren't involved whether those exercises involved um simulation or or um some kind of exercise where the fire acts inconsistently with the compartmentation
00:11:41 inconsistently with the compartmentation principle? I'm afraid I had no involvement in them. Sir, so I can confirm that. Right. And would the same apply in relation to the question about managing multiple FSGs? Yes. right
00:11:54 Yes. right now.
00:11:57 now. Uh,
00:12:00 in in July 2014, do you recall attending the Lacenol House incident case study training?
00:12:09 training? Uh, yes, I think I do recall that. And also doing the training package online as well.
00:12:13 as well. Right. Is that the back to basics training?
00:12:15 training? I'm not sure if it's the back to basics, but there was a lack training package like a PowerPoint that we we went through. Right. That is part of the back to basics. Did you deliver that training or did you receive?
00:12:24 receive? I did not deliver that. I would have received that. You received Who did you receive it from?
00:12:28 from? Um I think it was an online training package. So I think you just do it at your own computer as it were. Right.
00:12:32 Right. And then I think the input we were given may have been given at our headquarters building or we still had to try our training center at that point. I can't recall where the input was. So I think we had it twice. I mean one was an input that was given as a briefing if
00:12:44 input that was given as a briefing if you like and the other one was the online training package. Okay. Right. I'm I'm very sorry to ask you to do this. I wonder if you might slow down just a little bit of course um because we have to have the transcriber
00:12:55 because we have to have the transcriber get down what you say and also I have to try and follow it myself. Um thank you. Um did you take away from that training anything any learning
00:13:06 that training anything any learning about fire spread? Uh I think because I'd been involved in the lacanal investigation at the early stages I understood how the fire had spread. Um, so I understood how it had spread downwards, how it had spread
00:13:17 spread downwards, how it had spread through the corridors and how it spread upwards. Right. So it probably reaffirmed my understanding of what my awareness was of the Lacanal fire. Right. Did you take anywhere any learning about handling multiple FSGs?
00:13:31 learning about handling multiple FSGs? I think the lesson was I think that point in time the organization we found that some firefighters and some officers didn't understand what FSGs were. Um, so there was a breakdown in actually what the terminology stood for and what it meant. Um so that was the key thing we
00:13:43 meant. Um so that was the key thing we had to make sure that we put in place fire guidance training for officers and firefighters. Right. What what can you just explain to us what was that misunderstanding that some firefighters had? I think we found some firefighters
00:13:54 I think we found some firefighters didn't know the terminology fire guidance school. They didn't know what it meant
00:13:57 it meant at all.
00:13:58 at all. No
00:13:59 No really
00:13:59 really not so much the officers but some firefighters. Right. Okay. Um can I just continue then with this on the topic of training and and turn to the question of large scale incidents? Um what training have you
00:14:11 incidents? Um what training have you received in relation to the management and operation of a response to a large scale incident at a high-rise residential block? Um so in addition to the lacal training that we received, you
00:14:22 the lacal training that we received, you receive training through our training provider which you carry out at either Vectton or Park Roy which are our training venues and there they will do simulated incident command exercises. uh sometimes relating to high-rise fires, sometimes other types of fires, but in
00:14:33 sometimes other types of fires, but in probably the majority of those, they would put in place some sort of fire survival guidance situation that you would need to deal with. In addition to that, you carry out as your own, if you like, CPD, if you like, you will train
00:14:45 like, CPD, if you like, you will train with your fellow officers and you create situations where you have a simulated environment to a high-rise fire and within that you would put in fire survival guidance calls. In addition to high-rise, I've also done it for other
00:14:56 high-rise, I've also done it for other types of residential buildings. So, care homes and hospitals, that sort of environment, right? And in almost all of those, you would put a fire survival guidance situation into it as a as a situation to deal with. Now, in that answer, there are two
00:15:07 Now, in that answer, there are two things I wanted just to follow up if I can. First of all, in those simulated uh training exercises, um did any of them that you went experience that you had went through or
00:15:18 experience that you had went through or experienced involve um multiple compartmentation failure in a high-rise residential block? So sometimes in the high-rise style, you normally use a Canary Warf style building for your high-rise training
00:15:30 building for your high-rise training because that's where you would expect the possibility of um one or two floors to catch light rather than just a single compartment. So you would sometimes deal with fire spread within that sort of environment. We wouldn't normally do it
00:15:41 environment. We wouldn't normally do it in a in a Grenfell style building, so a council block of flats where the compartmentmentation in general hasn't been known to fail in the past. I was going to ask you why would you not
00:15:52 I was going to ask you why would you not train on a building like Granfell? Um some of the simulations I've done for CPD have been so there's two particular ones that I use as examples and you would do normally smoke spread within
00:16:04 would do normally smoke spread within the building which would be in the corridors. You wouldn't do it necessarily as an external fire spread because you rely upon the the the building the building integrity working as it should and limiting the fire spread externally.
00:16:15 spread externally. Did you in any of those exercises ever uh receive any training in fire spread up a high-rise residential block facade?
00:16:26 up a high-rise residential block facade? No, because it's not an expectation that would happen. Um, normally when expectation is only when you get outside facade fires, it's normally linked to either scaffolding on the outside or balcony fires which spread upwards and
00:16:38 balcony fires which spread upwards and okay,
00:16:38 okay, they don't normally then penetrate inside the building. So, it would appear that that would be almost not enough of a challenge if it's on the outside because you could deal with that. It's the challenge of smoke logging inside that would be the the
00:16:49 logging inside that would be the the issue you need to deal with. Yes. Okay. Well, we'll come back to that um shortly. I think the second thing that I got out of that answer which is which you gave us a moment ago on these large scale exercises is FSG training.
00:17:01 large scale exercises is FSG training. You said that some element of FSG training would be involved. Um how much how many FSG calls would be involved normally in these large scale exercises which um you did. So I think the most I've probably had
00:17:13 So I think the most I've probably had put in front of me was maybe six or seven and that in itself would present a large challenge. Um but six or seven calls with two people involved in each that's 12 to 14 people. That's a lot of
00:17:24 that's 12 to 14 people. That's a lot of people and even that is um a large enough challenge that you'd want to put in the structures to carry out fast guidance coordination etc. Right. Uh and when was the last training
00:17:35 Right. Uh and when was the last training on high-rise residential block incident management or incident command that you had you received prior to Grenfell? So within the training we do with our training providers, you will uh normally
00:17:47 training providers, you will uh normally cover instant command in general and that may touch upon high-rise fires. Uh the last the assistant commission's exercise you mentioned wasn't high-rise and the training I did at the end of 2016 also wasn't high-rise but within
00:17:59 2016 also wasn't high-rise but within those training I expect we probably had discussions around high-rise fires but I can't recall them exactly. So just pressing my question, when was the last training uh on um high-rise residential block incident command specifically
00:18:12 block incident command specifically prior to Granfell? So I can't recall the date of that. Okay. Um moving away from training and looking at your experience, uh what
00:18:23 looking at your experience, uh what experience do you have in relation to the management and command of a response to a large scale incident? Um, so
00:18:33 Um, so more recently I was the so I've been in charge of 20 pump fire. I've been in charge of a number of 15 pump fires. Um, I've been them in charge of 12 pump fires as well and the monitoring officer for a number of 10 pump fires.
00:18:45 for a number of 10 pump fires. Right.
00:18:45 Right. All of those in themselves are large scale deployments of our crews. Um,
00:18:50 Um, and was were those all pre-ranfell? I've attended 15 and a 15 pump fire and 12 pump fire and 10 fire since Grill, but most of those would have been before Granfell. Yes. Yes. I see. And the 20 pump fire, can
00:19:02 Yes. I see. And the 20 pump fire, can you just give us a bit of detail about that? When was that? Uh, that would have been at the end of 2016, I think it was 2016. It was a large warehouse fire. Large warehouse. Yes.
00:19:17 Uh, in terms of high-rise training specifically, have you ever had training on, and it's a specific question, on the ignition or fire spread over the facade of a
00:19:30 fire spread over the facade of a high-rise residential block? Not specifically that. No. Um, would it follow that you've never had any training at all on cladding and the way cladding reacts when ignited?
00:19:42 the way cladding reacts when ignited? Uh, how cladding reacts on the outside of a building? No. I haven't ever been training
00:19:45 training or fire spread up cladding. No.
00:19:49 No. So would it follow that you at June 2017 did not know or understand the particular dangers or how to respond to such a fire? Um my understanding 2016 is that
00:20:01 Um my understanding 2016 is that cladding and other types of fascia systems would be used on the outside of buildings, but my expectation would not have been that they would have caught fire in the way that Grenfell did. Right. Um can I show you something? Um
00:20:12 Right. Um can I show you something? Um it's LFB quadruple03521. [Music]
00:20:17 [Music] It's in tab 10 of the master documents bundle. Now this is a slideshow presentation created by the London Fire Brigade. The date on it is the 13th of July 2016. But um because as you you
00:20:29 July 2016. But um because as you you will see if we go through it that it is based on lessons taken away from a fire at Shepherd's Court in August 2016. Uh, it's actually it actually postdates that and we've got a date of sometime in
00:20:41 and we've got a date of sometime in October for the final production of this document. First question, have you ever do you think you've ever seen something like this before? Um, I've seen that particular picture through this inquiry, but prior to this inquiry, no.
00:20:52 inquiry, no. Right. Uh, did you attend the Shepherd's Call fire? No,
00:20:58 No, you didn't. Um, do you did you ever receive any training or intelligence or even as it were mess table gossip about lessons learned at the shepherd's court fire?
00:21:07 fire? No, not that I recall. Can I ask you to look at page 25 of this slideshow? General conclusion just to have a look at it with me if you would. General conclusion as a general
00:21:19 General conclusion as a general principle in bold. The external envelope of a building bold should not contribute to the fire spread along the facade. New construction material in bold and method of construction are being used in facads
00:21:31 of construction are being used in facads with a bold limited understanding of their bold fire behavior straight performance. There is a need to understand first what products are being used in
00:21:42 first what products are being used in the facade system and their fire behavior and second if they are used appropriately and meet the relevant guidance. These could affect the way fires develop and spread in a building. Um is there any part of that or perhaps
00:21:54 Um is there any part of that or perhaps all of it that as at June 2017 was familiar to you just in terms of principle? Uh certainly the first paragraph first
00:22:05 Uh certainly the first paragraph first general principle is the external envelope shouldn't contribute to a fire. Absolutely. That would be my understanding. uh the new construction material limited understanding of their fire behavior performance is probably the opposite world I thought I would have expected that we would have
00:22:16 have expected that we would have understood really
00:22:17 really what um any construction material being put onto a building or in a new building is we would understand uh its fire behavior say we would have had experience of it but my expectation
00:22:28 experience of it but my expectation would have been that we would have uh through building control and building regulations understood what it meant if you were going to either build a facade on a new building or refurbish an existing
00:22:41 I think the the need to understand so none of this was familiar to me as in I'd not seen that that slide but um my expectation is that those questions would have had answers to
00:22:52 questions would have had answers to I see.
00:22:54 I see. So and then looking at the third there is a need to understand what products are being used in the facade system and their fire behavior and if they used appropriately meet the relevant guidance. Was that specifically um that was that need something you knew
00:23:07 um that was that need something you knew about as at June 2017? I wouldn't say it was something I knew about it. It was something I would have expected though is that if you are going to uh build a product and put a product onto the facade of a building, you would understand what the consequences of that
00:23:19 understand what the consequences of that if there was a fire. So that would be my expectation because you'd need to comply with the first one. So if you can't comply to prove you comply with the first one at the top paragraph, you'd need to understand the others within that page.
00:23:31 others within that page. it in looking at the words need to understand. My question is really devoted to um an incident commander at an incident. Did you expect whether or
00:23:42 an incident. Did you expect whether or not you'd seen this slide that an incident commander would need to understand what products are being used in the facade system and their fire behavior and if they're used appropriately and meet the relevant guidance?
00:23:52 guidance? Um I think that'd be very difficult for an instant commander arriving at a fire to understand what facads have been put onto the outside of a building. You would have to trust that that has been done during the uh planning stage,
00:24:04 done during the uh planning stage, during the building regulations and building control stage. In the middle of the night, you wouldn't be able to assess what type of facial or facade has been used within the construction of either a new build or um a refurbished
00:24:16 either a new build or um a refurbished building. You wouldn't you wouldn't have that opportunity to do that unless it was provided to you in a different way. But even then, you may not fully understand what that particular product is and how it's going to react. You would trust that it's in place before
00:24:27 would trust that it's in place before you arrive. H and then looking at the last sentence, these could affect the way fires develop and spread in a building. Looking at that, would you expect an incident commander, any
00:24:38 expect an incident commander, any incident commander, uh in command of an incident to know that the need to understand those matters or or those matters themselves, products in their
00:24:49 matters themselves, products in their appropriate use, could affect the way fires develop and spread in a building. I think you couldn't read the last one without linking it to the top one in that you you would be trusting that the the principle is that the external
00:25:00 the principle is that the external envelope shouldn't contribute to the fire spread. That would be your expectation. Um and you when you attend instance and fires, you expect building controls, building regulations, etc. to
00:25:11 controls, building regulations, etc. to support you in your firefighting operations, not hinder you. There could be exceptions where you turn up, for example, to a derelict building, but we have different procedures for dealing with that because you know that any sort of systems in place for keeping that building safe have already failed
00:25:22 building safe have already failed because it's a derelict building. But buildings that are in use, you would expect that the responsible person has made sure that that building is safe for the occupants. And alongside that, as you turn up as a responder, you would
00:25:33 you turn up as a responder, you would trust that the general principle at the top is in place and therefore you shouldn't need to apply the bottom line. I just wonder though, can I can I just explore that a little bit? I know you've
00:25:44 explore that a little bit? I know you've not seen this before and we can argue about the layout of the cows coming in, but my question is really this. As of June 2017, were you aware with within the London Fire Brigade, although the general principle, as you can see at the
00:25:56 general principle, as you can see at the top paragraph, exists, nonetheless, new construction material um and methods of construction used in in facades um with a limited understanding of fire
00:26:08 um with a limited understanding of fire behavioral performance meant that there was a risk uh of fire spread and development uh which um needed to be understood. I'm sorry, could you repeat that
00:26:19 I'm sorry, could you repeat that question?
00:26:20 question? Yes. Although the general principle was as you see there, nonetheless, new construction material uh and methods of construction were being used in facades which created a a
00:26:32 being used in facades which created a a a need to understand the things you can see there because incident commanders needed to understand those so that they could understand how the fires develop and spread.
00:26:45 and spread. Yeah, I think my understanding would you need to be understand that they are putting fascias and uh uh onto the outside of buildings that may be new to you, but I think you would still trust that whatever that that that would be
00:26:56 that whatever that that that would be safe still because of the fact that it needs to comply with not assisting fire development on the outside of a building. So you'd need an understanding of the types of fasia that that may be there, but not necessarily that you would expect it then to develop
00:27:08 would expect it then to develop significant into a fire on the outside of the building. Well, let me put the question a bit more bluntly. Uh the general principle is the general principles. Were you aware as of June 2017 that that general principle had exceptions which you had to watch
00:27:19 had exceptions which you had to watch out for?
00:27:20 out for? No.
00:27:24 Would you agree with this principle or proposition that once it becomes apparent to an incident commander that fire has spread vertically, horizontally or vertic vertically downwards uh across
00:27:37 or vertic vertically downwards uh across the exterior of a building, the incident commander would need to consider changing his approach or her approach to firefighting. And you've not necessarily changing the approach, you'd need to assess what the
00:27:49 approach, you'd need to assess what the fire is doing and then put an approach in. It would depend what the approach was. Yeah. And did you yourself ever receive any training on how to conduct that analysis so that you could change
00:28:01 that analysis so that you could change your approach to firefighting? Uh you you're you make a decision based upon what we call decision-m model and that be like a cycle with DMM. So that's a cycle that you go through. So you should be going through that on a
00:28:12 So you should be going through that on a regular basis and then also if anything changes you would also go through that. So that's the tool we would use and you use the decision-m model all the instant command exercises or all the training that we do. It's always referred to and it's the tool you should
00:28:23 referred to and it's the tool you should use to assist you at an incident. So you would that's when you would do your reassessment of whether you need to change the tactics you're using. Yes, I see. Um well, we'll come back to that uh in due course. Um can I then ask
00:28:35 that uh in due course. Um can I then ask you what training you've received if any in relation to the stay put policy very generally. So state policy principle I suppose you are you're aware of again through the
00:28:47 are you're aware of again through the any exercises you carry out because in a high-rise building that's your understanding of um the application of it. So I think probably since I first joined the fire service you understand that in high-rise buildings majority of them um they stay put is the principle
00:28:59 them um they stay put is the principle that the people the occupants will be using more modern buildings um particularly where there's mixed use so if it's got so some residential buildings now will have hotels and restaurants in them as well they may
00:29:10 restaurants in them as well they may have a different approach and so those you'd need to understand differently but the majority of um social housing has stay put and that's the expectation you would have. Yeah. And have you ever had any training on in in in the housing context as being
00:29:23 on in in in the housing context as being specific um on when you would depart from stayput guidance? So departing from stayp put not specific training in relation to when you would depart. It's part of your risk assessment of what the building is doing
00:29:35 assessment of what the building is doing and whether it's appropriate for that to change. You could consider it. But I wouldn't say I'd have specific training on when you need to change stateput. It's part of your decision- making process for any incident. And it
00:29:46 process for any incident. And it wouldn't just apply to stay put. would apply to the occupants of any fire that you were arriving at. You'd think about the occupants of that building and what is the best approach for either rescue or evacuation office. Yes. Um have you ever had any training
00:29:59 Yes. Um have you ever had any training on policy 790? Could you mind which one? Fire survival guidance. Uh I'm I've got a good understanding of fire survival guidance policy. Um within
00:30:10 fire survival guidance policy. Um within the training that we do either in the formal training through our training provider or separately, you would always cover fire survivor guidance. Okay. So yes, I do let me look at something specific within it. This is policy 790 which was the
00:30:22 it. This is policy 790 which was the current policy as of 17th of April 2014 um which is tab five of our policies bundle. And can I ask you please to turn to paragraph 8 which is on page five
00:30:33 to paragraph 8 which is on page five advice to fire survival guidance callers.
00:30:37 callers. And I just want to look with you if I may paragraph 8.7. In exceptional circumstances, an IC may consider informing control that their advice to FSG callers should be altered, eg to
00:30:48 FSG callers should be altered, eg to attempt to leave their property. The IC should remember that this advice may be contrary to national policy for control staff on FSGs and liaison with the officer in charge at control will be required for agreement to change the
00:30:59 required for agreement to change the prescriptive advice. Just focusing on the first sentence there. My question is, have you ever had training on how you as a putitive IC would go about um
00:31:12 you as a putitive IC would go about um changing the advice and telling people to attempt to leave? Not formal training though. Right.
00:31:20 Right. Have you ever had an experience yourself in doing that in in revoking stay put and telling control to to tell people to try to leave their property? No.
00:31:32 Have you ever had any training or experience prior to Grenfell um as to the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to revoke the stay put advice and to conduct some kind of
00:31:43 advice and to conduct some kind of evacuation of the whole block? Uh I wouldn't say formal training how you carried that out. It would be part of your decision-m process um based on what you are dealing with in front of you and the risks you believe are people
00:31:55 you and the risks you believe are people are exposed to. Right. Um
00:31:59 Right. Um I in understanding how that model works, the DMM, at what point do you understand that you should consider whether the
00:32:10 that you should consider whether the stay put advice remains wise and start to look at other options? Um, I guess it would come in where you are assessing the risks not only to your firefighters but to the public as well.
00:32:21 firefighters but to the public as well. And then you've got you put in what you're trying to achieve and your plan. So within those sort of stages, you'd be looking at the exposure to the firefighters and to the public. And then also what does it how does it fit in with the plan you've got in place?
00:32:32 with the plan you've got in place? Right. You say I I guess um is that you speaking from your experience or you speaking from your training? Oh, from experience. Right. Okay.
00:32:45 Would that training or would would training or indeed your experience on the on this question of whether to revoke the stay put policy include
00:32:56 revoke the stay put policy include circumstances in which it would then be appropriate to use second set breathing apparatus to assist occupants of a high-rise block to evacuate? No, I've not been I've not had training on use of second sets for uh
00:33:07 on use of second sets for uh firefighters to help evacuate. Have you heard training in relation to the prevention or mitigation of the effects of smoke in a single exit
00:33:18 effects of smoke in a single exit from a high-rise? Uh ventilation within the building is in any building is something you have to consider quite early on as the instant commander. So yes, I've had training in ventilation in general. Um and every building will
00:33:29 in general. Um and every building will be slightly different than the ventilation that you need to put in place. So you'd assess it based on the building that you're dealing with. At what point would you make that assessment as an incident commander? You need to be considering where the products of the smoke are going. Right. at the early stages. It doesn't mean you
00:33:40 at the early stages. It doesn't mean you can necessarily ventilate at that point, right?
00:33:42 right? But you would be considering at a very early point is where is where is the smoke going? And to assist our firefighters, you would quite often try to ventilate the building to make the conditions better for them to enter. Right. Does that does that mean that
00:33:54 Right. Does that does that mean that understanding the location of the controls of and the operation of a smoke extraction system if there is one there? Was it was the matter of first importance to an incident commander on arrival?
00:34:04 arrival? Um I don't know if it's first importance. Um a lot of things when you arrive are very important. I think it's important to establish if there is any fixed installations such as that that could help you. Right. And what expectation would you
00:34:15 Right. And what expectation would you have from based on your experience or training as to as to how familiar an incident commander would be with how to operate a smoke extraction system at a high-rise? Uh we'd actually have limited we we'd be
00:34:27 Uh we'd actually have limited we we'd be aware that they exist. Um you'd expect the system to normally be in some sort of automatic mode rather than us having to override it because they can be very complex systems, right? Um, if you needed to change the
00:34:38 right? Um, if you needed to change the system that was working, particularly if it was in an automatic mode, you'd want to rely upon someone who was understanding of that building and that system, if that wasn't available to you. Our fire safety officers have a good understanding of those types of systems
00:34:50 understanding of those types of systems and they can try to look at it if there's instructions or possibly a phone number for them to call. But generally speaking, you would not want to interfere an automatic system because it's been set up to deal with uh what
00:35:01 it's been set up to deal with uh what would be expected to happen at that particular building.
00:35:12 Going back to the question of FSGS if I may just for a moment. Um you we looked at policy 790 a moment ago. Can you remember what the last
00:35:23 ago. Can you remember what the last training you had prior to the Granville Tower fire was on this policy policy 790?
00:35:28 790? Uh so it would have been the application of it at the instant command exercise we do. So on the assistant commissioners exercise that I carried out in March, there were fire survival guidance calls within that exercise. It wasn't a high-rise building,
00:35:39 high-rise building, right?
00:35:39 right? On the fast survival guidance calls put into that exercise to test my response for
00:35:43 for on that specific exercise, I'm not sure I quite covered this with you. On that specific exercise, were there multiple FSGs involved? Uh there were multiple rescues and multiple FSG. How many do you remember? Um I don't know. It was single figures
00:35:55 Um I don't know. It was single figures though. It wouldn't have been once you once you go above single figures it's it's almost getting to the point where it's unrealistic as an exercise because it it could become the only thing you would end up focusing on when an exercise you need to put in lots of tasks to carry out.
00:36:07 tasks to carry out. Did that training involve any analysis or exploration of how lines of communication should work part um between the control room and the incident ground so far as FSG
00:36:19 incident ground so far as FSG information was concerned? Not in detail. No. So at the assistant commissioner level, you would assign that role to someone else to establish and so be a fire survivor gardens coordinator and you wouldn't get into the detail of the communication between
00:36:31 the detail of the communication between the fire survival gardens coordinator and the control. You'd expect communication to be set up in the best way available. Does does that indicate that in some way FSG calls are not a matter of the first
00:36:42 FSG calls are not a matter of the first priority to assistant commissioner? No.
00:36:45 No. So why would it be delegated down to some delegated to somebody else? because that could become the sole focus for that individual officer, right? Whereas the instant commander, you may have
00:36:55 have lots of other priorities at that point in time. So, you wouldn't be able to give it your sole attention. You'd need to give someone else who can take that as their sole point of focus to deal with. And as um an an incident commander
00:37:08 with. And as um an an incident commander at assistant commissioner level, would you expect there to be a continuous flow of accurate and up-to-date information about FSGS coming to you so that you could make decisions based on the
00:37:19 could make decisions based on the changing situation? As the instant commander, you rely upon feedback from whatever sectors you've set up as frequently as they're able to give them to you, so you can adjust your plan as you need to. Yeah. Now, uh, can I ask you to I think
00:37:33 Yeah. Now, uh, can I ask you to I think we still have policy 790 on the screen, Paul, if we can just have that. Can I ask you to look at paragraph 4.2?
00:37:44 It follows from what I've just been asking you about. We'll look at it together if we can. The IC, and this is under the rubric prioritizing calls.
00:37:54 uh
00:37:58 the IC based on their situational awareness and the information provided by control will decide how to prioritize FSG calls and the actions to be taken on the incident ground. IC should direct
00:38:09 the incident ground. IC should direct resources to those callers at greatest risk high priority if practicable. Other callers not seen as at greatest risk medium priority should be allocated resources when available. Now my first
00:38:22 resources when available. Now my first question is did did you ever have any training on how to go about working out who was at quote greatest risk unqualifed
00:38:34 as the priority and I've never had a situation where you had to then um put them in some sort of priority order. That's not something I'd ever experienced or expected to happen
00:38:45 experienced or expected to happen either. Um it was that every fast survival guidance call would be treated as a priority. Um, so, so the training on it is no, but it's not something I would have ever expected that you would need to take such a large volume of our
00:38:56 need to take such a large volume of our survival guidance calls and in some way put them in some sort of priority order. It's an incredibly difficult thing to do.
00:39:01 do. Do I take away from that answer that although the policy indicates that there may be a um a a set of priorities, those callers at greatest risk and those callers at not such great great risk. In
00:39:13 callers at not such great great risk. In practice, they were all treated equally. It's a very difficult thing to apply. I mean, it would be very subjective. So it would be based on um what information is being received at control, who it's been transmitted to, what you regard as risk.
00:39:25 transmitted to, what you regard as risk. So it's a very difficult thing to prioritize individual fast guidance calls and put one call over another. Have you had any experience of attempting prioritization in accordance
00:39:37 attempting prioritization in accordance with this part of this policy, paragraph 4.2?
00:39:40 4.2? No.
00:39:41 No. Right.
00:39:44 Now, can I turn to the night of the fire, if I may? Uh
00:39:52 and just starting off with your paging. Um we have a record from the vision system which we call the short incident log. Um that you were assigned to the incident at 120 or so
00:40:04 assigned to the incident at 120 or so and mobile to the scene at 129 or so. That's page 13. Um does that recall accord with your recollection? Uh yes. Um, the reason I ask is in your witness statement on page four, you say,
00:40:17 witness statement on page four, you say, uh, that, um, you thought it was approximately 130 when you first received the page, a message. Um, and this is, uh, the second paragraph down, about a third of the way down the page,
00:40:30 about a third of the way down the page, you see that shortly after this, I went to bed about 1:30 approximately, I received a pager message indicating an 8 pump fire in a highrise. Um would you do you think it's 130 or
00:40:42 Um would you do you think it's 130 or would you agree with the vision log version?
00:40:44 version? I'm not sure the vision log is correct. Okay, let me show it to you. Um it's um tab 23 of our documents bundle and if you go to that
00:40:57 just just to be absolutely clear about this if you look at page uh 13 well yes 13
00:41:08 u you can see um that you were assigned E6 you were assigned at 012057 and mobile at 01290 3.
00:41:19 and mobile at 01290 3. Uh, do you think that that is correct just to press the point or do you think your recollection is better? I don't doubt the vision log is correct. Yes,
00:41:25 Yes, you think it is. Right. Okay. And in fact, so when I say around 1:30, I'm probably meaning I was in my car around 1:30, right? Um, clearly I was mobilized before. Okay. Uh,
00:41:38 Okay. Uh, are you sure that it was an eight pump fire at that stage? Uh, yes, most definitely. When I looked at my page the first time it was an eight pump fire, my surprise was that I'd normally be notified about a six pump fire. So it give me a little bit of
00:41:49 pump fire. So it give me a little bit of time to prep for it. Whereas an eight pump fire, I had just have to Yeah. go.
00:41:54 Yeah. go. Now uh on page four of your statement, if we can just look at that uh you
00:42:02 uh say
00:42:07 uh and this is a line down where you were. My first reaction was just above halfway down the page. second line of the second paragraph. You say, "My first reaction uh was some surprise at not
00:42:18 reaction uh was some surprise at not being notified before. DAC's are normally notified of six pump fires and they monitor these remotely either from the office or at home. They have time to review the available information and conclude whether or not the fire would
00:42:29 conclude whether or not the fire would likely escalate."
00:42:33 And then you say, "Because I was being caged at eight pumps, it indicated to me that the fire had escalated very quickly. with an eight pump fire. I have to attend as DAC and would expect to be in my car within 5 minutes and on route. This doesn't afford much time for
00:42:44 This doesn't afford much time for planning a response to the incident. I've read you a chunk of that because I've got a number of questions about it. It's good you have it all there. Now, we know that the incident went six pumps and then and one aerial at 113 and 114.
00:42:57 and then and one aerial at 113 and 114. And just for our note, that's page 17 of the SIL. Um, which is before you were paged. um
00:43:05 paged. um what would you what would you usually do uh with that sort of time it to plan a response?
00:43:12 response? So you'd have more time to get information out of off a control officer. So you'd be able to ask them more questions, right?
00:43:17 right? Um there's a lot of things you can ask control officer, but it takes up their time and it takes up obviously their ability to do other work. So you you can ask more questions of them. Um you're then able to log on to the vision system. We have access to that through
00:43:28 system. We have access to that through our own computers. So you can look at any messages that have been sent previously. You can look up the map of the area. So using such a Google maps for example, you'll be able to look up the building itself even from street
00:43:39 the building itself even from street view for example, right? You'll be able to look up the surrounding risks. So you'll be able to see access and egress issues. You'll be able to see if the fire was going to spread anywhere. You can start looking up your water supplies, the impacts on local businesses or local um local
00:43:52 local businesses or local um local environment, for example. You can look up environmental issues. So there's a whole raft of tasks you can carry out. If necessary, you can make phone calls to other officers andor to the fire ground as well to get updates from them. So, so there's a lot you can do and
00:44:04 So, so there's a lot you can do and that's a normal part of the deck role is to remote monitor instance that are 6.5. So, we do that on a regular basis. Yeah. And would you use the boss system for accessing the um it's boss or vision? I'm not sure which one is I think it's the same system, but
00:44:16 one is I think it's the same system, but it's got different um different usernames. Right. Have you have you used boss before? Are you familiar with its use? Yes.
00:44:22 Yes. Um did you use it on this occasion? No.
00:44:24 No. Why is that? uh because I had to get in the car so quickly. Right. And does does that mean that you didn't have time to do anything that you've just described prior to being paged and leaving? None at all. The only thing I could do was phone control and I also phoned
00:44:36 was phone control and I also phoned Adrian Fenton who was the other Dak on duty that night. Right.
00:44:39 Right. Um
00:44:44 now the pumps went um from 8 to 15 in less than 10 minutes. Do you remember that? Yes. I I I'm happy to show you the short
00:44:56 Yes. I I I'm happy to show you the short incident log. Um and uh I think you say in your statement that you heard you you heard on the airwave radio that the pumps went from 8 to 10 and then to 15
00:45:07 pumps went from 8 to 10 and then to 15 and you thought that was unusual. Yes.
00:45:10 Yes. Um why did you think that going from 8 to 15 in less than 10 minutes was unusual?
00:45:16 unusual? So the majority of high-rise fires are put out by the first pumps that attend if not there by four or six pumps. Right.
00:45:22 Right. Some will go to eight or 10 pumps, but beyond that is really very unusual. You don't get many high-rise fires going above 10 pumps. So even for it to go to 15 was unusual. Uh for it to gone to 15
00:45:33 15 was unusual. Uh for it to gone to 15 so rapidly was again it shows that the fire must be escalating and that would be based on any fire. So any fire that's gone from eight up to 15 pumps which is a lot of fire engines um that quickly
00:45:44 a lot of fire engines um that quickly would show you that the fire must be quite dynamic and must be developing very rapidly. Yeah. And you heard that on your airwave radio while in the car. Is that right? I think I heard the 15 as I was phoning Adrian Fenton and I think the 25 was
00:45:56 Adrian Fenton and I think the 25 was when I was in my car. I think it was that way around. Okay. Um can I ask you to go to the control report we've got which um is LFP quadruple04790
00:46:09 and go to page 20.
00:46:14 Uh and I'd like you to look at the time mark please of 012805.
00:46:33 It's page 20
00:46:37 and it says that echo6 that's you DAC Andre Lachland calls brigade control in response to the pager message to an eight pump fire at Grrenfield Tower.
00:46:48 eight pump fire at Grrenfield Tower. Sorry, I could just pause while that's expanded
00:46:51 expanded and asks
00:46:53 and asks asks if that is that if that it is now a 15 pump fire which control confirms DACA a lockman confirms that he's on route and to book him status 2 mobile to incident and states that DAC Fenton will
00:47:05 incident and states that DAC Fenton will be taking over the duty DAC role and the source of that is a radio message at that time. Mr. Lachlin, um, can I ask you this? When you rang control, as you say, to book status, too. Um, why did
00:47:18 say, to book status, too. Um, why did you not try to gather any further information about what was happening at the end of the control officer? So, normally when you're in control, the control officer is very calm. They're very collected. They're used to dealing with large
00:47:29 They're used to dealing with large fires. So, they're not um and in this particular call, the call the control officer um agitated might be too strong, but she was you could tell a lot was going on. You could tell she was under pressure and you could hear background
00:47:41 pressure and you could hear background noise in the control room as well. So, it was clear that something significant was happening. There's a lot you can ask a control officer, but you could be on the telephone for 10 minutes asking that. Um, my priority was to get to the
00:47:52 that. Um, my priority was to get to the incident. Also, anything I ask her at that point with the time I've got to drive there, it will probably change in that time anyway. So, it's in my view better to get there as quickly as possible. And it sounded like she needed
00:48:03 possible. And it sounded like she needed to be freed up to deal with other calls. Right. Did you um ask her whether there were persons reported at that stage? I don't think I didn't know. Um did you hear over the radio, the main
00:48:15 Um did you hear over the radio, the main scheme radio, the persons reported message?
00:48:18 message? I can't recall if I did or not. Okay. There's one, and I'll just show you this. There's one at 012812. If you go back to the short incident log
00:48:34 uh and turn please to page 17
00:48:41 sorry 18 actually top of page 18 um 012840
00:48:46 012840 service request created IUP G271 persons reported Do you think you heard or knew about that while on route?
00:48:57 that while on route? I I turned my radio on before I found control. So I would have heard that. Yes.
00:49:00 Yes. Right. You would have done. Okay.
00:49:06 And at that stage, what were your thoughts about how you were going to start planning the incident given that you were likely to be the senior most officer at the scene when you arrived? At that stage when speaking to control,
00:49:17 At that stage when speaking to control, I'm still just focusing on getting to the incident. So finding the route first of all. Um along the way I then started to do some planning. Okay.
00:49:28 Okay. Uh and then you you can see uh you we booked status 2 as we've shown you at 012903. Um and did you hear make pumps 25
00:49:41 Um and did you hear make pumps 25 shortly after that? Yes. So so I booked status 2 I think um I'd still been in the house and then it's a 30 second walk to the car. Yeah. Yeah,
00:49:48 Yeah, I think within the car I heard the make pumps 25
00:49:52 pumps 25 correctly. The car takes about 2 minutes to warm up the satnav. So there have been a couple of minutes there when actually I can't go anywhere cuz the satnav needs to turn on. Um and I think that's the time maybe I heard the 25, but it was around that time.
00:50:03 time. Right. I see. Okay. Now you then describe in your statement at page five your journey to the incident. I just take you to that.
00:50:16 I just take you to that. Um
00:50:18 Um it's quite a long passage
00:50:22 uh about your incident. I don't want to take you to any specific part of it. Um my question is um did you hear on route in general the types of messages um including fire survival guidance
00:50:34 including fire survival guidance messages over your airwave radio? Yes, I did. Yes. Uh now we'll look at those in just a moment. I just want to work out exactly when you arrived. In in your statement, you say, and it's page
00:50:46 your statement, you say, and it's page six. If you go to that, about a quarter of the way down the page, you say, "I arrived at about 155 hours." So, does that mean it took you about 25
00:50:58 So, does that mean it took you about 25 minutes to get there? Yes.
00:50:59 Yes. Okay. Uh,
00:51:02 Okay. Uh, did during that journey, did you listen to your airwave radio constantly? Uh the Oway road is on constantly. Yes. So for the first part of the journey, I was listening to it very carefully because
00:51:14 listening to it very carefully because it's a much clearer road. It's a faster dual carriageway. Yeah.
00:51:17 Yeah. Whereas the second half of the journey, if you like, um you're on much smaller road. So because you're driving at quite high speeds, you I'm not listening as carefully as I was probably on the first half of the journey. No, I'm still probably getting a feel for
00:51:28 I'm still probably getting a feel for the traffic but not the detail of it. And do those messages help you plan your response?
00:51:33 response? Yes.
00:51:33 Yes. How?
00:51:34 How? Uh because they give you a good understanding of what you may be dealing with. So when you're ordered to a 15 pump fire as it were now 25 pumps, you don't actually know what the fire is until you start getting information across either from the control officer
00:51:46 across either from the control officer if you've had time to ask them the questions or from the radio messages that are going across. Right. And you say you don't didn't know what you were dealing with, but what sort of plan
00:51:57 were dealing with, but what sort of plan was beginning to evolve in your head once you'd heard um persons reported and it was a 25 pump fire and and also had accelerated through the makeups at the speed it had. Um so there's a limit to what you you
00:52:09 Um so there's a limit to what you you still don't know the exact fire and what's going on. You're still waiting for the briefing that you need to receive. Uh so I was probably thinking more around resources in that 25 pumps was a very large number of pumps. It's a larger fire than I've ever intended as
00:52:20 larger fire than I've ever intended as instant commander. So I was trying to calculate what that would give me in terms of firefighters and in particular in terms of briefing operators crews, right?
00:52:27 right? And it gives you a lot. It gives you as a as a deck, you're trying to plan for the next two to three hours of an incident. So you're starting to think, have I got the resources um available that may get me through the next two to three hours of this fire,
00:52:38 next two to three hours of this fire, not just the next 30 minutes. Right.
00:52:40 Right. Alongside that, we're starting to think about any because it was a high-rise and I was aware it was a high-rise. um starting to think about whether I need EDBA as well because to deploy to the upper floors. So it was more resources I was thinking about rather than uh
00:52:51 was thinking about rather than uh specific actions you're going to take at the because I haven't seen it or nor do I have a briefing on what the fire is at that point. But at that point your expectation was that you would you would take over and remain incident commander was it? Uh as a 25 pump fire I would take over
00:53:03 Uh as a 25 pump fire I would take over from the officer that was in charge at that point in time. But at above 16 pumps and above the assistant commissioner takes over. So I knew that I would arrive before the assistant commissioner. So I would take over until the assistant commissioner arrived and
00:53:14 the assistant commissioner arrived and then I would hand over to um him which was Andy on that night. Yes. I see. So when you say that you were you were planning for two or three hours that's not your two or three hours as incident commander necessarily. You try to establish a plan that will see the incident through for the next
00:53:25 see the incident through for the next two to three hours and then you hand it over to the officer taking over from you. Then it's of course their operation so they can change that plan or change the resources. Yes. But you are trying to plan for the next two three hours when you take over. You don't know when the assistant
00:53:36 don't know when the assistant commissioner could arrive. So you could actually have it for an hour or more in which case you would need to ensure that your plan is suitable for the next hour to two hours, three hours. No. Um, now just focusing on what you heard on route over your airway radio.
00:53:49 heard on route over your airway radio. Do you remember hearing multiple FSG messages being broadcast? Uh, I remember hearing FSG messages and I think there was also messages that were saying about uh checking on people on different floors and they weren't specific FSG messages. So an FSG message
00:54:02 specific FSG messages. So an FSG message would normally involve a flat number and the number of people in it and some other information quite often. I think I recall there was some of that but there was also information about uh smoke on certain floors and also checking on
00:54:15 certain floors and also checking on certain floors. So there was a lot very quickly of different floors. Some some appeared to be FSG, some appeared to be reports of smoke or something to that effect on different floors. Now,
00:54:28 Now, uh, if I could ask you please to look at some of these you might have heard. Can I ask you to be shown page 18 of the short incident log? And we'll pick it up at the foot of page 18
00:54:41 where we can see turning out with message 25 pump fire. Uh, and at the very front of the page, SAD, that's Sharon Derby puts out a service request RT4. That's over the
00:54:53 service request RT4. That's over the radio channel 4 at 13530. Further call to say fire on 20th floor flat 82 also people trapped. Now this
00:55:04 flat 82 also people trapped. Now this was as an early stage as you've told us in your journey to the incident. Yes.
00:55:08 Yes. Do you think you would you you heard that call? I would have heard that. Yes. And because if she said people trapped I would have taken that as a fire survivor guidance call. Right.
00:55:15 Right. Even though the words aren't there. And 20th floor. Would you have picked that up?
00:55:20 that up? Uh yes. Yes, I knew it was um yeah, I knew it was on the high floors. Yes. Right. And then if we look at page 19, we can just look at further examples. There's one at 13536.
00:55:33 There's one at 13536. Persons on the 22nd floor, smoke coming into flat. Do you think that again was something you would have heard? Yes, I would have heard that. But that's an example where that's not clear if that's a fast guidance call or if it's a
00:55:45 that's a fast guidance call or if it's a call that there is smoke coming to the flat and the occupy needs to leave. Uh a and then uh one well like looking at 14047 a third of the way down the
00:55:57 at 14047 a third of the way down the page as a service request RT4 FYI seven people in flat 205 on 23rd floor persons unable to leave this is at 140 so about 10 minutes into your
00:56:08 140 so about 10 minutes into your journey. Do you think that was a message you heard? Uh yeah not sure which one it is. It sounds like one I would have heard. Yes. And that again would sound like one that is a fire survivor guard school because now they're saying they're unable to leave.
00:56:19 leave. No, it's Yeah, just to be clear so that everyone sees it, it's 14047.
00:56:26 So do do I take from that that on route you learned that there was the fire was high in the building and there were persons trapped on high floors? Yes.
00:56:37 Yes. And that they were affected at least by smoke.
00:56:39 smoke. Uh yes.
00:56:40 Uh yes. Yes.
00:56:43 Yes. So, and that we've just taken some examples of that. You can see if you just cast your eye down the rest of the page, which runs to 14545, a long list of FSG calls coming over or
00:56:56 a long list of FSG calls coming over or messages coming over the the um the radio on channel 4. And that runs over to page 20, long list all the way down to the bottom of page 20, 155, which is about your
00:57:09 of page 20, 155, which is about your arrival time. Um, by the time you had arrived and heard those calls or those kinds of calls, um, what was your impression of the fire in general?
00:57:21 in general? So,
00:57:23 So, my impression I think my impression was that the fire had gone on to different floors. Um, I think by this point I knew it was on the outside of the building. I don't know if that was in the messages or not. I think I knew there wasn't the fire was on the outside. Um and then
00:57:34 fire was on the outside. Um and then obviously I know that people are involved in either fire survivor guidance calls or that they um that they are u uh in the building still and need to be assisted or rescued. Right.
00:57:45 Right. Um and it's on it's um it's on the high floors
00:57:47 floors or high floors. Did you pick up the fact that there was actually fire in flats? Uh because of the fire survivor guidance calls I would have interpreted that as there will be the products of the fire.
00:57:58 there will be the products of the fire. The fire either the smoke or the fire has got into some of those flats. That's my that would have been my interpretation of it. I don't I don't think it came across that there was fires in flats, but my interpretation of fire survival guidance call means that
00:58:09 fire survival guidance call means that either smoke or heat or flames has got into that flat somehow. Right. Let me just show you one or two examples. If I can just press this at page 19 of the SIL at the foot of the page,
00:58:22 page, you can see uh a service request created
00:58:27 created at 14544
00:58:32 uh by PD. There's Pete Duddy in the control room. RT4 to G271. Further fire started on 12th floor, flat 96.
00:58:43 started on 12th floor, flat 96. Uh
00:58:45 Uh Did you or did you hear that or do you think you might have heard that uh
00:58:49 uh by this point? So because so many were coming in what I decided to so the first few that came through I was try to remember the numbers and the number of people involved because if it was say one or two fast guidance calls it be
00:59:00 one or two fast guidance calls it be quite easy to remember flat X and flat Y and you know the number of people in them. What became quite clear was there was more than that. So, I wasn't trying to remember flat numbers or floor numbers because my thoughts were I'm going to confuse everyone when I arrived
00:59:11 going to confuse everyone when I arrived by mixing up the floor numbers and flats. And I've got no way of writing those down. So, by this point, this would have been a number of the calls that were coming in that I was hearing, but I wasn't trying to listen to the specific detail of them. What I was going to rely upon
00:59:22 of them. What I was going to rely upon was that when we got there, when I got there,
00:59:24 there, that information would be available to me.
00:59:26 me. Right. And there's another one at 155 I just want to just quickly put to you. um 15518 which is page 20 of the SIL at the foot of the page
00:59:40 at the foot of the page at last entry bit one uh PD service request RT4 to G271 caller in flat 95 has flames coming in
00:59:51 caller in flat 95 has flames coming in window again is that something that you might have picked up on the airwave radio as you were approaching I think that's probably about the time I think I arrived and there was a fast travel guidance call trying to be passed across the radio at that point which is
01:00:03 across the radio at that point which is why I didn't try to cut across it at that moment. So that could be the one that was going across at that point in time but I don't recall the detail of it. Right. Sum summarizing what you've just told us about
01:00:14 told us about about the behavior of the fire. Was it clear to you at that stage that the fire wasn't contained solely on the exterior of the building but but the fire itself was getting into flats? I think my
01:00:27 was getting into flats? I think my expectation and interpretation was that because there are fire survival guidance calls at least the smoke must be getting into the flats. Not necessarily that there would be fire. I can see some of those messages say fire but um but yeah so the smoke and if the smoke's getting in it means that the fire will get in
01:00:39 in it means that the fire will get in but it won't. So yes. So can we take it this way that that even if you didn't know there was fire getting in at that stage on arrival you were aware at least there was a risk of the fire getting in. Yeah. I think it being a a hot night, my
01:00:50 Yeah. I think it being a a hot night, my expectation was that some people would have their windows open and if there was a external fire spread, it is likely to get into those flats. Right.
01:00:59 Right. Did did you at that point have any thoughts about whether compartmentation in the building had been broken? Internal compartmentation. No, there's no reason at that point I would have believed that the internal compartmentation would fail. My
01:01:10 compartmentation would fail. My expectation would be that if a fire goes from the outside into a flat, it's then contained either within the room of that flat or certainly within that flat. There was no reason for me to think at that point that it the internal compartmentation was going to fail.
01:01:22 compartmentation was going to fail. How did you think smoke was getting into all these flats even as high as the 23rd floor
01:01:27 floor from the exterior fire? But what was the means of ingress of the smoke in your way of thinking because it was the middle of summer the windows people would have had their windows open just open window with regard to lacal when the fire
01:01:38 with regard to lacal when the fire spread downwards that's exactly what happened the window was open and debris fell down and wind into the window so the expectation and again lacal was a very hot day where you had windows left open so so the building which is
01:01:50 open so so the building which is designed to protect itself from external fire spread if windows are left open it it allows the products to the fire to go in so my expectation would be that the the flats that had windows closed, the building the fire should not go into
01:02:02 building the fire should not go into those flats because the building should be protected from a fire on the exterior. But if flat if windows are left open, then the fire and the products of the fire, the smoke effectively will be able to get in because there's nothing to stop it from going in through the windows.
01:02:18 Now, we'll come back to the question of fire penetration later on, but do I take it therefore that on arrival
01:02:29 arrival just on the basis of what you'd heard, you didn't think that compartmentation had been breached? Internal compartmentation? No. What about external compartment? External. So based on the calls and the fact that my understanding was the fire
01:02:41 fact that my understanding was the fire was on the outside then it was clearly getting into the flats through either open windows or by another means. By another means now by another means I'm interested in was that on your radar on arrival that there was a risk that
01:02:52 on arrival that there was a risk that the fire was getting into individual flats from the outside. That's something I needed to establish. My expectation was that it would definitely get in if there's windows open but the building the windows should
01:03:04 open but the building the windows should protect it if they're closed and sealed. Yes.
01:03:06 Yes. So, but um so it was on my radar, but I would be expecting it to not penetrate flats whose windows were closed, right? But it's something I needed to establish. It's something you needed to establish. Right.
01:03:15 Right. Okay.
01:03:16 Okay. Um Mr. Chairman, we've been going just over an hour. Uh and I would like to turn to a different topic. It's probably a little uncharacteristically early for me to suggest a break, but may now be a convenient moment for a short one.
01:03:27 convenient moment for a short one. All right. Um thank you. Well, Mr. Lachlan, I think we'll have a short break now. Give you a bit of a rest. Chance to stretch our legs. Um, so I'm going to ask you in a minute to go with the usher. U, please don't talk to
01:03:39 the usher. U, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything related to it while you're out in the room. And we'll resume at quart 11, please.
01:03:45 please. Thank you. All right. Have to go to the usher then, please.
01:04:00 Right. 11:15.
01:15:06 [Music]
01:15:09 All right, Mr. Llin. Yes, sir. Happy to carry on?
01:15:12 carry on? Yes, sir. Good. Thank you, Mr. Millet. Mr. Lofty, thank you for coming back. Um, just going back to one or two uh answers we looked at before the break. Um, we were discussing PE the fact that
01:15:23 Um, we were discussing PE the fact that a message had come across that persons have been trapped on the 23rd floor. And I think you said, although you may not have heard that specifically, you knew by the time you'd arrived that people were trapped. Um
01:15:35 were trapped. Um that would have meant though, wouldn't it, to you, that their exits were blocked by fire or smoke so that they couldn't leave the exit from their flat? Yes. Yes. And would that not have meant to you, that internal compartmentation
01:15:47 you, that internal compartmentation would have failed of individual flats potentially? No. Actually, no. It depends how they've set their flat up. So, if for example, uh smoke has gone into a living room and the living room door isn't closed, it
01:15:58 the living room door isn't closed, it could go into the hallway. And if you were perhaps in the bedroom, you then can't get into the hallway of that flat. So it would be unlikely if a if fire got or heat and smoke got into a living room and the living room door was closed for
01:16:10 and the living room door was closed for example, then you wouldn't expect the smoke to then get into the hallway of that particular flat. So so within an individual flat, it would be that I wouldn't expect the compartmentmentation to have necessarily failed. It is that it maybe isn't in place. So people have
01:16:22 it maybe isn't in place. So people have left their doors open in their flats, which is not unusual, but not the compensations of the whole flat. It hasn't got outside of the flat into the communal areas because I wouldn't expect that to happen from certainly not smoke because it wouldn't do that.
01:16:34 because it wouldn't do that. Right. But if people are trapped in their flats, would that not at least signal to you that there was a real risk that smoke had got into their exit routes? In other words, the lobbies
01:16:45 routes? In other words, the lobbies outside their flats or uh an escape stair.
01:16:49 stair. It's possible, but that wasn't my expectation at that point. The expectation with that point the point that the fire heat smoke had got into individual flats and that therefore the compartmentmentation in the individual flats has not has failed if you like
01:17:00 flats has not has failed if you like most likely from the doors being open in the flats rather than the communal areas. So my what I would need to establish if I can is what the communal areas are from from the instant commander. I think my point would probably be I didn't I didn't I don't
01:17:11 probably be I didn't I didn't I don't recall hearing anything that said there was an issue with the communal areas on the radio. So I didn't hear anything saying there was an issue with lobbies or staircases. I only heard flats as having an issue. I see. So, by trapped, you understood it
01:17:23 I see. So, by trapped, you understood it to mean couldn't get to their front door.
01:17:25 door. You can't get out of your flat. Yes. Well, there are a number of reasons why you can't get out of your flat, aren't there?
01:17:30 there? One of which, as you've said, is you can't get to your front door because your hall is logged with smoke. But another might be that you can you you can't get out of your flat because the smoke logging the lobby outside it. That is possible. Yes.
01:17:41 That is possible. Yes. Yeah. And did that possibility occur to you?
01:17:44 you? Uh, it's possible. Yeah. I needed to know the conditions inside the building. So yes, it did occur to me. Right. So
01:17:49 Right. So my expectation at that point was still that the fires were where the smoke and fire was inside individual flats. All right. Rather than communal areas. But but you your answer is it is possible. I needed to know the conditions inside the building. So does
01:18:00 conditions inside the building. So does that mean that on arrival one of the things that you would be looking at closely in taking command over would be the conditions in the lobbies and the stairs?
01:18:09 stairs? The conditions within the building as a whole? Yes. Including the lobbies and stairs. Yes. Now, did you know uh at any time before you left or during your journey to the incident that the fire had started on the fourth floor?
01:18:22 had started on the fourth floor? I'm not sure if I did. I'm not sure if I heard an informative on the way or not. So, I I'm not sure if I was aware it was on the fourth floor. Right. Did you ask yourself how come there was so much smoke on different
01:18:33 there was so much smoke on different floors right up and down the building? I think my understanding at that point was it was an external fire. So if it been an external fire, that would have explained why there's smoke reported in individual flats on different floors.
01:18:45 individual flats on different floors. Right. But as you said before the break, it was on your radar at least that fire had broken back into flats. Into flats. Yes. And my expectation was it would be in the flats. Right. Now, um on arrival, let's turn to
01:18:56 Right. Now, um on arrival, let's turn to that topic. Uh you you say that you were looking for the command unit. Yes, that's right. it. Um, now on page six of your statement, if you just go to
01:19:07 six of your statement, if you just go to that, um, if you look at the, um, last paragraph and go to six lines up from the bottom of the page, uh, you say, "As I continued along Grenville Road, I passed the junction with Bowore Road and then I saw one of
01:19:19 with Bowore Road and then I saw one of the command unit team leaders called Mark Kentfield." Um, are you sure it was him? Uh, yes. I knew him on the night as Mark. I've since found out his name was Kentfield, right? But I knew him as Mark and I've known him for quite
01:19:30 him for quite before or perhaps on the night. Did you actually know him? Yes, I did. to recognize him. Yes.
01:19:35 Yes. You you'd worked together on incidents before.
01:19:37 before. Um we would have worked together on incidents. There's a lot of command unit staff. I knew him outside of that as well. I think he'd been at a station, not on a station with me, but on a station with colleagues of mine. So, we've probably met socially as well. Right.
01:19:47 Right. He's someone I know to say hello to outside of operational instance. Okay. So, cuz in your statement you call him Mark Kentfield. In your contemporaneous note, you called him Mark.
01:19:57 Mark. Yeah. I don't know everyone's surnames, so I think that was I just couldn't remember his surname. Right. Did you discover his surname after doing your contemporaneous note, but before doing your statement? Yes.
01:20:04 Yes. I see. Who Who told you? Who Where did you learn that from? I can't recall. Did someone tell it to you? Yes, most likely. I think I may have actually looked up who was on
01:20:15 I may have actually looked up who was on the night. Actually, I think I looked up who was on on Star. So, our our attendant system called Stars at Work. You can look up who the officers are that are on duty and I think I'd looked him up on Stars as well to make sure I got the right name for when I gave the statement.
01:20:26 statement. I see.
01:20:27 I see. So, I know him as Mark and Kempfield is my understanding surname. is probably the best way of putting that across when you did your state. I'm going to have to slow down. Sorry. I think the struggling to keep up with you, Mr.
01:20:39 struggling to keep up with you, Mr. Locking, so we'll take pity on her perhaps and of course try and go a bit slower. Thank you very much. Right. Um, in the light of that last answer, do I take it that when you did
01:20:50 answer, do I take it that when you did your police statement, you'd done some prior preparation before you met the police to give to be interviewed by them? With regard to his name, yes, I looked up Fulham CU and saw who was on duty that night. So, I got so I knew it
01:21:01 duty that night. So, I got so I knew it was Mark. I just didn't know his surname.
01:21:03 surname. Did you do any other preparation by looking at documents records before before being interviewed by the police? I think I looked through my proformer. Um I look through map of the building. So, I got an understanding of the layout
01:21:15 So, I got an understanding of the layout of the area, the roads that I will use to get in. Um I think I what else did I look at? Um, I looked through the incident log and I think I also looked through my I sent an
01:21:26 think I also looked through my I sent an email to myself with the timings on it of the attendance times. Yeah.
01:21:30 Yeah. Uh, I took some photographs that night. I think it was only three, but I looked through some of those photographs. But you also looked at the stars system which I don't think is something you have told us about just to um before you
01:21:42 have told us about just to um before you because when I did the contemporaneous notes I was very aware that I put a question mark by his name. Yeah. So to try and help the police on the day was to see if I could identify which mark I thought it was because I know him as Mark but I don't
01:21:53 because I know him as Mark but I don't know it was Mark Kempfield. My question is this. In addition to the documents that you've exhibited to your police statement and in addition to the STARS system that you say you looked up. Yes.
01:22:03 Yes. Was there any other document or record or database that you studied before your interview with the police which resulted in your witness statement we're looking at now
01:22:12 at now now? Um, when you spoke to Mark Kentfield, um, did he tell you where the incident command was? Incident the, um, incident command unit was.
01:22:23 incident command unit was. Yes. I asked him where the incident commander was, and he said he was underneath the tower, right? Well, you could see where the tower was by that point. And then I asked him where the CU was, and he pointed sort of over to my right hand shoulder uh, behind me, which when I turned around
01:22:34 behind me, which when I turned around and looked that way, I could see the command unit was parked on the right hand side behind my shoulder. And that was Bowore Road. That was Bowmore Road. Yes. Where it stayed. And did you know that there was another command unit on Grenfell Road at that stage? Uh, so I think as I walked along
01:22:45 Uh, so I think as I walked along Grenfell Road, I was focusing on the fire. Um, I can't recall seeing the command unit, but it's a huge red lorry. So if it was there, I would have seen it and recognized it was there, but I would have been focusing on the fire as I
01:22:56 have been focusing on the fire as I walked up there. Yeah. So I have no doubt it was there, but I I can't recall if I picture it now seeing it. But it is a big red lorry, so it's difficult to miss. Right now, if you turn to the top of page seven of your statement,
01:23:10 you deal with this point and then you go on to say in the fourth line, I then asked Mark to take me to the incident commander. Um,
01:23:21 Um, did you know at that stage who the incident commander was? No.
01:23:25 No. Did you ask him? No.
01:23:27 No. Did he volunteer it to you? No.
01:23:34 Now uh he says that he didn't know who the incident commander was u and he went to the tower and failed to locate the incident commander. But he's given a
01:23:45 incident commander. But he's given a contemporaneous statement and we'll have to explore that that aspect of what he says with him. But can I ask you um this question? Why did you not go to the
01:23:57 question? Why did you not go to the command unit he'd indicated and check in first? So the only thing for me to do on the commander would be to hand over what we call a roll board which is a a metal plaque if you like with your name on it. Um that would have maybe taken probably
01:24:09 Um that would have maybe taken probably two to three minutes and at that point in time it didn't feel like it was two to three minutes that I had spare um from taking over from the incident. It would be an hour 25 pump fire I need to take over. The person I need to take over from is the incident commander.
01:24:20 over from is the incident commander. So my priority was to get to that person and didn't take over. Did you know it was protocol for senior officers to go to the incident command command unit first?
01:24:30 first? Uh yes, you normally go to the command unit to book in and normally you would find the instant commander on that unit and then you can receive direction where you need to go. Of course, I was going to be the incident commander. So what I needed to do was find the instant commander and take over from the instant
01:24:42 commander and take over from the instant commander. Right.
01:24:43 Right. I don't there would be no other purpose for me to go into command other than to hold hand over that roll board which um would have taken a few minutes and I didn't feel I had that time to spare. Right. Was it not important to you uh to
01:24:54 Right. Was it not important to you uh to establish first on the incident command unit that you were there and to get the incident command unit to send a message to control to say that you were status three and and and were about to take
01:25:05 three and and and were about to take over.
01:25:05 over. You would normally send your messages through the team leader and I had the team leader from the command unit with me. So Mark was with me at that point in time. So any messages I needed to be sent I could send through Mark anyway.
01:25:16 sent I could send through Mark anyway. So so Mark could fulfill that role for me.
01:25:18 me. I see.
01:25:19 I see. And I wouldn't have I wouldn't have done that on the command unit. So if I gotten the command you're handing my roll board over, I wouldn't have sent a message to say that I was then the instant commander because I hadn't taken over from Andy. So until you physically take over from the previous instant
01:25:30 over from the previous instant commander, you're not the instant commander if you like. Yes. So I had to get to Andy and get a briefing from him and then take over as instant commander and get that message sent at that point. Right. Did he have an airwave or other
01:25:41 Right. Did he have an airwave or other fireground radio with him? Is this Sorry. Is that Mark? Um I don't think they do have airway radios. I could be wrong. He has a um a normal fireground radio, so like a a
01:25:52 normal fireground radio, so like a a walkie-talkie effectively, and he would use that to talk to the radio operator on the command unit, and the radio operator on the command unit would then send a message to control. Right. And when you encountered him uh and um asked him to take you to the
01:26:05 and um asked him to take you to the incident commander, did he radio the command unit to say you were there and he was with you? Uh no, I did. I don't think he did. I didn't ask him to do that. So, all I did was ask him to take him the incident
01:26:16 was ask him to take him the incident commander. We were probably 50 to 75 m from the tower. So, we just walked together towards the towards the tower. And did you have your airwave radio with you?
01:26:24 you? I think I would have done. I normally have it on me. I normally have it on the left hand shoulder strap here. Um either underneath my tabard or on the tabard. So, I normally would have it on uh on me, but I don't normally leave it
01:26:35 uh on me, but I don't normally leave it turned on because again, you you rely upon your communications in commander being through the command unit rather than directly to you. So, I probably would have turned it off. Off?
01:26:44 Off? Yes. So that would that mean that you weren't then able to hear messages being broadcast from control? Not from control. No, you rely upon your team leader and your command unit and your comm's officer to do that for you. Right.
01:26:55 Right. At what point do you think you turned your airway radio off? I probably would have turned it off when I started walking towards the tower and saw Mark.
01:27:02 saw Mark. Would that not have deprived you of having an ear to what was going on as between control and the incident ground? What can happen is you end up if you've got that radio on as well as your fire ground radio as well as people trying to
01:27:13 ground radio as well as people trying to talk to you, you're just having too many lines of communication coming into you. So you you use your communication as the instant commander through your team leader and through the command unit. And that way you you limit the amount of communication, verbal communication
01:27:24 communication, verbal communication you've got coming at you at one time because as it was Sorry, you I think you're going to have to try try pausing a bit between sentences and then she may catch up. Thank you. Um, so you switched to your fire ground
01:27:37 Um, so you switched to your fire ground radio, turned your AW radio off when you left the car. Yes.
01:27:41 Yes. Um, would you be able to hear messages broadcast from control to the incident command unit via your fire ground radio? No.
01:27:52 No. So that means that by switch does this is this right that by switching from your airway radio to your fireground radio, you could no longer hear messages coming from control. That's correct. Yes. Did that not
01:28:03 That's correct. Yes. Did that not deprive you of a vital source of information which would guide you in the role you were about to take over? You rely upon that information going via the command unit and the team leader, the comm's officer to the incident
01:28:14 the comm's officer to the incident commander. Right. But the problem was that you the team leader you were with, Mark Kenfield, also didn't have his airwave radio.
01:28:21 radio. No, but he used the handheld radio to talk to the command unit. I see. So
01:28:24 I see. So So effectively with a lot of information coming in as it was on that night, as the instant commander, you haven't got the ability to write it all down or record it. So, so although it's important information, you trust the systems and structures in place to deal
01:28:35 systems and structures in place to deal with it for you rather than um because there's just otherwise too many sources of talking if you like going on at one time rather than so you're trying to limit that sort of span of communication,
01:28:46 communication, right? But but but that means does it that that instead of having a direct ear to the communications between control and the and and the incident ground, you're now reliant on uh messages being
01:28:59 you're now reliant on uh messages being passed not just from control to the command unit, but from the control from the command unit to Mark Kenfield and then he has to tell you about them. Yes, you are. Yeah. And that would be normal for the fires we attend. But
01:29:11 normal for the fires we attend. But you're creating extra links in the communication chain that way, aren't you?
01:29:14 you? You are. Yes. or you're limiting the communication links. So the structure in place would be the comm the control talk to the command unit and then the command unit talks to the instant commander rather
01:29:25 talks to the instant commander rather than control talks directly to the instant commander because a lot any fire a lot of information comes across from control to the command unit and you need to filter that information out at any fire. So if
01:29:36 that information out at any fire. So if you were if you were as commander were directly communicating all the time with control, you'd be continuously sending or receiving messages and you rely upon your comms officer and the command unit to do that for you. Right. Do do you do you recall hearing
01:29:50 Right. Do do you do you recall hearing through any means of communication uh at the time that group manager Welch had taken over incident command? No,
01:29:59 No, that that's timed at 0204 and it's in the short incident log at page 21. That's the timing. Does that assist you in your recollection? First I became aware that Richard was on the fire ground was when I went on to
01:30:10 the fire ground was when I went on to command unit afterwards. Right. Had you had your airwave radio with you, would you have heard that message?
01:30:17 message? Yes, I expect I would have done. Yes. With that said, there was a lot of noise around that time. So if at that time I'm in the vicinity of the tower, uh the noise around that area was horrendous.
01:30:28 noise around that area was horrendous. So it was almost the equivalent of a small jet engine going off is how it sounded. So whether I would have heard it more clearly or not, I I wouldn't recall, but it would have been available to me. I suppose it's fair to say. Does that mean that Mark Kentfield, who
01:30:40 Does that mean that Mark Kentfield, who as you said was in touch with the command unit through his fire ground radio, didn't tell you that group manager Welch had taken over as incident commander? No, he did not. The first I knew of Richard even being at the fire ground
01:30:52 Richard even being at the fire ground was when I went on the command unit. Did that come as a surprise to you that you did not know that group manager Welch, prior to that, had become incident commander? It came a surprise to me when I got on the command unit and Richard was on there wearing the instant
01:31:03 Richard was on there wearing the instant commander tab. Yes, that was a surprise. Right now, uh, can I take you to page seven of your statement a little lower down? You you say I think this is again
01:31:18 down? You you say I think this is again five lines down from the top. I think I first saw the fire either on Sdar Road or Grenfell Road. I could see approximately the top 15 floors of the tower block and that there were flames
01:31:30 tower block and that there were flames on the northeast corner in particular and a limited amount of flames on the central part of the east face. The flames were yellow and very bright and were pushing out from the building particularly on the norththeast corner.
01:31:44 particularly on the norththeast corner. Now first of all what was your general understanding of the nature of fire spread that you could see? Uh so my expectation of a fire that's spreading on the outside of a building would be
01:31:56 on the outside of a building would be normally it is either scaffolding where a building is under refurbishment. You've got the uh netting and the boarding itself that can catch fire or you've got uh balconies for it to spread from one balcony to another is not that
01:32:08 from one balcony to another is not that unusual. Um particularly if people have got um stuff on their balcony and or there's wooden balconies. Um but I couldn't see either of those. So my surprise was that the the fascia of the
01:32:19 surprise was that the the fascia of the building was what appeared to be on fire and that appeared to be explosively violently being pushed away from the building as well and you could see that from some distance away. Yes. And uh you say that that you say
01:32:32 Yes. And uh you say that that you say that in the next sentence of your of your your statement. Did it occur to you that the exterior cladding was a light? So at that point I was thinking it was a fascia um which could be cladding. At that point I couldn't tell what the
01:32:43 that point I couldn't tell what the fascia was or what type it is. Clearly, it was a combustible fascia. Yeah. So, it's not the fascia I would expect on a building of that type. So, I could tell the type of building was a 1960s or 1970s normally council tower
01:32:54 1960s or 1970s normally council tower block. Um, I've attended lots of those and they don't normally look like that. They're normally concrete um exteriors. So, it was clear that a fascia of some sort or a cladding had been put on the outside of that building and you could
01:33:05 outside of that building and you could tell that by um how the building looked. It didn't look as those buildings would normally look. Prior to that moment, had you had any personal professional experience of dealing with a fire on a
01:33:16 experience of dealing with a fire on a fascia on a high-rise block such as this?
01:33:19 this? No.
01:33:19 No. So, this was a first for you, was it? Uh, yes.
01:33:22 Uh, yes. Right.
01:33:24 Right. And could you see at that point whether the fire had penetrated any flats? Not from the angle I was at. No. So, as you come up um Grenfell Road, you're at quite an acute angle to the east face of
01:33:37 quite an acute angle to the east face of the building. So the view I'm getting is the flames coming out from the side of the building, right? Rather than being able to tell if there's individual flats or light. Right. Now, you said before that on arrival it was very much on your it was
01:33:49 arrival it was very much on your it was on your radar that that was something you needed to ascertain. Uh did you ask or set about ascertaining whether or not the fire you could see on the exterior had penetrated plats?
01:34:01 exterior had penetrated plats? Uh that was something I needed to establish. Yes. And I was going to do that through the instant command. And how and did you go about establishing that? uh through Andy and Mike. Yes, through Andy and Mike to a limited extent from the view, but the angle I was at, which was probably
01:34:12 the angle I was at, which was probably 15 or 20 degrees to the building, you couldn't see if the fire was in the flats or if it was just contained on the outside of the building. Okay. Now, you said through Andy and Mike. We'll come to the I assuming you
01:34:23 Mike. We'll come to the I assuming you mean Andy Walton and Mike Davin. That's correct. Yes. At the briefing you got moments later. We'll come to that in just a in just a moment. But just at the point at which you could see the fire on the exterior. Yes. Did you think in that moment that
01:34:35 Yes. Did you think in that moment that this fire could be contained or controlled in any way? So my expectation was that the at that point? No. I think I I was probably waiting for a briefing still at that
01:34:46 waiting for a briefing still at that point and to get closer to it. So I'm still probably 50 or 75 meters away from it. So at the at that point I'm just seeing an exterior building fire. I can't I need to get closer to make the assessment you're probably thinking.
01:34:58 assessment you're probably thinking. I see.
01:34:58 I see. So when you say no, you mean you didn't know one way or the other? Yes. that I mean we haven't got the ability to put an external fire out using aerials for example above probably the 12th to 13th floor. So I would I
01:35:10 the 12th to 13th floor. So I would I would be relying upon the fire burning out rather than above the 12 or 13th floor rather than us being able to put out an exterior fire on those upper floors.
01:35:18 floors. Right now don't if that answers one of the questions just on that last answer. You'd be reliant on the fire burning out above the 12th or 13th floor. Just just
01:35:29 the 12th or 13th floor. Just just breaking that down a little bit. Does that mean that at that moment you knew or realized that or had realized that there was no possibility of extinguishing the fire on the exterior
01:35:40 extinguishing the fire on the exterior above the 13th floor 12th or 13th floor? Either our appliances are on monitors wouldn't have been able to attack the fire externally uh above probably the 13th floor. Um so you are relying upon
01:35:52 13th floor. Um so you are relying upon the fire on the exterior whatever type of fire it is burning off or burning out. And what we can attack is fires on the inside of the building, but we have no facility to attack the fires as high up as that on the outside of the building.
01:36:02 building. Now, you say you're reliant on the fire burning out above the 12th or 13th floor. What experience or training had you had on that ever happening
01:36:13 you had on that ever happening in a high-rise building? Well, necessarily. Um, you wouldn't expect there to be a high-rise exterior fire that high up. So, specific training on how to attack an exterior fire on a building that
01:36:24 an exterior fire on a building that high, you wouldn't have. I haven't had training for because you wouldn't have expected the fire on the outside of the building like that at that level. So you were reliant were you on something which you never had training on and never had experience of.
01:36:38 on and never had experience of. Uh it's not something we I was expecting to arrive at to have a fire on the outside of a building across so many multiple floors. No.
01:36:45 No. And we can't attack the fire on those upper floors from the outside. You can attempt to fire attack fires from the inside.
01:36:52 inside. Yes.
01:36:55 Yes. My question is slightly different. Does that mean that you were reliant as you say on the exterior of the fire above the 12th or 13th floor burning
01:37:06 above the 12th or 13th floor burning out? You were reliant on something of which you've never had experience and on which you've never had training. Um I haven't had a training or experience of an external facious fire
01:37:17 experience of an external facious fire across that many floors. No. So, how could you make an assessment of how firm your reliance was on the exterior burning out? So, whatever whatever it is that's
01:37:28 So, whatever whatever it is that's burning, whatever the fuel is, if you like, so the fascia, or in this case, it was the cladding. Um, in any normal fire, you would expect a fire to burn upwards, that's the the gases and the products of the combustion take it upwards towards the roof of the
01:37:39 upwards towards the roof of the building, which is where I'd seen it get to, so I could already see it was at the roof at that point. Um, you don't normally have fire spread horizontally and you don't normally have fire spread downwards, certainly not from direct
01:37:50 downwards, certainly not from direct flame impingement. So, the fire from what I could see on the northeast had already reached the top of the building. So, it already, if you like, done its worst based on what I had experienced with fires previously, as in they burn
01:38:01 with fires previously, as in they burn upwards. Um and so and because of the way it was burning so violently, my expectation was that that product the the cladding would burn off and come down off the building and it would effectively there'd be no more cladding
01:38:13 effectively there'd be no more cladding to burn.
01:38:14 to burn. Right. But your expectation as you you keep calling it isn't wasn't based on any experience or any training was it? No, it's based on expectation of what what I'm used to fires happening or what
01:38:25 what I'm used to fires happening or what fires would do but not on based on training. I hadn't had training in external cladding fire at that high point. No. Right. Did you did you think did you have any kind of fallback plan as to what if your reliance on the exterior
01:38:36 what if your reliance on the exterior burning out was wrong? Uh you you based it on the fire you are confronted with at that point in time and what you anticipate the fire will do.
01:38:44 do. So my anticipation was that the fire had reached the top of the building uh the external fire that is sorry um and that the expectation would that be that the cladding was burning itself off. So from that distance I could see it was burning
01:38:55 that distance I could see it was burning and coming off the building. So at some point that fuel so the cladding itself will all be gone and will have the external fire potentially would be finished if you like and then we'd be have to deal with the internal fire.
01:39:06 have to deal with the internal fire. Did you see the fire spreading laterally at that point? No.
01:39:09 No. Right. Not at the top. No. At the very top northeast corner. It looked like it was uh there was there was virtually no wind that night. So certainly not a ground level, but it looked at the top when you looked up as
01:39:20 looked at the top when you looked up as though there might be a slight wind at the top because it was uh it was slightly curving around the northeast corner at the top of the building. But it wasn't blowing strongly around and it wasn't pushing in any particular direction in any strength.
01:39:31 direction in any strength. Given what you had seen and given what you had heard on the radio, at least your airwave radio before you turned it off, did you have any thoughts at that
01:39:42 off, did you have any thoughts at that time as to whether you should be considering an evacuation strategy for some or all of the block? So the intention would be on arrival that everyone within that building would be either rescued or evacuated. There wouldn't have been any intention to
01:39:53 wouldn't have been any intention to leave anyone within that building. So that would always been part of a plan to make sure that everyone is taken out of that building. Right. And and what was that plan at that time? Uh the plan to rescue and evacuate
01:40:04 Uh the plan to rescue and evacuate everyone.
01:40:04 everyone. Yeah.
01:40:05 Yeah. Uh at that time when I've not taken over from either Andy or um Mike, then that plan is not in place because I'm not the instant commander at that point. But my expectation is I will need to prioritize
01:40:16 expectation is I will need to prioritize those most at risk and get those out and then we can work on rescuing and evacuating other people within the building.
01:40:22 building. Now, we looked at prioritizing those most at risk before. How would you go about prioritizing those most at risk? Uh so those most at risk would be the fire survival guidance calls, right?
01:40:30 right? Um and then you'd work on others that are most likely affected by the fire. So when you look at a building such as that, the uh you tend to work on the higher floors first. So if there is uh as you described, if there is any smoke
01:40:42 as you described, if there is any smoke within the staircase or the lobbies, the smoke tends to go up. So you'd want to rescue evacuate the top floors first and then work your way down. Um you'd also look at where the areas may be safe. So at this point in time, the fire was on
01:40:53 at this point in time, the fire was on the northeast side of the building. So the expectation would be that, for example, anyone on the southwest side of the building should be safe because there's no reason to believe that fire is going to spread externally around the
01:41:04 is going to spread externally around the building and there's no reason to believe the fire is going to spread internally through the lobbies. So So just just on that last answer, you say there's no expectation or no reason to believe the fire is going to spread
01:41:15 to believe the fire is going to spread externally around the building. Uh c can you just square that with something you told us earlier just a little moment ago about um eventually the all the cladding would burn and fall
01:41:26 the all the cladding would burn and fall off. Um did you expect expect it to spread laterally or did did you expect that it would burn off once it reached the top and stop there on that east face? So fires in buildings rarely go laterally. They the direct flame
01:41:37 laterally. They the direct flame impingement doesn't tend to go that way. So it was very unusual what happened that night where it then horizontally went around the building and in some cases started burning downwards as well. That's not something I'd experienced
01:41:48 That's not something I'd experienced before in this type of building at all even in cladding fires or any other type of fire. So so it was unexpected that it and it was unexpected that night the way it then burnt um not just upwards but it
01:41:59 it then burnt um not just upwards but it was burning. So effectively normally a burnt fire would burn upwards cuz the heat and the gases and the flammable gases are going upwards. That's a natural direction. by burning horizontally or in fact diagonally downwards which it was doing. It has to
01:42:11 downwards which it was doing. It has to be direct flame impingement. The product has to be catching light and that wasn't something I had anticipated or expected. My expectation was that the flammable gases and the hot gases rising were what were causing the fire and that's how it
01:42:22 were causing the fire and that's how it looked from the ground floor as well that it had caught a light at a lower floor and it burnt upwards which is normal for a fire.
01:42:32 Did you um
01:42:38 ask anybody? Now I'm looking at the moment you're arriving just before your handover. Did you ask anybody Mark Kentfield particularly because he was with you um what the um what evacuations
01:42:53 with you um what the um what evacuations had so far taken place. I the only conversation I recall with Mark was regarding who was in charge and where the command unit was. Right. I may have spoken more about it's not about that specific point. I think
01:43:04 not about that specific point. I think between Mark and the bottom of the tower, I focused on the tower and probably collecting myself and getting myself ready to take over. I don't recall any further conversations with Mark.
01:43:12 Mark. Now, just on just just at that moment before the handover and pausing at the moment when you look up and you see what you see, was a plan in your head forming
01:43:23 you see, was a plan in your head forming as to evacuation of this block either in whole or in part? Uh, yeah. Yeah. So the plan would be that there'd be a rescue and evacuation of the entire block and that we'd have to do that in a priority order. So
01:43:34 to do that in a priority order. So already I was thinking that. Yes. Okay.
01:43:37 Okay. And a lot of that sir is on the basis that we would not have a 25 pump fire in a high-rise building that I'm aware of. So you you wouldn't expect to leave anyone in that building after the fire had been dealt with because the building
01:43:49 had been dealt with because the building owners need to decide that the building is safe for those occupants to reoccupy and go back into. So with such a catastrophic failing already on the outside of the building, it was clear that, you know, we wouldn't intend to leave anyone within that building.
01:44:01 leave anyone within that building. Now, just at that point, and I'm interested in getting your impression and thoughts prior to the handover, but at that moment, can you just give us a snapshot of how you intended to go about
01:44:13 snapshot of how you intended to go about affecting that evacuation that you've told us about? So it would prioritize who we thought we need to go out first. be the the fastest survival guidance calls for example. Um and then we would look at who then was
01:44:25 and then we would look at who then was most at risk after that. Most likely it would be the floors the northeast side of the building where the fire appeared to be the upper floors where you are likely to have or possibility of smoke logging and then you would work
01:44:36 logging and then you would work methodically through the rest of the floors.
01:44:38 floors. Right. So you had at the moment of handover or prior to it at least some idea of how to go about prioritizing rescues.
01:44:44 rescues. Yes, definitely. Right. Now let's move on um with to the handover itself on on page seven of your statement u where we are still are
01:44:56 statement u where we are still are you say just below halfway down I then saw SM Andy Walton he was wearing the incident command tabard I met with Andy at position A indicated on map AF10
01:45:09 at position A indicated on map AF10 and if we can just look at that that's me 015702
01:45:14 me 015702 two.
01:45:21 Can you just point out position A to us? I think we can see it just below the right of the walkway. I think it was probably further to the left. And the reason for that is if you look just to the north of where the TL's marked, that's the grassy area and the
01:45:33 marked, that's the grassy area and the TL wasn't on the grassy area. It was it was more across where the walkway is. So I think the T So that's that's the approach I took. But I think the TL was more over to the left as you look at it or to the west.
01:45:44 or to the west. Was the TL under the walkway at that point?
01:45:47 point? It was under the walkway. Yes. It was um it had it was sheltering under the walkway. It was housed and it was under the walkway and it was it was in line with the paved area, not with the grass. So it it appeared like it I expected it had been
01:45:58 appeared like it I expected it had been on the paved area and reversed up. So it's probably just slightly further to the left. Right. So where should point A be? Um may I point to it? You may. Okay.
01:46:10 You may. Okay. So I'd say that the TL was here and I walked in and then met Andy around here. So just
01:46:16 So just just pop in that area on the edge of a cupboard underneath the walkway as well. Underneath the walkway at the very southeast of the court to distance wise probably no more than 10 m to the left of where that where it's marked at the moment.
01:46:27 marked at the moment. Now do you remember roughly what I would say what time that was? How long after you arrived? Um so from arrival I obviously have to put my fire gear on. So, by the time I put my fire gear on, it's probably a
01:46:38 put my fire gear on, it's probably a couple of minutes. And then walking up the road, I would expect that's no more than two minutes either. It's it's probably a couple hundred meters, maybe 300 meters, but it's I think my
01:46:49 300 meters, but it's I think my distances are slightly wrong in my statement, but um I can't imagine it took more than a couple of minutes. Obviously, you're walking quite brisally as well.
01:46:55 as well. Yes. Now, uh let me just see if I can be even more precise because we have to be precise. Can I ask you please to look at LFB quadruple03117
01:47:08 um which is the PRC notes
01:47:18 which we've also got at tab 20 um 24 of our documents bundle and go to page 13 of that the relativity reference page team.
01:47:38 Now you uh say there uh
01:47:48 about halfway down uh DAC best guess met with Andy Walton 01
01:47:55 01 56 approx
01:47:58 56 approx does that say it's an approximate that's your best guess does that is that still your best guess I'd say it's probably too quick if I've arrived at 0155 it would have taken at least a minute or two to put my five gear on in another minute or two to walk
01:48:09 gear on in another minute or two to walk up to the so probably closer to 0158 or 0159.
01:48:14 0159. Okay. Uh now you say in your statement just going back to it page seven
01:48:26 that
01:48:33 uh he he confirmed he was in charge.
01:48:39 uh and uh you say it is very unusual for a DAC to take over from a station manager even at a smaller fire. So at a 25 pump fire it made me wonder where the group manager was. Did you ask that
01:48:50 group manager was. Did you ask that question of Andy Walton? I didn't because if he was the station manager it meant that he hadn't met a group manager because the group manager would have taken over from him and would be the person there. So I don't specifically think I did ask him. Um
01:49:03 specifically think I did ask him. Um right.
01:49:04 right. And then you go on to say before we spoke I looked up again at the tower. I could see that the fire had gone up a central core of the building on the east elevation and then you've got a you've got a uh
01:49:17 got a uh an exhibit. Um
01:49:21 Um did you realize at that point that it was the cladding that was a light? It now looked like it was cladding. Yeah. So rather than the sort of very thin fascia or something like that that they put on there, it looked like it was
01:49:33 they put on there, it looked like it was something more substantial like a cladding system. right now. If you go to page eight of your statement uh
01:49:41 uh you say
01:49:44 you say uh
01:49:45 uh a third of the way uh down I'll just take you to that. It's you say um I concluded that this was actually helpful for us as
01:49:56 that this was actually helpful for us as the cladding had effectively burnt off the building leaving only pockets of fire. These pockets weren't significant and so shouldn't have penetrated the building. The cladding on section CD was
01:50:08 building. The cladding on section CD was burning off quite vigorously as well. This is a reference to your plan. And then you go on to say at the last uh in the last line there, last sentence, I believe that the construction of the building should protect it and keep the
01:50:20 building should protect it and keep the fire outside.
01:50:24 And then in the next paragraph you say
01:50:28 you say uh
01:50:30 uh just below halfway down. My expectation was that if we were unlucky perhaps one or two flats, one or two flats with open windows could catch light, but it looked
01:50:41 windows could catch light, but it looked at this point as though the fire had possibly done its worst on the east elevation. I could see pockets of fire dotted around areas of the east elevation where the cladding had already come away. It didn't look as though any of the flats were a light.
01:50:53 of the flats were a light. I assumed that these pockets of fire were something to do with how the cladding had been attached to the building.
01:51:00 building. Now you say that there. Can I take you to the PRC meeting notes again? LFB quadruple 03117 and ask you please to go to page 19.
01:51:26 you say halfway down in those notes, I should just tell you what these are. I'm so sorry. Um these are notes uh of a meeting uh on the 3rd of July 2017
01:51:41 meeting uh on the 3rd of July 2017 um with the incident commanders, a PRC meeting. Do you remember at that meeting? Okay. And these notes were taken in manuscript by a notetaker um uh I think it's Tom George. Uh and
01:51:55 um uh I think it's Tom George. Uh and what that's what we're looking at. Um if you go to um back to the page I showed I asked you to go to page 19 you say just below halfway down
01:52:08 uh I was surprised I was taking over from Andy and SM. Andy had only just taken over. Was clear where fire started. Fire was in flats.
01:52:20 where fire started. Fire was in flats. no clear indication of how many involved.
01:52:27 So is it right that at this meeting you did recall this is 3rd of July last year that you did know that the fire was in flats.
01:52:40 Uh so still my expectation is that um this so
01:52:45 this so yes so this is after I've spoken to Andy. So before I spoken to Andy, my expectation was that there would be the fire would get into some flats from open windows. Looking at that, it's it looks like I'm saying what was clear where the
01:52:57 like I'm saying what was clear where the fire started must have come from Andy and Mike because they knew exactly where the fire was started. And then when it says fire was in flats, I'm not sure if that refers to the fourth floor flat or other flats. But um but I think that's
01:53:11 other flats. But um but I think that's after I've taken over that comment because
01:53:14 because right
01:53:14 right but the expectation my expectation even before taking over was that there would be fire in some flats because of the calls that we'd received. Yeah. So so and it was on your radar as you told us. So when you when you say in your statement
01:53:26 your statement um that it looked at at this point as though the fire had possibly done its worst. I'm sorry I'm looking at the wrong place. expectation was that we if we were unlucky perhaps one or two flats with open windows could catch light. Um
01:53:37 with open windows could catch light. Um that expectation did you really have that expectation? Uh it's probably more than one or two. Um what I may have meant there is that the so some of the flats have been affected by smoke. Um that is that
01:53:49 affected by smoke. Um that is that actually they're going to the fire is going to penetrate and and set fire to the flat. So we would have individual flat fires on a number of floors. Uh one or two is probably too low. It's probably my expectation as I was arriving. Certainly when I saw it, I
01:54:00 arriving. Certainly when I saw it, I would have expected possibly more. Um.
01:54:04 Um. Right.
01:54:05 Right. Yeah. So I think it's probably the difference between those affected by smoke and those that are on fire, but one or two is probably too likely would have been more than that I would have expected based on the calls that we were receiving. Right. Okay.
01:54:18 Based on the calls that we've being received
01:54:20 received that I sorry that I'd heard on route. So Right. Okay.
01:54:27 And then if we can go to your contemporaneous note, we'll come back to this um this record in in due course, Mr. Lachlin, but go to your contemporaneous note, please, and turn
01:54:38 contemporaneous note, please, and turn to page um five of that, this is 5213, me quadruple 0 5213. And at page five,
01:54:49 me quadruple 0 5213. And at page five, just to make this absolutely clear, you say the in the middle of the page there under the heading fire spread, you say, "The fire spread as though it was wrapping around the building from the east stroke north when I first arrived
01:55:01 east stroke north when I first arrived to the west, then to the south. It seemed to spread upwards, sideward, and downward. It was clear that the fire was spreading externally, but that the flats were catching a
01:55:13 but that the flats were catching a light.
01:55:15 light. At various times it was clear that the entire floors of the building were alike and multiple floors were alike at the same time. Now this is a in a part of your um contemporaneous note under
01:55:27 your um contemporaneous note under paragraph 11 some way into it about what you actually did and that description there is very general to to be fair to you. Can I just ask you, taking it line by line,
01:55:39 by line, you say, "The fire spread as though it was wrapping around the building from the east stroke north when I first arrived to the west and to the south." Is what you're describing there what you saw when you first arrived? Wrapping
01:55:50 saw when you first arrived? Wrapping around the building from the east stroke north to the west and the south? No.
01:55:55 No. So that's later on. So when I arrived, there was no fire spread to the south side of the building and no fire spread to the west side of the building either. Then it seemed to spread upward, sideward, and downward. Is that when you first arrived or is that late?
01:56:07 first arrived or is that late? So that whole paragraph is a summary of what the fire did over the 10 hours that I was standing in front of the building. Okay.
01:56:13 Okay. [Music]
01:56:16 And when you say it was clear that the fire was spreading externally, but that the flats were catching a light. We've looked at some of this material now, but flats catching a light. That was something you did see on arrival or didn't know about on arrival.
01:56:27 didn't know about on arrival. No. So when on arrival I couldn't see that the flats were alike because of the angle I was at. But my expectation was that there would be flats of light but I couldn't see I couldn't see which ones were alike from the angle I was at. You
01:56:38 were alike from the angle I was at. You know you could just see the flames coming out from the side of the building which was the fascia and my expectation was that there would be flats of light as well.
01:56:46 as well. Okay. And it was once you had a is this right? Once you had the handover from Andy Walton that you knew that there were flats on fire on the upper floors. No, that wasn't clear at that point in time either. Never mind where they are. We'll come to that. But flats on fire.
01:57:01 As you've as you've seen from the PRC notes we've looked at a moment ago, uh,
01:57:06 uh, fire was in the flats. I'm not sure if that was on the handover. I don't think it was on the handover.
01:57:10 handover. Well, I think there may be some confusion here. Um, are you talking about the flats of origin or other flats which weren't initially involved? So on the handover, I was definitely made aware that the fourth floor flat of
01:57:21 made aware that the fourth floor flat of origin was a light. Um I wasn't on the handover told about any other flats that they knew were alive. So going back to the PLC note if I let's just be clear
01:57:32 just be clear and we got a little ahead of ourselves because you say that this was on handover but in in the middle of that page which is page um 19 um where you say was clear where fire
01:57:43 um where you say was clear where fire started fire was in flats no clear indication of how many involved. I thought we'd got to a position whereby at least by the end of the handover from Andy Walton, you were aware that there
01:57:54 Andy Walton, you were aware that there were there were multiple flats on fire even though you didn't know how many. Not from the handover. No. So Mike, so so what is that a reference to then? That's because because of the calls that
01:58:05 That's because because of the calls that I've heard coming in on the FSG calls. My understanding is that there is fire in flats on the upper floors or at least smoke affecting those flats. So I don't know the context of that conversation. That's it's obviously a short note of
01:58:16 That's it's obviously a short note of the conversation, but it wasn't as part of the handover that they told me there was flats on the upper floors on fire. That was my expectation on the FSG calls and in fact that was right. Yeah.
01:58:27 and in fact that was right. Yeah. Okay. So what so when we uh see going back to on that page of that the PRC notes you saying the fire was in flats no clear indication of how many involved
01:58:39 no clear indication of how many involved just to be absolutely crystal clear that's your recollection of what you learned from the FSG calls you'd heard on your airwave radio on route yes I think so I see not something you'd heard seen as you've told us or something you heard
01:58:50 you've told us or something you heard from Andy Walton is that is that right that's not my understanding I think that's putting aside PRC notes I think conversation with Andy Walton my understanding was that there firing flats and that was based on the um based on the fire survival guidance calls I'd
01:59:02 on the fire survival guidance calls I'd heard and I may have had that conversation with Andy and Mike but they were not aware of particular flats that were on fire. Right now can I get ask you to go to your contemporaneous notes at page two.
01:59:24 Um, this is paragraph 10 and the question is uh what were you tasked with doing on your arrival?
01:59:35 tasked with doing on your arrival? You uh say that you met Andy Walton and say where and then you say I received a short brief from him as he had limited information and then three lines down from that you
01:59:46 and then three lines down from that you say the fire was not only on the east side and northeast corner but had also developed around the north side and was wrapping around the building. Note this was a description I received many times
01:59:57 was a description I received many times from officers and firefighters. So just just just coming back to the point about fire spread on the basis of this note it looks like your recollection was that on arrival
02:00:09 your recollection was that on arrival you could see that there was lateral fire spread on the exterior. Is that right?
02:00:16 right? No. My interpretation at that point in time is that's still the top of the building where you could see the flames almost being blown around that way. So because it's a corner, the northeast corner of the building, uh those flats
02:00:27 corner of the building, uh those flats normally are laid out so that there's a a room in that corner. So if a room if the fire has gone up that northeast corner, it is likely that it's on that northeast corner on the north side and the east side of it. So
02:00:38 north side and the east side of it. So my interpretation of that was that it had gone up the east fascia and was affecting the northeast corner. So both both sides if you like of the northeast corner.
02:00:46 corner. Yeah. And then when it had got to the top, the wrapping around at that point in time, not later on, but certainly that point in time, it appeared to be where the top of the building, there was a slight wind. It was blowing it around towards the north side um on the just at
02:00:59 towards the north side um on the just at the top of the building. So my interpretation wasn't that it was the lateral fire spread if you like from the materials. It was that the wind was slightly blowing it around on the northeast corner at that point in time. Later on, the wrapping around was about
02:01:10 Later on, the wrapping around was about describing how the building was it was horizontally going around at all levels. So, so that at that point in time though, it's just about the top of the building.
02:01:19 building. So, when you use the phrase was wrapping around the building, what what what what do you mean? So, the way a few firefighters said it during the whole evening was that it appears to be wrapping around the building. In other words, going
02:01:30 building. In other words, going horizontally around the building, which is very unusual. But at that first time, I can't recall if it was definitely a conversation that took place with Andy that wrapping around the building, but I think we meant the top of the building or the
02:01:41 meant the top of the building or the conversation was about the wind appears to be blowing it around the top corner of the building, which again, wind will affect the building differently at the high levels than it will at the low levels.
02:01:51 levels. But it certainly wasn't a conversation around it being um direct flame spread horizontally around the building. That's not what it was a conversation. It was around. It was around I think if it was wrapping around the building it was the blind the wind that was blowing it
02:02:03 blind the wind that was blowing it around the top of the building. So you thought that was wind? Yes. And that's not unusual and that's how it looked. So the so where I was standing on the southeast corner the fire was going away and to the northeast if you like. So it was coming directly
02:02:14 if you like. So it was coming directly out the east side of the building and then it was going around to the the northwest side if you like. So although there was a very limited wind at the lowest levels, it looked looking up as though there was probably light wind at higher levels that was blowing the smoke
02:02:26 higher levels that was blowing the smoke and flames slightly off towards the northwest side, but very little. Did you also see fire spread moving towards the south side of the building, the southeast corner?
02:02:37 the southeast corner? No, at that point in time, no, it was on the northeast corner predominantly. Sure.
02:02:41 Sure. Northeast side, sorry, I should say. and the and in the middle of the eastern side appeared to be um a column which I think was where the TL looked like it may have been that some of it looked like it had been put out and then others
02:02:53 like it had been put out and then others it looked like it may have burned out and that was the sort of central core of the eastern side of the tower but there was nothing on the southwest corner at that point in time. The southwest corner was completely unaffected at that point as far as I can recall.
02:03:09 Okay. Um at the point of your handover, can we summarize it this way that at least at that stage you knew could see that the fire hadn't arrested and was still continuing to develop?
02:03:21 still continuing to develop? Yes.
02:03:23 Yes. Um
02:03:25 Um at the time of handover, did you ask Andy Walton or indeed anybody who had been inside the building uh what the conditions were like inside? Yes. So I asked Mike the conditions.
02:03:36 Yes. So I asked Mike the conditions. He responded I thought he responded that I've not been in. I think he said, "I've not been in for a while." Right. So, he didn't know the conditions. Okay. Um,
02:03:46 now we'll come back to that in a minute if I can, but just on page eight of your statement, just to pick up a point. Um, you,
02:03:54 you, um, you say you could see the glass entrance and firefighters moving in and out. um
02:04:06 in the second paragraph just below halfway down.
02:04:13 Uh
02:04:19 can I just ask you um could you see casualties coming out
02:04:25 during the handover with Mike and Andy? I don't think I recall casualties coming out, but my focus would have been on the conversation with those two. Okay.
02:04:36 Could you you could you didn't observe yourself a flow of occupants? No, the mezzanine area. I recall um looking at the the pump that was operating that was supplying the dry in
02:04:47 operating that was supplying the dry in Maine and a number of firefighters going in and out and firefighters in that ground floor mezzanine area, but I can't recall any uh members of public coming out. They may have done during that time, but my focus would have been on
02:04:58 time, but my focus would have been on the conversation with Andy and Mike and looking at the exterior fire right now. Um, on page nine of your statement, if we just go to that, um, you say, "I spoke to Andy and told
02:05:09 um, you say, "I spoke to Andy and told him I was taking over." This is a quarter of the way down, so third main second main paragraph. I can't recall the exact conversation, you say, but I always use the same decision-making model so I have an idea of the structure
02:05:20 model so I have an idea of the structure of the briefing. Is that the decision-making model you referred to earlier in your evidence? Uh, the DNM. Yes. Yes. DMM. And just for our our note, that's that's policy 341, is it?
02:05:31 that's policy 341, is it? Uh, it most likely is. Yes. Sorry, I don't know the policies by number. Right. Okay. Um, now what structure for the briefing did you adopt? Um, so the first thing I did was tell him I was taking over. Yes.
02:05:42 Yes. Uh, then asked him and I think actually before I think very quickly he told me he'd only just taken over. So I asked him who he' taken over from and he pointed to Mike. Um, I didn't know Mike Dowen at that point at all, but I could
02:05:54 Dowen at that point at all, but I could see that he was a watch manager. Where was he standing at that point, Mike?
02:05:57 Mike? Probably the other side of the TL. So, around maybe 10 meters away from us. Right. So, between us and the mezzanine entrance, but about maybe less than 10 meters.
02:06:04 meters. And did he have to be summoned over? Yes, I sent I sent Andy to go and get Mike.
02:06:08 Mike. Right.
02:06:10 Right. And uh carry on with the structure of the briefings. What the structure did you as well? Predominantly the briefing came from Mike although Andy gave some of it and it was because Mike had the detailed knowledge from the start of the fire. So
02:06:22 knowledge from the start of the fire. So I would have asked him I did ask him you know where was the fire and he started with it was on the fourth floor uh the flat of origin. I asked him about the person in that flat and he knew they were out. I think he possibly even spoken to that person. He knew that the
02:06:35 spoken to that person. He knew that the fire had started in a fridge and that they thought they had put the fire out in that flat. Um, but then he said he'd seen the fire go outside the flat and then I can't remember his words, but it
02:06:46 then I can't remember his words, but it had just spread rapidly on the outside of the building up to, you know, where we could see which was all the way up to the top.
02:06:52 the top. Right.
02:06:53 Right. Um, I think that may have covered the fire and then very quickly I asked him about the FSG. Right. Um, I'm just going to come back to that in just a second. Before I do, can I just ask you this? Um, was Mark
02:07:06 can I just ask you this? Um, was Mark Kentfield still with you at the point when you're briefing? Yes, he was standing to my left and uh Mike's right. So, in a triangle if you like, you had me standing facing the mezzanine, um Andy to the right of me,
02:07:18 mezzanine, um Andy to the right of me, Mike opposite me, and then Mark to my left.
02:07:20 left. Right. Uh, and was Mark Kenfield there throughout the whole briefing? Yes,
02:07:25 Yes, he was.
02:07:30 Now, you say in your statement, and you've just said it now, that you um learned that Andy Walton had only taken over a few minutes before and that your briefing mainly came from Mike Dow. That's paragraph page nine, about
02:07:41 That's paragraph page nine, about halfway down the the page there. Um uh did he Mike Dowen that is tell you anything specific about the fire spread?
02:07:54 anything specific about the fire spread? The fire spread on the outside of the building? Yes. He pointed that it had been in a fourth floor flat and then it had got on the outside of the building and I can't remember Zach's word but it had gone quickly up the outside of the building and we could physically see a
02:08:06 building and we could physically see a number of numerous times Mike and Andy tried to step out from underneath the walkway which was quite dangerous to do but they were trying to point out where the fire had gone out particularly Mike he was trying to show me where it had gone out and gone up and you could see
02:08:17 gone out and gone up and you could see it had gone up the north well he was explaining it's gone up the east side and northeast side of the building to the to where it was now at the top. Did he tell you uh anything about the the fire or smoke conditions on the inside of the building?
02:08:28 of the building? No. So when I asked him about the conditions, which was later on, when I asked him about the conditions inside the building, he said he hadn't been in for some time. Right. Did you ask him to find out from immediately from the bridge head what
02:08:40 immediately from the bridge head what the conditions were like inside? Not at that point in time. No, I was still taking a handover at that point in time. So if I if I'd started tasking him with jobs to do, it would have distracted him from what I needed from him, which was a handover briefing. Did
02:08:51 him, which was a handover briefing. Did it surprise you that he didn't know uh what uh the conditions were like or hadn't found out what the conditions were like inside the building at that point?
02:08:59 point? Uh so from from where he said that he hadn't been in for a while, I think what he meant was he'd be guessing what the conditions are like inside the building. Most of your information would normally come from the radios, but the radios at that point in time were overwhelmed with
02:09:10 that point in time were overwhelmed with traffic. They were just um you couldn't make any sense out of what people were trying to say on the radios cuz being a simple system the radio where one person talks to another they were getting cut across continuously so my impression was
02:09:22 across continuously so my impression was he hadn't had an update for a while. Did you ask him who was uh in command of the bridge head? He told me a watch manager was in charge of the bridge head but I don't recall the name at that point in time or if he told me a name. I think he may have just
02:09:33 told me a name. I think he may have just said there's a watch manager in charge of the bridge head. Did you ask him uh what the bridge head had told him, Mike Dowen, about the conditions inside the building?
02:09:43 building? Uh not specifically about the conditions. No, I think he he just before that had thought the fire was out on the fourth floor. That's what he definitely knew. He didn't know about the conditions or he didn't tell me information about the conditions inside the building that had come in from the bridge head or anywhere
02:09:54 come in from the bridge head or anywhere else.
02:09:55 else. Right. So what picture did you have by the end of the briefing about the conditions inside the building? Uh so my expectation was because I'd asked him where the hose had gone in from as well or he told me and the hose had gone in
02:10:07 or he told me and the hose had gone in from the floor below which is which is normal practice. The risk from that is you then um open the lobby doors onto the staircase and any smoke in the lobby from the original fire will go into the staircase. So my expectation although he
02:10:20 staircase. So my expectation although he hadn't told me it is that the smoke from the original fire will have gone into the staircase because we will have breached the doors and in fact we'll be opening and closing the doors continuously whilst we're trying to go up and put the fire out on the fourth
02:10:31 up and put the fire out on the fourth floor. But he that didn't come from Mike that came from the conversation we had about the hose which would have been breaching the door to the staircase. Be beyond some smoke logging or smoke effect as a result of propping the
02:10:43 effect as a result of propping the fourth floor lobby door open. Yes. At the end of the briefing, did you have any picture beyond that of the conditions in the building? No, not beyond uh what I'd heard on the
02:10:57 No, not beyond uh what I'd heard on the calls coming in uh which was limited and u so yeah, I was limited in what I knew about the conditions inside the building at that point. Did you were you conscious at that time that that was a limitation on your
02:11:09 that that was a limitation on your knowledge? Yes. And did would that or did that affect your planning of how to go about commanding this incident? It it affected it in certain extent. I
02:11:20 It it affected it in certain extent. I needed to find out more about what the conditions were inside the building, where the flats were that were on fire, and where the fire survival guidance calls were coming from. Yeah. So, I needed that information established. Um, as in how I was going to structure the
02:11:31 as in how I was going to structure the incident, no, it didn't change that because I was still going to put in the same structures, but it did affect um, you know, the fact that I didn't have as much information about the conditions inside the building as I needed to. No. Um,
02:11:44 No. Um, on page nine of your statement, just about twothirds of the way down. Just a minute. I'm just wondering, we've been running another hour. If we're going to have another break before lunchtime adjournment, we can probably
02:11:55 lunchtime adjournment, we can probably cover it soon. Yeah. We'll have let I'm very happy to take it now. Is that all right? Yes, absolutely. All right. I think we'll have another short break now then, Mr. Lton. Um, again, please don't talk to anyone about
02:12:06 again, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence when they're out of the room. And uh, we'll come back at 25
02:12:12 25 Yes.
02:12:13 Yes. Yes. 25 12. Thank you. Thank you. You like to give the usher, please?
02:12:28 25,000, please.
02:22:21 He's
02:22:41 on his way.
02:22:54 Right, Mr. Lton, happy to carry on. Yes, sir.
02:22:56 Yes, sir. Good. Thank you very much. Mr. Lachlin, thank you for coming back. Um, during the briefing, do you remember Andy Walton being well, you telling Andy Walton that the fire needs to be brought
02:23:07 Walton that the fire needs to be brought under control? Um, I don't think I use those terms. No, I mean, any fire you expect to try and bring the fire under control. Um, so it wouldn't be terms that couldn't have been used, but I don't recall that being
02:23:19 been used, but I don't recall that being a briefing I gave Andy Walter. I don't because Andy Walter's recollection was that you did tell him that the fire needs to be brought under control. In general terms, you are expecting a fire to be brought under control because that's what we do. Um, but I'm not I
02:23:30 that's what we do. Um, but I'm not I don't recall that term. That wasn't to say I didn't say that. I don't recall that term to Andy. I recall the briefing to Andy was particularly to be a sect commander and what I expected from it. I don't recall. I would I wouldn't have expected Andy in
02:23:41 I would I wouldn't have expected Andy in the time he's going to be the sector commander to be able to bring that fire under control. I see. Now um on page nine of your statement just about twothirds of the way down you
02:23:53 way down you uh you say this is the third main paragraph. I asked him about people. This is Mike Den. I asked him about people and he explained that there had been a man in the flat but he was now
02:24:04 been a man in the flat but he was now out and they had evacuated the neighbors and possibly people from the floors above. He didn't know what was involved on the upper floors, but was aware that there were fire survival guidance calls coming in and that he had someone dealing with those on a pump.
02:24:17 dealing with those on a pump. Uh now,
02:24:20 Uh now, and you thought you were given Brett Loft's name, but later on, did you did you ask him uh for the name of the person dealing with FSG when he told you there was someone dealing with the I didn't ask him for no name. No, I
02:24:31 I didn't ask him for no name. No, I think uh they told me it was an officer or Mike told me it was an officer. Did you ask him which pump was said to be taking FSG calls? Golf 271 rings a bell, but I don't think they were certain themselves. I think they said that it's he's on a pump or
02:24:43 they said that it's he's on a pump or they're on a pump. Um, and they they pointed in a general direction actually towards sort of behind me somewhere, which would have been back towards the uh sports center and the CU7 area and but they didn't know exactly well they
02:24:55 but they didn't know exactly well they didn't point to someone um and they didn't they didn't give me a name. Right. Did you get any sense that actually a command unit was handling FSG calls?
02:25:04 calls? It wasn't a command unit handling. No, it was a pump is the way I recall it. Right.
02:25:09 Right. So, nobody told you that actually a a command unit was receiving FSG information from control. Not at that point in time. That when did you first discover that? Um, sorry. Go back a step there. Sorry.
02:25:21 Um, sorry. Go back a step there. Sorry. A command unit receiving the calls. Yes, I'd heard that the commander, but not that someone so that's someone's been assigned to deal with it.
02:25:28 with it. That's not that's a slightly different person. So yes, I'd heard messages going across to CU8 I think it was about fire survival guidance calls, but that's not then the officer dealing with them. That's just the command unit
02:25:39 them. That's just the command unit receiving them. You would expect an officer on the ground to be collecting those calls and taking action upon them. So and that person wasn't on a command unit. That person, if I recall, was
02:25:50 unit. That person, if I recall, was supposed to be attached to a pump or linked or working on a pump. I follow. Now, did Andy Walton or Mike Davin tell you that there was a station manager at the base of the tower uh collating or handling fire survival
02:26:03 collating or handling fire survival guidance calls? No, I recall very clearly that when I left Andy Walton and and Mike Dowen, I was still under the impression that I had one station manager at that fire. And I couldn't understand how I had a 25 pump fire, now a 40 pump fire, and I had
02:26:16 pump fire, now a 40 pump fire, and I had one station manager. So if I'd been told there was a station manager, I would have understood there was someone else there who was of a senior officer level. So I was clear that I my understanding as I walked towards the command unit was that I have one station manager at that
02:26:28 that I have one station manager at that fire.
02:26:28 fire. I see. You say now a 40 pump fire. Did you know that it had become a 40 pump fire during your briefing? I made it a 40 pump fire when I was speaking to Andy and Mike. I stopped the conversation with them and made it made pumps 40 and various other
02:26:39 made it made pumps 40 and various other messages.
02:26:40 messages. Yeah. I see. And that was during the briefing was it? Yes. So, I within probably 30 seconds to a minute of the briefing started, I stopped it there and then asked Mark to send me the makeup messages for me.
02:26:51 send me the makeup messages for me. Okay, we're going to come and explore those messages a little bit a little bit later on. Did you ask either Mike Dow or Andy Walton for any details regarding the FSG calls such as flats, floors, or
02:27:03 the FSG calls such as flats, floors, or even just call volumes? No, I asked him who was dealing with the FSG calls and that's when he said that officer was dealing with them and I recalled it as on a pump and I it recalls as Golf 271. Golf 271 could be mixed up with the fact
02:27:15 Golf 271 could be mixed up with the fact I heard messages going to Golf 271 I think on route. Um but I just recalled it was an officer dealing with them and and a pump. That's how I recall it. Beyond for me that was then they were being dealt with which is what I needed
02:27:26 being dealt with which is what I needed to hear that they were being coordinated, collected and then dealt with.
02:27:30 with. Right. But beyond being told that, did you not think at this point to find out more information about flats, floors um at call volumes um just so that you
02:27:42 um at call volumes um just so that you could carry out the prioritization that you described to us earlier? Um because all I had as a senior officer was Andy, my priority at that point was to put a command team together. So it was to put people in place to manage those sort of uh that sort of issue. So
02:27:54 those sort of uh that sort of issue. So I knew I needed a fire guard guidance coordinator and that's what I needed to put in place and I needed a senior officer to do that rather than the watch manager. That's nothing against the efforts that the watch managers may be
02:28:05 efforts that the watch managers may be making. It's just that the senior officers are much more used to working within a command unit environment and working on a larger scale incident. So you want to put that that senior officer command in place and I didn't have that at that point in
02:28:16 and I didn't have that at that point in time.
02:28:16 time. What was your priority in terms of strategy at that point? Uh the priority was the rescue of the fast guards callers. Right. And and so in order to be able to formulate a plan, would you not need to
02:28:27 formulate a plan, would you not need to have some detail about the fire survival guidance calls, flats, floors, uh and and the conditions in the building in order to be able to to do that? Uh no, I'd hand that over to an officer to deal with. So because of the number
02:28:38 to deal with. So because of the number that were coming in, if I tried to deal with them personally, I'd be drawn into only one task at the incident. And obviously, I've got the whole overall incident to command at that point. So it's my intention at that point in time, they would be dealt with by an officer.
02:28:50 they would be dealt with by an officer. My understanding be a watch manager. What I needed to put in place was a command team to deal with the fire survivor guidance calls because I wouldn't be able to do them personally on my own. I need a team of people to do it and that was my intention.
02:29:01 it and that was my intention. Yes, of course you would need people to deal with the actual calls themselves. My my point my my question was a slightly different one which was did you not need at least a picture even an overall picture of the flats the floors
02:29:13 overall picture of the flats the floors and the kind of volumes of FSG calls coming in and the nature of the conditions at least an outline in the building so that you as the incoming incident commander could formulate a strategy uh for carrying out
02:29:25 strategy uh for carrying out prioritization of calls and rescues. Yes, that would have been useful for me. What I wasn't going to do is go and find that officer who was dealing with them. they weren't they didn't appear to be nearby to me. So I would have had to
02:29:37 nearby to me. So I would have had to have gone to have found them and then got drawn into that. So at that point in time my focus was to get to the command unit and put a command team in place once I'd established Andy as the fire sect commander inside the building.
02:29:48 sect commander inside the building. All right. Well, we'll come back to that. Um
02:29:57 while you were being briefed, could you hear radio traffic over your fireground radio? Uh there was a huge amount of radio traffic, but it was all cutting across each other. Right. What it sounded like was that um so it
02:30:08 What it sounded like was that um so it wasn't ill discipline. It was the fact that I think everybody there seemed like they had something important to put across, but because they're simple systems, so a pointto-oint system, if you cut across if you if you also press
02:30:19 you cut across if you if you also press to transmit, it will cut out the radio message that's been sent. And that was just continuous, not just at that point in time, but for a long time in the incident. Did the volume of traffic and the nature of the communications via the
02:30:30 the nature of the communications via the fire and radio not give you an insight as to what was happening inside the building? Um the insight it gave me was probably as I'd heard on the way in that we have um a significant fire on the outside of the building that's affecting
02:30:41 outside of the building that's affecting people in a number of flats and that those people um need rescuing. So it would have confirmed my expectations on the way there. But um but there was no specific detail because because people were cutting across each other. It was no way that
02:30:53 across each other. It was no way that you could um get detail or make sense out of it. At the same time, as well um as trying to get a briefing off of Andy and Mike, the the noise from the fire itself was horrendous. It was, you know,
02:31:04 itself was horrendous. It was, you know, a very very loud noise coming off the building. Um so it would have interrupted it would it would have probably disrupted any radio communications you're trying to listen to anyway because there was just a noise that was coming from the building.
02:31:16 that was coming from the building. After the brief, well, let me ask you this. How long do you think the briefing lasted?
02:31:21 lasted? I'd say four to five minutes. Four to five. Four to five minutes, which is very quick. And obviously I'd prefer to have given more, but I'd say four to five minutes. And I knew I knew that I had to get Andy and Mike back into the building as the fire sector and I had to
02:31:32 as the fire sector and I had to establish a command team. Yes. After the briefing, did you seek to find the station manager who you were told was handling the FSG pool?
02:31:43 told was handling the FSG pool? I wasn't told it was a station manager. I wasn't handling. I was told it was an officer.
02:31:46 officer. All right. Officer. So, no, I didn't try to find No, they didn't. So neither Mike nor Andy actually pointed anyone out to me. They said that an officer's dealing with it. Um and I recall it as Golf 271. It could
02:31:57 Um and I recall it as Golf 271. It could have been something else on a fire engine. So it would have meant me having to wander off and try and find a fire engine that happened to have a an officer working on it. Whereas my priority at that point was to get back to the unit and establish a command
02:32:08 to the unit and establish a command team.
02:32:10 team. Right.
02:32:12 Right. Was
02:32:13 Was it not of the first importance though to at least find out who it was who was handling the FSG on the incident ground so you could go and find them? I think it was important to understand that there was someone dealing with it. So, an officer was dealing with it. Um,
02:32:25 So, an officer was dealing with it. Um, who it was. I'd be really unlikely to know the who. I mean, there's there's an awful lot of watch managers. I'm probably unlikely to know them individually. Um, so if they'd been nearby, if they'd been pointed out to me
02:32:36 nearby, if they'd been pointed out to me and they were standing close by, I would have gone to them, but I'd have had to go to try and find them. Um, and I knew there was an officer dealing with it and that was the important bit. Who they were, if it was a watch manager, which is my expectation because my
02:32:48 is my expectation because my understanding was Andy was the only station manager. There's no reason to think I would know that watch manager individually or whether that would help me at all at that point in time knowing that watch manager as an individual. At the end of this briefing, if if you
02:32:59 At the end of this briefing, if if you weren't going to go and find the officer managing the FSGS, how were you how were you going what was your thought about how you were going to educate yourself as to the detail of the FSGS flats, floors so that you could prioritize?
02:33:11 floors so that you could prioritize? So I'd heard the messages going to a command unit. So which was CU8. So when I went to CU8, the command unit on Bow Road, I was expecting to find information on there telling me what FSGs we had in progress.
02:33:22 FSGs we had in progress. Right. Okay. Um, now, uh, on page 10 of your statement, if you could turn to that,
02:33:34 uh, a quarter of the way down, you say Mick explained, uh, that there was a single staircase inside the building.
02:33:45 inside the building. That's during the briefing, was it? Uh, yep. So we had a des a description a discussion about the building which was the number of floors which was 24 as he told me. Um and then uh said it's a single staircase. These buildings as I
02:33:57 single staircase. These buildings as I know them normally would have a single staircase but I wanted to make sure that it was a single staircase and it was and we also talked about the dry in main and the bridge head and also the jets that were working at that point in time. Now you say a quarter of the way down up
02:34:10 Now you say a quarter of the way down up the page, four lines down in that paragraph. Um, I knew we would already be congesting the staircase, making it difficult for people to get out and I knew that there would be smoke logging because the hoses would be keeping the
02:34:21 because the hoses would be keeping the doors open.
02:34:25 Now, just looking at that, did you know any more than just that it was smoke logging?
02:34:32 logging? For example, did you know the conditions of the smoke or whether that smoke logging was making it difficult for residents to escape? No. So my my at that point in time, Mike didn't know the conditions within inside the building. So my so he wasn't able to
02:34:45 the building. So my so he wasn't able to brief me on what he thought the conditions were other than the fourth floor fire. My expectation would be because we end up breaching the door to put the hoses in, smoke would have got into the staircase. So my expectation is and experience would be that we have
02:34:57 and experience would be that we have caused smoke to go into the staircase. Um but I didn't get that as a as a handover from Andy or Mike because they hadn't been in the building for some time and hadn't given me a briefing. So did you have a plan as to how to go about getting detailed information as to
02:35:09 about getting detailed information as to the conditions in the lobbies and stair? Yes, to establish a fire sector and then get that fire sector to establish where we were at that point in time with regard to the conditions inside the building and the the type of fires we
02:35:21 building and the the type of fires we had on whichever floors what we needed to deal with. Did was it was it not more important to you at least to get the information before you established the fire sector as to where the fire was, where the smoke was, what the
02:35:32 where the smoke was, what the difficulties with exit were for the residents. Um, the only people available to me at that point in time for that information was Mike and Andy. The only other way to have done it would have been either by the radios, which were completely
02:35:44 the radios, which were completely congested, or me going into the building and talking to the bridge head. But that was on the second or third floor at that point. So again, I would have got probably drawn into the building for 5 to 10 minutes then to try and establish that um when I had the whole instant to
02:35:56 that um when I had the whole instant to run rather than just the fire sector. So so putting a fire sector in place and Mike going with Andy was to then find out what are the conditions and what do we need to do to rescue everyone in the building.
02:36:06 building. Did you think to try to make radio contact or ask somebody with you to make radio contact with the bridge head to to It would have been pointless. The radios were just overwhelmed with information going across. So, normally if you want to get something across urgently, you'll say priority and people should then stop
02:36:18 say priority and people should then stop using the radios. I think everybody was saying priority. Everybody was trying to get an urgent message across. So, and because they're simple radios, I mean, they're very they're good digital radios, but they're still simple radios in that only one person can talk at a
02:36:30 in that only one person can talk at a time. If you cut across, you just lose the radio communications. So, can we summarize your evidence in in this way that at the end of the the the handover from Andy Walton and Mike Dowen, you
02:36:43 from Andy Walton and Mike Dowen, you knew no detail about FSG calls, flat numbers, floors, and you knew no detail about the conditions in the building. I knew we had FSG calls that were in progress. I knew that we had numbers
02:36:55 progress. I knew that we had numbers that because they've been passed across by control, and I knew that somebody was coordinating those, but I didn't have them in front of me. No. Can I ask you to look at the
02:37:07 the policy
02:37:10 policy which covers incident command uh which is 238. It's entitled incident command procedures. It's tab one of our policies bundle and this is the version current in a well as at April April 2014. So
02:37:24 in a well as at April April 2014. So current as at the time of Grenfield Tower
02:37:28 Tower and if I can take you please to paragraph six handing over stroke taking over. I just like to focus your attention on 62. The IC
02:37:42 this is the next page 62. The IC will provide this manager with the following information. a full description of the operational situation in
02:37:54 of the operational situation in accordance with the DMM. That's the decision-making model. And then you've got five bullet points. And the third one I want to and fourth one I want to look at with you actions that has been initiated and the objectives and
02:38:05 initiated and the objectives and operational plan. Um
02:38:10 Um coming away from that meeting that you had with Andy Walton and Mike Darham, what were the objectives and operational plan in place at that time? So is that what was their plan or what
02:38:21 So is that what was their plan or what was my plan? What was the plan you were prov what was theirs?
02:38:26 theirs? So I assigned Andy uh as the fire sector commander. He was to take Mike with him because they were Mike's crews and Mike knew the people inside the building. He was to establish where we were with regard to the firefighting on the fourth
02:38:37 regard to the firefighting on the fourth floor and the conditions inside the building and then uh when and to use the FSGS as the priority for the rescues inside the building. No, my question was what was their plan?
02:38:48 No, my question was what was their plan? So let let me perhaps I I've muddled you. What's supposed to happen on handover according to this policy is that the arriving manager to take the incident over will get a full description of the operational
02:38:59 description of the operational situation. uh and that would include as the fourth bullet point the objectives and operational plan as I understand the policy. Now my question is by the end of
02:39:10 policy. Now my question is by the end of that briefing what was as you understood it there as Walton's and Dowen's objectives and operational plan. So so M so Mike's operational plan had
02:39:21 So so M so Mike's operational plan had been to put the fire out on the fourth floor which his understanding was they had at that point. um once and then on the outside of the building it was he put a place a ground monitor to try and attack the fire but it was only
02:39:32 attack the fire but it was only affecting the lower levels. So his plan was to call a lot of resources to the incident which he had he'd asked for the 25 pumps to commit BA crews to then start to search the upper floors. Um
02:39:43 start to search the upper floors. Um there was talk about trying to get a third jet to work as well. I think they were getting a third check which I took to protecting the staircase if you like for the firefighters entering and entering entering and egressing the
02:39:55 entering entering and egressing the building. Um so primarily DT's plan was to start to get to the fire survival guidance calls that were in place. Right. Did any part of the objectives and operational plan that they had as you understood it include any plans for
02:40:07 you understood it include any plans for evacuation or rescue? Uh yes. So the rescue part of it would have been focusing on the fire survival guidance calls that have taken place or are in progress sorry I should say. So his focus was to get to the fire
02:40:18 his focus was to get to the fire survivor guidance calls. Uh and then the evacuation he talks about the fourth floor I think either being clear or they were clearing it. Yeah, but they hadn't at that point they didn't have a a plan for the whole rescue and evacuation of the building.
02:40:29 rescue and evacuation of the building. It was focusing on the people most at risk which was the forest survival guard schools.
02:40:32 schools. Right. Did you establish from then whether they as incident commanders for the time they were had established any prioritization system for FSG calls? Not breaking down individual FSG calls.
02:40:43 Not breaking down individual FSG calls. Now I think um Andy sorry Mike had Andy and Mike had someone dealing with the FSG calls. I think at that point in time we all focused on FSGs being the priority. We I hadn't we hadn't discussed breaking those down into which
02:40:56 discussed breaking those down into which one is more important than another. That's not something we did at that time though.
02:40:59 though. No. Is there a reason for that? Uh it's not something I'd come across before or experienced before. You treat the FSG calls as the priority because it's somebody saying I am in I'm at risk and there's there's smoke and flame of heat directly affecting me. So it is the
02:41:11 heat directly affecting me. So it is the priority to deal with. I'm not sure I'd ever expected before that we would have to then decide which call was more important than another call before Grenville. And I don't expect they had
02:41:22 Grenville. And I don't expect they had as well either. Right. So each of the FSG calls was a priority or was the priority.
02:41:30 Did you discuss with them or did they discuss with you what the plan was for uh dealing with particular callers who had mobility difficulties or who were
02:41:41 had mobility difficulties or who were elderly or had young children or were pregnant.
02:41:44 pregnant. I don't think by that point Michael Andy had the time to get into that level of detail. So we never had a discussion about that level of detail of it. I think it it it felt like when Mike was handing over to me that it had gone up so rapidly. Um and for a watch manager
02:41:56 so rapidly. Um and for a watch manager to have to be dealing with that that he was just doing as much as he could as quickly as he could but there was no way he could cover every detail including those level of details such as he would handed that over to the the officer
02:42:07 handed that over to the the officer doing the firearm guidance calls for him.
02:42:10 him. You say he would have and you you call it a level of detail. We can argue about whether that's a detail or not. But my my question really is given that FSGS as
02:42:21 my question really is given that FSGS as a block you you say were a priority. Did you not think that within that block of FSG calls there were particular callers who needed particularly prior treatment? For example, elderly
02:42:33 treatment? For example, elderly children, pregnant people or people with mobility issues at that point in time? Yes.
02:42:39 Yes. No, I didn't. No, not you. you all the F5 guidance schools you treat as the priority um to then decide which one is more important than another becomes quite subjective in that um you have to
02:42:51 quite subjective in that um you have to look at who's most affected by the fire, heat and smoke, who's most in danger at that point. Mobility issues would definitely become an issue but then you're subjectively deciding one mobility issue against another perhaps.
02:43:02 mobility issue against another perhaps. Um young people are definitely vulnerable to smoke as elderly people or people with conditions such as COPD, asthma etc. Um so you'll be aware of that but it becomes very subjective and I think um at that point in time there
02:43:14 I think um at that point in time there was no conversation around that level of detail of each individual fire survivor guidance call and and at that although at that point in time there was no conversation did you then have a plan as to how to go about prioritizing those particular FSG
02:43:27 about prioritizing those particular FSG callers after that? I'd say at that point in time I wouldn't say I did because I'd never been in a situation where I expected to have to prioritize one fast survivor guidance call over another. It's not something
02:43:38 call over another. It's not something that I would have expected to have to um to do previously.
02:43:45 And if you
02:43:50 didn't expect to have to do that, how are you going to be able to formulate
02:43:57 formulate a strategy of search, rescue, and evacue or evacuation? So this probably moves forward to when the fire survival guidance coordinators put in place in that you you make I made
02:44:08 put in place in that you you make I made the fire survival guidance calls the priority. Um and then although it is subjective based on the phone calls coming from control to the fire survival guidance unit, you're relying upon them to start assessing the level of risk to
02:44:19 to start assessing the level of risk to those individuals and then passing that across to the fire sector and then the fire sector working out where they think they can get to people who are a priority. It's it's a very difficult
02:44:30 priority. It's it's a very difficult challenge and on that night it was an enormous challenge for all of them to to somehow work out how you prioritize individual calls and it is subjective even though you could use the criteria you mentioned um is still very
02:44:41 you mentioned um is still very subjective and then to expect the fire sector knowing which ones they could possibly get to at first or or not. It it was a very difficult task for those crews on that night to carry that out.
02:44:58 Page 10 of your statement, just continuing on this theme, picking it up at the foot of that page. You say, "I asked how many people were still in the building,
02:45:09 the building, but he didn't have a number." I'm just pausing there. So, this you were interested in understanding, of course, at least the numbers involved.
02:45:19 involved. And you say he didn't have a number. Um, how were you going to get that number? Uh, so the way I asked that, I probably knew he wouldn't have the number unless
02:45:30 knew he wouldn't have the number unless he'd spoken to someone like a caretaker or something like that. Um, and he'd given me no indication that he'd spoken to anyone like that. So, so it was a question that you always ask how many people are inside a building. Um, but in this circumstance, I and to be fair, he
02:45:43 this circumstance, I and to be fair, he actually looked as if there's no way he could know. And that's the answer I would have expected. So, I then based it on my own estimation of the numbering floors involved and how many people I would expect to be in in each flat. I think it was probably a
02:45:55 in each flat. I think it was probably a question I knew Mike wouldn't know the answer to. Yeah. And then you you say you estimated it was between one and 200 people. Uh and you didn't know the age condition, ambulatory or health issues. Um so I
02:46:06 ambulatory or health issues. Um so I knew you say that getting them down a smokelog staircase was going to be a challenge. My thoughts and this is what I want to ask you about. You say my thoughts then were that it would probably be safer to keep some of the people in the building
02:46:17 keep some of the people in the building until we had put the fire out at which point we could bring them down a staircase that wasn't smoke logged. Now, in order to do that, isn't it right that you would need to have at least
02:46:28 that you would need to have at least some further information about the conditions in the building before you could determine reliably whether to keep them in the building or not?
02:46:41 You so the expectation there when you when you turn up at fires involving buildings like this, it's always safer to keep people in their flats while you deal with the fire. And then so it's it's what you would normally do. My
02:46:52 it's what you would normally do. My expectation at this point in time is the fire is on the outside of the building and we would have a number of flat fires, individual flat fires that we would have to deal with. Um the assessment of the internal conditions I hadn't had yet. So I still needed that
02:47:04 hadn't had yet. So I still needed that information. So you're relying upon what you would normally do and would normally be safe for people in a building like that because at that point in time there's no reason to believe that the fire is going to spread externally in
02:47:16 fire is going to spread externally in the way it did um you know horizontally around the building or that the doors inside are going to fail and mean that fire is going from flat to flat inside. So you're basing it on the experience you I've had over years where you know
02:47:28 you I've had over years where you know fire doesn't spread in this way. So your expectation is that people who will be safe within their flats if they're unaffected in particular areas of the building.
02:47:37 building. Exactly. And let's just take it step by step. Is it right that you could only actually safely keep people in their flats if you were if you had reliable information that they weren't affected
02:47:48 information that they weren't affected by heat, smoke, or fire? Yes. Yes.
02:47:52 Yes. Yes. And you could only do that, couldn't you? If if uh you knew you had reliable information that that was the case. Yes.
02:48:02 Yes. And you would only be able to get that information uh by well how would you get that information? The sources for that information is either through the calls that people are making to control where they are either
02:48:13 making to control where they are either saying that they are uh trapped in their flats as they were or that they've been affected by the smoke but could maybe escape or um or through direct contact with the people on that day which um so
02:48:26 with the people on that day which um so it would have meant knocking on everyone's flat and asking what the position is that they were in. And how would you go about that? And that would have been part of an overall rescue and evacuation plan which would be to say prioritize the people who are
02:48:38 be to say prioritize the people who are most at risk which would be the fire survival guidance calls followed by the people on the or alongside I should say people on the northeast side of the building which was the building directly affected by fire and on the upper floors and then you I would have put in place a plan for
02:48:50 would have put in place a plan for searching all the floors below that and evacuating everyone. Yeah. Was that part of your plan? That would have always been part of the plan with I don't think we've ever had a 40 pump fire in London apart from one near
02:49:01 pump fire in London apart from one near the Olympic Park when the Olympics were wrong. So the thought that we would have a 40 pump fire within a building and then leave people in the building at the end of that, it just would not happen. No, the plan would be that everyone
02:49:12 No, the plan would be that everyone would be evacuated from that building and then we'd hand the building back over to the the owners of the building for them to decide when it was safe for people to go back in. Right. Well, may maybe we could just take this shortly. when you say my thoughts then were as you go on to say
02:49:24 thoughts then were as you go on to say um that it would probably be safer to keep some of the people in the building um how long did you have those thoughts for?
02:49:35 Right. So that that's the point when I think when I'm walking towards the command unit. So um so the expectation at that point was if the fire on the outside did burn off and and certainly I would not have expected it to go around
02:49:47 would not have expected it to go around horizontally like it did um then we are dealing with a series of flat fires on the northeast side of the building. Um so we would in an order get people out from the different flats in the
02:49:58 from the different flats in the different positions. I couldn't put a time on how long I thought that would take. We certainly had a huge amount of resources in place and it would have depended on things like the conditions in the staircase which at that point in time I didn't know the conditions in the
02:50:09 time I didn't know the conditions in the staircase except for my expectation that we would have had some smoke in it from the original fire. Yes. And what was your plan if you had one for getting the information as to the conditions in the staircase and in the lobby. Uh to put a fire sector commander in for
02:50:20 Uh to put a fire sector commander in for those to establish what where we were with the fire inside the building, what the conditions were and that information back to me and put a fire survival guidance coordinator in to find out the information we were receiving from control. And so those would be the two
02:50:32 control. And so those would be the two primary sources of information and then spotters if you like outside the building looking at what the building is doing on the outside. But that plan would involve putting is this right? Putting new officers coming into the incident in a position of
02:50:44 into the incident in a position of command as opposed to asking the officers already there what the experience was that they'd had over the past hour or so. I'd expect the new officers to work with the one officers that were already in place. So Mike and Andy for example, I
02:50:55 place. So Mike and Andy for example, I expect them to go inside the building and talk to the people on the bridge head and find out where we are and what the conditions are from them face to face. And similarly putting uh the FSG coordinator in, I would expect that
02:51:06 coordinator in, I would expect that person or did expect that person to link up with the person who was doing the FSGS before and find out where we were doing the FSG. So you're not taking that person out of the loop as it were. You are adding to it. So, so do I understand your evidence and
02:51:17 So, so do I understand your evidence and this is perhaps a general question that instead of actually getting primary factual hard information about the conditions in the bridge head and about numbers of FSG calls um your your you
02:51:28 numbers of FSG calls um your your you saw your role as just as putting command structures in place so that the people you put in place could get that information. Yeah, I think you are so in that information gathering stage you you are
02:51:39 information gathering stage you you are limited how long you can spend on the gathering of information. So even at the bottom of the tower if it was four or five minutes with Andy and uh Mike I that's still the information going I need to actually put actions into place. So to to get the full picture of the
02:51:51 So to to get the full picture of the incident would have taken so long that I'm actually not getting action put in place. So my plan was to put a structure in place so they could take those responsibilities and lead those roles for me particularly the fire sector and
02:52:02 for me particularly the fire sector and the FSG coordinator. Yes. My question is really whether you could put a strategy in place without that information. You could put a structure in place. I
02:52:13 You could put a structure in place. I can understand that. But how could you put a strategy in place without that information? Um so the strategy although this is a a unique incident, it's it's you can almost say the approach was in a way generic because you are prioritizing
02:52:25 way generic because you are prioritizing who you want to be rescued first. you are then uh putting in place a system to achieve that which is the FSG coordination unit and the search coordinator alongside the fire sector.
02:52:36 coordinator alongside the fire sector. So so you are putting a structure in place that you've practiced before but what's different here is the detail of it and what's occurring and so so you are giving them the roles that you in this case I've given roles like this
02:52:47 this case I've given roles like this before at um exercises for example and so you're putting those in place and then the level of detail can be filled in from there. So you're given if you like an um an objective to achieve
02:52:58 like an um an objective to achieve rather than the specific tasks to achieve that objective. So was your approach and tell me if this is an unfair way of summarizing what you've been telling us over the past few
02:53:09 you've been telling us over the past few answers. Your approach was to establish a structure a command structure from which a strategy would then be developed once you had the information rather than developing a strategy and putting a command structure around that. No, I'd say it was establishing a strategy with
02:53:21 say it was establishing a strategy with a command structure to achieve that strategy and then giving those command team objectives to achieve that would meet that strategy. So then comes one comes back to my question without knowing the primary factual information about the conditions
02:53:33 factual information about the conditions in the exit routes in the building and without knowing the detail of the FSG, how could you begin to evolve any kind of meaningful strategy? Their priorities still be the same. So the priority is that you need to put in
02:53:44 the priority is that you need to put in place a plan that rescues the people in the fire survival guidance calls and what you expect to do is them to establish the tasks they need to achieve that. So the so the objective is the same and what you're trying to give to
02:53:55 same and what you're trying to give to those sector commanders is objectives to achieve rather than always giving them the detail of the task of how they should do it. So you give them an objective. So the objective there was to uh rescue the fire survival guidance
02:54:06 uh rescue the fire survival guidance call people involved in fire survival guidance calls and so that is the objective and what I expected them to do is when they go inside is to work out how they can achieve that through um taking into account the conditions in
02:54:17 taking into account the conditions in the building for example. Did you at that point so we're looking at the time after the briefing with Andy Walton and Mike Den you're on the way back to the CU
02:54:27 CU did you have any thoughts at that time about precisely how you were going to go about
02:54:32 about evacuating this building either wholly or in part? Yep. So it was to put a fire sector in place and that they would deploy BA crews to the fire sector fire survival guidance calls as a priority to deploy
02:54:44 guidance calls as a priority to deploy other firefighters to the uh northeast side of the building which was the affected side of the building and then um work away if you like from the top floor downwards because that's where the smoke would go if there was any smoke inside the building
02:54:55 inside the building to evacuate people in a staged way if you like from each floor working downwards because the smoke's going to go upwards. Just following that up. So was the idea then then you would push as many BA wearers up as high into the building as
02:55:06 wearers up as high into the building as you could and then work their way down. Is that your thought? Yeah. Well, yes and no. So the fire survival guidance calls weren't all at the top of the building. So So you so the so you would send the BA crews to
02:55:17 the so you would send the BA crews to where the fire survival guidance calls were first. Um and in some of them they were at the top of the building. So you would send some crews to uh the upper floors if you like the top floors and some of them to say the medium floors. So yes, the intention would be to send
02:55:28 So yes, the intention would be to send BA crews as far as they could go to rescue people in the fire survival guidance schools. Ellen, what sort of order was your would that plan be carried out? Uh and that's where it comes back to the the subjectivity of the fire survival
02:55:40 the subjectivity of the fire survival guidance calls. They were each a priority. So so I would have expected crews to be sent to each of those. Um that was not realizing the volume that was involved but at that point in time. Did during the briefing did um Mike
02:55:52 Did during the briefing did um Mike Dowen tell you any or give you any information about the success or failure so far of any particular deployments of BA wearers? Uh they put the fire out on the fourth floor. Um I think my recollection was
02:56:03 floor. Um I think my recollection was that I thought they'd either searched or checked the fourth floor. Now whe that mean they'd cleared the people or they had made sure that they were okay, I'm not sure. Um and I think he said they were now doing the fifth and sixth floor at that point. Um, he didn't know if the
02:56:16 at that point. Um, he didn't know if the crews have been sent up to the higher floors than that at that point in time. He didn't know. No.
02:56:20 No. Did that surprise you? Um, no. I think what had happened so quickly um that Michael still uh had so much information coming at him still a very difficult scene um that I don't
02:56:32 very difficult scene um that I don't think he'd been able to get the information probably because he couldn't get it because it was relying upon the radios. So for him to have got it, he would have had to go inside the building and he he hadn't had a chance to go inside the building. If the radios hadn't been overwhelmed, I'd expect you
02:56:43 hadn't been overwhelmed, I'd expect you would have had a better picture of what was going on inside. Right. But given that you'd heard on the way to the incident that people were trapped on the 23rd floor, did you not raise with Mike the question? Well, have
02:56:55 raise with Mike the question? Well, have you not sent a crew to get them? I didn't raise questions like that with him that.
02:56:58 him that. Is there a reason why not? Um, no. He he knew what he knew and there was no point in me starting to question why he hadn't done things or why things hadn't been. If if I started giving him individual questions about
02:57:09 giving him individual questions about whether he had made it to certain floors, it would have taken up more time of us. And if he didn't know, there was no point in me laboring the point of asking him questions he didn't know the answer to. He'd said to me he didn't know the conditions inside the building.
02:57:20 know the conditions inside the building. And at that point in time, he didn't know the full where the where the crews are being deployed to.
02:57:27 Uh he told you, I think, as you say, that uh he had made pumps 25 and had ordered one through and one aerial. which is already there. I don't think he told me about the F
02:57:39 I don't think he told me about the F through I think I I I would have known there was an FIU on it anyway because you order one the eight pump. So I'm not sure he told me that or if I would have just known that you get one FIU on an eight pump fire.
02:57:50 eight pump fire. Forgive me. It's my fault. I've gone too far too fast. But let me just look at what you say in your statement. It's page 10
02:57:57 page 10 and it's 3/4ers of the way down at the end of that second last paragraph. You say he told me he'd made pumps 25 and had ordered one through and the aerial TL which was already there. No other
02:58:08 TL which was already there. No other appliances or vehicles had been requested. So are just are you it's not a memory test this but are you sure that it's right that he told you that he had ordered one through? It's more likely that I asked him about
02:58:19 It's more likely that I asked him about the FIU because I'm I know that they come onto an eight pound fire. Um so he wouldn't have had to order it. So the wording is probably slightly wrong there. It's that he had an FIU there uh because I was about to request FIUs. So, so he wouldn't need to have
02:58:32 FIUs. So, so he wouldn't need to have ordered that FIU. It would have already been sent when the fire was an 8 pump fire. So, it's probably just the wording of it.
02:58:37 of it. Did were you content with the resources that he had made or did you think you needed more? I think he um for a watch manager to ask for 25 pumps was probably unknown and unprecedented. So, I think he'd done a
02:58:48 unprecedented. So, I think he'd done a great job of that, but I wanted more EDBA crew. So, I was going to have to order more FUS to achieve that. But that's not a reflection upon him at that point in time because I think what he was dealing with was not the expected sort of fire
02:59:00 with was not the expected sort of fire that a watch manager would have to deal with.
02:59:02 with. And what were you why did you need more EDBA crews uh to so the SDBA gives you about 30 minutes of air which you would expect to be able to get to the top of the building but it's going to limit how
02:59:13 building but it's going to limit how much activity you can carry on at that floor especially if you have to firefight for example. Um and it would also limit how much air you've got if you're trying to carry casualties or rescue casualties down. So, so although 30 minutes is a good amount of air, it
02:59:25 30 minutes is a good amount of air, it limits what you can do. Whereas the EDBA gives you somewhere between 45 and 48 minutes of air. So, it just gives you more. So, it was going to give us more options at the higher floors. Right. During or at the end of the briefing, do you remember forming a
02:59:37 briefing, do you remember forming a particular view about how about the weight of EDBA response that you'd need? How many EDBA wearers? Um, yeah. It's not wasn't really part of the briefing. I ordered them on. So, I ordered on I asked Mark to send a message that asked for six of them,
02:59:49 message that asked for six of them, which would have been 24 wearers probably. And once you take out an emergency crew, I would have worked out that given me somewhere between 10 and 11 EDBA crews or two. Right.
02:59:58 Right. And I think you've answered this, but let me just be clear. Is it right your plan with those EDBA wearers was to send them as high up in the tower as you could in response to particular FSG? That's the best use of the EDBI? Yes, it's the best use, but was that your
03:00:09 it's the best use, but was that your thought at the time? Yes.
03:00:10 Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is that a convenient moment? Yes. Yes. Thank you very much. We're going to have a break now, Mr. Lachling, so we can all have some lunch. So, in a minute, I'm going to ask you to go with the usher. Please don't talk to anyone
03:00:21 the usher. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while they're out of the room. And we'll start again at 2:00, please.
03:00:25 please. Thank you. Thank you. Right. I'd like to go with the usher.
03:00:36 [Music] Good. 2:00, please.