Further LFB evidence (24 September 2018 Pt 2 of 2)

Full transcript

00:00:04 mr. Chapman

00:00:18 all right mr. O'Laughlin yes I'm ready to carry on yes sir very good yes mr. Locher thank you for coming back to us going back to the briefing that you had with Andy Walton

00:00:29 briefing that you had with Andy Walton and Mike doughten at any point during that briefing did you have a discussion about the viability or the continuing viability of the stay-put policy or advice not about stay put no we talked

00:00:41 advice not about stay put no we talked about generally the people in the building but because they had limited information about the people in the building other than first of all the guidance so I didn't have a conversation I'm about the stay-put guidance right did it did you have a discussion or any

00:00:54 did it did you have a discussion or any thoughts yourself about about whether or not that advice to stay put should be revoked so my thoughts would have been that there's people within that plan behind the building who are

00:01:06 that plan behind the building who are staying in their flats because they're in a safe environment at that point in time and for that reason there's no reason to expect that if the if the smoke eagle fire isn't affecting them why they shouldn't be safe where they are so there was no point I consider

00:01:19 are so there was no point I consider changing the stay put for the people who were unaffected in the flats now did it occur to you that all the way people might be unaffected for the time being the speed and spread of the fire and the

00:01:30 the speed and spread of the fire and the violence of its behavior which you would observe meant that although somebody might be safe at the time being they might not stay stay for very long so different people in the building could be affected differently yes so so for

00:01:42 be affected differently yes so so for example if there's people on the south west side of the building that's completely unaffected at that point in time my expectation would be that they'd be safe within their flats there was no reason to expect the fire to go around the outside of the building to them and there was no reason to expect it would

00:01:54 there was no reason to expect it would go through the communal areas to them so so within those flats for example would expected them to be safe to stay where they are other flats that in different eras had a northeast side for example was being directly affected by the fire

00:02:06 was being directly affected by the fire and smoke so I would expect those people which were probably the majority of fire so our guidance calls to if they can't escape so we'd leave their flats right so did you have any thoughts at that time about partly revoking the state

00:02:18 time about partly revoking the state permit advice and getting somebody to tell control that whoever called from flats on that side of the building that they should get out at all costs so I think the flats on that side of the

00:02:29 think the flats on that side of the building so I didn't think that cordon control

00:02:30 control that's on flats inside of the building if they're being affected by the smoke in particular I would expect they're being told to leave if they can already because that's the procedure they should follow so it's so forgot to stay put is that people were unaffected my

00:02:41 that people were unaffected my expectation was that they's unaffected should be safe where they are safer at that point in time because at that point in time we don't know the conditions of the staircase so I could be taking them from an unaffected environments or a smoke-free environment and putting them

00:02:52 smoke-free environment and putting them into a smoke-filled staircase without knowing the details about those people so we talked about abilities earlier for example I wouldn't know if somebody was in a safe flat he's then being asked to go down a smoke-filled staircase when

00:03:03 go down a smoke-filled staircase when actually they've got people disabilities or some sort of vulnerability to the smoke that may be in their staircase yes and I think you told us before at that stage you didn't actually have any clear or indeed any understanding about what

00:03:14 or indeed any understanding about what the conditions were inside the staircase all the lobbies outside those flats I haven't had enough you know what that is you knew thoroughly you had no means of assessing whether or not safe exit was possible the means of a session it was

00:03:26 possible the means of a session it was to them put in at the fire sector commander who could find out what those conditions were and let me know but they the information wasn't available to me other than going into the building which I didn't have the time to do did you have any information or information or

00:03:39 have any information or information or any understanding about the layout of the building at that point not in detail so this sort of building I've been to before so my expectation was it's got a central core which is where the lifts are and then the flats are normally on

00:03:50 are and then the flats are normally on the outside of that central core normally with Eva four or six flats on each floor and normally they have a single staircase with the driver izing main outside and then the serve and then they fired if it's the find if the draw

00:04:02 they fired if it's the find if the draw horizon main would then be in the lobby so so I've been to that type of flat before but I'd win them lonely exactly I know did you ask for any plans I didn't ask Mike for any plans now did

00:04:13 I didn't ask Mike for any plans now did you ask if there was the premises information box I didn't ask that now my expectation is they found the premise information box they would have would have passed that information to me but I didn't ask very specifically that there's a reason why not no no I just

00:04:25 there's a reason why not no no I just didn't consider at the time I think I think your expectation is if there's a premise information box or plans then you

00:04:30 you ended over to you so when he paid if they'd have had them they would have given to me but I didn't ask for them right

00:04:40 [Music] now at the bottom of page 11 I just want to turn away from this topic for the moment and come and look at something a bit more specific and I'll come back to

00:04:52 bit more specific and I'll come back to your strategy shortly at the bottom of page 11 of your statement you say well it's three quarters of the way down the page after the briefing I headed back

00:05:04 page after the briefing I headed back towards the command unit with mark we walked some of the way together down Grenfell row but at some point he left and went elsewhere and you then say I

00:05:23 and went elsewhere and you then say I saw a command unit had arrived on Grenfell row but it wasn't yet operating

00:05:29 do you know where he went no I don't know so I don't so I recalled at the end of the briefing Mike and Andy headed towards the tire tower and in mark went with me but it could have been

00:05:41 mark went with me but it could have been for a very short distance you may have only been five or ten meters there mark was with me for because the majority of Grenfell road I walked down on my own but I don't know where he went to no right okay then I want to ask you just a

00:05:52 right okay then I want to ask you just a little bit before that to look at something a slightly higher up the page during the briefing you say with Andy and Mick I'd asked mark Kentfield to send a series of messages for me saying that I was in charge when I wanted pumps

00:06:04 that I was in charge when I wanted pumps increased to 40 Cruz increased to 6 so that I had more edpa to have for aerials present I also asked for additional officers specifically 6 station managers and for group managers and then you go

00:06:17 and for group managers and then you go on to say that you increased the number of command units to 4 to ensure I had enough command unit staff there's quite a lot of quite a lot in that now first

00:06:28 a lot of quite a lot in that now first question is if you thought the fire was only on the exterior why did you need to increase the makeup of crews to 6 so the

00:06:40 increase the makeup of crews to 6 so the fire that I could see was on the outside of the piers but my expectation based on the first of all the gardens cause and what the callers were saying was that there would be evil fire or smoke getting into some of those flats on the upper floors or on the floors so so I

00:06:52 upper floors or on the floors so so I had no detailed knowledge from and your Mike about where the smoke or fire was on those floors but from the first of all guidance calls my understanding was that there was either fire or smoke in some of the flats and how could what why

00:07:04 some of the flats and how could what why six in particular why not six fi use so on a quick calculation that gave me at least 20 for a DBA wearers once I took off the emergency crew of two that gives

00:07:15 off the emergency crew of two that gives me 22 which is 11 crews of two so that's a lot of a DBA wearers so it's a good start when we say on the a DBA resources so I've done a calculation of what that would give me and how long that would

00:07:27 would give me and how long that would last for right and what what would eleven crews of EDB n whereas allow you to do so their task would have expected us to go it would be to go into the building to the higher floors and to arrest new people right did you go back

00:07:40 arrest new people right did you go back to the briefing and started to do this go back to the briefing did you have a discussion with Mike dad about what he had done with any edpa crews that were already there I didn't have a discussion with about a DBA but my understanding

00:07:51 with about a DBA but my understanding was only one F are you there so Devon you have one a DBA crew available to him so even if he had deployed it was a limit to what they could have done I didn't have this specific decision did you know that he had tasked an e DBA

00:08:02 did you know that he had tasked an e DBA wearing crew which was the only EDB a crew then present to go to the roof level to set up a lines operation and try and facilitate some kind of drenches

00:08:13 try and facilitate some kind of drenches system to try to extinguish the fire on the exterior from above now I don't recall that being ended out - right you don't recall that

00:08:25 did Mike mention anything to you about what he'd done with the EDB a crew present if he did he may have said he sent them to an upper floor but I specifically don't recall anything about

00:08:36 specifically don't recall anything about a needle be a crew go into a roof okay now coming back to the briefing and your request to Mark's Clark Kent field to send a series of messages do you

00:08:47 send a series of messages do you remember when during your briefing you asked

00:08:50 asked Kent field to do that very early stages so it was Mike might not even be there was it when and when I've taken over from Andy and then Andy went to get Mike and it was probably even as Mike arrived

00:09:03 and it was probably even as Mike arrived or some around that time so it was very early on in the briefing because I knew that I'd wanted the resources I had taken over and what did Mark Canfield do he broke them down on a pad day everything the normal clipboard that the

00:09:14 everything the normal clipboard that the command unique teams normally carry awesome we read them down did he immediately call the command unit and pass those messages to the command unit I didn't see him on his radio but that's not to say he wasn't right and then I

00:09:26 not to say he wasn't right and then I think you said that mark Canfield state with you for the whole briefing as I recall it yes I recall Mike and Andy much more clearly because I would want to I was talking so bad I recall mark being there to my left hand side during

00:09:38 being there to my left hand side during the briefing well I don't think he left during the briefing I think he was there for all of it which would be normal because in case I need anything else sent or requested so yes my recollection that's why I took you to the bit where you said you after the briefing I headed back towards the command unit with Mark

00:09:50 back towards the command unit with Mark does that rather tell us that he did stay there throughout in that briefing yep my reflection she was there until the end of the briefing and then he came with me for maybe a few meters and he went off in another direction and having written down the messages that you

00:10:03 written down the messages that you wanted him to send on a piece of on his notepad

00:10:05 notepad at the start of the briefing did you observe him actually communicating either with the command unit or with control to send those messages as you had instructed him he wouldn't communicate with control it would have been the other command unit he would the

00:10:16 been the other command unit he would the command he would have talked to he would have done that on his radio I wouldn't have been listening to him using radio and I don't the I some vague recollection that he was listening in on the radio or maybe talking on it but I

00:10:27 the radio or maybe talking on it but I can't remember him specifically and he most likely if he was doing that he probably would have stepped away from us because we were trying to talk and I say it was so noisy in the environment we were in there having him standing right beside us and talking over us would have

00:10:38 beside us and talking over us would have been unhelpful so he if he did he would have probably stepped away from us for a meeting tonight after the briefing and you left with him to go back to the command unit were you satisfied that he'd sent those messages that you'd asked him to there was no reason to

00:10:50 asked him to there was no reason to think he would have done did he tell you he had no he didn't know we know those messages weren't sent that's right and I think you only discovered that they

00:11:01 think you only discovered that they didn't go the next day no that's not correct no but is that not correct no I think in their entirety I didn't realize hangang I think when I went back to the command unit I asked the radio

00:11:12 to the command unit I asked the radio operator on there if he'd spoken to mark and if Mark had given him the messages that needed to be soon and he said that he'd not heard from mark but he tried to get hold of him right

00:11:23 and if you go to your contemporaneous nose just to follow that up you say I think under paragraph 11 on page 2 in the second paragraph I confirmed with a

00:11:37 the second paragraph I confirmed with a Cu T that my requests for appliances at office has made to mark were being actioned and they indicated that they would check so that wasn't a team that

00:11:49 would check so that wasn't a team that was just the radio operator on cu8 yes do other who that was dan Merrick it was down Merrick on the night I know since then he's down Mary all right fair enough and did Dan

00:12:00 all right fair enough and did Dan Merrick check and come back to you in response to your request to him Dan was very very busy with phone calls and radios he said he'd get hold of marking to check and then when unexpected Dan he

00:12:14 to check and then when unexpected Dan he said that he'd not been able to get over to mark still so that's when I then sent the assistant messages for the F I use and the command units and the other appliances right so you discovered when you got back to CUA and had that conversation with the American actually

00:12:25 conversation with the American actually mark Enfield haven't send those messages that's right yes I see okay do you have any idea why mark Enfield didn't send those messages no okay do you did did the fact that he didn't

00:12:37 do you did did the fact that he didn't send those messages have any effect on the speed at which resources you had ordered got to the incident it would have meant that they were delayed by how whatever lympha time it was from me being under the towel to when I got them

00:12:48 being under the towel to when I got them sent on by no now we've got I think some idea of what the makeups were that were were ordered we know that pumps were made for tea in fact my group manager

00:13:02 made for tea in fact my group manager Welch at 203 it's great and we know that at 211 46 6fr use were ordered yes if

00:13:13 at 211 46 6fr use were ordered yes if you'd like me to show you the sial I can do that but no I'm aware that I ordered six initially no was that was that through six your order or group manager well which isn't that was - what that

00:13:24 well which isn't that was - what that was yours why because you told America send it did you yes right and I think there came at the same time as I asked down to send I'm incident commander as well

00:13:32 well yes now we have an order for for Ariel's first being ordered at 2:30 201 does that is that time familiar to you if

00:13:43 that is that time familiar to you if it's on the log then yes it is it's page 21 23 I can show it if you like but if you go to page 23 of the short incident

00:13:55 you go to page 23 of the short incident log

00:14:04 at 2:30 201 to see just three engines down from the top of the page Sharon Darby sends the makeup message by UPC you a make aerials for you see that

00:14:18 UPC you a make aerials for you see that yes does that accord with your recollection on the night it feels like it should have been earlier but I have no doubt the looks correct right how'd you know who ordered days it would have been me that's yours so that would have

00:14:29 been me that's yours so that would have been a vat of 20 or 30 minute delay with it between your actually first asking it's dead tried a different way how long do you think it would be between your

00:14:40 do you think it would be between your first asking mark Kentfield to order for aerials and the order actually being processed by Sharon Darby that does look around 20 minutes right do you think that had an effect on the

00:14:52 do you think that had an effect on the resources getting to the scene I it would have affected the resources getting to the scene I think my thoughts at the time was that you would we would not be able to get for everyone's to work on that building anyway because you didn't have the access to it so I think

00:15:05 didn't have the access to it so I think I might have asked Mike about aerials and you couldn't get them in so my thoughts on the area was normally the best thing to do is ask the drivers what they think they can do with them when they arrive because they tend to be the ones who know what to do so so yes it

00:15:16 ones who know what to do so so yes it would have been delayed but I don't think we would about the opportunity to use all forward um anyway all right so I think I know the answer this because I think you might just have given it to me but what was the point of ordering for aerials if you didn't think you'd be

00:15:27 aerials if you didn't think you'd be able to get them in so the so I'm not an aerial operator so and every operator might be able to arrive and work out a way that they could either get access to the building or they wouldn't normally

00:15:38 the building or they wouldn't normally you know we may be able to move cars or move street furniture out the way for example to get the aerial into the position you need it and so they the best person to judge that is the aerial operators so quite often you'll order it

00:15:51 operators so quite often you'll order it to then let them decide if they think they can do what you'd like them to do in this instance for example one of them got to work on the grass which they normally wouldn't do but it's a risk that we were obviously going to take

00:16:02 that we were obviously going to take that night and what was the highest reach of of a water jet operated from the top of a basket of an aerial so the highest areas we have her around 30

00:16:13 highest areas we have her around 30 meters and that monitors working it would depend on the angle you've got the monthly aerial pitch to I would expect it so that would take you approximately about the tenth floor yes and I would then expect a monic that's a maybe go two or three

00:16:24 monic that's a maybe go two or three floors above that so I expect about the 13th floor but I can't say I've ever tested that was it but it is was there at that time a piece of equipment in the possession or control of the lfb which

00:16:36 possession or control of the lfb which would apply a jet higher than the 12th or 13th floor was there a piece of equipment in the possession of a near a

00:16:48 equipment in the possession of a near a nearby farm Rescue Service which would get above the 12th or 13th floor I think later in the instant we ordered Ansari's aerial appliance and how did that go I can't recall it probably was around

00:16:59 I can't recall it probably was around the 13-14 flooring because they couldn't get that close to the building at that point in time because of the debris field that was a concern at spot least east side of the tower so but how high I could get on a different day I don't

00:17:11 could get on a different day I don't know and why didn't you order that straightaway I didn't know sir II had an aerial that was particularly long mmm who discovered that I don't know if it was mentioned to me during the night that sir II heard made contact he

00:17:22 that sir II heard made contact he doesn't asked if we wish to use their aerial and it was ordered on and then it came within my operational area of commands my god it's at work in my area but it wasn't something I was aware right is there a system in the NFP for

00:17:34 right is there a system in the NFP for working out what other neighboring fire and rescue services have by way of equipment that LFE perhaps doesn't have such as this aerial we work with neighbouring brigades on cross border working so we would have understood it's

00:17:46 working so we would have understood it's more likely actually that we send our aerials out of London to support other fire services I've not known a situation where we've had to request an aerial from another Brigade so who should have had the understanding that this area was

00:17:57 had the understanding that this area was available from sorry I don't know the answer to that do you know where it's based this aerial well I don't my expectation it's possibly their headquarters area which is Reigate but it might not be I don't know whereas

00:18:08 it might not be I don't know whereas basting sorry do you tell me if you don't know though do you know why Sir II have got this super high aerial but the lfp don't I don't know the answers down frankly now um you

00:18:22 also ordered I think foresee use that was a - Oh 8:05 yes was that you yes okay I let it get was through down there it was it yes okay now we know that group manager Welch

00:18:39 now we know that group manager Welch declared a major incident and he did that at Oh - oh six oh eight sorry 3802

00:18:51 that at Oh - oh six oh eight sorry 3802 a 638 that's page 21 of the SI l you don't need to see that my question is did you consider declaring this a major incident yourself I considered it yes why didn't you do it my intention was to

00:19:02 why didn't you do it my intention was to do it when I got on the command unit one side so the key bit about the major incident message isn't just sending the message which is like an alert if you like to that category one in category to responders it's more thinking about what

00:19:13 responders it's more thinking about what you want from there and at that point in time I know what I wanted from the fire service point of view but I hadn't fully thought through what I wanted from a police and ambulance point of view so I wanted to think that through for a

00:19:24 wanted to think that through for a minute or two before I sent that message right so you then presumably discovered that group manager Welch had done it that's correct and do you know whether he went through

00:19:36 and do you know whether he went through the same thought process is that you were going to go through but didn't I don't know if you met for the same fault processes but the the message is useful in alerts those other services but the key part is thinking about what you actually want as an incident commander

00:19:48 actually want as an incident commander so the key bit for me there was that the three priority I suppose would the police the ambulance and the hospitals and that's the bit I needed a little bit of time to think about and then a couple of minutes back to the unit gave me that time to think about what I needed from

00:20:00 time to think about what I needed from the other services yes now you

00:20:06 let mark Canfield go I think were on the way back to the Cu and you don't know where he went so you've just told us do you know what his role was did give you any impression of what he was actually doing he was the team leader for the

00:20:17 doing he was the team leader for the command unit yeah and why was he out on the incident ground you know it's normal for the team leader to be out on the instant ground even with the incident commander or in another way supporting the incident commander so my expectation

00:20:30 the incident commander so my expectation is he would have been with the incident commander prior to my arrival and then if the incident Amata goes to the command unit the team leader would normally go with them so the team leader is the liaison if you like between your command unit team and the incident

00:20:42 command unit team and the incident commander did you see him or hear him taking FSG information from the command unit I didn't know but like I said when I was talking with Andy and Mike he was a little bit away from us doing something on his radio or other things

00:20:54 something on his radio or other things but he wasn't part of that conversation I wasn't listening to what he was doing and I wouldn't be able to hear him even right

00:21:04 now if you go to page 11 of your statement

00:21:17 [Music] at the very foot of the page you say I continued on towards the command unit on thermal Road as I walked it gave me time

00:21:28 thermal Road as I walked it gave me time to think about how I was going to manage and structure the incident I'd already decided to stick with the National incident command system in ICS I decided that I'd divide up the building as we

00:21:39 that I'd divide up the building as we would if it were a much smaller high-rise fire and maintain the structures I've practiced and use many times well there we'd not practice for this type of incident within a council style block we had practiced for a similar event within Canary Wharf style

00:21:52 similar event within Canary Wharf style buildings where FS g FS G's were occurring where there had been a face tip where there had been phased evacuations falling debris and impacts on local infrastructure such as Transport Systems now first can you just

00:22:10 Transport Systems now first can you just tell us what is the N ICS system the National instant command system so it was introduced probably around 2005 2006 and the idea was to standardize how fire

00:22:22 and the idea was to standardize how fire rescue services operated in a command wait so the same terminology the same tabards the same sector ization a number of other aspects of how you command an incident right and to the best of your

00:22:34 incident right and to the best of your knowledge of those systems encapsulated in incident command policies and procedures at the NFB such as policy 2 3 8 yes they all right and secondly can

00:22:46 8 yes they all right and secondly can you just tell us a little bit about the Canary Wharf style building that you you refer to but when was the exercise the Canaries and what's canary water style exercise you refer to there probably

00:22:58 exercise you refer to there probably around 2013 I think right so Poe slacking off post lack and hell yes and what did it involve so as a high-rise fire in a building similar to Canary

00:23:10 fire in a building similar to Canary Wharf but wasn't using that name it was a fire on a high floor so above a common room and the floor may be to be into 20 or 30 or floor or above and it would involve was involving a fire that

00:23:21 involve was involving a fire that affected that floor and I think a second floor as well and then along the way first of all the guidance calls there was debris falling from the building and a number of other

00:23:33 from the building and a number of other sort of aspects to fair situation was that exercise a residential block or a commercial block it was a commercial tapping I see and how many first survival guidance calls were introduced

00:23:44 survival guidance calls were introduced as part of the exercise I can't record exactly but it would have been less than ten probably more than five so somewhere around them okay and you say you were drawing on that experience what aspects

00:23:59 drawing on that experience what aspects of that Canary Wharf exercise did you draw on in order to formulate the plan as you were considering it at this point so it's establishing that your priorities are clear and then establishing how you're going to

00:24:10 establishing how you're going to structure the incident and put a command team in place to carry out the priorities you want to achieve in particular what was it about the Canary Wharf exercise that meant that it was similar to or analogous to this because

00:24:23 similar to or analogous to this because I needed to set up a fire sector which in this case I was also going to be setting up a fire sector I think on that one I probably set up a search sector which I decided I wasn't going to do for this incident I would have set up a lobby sector which again I planted for

00:24:35 lobby sector which again I planted for this incident I didn't get to do and then alongside that I'd set up a farce a lot of gardens coordinator who would coordinate the FSG calls and I think for that incident I all that exercise I've put in place and operations commander so

00:24:47 put in place and operations commander so the role I ended up taking for this particular for us Grenville so those structures and then alongside of that because that's if you like the operational side of the incident I then have to do the logistical and command support side of the incident the all the

00:24:59 support side of the incident the all the operations that support our our firefighting and rescue side so I would have had to put in that as well which again zone and then alongside that I'd need someone covering safety so so it's the same roles and what I need for that

00:25:11 the same roles and what I need for that incident as I would need for this incident

00:25:13 incident I see so you talk about structures so do we take it from that evidence in your statement and what you've told us that actually what you were thinking about them was the structures of command structures of command and the authority

00:25:24 structures of command and the authority that goes with that to carry out the objectives I wish them to carry out right and just so that I'm clear at that point the objectives you wish to carry out work with what can you summarize in which area in the whole incident or

00:25:35 in which area in the whole incident or just in the fire sector so that the primary role for the fire sector and the first of all the guidance was to coordinate the first of all the guidance calls identifying them as a priority and setting about the task of rescuing them and then alongside that to identify

00:25:49 and then alongside that to identify those others at risk such as those on the northeast side of the tower and the people on the upper floors and then in time it would be the entire building and then go in the statement if you continue so alongside this I also considered the

00:26:01 so alongside this I also considered the priorities these were the FSG calls and the people inside the building I didn't have a specific number on the FSG calls but I knew the radio had been busy with them so I assumed that it was big when

00:26:13 them so I assumed that it was big when you say I assumed that it was big what do you mean just clarify about us so I think the most I've had in any exercise

00:26:24 think the most I've had in any exercise is I'm not sure it's ever got into double figures I think it's been 8 or 10 is the most of ever than exercise me and if each one of those has two or three people in it

00:26:35 those has two or three people in it that's a lot of calls and it's an awful lot of people to try and rescue so that would be regarded as big obviously what occurred on the night was huge but that's the eight or ten would have been

00:26:46 that's the eight or ten would have been a lot to deal with and a lot of people to try and rescue and I think based on what I was hearing coming in and the exercises are previously done and that the expectation of how many FSG calls you would have an incident that was the

00:26:58 you would have an incident that was the sort of number I was anticipating right

00:27:03 and then you say I'd also consider the fact that some people would be trying to leave the building while others would be staying put either because they've been

00:27:14 staying put either because they've been told to do so by control or because they didn't know that the fire existed or asleep

00:27:19 asleep I'd also estimated that there were between 100 and 200 people to try and get out of the building and some of these were a greater risk than others that there is something you said earlier in your statement and just on that last

00:27:30 in your statement and just on that last sentence about your estimate of the numbers people to try to get out of the building does that mean that at that stage you're walking back to the command

00:27:41 stage you're walking back to the command unit after your brief after your hand over at that stage you were actually considering a whole building or partial evacuation so I think from probably the

00:27:53 evacuation so I think from probably the moment of arrival I was thinking the whole building needs to be evacuated right cleared right so you consider everybody in the building when you are putting in firefighting the rescue operations you do think about the other

00:28:05 operations you do think about the other people who may be affected in that building and what you need to do with them so yes I was taking into account everyone in the building so so I'm clear really from the point of arrival through the briefing to this point your plan is

00:28:18 the briefing to this point your plan is this right was to affect a whole building evacuation yes it would have been no I don't think for one moment I would have considered a fire that has failed on the outside of the building so catastrophically that we've had to order

00:28:29 catastrophically that we've had to order on an unprecedented number of pumps to that we would then consider if we had got it under control leaving somebody in the building asleep or something we just wouldn't have been would intervene fees were a consideration that you would do

00:28:41 were a consideration that you would do that it would always be in the intention that you would rescue when evacuate everybody from that building either you have to do it in some order and that order was those most at risk so what that would mean that is this right that

00:28:52 that would mean that is this right that mean nobody would be asked to stay put you'd have to get everybody out they may have to stay put at that point in time because where they are in their flats that are unaffected you may if you told

00:29:03 that are unaffected you may if you told them to leave those flats there then leaving into flats that could wash leaving into a staircase that could be spoken Lord so they may need to stay where they are for a time until we can ensure that we getting them out safely but just keen to

00:29:16 getting them out safely but just keen to understand this strategy in a bit more detailed way how would you go about working out who should be asked to stay put

00:29:22 put who should be told to leave if they could without assistance and who needed assistance so at the time so this is still at the bottom of the tower what

00:29:33 still at the bottom of the tower what you'd be looking at histor the rock the north east side of the fire which is where the fire was so those would be your most at-risk people because that's where the fire is and Longsight the people in the first of all the garden schools any smoke that's got into the

00:29:44 schools any smoke that's got into the building or from the original file on the fourth floor is likely to go up to the top floors because the smoke will rise so they sort of your next priority and then you would work your way systematically making sure that each

00:29:55 systematically making sure that each floor is cleared or searched and that's how you would base it up on it any other information that's coming in through control you would pass on via fire some other guidance you know I pass on than they would I would expect them in to deal with those other calls right so

00:30:07 deal with those other calls right so you'd put your saying is that you prioritize those for which those people callers for whom you had first survival guidance calls because then the casinos are at risk you'd send crews to those

00:30:18 are at risk you'd send crews to those flats yes is that right yes and other flats you wouldn't send crews to or what would you do with the other flats so so the first of all guidance calls were the immediate

00:30:30 guidance calls were the immediate priority because they were the ones who were saying they had either smoke or fire or here in their flats so they would have been the priority if crews along the way are able to check on other flats then they may well do but the second priority would be the ones that

00:30:41 second priority would be the ones that clearly could become not really effective which was the northeast side of the building and then you would have to do a cinematic way of searching the other flats normally from the top downwards now just focusing on the first

00:30:52 downwards now just focusing on the first survival guidance calls you did have at that time do you know how many you had so when I got on the unit with Dan Marek he was extremely busy and I asked him about FS cheese and he had a yet sheets

00:31:03 about FS cheese and he had a yet sheets of paper in front me right I think he apologized cuz they weren't using the multicolored papers that we were supposed to use and he said that they had too many or something or too much information so he was using sheets of paper I can't recall if there are a four

00:31:15 paper I can't recall if there are a four or

00:31:15 or pieces of a4 and he had a number of them if I had to guess on a number it looked so often you ain't got ten sheets of paper but I don't know if they were individual ones or not he hadn't added them up and I hadn't I didn't ask him to

00:31:27 them up and I hadn't I didn't ask him to add them up no he was still so busy talking to control and using the fire ground radio and I think even if control he was using both his telephone and the radio as well and did you have any

00:31:38 radio as well and did you have any information did you go about finding information as to what the conditions were like outside the flats from which fire survival guidance calls were coming not at that point in time though so that would have so that was the time when I

00:31:49 would have so that was the time when I just taken over from Richard and the first person off that I spoke to was Dan mmm and that would have taken Dan away from what he was still trying to do which was get the information from control and get it out to the fire ground by the radio as well as I think

00:32:01 ground by the radio as well as I think sending some of the priority messages for me and getting hold of mark and at the same time was trying to do the telephone so all that was what my dad was trying to do so then try and get Dan

00:32:12 was trying to do so then try and get Dan to stop all that and talk me through it just wouldn't have worked I don't think what I needed to do was put an officer in place to deal with that directly with Dan whose only role was to deal with fire some other buttons and how would

00:32:24 fire some other buttons and how would you have got crews to those flats which from which fire Survival guidance calls were coming safely so by putting Richard

00:32:35 were coming safely so by putting Richard in charge of the fire sector with the brief to prioritize the fire some of the guidance cause they'd already have some information that had gone from the original see you to the watch manager dealing with it you know that I've been

00:32:47 dealing with it you know that I've been told about and then when I put some go-to in charge a fire starter Gordon's coordination no expectation was the information from control would go to that command unit and then from that command unit across to the fire sector

00:32:58 command unit across to the fire sector and that would give Richard at the knowledge of where those for of guidance calls one yeah but wouldn't you need to know what the conditions were like the rest verbal conditions were like in the routes of escape

00:33:09 routes of escape lobbies and stairs before you could finalize a plan to send EBA crews up the building if you had them or st pas if that's all you had to rescue people and bring them down wouldn't you need to have that information if the expectation

00:33:22 have that information if the expectation said expectation for me was that there would be smoking the staircase but the be a cruise can go up a smoke-filled staircase so so there's no issue with that if they come across a fire situation they would then need a

00:33:33 situation they would then need a firefighting jet to use against it so so you don't need to have an in-depth knowledge of the conditions you are sending so so quite often as instant modeling you you've not been into the fire yet in in normal circumstance you

00:33:45 fire yet in in normal circumstance you don't know what the fire is like inside a building until crews have gone in and checked it for you so so my expectation was Richard would be - Richard would go to take over the fire set to an established through the bridgehead what

00:33:58 established through the bridgehead what the conditions were that we were expecting and where I could send the EDB a crew stick but let's just take it that's if we can work from an example or two 'not that it is I stress an example can I just ask you to look at the sial page 21 and the third of the way down

00:34:16 page 21 and the third of the way down quarter the way down the page at 159 52 so you're on the incident ground hjf Heather Fox creates a service request over the radio

00:34:27 creates a service request over the radio to g27 one call received person with two children is trapped in her flat number 203 on the 23rd floor and then that service request is completed by Sharon Davi over the radio just taking that as

00:34:38 Davi over the radio just taking that as an example flat 203 23rd floor you treat that as a priority how did you were you going to satisfy yourself that those

00:34:51 going to satisfy yourself that those callers or that caller and the occupants of that flat could be brought safely from the flat through the lobbies down the stairs and out of the building so by

00:35:03 the stairs and out of the building so by setting up the fight of all the guidance unit they would identify that that call caller needs to be rescued and they would pass that information on to the fire sector and they would then deploy the a cruise up to that flat to attempt

00:35:14 the a cruise up to that flat to attempt to get those people out in the event that the conditions in the staircase are completely untenable because that's where the question is as in how would they get them through this month in Baran it is difficult so normally

00:35:27 in Baran it is difficult so normally when you rescue people you've got to take them through a short travel distance if it's in a house it's normally down a flight of stairs if it's in a flat it's normally from a room in the flat to the staircase so it would have been a challenge for them but if

00:35:39 have been a challenge for them but if they're already in a an environment which is affecting them directly then the only way is to take them and to get down the stairs as quickly as possible yes my question really was it was there

00:35:51 yes my question really was it was there any way in which you could or did go about assessing whether those occupants had called couldn't brought out safely in accordance with your plan they could

00:36:03 in accordance with your plan they could be well died expect the so I spent the bridgehead in the fire sector when they send in the crews up they would they would assess what the conditions are that they're going to bring in and down through if the conditions within their

00:36:15 through if the conditions within their flat are you know very heavily smoke logged for example their only option may be to bring them down a staircase which could also be smuggled so so yes I wanted to know the conditions inside the building particularly the staircase

00:36:26 building particularly the staircase that's I didn't have that information at that point in time that you rely upon the crews to make the decision of how they're going to get those people out hmm and they know but in order to and I've asked this question a number of

00:36:37 I've asked this question a number of times though because I'm still curious about it but it all to formulate a plan strategy tactic wouldn't you need information about the conditions in the lobbies in the stairs at for example

00:36:48 lobbies in the stairs at for example floor 23 in order to be able to to work out what strategy you needed how many people how many crews you needed to send up whether it was edpa whether they needed water yes but you don't

00:37:00 needed water yes but you don't necessarily have all that information when you set their objectives so the objective was to rescue those people from that flat you rely upon the information then coming back from the people you've tasked that to so the firefighters to find out the conditions

00:37:12 firefighters to find out the conditions on the way whether they can get to that flat reasonably whether there's firefighting needed when they get there how they're going to escape the evacuate the person the objective stays the same the objective is I need you to rescue the people who work in that flat what

00:37:25 the people who work in that flat what you can't do is you give it I upon the briefings back to find out whoever that's possible sorry that you say what you can't do is you rely upon the briefings back yes sir do you mean you

00:37:37 briefings back yes sir do you mean you can't rely on the briefings or now you would rely upon you would rely on the BSS

00:37:41 BSS so that takes me to the question did you take any steps in formulating this plan when you first arrived back at at the CU 8 to find out from the bridgehead what the reports the debriefs work were that

00:37:53 the reports the debriefs work were that were coming from crews that have been in the building no that was that was a time when the radios were still overwhelmed so the way I was to get that information was the same rich to take over the fire sector and then what I would expect from

00:38:04 sector and then what I would expect from Richard is him to give me a briefing as soon as he's able to on what the conditions are within the building what's how its operating within the building and what they're able to achieve now the strategy that you've described just now and indeed it before

00:38:17 described just now and indeed it before the lunch break about sending even VA wearers up to the top and for rescue people as on a downwards approach did you carry that into effect at any point and on the hold scale in that zone so by

00:38:30 and on the hold scale in that zone so by the time I went out as Operations commander the fire had got significantly worse both on the outside of the building and then when I first went into the tower it then became clear that the fire wasn't just in individual flats it

00:38:42 fire wasn't just in individual flats it was in communal areas as well so the plant the original plan would have to be changed

00:38:53 [Music] so would this be fair or unfair that really at the point you were considering your strategy you had an information vacuum as to details in relation to the

00:39:06 vacuum as to details in relation to the FSGS conditions in the building and the safety of the means of escape so as far as the occupants were concerned yes oh I knew that the FSG calls were being dealt with by an officer I knew a limited

00:39:19 with by an officer I knew a limited amount about the information about the conditions in the building outside of the fourth floor and then with regard to so the last point was the FSG calls yet history calls I know we had a number of FSG calls that have been going to a pump

00:39:31 FSG calls that have been going to a pump and Sue and then subsequently to a command unit so I know that those things were being dealt with but I had a limited amount of information on them because I hadn't yet had the chance to get all the detail did any part of your

00:39:42 get all the detail did any part of your strategy involve being able to communicate with occupants of the building directly from the fire ground

00:39:51 no there's no there's no means to communicate directly with the occupants of the flats there's no there's no fire alarm system within the building is no tannoy system within the building during

00:40:02 tannoy system within the building during the incident there were some firefighters were given thousands of members of the public who were speaking to people in the building but in a building like this there's no means of directly talking to any of the occupants

00:40:13 directly talking to any of the occupants from the outside did you not well we put it differently did you did you seek to find out whether there was a flat intercom system so that anybody who arrived at the foot of the tower and

00:40:24 arrived at the foot of the tower and wanted to be wanted to be let into a high flat press the buzzer that would that would not normally be the way we communicate with people inside the building it's something that you could consider it would probably depend on the

00:40:36 consider it would probably depend on the type of intercom system it is so some of them are a bit like a telephone when you press them they'll ring one flat and one flat only and that's the only person you can talk to other them others are a bit like an open mic so everyone can hear

00:40:47 like an open mic so everyone can hear it's not a system I'd ever thought of before

00:40:50 before not saying is not a system that couldn't be used but I'm not sure it is set up even for gramophone or other buildings that that's that's the means you would not used to talk to it it's not something that was mentioned and later

00:41:01 something that was mentioned and later on I suppose when the fire affected the south side of the building it would have meant we couldn't get to the intercom system anyway now you boarded seat the Cu and that's the CEO of that cu8 Ando more rhodomont yes yeah

00:41:12 of that cu8 Ando more rhodomont yes yeah and you say that on onboarding to see you hurt and say you had two surprises and this is the foot of page 12 and the first surprise you say was that there

00:41:24 first surprise you say was that there was no information written up at all the white boards were blank see that no you're an hour so hour and 20 minutes perhaps into the into the incident by now what would you have expected to be

00:41:36 now what would you have expected to be written up on the white boards in the see you so as you go in the white boards you're right normally has something called the headline board which is a organizational chart is probably the best way to describe it yes and if the CSS isn't working then the which is the

00:41:49 CSS isn't working then the which is the command support system the computerized system if that's not working then you expect the headline board to be filled out with the organizational chart so in other words who which officer to do in which roles right what's the CSS working it wasn't turned

00:42:00 what's the CSS working it wasn't turned on that wasn't turned on you know why not

00:42:02 not no and you say did you say if if it's not working that sounds as if that might be a common to people later on I was told it wasn't working it works the majority of times it does

00:42:13 it works the majority of times it does have faults I believe the IT is technologies quite it's meets a lot repair but it works at most incidents would it have helped on the night would it have helped you on the night during

00:42:24 it have helped you on the night during the period you where I see to have a working asset CSS it may when I've done yes it's difficult to know no okay yeah did the fact that the information wasn't written on the boards affect your

00:42:35 written on the boards affect your ability to carry out your role at that stage it would have been much more helpful so so that's the organizational chart board the other one would be the main board in front of you as you get on he's normally just a blank white board and within that one you'd expect nominee

00:42:48 and within that one you'd expect nominee list of priorities list of hazards quite often there would be a plan drawing or a schematic of the building to show you what you're dealing with and then on this particular one I would have expected something like a list of SST FSG calls or information about that and

00:43:01 FSG calls or information about that and instead of any of that it was just blank so

00:43:04 so information to support it did you ask the officer on board the Cu age why there was no FSG information on the whiteboards so the two officers on board were Richard and Dan I didn't ask for it should um and it wasn't the time to ask

00:43:17 should um and it wasn't the time to ask Dan he was said it was clear why Dan wasn't able to do it he just had so much to deal with on the radios and the telephones right so it would appear that with the two large unit staff Marc been

00:43:28 with the two large unit staff Marc been out on the fire ground and Dan being on the radios day we just had not had the opportunity to put that information out because it normally would be a role that they would do right now at this point from what you could see was cu8 still

00:43:40 from what you could see was cu8 still handling FSG yes sir dan was taking phone calls well I think he was on on the main screen radio and taking phone calls I think the impression I got was that they were FSGS as well and he was

00:43:53 that they were FSGS as well and he was also trying to operate the FIR going radios well did you see well what was dan merrick communicating what he had learned from control about our first jeez to somebody on the incident ground

00:44:04 jeez to somebody on the incident ground he was continuously talking on a second to you he was talking continuously either on his fire ground radio to people or on the main screen radio or on the telephone so he was doing a three or four-way conversation no yes there so

00:44:15 four-way conversation no yes there so yes it certainly appeared like he was talking on the radio and he would have been on the command channel which is to the other command unit operatives on the ground so most likely would be Marc or any other command unit staff that were there did you see him writing any FSG

00:44:27 there did you see him writing any FSG information dermal pieces of paper I he was definitely writing information down and bits of paper I think it what was it G but I can't recall I wasn't looking at what he was writing down specific did you see possibly one to

00:44:38 specific did you see possibly one to finish their boxers I think I could only talk to my Dan probably two or three times during the first 30 minutes each time for around 30 seconds so I didn't get the time to look specifically of

00:44:49 get the time to look specifically of what he was writing down what did you observe any runners coming to the command unit to collect bits of paper and take them into the that point in time when Dan was on the unit and Richard was on the unit there were no

00:45:00 Richard was on the unit there were no runners they were the only two officers who came to the union until I think the next one to arrive was yes Thank You mr. chairman mr. lakhtin it may be appropriate to take a break now would you like that yes right

00:45:14 now would you like that yes right [Music]

00:45:15 [Music] well again you said talk to anyone whether a little about or evidence surrounding us and we'll have a break and resume at five to three that's right thank you

00:45:38 right five two sweeteners

00:55:22 yes mr. chairman please continue

00:55:35 great mr. O'Laughlin yes exactly how did you carry on yes sir think you from it mr. locking thank you for coming back can I just take you to the middle of page 12 of your statement where you refer to the heli telly in the middle of

00:55:47 refer to the heli telly in the middle of the page you you explained that on the command units there is a range of communication comms and so can communicate with our control but with the fire ground with police control if

00:55:59 the fire ground with police control if necessary they connects access the heli tele from the police helicopters now was to your knowledge was the heli tele downlink into the command unit working

00:56:10 downlink into the command unit working on the night I never saw any heli telly on the command units so I expect knowledge but I didn't because I didn't see it doesn't know it's not safe wasn't sorry I didn't see they had he said he downlink working on collagenous when did

00:56:22 downlink working on collagenous when did you first become aware that the police helicopters were in attendance it was Eva when I was outside the building with Dan and Andy that's right yeah or with

00:56:33 Dan and Andy that's right yeah or with with Danone and heels like Mike and Mike and handy supplies his Eva at that point or when I spoke to the police officer when I was in charge on the unit or possibly when I went back so for some time in that period I think it was when

00:56:46 time in that period I think it was when I think it was when Andy and Mike were handing over but I can't record it I'm only think of it through the noise it would have made but actually think about it now at the bottom of the tower I probably wouldn't be able to hear it

00:56:57 I probably wouldn't be able to hear it above the noise of the fire and the debris falling so so I'm not sure I didn't know it at that point for definite but I think there was a conversation with the police officer about the heli telling that I can't recall exactly when you did discover

00:57:09 recall exactly when you did discover that police helicopters were in attack were in attendance did you take any steps to see if the heli telly downlink and the command unit could be made to work that would be a conversation I would have with the police to see if it

00:57:21 would have with the police to see if it was working and then with the command unit operatives did you have a conversation I can't recall that I did but it's so normal for us to do it in fact they'd already do it proactively

00:57:32 fact they'd already do it proactively you wouldn't normally have to ask them they normally know themselves when the heli tell you is there and they get it to work so I remember conversations on the night around the head attorney I don't recall specifically if I asked Dan Merrick on the unit I wouldn't have

00:57:43 Dan Merrick on the unit I wouldn't have asked Ann to do it actually cuz he was too busy if I asked one of the other commanding officers to or if they told me it wasn't working I Carmical it won't look cool

00:57:51 look cool would it have helped you as incident commander to have had access to the heli TV and images from the helicopter so yes it most likely one could he would have shown me if there's any other fire

00:58:02 shown me if there's any other fire spread around the building or it would have shown me what the fire was doing on that northeast side him how I never was obviously I can only see it from a very acute angle what the brandable what so was that another gap in your information

00:58:16 was that another gap in your information it's always text on for the heli tell you to get to work at any fire so I was aware that a helicopter was there or was ordered there and the one thing you want is it to be available on the command

00:58:27 is it to be available on the command unit here so it would have been useful yes so when I say another gap it's a tendentious question but my in addition to not knowing detailed information about the conditions in the building

00:58:39 about the conditions in the building inside and without knowing detail about the FSG calls that's why I said another gap it's not unusual developing stage of a fire which this still is now cuz it's getting worse yes to not have all the information

00:58:51 yes to not have all the information about all of the incident easily and readily available to you and I say you try and gathering as much of that as you can and the police information from daily copy one source of information that you're relying upon as well as all

00:59:02 that you're relying upon as well as all the other sources of information that you're trying to collect together now you said a minute ago and seconds ago it's getting worse I just want to understand that a little bit better when you got onto the command unit and you

00:59:13 you got onto the command unit and you would talk you to Dan Merrick you saw Richard Welch there did you think that the fire was getting worse the likelihood was that even if the fire on

00:59:24 likelihood was that even if the fire on the outside of the building did burn off which I hoped it would but obviously it didn't we know now the fires were in the flats or the smoke from the flats is likely to get they will get worse until we put the fires out if we were able to I say so I had no knowledge that they

00:59:36 I say so I had no knowledge that they were getting worse the expectation was until we are able to put those fires out they're not going to get better on their own

00:59:42 own I'm going to go off in the round so at that moment would it be right to say that you you were aware that this was a very dynamic situation dynamic it was extremely dynamic I've never ordered forty fire engines to a fire before so

00:59:54 forty fire engines to a fire before so it's about the most dynamic I think that most officers there it about being super fire and by dynamic do you mean liable to change and get worse or behave unpredictably it would have the potential to do and it's already acted

01:00:06 potential to do and it's already acted very unpredictably insofar as it's gone up the outside of the building right like it has and there's the number of fast web of guidance cool so it's already done there the thing that you're trying to do is put some sort of measure

01:00:17 trying to do is put some sort of measure on based on your experience your knowledge of what you think it may do next and at that point in time it was still that it would create fires on the north east side of the building in individual flats right would you

01:00:28 individual flats right would you describe the far as unpredictable at that point it had been unpredictable before I got there insofar as it had gone up the outside of the building in the manner it did yeah which is not something I'd ever experienced or seen or being aware of before in this country

01:00:41 or being aware of before in this country no but sorry that's the question again it had done that we know but at that moment did you think the fire was unpredictable he's reasonable so yes the fire was unpredictable at that point was reasonable sorry

01:00:52 reasonable sorry did you think it was at the time yes you did I'm given that the fire as you thought was unpredictable at the time did you at that point we're now on CUA to consider whether now is the time to

01:01:04 to consider whether now is the time to at least rethink the stay-put advice being given to residents who at that moment weren't let's say affected by the fire smoke or heat and the issue was telling the people who are unaffected by

01:01:16 telling the people who are unaffected by the fire to leave is I did not know the conditions in the staircase at that point in time so you might be asking people to leave unaffected flats that may never become affected into a potentially smoke-filled staircase so until I had a good knowledge or the fire

01:01:28 until I had a good knowledge or the fire sets come on had a good knowledge of what the staircase was doing I wouldn't have wanted 10 people to leave in the risk that they would get trapped on a staircase full of smoke in addition to that you've also got all our

01:01:39 that you've also got all our firefighters trying to go in so and they're obviously carrying quite a lot of equipment and quite bulky with that equipment so you'd you'd have a flow of people trying to rush out if it was even possible to let those people

01:01:51 possible to let those people at the same time as you're trying to get people in which firefighters to the the people most at risk which was the ones involved in the fire survival garden schools hmm and the staircases don't allow very easily for us or two-way flow

01:02:02 allow very easily for us or two-way flow of traffic as it were yeah my question is really didn't it's really trying to find out how reliable it was the people who were for the time being safe in their flats would stay safe given the

01:02:14 their flats would stay safe given the dynamic nature of the fire depending on where their flats were so on the so the expectation of the fire wouldn't go horizontally around the building in the way that he did because there was no reason to believe that was going to happen it would appear that the

01:02:25 going to happen it would appear that the outside fire was on the northeast side of the building and then the internal fires were what may be the true address and if none of those have breached into the lobbies and the staircases then the

01:02:36 the lobbies and the staircases then the people in unaffected flats had the potential of not being affected at all so my thinking would be as an example if there's people on the southwest side of that building there's no reason to consider that the fire would go externally around to their

01:02:48 fire would go externally around to their flats or then it would come out of a northeast flat across a lobby and then into a flat internally there was no reason to think at any point in those early stages that that was a likelihood when did you first think that well first

01:03:02 when did you first think that well first here that the fire was quotes wrapping around the building on quotes your words and your contemporaneous name I can't recall that was mentioned by Andy and Mike I don't think it was if it was I did my interpretation that was that it was that wind I am described earlier on

01:03:15 was that wind I am described earlier on the north northeast corner if you like and that could be a normal thinking of it in the wind will blow bit slightly around the one side of the building that was probably after I'd gone out and seen the building you know initially on the

01:03:26 the building you know initially on the south side that I saw and obviously the east west side as well and it rapping became a common term people were using because it because it was going horizontally around it that's the way

01:03:37 horizontally around it that's the way people were describing it was wrapping around the building a number of firefighters and what sort was that word in tone I'd say it was probably I went at his operations commander right and onwards from there now going back to

01:03:48 onwards from there now going back to your statement you say you had two surprises page left page 12 and you say the second surprise and this is the very foot of page 12 mister Bachmann was the group manager what Richard wealth was on the unit and that

01:03:59 Richard wealth was on the unit and that he was wearing the incident command at a bard

01:04:02 bard now just explore that a bit group manager Welch recalls that you arrived on the command unit and told him that you were incident commander at about two

01:04:14 you were incident commander at about two eleven and it was you who asked for the message at two 1146 to make FRU six do you remember that I remember making

01:04:26 you remember that I remember making Richard and tell him I was instant commander yes okay and I think you then got a message to the control room to say that you were incident commander that's

01:04:37 that you were incident commander that's I would have asked for that to be done yes we have that in the we don't need to go to it we have that at 211 48 and it's a page 70 of the control report it

01:04:49 a page 70 of the control report it doesn't look as if the senior officers were told individually who the incident commander was the only senior officer that I'd spoken to was Andy Walken and

01:05:00 that I'd spoken to was Andy Walken and so Andy Walton knew that I was instant Amanda and then when I got onto the command unit Richard Welsh I was instant water they were the only two senior officers to I had any direct communication with at that point and then the message should have gone out

01:05:12 then the message should have gone out from Mark MPhil to the incident ground I had taken over the incident and then everybody else didn't I think to be fair of that one the radios were so congested it wouldn't surprise me if that message wasn't possible but the two senior officers at that point that I knew about

01:05:23 officers at that point that I knew about was Andy Walton and Richard and they both knew I was easily honor did you get told or get the impression that at some point station manager loft had been incident commander instant commander now

01:05:36 incident commander instant commander now now looking at your statement at page 13 you start by saying at the very top of the page that Richard Welch apologized by saying he hadn't realized that you were present at the incident he thinks I

01:05:49 were present at the incident he thinks I informed you that I was and that I was in charge he then told me he'd made pumps 40 and implemented the major incident procedure he'd explained this is all you've done is he then you just arrived on the CEO himself I said that I

01:06:00 arrived on the CEO himself I said that I was happy with his actions and thanked him and now did he tell you that he had instructed station manager to send a methane message now he didn't

01:06:11 to send a methane message now he didn't know the first concepts or awareness I'd of Steve West was much later on when I was in charge and I asked him to take over set command command support until that point I didn't know Steve West was on the Instagram did group manage well

01:06:22 on the Instagram did group manage well surely that he asked anybody to send a methane message I think somebody was draft in a vain Fame message it was on the whiteboard as you go into the union on the left hand side somebody had written me phone up and had started to populate you sure I don't know who that

01:06:34 populate you sure I don't know who that was from duels and so far as the major incident procedure is concerned did you know that the police for themselves declared a major incident of just after 1:30 a.m. I didn't know that now did you

01:06:47 1:30 a.m. I didn't know that now did you or did he Richard Welch tell the local authority that a major incident had been declared Richard wouldn't do that which is the major incident procedure message

01:06:58 is the major incident procedure message should notify the local authority as a as one of the responders they have to be told so so by setting their major instant messages send an alert if you like to a number of category one and category responders right so that would

01:07:09 category responders right so that would be done by control obviously control was extremely busy at that point in time but but that would be that's the point of the message is to alert those who need who may need to know to help us until your way of understanding that would

01:07:20 your way of understanding that would include the local authority with it almost certainly I think they are the category one responders possibly categorically okay do you remember a watch manager Harrison being on the in speed command unit not that point in

01:07:31 speed command unit not that point in time notes are the only tone unit at that point on was Richard and Dan Merrick right

01:07:41 now on page 13 of your statement you say well you described how you asked Richard Welch to take command at the fire sector from Andy Walter that's the third of the way down and then you would go on to say

01:07:53 way down and then you would go on to say I then explained what I just seen in that the fire was affecting most of the floors from the third to fourth floors and up to the roof level and seemed to

01:08:05 and up to the roof level and seemed to be on the outside of the building at that time I informed him that FSG was in progress but had no numbers and no idea of priority I told him to focus on foreign on rescue and firefighting inside the entire building and that the

01:08:17 inside the entire building and that the entire inside of the building was essentially now the fire sector know when you say that and seemed to be on the outside of the building at that time

01:08:29 the outside of the building at that time did you tell him that or did you tell him a little bit more which I think the office is one of the first things I asked if they'd seen the fire and Richard said he had seen the fire and

01:08:40 Richard said he had seen the fire and then I I told him what my understanding of what I'd seen was to see if it was the same as what he had seen so I'd seen a fire on the north east side of the building going from around the third or fourth floor up to the top of the building

01:08:51 building and whereas that was what he'd seen as well and it was and then we got onto the FSGS as the next thing and within the FSG conversation I would have been that's where we've been saying that he looks like the fire is in the flats or

01:09:02 looks like the fire is in the flats or at least two smokers in the flats although it's not in the statement if there's an FSG in progress then it means that there is smoke or fire in their flats right just to be clear at any point during your conversation with

01:09:13 point during your conversation with Richard Welch did you tell him that so far as you could see as far as you understood fire penetrated into flats I couldn't see if the fire had got into the flats so from the angle I'd seen it I could only see the fire on the outside

01:09:25 I could only see the fire on the outside of the building yeah but with the messages of the coming in through the FSG that I'd heard enroute they appeared that the fire was getting from the outside of the building into some of those flats yes - did you tell Richard Welch that we had

01:09:37 - did you tell Richard Welch that we had the conversation at that so yes you did okay now you say you tell have no numbers or priorities from it for FSG messages

01:09:46 messages was it were you able to ask the operator on the CEO Dan Merrick about those FSG messages not at that point in time so this was so I was aware so that's when

01:09:59 this was so I was aware so that's when Dan was extremely busy so I was aware that he was doing those when I say I have no idea of numbers and priorities I know we've got a lot of them and I know that they are a priority themselves but I can't break them down for Richard at that point in time so I wanted from

01:10:12 that point in time so I wanted from Richard and I knew there was a system already set up with that information was going to the officer at the tower that Mike and Dan have told me about so I'm like an Andy had told me about so I knew there was a system in place and what I

01:10:24 there was a system in place and what I didn't have that point to give Richard was an exact number of how many FS geez we had and what the priority of them was but there was a system and then most

01:10:35 but there was a system and then most likely I would have told him Richard that I'll put in a facile regards you need to help that I know I see now in that last answer you said that Mike and Andy told you about a system whereby FSG

01:10:47 Andy told you about a system whereby FSG information was going to the officer at the tower that's that was that during the briefing that was during the briefing when they told me they have an office hour dealing with the FS geez my recollection was that was possibly with golf two seven one right did they give

01:10:59 golf two seven one right did they give you any more detail about what that system of communication was no they didn't do they tell you who do what the officer was no that's it so that's where I'm certainly didn't same as a station manager because of the founder right did they do we only had I thought I only

01:11:11 they do we only had I thought I only have one station manager at that point in time so when they said an officer and my expectation was it was a watch manager and in fact more so that was because if it had been another officer they not would have expected that the station manager would expected that station ager to be with Andy Walton

01:11:23 station ager to be with Andy Walton because Andy had only taken over five minutes before right so if there be an additional station managers there I would have expected them to be there with Andy Walton because he had only just taken over okay at this point did

01:11:35 just taken over okay at this point did you know about a plan or a merging plan to have a watch manager collating for survival guidance details outside the tower and then running those messages

01:11:46 tower and then running those messages into the tower that I wonder I knew that plan is detailed but that's what I would have even expected to happen is that the the office that has been assigned to call make the

01:11:57 call make the first of all garden schools at that point is he's writing them all down if you like and then taking him into the tower to the bridgehead or getting somebody to take him into this out of the bridgehead so the bridge shake and then act upon them again as I said the radios were overwhelmed so we couldn't

01:12:09 radios were overwhelmed so we couldn't use them they wouldn't be not to use the radios right now you say you say in your statement that you've had no numbers on and no idea of priority did you then go

01:12:23 and no idea of priority did you then go about seeing how you could get numbers and an idea of priority so I knew that Dan had the detail of those and what I wanted to do was set up a far smaller Gordon's coordinator to deal with the detail of that and use Dan to support

01:12:36 detail of that and use Dan to support that setting up and so so there so when I said no idea of numbers as you know I couldn't have told Richard the exact number of FSG calls at that point unless I asked Dan to start counting them up for me but Dan was already too busy right with the communication systems he

01:12:48 right with the communication systems he was working on how was Richard Welch going to get those numbers so that a prioritization system could be put in place

01:12:55 place so Richard asked initially was to take over the fire sector to establish what we had going on there and then as quickly as I could I would get the FSG Union set up to support him in exactly

01:13:06 Union set up to support him in exactly that in identifying exactly where these flats were and the priority of them in the meantime there was already a system set up which was it would appear dan Merrik

01:13:14 Merrik to the officer at the base of the tower and then from the base of the tower to the Brigid yes it was a early system set up I won't do much more robust system that would last for the hours rather

01:13:25 that would last for the hours rather than what we had at that point right but given where we got to and you have been on the internet ground for some little time you got back to the CEO you still hadn't had any idea in terms of numbers

01:13:37 hadn't had any idea in terms of numbers or priorities for FSGS did it occur to you to get hold of somebody in the control room to get that information for yourself so that you could at least brief Richard Welsh with that no because that information was coming through to

01:13:49 that information was coming through to us it was going today and it was just that we didn't have the opportunity for Dancer can't add them all up as it were and give them over to me what Dan lead it was a team to help him do it and so if I had a phone control I wouldn't have been able to manage the entire incident

01:14:00 been able to manage the entire incident I would have owned being able to get specific details about the first wave of guidance calls what I wanted was someone else to take on the whole responsibility of the first wave ago and it's called the nation and so they could do that for me with a team of

01:14:11 they could do that for me with a team of people working with them yes just I'm sorry I press that a bit bit more I understand that you didn't have the perhaps couldn't manage the exact details but my question really is what

01:14:23 details but my question really is what why didn't you get hold of somebody of control perhaps the officer of the watch and just say well give me a general impression of what you've got their numbers flats floors I don't need the exact details I just need need to

01:14:34 exact details I just need need to understand in general terms so that I can formulate my strategy with greater precision here on the incident ground it's not the way you'd normally communicate the control you'd do it through your comms officer I think also in that point in time I take within

01:14:46 in that point in time I take within probably 30 seconds of Richard leaving the Union it's all good all turned up so I had a person who could take that from me so at that point in time it would have been I'd have to put Tom on hold while I made a phone call to control so

01:14:57 while I made a phone call to control so so it wouldn't have been the best use at that point of my time to try to get that set up it was better to assign it to an officer to take command of that as a whole

01:15:06 whole rather than me trying to get through control who I knew were overwhelmed already because I'd heard that on the radio

01:15:14 okay

01:15:19 at the bottom of page 13 you

01:15:29 say then quite quickly additional additional officers arrived the next officer who came on board was group manager Tom Goodell who's in charge of our operational policy team where one of his responsibilities as FSG and then you

01:15:42 his responsibilities as FSG and then you say I explained to him at the key priority this point was coordinating the FSG calls and establishing how many people we had inside the building how many of us are talking to control how

01:15:53 many of us are talking to control how many were a priority and at risk and how many we needed to get to quickly that that how did you expect him to go about

01:16:06 that how did you expect him to go about that task to so I Eva I came up before somebody else recommended use in the command unit 7 I know command unit 7 was what ain't a command you know should so he was closer to the tower

01:16:17 he was closer to the tower so he'd need to do that from a command unit so the option was even kept the command unit that I was on which was further away from the tower or he went it's the command Denis that was closer to the cell so I gave him I told him to

01:16:28 to the cell so I gave him I told him to take the command unit closer to the tower which I now know to be cu7 and also to take down merrick with him as well or sent down merrick with him because they america was the person who had all of the information at that point

01:16:39 had all of the information at that point in time right would you not need to know this information yourself at the earliest possible stage so that you could finalize with your the formulation

01:16:50 could finalize with your the formulation of your strategy and resource the incident appropriately so resources wise we have a huge number of resources on route already so I was satisfied that a number of resources we had coming were

01:17:02 number of resources we had coming were enough for that building so you I don't think you physically gotta kick fitted the number of firefighters that we don't I'd ordered on into the building in probably the next hour or so so so resources why as I was satisfied regard

01:17:14 resources why as I was satisfied regard to the detail of the FSGS it was it was better if one person could take control of that and then coordinate through the unit and that's the way the system is set out to work that you like

01:17:25 system is set out to work that you like so that person their entire responsibility and the team they're working with is to focus on the first part of gardens detail and then identifying that to support the fire sector in carrying out the rescues

01:17:36 sector in carrying out the rescues again as a whole I've got the entire incident to manage so there's a lot of other things I need to put in place as the instant - oh it is clearly it's important information but I'm handing over that responsibility to the Fort Collins coordinator it's a cold name on

01:17:48 Collins coordinator it's a cold name on my behalf and would you expect them to feedback to you oh yes I would expect them to feedback okay we'll come back to that now now on page 13 of your statements still on that you say that

01:18:01 statements still on that you say that you tasked Richard Welch with rescue and firefighting it's half way down and you say I told him to focus on rescue and

01:18:12 say I told him to focus on rescue and firefighting inside the entire building that mitigates not to ask you a question or two about that when you say rescue and firefighting time such as wait till

01:18:23 and firefighting time such as wait till it gets marked it's exactly helping down the page and it's the sentence that starts I told him to focus on rescue and firefighting inside the entire building

01:18:36 yes

01:18:39 now how did you envisage at that time when you were briefing Richard Welch that these rescues should be carried out so he would get the information about a

01:18:51 so he would get the information about a fastball guidance call from a particular flat he would send crews to that flat and if they were able to rescue them without firefighting than they would rescue them and evacuate them from building if however they when they got

01:19:03 building if however they when they got to the flat they needed to fight the fire and they would have to get jets to that floor and attack the file and then rescue the person how did you envision

01:19:14 rescue the person how did you envision the firefighting would work with a fire that had spread from the third or fourth floor right to the very top and was beginning to move around the northeast face his corner so at that point in time

01:19:26 face his corner so at that point in time it's still the northeast corner that's my understanding of where the fire is and it's on the outside of the building what my expectation was there's a number of flats that have caught a light but the fire because their compartments it should stay within those flats so my

01:19:38 should stay within those flats so my experience has been that the fire within a flat in a high-rise building can stay contained within that flat for an hour or more without there being attacked with fire fire media and it will still stay within that individual flow so what

01:19:49 stay within that individual flow so what you effectively have here is a number of flats on fire individually within the building there was no reason to think at that point that it was they were all going to breach into the lobbies and all breach into the staircase and on the

01:20:00 breach into the staircase and on the flats so so you effectively have got a number of high-rise flat fires on different floors that you have to attack each high-rise fat fire individually at that point but if that's so um does that

01:20:12 that point but if that's so um does that mean that you were assuming working on the assumption that although fire had got into flats the fire was contained in those flats and that therefore the lobbies and stairway were clear so the

01:20:26 lobbies and stairway were clear so the the reason normally that you would have the smoke or heat coming out of the flat into the lobby is if the occupants have left the door open when they've left themselves and then there's nothing to stop it getting out alternatively it

01:20:37 stop it getting out alternatively it would have to burn through the door of the flat and the doors of the flats in normally quite substantial doors they should give you a minimum of 30 minutes protection so so you'd need the fire to have got into the flat and then got

01:20:48 have got into the flat and then got through to the door of the and then burn through the door flap into the lobby even when it gets into the lobby there shouldn't be any there should be any fuel in that lobby for the fire to sort or get worse as it were so there's no storage in the lobby for

01:21:00 there's no storage in the lobby for example so expectation is that you've got a series of flat fires on the northeast side of the building that's if it does get into the lobbies it will be possibly where people have left their doors open as they've left right so it

01:21:12 doors open as they've left right so it shouldn't be through the fact that he's burning through you wouldn't expect that number of flats compartments to fail but compartment ation correct me if I'm wrong but compartment ation fails when

01:21:24 wrong but compartment ation fails when fire breaches but also in smoke breaches again with a door if a front door of a flat that's fitted correctly that's working correctly the smoke or heat shouldn't get out of that flat so it's not the door should stop the heat or

01:21:36 not the door should stop the heat or smoke coming out of the flat so at this point where you're breaching Tariq briefing group manager Welch what assumptions were you making about whether or not there was smoke spread through the lobbies and and stairwell so

01:21:50 through the lobbies and and stairwell so my expectation was that there was a possibility of smoke in the staircase from the original floor floor floor and that's a series of flat fires on the on the floors and the right hand on the northeast corner that there was the

01:22:01 northeast corner that there was the possibility that there could be smoking some of the lobbies and that's evoke may get into the staircase again it shouldn't go into the staircase from the lobbies because the the doors did a staircase should be should closed

01:22:12 staircase should be should closed automatically and keep the smoke out yeah but there's the possibility of it and that's something that I need to find out from the fire sector commander right but there's no reason to expect it to have done that because you expect the

01:22:23 have done that because you expect the compartment ation effectively the door was to do the job they're designed to do which is to keep that the heat and smoke away from the communal areas if you were going to act on that expectation then

01:22:35 going to act on that expectation then would that not mean that actually revoking stay put and getting everybody to evacuate would be safe because on that expectation the exit routes wouldn't be smoke compromised but the

01:22:47 wouldn't be smoke compromised but the potentially smoke compromised from the fourth floor fire steel and without the knowledge of if they are I'd still be asking someone to leave a flat that's not affected by smoke and go through

01:22:58 not affected by smoke and go through smoke-filled environments try to escape and you've also got the issue of how to communicate with them so again there was no direct means of communicating with them there's no tannoy system or fire alarm system and at the same time you

01:23:09 alarm system and at the same time you didn't have people who were in a safe environment now going into the staircase which would impede the firefighters who have to go in and try to carry out the rescues of the people which we which I believe most of risk at that point in

01:23:20 believe most of risk at that point in time which was the first wave of garden school so again you'd end up with a a two-way traffic almost on the staircase which would hinder the rescue operation of the people that were most at risk which was the first type of garden school did you in your own mind look

01:23:35 school did you in your own mind look looking back on it did you balance the risks of revoking stay put and putting people into that you would assume on that expectation would be relatively clean on the one hand with on the other

01:23:48 clean on the one hand with on the other hand the risk that if they stayed in their flats the fire would develop so dynamically that they would become affected but again I think if you think of the flats on the southwest side said the opposite side to where the fire was

01:24:00 the opposite side to where the fire was on the northeast side was there was no reason to think at that point that they fire was gonna go horizontally around the outside of the building like it did it so that's not something I had experienced or seen before so it was no reason to think that it was gonna go

01:24:12 reason to think that it was gonna go around the building and then get into those flats or similarly there was no reason to believe it was going to breach a flat door on the northeast side go across a lobby and then breach the door on the southwest side so there was a

01:24:24 on the southwest side so there was a number of people in parts of that building who should have been safe if the building had done as it was designed to do and not as it did on the knife glue

01:24:35 at what point during your period is incident commander sorry I tried this a different way what did the comer point during your period in commanders into the commander when you thought the

01:24:48 the commander when you thought the building had failed completely so that nobody could was reliably safe not as interested commander now did that point come later it came when I went out as

01:25:00 come later it came when I went out as Operations commander and I'd seen the fire now spreading to the southwest corner and south side of the building okay

01:25:06 page 13 it still on page 13 can I just ask you to look at the very end of the first main paragraph just below halfway

01:25:18 first main paragraph just below halfway down you say I think we discussed comms and explained that the radios were poor so advised he put a runner and if needed this is two-thirds of the way down the

01:25:29 this is two-thirds of the way down the page we said do you see that

01:25:35 this is the footer on this cup three lines up from the bottom of the screen I think we discussed comms and explained that the radios were poor so advise you put a runner in if needed this is the

01:25:46 put a runner in if needed this is the page 13 of your statement pour in what sense to many speak people speaking on it so too many too many people trying to send messages across so they because we were so this was still outside the

01:25:58 were so this was still outside the building not inside so there was no problem if the distance because it was probably I guess maybe 100 250 meters it was more than it was so many people talking and there was only one radio channel or that one did that affect

01:26:10 channel or that one did that affect communication since between crews inside the building did you think inside the building not with bi crews it on a different radio channel so that may have happened separately but it could have affected the bridgehead commander

01:26:21 affected the bridgehead commander because he would have been on the command channel as well so it's possible that it would have been actually that they can't communicate here because there was everybody's trying to talk at the same time on the radio what about communication of FSGS from

01:26:32 what about communication of FSGS from the command unit on to the incident ground so the FSGS of it going from down Merrik had done on the command channel and only the commanding officers use that channel so he should have been able to speak to the other commanding

01:26:43 to speak to the other commanding officers in particular mark kim filled with that information and that that channel wouldn't have been overwhelmed because it was only at that point maybe two or four c'mon junior staff was a channel 6 no channel situational channel

01:26:55 channel 6 no channel situational channel 10 john 10 right and now after group manager wells left the command unit and indeed during the rest of the incident did you ever receive any information back from him or from anybody else about

01:27:10 back from him or from anybody else about the progress that firefighters were making to respond to FSG calls i went inside the building as operations commander a lot of times to speak to

01:27:22 commander a lot of times to speak to both Richard and Pat about the progress we were making and received a lot of information about the rescues they were carrying out the will come to that but just just in general terms at this stage

01:27:34 just just in general terms at this stage was the information that you got from them written down anywhere or was it just face to face as operations commander he was all face to face right now during your timers incident commander did you stay on the command

01:27:45 commander did you stay on the command unit I think you said he went to the tower how many times did you go to the tower

01:27:49 tower no so he's into the grinder no the only time is instant minder I went to the tower was when I took go from Andi and Mike and then when I went to the command unit I handed over to Andy row and I hadn't left the command unit during that

01:28:00 hadn't left the command unit during that time right except to step off to speak to the police and ambulance which was right by the door the command unit okay and then as Operations commander it was the second time I went back to itself now you were on I think you were in

01:28:13 now you were on I think you were in command for a period of about 25 maybe 30 minutes all right yes possibly I think a pv cap I think of another instant logs it's probably from 10 or 11 minutes past two but of course

01:28:25 10 or 11 minutes past two but of course I was underneath the tower with Andy Walton there probably around two o'clock so there may be another 10 minutes right at the beginning with the incident log isn't now during a period on the command unit other officers I think joined you

01:28:37 unit other officers I think joined you and if we look at your contemporaneous notes page 3 we could see I think who Kate who came on if we go to the top of page 3 Pat Goulbourne did he come on to

01:28:52 page 3 Pat Goulbourne did he come on to the command unit yep so I had a steady stream of common of officers I think the first one I recall coming on was Tom girdle yes and then then I thought it

01:29:03 girdle yes and then then I thought it was Pat :

01:29:04 was Pat : followed by Dave O'Neill followed by Steve noise that's as the group managers there were a number of watch managers and station managers during that time right but they were the four group managers I recall okay sorry alongside the ort officers off

01:29:16 sorry alongside the ort officers off because one of those is a group manager with Matt Cooke and meanwhile column is a station manager that's all right I'm just going to pick up on one or two of those briefings in detail if I can't start with starting with them with group

01:29:30 start with starting with them with group manager Tom Goodell who in the second bullet point you can see those tooken to you it you tasked to take over the first available guidance coordinator as coordinator and used the co 7 on

01:29:41 as coordinator and used the co 7 on grenfell Road you say he was to set up the unit for the FSGS coming in and to coordinate with the far sector

01:29:50 do you ever do you remember ever seeing Daniel Egan station manager Daniel Egan at the command unit I don't know Danny than the part from through this inquiry he could have been one of the station

01:30:01 he could have been one of the station manager watch manager that came right to the unit during the time the group majors and station managers I think I didn't brief a station manager to take on a role it was a group managers I was

01:30:13 on a role it was a group managers I was briefing

01:30:14 briefing let me see if you can cut the knot for us I asked you that question because Tom Goodell has told us that he thought you asked Dan Egan to do FSGS but Dan Egan says it was Richard Welch

01:30:27 but Dan Egan says it was Richard Welch but Richard Welsh says he didn't remember seeing Dan Egan so we've got a set of regulations that are different well Tom good ought to do the first of all guys I wouldn't the brief Dan Egan I

01:30:38 all guys I wouldn't the brief Dan Egan I don't know Danny okay did you brief Tom Goodell in the presence of Richard Welch no Richard had already left you know I've gone to the tower okay no at the moment when you briefed Tom Goodell to act as FSG

01:30:51 briefed Tom Goodell to act as FSG coordinator had you discovered by that point who had been coordinating FSGS up to that point now at that point he was still just that though I'd heard at the beginning there was an officer was doing

01:31:02 beginning there was an officer was doing the doing them at the bottom in a towel right and obviously Dan Merrick on the Union okay did group manager Welch tell you

01:31:13 anything about station manager Brett lofts involvement in coordinating FSGS I don't remember any conversations about Bretting offed on the night at all right

01:31:26 if you didn't know who had been coordinating FSGS up to the point when you instructed group manager Goodell did you ask group manager girdle to find out who it was you take your hands over from there I mean I said there's an officer out on

01:31:37 mean I said there's an officer out on the fire ground who's dealing with them right find that person okay and you would have expected I imagine to get him to get a full handover I'd expect to get hand up but also to keep that person with them so that person would then go on to the unit with tormund work with

01:31:49 on to the unit with tormund work with Tom alongside Dan Merrick as well that was nice i sent across so is this rights as far as you're concerned you briefed tom good or to act as FSG coordinator and you live to him to find out who he's

01:32:00 and you live to him to find out who he's taking over from yes how would he have found that out you know so the tough that the physical dimension physical area of the building wasn't that big city so where that officer was somewhere

01:32:12 city so where that officer was somewhere on the outside of the tower even working on a pump was I've been told I'd expect Tom to go out and even find the person himself or some point someone to find him for them right was there a special tab are that the FSG coordinator

01:32:24 special tab are that the FSG coordinator would have warned to identify him easily wouldn't have been up until that point so we do have a an FSG called negative odd and I would expect Tom would have put one of those on I doubt with the way the incident was going to those early stages they'd have

01:32:35 going to those early stages they'd have got time to put her at a board on so he would have had to send someone to go and find him or gonna find himself but it wasn't a physically big area that the pattern look on so it was on that southeast side that Dan that's why I

01:32:49 southeast side that Dan that's why I could sort of pointed towards somewhere in the area so it wouldn't have physically we shouldn't have been that difficult to find him but now I didn't tell him where they were so I didn't know the time okay so the last time seemed not quite sure I understood it

01:33:00 seemed not quite sure I understood it you say wouldn't have been up to that point we do have an FSG coordinator Tampa did did the lfp have mfsu coordinated tabards on vehicles so we have on the night a huge range of

01:33:12 have on the night a huge range of tabards that you then put inserts into which have the name of the role you're doing so if for example you were doing water it would say water right so it's it the tab art all look the same they're all set to commander tear pods and the

01:33:23 all set to commander tear pods and the effort

01:33:24 effort different insert so there's a lot of inserts I expect one of them is almost certainly if I saw our guidance called name did you give group manager Goodell any kind of positive information about

01:33:37 any kind of positive information about FSGS so I said we'd heard a number of SSDs on the Rope that Dan Merrick had information on them that he needed to contact control and find out or get the

01:33:49 contact control and find out or get the get get communications out with control and find out how many we were dealing with what the priorities were and where they were right did you tell him to go to see you seven yes see you seven was

01:34:00 to see you seven yes see you seven was long yourself why did you tell him to do that rather than just staying on cu8 and yourself moving to see you seven to see you seven was closer to the tower so if they weren't able to use radios and have to put runners in it was a short distance to travel and there was nothing

01:34:12 distance to travel and there was nothing physically on cu8 other than Dan Merrick and he's it's a paper that was going that made that unit essential so if for example they've been a huge list of FSG calls written up on the boards then i

01:34:23 calls written up on the boards then i may not have taken that same decision but it was nothing physically on cu8 that that wasn't that was useful to them other than dan and the information here and cu7 was just much closer right with

01:34:34 and cu7 was just much closer right with that not of risked taking time losing valuable time between cu8 doing the moved into CU 8 and CU 7 it was such a short distance it's probably less than a minute maybe and for the benefit of the

01:34:45 minute maybe and for the benefit of the closeness to the tower it was it was in my view worth having it that much closer to say also that they've got a shorter travel distance to get the information into the building so you weren't concerned about only delay it was such a

01:34:56 concerned about only delay it was such a short amount of time so no so in fact Dan would have gone across with his mobile phone so he actually he's still speaking with control so he made for about 30 seconds to a minute not have

01:35:07 about 30 seconds to a minute not have the main screen radio available to him but he would have still had his phone call phone to control because it's a mobile phone on the Union so they can they can travel around with him so it was more important that they got closer

01:35:18 was more important that they got closer to the tower right

01:35:31 did you tell group manager Goodell about the difficulties with communicating by radio yes I am I certainly would have done I mean and it was actually obvious because the radios were just so still so

01:35:42 because the radios were just so still so busy I think I turned so when you go onto the command units you're supposed to turn your radios off because they can interfere with the communication system I don't think I'd turn mine off I turned it down and you could still hear it was

01:35:53 it down and you could still hear it was a huge amount of traffic going across and so it would have been so I think I would have said it and it would have been obvious as well right and then turning to top of page 14 and looking a little bit more of the briefing you gave

01:36:05 little bit more of the briefing you gave to Tom Goodell it's a it's the top part of that page you say to him you say I made it clear to him that some people would still be asleep and unaware of the fire some would be talking to control

01:36:17 fire some would be talking to control and being told to leave or stay put depending on what information individuals were supplying as I understood it at that time the stay-put advice was still in place for the whole building the fire was still external but

01:36:28 building the fire was still external but might if we were lucky spread to one or two flats who had their windows open or if the fire burned for long enough to breach the windows should fire penetrate the building it shouldn't then move from flat to flat Tom understood the relic coordinator and then he left did you say

01:36:40 coordinator and then he left did you say to him if you're unlucky that the fire will spread to one or two flats who had their windows open what was that about just an assumption in your own head you were making news I think it's probably

01:36:53 were making news I think it's probably their house spread too and it would have been more than one in two I've probably said it spread to some of the flats but based on the calls and then I in my head the reason it had got into those flats from the window side right so I may have said it but it's my expectation from the

01:37:05 said it but it's my expectation from the first of all the guidance calls it would have been in more than one or two flats are saying right and most likely through the windows that would been open again did you have a conversation in the light of that instruction with Tom Goodell

01:37:16 of that instruction with Tom Goodell about the wisdom of keeping the stay-put advice in place for the whole building no we didn't know I think our focus was on first of all the guidance calls so if if somebody is making a call to control

01:37:27 if somebody is making a call to control and is able to escape then you would expect them to escape and wait once you get too far as 12 guards there they are saying I can't escape from my plan Navis our primary focus was on fast 12 guidance comes at that point yeah at that point in the night and I

01:37:40 yeah at that point in the night and I know we've moved on perhaps not very far in terms of timing but did you have another thought Rea thought about whether to revoke the stupid advice at least for part of the building what again I've been revoking it for the

01:37:51 again I've been revoking it for the people who are in unaffected parts of the building so so not only would I be risking exposing them to any potential smoke in the staircase from the original fire they'd also then be hindering the firefighters getting into the building

01:38:02 firefighters getting into the building to get to the floors where the first 12 garden schools are coming so so at that point the primary folks were still to get firefighters to the first wave of garden schools and to the top floors where the smoke may end up smoking log

01:38:14 where the smoke may end up smoking log in at the upper floors so that was always the primary focus of it thank you and along with that there was no way I could communicate with people who in the way I've read it they're talking they'll be there will probably be beautiful still asleep there's no way I've got to directly with

01:38:26 there's no way I've got to directly with those people yes yes thank you it's maybe an appropriate moment for a break mr. chose my very thoughtless time for say we'll have a short break now again

01:38:38 say we'll have a short break now again don't talk point on please about your evidence when you're out of the room and we'll resume at 10:00 and 2:00 for again I assume just a minute that you are expecting to run through the files for

01:38:50 expecting to run through the files for today yes I am and I should be clear with you and the witness that I am not confident of finishing today I hope that doesn't come as too much of a shock to you mr. Lockley I'm afraid I was hoping

01:39:02 you mr. Lockley I'm afraid I was hoping to be able to do that but I made my sister to see where you are I see why I'm going to assume that you're going to want to continue with the witness until I pass for in which case ten minutes now I think is

01:39:14 case ten minutes now I think is essential absolutely thank you 10 to 14 degrees thank you thanks so much

01:39:29 right 10 to 4 min please

01:51:27 right ready to go understood yes I think yes mr. O'Laughlin thank you for coming back and I'm sorry to keep retaining you can I ask you please to go to page 15 of

01:51:39 can I ask you please to go to page 15 of your statement we're at the top of the page in the fin the first main paragraph break you say the next officer to appear on the sea he was group manager Pat Goulbourne and you then proceeded to

01:51:52 Goulbourne and you then proceeded to describe his briefing and you say halfway down the page just below the just before the paragraph break I would also have briefed him about the FSG calls and that Tom Goodell was

01:52:04 calls and that Tom Goodell was coordinating that aspect did you in fact briefed group manager Goulbourne about the FSG calls so normally when you assign officers to sectors you briefed them on whatever sectors you've got in place just so they have a general

01:52:16 place just so they have a general understanding of who's doing what you wouldn't necessarily them run through again the briefing you just given at all no but I would have said to him that Richard had to fire sector and that's all good all had the FSG sector right so

01:52:29 all good all had the FSG sector right so you gave you suggested the role of operations commander but basically you made him and Richard Welch joined fire and search yeah Richard Welsh was the fire technical Marner Pat was going

01:52:41 fire technical Marner Pat was going across to assist him yeah am I expected to work as a team carrying out that wrong exactly and did you actually brief him to do that yes to assist Richard within the fire sector right and did you expect him or ask him to find out as

01:52:53 expect him or ask him to find out as much as he could about the current status of our survival guidance calls whether were coming from and what resources were needed to attack the fire as well sorry just repeat beginning of

01:53:04 as well sorry just repeat beginning of that question happened yeah did you um we tried a different way did you brief him to find out as much as he could about the fact that the state current status of a survival guidance calls I

01:53:15 status of a survival guidance calls I expect I probably didn't know because I asked Richard to do that as the fire sector and then Tom to do that as far as love a garden school now why spent it why once it from Pat was him to go to Richard and get a briefing from Richard

01:53:26 Richard and get a briefing from Richard about what Richard needed at that point in time so so I I'm sure I would have mentioned the fastball guidance calls but I wouldn't have given Pat specific objectives or tasks he was to work with Rick

01:53:36 Rick to the cheese like information I see so the briefing didn't contain any specifics it was just essentially going help Richard Welch with a little bit more than that but you know effectively yes go and go and assist Richard he's got a lot to do okay now you then say at

01:53:50 got a lot to do okay now you then say at the bottom of page D that the next officer to arrive was group manager Dave O'Neill and you gave him the rover safety sector and you explained why you

01:54:01 safety sector and you explained why you said you were concerned that debris falling from the building was a real danger because it was falling out and planing out to a distance of 50 to 75 meters and so posing a real risk and

01:54:12 meters and so posing a real risk and then you say this made me think about whether or not there was a danger to the structure itself at this stage I didn't think though that there was a risk of collapse but concerned that depending on how the cladding was bolted on that it

01:54:23 how the cladding was bolted on that it might also bring down chunks of the building as well now we know that around two 1736 a dangerous structure engineer

01:54:35 two 1736 a dangerous structure engineer was requested and that's page 22 of the short incident log I can show you if you want but do you remember a dangerous structure engineer being requested at about that time yes you did was it you who requested

01:54:55 were you concerned that having explained what you've explained at the foot of page 15 that there was at least a risk of partial structural failure so by partial failure what I was thinking of

01:55:07 partial failure what I was thinking of was depend on how the bolts are attached abilities like that the chunks I'd seen falling down some of them were huge at least sort of three feet possibly up to six feet in size I didn't know the weight of those at all so how they've

01:55:19 weight of those at all so how they've been attached to the building wasn't something I would have known so if they're attached with six or eight or twelve inch bolts for a number of those are starting to pull chunks of concrete from the building when they fall for

01:55:31 from the building when they fall for example I needed to know what the likelihood of that would be on particular that northeast corner where it may be weakening if you like the northeast column again we talked about

01:55:42 northeast column again we talked about collapse I was thinking more if there was you know huge chunks coming out not so much it collapse off the northeast side it was more just if bits of the actual building were falling down not just the cladding yes yes just following

01:55:58 just the cladding yes yes just following that up a little bit can I ask you please to go to the PRC notes which we've looked at before which is some tab 24 of the documents bundle right so 3 1

01:56:14 24 of the documents bundle right so 3 1 1 2 LFP 3 1 1 2 and go please to page

01:56:23 page 20 in this

01:56:40 now yes

01:56:44 halfway down the page you say asked for dangerous structure engineer DSE was concerned about was concerned over structure and then you pick up the

01:56:56 structure and then you pick up the briefing with Dave O'Neil for lines up from the bottom and you say needed safety concerned about full or partial collapse gave him SC Safety that sector

01:57:11 collapse gave him SC Safety that sector command to safety I'm assuming yes the reference there to full or partial collapse does that show us that in fact

01:57:22 collapse does that show us that in fact you were concerned about a full collapse of Grenville tower I think that might be a summary of the of the in the incident as a whole later on that the we had to consider whether a full or large

01:57:34 consider whether a full or large collapse was possible I don't think that was when I gave Dave the briefings take over set to command the safety my expectation is what I'd seen so far there was no reason to believe a building like that that's normally very

01:57:45 building like that that's normally very solidly built he's going to collapse as it were so that may be a summary of safety in general but I don't think he was in the briefing that I gave Dave that I was for collapse was a one of my

01:57:58 that I was for collapse was a one of my concerns at that point in time I don't recall that well it does sit in the briefing note and I know this is a note and you didn't write it and it's obviously a record of what was said at

01:58:10 obviously a record of what was said at the meeting but it does sit in the context of the briefing that you gave to Dave only concerned about full or partial collapse and so these to the reader it looks as though that was part

01:58:22 reader it looks as though that was part of your concern which led to at the briefing if I covered it I expect I would have said to him unconcerned about a partial collapse on the northeast side I not probably said I'm not overly concerned about a full collapse but it

01:58:33 concerned about a full collapse but it wasn't a concern at that point in time that there would have been a you know a pancake type collapse of the building that wouldn't have been an expectation right however it was noted at the time I can't recall that I don't recall

01:58:45 can't recall that I don't recall thinking with Dave that a full collapse was likely of the bill at that point in time can I ask you them to go to your contemporaneous note which is a meaty quadruple 0 5 2 1 3 and turn

01:58:58 is a meaty quadruple 0 5 2 1 3 and turn to page 3 fourth bullet point down which is your briefing that you summarized here - Dave O'Neil and you say sector commander safety safety officers particularly on all sides the building

01:59:11 particularly on all sides the building falling debris on all sides and then you say structural integrity for partial or whole building collapse I felt that Dave was the most experienced officer for user and he was

01:59:22 experienced officer for user and he was the most suitable officer for this role

01:59:27 when you wrote that were you recalling that in fact you did have a concern about the structural integrity for partial or whole building collapse and that was what led you to my brief Dave

01:59:39 that was what led you to my brief Dave O'Neill aesthetic as safety consecutive I recall having a concern about the partial collapse particularly northeast side I don't recall the concern of the whole building collapse so how did that get into your contemporaneous note that you were concerned about whole building

01:59:51 you were concerned about whole building collapse I mean that she comes it became concerned later on so ever I've confused that the issues later on that we started to address all right discussions with Dave O'Neill and others when the fire had spread around the outside of the

02:00:02 had spread around the outside of the building around the possibility of a total collapse but no I don't recall it at that stage if I did briefed him on it it's possible but I don't recall briefing Dave on a on a total collapse

02:00:13 briefing Dave on a on a total collapse so we've got to contempt two documents one done a week within a week after the fire which refers to your concern about whole building collapse in the context of great briefing Dave O'Neill and we've

02:00:24 of great briefing Dave O'Neill and we've got the PRC notes similar faced with those - I just wonder whether it's really right to say that you didn't actually briefed him on the risk of a whole building collapse at the time don't record him on a whole building collapse but say these notes to the

02:00:37 collapse but say these notes to the extent that they would suggest that wrong or misleading I definitely record breaking him on the partial collapse and I don't think I would have covered the whole collapse

02:00:49 were you concerned for the safety of the residents and the firefighters in the building as a result of the concerns that we see recorded there even about partial building collapse so my concern

02:01:01 partial building collapse so my concern on that northeast side was where the cladding was connected and if you like the way it's been fixed into the building it could start to pull out chunks at the building and the impact that might have those people on the

02:01:12 that might have those people on the northeast side are already a huge risk from the fire itself spreading so it's an additional risk to those people on that northeast side of the building but there was no reason at that point in time for example to be concerned about the stability of the southwest side of

02:01:23 the stability of the southwest side of the building rose unaffected as an example so so yes if there was a structural issue on that northeast side where the fire was then that was on an additional risk that the the occupiers

02:01:34 additional risk that the the occupiers would be faced with did it occur to you at the time that those who were on the northeast side or sector of the building were who were at risk not only a fire spread but structural collapse should be

02:01:46 spread but structural collapse should be told to exit and make their way out my company was a concern that there be any imminent structural collapse it was more that if the boxart okay if if there's chunks of the building being pulled out of the northeast side in addition to a fire on the northeast side it was trying

02:01:58 fire on the northeast side it was trying to establish how much that would weaken that northeast side of the building that there could be the risk of some partial collapse occurring it wasn't something I was expecting to happen immediately so where I've seen building fires that are

02:02:10 where I've seen building fires that are burned

02:02:10 burned severely inside flats before it can burn the conch it makes the concrete sprawled away to the point where you see the steel beams exposed and yet the building's integrity still holds place I

02:02:21 building's integrity still holds place I think the concern here may be that if those steel beams are exposed plus there's been chunks of the concrete outside pulled away as well I needed to know what the impact of that could be but there's no point at that point it wasn't my fault that was an

02:02:32 point it wasn't my fault that was an imminent collapse or something like that Eva Eva partial or but you knew there was a sufficient risk of collapsed or partial collapse to summon a DSE my question is in the light of their knowledge of that risk could you act it

02:02:44 knowledge of that risk could you act it on

02:02:45 on why not tell residents in that sector of the building that stay put no longer applied and they had to get out okay so so a corner TSE on is almost standard practice for a

02:02:56 almost standard practice for a structural building fire that you're a large doctor but you put the fire files into so it's it's almost a standard request along with the gas and electric board the specific tasks I needed for them or specific questions were what type of cladding was this did they know

02:03:08 type of cladding was this did they know more about the cladding the type of cladding was fitted because they're also sort of engineers within that field and then in addition to that what they thought the impact of it would be as in how it's attached to the building of what and then it further on from that is

02:03:20 what and then it further on from that is what impact with the fire half when it's being burning on the outside of the building for that long so it was a number of questions for that DSA to answer

02:03:27 answer and all of those were going through my mind at that point and that's the person you need to get to answer those questions for you indeed and given the risks about partial collapse in a part of the building

02:03:38 of the building that you've discovered that we've discussed and you've acted on by calling the DRC to assess how is that consistent with not revoking stay put for the residents in that part of the building

02:03:49 residents in that part of the building so I think I needed to know what the risk of the partial collapse possibility was but I didn't think it was a likelihood that that would happen so we say about risk I think it was a low risk that actually they'll because the buildings are built so solidly when they

02:04:01 buildings are built so solidly when they were built that the chance of a partial collapse is actually unlikely but I need that confirmed by someone whoever a greater understanding of that than I did at that point in time and again with

02:04:12 at that point in time and again with regard to individuals who are staying put in unaffected flats it would come back to steal that I'm not I'm not expecting a partial collapse of the building what I need is a DAC to tell me if my thinking is right that it's

02:04:23 if my thinking is right that it's unlikely that this building is going to suffer any sort of collapse because of the way they're being built so well well given that you couldn't rule it out until you have advice from a DAC my question I'll repeat it one more time and question is given that you couldn't

02:04:34 and question is given that you couldn't rule it out what was the wisdom of continuing to retain stay put in relation to those residents in the affected part of the building or potentially affected part of the building so the people in the affected part of all in the Northeast I love you

02:04:45 part of all in the Northeast I love you know I've made the priority to be rescued and evacuated anyway so they they were the people with the first bubble of guidance calls my expectation was they would be a priority along with other

02:04:53 other and flats on that northeast side so so without the risk of the collapse the northeast side was still the priority for people to be rescued and evacuated so he added to it I suppose but it didn't it didn't mean that there was any

02:05:04 didn't it didn't mean that there was any additional risk in the short term so so my thought was that the any risk of the collapse was going to happen long after the fire if we hadn't managed to get control of it would spread further in the building you say that the people on

02:05:15 the building you say that the people on the northeast corner of the building were a priority in terms of responding to the FSG calls because that actually say what to wait while your incident commander did you actually ever give an instruction to Tom Goodell or Richard

02:05:26 instruction to Tom Goodell or Richard Welch or or Pat Goulbourne that those callers from that part of the building should be treated as the priority for rescue now my expectation was that the first one guard school because the fire was on the northeast side of the

02:05:37 was on the northeast side of the building that that is where the the fire survival guards calls were coming from yes when I got to the unit later it became clear that actually it was beyond just that northeast side so that was in my time of incident commander with the fire spread that I'd seen on northeast

02:05:48 fire spread that I'd seen on northeast corner my expectation was that his where the first 12 Gardens calls were coming from at that point they're just a series of numbers so we had to confirm that where they were located but my expectation was that that's where they would be later on when I was operation

02:06:01 would be later on when I was operation tomorrow it became cleared it was more than just the northeast side of the building right so the answer is you never actually asked anybody of tusked anybody to treat the northeast corner as the priority in terms of rescue didn't

02:06:12 the priority in terms of rescue didn't come today I think within the fire sector I probably would have briefed Richard to focus on the first moment garden schools which if my understanding would be on the northeast side and any other flats on that so it's the affected side of the building so where we can see

02:06:23 side of the building so where we can see the fire on the outside those are the flats you want to treat as their priority along with the forest above garden schools

02:06:39 now

02:06:42 at the top of page 16 of your witness statement you say still on the subject of safety officers that I play in the second line I particularly wanted safety

02:06:54 second line I particularly wanted safety officers on the eastern North elevations and also on the remaining innovations so that they also could look out for people at windows I want also wanted to maintain our safe access and egress into

02:07:06 maintain our safe access and egress into the building on the south side what did you plan to do if the safety officers did see people at windows I would expect

02:07:21 did see people at windows I would expect them to even let me know or enact a rescue that could be carried out if it was if it's something we could rescue them from there certainly to get that information back to either the incident

02:07:32 information back to either the incident commander or by then we've got a service coordinator in the force above a guidance unit working so so I expect them to pass that information on to someone right is that any windows or windows on the north and east elevations

02:07:43 windows on the north and east elevations so in general safety officer is what you can use them for so it's because they by the very nature of job they are looking at the building that's in front of them so if they see they can almost work as a

02:07:54 so if they see they can almost work as a lookout as well for you so so if they see any unusual fire spread for example or if they see people that they believe needs to be rescued they can pass that information on even to the incident commander the operations commander or to

02:08:05 commander the operations commander or to the FSG Union or the search coordinator so so if they're seeing people I would expect to pass that information on right now at this point in the night you're still briefing and giving giving out sector jobs if I can put it that way in

02:08:17 sector jobs if I can put it that way in terms of rescue was it your intention that that firefighters would only go to the floor to rescue from a specific flat or would they well they were on that

02:08:29 or would they well they were on that floor go around all the other flats and knock on the doors and make sure the occupants were safe or to tell them to leave well the expectation would normally they go to the flat they've been assigned to because that's being

02:08:41 been assigned to because that's being decided to that's the flat most at risk if when they got there they thought there was a reason why they would check the other flats so then they could and they you wouldn't expect them you have to trust them to use their own

02:08:52 you have to trust them to use their own initiative as well but you expect me to carry out the tasks they've been assigned which is to go to the particular flat they've been sent to given what you could see of the dynamic

02:09:03 given what you could see of the dynamic nature of the fire and the way that fire had behaved in the early stages of the incident has you've been told by Mike that Mike doubt it what did you think was the most efficient way to evacuate people in the

02:09:14 efficient way to evacuate people in the light of all of that so focusing on the first wave of guidance calls first northeast side of the building then as well and then from the top floors downwards because that's where the smoke if there was smoke inside the building

02:09:26 if there was smoke inside the building would start to mushroom at the top of the building and then work its way down right and then you would do a floor-by-floor search and evacuation of the whole building no moving through

02:09:37 the whole building no moving through your role as as incident commander where you were where the crews had told residents to they'd gone up into the

02:09:50 residents to they'd gone up into the tower and actually told residents to stay put

02:09:52 stay put no it was honor we have a number of examples and we give you just one were you told that an SD be a crew foster and

02:10:04 you told that an SD be a crew foster and Lawson who tallied out at 2:27 reached floor 18 and told residents to stay put before coming back down to the

02:10:15 before coming back down to the bridgehead I was not worried as the commander would that surprise you Foundation not known at detailing the circumstance is it again if they've got the eighteenth floor and their flat is

02:10:26 the eighteenth floor and their flat is on the southwest side and the conditions are in the 18th floor were okay and the lobby I mean there's no reason why they wouldn't think that those people would

02:10:37 wouldn't think that those people would be safe where they were what they were expectation would be the same Bobby as mining that fire shouldn't go horizon-- around the building and that there's no reason why it should breach internally across a lobby and into their flap

02:10:55 now

02:10:57 but can I ask you to look at page 6 of your contemporaneous note where you say

02:11:12 in the second main paragraph from the top I receive detailed updates from Richard Welsh and Pat Goulbourne on a

02:11:23 Richard Welsh and Pat Goulbourne on a number of occasions face to face within the building due to the issues with the radios I did not try to use the radio for updates but relied on either face to face or mat straight make ort the key

02:11:35 face or mat straight make ort the key points they highlighted when there's a list of them when were the when was the first of the detailed ups updates that you refer to that that was Operation

02:11:46 you refer to that that was Operation scamander so with instant commander I was asking their miracle if he could or it might be another command unit operative when Dan went across to the other Union if they could get updates from the fire sector or the first of all the guidance sector right and they were

02:11:58 the guidance sector right and they were trying

02:11:59 trying there was nothing coming back from Eva unit the first piece of information I had back from even unit was commanding he personally brought back the numbers or first law of gardens cause in progress how long you last between your

02:12:11 progress how long you last between your briefing Richard Welch and Pat Goulbourne and you being relieved of incident command by Andy Road it was probably 25 minutes maybe right during

02:12:24 probably 25 minutes maybe right during that period did you get any updates detailed updates from Richard Welch and Pat Goulbourne no I didn't did you did you ask yourself why you hadn't had any detailed updates or indeed well did

02:12:35 any detailed updates or indeed well did you get any updates from them during that so I I'd ask the kamon universities they couldn't retain them and get through to them when that normally happens afar it means that they are so busy dealing with what's in front of them they're not getting the time or

02:12:47 them they're not getting the time or opportunity to get a message back to the instant commander and you end up sort of chasing it more and more and that's what it felt like and I've had I've experienced that other fires so it's not unusual that what you've send someone

02:12:58 unusual that what you've send someone had to do a task of they are so busy with what they're doing they're not getting the opportunity to get the information they'd like to back and that's that normally tells you something as well so okay with neither unit wealth Nina secretary send them back information to

02:13:10 secretary send them back information to me it was becoming quite clear that what they must be dealing with which I knew was already significant was just overwhelming what they were trying to do and they were not getting the ability to get information back to me right so you

02:13:22 get information back to me right so you send them out in the beginning and then 20 to 25 minutes elapses before you're relieved of command by Andy row apart from briefing Dave O'Neill which we've

02:13:33 from briefing Dave O'Neill which we've talked about what else did you do during that period so I think that cook and makhmur Holland appeared during that time as well they were in the Rho RT role so I again ask them what their

02:13:45 role so I again ask them what their understanding of the fire was what my understanding of the fire was and then ask them if they could I said I think I even said to know I won't be able to get out to the fire for quite a while so can you get out and assess if what I think

02:13:56 you get out and assess if what I think is in progress is in progress and then take action if you need to effectively be my eyes and ears but almost empowering them to you know if they need to put things in place to do it rather

02:14:07 to put things in place to do it rather than just come back and tell me what needed to be done so that's a pro an active role in in the command and did they then leave the see you they go first to see you and and how long your elapsed after they left and see you before you really would come on

02:14:19 see you before you really would come on by and ear oh I've got a feeling they were just after Tom Goodall and probably before Pat so probably in 20 minutes maybe see

02:14:27 maybe see so once you've briefed all the officers and sexualized in the way you've explained what did you do on the command unit but it was still more officer so I have to speak with the police so I think the police and ambulance the police probably were around the time that's Pat

02:14:39 probably were around the time that's Pat and Dave arrived so within and then the ambulance were probably I think just after that and then there was a number of station managers and watch man who disappeared and in addition to that

02:14:51 disappeared and in addition to that Steve West and then also the command support team so during your time on the command unit in your role as incident commander did you receive any kind of feedback or information back from the

02:15:02 feedback or information back from the sector commanders who briefed no sir from the fire second fast Moffat garden said - I kept chasing for information but it wasn't coming back so it was becoming clear to me that they must be so busy with the tasks that

02:15:14 must be so busy with the tasks that they're engaged with they're not getting the opportunity to get information back to me because I've known that they would have wanted to but they most likely just so busy dealing with what they've got in front of them and they're not getting the opportunity until Tom Goodall

02:15:26 the opportunity until Tom Goodall managed to send across the FSG numbers to me and so that was that that was the first piece of information I guess that came back specifically on that do you say you kept chasing for information who

02:15:40 say you kept chasing for information who are you chasing so through the command unit Tom's operate on a team leader at that point I was asking him to get updates from the fire sector in the form of a coin suit so I say keep chasing it's really two or three times I

02:15:52 it's really two or three times I probably asked is anything coming in from them if not can you get on get hold of them which again is normal an incident if you're not getting an update you will through the command unit team leader or the comms operator ask them to get updates from those two from the site

02:16:03 get updates from those two from the site as you've deployed so just just to break this down you asked Dan Merrick who was the operator see you a to get whatever it was still Dan Burke at that point cuz Dan at crawling across the cu7 so it could have been someone took over from down Marik okay

02:16:14 from down Marik okay at that point around that time but you know who that was I'm not sure which one of them it was so two other command unit operatives turned I want to go from damn American one to go from mark M field as

02:16:26 American one to go from mark M field as the team leader so it was one of those two one of those took the radios and one of them took the team leader up okay and do you know you don't who they are well I think I recall their names of his

02:16:38 well I think I recall their names of his column now who is it Norman Harris might be one of them and I can trim the other name so Tony Peckham ringabel it could be Tanya pick him yet by name on the

02:16:51 be Tanya pick him yet by name on the night and so right but whoever it was you asked them to get information from the bridgehead did you yes oh that's so it was the the one who'd taken over the comms on the year I think was the one I asked to get the update so that's the

02:17:02 asked to get the update so that's the one who literally sat in Dan Merrick see and took over from him right did you at any stage seek to speak to control to tell them what you did no

02:17:16 mr. Yu normally when you communicate with control you do it through the command journey that's the that's the normal link of use you don't normally the incident commander get drawn into speaking to the control as well can I

02:17:28 speaking to the control as well can I ask you to go to policy FS gene type policy for 790 FS g tap three of the policies bundle and turn to paragraph

02:17:40 policies bundle and turn to paragraph 9.1 we may come back to this at a later time but i just want to show it to you and ask you one or two things about it

02:17:59 9.1 says it is vital that control is kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve each each FSG called the fact that controllers aware of the actions being carried out on the incident ground

02:18:10 being carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice given to us FSG callers on the night were you alive to that requirement yes of policy you were and what did you do anything to

02:18:24 you were and what did you do anything to ensure that control was kept aware of the actions being carried out at the incident ground to resolve each FSG core so I'd ask Tom when he went out this 6:00 tomorrow for the first of all the

02:18:36 6:00 tomorrow for the first of all the guidance to make sure we were in communication with control right when I first got onto the FSG unit as Operations commander he pointed to one of the officers I think it was probably Dan who was on ER on the phone and

02:18:47 Dan who was on ER on the phone and actually talking to him and he said we've got a two-way conversation going on with that with that with Dan speaking to control and then that information going across to the to the fire sector

02:19:01 going across to the to the fire sector and to the bridgehead right so that that's the structure you have in place looking at nine point two informative messages from the incident of ground should also contain an update on progress relating to those specific FSG

02:19:13 progress relating to those specific FSG calls by both flat house number to avoid confusion did you do anything on the night to ensure that informative messages did contain updates on the progress relating to specific FSG calls

02:19:24 progress relating to specific FSG calls no since this month so I managed to get one informative message away which detailed the fire as a whole but I wouldn't have had the time or opportunity to and the detail at that point to detail every single FSG call at

02:19:37 point to detail every single FSG call at that point in time bro but we didn't I did manage to get a and informative message away yeah was that the one at though 242 just before you really know how long yes let's just look at that if we can it's in the short incident log at

02:19:48 we can it's in the short incident log at page 23 at a time mark of 202 4203

02:20:04 and we can see it there we'll just look at it it's sup cu8 from da Co Lachlan a residential block of flats 27 floors 25

02:20:16 residential block of flats 27 floors 25 by 25 far and all floors from 2nd to 27th floor large number of persons involved FSG calls being dealt with major incident declared do you know

02:20:33 whether well you say large number of persons involved FSG calls being dealt with did you have any more detail in your head than that no so ideally on the

02:20:45 your head than that no so ideally on the persons reported message you should specify how many people you know are involved so if you know there's one person in house you would say one person involved I didn't know the exact numbers of the number of people involved so the

02:20:56 of the number of people involved so the first I could put on there was that large number one well I needed to find out was a specific number which came in later I came in quite soon enough how useful with that informative message be given that you couldn't even you

02:21:07 given that you couldn't even you couldn't even give an approximation of the number of FSG calls all their location the primary use of that is to let the firefighters and the officers who are coming onto the fire have an understanding of what they may be dealing with so until that point anyone

02:21:18 dealing with so until that point anyone any of the appliances on roof would just know they've been ordered to a forty pump fire they wouldn't know and the building obviously sorry but they wouldn't specifically know what the fire was so so for those firefighters to know and those officers to know some detail

02:21:30 and those officers to know some detail about what it is they're going to be approaching would be the primary use it's also the course of record of what I'm dealing with my primary person was getting that done as quickly as I could was your incoming appliances and

02:21:42 was your incoming appliances and oncoming officers yeah can you just explain while we're on that message why you referred or asked the right of the message to be to refer to a 27th floor yes it's over 27 floors in the but so my

02:21:55 yes it's over 27 floors in the but so my understanding of it was speaking to Mike was it it was 24 floors when I got onto the unit probably within five or ten minutes somebody had come on with a plate

02:22:01 plate that looked like it did have been taken from the outside of the building or next to the lift it's a sort of plate that you see normally for those and it was an it listed sorry that the the flat numbers and where they were within the

02:22:13 numbers and where they were within the building yeah when I looked at it was slightly confusing cuz at the bottom there were also additional what look like floors so what I wasn't certain of at that point was whether the mezzanine that I saw and that area was additional

02:22:25 that I saw and that area was additional floors or not with other things I think one was a doctor surgery one was a

02:22:31 possibly a child care area a nursery so so when you looked at you saw grounds 23rd which would be the 24 residential floors and then it wasn't clear as the

02:22:43 floors and then it wasn't clear as the two floors listed underneath were additional floors how I had those 24 and to 227 I don't know on the road was very quick that it happened but but and I remember talking to the whoever was on

02:22:55 remember talking to the whoever was on the Union at that point and saying my understanding is it's 24 floors but looking at this he looks like there's more and so my decision was it could be 27 send the 27 and if we need to change it will change its 24 while we're on the

02:23:07 it will change its 24 while we're on the subject and this comes to a question I had been later but um can I ask you to be shown a meaty triple zero one five six four four is that building plate

02:23:22 six four four is that building plate that is the type of plate whether that's the exact one or not some girl ground and yeah I'd say that it's definitely a plate that looks like that whether that's the exact one of those and so when you can see where it says ground

02:23:34 when you can see where it says ground floor and then you see how it's 23 so that was 24 and then what confused me was those two underneath I probably had 10 seconds to look and think that through and somehow I did that up to the

02:23:46 through and somehow I did that up to the possibility of 27 floors even though I've been told by Mike it was 24 so so for me it was either 24 as Mike had told me or there wasn't I had dubbed 27 and

02:23:57 me or there wasn't I had dubbed 27 and additional floors my thoughts were then that that was the mezzanine area so sometimes when flats are converted they will turn parking areas and things like that into additional flats or other uses

02:24:08 that into additional flats or other uses so so rather than dwell upon it and try to spend any more time I just authorized the message to be sent with 27 on the understanding I would change it back to 24 if I gotta clarify okay well we'll come back we'll come back to that plate

02:24:20 come back we'll come back to that plate in another time and just on your statement if I can just go to it it's um page 17 halfway down the page you say just as that message was completed

02:24:32 just as that message was completed someone came onto the CEO and handed me a sheet of paper detailing the FSG calls in my head I was thinking that we were dealing with double figures say between 10 and 20 people perhaps 30 to push

02:24:43 10 and 20 people perhaps 30 to push however the numbers I was given were 58 hours and 16 children I was totally shocked

02:24:54 do you know who gave you that information I think it was one of the watch managers from the FSG Union it could have been a station manager I think it's a watch manager but he had definitely come from the FSG unit right

02:25:06 definitely come from the FSG unit right did you remember what to take a look like was it a control information sheet or was it a a firefighters pad or or

02:25:17 or was it a a firefighters pad or or decock record it was on a sheet of paper I remember that I then challenged him on it quite strongly because the number just seemed unrealistic in how high it was and then I wrote on to the command

02:25:30 was and then I wrote on to the command unit inside on the on the board as you're walking so I can trick it was definitely a piece of paper but I can't recall the size of a piece of paper or what did did you know where that information came from so I asked him so

02:25:43 information came from so I asked him so that was where I was so because the number was so high I asked him where that had come from how he was right he said it had come from the command unit and Tom I think I asked him if told knew about it he said it's come from Tom and

02:25:54 about it he said it's come from Tom and the command Denis I said how did I know it's that number and he said they're talking directly to control that's the number we've been given in fact he was quite strong in the way he was clear to me that that is the number because I was

02:26:05 me that that is the number because I was totally surprised by the night did the number of FSGS that you saw on that piece of paper give you any cause for concern as to the strategy that you were you'd implemented that number isn't

02:26:16 you'd implemented that number isn't horrendous number to be challenged with if all of those people are in flats what they can't escape from then the task of getting to all those people and rescuing them is going to be enormous

02:26:33 we can identify a piece of paper can I ask you to look at em et triple zero one

02:26:45 ask you to look at em et triple zero one six nine six seven please is that familiar no it's not no I mean I may

02:26:57 familiar no it's not no I mean I may have seen bits of paper on the night that looked like that but no this was a shorts with a piece of paper that just said to 5000 dogs and 16 children I don't recall anything else being real oh I see it was just specifically that's

02:27:09 I see it was just specifically that's all what I recall we don't know it was a list it was oh no no it's a specific number of that I didn't add them up or anything he just gave me that numbers of people on a piece of paper I saw I remember thinking that yeah I need his confirm that was a correct number

02:27:28 did you think that fighting the fire having seen that information was still a viable option at that time by that time I had my briefing on the extent of the fire and one of those important things I

02:27:39 fire and one of those important things I need to do at that point was get to the fire get to the fire sector and find out a briefing of where the progress was you're always likely to have to fight the fire whoever it's to protect crews

02:27:50 the fire whoever it's to protect crews who are trying to get in or out of the building or if when they get to a flat it is on fire then and they need to get into that flat so so you there was no fault that we would just be able to stop

02:28:01 fault that we would just be able to stop firefighting at some point we'd always have to carry out some sort of firefighting operations but at the same time we're going to have to carry out rescue operations in addition to that do you remember what you did with that piece of paper I don't think I took the

02:28:13 piece of paper I don't think I took the piece of paper I wrote it up on the whiteboard I expect that watch manager must have kept it but I wrote the number up on the whiteboard in the top left hand corner of the union on the board right in front

02:28:24 of the union on the board right in front of you but in the top left hand corner of that board no this was just after you sent your message at 240 203 so this is very much towards the end of your time yes as incident commander did you relay

02:28:39 yes as incident commander did you relay that information to Richard Welch or Pat Goulbourne as an update to them I recall I was sent as a message I can't recall

02:28:51 I was sent as a message I can't recall whether I told the comms operator to send that across to the fire sector or not as well but within a minute of that I think and you had come on so I it's that it's likely that I would have asked

02:29:02 that it's likely that I would have asked that to be done but I can't recall that if I did along

02:29:11 we don't yeah if you go to page 23 of the short incident log we can see that 24250 we can see that Sharon Darby puts

02:29:30 24250 we can see that Sharon Darby puts out an informative sup Co 858 adults and 16 children believed involved tactical mode Oscar is that the message you're referring to yes oh so the what's

02:29:41 referring to yes oh so the what's manager of being on I probably spent about 30 seconds challenge noon as the accuracy of that number because it was so high and where it had come from when he was very strong in his response

02:29:52 he was very strong in his response saying it was definitely the right number that's when I turned to the comms operator and asked him to send that as well and obviously at the same time around same time I wrote me up on the board

02:30:01 board and then within a very short and out time and ear and got onto the unit and having received that piece of information and knowing now that the task you face was as you just said

02:30:13 task you face was as you just said enormous did you then have any thoughts about whether to revoke the stay-put policy in whole or in part for this building well that in particular is the first part of guidance calls so they are still the people who are in the affected

02:30:25 still the people who are in the affected flats I think my surprise was with the fire being on the northeast side of the building at the point I'd seen it what you have on that side of the building and potentially elsewhere in the building is 58 how adults and 16 children they're still the primary focus

02:30:37 children they're still the primary focus to try to get to so again people who are in unaffected flats at that point in time it was still possibly no reason to believe they wouldn't be safe in their unaffected flats but what I did need was

02:30:49 unaffected flats but what I did need was a player briefing on how the fire had progressed since I had last seen him yes thank you and mr. it mister Lachlan we've come to half-past four and mr. chairman would say we have come to help

02:31:00 chairman would say we have come to help you so as you can tell I haven't finished him afraid my questions for this witness that's regrettable that it is what it is I'm afraid I'm gonna have to ask you bastard to come back tomorrow morning if that's not inconvenient yes of course sir

02:31:13 not inconvenient yes of course sir well I'm sorry we have to ask you to do that but Millett says there are more questions I'd like to ask you so I'm afraid I have to do that can you give us

02:31:25 afraid I have to do that can you give us any indication of how long you might be missing that Karen I would be no more than one and a half hours including an estimate that an estimated time to take

02:31:36 estimate that an estimated time to take any further questions at the end in the usual way has to be have been I notice the chairman like eyebrows going up and I'm sorry about that but well sometimes

02:31:47 I'm sorry about that but well sometimes over the adjournment you can sometimes find it's possible to reduce the number of questions yes you have to ask all the questions that you have to ask and you have to follow the leads that you need

02:31:59 have to follow the leads that you need to be following yes well I'm sorry about that I don't think it's going to impact the timetable in the medium term but may

02:32:10 the timetable in the medium term but may I ask if we if we have a 9:30 start tomorrow morning unusual application I know but that will certainly help us yes well this look and what inconvenience

02:32:22 well this look and what inconvenience you to start it our first night in tomorrow no that's fine sir you sure yes sir yes all right well in that case yes I think we better start early with obviously not doing as well today as we in terms of getting through your

02:32:35 in terms of getting through your evidence so I'm going to ask you to come back tomorrow to resume at half past 9:00 if you wouldn't mind and while you're away from the inquiry please don't discuss your evidence or anything to do with it put anyone else all right

02:32:48 to do with it put anyone else all right thank you very much indeed we'd like to go to the ocean

02:33:04 but half-past nine tomorrow empty