Evidence from Station Manager Andrew Walton regarding his training on high-rise fires, knowledge of Grenfell Tower from 2016 smoke extraction system visit, lack of training on cladding fires, and failures to update operational risk database.
00:00:00 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing and we're going to continue today with the firefighter evidence we are mr. chairman yes may I now please call station manager Andrew Walton thank
00:00:11 call station manager Andrew Walton thank you
00:00:31 I do solemnly sincerely and truly late I do solemnly sincerely and truly declare declare and affirm but the evidence I
00:00:42 declare and affirm but the evidence I shall give shall be the truth shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you very much yes mr. Walton good morning
00:00:52 morning can I ask you please first to give the enquiry your full name Andrew Frederick Walter and can I say first of all thank you very much to you for coming to the
00:01:03 you very much to you for coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our investigations we're very grateful if my question is are too long or you don't understand them or you want me to repeat a question please just say if you need a break at any stage again please just
00:01:15 break at any stage again please just indicate if you would so now you have created and provided to the inquiry and quite a volume of written material which I'm not just going to put to you formally first of all your statement
00:01:27 formally first of all your statement stated the 25th of January 2018 at MIT triple zero one zero eight to eight and that's your first statement and can I just ask you and respect of that have
00:01:39 just ask you and respect of that have you read that recently yes I have and subject to corrections made in your second statement which I'll come to in a moment can you confirm that its contents are true yes they are turning to your
00:01:50 are true yes they are turning to your second statement dated the 17th of September 2018 which goes under the reference lfb triple zero two three three six five was that provided to the
00:02:01 three six five was that provided to the inquiry but the inquiries request are the rule nine yes it was yes and can have you read that recently yes I have and can you can further the contents of that second statement are also true and accurate yes they are now you have also
00:02:14 accurate yes they are now you have also provided to the inquiry some contemporaneous material first of all Appendix A to your first statement which is M eet quadruple zero five seven one
00:02:25 is M eet quadruple zero five seven one two which is there on the screen have you read that recently not as recently as the others but I have very well there is also an email date of the 18th
00:02:36 there is also an email date of the 18th of June 2017 which is any T quadruple zero seven five seven one three five seven one three is that it
00:02:53 yes thank you and then there are some handwritten contemporaneous notes at MIT quadruple zero five seven one four and
00:03:05 quadruple zero five seven one four and with it and they run for some number of pages can you confirm that that is those are your contemporaneous written notes yes they are thank you
00:03:16 yes they are thank you and then you've provided I think three notebooks to us a meaty quadruple zero five seven one five five seven one six and one five seven one eight we'll look
00:03:28 and one five seven one eight we'll look at those in due course but I've read those into the record that there's no need to go through those now and you also provided something called statement headings which is a meaty triple zero one five seven two four which I'd like
00:03:41 one five seven two four which I'd like please to have on the screen first of all can you confirm that that is that is your document yes it is you can see that it's identified as a record of actions
00:03:53 it's identified as a record of actions at the top of the page completed on the 6th of November 2017 could you just tell us what this document is that was something I used in preparation for my police statement to guide the flow of
00:04:08 police statement to guide the flow of information that I was giving to make sure that I didn't miss anything though I had remembered at any other time okay
00:04:15 time okay well you asked to provide this document or produce this document because I referred to it during the police interview I entered it as a piece of evidence I see okay but nobody asked is
00:04:26 evidence I see okay but nobody asked is about writing the thing you never asked you to produce it was something I produce to make sure that I didn't neglect to say something that I'd been aware of either in my contemporaneous
00:04:37 aware of either in my contemporaneous notes or in any other recollection since the incident and when you when you created this document did you have any other documents in front of you to refresh your memory yes I referred to the contemporaneous
00:04:48 yes I referred to the contemporaneous notes that have already been mentioned and that summary was put up though I said I haven't brought it out recently right
00:04:57 right and your notebooks did you refer to those as well yeah those are the contemporaneous no right I did two sets of contemporaneous notes the ones I was asked to complete that paddington fire
00:05:08 asked to complete that paddington fire station are those the ones in handwriting those are the ones on loose pages that those the first contemporaneous notes that you put up
00:05:19 contemporaneous notes that you put up those were done on the morning of the fire right that's Appendix A as it's your standard I see the second contemporaneous notes are the ones in
00:05:30 contemporaneous notes are the ones in the notebook and they were done on the evening following the fire right whereas our three note sorry there are three notebooks I was aware of two notebooks so that was something I was going to try
00:05:42 so that was something I was going to try and come back to this is if you refer to them right my recollection is I use two notebooks which are they are contemporaneous stoked statement notebooks which I had
00:05:53 notebooks which I had as a senior accident investigator and
00:05:59 upon returning home after the incident I felt uncomfortable that I'd had to give my contemporaneous notes into the fire
00:06:11 my contemporaneous notes into the fire brigade
00:06:14 brigade I knew that my role would be a key role and I wanted to make sure that I had a note that was contemporaneous that was
00:06:26 note that was contemporaneous that was in my position so that's why I sat down on that evening and I wrote those notes right so when you say you sat down and wrote those notes we're talking about the notes and manuscript that you see that during five seven one four just to
00:06:40 that during five seven one four just to have those back up on the screen if we can quadruple zero five seven one four now those are the notes that are made at Paddington right on the morning of the fire the notes that are in the the
00:06:53 fire the notes that are in the the notebooks as you prefer to use those are contemporaneous notes that I made on the evening visibly when I returned home oh yeah and that we have three notebooks and could I see that copies and I'll be
00:07:06 and could I see that copies and I'll be able to say yes good so let's look at let's look first of all at five seven one five
00:07:18 that is the first notebook of the contemporaneous notes that I made on the evening of the 17th and five seven one eight
00:07:32 so I won five seven one eight
00:08:28 so we got it in hardcopy no I don't think so
00:08:32 think so the the notebooks I retained I scanned those in and we sent a scanned copy into the inquiry team so you will have I've
00:08:43 the inquiry team so you will have I've recently reviewed those notes yeah you sure you spoken of the first one five seven one five
00:08:54 seven one five let me try five seven one six that's meant quadruple zero five seven one six which is the second I think the second in the little bit notebook series I think that's the first
00:09:07 notebook series I think that's the first notebook cover on it that would be the second he says Grenfell tower - yes and that was the way that I annotated them so I could tell you what do they write
00:09:19 so I could tell you what do they write so we've seen five seven one five five seven one six the two we've seen already those were done in the in in the evening with it so the ones that are on an a4 page line paper those were done at
00:09:31 page line paper those were done at Paddington Station in the morning yes when I returned home I as I say I felt uncomfortable not having my own recollection in my hand and so while it
00:09:43 recollection in my hand and so while it was still fresh while I was a bit more composed than I had been when I was at Paddington I sat back now and it's completed the note then yeah so we've
00:09:55 completed the note then yeah so we've seen the first two I just want to show you if I can the last but in the series because we have three mr. Walton and it's M et triple zero one five seven one eight
00:10:18 and no we don't have it well let's move on well sort that out later that's fine I just I know I wrote my notes into
00:10:32 I just I know I wrote my notes into books you know you're referring to three I just want to make sure what the third is just so I can let's move on you know I'm going to ask you questions under four topics and I'll tell you what they
00:10:44 four topics and I'll tell you what they are first of all we're going to cover training in relation to high-rise fires secondly your previous knowledge of grenfell tower then we're going to move to the handover of command from mic down
00:10:55 to the handover of command from mic down to you and from you to DAC O'Laughlin on the night and then your role as fire sector commander and then as officer in charge of BA okay just so you know where we're going today okay
00:11:07 we're going today okay and there's a broad headings obviously we may move around in and out of days um before I get to the first of those can I just ask you some questions about the your general background and experience
00:11:20 your general background and experience you joined the NFB I think in October 2014
00:11:23 2014 yes yes have you been a firefighter in various fire and rescue services for some 29 years in total yes I started my career in January 1989 with the West Midlands Fire Service I served at the
00:11:35 Midlands Fire Service I served at the city center station that had high rise a lot of high rise on this area so in the first five years of my career I responded to a number of high-rise fires
00:11:48 I transferred from the West Midlands fire service into the Isle of Wight fire service in 1994 in my time on the Isle of Wight I went through the ranks to
00:12:02 of Wight I went through the ranks to station officer that when ranks are all came in was assimilated to station manager B during that time I worked in every department in the auto fire Rescue
00:12:14 every department in the auto fire Rescue Service in a managerial role and attended numerous training courses in various aspects different skills in the time of the fire you were an SM I think based at Kingston that's great and your
00:12:27 based at Kingston that's great and your callsign on the night of the fire was H 41's I believe yeah we use some phonetics so it's hotel for one Sierra right and as to timings just very briefly we can see that you were paged
00:12:38 briefly we can see that you were paged at 0-0 fifty nine hours to monitor the incident you mobilized at 115 as you tell us in your statement following the instructions to make pump six yeah you
00:12:50 instructions to make pump six yeah you were Mobile at 118 or thereabout that was at the time I was able to get through yes to book mobile as other people have said the we had just changed
00:13:02 people have said the we had just changed our mobilizing system to one called vision and it was not unusual for you not to get through on the first attempt to call fire control so I tried to call
00:13:16 to call fire control so I tried to call control to book mobile didn't get an answer but because I was already monitoring the incident and I'd heard the make pumps I was moving to getting
00:13:27 the make pumps I was moving to getting my vehicle and mobilize you know we'll come to that detail in in due course but just in overall terms yeah I yo I book mobile with control at that time but I was already in the process of yeah yes okay
00:13:40 already in the process of yeah yes okay and what we'll try and establish you more exactly at what time you you arrived at the incident because we don't have a status three for you I'm afraid in the record so we'll try and work it out okay now in terms of your training
00:13:52 out okay now in terms of your training to turn to the first of a major topics I want to cover with you if I may and are you required as a station manager to do continuing or continuous training yes we
00:14:03 continuing or continuous training yes we maintain our competencies in all of our school lives and can you summarize for us briefly if you can the training that you had received in relation to high-rise fires in the two years or so
00:14:14 high-rise fires in the two years or so before the grenfell tower fire in June 2017 every command assessment that I've taken in London Fire Brigade in my recollection has had a high-rise
00:14:27 recollection has had a high-rise scenario as part of that command assessment either as some of the input in the morning and to refresh our skills or as the actual scenario that we've
00:14:38 or as the actual scenario that we've been tested against I carried out a camera the last command train and I've had before brain fill I think was in March 2017 so I can't remember what the
00:14:51 March 2017 so I can't remember what the concept was but I would be very surprised if there wasn't a hoist elements in there in the role of the triple-s Oh which is mentioned in the statement I've been involved in delivering or facilitating the
00:15:04 delivering or facilitating the back-to-basics training which in 2017 the I think it would be the 2016-17 round
00:15:13 round we were concentrated on high-rise firefighting and particularly about making sure that information reached the beachhead
00:15:23 beachhead influenced operations so that that probably is the the most recent training that I was involved in now did you you I
00:15:35 that I was involved in now did you you I think we know that you provided training as a station manager during that period two years before Grenfell can I just turn to a spreadsheet and see more in a more focused way what you did
00:15:46 more focused way what you did you can I ask you to be shown LFE quadruple zero three five seven one which is also a tab nine of our master documents bundle and I'd like to turn
00:15:59 documents bundle and I'd like to turn first of all please to page 31 of that document which is the very last page this is your or is the NFP trigger
00:16:11 this is your or is the NFP trigger printout spreadsheet of your training record so it starts on page 13 halfway down in 2014 23rd of October 2014 and and runs down to April 18 so through the
00:16:25 and runs down to April 18 so through the incident I want to look at page 31 and the time mark or date mark for 22nd of February 2017 please which is a third of the way down and you can see there no
00:16:38 the way down and you can see there no that's not that I did so third of the way down there's a date in the third column from the right 22nd of February
00:16:50 column from the right 22nd of February 2017 as a bunch of dates there and I want to focus on firefighting in high-rise buildings 6 3 3 which is in grave shaded under the under the column
00:17:03 grave shaded under the under the column marked training and it says their training supervisor incident management buildings and structures buildings and structures firefighting in high-rise buildings and that was you being a
00:17:17 buildings and that was you being a training supervisor so just in general terms this short question were you does that show that you were supervising the delivery of training to officers on the
00:17:30 delivery of training to officers on the subject of incident management and on buildings and structures and firefighting and high-rise buildings at that time I believe that would relate to a back-to-basics course at that time okay yeah I would
00:17:42 course at that time okay yeah I would have been a facilitator on that course a facilitator and what does that what does that mean well as the triple SOS we we
00:17:56 that mean well as the triple SOS we we maintained the schedule of the delivery of back-to-basics every station in the area would be involved in back-to-basics note it was - it was the borough commander and the station managers
00:18:07 commander and the station managers within each borough that were responsible for delivering the training we facilitated that so the the course content was provided by the triple SOS that was prepared centrally we attended
00:18:20 that was prepared centrally we attended we acted as additional resources in the room if need be we led the training but usually the local station managers led that training
00:18:31 local station managers led that training did any part of that training on policy 633 that you suit you facilitated as an SS si did that involve how to go about doing a 72 d visit no did it involve how
00:18:45 doing a 72 d visit no did it involve how to examine the building layout and construction of a high-rise building no not prior to an incident did it examine what materials specific building
00:18:56 examine what materials specific building materials a high-rise building was composed of no did it examine cladding no did it examine the circumstances in which the stay-put policy in place for a
00:19:10 which the stay-put policy in place for a particular high-rise residential block would have to be changed to a full or partial evacuation
00:19:20 something I've struggled with all the way through the inquiries with reference to a stay port policy there's a building design principle that any high-rise is built so that people can stay in their
00:19:32 built so that people can stay in their premises that aren't affected directly by fire and that is the principle that all of our procedures have been built to deal with so when the building fails
00:19:44 deal with so when the building fails that's the only time that an evacuation would be required and when the building fails an evacuation isn't possible so I've really struggled with us meanest at
00:19:56 I've really struggled with us meanest at what time the staple policy should have been changed because we don't have a policy to tell people to stay put so
00:20:05 that that's just that's just the fact that I wanted to state you say you don't have a policy to tell people to stay put is that really right yes my survival
00:20:18 is that really right yes my survival guidance yes is normally because those principles are assumed to exist for fire control operators to confirm with a caller that under normal conditions it's
00:20:30 caller that under normal conditions it's it's probably preferable for them to stay put in a fire situation because they're not directly affected so some of the question is at least smoke and fire affecting them in their flats if the
00:20:41 affecting them in their flats if the caller states they can't evacuate and they believe they should be evacuating that's when for survival guidance is given it's am i - the only so reference in our policies to advising people to
00:20:53 in our policies to advising people to stay put have you had or delivered training on policy 790 I've received obviously advice and FSG advice in
00:21:06 obviously advice and FSG advice in particularly and the area of that policy that we focused on the back-to-basics was the information exchange between control and the fire ground and the fire
00:21:18 control and the fire ground and the fire ground and the bridgehead and making sure that that information information could be used to prioritize operations yes understand that and come back to that
00:21:27 that in due course have you had training on policy
00:21:33 5:39 emergency call management in relation to fire survival guidance cause I can't answer that off the top of my head I'd have to see the policy to safer
00:21:44 head I'd have to see the policy to safer okay I'm just following up an answer that you gave them that's what it be sure that you're right about that Chi can I ask you to look at policy 5:39 yeah
00:21:53 yeah emergency core management which was the one current as at March 2014 which is in Tab 3 of our policy bundle and I want you to go please if you were to page 16 of that which is appendix 3 fire
00:22:05 of that which is appendix 3 fire survival guidance and in the third paragraph down on that page and we've examined this with a lot of it control room operators the text of the policy
00:22:19 room operators the text of the policy says the pre gate controlled advice called us to get out and stay out however if a call is received from a high-rise building where fire heat and smoke are not affecting the caller lfb would advise that and then code on you
00:22:32 would advise that and then code on you are usually safest to remain in or premises and less affected by fire eat or smoke if the situation changes you should leave your premises and dial 999 if you need further assistance now tell
00:22:43 if you need further assistance now tell me if this is wrong but it looks to the me is the lay reader that that is the advice that control room operators actually give yet to call us you are safer still usually safest to
00:22:55 us you are safer still usually safest to remain in your premises I'd I go back to the answer the principle of a building design is that the fire will be contained in the compartment originates in yeah so in those buildings because
00:23:07 in yeah so in those buildings because they are designed specifically for that it is the safest advise that you stay put unless you are directly affected by smoke or fire so that would be the correct advice but this this policy is
00:23:18 correct advice but this this policy is aimed at fire control operators yeah so I've not got familiarity with this policy okay now to go back to an earlier answer you you said
00:23:31 I'm summarizing I hope accurately what you said stat stay put was a building design principle yeah but once the building failed there no evacuation was possible on that night that's that was
00:23:43 possible on that night that's that was summarizing or evidence I just want to examine what you mean by failed so if as I say the principle is that the building is designed to have a fire fire resistant shaft so that firefighters can
00:23:55 resistant shaft so that firefighters can access the floor where the fire is and other features to assist the fire service the compartment ation in the building is designed to have a minimum fire resistance so the fire will should
00:24:07 fire resistance so the fire will should be contained where it originates and depend on how high the building is is how long that period of resistance should be and the reason it is designed
00:24:19 should be and the reason it is designed that way is because we cannot fight the fire from outside above at a certain level
00:24:25 level so therefore the people within the building need to remain safe from that fire while we access the fire we access the fire deal with the fire and affect
00:24:36 the fire deal with the fire and affect any immediate rescues where the fire is yes and but presumably in your experience compartment ation in a high-rise block doesn't always hold sometimes compartment ation in a flat or
00:24:49 sometimes compartment ation in a flat or neighboring flats will fail I've never seen the internal fire resistance fail in my career really I have been aware although I've not experienced it myself
00:25:01 experienced it myself fires breaking out of the window and re-entering the floor above I've not been on any fire where it's gone in that way but that's just my experience I know
00:25:13 way but that's just my experience I know other officers have experienced that but every flat fire I've ever fought has been contained within the compartment where it started and the only influences had anywhere
00:25:27 and the only influences had anywhere else is potentially that the walls of the neighboring compartment get warm or you might get a damp patch on the ceiling as a floor below where we fought the fire but that's always been my
00:25:38 the fire but that's always been my personal experience have you as part of this training that you were facilitating we coming back to the training have you facilitated
00:25:50 the training have you facilitated training which focused on how to go about considering and if appropriate implementing evacuation where
00:26:01 implementing evacuation where compartment ation from the flat of origin fails it never been a consideration right going to page 30 if
00:26:12 consideration right going to page 30 if I can just get back to the spreadsheet mr. Walton if we can look at the bottom of page 30 we can see that on the 21st of October you did it this is for the
00:26:25 of October you did it this is for the fifth I think entry up from the bottom see you insert incident command lecturer command unit incident management Cu incident command
00:26:40 did you facilitate that as well in your capacity as an SSO I'm not sure if that was the triple a so wrong or if that's my role as this station commander I
00:26:52 my role as this station commander I think due to the time it was probably it was probably as a station commander it may have been as it should play a role but if he was in the triple-a so wrong
00:27:03 but if he was in the triple-a so wrong it would have been in that type of training if it were the back-to-basics training if it was in the station manager role it would be for one of my watch managers or crew managers who
00:27:15 watch managers or crew managers who would be having what we call a better assessment which is where a command unit comes to the station and we run what's known as a TD a tactical training exercise where we we give them a
00:27:28 exercise where we we give them a scenario and we make sure that their decision-making processes are appropriate that their tactics are appropriate etc did you train officers potentially incident commanders because
00:27:41 potentially incident commanders because that was the subject of it um specifically on how to use the decision-making model that is always a key part of any training we give them from command point of view did you train
00:27:52 from command point of view did you train them on incident command communications I we don't know in the specifics of that training session but we always part of our process is to confirm commander
00:28:05 our process is to confirm commander control as part of the handover so you talk about what the structure is so who you're reporting to who you're responsible for yes and how are you going to communicate with those levels
00:28:16 going to communicate with those levels so you identify if you're going to use a radio channel if you're going to use runners whatever the method is going to do so it's part of dealing with an incident so it would be it would be assessed during that training did you
00:28:28 assessed during that training did you train it would be incident commanders to turn on the actual mechanics of information gathering at handover of come
00:28:39 come I am my station I have I've got a framework that I use personally to base my information gathering on my
00:28:50 my information gathering on my identification of priorities objectives the tactics that are going to be involved and communicating that and I've shared that with the offices that I am responsible for because it is their
00:29:02 responsible for because it is their choice if they want to use the framework I've developed or if they've got another method that they use to do actual so connected in what you in whether you trained them in that use of that framework okay finally did you
00:29:15 framework okay finally did you train would be incident commanders on how to ensure that far survival guidance information was communicated back to the control room results of deployments in response to
00:29:28 results of deployments in response to fire survival guidance calls was communicated back to the control room in the back to basics training part of that training was the effective use of fire of forward information boards and making
00:29:39 of forward information boards and making sure that the information got to the bridgehead and the response the operations from the bridge it got back to fire control so that was part of the the the information
00:29:50 that was part of the the the information that was covered in that training was the importance of gut feedback loop the importance of the importance of feeding back what operations we got taking place on the vibrant now just picking up one
00:30:02 on the vibrant now just picking up one or two features of these training courses which happened in October 16 and again in fact we sit at the very foot of the page January 17 we can see that
00:30:13 the page January 17 we can see that there was training on Cu vector tactical command training [Music]
00:30:20 [Music] vector as a system isn't it yeah as I say that because vectors in the record I'm an Anderson assumption I'm assuming that that was me acting as a monitoring
00:30:32 that that was me acting as a monitoring officer in effect whilst one of the junior officers watchman is your crew managers on my station was going under that periodic training with the command unit where they were given a a TDE they
00:30:45 unit where they were given a a TDE they responded to the incident I would observe their information gathering their decision-making process their identification of priorities objectives how they structured the fire ground any
00:30:57 how they structured the fire ground any command structure they put in place the communications we go through the whole aspect of incident command to do in a vector session and then we we feedback if there's any areas for improvement or
00:31:08 if there's any areas for improvement or any really outstanding good practice that comes out of that we feed that back to the individual yeah we've had some evidence earlier in the inquiry from station manager Peter Johnson and his
00:31:20 station manager Peter Johnson and his experience was that vector hadn't worked for the last nine years there was a very important system with a very with very poor IT backup was that your experience victor is the the name that is
00:31:34 victor is the the name that is associated with that type of training in London Fire Brigade I think he's a historical reference to the system the IT system that originally brought that type of training into London Fire
00:31:45 type of training into London Fire Brigade obviously that was probably before my time so I've never actually to my knowledge I've not used vector in London Fire Brigade I've used it in other brigades so I understand the system but I think it's an historical
00:31:58 system but I think it's an historical reference that that training that would be referred to there would have been facilitated by the command unit staff they would have selected a scenario a lot of it is whiteboard pictures and and
00:32:11 lot of it is whiteboard pictures and and reacting to screenshots that type of thing
00:32:15 thing in that training it's not relying on the vector system it's I think it's just a historical reference now dad you put yourself previously encountered any difficulties with the system the vector
00:32:27 difficulties with the system the vector system I've never used the vector system in London Fire Brigade on the phone I have no issues with it in the other nodes other issues outside the other thing right turning to back to basics training that you referred to you've told us I think
00:32:40 you referred to you've told us I think that you were us in your statement that you were an SSO or ssso a service standard Support Officer having done 12 months at an Energy National operational
00:32:51 months at an Energy National operational guidance yeah what date did you become an ssso I can't be clear on that I've tried to look back at when the actual move occurred but it would be around the
00:33:03 move occurred but it would be around the the March April so the time of 2016 March April 16 all right and were you already at the lfb when you became an
00:33:15 already at the lfb when you became an ssso yeah I transferred into London Fire Brigades in October 2014 or two and that when I went into a national team as a
00:33:26 when I went into a national team as a seconded officer from London Fire Brigade in effect which was National operational guidance sorry my question was a big gamble but what was I really meant to ask you what didn't you became a did you become a specific lfb ssso
00:33:40 a did you become a specific lfb ssso also known as a national badge now Triple A so was a specific role in London Fire Brigade right at that time
00:33:51 London Fire Brigade right at that time okay
00:33:54 now in that role is it right that you organized certain elements of back to basic training and I facilitated them and I'm not trying to be funny with the words but I didn't develop the training
00:34:07 words but I didn't develop the training program I didn't decide what the subject matter would be that was all done centrally that package was delivered to us in the southwest we arranged the
00:34:20 us in the southwest we arranged the training schedule and we provided the the resources for that training so we made sure there was the correct type of venue we made sure that the training
00:34:32 venue we made sure that the training dummies the drill dummies that we use for simulated rescue were there the smoke machines were there the the fit boards the ACO telemetry boards etc so
00:34:43 boards the ACO telemetry boards etc so we provided all the facilities for that training to take place and we supported the local officers who delivered that training and if need be we would deliver
00:34:54 training and if need be we would deliver that training on their behalf if they felt more comfortable observing and maybe supplementing the input from us with can I ask you to show the document
00:35:06 with can I ask you to show the document which is NFB quadruple 0 3 5 6 6 3 5 6 6
00:35:28 that is back-to-basics 2016 a tactical decision making high-rise dated 15 December 2015 do you know who authored that I don't
00:35:41 do you know who authored that I don't you don't not you that wasn't was that one of the back to basics training elements I believe that would be the PowerPoint slideshow that was used as as
00:35:53 PowerPoint slideshow that was used as as the core of that training okay and there's another one lfb quadruple zero three five six eight
00:36:05 which has a title which doesn't appear to be coming up but does that does the title operational scenario 2016 mean anything to you yeah that so
00:36:16 2016 mean anything to you yeah that so the the training was delivered with input that basically described what officers should do a high-rise incident
00:36:27 officers should do a high-rise incident and that was followed by a practical exercise so the exercise was tailored for the stations that receiving the training that day so it was usually you venue from their own risks so you'd
00:36:40 venue from their own risks so you'd select a tower block that was within the area that that bohra covered the call sheets we referred to the appliances that were in the room so that so that the personnel could relate to that
00:36:52 the personnel could relate to that scenario but the actual the way the scenario played out was generic but you made it specific to the the crews that were in the room that were receiving the training perhaps we could just look at
00:37:03 training perhaps we could just look at the second page of this poll just to make sure we've got though clearly the right I recognized the cover and I'm comfortable that it is the document we used okay
00:37:13 used okay now are these two documents that I put up on the screen packages the entirety of the back-to-basics training that addressed the ripest C's and risks which arise from high-rise residential fires
00:37:24 arise from high-rise residential fires now there as I say the focus was about ensuring that information that was received on the fire ground got to the crews that were within the building and
00:37:36 crews that were within the building and was used to help direct fire service operations and that one of the key aspects we looked at was because there was there were two drills in the
00:37:48 was there were two drills in the afternoon if you like one was a bit more of a theory session where we were looking at literally looking at the communications so we put people in different rooms in the the venue and
00:38:00 different rooms in the the venue and people were given a linkedin interject a briefing as to what was happening at that time in their role in the incident and it was about them communicating with
00:38:11 and it was about them communicating with the correct people and making sure that the info
00:38:14 the info they've been given was what the people who had received it understood partner that was recording information on forward information boards and at the end of that exercise we put the boards next to each other and we look for any
00:38:26 next to each other and we look for any discrepancies and then we explored if there were any discrepancies we would explore well how did that happen I hope you make sure he doesn't happen in real world okay can I ask you to look at three six sorry three five six eight
00:38:39 at three six sorry three five six eight which was the second of the two documents that we had on the screen there a moment ago and go to internal pages five and six
00:38:50 now if you go over to page six there are you could see on this page there's a lot of little arrows bullet arrows scenario expectations you can see things like
00:39:02 expectations you can see things like file if I don't have secured cordons falling debris yeah rescue casualty and withdraw handover the station manager and if you go over the page please Paul
00:39:13 and if you go over the page please Paul we could see more
00:39:22 and you can see a list of things there and I think if you turn to the next page as well it runs to up to I think 233 yes there it is 33 when David debrief as per
00:39:36 there it is 33 when David debrief as per WM seven point four so there's a lot of things in the list yeah was that list designed to be comprehensive the list covered
00:39:47 comprehensive the list covered everything that would be in policy procedures and guidance to deal with an incident and particularly a high-rise incident and it was used as a tick list so that the officers who were observing
00:39:59 so that the officers who were observing the activity could tick off that they'd seen that that element demonstrated by the officers who were carrying out the practical scenario and if anything
00:40:10 practical scenario and if anything wasn't demonstrated then you would pursue that afterwards as a learning point the the scenarios were done on
00:40:21 point the the scenarios were done on Fire Brigade premises mainly it's my memory that year they were all done on Fire Brigade premises so we were using Brigade training towers which don't have
00:40:33 Brigade training towers which don't have lobbies in the in the domain aren't high-rise buildings in their own right so some of the stuff we we had to see
00:40:44 so some of the stuff we we had to see that the officer referred to you know at this time I would so that you know it's in their thought process even though they physically couldn't demonstrate it so so usually they did ship a hydrant
00:40:58 so so usually they did ship a hydrant they did between the feed into what we what would be the inlet we we fabricated a lift lobby in the base of a tower we
00:41:09 a lift lobby in the base of a tower we told them that the ground floor is in effect the sixth floor of a tower block the fire is on the 8th floor so that would have been the third floor the training said I'm going to stop in this dude whispers what I'm so sorry to
00:41:21 this dude whispers what I'm so sorry to find out me to be rude at all my question I hope it's quite a simple one and they've given a long long list of things in there and it's very helpful to us but I I think we do need to try and keep the glances of bit shorter you can
00:41:33 keep the glances of bit shorter you can I'll try to keep the questions a bit more focused just just just focusing on this list was any of these 33 items designed to train officers on how to
00:41:46 designed to train officers on how to deal with a high-rise fire where compartment ation gets breached and successively those breaches grow no was any are any of those scenarios designed to deal with a fire igniting and
00:42:01 to deal with a fire igniting and spreading across the exterior of a high-rise block no they're designed to deal with a high-rise building this beer even in the way is you okay now can I just ask you to look at page
00:42:14 now can I just ask you to look at page three where I think there is something called an incident briefing card
00:42:24 and if you look that's pitch to its internal page 3 so it's page 4 of the
00:42:35 internal page 3 so it's page 4 of the relativity that's that's the best the incident briefing card now that that's I'm that I'm assuming is given to the facilitator if you look at that was
00:42:48 facilitator if you look at that was given to the incident commander right so the officer who's in charge of the first appliance that in the scenario is attending would be given that to give them the sort of information they would
00:43:00 them the sort of information they would get from a turnout message from fire control and as I say we tailored it to the actual specifics of the the group that was there so the the reason there's no name for the high-rise is we would
00:43:12 no name for the high-rise is we would pick a high rise from their risk information what I want to focus on is the second paragraph you're the fire will be on the 14th floor with an unknown number of persons involved you are two appliances of a four appliance
00:43:25 are two appliances of a four appliance PDA that that's quite a small incident I would imagine is that right that would
00:43:37 would imagine is that right that would be a normal high a normal high rise fire okay do write say that the training didn't focus on the spread of fire out
00:43:48 didn't focus on the spread of fire out of the 14th floor either upper floor or sideways on the 14th floor or below no that was the initiator document that is the sort of thing you would get as a response as a as a turnout message from
00:43:59 response as a as a turnout message from fire control when they arrived we would put put injects in that that tested their ability to deal with a developing incident but a fire spreading out of the
00:44:16 incident but a fire spreading out of the original compartment more than true commander effect which is from one window to another note really wasn't covered
00:44:24 covered now page 8 of your statement if I can ask you to go to that please is where we find you dealing with on parts dealing with training and called
00:44:36 parts dealing with training and called for the way down that page you say in terms of realistic training of fighting a fire and a high-rise I think this was the main subject of our back to basics training in 2015 I'm just pausing there does that mean that the training
00:44:48 does that mean that the training packages we've just seen in the facilitators card that you say would be handed to the incident commander or what watch manager you thought was realistic in terms of training yeah and then you
00:45:02 in terms of training yeah and then you go on to say we were looking at making sure water supplies were adequate to establish the correct bridgehead the communication was correct the right equipment was taken to the bridgehead the right recording systems were used
00:45:14 the right recording systems were used such as the forward information boards which are a big laminated which are big laminated sheets attached to the back of PA entry control boards first water supply is just focusing on that as an issue did the training consider issues
00:45:26 issue did the training consider issues around water supply with large-scale attendance of pumps and I remember on more than one occasion and this is the first time I've thought about this but I remember on more than one occasion I
00:45:38 remember on more than one occasion I talked about considering the possibility that if you had a large developed fire in a high-rise and you have to use a number of Jets you could get to the point where you each strip the capacity
00:45:50 point where you each strip the capacity of the rising main mains are designed to deliver 1500 liters a minute each one of our Jets uses roughly 250 liters a minute so if you were using six Jets on
00:46:02 minute so if you were using six Jets on the ground maybe four Jets a higher of the building you could get to the point where because of friction loss you didn't have enough water to have effective fire fighters injects so something we talked about about
00:46:14 something we talked about about potentially providing additional mains using aerials to put hoses in the side of the building running hoses upstairs were turvy as a consideration and it wasn't part of the
00:46:26 consideration and it wasn't part of the course but it was one of the where I said sometimes station managed just put supplementary information in that was one of the things I mean i injected more than once alright and did the training cover sighting and
00:46:38 did the training cover sighting and positioning of aerials in order to maximize their effectiveness it talks about making sure the aerials had access because obviously on the initial positioning of appliances if you put them in the wrong place once they're set
00:46:50 them in the wrong place once they're set in and pumping water it's really hard to move them so if they blocked access you wouldn't be able to get an aerial in so that was a consideration for the incent commanders as far as what would be
00:47:03 commanders as far as what would be effective sighting that that is dependent upon the site it's going to be most effective yeah did training cover how to deal with or how to attack fire
00:47:15 how to deal with or how to attack fire on the exterior of a building above 30 meters no communication did the course
00:47:26 meters no communication did the course cover problems that could be encountered in high-rise concrete buildings communications wise yes yeah London Fire Brigade is very well resourced and
00:47:41 Brigade is very well resourced and compared to a lot of relays in the country so we have command units and fire rescue units that carry repeater
00:47:52 fire rescue units that carry repeater systems so for radios we can put in in effect little transceivers at various points to try and boost radio signals and we can do the same thing for the
00:48:03 and we can do the same thing for the celebrity systems for our breathing arthritis where is so I'm not sure that every other Brigade in the country's got that but we've got those so we made sure that they're in the thinking of the
00:48:15 that they're in the thinking of the officers so part of the training was if you're experiencing command communications issues or telemetry issues consider putting in the the feeder system so the repeaters or the leaky feeders which is in effect like am
00:48:28 leaky feeders which is in effect like am like the cable that gets laid and that that again leaks the the message transmission did the training cover communicating or recording FSGS in large-scale incidents where there are
00:48:41 large-scale incidents where there are large number of first G calls I think the mature the most FS G's that were considered in any training package occurring at the same time as probably two or maybe three
00:48:52 time as probably two or maybe three right and did the training cover the use of forward information boards yes was their training on policy 8:20 which is fib use in so much as the relevant
00:49:05 fib use in so much as the relevant sections of that policy would have been referred to in the training and the diagrams and use of the the casualty post or that type of thing would have been referenced in that China okay were
00:49:17 been referenced in that China okay were you ever aware that officers of the status of rank of watch manager with themselves developing their own pilot
00:49:29 themselves developing their own pilot trainings on FSG call handling I wasn't aware that not turning to other aspects of high-rise training do you have your
00:49:40 of high-rise training do you have your own experience in relation to the management and operation of a large-scale incident by which I mean something which was what became a major incident I've never been in charge of a
00:49:51 incident I've never been in charge of a major incident although at night
00:49:59 have you ever had any training and we've touched on this before but let me just ask the question and decided my way have you ever had any training or given any training or what should happen once it
00:50:11 training or what should happen once it becomes apparent to an incident commander but the fire has spread vertically up the exterior of a high-rise residential block it wasn't consideration I've never heard any of
00:50:23 consideration I've never heard any of that true you write it sorry I'll come back to that I've had reference to
00:50:34 back to that I've had reference to kuranda effect in training I've received which is where a fire breaks out the window and gets back into the window of the room above so one of the things we look for in the response to a high-rise
00:50:45 look for in the response to a high-rise fire is that once the immediate life-threatening actions have been taken that crews do get dispatched to above the sides and below the compartment of origin to confirm there is no no you're
00:50:58 origin to confirm there is no no you're okay
00:50:59 okay yes we're a fart just so I can get your understanding then in terms of where it sits in your training experience where a fire spreads vertically up the exterior of a high-rise building even in
00:51:11 of a high-rise building even in theoretical terms was it your understanding as at June 2017 that compartment ation would thereby have been breached my I'd never had any training regarding
00:51:24 my I'd never had any training regarding virtual fire spread in the operational environment other than what I've just talked about there with Co under effect though there is a fire safety inspecting officer I was aware that any planning
00:51:38 officer I was aware that any planning but no any facade on the outside of a building should have fire stopping that prevented it from spreading any any great distance so I would never have
00:51:51 great distance so I would never have expected a fire to be able to spread up the outside of a building in the you know
00:51:57 know taking them were you aware as a June 2017 of exterior fires on high-rise buildings being experienced in Dubai or France only from the television reports
00:52:09 France only from the television reports run reports what how much did you know about those event those particular incidents just what I saw in the news okay do I take it that that also means
00:52:21 okay do I take it that that also means that you as at June 2017 had never seen a training slideshow produced by the lfb in October 2016
00:52:32 in October 2016 entitled tall building facades never seen that training still focusing on training and have you ever heard training on when you should go from
00:52:49 training on when you should go from attacking the fire if you like tactical mode Oscar offense to evacuation on the moment you make the decision not in the
00:53:03 moment you make the decision not in the terms you're describing there and I've had reference to phased evacuation which is in certain types of office buildings that have been designed and built to
00:53:14 that have been designed and built to facilitate that right because it's important you use the features that are designed in to facilitate that as far as a high-rise building a residential
00:53:25 a high-rise building a residential building I've never had any training in the 29 years in this Fire and Rescue Service to do that so to effect an
00:53:37 Service to do that so to effect an evacuation of the whole building when it's designed on that principle that people can stay put have you ever had training or given training on when it might be appropriate to use a what we call a what is called a second set bag
00:53:51 call a what is called a second set bag second set breathing apparatus to assist the evacuation of a an occupant of any building no
00:54:01 have you ever had any training or given any training in relation to the prevention and mitigation of the effects of smoke in a single exit like a stairwell or corridor only practical
00:54:13 stairwell or corridor only practical firefighting using what we call hydraulic ventilation which is where you you play a hose out of the compartment through an opening and a process called
00:54:24 through an opening and a process called venturi effect draws air into that lower pressure that that jet creates yes and that will draw smoke out but that's see that's the only time I've ever received any training about that type of insulation being otherwise I did receive
00:54:37 insulation being otherwise I did receive training on positive pressure ventilation because that was a process that was going to be brought into the Isle of Wight I transferred out before that became a frontline tactic and it
00:54:48 that became a frontline tactic and it wasn't available in London Fire Brigade we have heard quite a bit this morning already about your experience or lack of experience in terms of cladding fires
00:55:00 experience in terms of cladding fires just just to be absolutely clear did you ever have any training on the particular dangerous that cladding on the exterior of high-rise blocks posed to firefighting I never had any trained in that I didn't believe cladding could
00:55:12 that I didn't believe cladding could burn but does that mean that you would not as a June 2017 be able to identify a cladding fire and only from the news report I saw but my belief was in the
00:55:26 report I saw but my belief was in the United Kingdom Building Regulations would not allow the circumstances to exist does it follow from that that you wouldn't have been able to identify the particular risks flowing from a fire
00:55:39 particular risks flowing from a fire where the cladding had ignited and the fire had spread up to up the exterior only by applying principles from other trainings and so I would be looking at probably applying my knowledge of
00:55:51 probably applying my knowledge of sandwich panel fires and some of the film it's similarities between a sandwich panel and a cladding panel and assuming that the same hazards and risks would be there so and as a result it's
00:56:03 would be there so and as a result it's that type of thing as a result of applying that analogy from clarity from sandwich panels to cladding what would be the appropriate firefighting measures to be deployed in combating as a cladding fire to the best of your experience you the only thing
00:56:19 of your experience you the only thing you could do would be to get water on to the fire your main issue is making sure nobody gets injured or killed while they're falling delaminating services
00:56:30 they're falling delaminating services and that secondary fires don't get started by the burning droplets of material how would you get water on to the fire if the cladding material itself was on the exterior face a rain screen
00:56:43 was on the exterior face a rain screen designed to repel water it's not possible so how would you go about attacking an exterior cladding fire to
00:56:54 attacking an exterior cladding fire to the best of your knowledge and experience as a June 2017 I believe we'll go there but my tactic was to try and stop it getting back in because I didn't I thought we were doing everything we could mr. Chappel we're
00:57:10 everything we could mr. Chappel we're going to move to a different topic yeah I think it's time we had a pretty good yep I'm gonna have a breakdown this tool team will take ten minutes out please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out in the world will
00:57:22 while you're out in the world will resume at ten past eleven right to give her the option now Sheila Patton thank you very much
00:57:39 at ten past eleven
01:03:02 you
01:08:28 yes would you like to ask mr. Wolfson to come back thank you
01:08:49 wherever's Walton my carry on if at any stage you feel it's time for another break just indicate no difficulty mr. Walton I'm now going to ask you about
01:09:01 Walton I'm now going to ask you about your previous knowledge of great tower itself and I'm going to start with the topic of your role as station manager if that's the right thing to say at North Kensington can I ask you to go please to page 11 of your statement your first
01:09:12 page 11 of your statement your first witness statement and look at the second paragraph in that which starts the AC Jane Philpott DAC Jane filbert organized for me to be detached for a couple of
01:09:23 for me to be detached for a couple of months into the North Kensington Fire Station in an effect become their station manager I work with Nick Davis who was the station manager who covered North Kensington and Kensington at that time he concentrated on Kensington and I
01:09:35 time he concentrated on Kensington and I looked after North Kensington working on the Baraka model Rob Davis question was that in the period April to June that you were attached to North Kensington
01:09:46 you were attached to North Kensington yes I look back at my Outlook calendar and I've identified that I believe I started at North Kensington probably on
01:09:57 started at North Kensington probably on the day of the smoke extraction demonstration our 28th of April I think it was my first day at the station and then I was at the station for a period of eight weeks eight weeks now you say
01:10:11 of eight weeks eight weeks now you say that station manager Nick Davis was the station manager in command of both north Ken and Kensington at the time so you became the station manager in North Kensington yeah the some stations at
01:10:23 Kensington yeah the some stations at wind ie one station manager manages to station sites those are the ones with one appliance at each station right other stations where there's multiple appliances they manage by a dedicated
01:10:34 appliances they manage by a dedicated station manager so the reason I'd ask to go in there was that I had no direct experience of managing the London Fire Brigade station all my experience was
01:10:46 Brigade station all my experience was from other brigades managing stations so I wanted some direct experience in five nation now can I ask you to look at your second parent your second witness statement to turn to page two paragraph
01:10:57 statement to turn to page two paragraph three page one where you cover this topic and you say there in the third line that you you spent a period of six to eight weeks acting as the day-to-day
01:11:08 to eight weeks acting as the day-to-day lead s/m at North Kensington I'll come back to that in a minute but then say in the third line I was not able to be given admin rights by the IT department so couldn't carry out the full duties of a station based sm such as approving
01:11:21 a station based sm such as approving operational risk database ORD entries for the station but at the time was designed to give me more of an exposure to an understanding of the issues and NFP station based sm faced on the day-to-day basis to be for my actions as
01:11:32 day-to-day basis to be for my actions as a NEX a so now my question is did you ever get access to the ORD entries for north kensington not in that room right
01:11:45 north kensington not in that room right say not in that no I no I never got the admin rights for North kensie's net station okay if you couldn't see the ORD entries for more kensington during or
01:11:57 entries for more kensington during or 8-week SN period how could you carry out your ssso role an audit compliance with North Kent North Kensington with its requirements what I was referring to was
01:12:08 requirements what I was referring to was the quality assurance of the updated entry that would then go untoward I didn't have the admin rights to access that for everybody in London Fire Brigade has access to the operational
01:12:22 Brigade has access to the operational risk database and can go to specific locations and look at what the information is for that location for that risk but when you're in the station manager role you quality assured the
01:12:35 manager role you quality assured the information that goes on to the order and make sure that the right areas have been gathered and are recorded so you accept the updation for the update or
01:12:47 accept the updation for the update or you reject it and send it back to the watch to redo to the standard after in your role as ssso all station manager during that period were you able to college
01:12:57 college sure the information on the Ord that you could see I didn't look at that stations Ord information could you have done I
01:13:08 Ord information could you have done I could have access if I at that time I'd not had that system shown to me right so I didn't know how to that is you that is
01:13:19 I didn't know how to that is you that is the honest no so I didn't know how to after I came away from that detachment whilst I was in the triple-s OHS I spoke to my colleagues who were in the triple-s oh and I asked them to show me how you access the order and that was by
01:13:31 how you access the order and that was by the station diary and the work schedule I see so during that eight week period is am i right in thinking that you you either couldn't or won't didn't know how to access the station diary and the Ord
01:13:46 to access the station diary and the Ord database for that day I could access the station diary I could I didn't know that to access the auditing firm ation it was via the outside work schedule and that
01:13:58 via the outside work schedule and that was something that I discussed with my colleagues when I was in the triple-s Tyrol later and was shown that that method is there a reason why you didn't ask to access the Ord information for North Kensington while you were SM at
01:14:09 North Kensington while you were SM at North Kensington I'd spoken to Nick Davis I'd asked as get the admin rights to actually been able to do that because I thought I needed full admin rights to be able to do that when and I did that
01:14:21 be able to do that when and I did that with the IT department when it came back that they weren't able to give to station managers the access rights the admin rights for a station because Nick Davis already had those rights myself
01:14:34 Davis already had those rights myself and Nick Davis had a conversation and Nick knew that he was responsible for for the admin at North Kent as well as Kansas and as the normal practice how could you carry out came back to my question how could you carry out your role of audit compliance by North
01:14:47 role of audit compliance by North Kensington with the requirements of policy to message or as a joke I serve as a triple sa without having yourself access to the IT rights to be able to get into the Ord database of a North
01:14:59 get into the Ord database of a North Kent so as a as the way I would explain that is as a triple a so like everybody else in London fabric I could access the recorded audio
01:15:11 I could access the recorded audio information for a risk and when I was in the chapel esos because that was part of my role bear in mind that I went into the triple-s o team in the April and
01:15:23 the triple-s o team in the April and almost immediately because I'd asked to have experience on a fire station to be able to do that already role I was given the opportunity at North Kensington
01:15:34 the opportunity at North Kensington whilst I was at North Kensington I realized I couldn't access that when I went back into the triple-s O roll at the end of that eight-week period that was one of the first things that I raised was that how can i or Denise if I
01:15:47 raised was that how can i or Denise if I can't access it and then I was shown the way that you could access it so so while I was doing much of play so role I was accessing and auditing that information on stations as part of the quality
01:15:59 on stations as part of the quality assurance process that we did there
01:16:03 during the eight-week period you were there because during the eight-week period you were there did you not demand access to the OIG information so that
01:16:14 access to the OIG information so that you could carry out that triple s role during that period I wasn't carrying out that should play so role during that eight week period I was acting as the station the station base station manager
01:16:25 station the station base station manager so as I say I was dealing with the day-to-day administration of that station I see and that's the answer I see okay
01:16:35 see okay during your time at North Kensington's fire station were you ever made it aware of any Granville tower related safety issues raised by any residents of the
01:16:47 issues raised by any residents of the tower I'm not aware of any issues being raised as coming from Residence Inn at seven does the name Edward Devon ring a bell with you so you're not aware of any
01:16:59 bell with you so you're not aware of any issues raised by a resident Edward Devon no what about by the TMO were you ever aware of any particular fire related fire safety related issues
01:17:11 fire related fire safety related issues raised by the TMAO during your your your stint at north kensington no and can I then turn to the subject of section 72 d visits to the tower and can I start by
01:17:22 visits to the tower and can I start by asking you please to go to policy six three three high-rise on Wright's firefighting which is a tab for of our policy bundle and and ask you please to
01:17:34 policy bundle and and ask you please to go to internal page 19 appendix one
01:17:44 just looking at this first of all looking at this policy generally I'm assuming that you're familiar with with policy 633 and I'm going to assume you're also familiar with the terms of
01:17:55 you're also familiar with the terms of Appendix appendix 172 D yes and just to refresh your memory of the detail of paragraph 1 says during 70d visits personnel should ensure that they are
01:18:07 personnel should ensure that they are familiar with the following and their impact on firefighting and search and rescue operations so that's the general heading and then there's a long list of things we see in the policy in those
01:18:18 things we see in the policy in those bullet points there and my first question is did you ever have any training yourself as to as to how as a
01:18:29 training yourself as to as to how as a operational firefighter sent on a 72 DD visit to carry out such a visit in 1989 on training school at the time it was
01:18:41 on training school at the time it was under the previous phone Rescue Services Act section 1 1 D I had input about what a 1 1 D visit was and what you were there to do that's the only time I've
01:18:52 there to do that's the only time I've heard any training in familiarization visit so not since 1989 right and that's receipt of training would it follow that you've also never delivered any training
01:19:04 you've also never delivered any training to frontline officers as to how to go to about has to go about as to how to go about carrying at a 72 d visit only cascade training as an operational watch
01:19:15 cascade training as an operational watch manager where I was involved in carrying out those visits leading those visits at the stations I was on and you would develop the more junior members of the
01:19:26 develop the more junior members of the the watch I usually give them the responsibility of recording the information explaining the significance of it every every 72 day I've been
01:19:38 of it every every 72 day I've been involved with I've always told people that they need to record every piece of information they would want to have if they were an incident at that building right that's information that
01:19:50 building right that's information that they would want to have so that the question is did you ever train any officers as part of the training exercises you've just described of how to go about looking at each or all or
01:20:03 to go about looking at each or all or any of these bullet points on this page without reading every bullet points just from my general knowledge of this I would say yes over the over time every
01:20:14 would say yes over the over time every officer in the fire brigade whether it looks at every single aspects of those and will understand the importance of them when they're on a seven-to-three visit right and then we record the
01:20:25 visit right and then we record the significant areas let me ask the question a slightly different way did you ever train an officer or any officers who might be asked to attend a seven-to-three visit to take this list
01:20:37 seven-to-three visit to take this list go to a visit and ensure they are familiar with all of those bullet points on that single visit no the way that we would do it would be we would print off a copy of the information as it would be
01:20:49 a copy of the information as it would be so the template that would be shown on the appliance when we had a paper-based system and when the MDT systems came in later on in my career the actual
01:21:00 later on in my career the actual template of the electronic form as it would appear on screen and we made sure that every category that was relevant to the risk we were inspecting with the
01:21:11 the risk we were inspecting with the visiting was recorded right just looking down the list would you train personnel who were doing visits always to inspect for example fire fighting shafts only if
01:21:24 for example fire fighting shafts only if they were present in the building look at a location and function of fire fighting lifts the same that same answer David they're specific to high-rise yeah well this is all specific to high-rise because it's in the policy but but the
01:21:36 because it's in the policy but but the 72d visit isn't specific to high-rise it's any risk in your area so we visit anything that we think we may need a prior knowledge of prior to
01:21:47 may need a prior knowledge of prior to an incident occur in there and we gather relevant information on that visit so we'd be specifically so a high-rise yes you would cover those areas in every visit to a high-rise looking at the next
01:21:59 visit to a high-rise looking at the next bullet point the likelihood and impact of any fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and the potential for multiple rescues did you train people as to how to go about ensuring
01:22:11 people as to how to go about ensuring that they were familiar with that no is there a reason why not I don't think it was a realistic eventualities in our
01:22:25 was a realistic eventualities in our thinking at that time the that like I said like I said the norm would be to go above to the sides and below a compartment so you would cover that type
01:22:37 compartment so you would cover that type of aspect as you will as you were on the in the building you'd be talking about hey would you access the compartments either side how would you access the compartments above and below and if it was a an unusual type of construction so
01:22:49 was a an unusual type of construction so we call it scissors type construction where a premises can be on multiple floors and these types of premises then you would go into the specifics of that if the fire was moving and how would we
01:23:01 if the fire was moving and how would we make sure that we check to both below to the sides but it would be dependent on the circumstances of the building what would be appropriate so this would it follow and correct me if this is unfair
01:23:13 follow and correct me if this is unfair or or I've misunderstood you that but you're inter that that you wouldn't train people to personnel to examine the likelihood and impact of any fire spread beyond the compartment of origin beyond
01:23:25 beyond the compartment of origin beyond a spread in the neighboring flats I think the key word is the the second word in that sentence it's the likelihood so while you were there part
01:23:37 likelihood so while you were there part of what you're doing on a familiarization visit is familiarizing yourself with the features of the building and if it's built to the correct principles the likelihood of it spreading is is
01:23:48 the likelihood of it spreading is is negligible then looking at the next bullet point occupancy and use profile would you train visiting personnel to examine the occupancy and use profile of
01:23:59 examine the occupancy and use profile of every high-rise block they were visiting every time they visited it would be a consideration if you knew there were persons with mobility issues etc then
01:24:10 persons with mobility issues etc then you would probably factor that in that you you know that there's somebody who would not be likely to be able to self rescue in a fire situation so therefore they would need a response from us to
01:24:22 they would need a response from us to confirm their situation and bring them out if required but in a private residential block due to data protection mainly it's rare that we know the
01:24:35 mainly it's rare that we know the characteristics of the individuals who live in the block leaving a sign data protection would it not be important though to any personnel visiting any high-rise residential block to make
01:24:47 high-rise residential block to make absolutely sure they knew where persons with disabilities mobility issues elderly children were within the block other than knock in every door and be looking off to have the occupancy in the
01:24:58 looking off to have the occupancy in the flat and asking them to give us the details of the people in the flat we've got no way of gathering that information what about other other agencies will not share that information because of data
01:25:09 share that information because of data protection have you ever asked in your experience ever asked a building owner such as a borough council or a tenant management organization to share that
01:25:20 management organization to share that organize air that information with you so that you could satisfy the provisions of Appendix 1 yeah I we used to be the head of risk information management when I was in the on work Fire Rescue Service so I ran the old White's version of odd
01:25:32 so I ran the old White's version of odd and I try to get a data sharing agreement between the Health Service the local authority so that we would have access to that type of information and
01:25:44 access to that type of information and the barrier that prevented it was nobody would sign a data sharing agreement because of data protection while you are at North Kensington on air was only eight weeks was that something
01:25:55 was only eight weeks was that something that you considered doing with the TMO responsible for grateful tower probably because of that experience I knew that if they I assumed he wouldn't be possible because of the data protection
01:26:07 possible because of the data protection act right sea floor layouts next one down floor layouts at any building construction features which promote rapid or abnormal fire spreads such as sandwich panels timber frame construction atria or voids and same
01:26:20 construction atria or voids and same question did you ever train personnel on how to go about making that assessment as part of a 72 D visit yes and what training would you give them again it
01:26:31 training would you give them again it would be more practical experience based training sharing your experience so if we were doing a 72 day on this building the panel in here indicates to me
01:26:42 the panel in here indicates to me there's probably hidden voids that could because of the ducting in this room there will be voids where fire could spread so it's about considering that looking where it goes
01:26:53 looking where it goes checking if the fire stopping is at the compartment ation that should be there and although you're not there doing a fire safety inspection because we no longer have the regulatory powers to do that they in that way it is about making
01:27:07 that they in that way it is about making sure your office it familiar with the facilities that are in the building and that you've considered how they could be breached or any way that he could influence your operations while I'm on
01:27:18 influence your operations while I'm on the subtle on that bullet point are you familiar were you familiar as at your eight-week period at Grant North Kensington with the National
01:27:30 North Kensington with the National document for fr A's the generic risk assessment three point two as an operational firefighter I wouldn't be familiar with that no but because of the roles I have had in the collaborative
01:27:42 roles I have had in the collaborative partnership when I was on the Oliver Felicity Service and as a member of the National Operations of guidance and I'm aware of the document GRA s were written to capture the city
01:27:56 GRA s were written to capture the city very generic risks that can be assumed that type of incident that they're dealing with and they were there to give advice to fine rescue services as to the
01:28:07 advice to fine rescue services as to the issues that they needed to ensure their policies and procedures dealt with to know the right safe systems of work to be able to be introduced to deal with those issues when you familiar with the
01:28:20 those issues when you familiar with the detailed contents of GRA 3.2 yourself no I never was involved we developing the national guidance for high-rise I didn't have the responsibility for that so I've
01:28:32 have the responsibility for that so I've not referred to that document per se when I was in the collaborative partnership the team that we're doing tactical guidance for high-rise fire fighting for the 50% of the UK fire
01:28:43 fighting for the 50% of the UK fire service that were engaged with the collaborative partnership they used that document as their base document when they began the process of developing the
01:28:54 they began the process of developing the tactics that would be employed by those fire rescue services tailored to their specific needs their skill sets the risks in their area the equipment that they had told it to those risks
01:29:06 they had told it to those risks can I ask you please to be shown that GRA which is tab 7 of our policies bundle 2 and turn to internal page 16 which may be I think 17 in the
01:29:17 which may be I think 17 in the relativity reference let's it'll be 16 then and now there is the list of bullet points to be which are information
01:29:28 points to be which are information points to be gathered in relation to high-rise incidents and it comes quite a long way into passage which starts on planning if you look at the bullet point
01:29:40 planning if you look at the bullet point forth up from the bottom building construction features it says such as the presence and location of maisonette style construction sandwich panels timber framing cladding systems surface mounted trunking etc
01:29:54 surface mounted trunking etc did you know during your period of eight weeks a station manager at North Kensington that the National guidance required information to be gathered in relation to cladding systems as I said
01:30:06 relation to cladding systems as I said that guidance should have been used and I believe was used by policy writers in every Brigade in the country it's a tailor their policies to meet the
01:30:17 it's a tailor their policies to meet the risks in their area with the equipment the training and the skills of their personnel so it's used as a base document for brigades to tailor their policies so in London Fire Brigade I
01:30:31 policies so in London Fire Brigade I would comply with the policies and procedures of London Fire Brigade in the West Midlands it would be the West Midlands etc because it's tailored to the specifics of your area I understand
01:30:42 the specifics of your area I understand so so so going back to your question I wasn't aware that cladding systems were specifically mentioned in the National guidance but I would guess and it's a guess if we went back to that list of
01:30:54 guess if we went back to that list of the considerations on a 72 d in our policy it will be one of the bullets in that list and so it would be something you would consider right because that
01:31:06 you would consider right because that would be where that list in 72 d policy would have come from right and during that period of eight weeks did you notice that what did you notice any
01:31:19 you notice that what did you notice any detail about grünfeld ha particularly on that those premises or the information so far as you could get it station diary I didn't see the OID station at a time yeah I didn't go through that process
01:31:31 yeah I didn't go through that process while I was there but when I visited the site
01:31:34 site I've got no recollection of seeing cladding on the building but the thing too to qualify that at that time my
01:31:45 too to qualify that at that time my belief was that cladding systems didn't burn my belief was if they were installed correctly to building regulations they weren't an issue
01:31:56 regulations they weren't an issue in the United Kingdom right so there wouldn't be anything that I was specific specifically focusing on unless there was obvious failure to comply and that's where my attention would have been drawn
01:32:07 where my attention would have been drawn to it now
01:32:12 to it now looking further down the if we can get back to appendix one please of a policy 633 which is tab 4 of the policy bundle
01:32:23 633 which is tab 4 of the policy bundle you can also see six I think bullet points up from the bottom maybe seven means of ventilation and smoke control
01:32:34 means of ventilation and smoke control including location of operating switches again similar question did you ever give any training to operational crews as to how to become familiar with the means of ventilation and smoke control systems it
01:32:46 ventilation and smoke control systems it would be the same as a previous answer it would be that while you're actually engaged in a but in effect I would be relying on the Cascade training I'd had from my officers in the past that I
01:32:59 from my officers in the past that I reflected that and I cascaded that to the officers I was responsible for at that time it's it's about giving your experience to the crews that you are now responsible for making sure they focus
01:33:11 responsible for making sure they focus on the same areas when doing a seven to D visit to the best of your understanding did that require visiting personnel actually to understand the
01:33:22 personnel actually to understand the precise instructions and mechanics of a smoke control system so that they can actually operate it during an incident if it was designed for that to be a
01:33:33 if it was designed for that to be a feature of the system I would expect them to gather that information right and to make sure it not only to gather it but to make sure it was available for whichever crew happen to attend an
01:33:45 whichever crew happen to attend an incident there because you can't rely on it being the local station if the local stations already committed to another incident it will be the next nearest station that gets mobilized so any any
01:33:56 station that gets mobilized so any any facility like that you would have to ensure that those instructions were obtained and that they would be available for whoever attended one of the easiest ways is to ensure
01:34:07 one of the easiest ways is to ensure that it's attached to the order for that risk the operational risk database or that there are instructions at the sides here and that could be on a wall or it
01:34:18 here and that could be on a wall or it could be in a premises information box method like that okay that's very helpful and we'll come back to the specifics of this particular system in due course before I leave this list kind
01:34:29 due course before I leave this list kind of then on to ask you to look at the next one down infatuation arrangements which may include phased evacuation was it your understanding that crews needed to understand be trained on how to go
01:34:42 to understand be trained on how to go about familiarity or obtaining familiarity with evacuation arrangements in every high-rise block that they attended under 7 2 D any any premises
01:34:53 attended under 7 2 D any any premises that you attend high-rise or if they've got a specific evacuation plan you need to be aware of it because it could and probably would affect your firefighting tactics now you are qualifying the
01:35:05 tactics now you are qualifying the answer but if they've got an evacuation plan if it's a residential high-rise block with a stay put stay put in place if you see what I mean in other words that these fans in my strata support
01:35:17 that these fans in my strata support stay put it is that's the standing instruction to residents then would it not follow let's just that but nonetheless you would still have to examine evacuation arrangements which may
01:35:29 evacuation arrangements which may include phased evacuation the the responsible person for the building is responsible for having an adequate evacuation plan they assess their
01:35:42 evacuation plan they assess their building they detail the evacuation plan we have to make sure we're aware of it so that our operations will work effectively in tandem to that evacuation
01:35:55 effectively in tandem to that evacuation plan being implemented so where you've got us do I understand your evidence to view that where you've got a stay put policy in place put there by the building owner you wouldn't then go
01:36:07 building owner you wouldn't then go about examining evacuation arrangements now you would you'd say what what are the evacuation arranger - this building this building is designed and built to support stay put
01:36:19 designed and built to support stay put you know so therefore only the occupants of the initial flat will need to evacuate so our then focus is on making sure we make contact with the point of origin we carry out any immediate
01:36:31 origin we carry out any immediate rescues and we firefighter so that is taken into account the evacuation arrangements of that building I see so where a stapler is in place if you you would say that you would read and apply
01:36:43 would say that you would read and apply the evacuation arrangements there in a way that's limited to the compartment of origin and surrounding compartment those are the evacuation arrangements for that building and that limitation is that
01:36:56 building and that limitation is that personal to you or is to the best of your understanding was that shared by other senior offices in the in the London Fire Brigade who would deliver training on something I've not received any specific training to give me that
01:37:08 any specific training to give me that that interpretation but I think it would be fair to say that an officer who's carrying out 72d inspection would confirm what the evacuation arrangements
01:37:20 confirm what the evacuation arrangements are for that building and then confirm that our tactics wouldn't compromise those wait wait I am gonna expand a little bit Mary that would become an issue is in for example a phased
01:37:32 issue is in for example a phased evacuation building where if we katay all that phase evacuation and went to a general evacuation that could cause real issues because of the volume of people who would be coming down the stairs so
01:37:43 who would be coming down the stairs so it's important you do understand the arrangements for the specific building and if it's been designed and built for stay-put to be the the appropriate use of that building you make sure that your
01:37:55 of that building you make sure that your response will tailor to that right then can I in the light of that answer take you to page 14 of this policy which is paragraph 746 under the rubric
01:38:08 paragraph 746 under the rubric evacuation and there's a as a chunk of this policy devoted to evacuation and 72d it's a sorry seven
01:38:19 evacuation and 72d it's a sorry seven point four six it says it may be necessary to undertake a partial or full evacuation in a residential building whereas tape of policy is normally in place say that's rather suggesting that
01:38:32 place say that's rather suggesting that one thing that an incident commander should consider at an incident is full evacuation of a high-rise residential building even though a stay put policy
01:38:45 building even though a stay put policy is in place well it stay it states it may be necessary to do it it doesn't say that we have to consider it input arrangements in place to achieve it now I know that this looks like I'm playing
01:38:57 I know that this looks like I'm playing with words but you don't know what the incident is you're responding to where because we're focused on a fire we're all thinking about a fire in this room but you could have a staple building and
01:39:10 but you could have a staple building and it could be exposed to a chemical leak it could be exposed to a terrorist attack it could be anything where you you say we need to get everybody out so that's where it would be necessary to do
01:39:21 that's where it would be necessary to do that type of activity the building is designed to resist the fire there could be other things that make that not appropriate for people to stay in that so you saying that there may be other
01:39:32 so you saying that there may be other events other than fires where you would evacuate a residential building in full weather a staple policy is in place but not a fire no I'm not I'm definitely not saying that a fire it could never ever
01:39:44 saying that a fire it could never ever happen because obviously you cannot rely necessarily that the principle has been maintained so it might be something you have to deal with you buddy that is
01:39:57 have to deal with you buddy that is that's a statement of fact it may be necessary it doesn't tell you what you do about it no it doesn't and that leads me to this question taking paragraph seven two point four six you can see there is do you or did
01:40:14 six you can see there is do you or did you ever give any training receive any training on how to assess the need to undertake a partial or full of that creation in a residential high-rise block where a stapler policy was in
01:40:27 block where a stapler policy was in place do you know of what the principle are there any principles which would govern how an incident commander would go about assessing whether it was
01:40:39 go about assessing whether it was necessary to undertake such a partial or full evacuation I'm not aware of any guidance at all right now and can I then
01:40:52 guidance at all right now and can I then turn to a particular visit that you made to grenfell tower is it right that as part of your responsibilities I think you've said it was your first day at North Kenya went to Grenfell tower on
01:41:04 North Kenya went to Grenfell tower on the 28th of April 2016 yes the the station manager who would normally be based there had received an invitation to see a demonstration of a newly
01:41:15 to see a demonstration of a newly installed smoke extraction system and because I was there that day he forwarded that invite to me and asked me if I would like to attend in his
01:41:27 me if I would like to attend in his place and I took advantage of that employ yes and was that as as part of a 70d visit by the station or was that just coincidental with with the visit by
01:41:40 just coincidental with with the visit by white watch to Grantville tower on that day I put a bit of context then when I wrote my contemporaneous notes on the the morning of the 17th I remembered I've been in the building and I remembered I'd had a smoke
01:41:52 and I remembered I'd had a smoke extraction demonstration I also remembered that white watch were there and I assumed that white watch would do in a 70 day I'd forgotten that I'd had a specific invite to see the smoke extraction so I
01:42:06 invite to see the smoke extraction so I assumed that I must have been there to do the 70d in effect so I've done some weakness or 72d when I got asked the specific questions last week regarding
01:42:17 specific questions last week regarding that visit I went back to my calendar found the invite I remembered the circumstances more clearly so white watch because the block was under such an extensive renovation a periodic
01:42:31 an extensive renovation a periodic inspect
01:42:31 inspect program have been put in place so every watch periodically went back and revisited the building because the the condition that building was continually changing and it was to make sure that the Audion formation was up-to-date and
01:42:43 the Audion formation was up-to-date and their familiarity with the building was up-to-date as it as the circumstance has changed quite watch was scheduled to carry out one of those periodic seven two DS or familiarization visits that
01:42:55 two DS or familiarization visits that day because the smoking demonstration invite had come I mentioned it to white watch and they made sure that their
01:43:06 watch and they made sure that their visit coincided with the demonstration times so that they could tag on to the demonstration and become more familiar aged familiar with that system as it was was being put into the building can I
01:43:18 was being put into the building can I ask you to look please a paragraph seven of your second statement 17th of September statement paragraph seven
01:43:33 and I want you to look at the last three lines please you say there that the original invitation came from David Hughes from ridin in addition to Nick Davis of the NFB your email address the
01:43:45 Davis of the NFB your email address the others invited have the following extensions and then there's a set out and have you got that original email with you I haven't got it with me today touched it's attached to the calendar
01:43:57 touched it's attached to the calendar entry before that visit because I attached it into the into the irritation on the calendar now when you attended did you actually
01:44:08 now when you attended did you actually involve yourself with a 72d visit or did you just watch the demonstration of the smoke vent system that's as I say the watch we're doing the 72d they were there before I arrived so they'd
01:44:19 there before I arrived so they'd commence that visit when the smoke demonstration started they joined the group so the aspects of the building that we visited as part of that demonstration they would have been
01:44:30 demonstration they would have been recording information then so that's the only time I was engaged in the 72d process with them was where he overlapped with the smoke demonstration right so you didn't do any other 72d work other than think smoke vent there
01:44:42 work other than think smoke vent there now who needing a side white watch who from North Kensington attended the visit with you white watching myself just
01:44:55 with you white watching myself just white wasn't there no so Nick Davis didn't go no okay and did anybody briefed you as to the purpose of your visit not really no more than the invitation
01:45:07 not really no more than the invitation and the email and that it was a demonstration of a smoke extraction system to the best of your understanding was the purpose of your attending
01:45:18 was the purpose of your attending pursuant to the invitation to ensure that the system was compliant the smoke system was compliant with relevant standards or was it part of building control approvals neither my
01:45:30 control approvals neither my understanding was that it was just a demonstration of a new system so that the watch would have familiarity I would have familiarity and in effect for us to give any
01:45:40 give any the pinyin or guidance that may cross our minds from an operational point of view question so it was it was it was 72 d yeah yeah it was it was familiarization it wasn't it wasn't
01:45:52 familiarization it wasn't it wasn't regulatory it wasn't commissioning it wasn't acceptance like maybe it is purely a familiarization yes and say
01:46:04 purely a familiarization yes and say would it follow that you that it wasn't a as it were a training session on how to use the system it was a familiarization so I would expect them to talk about what the system was
01:46:17 to talk about what the system was designed to achieve and if there were any aspects that would be a benefit for the fire service for them to highlight that and for us to take notes of those right so it wasn't a training session
01:46:30 right so it wasn't a training session per se but I would have been really surprised if we didn't come away with a better knowledge of that system and how we might use it again going back to the evacuation arrangements for the
01:46:41 evacuation arrangements for the buildings the same sort of thing it's about us knowing what the ventilation arrangements were for the building and seeing if we would incorporate those into our tactics right okay did anybody
01:46:54 into our tactics right okay did anybody show you will teach you how to operate the system in the event of a fire during the the visit they did start to go into the specifics about how it would how it could be operated from a control panel
01:47:07 could be operated from a control panel in the lobby I don't know if it was at the beginning of the demonstration or the end I can't remember but I know that there was a touchscreen panel and it was talked
01:47:18 touchscreen panel and it was talked about that this controlled the system it was an automatic vent system that would operate automatically if the trigger mechanism was activated indicating there
01:47:29 mechanism was activated indicating there was a fire but there was a facility to manually override that and operate that and they started to talk about the specifics of that and I said I need to
01:47:42 specifics of that and I said I need to stop you there this is paraphrasing I can't remember the exact words it's a it's you know this was 2016 but I need to stop you there
01:47:51 there it probably or may not be us who would attend on if there was an incident it might not even be the local station so you need to make sure that these
01:48:04 you need to make sure that these instructions are available on-site and are clear for anybody who might need to operate this system in the way you are describing because it needs to be
01:48:15 describing because it needs to be available at any time there is an incident in this building irrespective of which crews attend to me dude who did you tell that that would have been to whoever it was that was leading the
01:48:27 whoever it was that was leading the demonstration and as I say I've assumed from the invite it was the representative from Ryden because the invert the emailing bike came from them and as I say that's in my Outlook diary
01:48:38 and as I say that's in my Outlook diary who it came from and who else was invited but I really did clearly make the point that they
01:48:49 did clearly make the point that they couldn't give us the direction and think that that would be adequate it needed to be captured in a way it would be available on site and my expectation and belief although I don't remember detail
01:49:02 belief although I don't remember detail in it but I can't believe it wouldn't have happened is that the crew that we're doing the 72d would have made notes of anything that was specific that they could at that time that was really
01:49:14 they could at that time that was really useful from an operational point of view and my recollection but I cannot be 100% sure err is that I asked that such detailed instructions to be sent to the
01:49:27 detailed instructions to be sent to the local station so that they could be uploaded onto the ORD appropriately because we don't put certain information on the board so we don't put access codes that type of thing on sword because again again there is a risk of
01:49:41 because again again there is a risk of it being compromised
01:49:54 the reason I'm sure that I asked in that way and this is just to put into context I explained what Ord was I explained what an MDT was I can remember doing this with our mobile data terminal which
01:50:06 this with our mobile data terminal which is the vehicle computer and I explained how that information would be used by crews as they arrived now come back to the order just a moment in your witness
01:50:19 the order just a moment in your witness statement your second witness statement of paragraph 11 you you say four lines
01:50:31 of paragraph 11 you you say four lines down as the demonstration progressed I began to feel it was possibly being treated as a formal commissioning process by the person leading the demonstration with me and the watch being treated as there we were
01:50:42 being treated as there we were representing an FB as part of an acceptance process I was concerned about this and I remember making the point to the person leading the demonstration that this could not be considered to be the case
01:50:52 the case now did you write those concerns down anywhere no didn't write that down did you report those concerns that you had at that time to Nick Davis I honestly
01:51:07 at that time to Nick Davis I honestly can't remember I don't think I did
01:51:16 I expressed them to the person leading the demonstration to my recollection is there was somebody from the for one of a better word from the contractors that
01:51:27 better word from the contractors that had carried out the refurbishment and there was an engineer that had been involved either in the design or the fitting of the system and they were leading that demonstration and that was
01:51:38 leading that demonstration and that was who I directed that to okay just just on that last point about refurbishment a couple of questions there very shortly did you receive a briefing from David Hughes or anybody else from Ryden who'd
01:51:51 Hughes or anybody else from Ryden who'd invited you regarding the progress of the refurbishment at that stage there was a general overview given so one of the things that had happened was there was a temporary riser inlet prior to
01:52:03 was a temporary riser inlet prior to that week I believe which obviously I had no knowledge of but I believe the access to the rise that was previously on the second floor via the walkway and they just got to the point where they
01:52:14 they just got to the point where they commissioned a new inlet on the ground floor I think that was what had happened and that was one of the main aspects the crew when familiarizing themselves with where the new inlet for the riser was do you know what risk rating Grenn filter
01:52:27 you know what risk rating Grenn filter had been allocated at the time of your visit no do you know what do you remember whether during the course of that visit there was any discussion or
01:52:38 that visit there was any discussion or broader discussion of fire safety issues arising from the presence of cladding on the exterior I don't remember clattering cladding reading reference light now going to your contemporaneous notes if I can and
01:52:49 your contemporaneous notes if I can and this is quadruple zero five seven one five if I could take you to the bottom of page two and the top of page three
01:53:05 that you that you described there
01:53:28 this is I'm so sorry probably my mistake this is 571 five say this is the notebook I think first of two notebooks
01:53:42 and if you go to the top of page three
01:54:03 yeah you can concede that the foot of the page on the left of the screen the person who did this can you see explained to us the system could be used by firefighters to control smoke in the
01:54:16 by firefighters to control smoke in the lift lobbies and stairs by using the panel so it's the very bottom of the page on the left and then up to the top on the page on the right do you see mr. Walton where I'm reading out from okay you just have that highlighted say that
01:54:28 you just have that highlighted say that with nobody else can see that now there was some questions about that first of all thinking back to the time of that visit was it your understanding having witnessed the demonstration that the
01:54:41 witnessed the demonstration that the smoke extraction system would automatically operate on the affected lobby and that the vents all the other levels of the building would close on the night of the fire I didn't recall
01:54:54 the night of the fire I didn't recall that distantly I'm sorry let me just be clear yeah this is at the time of the visit so on reflection now having been us last week to go back to and revisit
01:55:05 us last week to go back to and revisit that and having the prompts of photos that were sent to me etcetera yet that has come back into my memory yes so do
01:55:16 has come back into my memory yes so do you understand at the time of the visit that the system would operate to it extract smoke on only one floor at a time I my recollection is that it would
01:55:27 time I my recollection is that it would open the vent on the floor where I pressure headed activation and that was an unusual aspect of the system that it was a pressure operated system not a smoke operated system whether that's an
01:55:40 smoke operated system whether that's an accurate memory or not I can't tell and so the vent would open on the lobby of the of the affected head and all other live all of the vents would close now
01:55:54 live all of the vents would close now into a paragraph 25 of your supplemental statement
01:56:02 wanting to show you that you
01:56:12 say and this is on page 7
01:56:24 just to be clear about this you say I no longer believe and this is seven lines up from the bottom I no longer believe this is next next page yeah that's it
01:56:41 this is next next page yeah that's it say and it's six lines up to the bottom I no longer believe that the vents on more than one floor were opened but I can't be sure about this I have no recollection of moving from one floor to
01:56:52 recollection of moving from one floor to another to see the effect of a fire on multiple floors being simulated however it must have been my impression that it could achieve this at the time of making my notes in my original statement but I cannot remember the details of the visit
01:57:03 cannot remember the details of the visit well enough for me to say that this was stated or demonstrated in April 2016 now just just on that good said just to be absolutely clear standing there now your is your recollections and I think you've
01:57:14 is your recollections and I think you've told us that in fact at the time of this demonstration in April 2016 it wasn't your impression was that it wasn't capable of operating on more than one floor I can't recall that's that's
01:57:26 one floor I can't recall that's that's what he's on the morning of the fire when I wrote my contemporaneous notes right that was my belief he would open on more than one floor and that the fan speed would increase and it would take
01:57:38 speed would increase and it would take smoke out of more than one level right but I've got nothing so looking back and reflecting I can't remember specifically having that demonstrated or having that explained to me on that inspection on
01:57:50 explained to me on that inspection on that visit so that's why I'm saying I can't say whether or not the system was able to achieve that gain going back to what you told us earlier about the set
01:58:03 what you told us earlier about the set of instructions does does that mean that you saw no instructions or given no instructions at the time of that inspection day when 2016 you say I think
01:58:18 inspection day when 2016 you say I think and he said this morning and you said in your supplemental statement is paragraph 12 for that you asked for a copy of instructions to be sent to the local station so that they could go on to the
01:58:33 station so that they could go on to the Ord
01:58:34 Ord again it's not a 100% I would swear to it but I know that I asked for those instructions and I know that I referred
01:58:47 instructions and I know that I referred to the ORD and explained what the oid was and what the purpose of those are structure to be useful so that's why I believe I asked for those instructions to be sent so they could be put onto the Ord well let's see if we can just be a
01:58:59 Ord well let's see if we can just be a little firmer than that mr. Walton if you can go please to your supplemental statement page 3 paragraph 12 point 12 remand for you are quite clear they're
01:59:10 remand for you are quite clear they're four lines up that you say I recall saying that a copy of the instructions should be should also be sent to the local station g27 so there could be added to the operational risk database
01:59:21 added to the operational risk database or the entry for the tower so it would be available via the mobile data terminal MDT on it while attending appliances if needed I remember explaining what an MDT was and outlining the Rd system as part of
01:59:33 and outlining the Rd system as part of this discussion then you go on I believe the reason I asked for these instructions was because none were present at the time of inspection I cannot be sure if this took place at the beginning of the demonstration or following it I remember it being in the
01:59:45 following it I remember it being in the vicinity of the control panel though now justjust can you confirm that evidence yeah it's my recollection right but I can't be 100% okay now did you ever
02:00:00 can't be 100% okay now did you ever check after this that the instructions were sent to North Kensington say that they could be entered on the Ord no what's that I no longer got
02:00:11 what's that I no longer got responsibility for North Kensington I was in a different role and I was dealing with the the workload of that and it never entered my mind to follow that now you say you were in a different
02:00:22 that now you say you were in a different role you at you were station manager at North Kensington for eight weeks and that that 28th of April the day of this in demonstration was the first day during that eight week period - one day
02:00:34 during that eight week period - one day that followed did you not think to close up the instructions get them from writing and make sure they were put on the Ord no I would expect that to be captured in the next familiarization you see but you I thought your evidence was
02:00:49 see but you I thought your evidence was as you've just confirmed that you told asked rot Ryden to send a call or ask for a copy of the instructions to be sent are you saying now that you you wouldn't expect them to be sent but
02:01:01 wouldn't expect them to be sent but you'd wait for the next 72 d visit now I would expect them to be sent and if they hadn't been received I would expect them to follow that up on the next seven CD okay as I say that there was a very short duration periodically inspection
02:01:12 short duration periodically inspection the building going on it's like I don't know for certain but I would believe it'd be back once a month or once every two months that stage that building was revisited by a different watch to ensure
02:01:25 revisited by a different watch to ensure that all watches maintain their familiarity with that building so if if we'd request it for something we haven't received it I would expect it to be picked up on the next visit that we need it not know did you want I didn't chase
02:01:37 it not know did you want I didn't chase that offer I didn't find it if that happened did you report back to Nick Davis or anybody else at North Kent that they should chase up those instructions and make sure that they were on the Ord
02:01:48 and make sure that they were on the Ord in case they weren't received as promised
02:01:50 promised I never instructed anybody to follow that up my vague recollection and I I don't think this is a reliable
02:02:01 don't think this is a reliable recollection well my vague recollection is that I did speak about the visit with Nick Davis at some point over that eight-week period and I did talk about the fact that there
02:02:13 and I did talk about the fact that there was a smoke extraction system in there and that we'd asked for instructions but I can't put my hand on my heart and say that that definitely was something I asked and explained it's my
02:02:24 something I asked and explained it's my belief that I've got faith in myself as an officer and I believe I would have done that right but I can't point to any evidence I can't point to any really
02:02:37 evidence I can't point to any really strong recollection of doing that no
02:02:49 was it not though an important matter to make sure particularly since you were only there for eight weeks or so that your request for instructions of this system was known by North Kensington
02:03:04 system was known by North Kensington other personnel at North Kensington so that if they didn't come right and you didn't know about it they would know about it and chasey John the watch were there they were there at that time so
02:03:16 there they were there at that time so personally North Kensington didn't know and I would expect that to be part of the the order date there's a comment section on the updates where you can
02:03:28 section on the updates where you can record things like that and I would expect that to be captured but I wouldn't have access to that without the admin rights it's actually because that normally the comments are part of what the station officer station manager who
02:03:41 the station officer station manager who is doing the quality assurance of the update checks and they then check the areas that are referenced and make sure that they've been updated to the standard that's required and if they're
02:03:53 standard that's required and if they're not happy with any of that you send it back to the watch to go and revisit I understand but but given the specific invitation that you'd receive to go and look at this system given the request
02:04:04 look at this system given the request for these instructions that you've made was it not your responsibility to make sure that if you didn't chase them up and Nick Davis or somebody else senior at North Kensington knew that that the
02:04:16 at North Kensington knew that that the request had been made instructions have been pursued so that they could be chased up if you didn't my belief was that the station knew that we'd requested the instructions and my belief
02:04:29 requested the instructions and my belief was that they would get chased if they weren't delivered it was a belief at the end of your eight-week period did you Deker to you to find out whether or not those instructions had been
02:04:41 or not those instructions had been received before you left your roller station manager at north kensington no there's very reason for that I I genuinely believe it was such a a
02:04:55 hectic so a learning curve of being engaged with the the admin on a station compared to what I'd been doing that my
02:05:06 compared to what I'd been doing that my focus had gone from that visit on the first day a Graham field where I thought I'd dealt with the issues and have moved on to the other aspects of the job that I was keeping on top of break we've been
02:05:21 I was keeping on top of break we've been running nearly another if I'd like to be able to say well don't move on to another topic but I fear not well this bullet I mean let's finish the topic let's stop mouthing sure let's take a break if we can later all right
02:05:33 take a break if we can later all right yes thank you
02:05:37 if I say until 12:15 not give you long enough just to have a bit of stretch all exits on all right well would you like to get the action out then please and don't talk to about
02:05:49 out then please and don't talk to about your evidence 2:15
02:05:57 right 12:15
02:16:32 could you ask mr. Walton you to come back please
02:16:39 [Music]
02:16:53 right ready to carry all this towards you sir thank you this wasn't thank you for coming back to us can I ask you please to be shown lfp quadruple zero three five nine six
02:17:09 now this is the station diary for North Kensington and if you look at the first page canada's ascii are you familiar
02:17:20 page canada's ascii are you familiar with that as a as a form of document as a form of entry as a system we use yes yeah
02:17:25 yeah now it's an extract given to us by lfb and it's as you could see from the second paragraph on that page a set of screenshots from the last outside duty visit recorded in the station diary by
02:17:36 visit recorded in the station diary by north kensington prior to the 14th of June 2017 and it's got on it a an entry on the fourth page internally at the
02:17:50 on the fourth page internally at the bottom for February 2017 mm-hmm my question is do you think that there would have been a similar entry for the
02:18:02 would have been a similar entry for the visit on the 28th of April 2016 I would have expected this to be an entry to door okay do you know who would have completed that entry it would be one of
02:18:13 completed that entry it would be one of the week more than likely to be one of the watch officers the watch manager or the crew manager but depending on the way the watch is run sometimes
02:18:24 way the watch is run sometimes firefighters are given permission or for their own development are asked to do those sorts of interest not you then now it that the the station manager may well
02:18:43 right let's walk backwards the operational risk database is linked to the outside work schedule of the station diary like this because now when you
02:18:54 diary like this because now when you when you first assess a premises you give it a risk rating the score on that risk rating determines the level of information that needs to be gathered for that premises and the frequency that
02:19:05 for that premises and the frequency that the premises are going to be revisited in the future that then automatically populates the diary for the revisits in the future so if it was an annual revisit the system would automatically
02:19:19 revisit the system would automatically try to vary the watch that attended each year and would put an entry into their diary in 12 months in advance to sort of manage that revisit process so on the
02:19:31 manage that revisit process so on the shorter visits if that's what had been specified by the the station manager can set the schedule can adjust the schedule so for example where Grenfell was
02:19:42 so for example where Grenfell was undertaking a refurbishment it could well be I don't know that Nick Davis said that he wanted to revisit in every month every two months etc he would adjust the schedule accordingly and the
02:19:54 adjust the schedule accordingly and the system would automatically vary the watch that attended each time can I ask you them to go to the station diary ORD user guide actually no that's not look
02:20:09 user guide actually no that's not look at that can I take you to something different a general question are you aware of the terms in general terms of lfb policy 800 the operational state of
02:20:22 lfb policy 800 the operational state of Asia yep and are you aware that it requires an operational risk visit whereby the Ord is completed yet again
02:20:37 whereby the Ord is completed yet again the processes that you identify risks within your area and there's a number of methods that you can use to do that you do a desktop audit where you do the general risk assessment initially that
02:20:48 general risk assessment initially that gives it it's risk rating that risk rating dictates whether it needs a visit or whether it needs an entry and if it does need an entry it stipulates the schedule for the
02:20:59 stipulates the schedule for the revisions and are you aware like I can show you see if you like but to try to speed things up are you aware that particular attention should be given to fixed installations to ensure that the
02:21:10 fixed installations to ensure that the information on the Ord is correct that's part of that risk assessment process is yes
02:21:15 yes now can I then show you a document and then I'm going to ask you some questions about it
02:21:21 about it it's lfb three one one six which is also in our master documents bundle at 10:13
02:21:32 and this is what we understand to be the ORD as at June 2017 for Grenville Tower
02:21:46 ORD as at June 2017 for Grenville Tower just just looking at the first page you can see that it's latest date on it is the 28th of April 2017 and then earlier
02:21:59 the 28th of April 2017 and then earlier visit comments rundown back through 2016 to 2015 and then 2012 on the second page they need to go to the second page are
02:22:10 they need to go to the second page are you familiar or do you recall seeing this when you were at North Kensington always was this barred to you because you didn't have the IT rights this is a
02:22:21 you didn't have the IT rights this is a printout of the board system that would be uploaded on through the embassy when you access the information on the MDT this is where that information comes
02:22:35 this is where that information comes from I so the comments section is where I referred earlier to I would have expected a comment to have been put in there yeah and that's where that comment would have been made it would be dated and the person who made the comment
02:22:47 and the person who made the comment would be in that final column so if a station manager does the quality assurance and isn't happy with what's there
02:22:53 there they put a new comment in and explain what it is that they need to be done and when by right and that would be on there now looking at the first pet looking at the first entry 28th of April 2017 says
02:23:04 the first entry 28th of April 2017 says there are no comments applied for this visit user Davis and I'm I'm assuming that's Nick Davis I would make the same
02:23:16 that's Nick Davis I would make the same assumption with you - no I don't know I'm assuming you make sense right does that mean that you didn't input anything into the ORD which would then be reflected on the mobile data terminal
02:23:28 reflected on the mobile data terminal when you came back from your 28th of April I'm sorry I'm showing you the
02:23:39 April I'm sorry I'm showing you the wrong reference and it's my fault if you go down the page I'm sorry forgive me for that if you go down to the 30th of April 2016 2016 let's start with that
02:23:51 April 2016 2016 let's start with that building work is continuing however the entrance and reception area are fully open dry riser fully operational and located to the left of the entrance negative pressure ventilation system installed to lobby area of each floor
02:24:03 installed to lobby area of each floor removing smoke from fire floor only panel for this located in reception area do you remember whether that was you who entered it that into the into the Ord
02:24:15 entered it that into the into the Ord system said that it would appear there on the MDT if you printed it off it wasn't me it would be foster a whoever
02:24:26 wasn't me it would be foster a whoever that reference relates to and it would have been entered on the 30th following the visit that they gathered that information from where you where I referred earlier to I would expect that
02:24:38 referred earlier to I would expect that detail to be in the comments that's where I would have thought that would have been captured the request for operating instructions to be posted to the station right had been made that's
02:24:49 the station right had been made that's where I would have expected it to be captured the reason I wouldn't know that was there was I didn't have the admin rights that would put that quality
02:25:01 rights that would put that quality assurance into my work you it's basically the the what she's have a work queue and that's okay so um then just going up the but the page 10th of May
02:25:14 going up the but the page 10th of May 2016 plans are required for MDT and Davis ni enters that you were station manager at the time during this period because 10th of may is within the 8 week
02:25:25 because 10th of may is within the 8 week period you were there do you remember the circumstances in which that entry was put onto this onto the Ord plans are required I can speculate no don't I don't know right then I can explain not
02:25:39 don't know right then I can explain not if you don't know yeah oh but I can explain well let's wait and see yeah yeah well my question was do you
02:25:50 yeah well my question was do you remember we also had a different way do you remember a visit or any other information to Grenville tower which led to somebody looks like Nick Davis
02:26:03 to somebody looks like Nick Davis possibly putting into this system plans are required for MDT the previous comment would have been placed on the update by the officer that was recording the update that would then get sent to
02:26:15 the update that would then get sent to the work queue of the officer with the admin rights to quality a shear the entry because I wasn't given the admin rights that would have gone to Nick Davis's work you he would have viewed
02:26:26 Davis's work you he would have viewed the entry and he obviously on that comment as identified that there aren't adequate plans attached to that entry and he sent it back as a rejection to
02:26:37 and he sent it back as a rejection to the watch that carried out the affection or to another watch that scheduled to do the next inspection stating that plans are required for the MDT and then you see the entry above
02:26:48 MDT and then you see the entry above that by foster a 50th of May so still within your eight week period image of building added to plans do you remember that do you remember how it came about
02:27:00 that do you remember how it came about that the image of the building was added to plans again the process would be that because Nick Davis was the officer with
02:27:11 because Nick Davis was the officer with the rights he'd sent it back to the watch that carried out the original inspection the officer has taken that comment and they've responded to it by obtaining an image of the plans and
02:27:23 obtaining an image of the plans and adding them to the MDT they're adding them to the old system right now this is me interpreting the the flow I've got no
02:27:35 me interpreting the the flow I've got no personal noise about other ways I mean just interpreting the the process now go to your we'll come back to this document shortly but if you could go back to your statement your first statement please page 12
02:27:47 page 12 you say in the final paragraph on that page
02:27:55 [Applause]
02:28:00 and this is back to the smoke control panel you say we have the control panel on the ground floor shown to us and I
02:28:12 on the ground floor shown to us and I think I asked if I needed to make notes but there's told no if ever there was a fire it's an automatic system but if you did want to use the system to help you fight the fire the caretaker lives local and will always be at the fire anyway so
02:28:23 and will always be at the fire anyway so he would be able to do for you will tell you what you needed to do when you go on I wasn't based at that station so I didn't go into the ins and outs of what you would press and what you wouldn't because I felt it was information I
02:28:34 because I felt it was information I wouldn't retain rightly or wrongly it was the sort of thing I didn't need to know
02:28:38 know and you're in your supplemental statement in paragraph 13 you say and I paraphrase in your experience is normal
02:28:49 paraphrase in your experience is normal to have contact details for persons who can be called and asked to give advice about the building in the event of an emergency or all of that you say question first question in your
02:29:00 question first question in your experience is it common that the operation of a smoke clearance or smoke extraction system which would be dependent on a finding an off-site
02:29:13 dependent on a finding an off-site caretaker or responsible person no that's why we wanted the instructions but it is normal to have people identified who can assist at an incident
02:29:25 identified who can assist at an incident with additional information right did you or anybody else to your knowledge think to put the caretaker the requirement for a
02:29:36 caretaker the requirement for a caretaker to operate the smoke system onto the Ord again going back to the previous answer it wouldn't be a requirement but I genuinely would expect
02:29:47 requirement but I genuinely would expect the fact that the caretaker lived locally and would be available to be captured and that their contact details would be captured there's a section in the Ord for recording those sorts of
02:29:59 the Ord for recording those sorts of details were you given the caretakers details I can't remember right you say there's a section in the author recording those you are right and I can show you that if you go back please
02:30:10 you go back please to the Ord tab 13 of our documents bundle lfb quadruple 0 3 1 1 6 if you go to eternal page 5
02:30:31 you can see emergency contact so you could just have that highlighted towards the bottom of the page and there's a receptionist who's titled was that whose surname and
02:30:44 who's titled was that whose surname and full name varies curiously type office and then a telephone number and then a mr. O'Connor and a Miss Stephanie do those names ring a bell with you know do
02:30:55 those names ring a bell with you know do you know how they got onto the Ord know do we see it do we see they're the caretaker details or even generically the idea that there's a caretaker you
02:31:06 the idea that there's a caretaker you can get hold of who can come urgently well looking at the screen now and should that information be recorded on the OIG normally yeah I would expect if
02:31:18 the OIG normally yeah I would expect if it was available that we would have recorded it as part of our information gathering and do you know why it wasn't no whose job would it be to ensure that the caretaker information any other
02:31:29 the caretaker information any other information about the smoke vent system would be on the Ord the person carrying out the 72d the update music right and you say that wasn't you I'm not trying to slope shoulders I wasn't involved in
02:31:41 to slope shoulders I wasn't involved in the revisit I was there for the smoke extraction demonstration right do you know to the best of our knowledge and this may be wrong mr. O'Connor and miss Stephanie are were riding employees who
02:31:54 Stephanie are were riding employees who would be gone once the refurbishment had finished did you know that I didn't know that information at all if you had known that what would you have done with the entries on the Ord would you have taken
02:32:07 entries on the Ord would you have taken sets to find out who the permanent contact was I would expect that comp my instruction to crews on my own station when they carry out 72d visits is to gather every piece of information that
02:32:19 gather every piece of information that would be useful to them when responding to an operational incident that is useful information I would expect it to get gathered
02:32:30 looking at the detail about the ventilation system if you can turn to the page before
02:32:44 [Applause] at the bottom of the page which says fixed installations and you can see dry rising main other systems of building facilities smoke extraction systems
02:32:55 facilities smoke extraction systems negative pressure smoke ventilation system in Lobby afar floor panel okay to the main interest of building in your experience would that be enough information to allow a watch manager
02:33:06 information to allow a watch manager who's first on the scene as incident commander to be able to operate successfully the smoke vent system in the building that wouldn't give you enough information it would trigger you
02:33:17 enough information it would trigger you to know there was a system an investigate how to use it so if there was instructions at the panel you'd use those elsewhere in the
02:33:28 panel you'd use those elsewhere in the Ord there's areas for adding additional hazard information or enroute considerations those type of areas they could have been supplemented with more detailed instructions the whole point of
02:33:41 detailed instructions the whole point of this section is that it's rapid information that you can gather in the seconds it takes to go from the fire station to the place where the incident
02:33:52 station to the place where the incident is it's key information its triggers ok I'm just finishing off this point under on route on route consideration since you mention it if you look at the next page we can see for the next page in the
02:34:08 page we can see for the next page in the mid just above the middle you can see that the third entry down for a fourth entry down negative pressure ventilation system may have activated in Lobby area of fire floor only removing smoke from this area that rather suggests what help
02:34:23 this area that rather suggests what help me does that suggest to a watch manager on route that the ventilation system would already be operating in the lobby area of the fire floor removing smoke
02:34:35 area of the fire floor removing smoke from that area at the point when the watch manager arrived yes it would and the significance of it is that they would consider the effect that the operation of that system would be having
02:34:46 operation of that system would be having on the fire and any effect it may have on
02:34:49 on firefighting tactics because it's designed to take smoke out of the lobby but it could actually be affecting the way the fire is developing so they need to use that that trigger to investigate
02:35:01 to use that that trigger to investigate that from your visit is that description accurate I believe so yes but I think that's a good enough summary for what we saw that night that day but
02:35:14 for what we saw that night that day but before we leave this document we can see that it was clearly never updated with instructions can I just ask you to look
02:35:25 instructions can I just ask you to look at page 2 under the rubric tactical plan operational contingency plan and then we see Grenfell tower plan name version one
02:35:36 see Grenfell tower plan name version one date effective from 30th of October 2009 date documented 30th October 2009 my
02:35:50 date documented 30th October 2009 my mistake
02:35:50 mistake page 3 I apologize
02:35:57 it's paid to be I've got it on page it spit I think it's one page on
02:36:14 I'd say sorry let me repeat they murdered people I'm showing you plan name Granville tower version 133 October 2009 now if that's what the mobile data
02:36:27 2009 now if that's what the mobile data terminal printed out to first responding crews on the 14th of June a Grenville tower
02:36:35 tower mr. Walton what would you say that that was sufficient to inform a watch manager as to what the plan was I can't see what you're talking about on the screen well
02:36:46 you're talking about on the screen well justjust that panel yeah that says what the document is yes that's not what would be printed out the the if they press print for the Audion firm ation they would get all of the automation they would get reading the reams of
02:36:58 they would get reading the reams of information we have they would go to the they could either look at it on the MDT screen or they can print it off so if they look at it on the MDT screen as they're on route they'll go to the on route considerations on arrival tactics
02:37:11 route considerations on arrival tactics probably because that's the only thing that I'll have time to look at a bit later in the incident it's more likely Vera command units in attendance this full document will be printed out so all
02:37:22 full document will be printed out so all the plans all of the instructions everything else that's on there would be available for the initial incident commander has seconds to gather their information and start to intervene yeah
02:37:35 information and start to intervene yeah would it be normal for the plans for a high-rise residential block to be available at the touch of a button from the from a mobile data terminal everyone
02:37:46 the from a mobile data terminal everyone I approve yes and do you know the best of your knowledge whether the plans were available in respect of Grenville tower I don't know
02:38:02 that comment earlier with Nick Davis when he rejected it and asked for plans to be added that is this standard way you respond if the plans aren't there you do not get back and you send them
02:38:13 you do not get back and you send them back to go again and you don't know what happened after that is that right well it says plans added it says image of plans added so I assume that they were added well it says image of building added to plans do you know them
02:38:25 plans do you know them do you know not the card don't know that I was just going on what you showed me okay was gonna have to explore that with somebody else
02:38:32 turning to the question of access on your visit in April 2006 T were you shown how to access the building in an emergency I can't remember that I remember there was a security system
02:38:46 I've got a vague recollection of them talking about giving us one of this the swaps one of the the ancients fobs fobs but and I remember telling them that
02:38:58 but and I remember telling them that that wouldn't be adequate because it wouldn't necessarily with these crews that attend it couldn't necessarily be this station that attended so arrangements would be needed to allow access on-site can I ask you to look at
02:39:10 access on-site can I ask you to look at the first page of the ORD document we've got three one month six which we head up on the screen a moment ago I I just
02:39:22 on the screen a moment ago I I just asked you to look at the second entry down this is dated the 15th of February 2017 and I think by that stage you were no longer station manager at North Kensington yes and if the user was Dean
02:39:35 Kensington yes and if the user was Dean Ricketts and it says all building works now complete entry via front front door if drop key is used this will release the internal door between entrance lobby and lift lobby there is no 24-hour
02:39:46 and lift lobby there is no 24-hour concierge but housing offices opened during weekday business hours along to the left of building opposite playground first of all did you and have you ever
02:39:57 first of all did you and have you ever seen this entry before no right can you
02:40:04 remember weather when you went to Grenville tower the drop key was demonstrated to you on the day of the smoke extraction the illustration no I can't remember and where it says there's
02:40:24 can't remember and where it says there's no 24-hour concierge but the housing office is open during weekday business hours along to the left of building opposite playground does that chorus is that sufficient do you think would that
02:40:39 that sufficient do you think would that be sufficient to enable a watch manager attending as incident commander to be able to get somebody out to operate the smoke vent that's a comment that the obviously that are done the 73rd added
02:40:51 obviously that are done the 73rd added to the update so that the quality assurance station manager would have an idea what to check in the update right so I assume that that information is within the detail of the order and you
02:41:05 within the detail of the order and you so there's a station manager you do scan the whole entry when there's an update when you focus on the areas you've had an indication that there's been a change so if they've added plans you go and
02:41:16 so if they've added plans you go and check the adequacy of the plans in this case I would probably be looking at in
02:41:24 probably on the on route considerations there maybe something like that but I check the various sections where that may have been captured and see how it's being captured but this means that if a
02:41:35 being captured but this means that if a fire happened in the middle of the night they watch manager arriving wouldn't be able to contact a concierge '''l - caretaker with ease to get them to come to the building very quickly that's the
02:41:47 to the building very quickly that's the way I'd interpret that comment from seeing it for the first time and I would probably if it was on my station expected to be some linking on on route considerations to that effect right I
02:41:58 considerations to that effect right I see okay in addition to the smoke vent system did you inspect anything else at Greenville tower during your visit in April 2016 I watched the smoke them astray
02:42:11 I watched the smoke them astray we went to various parts of the building while it was happening one of the things I asked for was a demonstration asked them to run the fans on a lobby and I was going to try and open a flat door I
02:42:22 was going to try and open a flat door I currently if it was on the lobby we were on what if we went to another lobby but we went to an unoccupied flat the system was run I asked it to be run at a high speed
02:42:32 speed and then I went in the flat and I opened the door and I watched the operation of the the front door so I checked you could open it don't I have you anything I'm being rude but you've told us that
02:42:43 I'm being rude but you've told us that in your statement my question inspected the fire door and the flat wall I did that that's where I was going right did you ask to see the plans of the building at that visit no did you
02:42:56 the building at that visit no did you check to see whether Grenville tower had a P IP I wasn't doing a 72 day visit I was there on the smoke extraction demonstration so I wouldn't be asking the 72 day questions right I assume then
02:43:09 the 72 day questions right I assume then capture my next question which was in an information box did you check to see whether there was an information it wasn't while I was there did you see an information box I can't remember course anyone No
02:43:20 anyone No do you remember seeing an intercom system whereby somebody visiting that the tower could buzz a resident to be
02:43:31 the tower could buzz a resident to be let in literally are you saying that I think that's the way I accessed the building too because I got there after the 7th idiot started right and there
02:43:42 the 7th idiot started right and there were some of the other participants already there so my and it literally is this second my recollection is that I had to press an intercom for somebody to come and open the door to let me in a resident was that no not a resident one
02:43:54 resident was that no not a resident one of the I don't know I don't know how he how it works and that's this second recollection okay so it may not be accurate what you saying that has made me think I press the buzzer and I was let into the
02:44:05 let into the by the person conducting the demonstration right did you and I know this is at the second recollection but did you know which buzzer to press I can't remember that now I want to turn
02:44:18 can't remember that now I want to turn to mobilization and the information that you had yourself on route when enroute on the night did you expect to have
02:44:29 on the night did you expect to have access to plans of Grenfell tower via the mobile data terminal at some point in the incident I would expect an incident commander to get those because of the nature of being a level 1 or a
02:44:41 of the nature of being a level 1 or a level 2 incident commander level 1 along the fire engines level 2 of the first officer who comes in after we don't normally get the luxury of being able to go through the detail of the order
02:44:52 go through the detail of the order I would expect the initial crew on route to gather that information probably just visually from looking at the screen and have the key aspects of that information if we're lucky as I think was the case
02:45:05 if we're lucky as I think was the case on the night I think Mike died and had asked for the order to be printed but I never saw a copy of it in the the time I was in that role let me ask my question in a slightly different way while
02:45:16 in a slightly different way while enroute did you look for the plans of the building on your on a system that you had available to you I don't have a system the right do you not have the MDT available to you we have a car we have a
02:45:29 available to you we have a car we have a mobile phone and whatever pager now on route you described in various places I think in your materials many fire survival guidance calls happening what did the
02:45:41 guidance calls happening what did the increasing number of fast survivable guidance calls that you could hear over the radio suggest to you about how the fire was progressing I was getting really concerned enroute the nearer I
02:45:53 really concerned enroute the nearer I got to the building and the more FSGS that came through the more concerned I was about the potential what my experience of FSGS
02:46:04 experience of FSGS prior to that night and I've never been in charge of an incident that I creamed where there's been FSG but I've been at incidents in a different command role when they've occurred my experience of
02:46:15 when they've occurred my experience of FS G's is the caller genuinely believes they're trapped and when the VA crews get to them they assess the scene and they find that they're not trapped it's just a bit of smoke logging that to them
02:46:27 just a bit of smoke logging that to them is significant but to us is to be expected they get reassured they stay in their flat we put the fire out we ventilate the lobby and nobody else knows that there's been an issue in that
02:46:39 knows that there's been an issue in that flood in that building so that was my experience prior to them so that is still in my thinking whilst I was enroute I genuinely believe these quarters think they're trapped but what I need to know is are they trapped or do
02:46:52 I need to know is are they trapped or do they think they're trapped because that will affect my tactics so that was what was thinking but the more calls you get the more likely is that they are trapped yes because everybody's under that that
02:47:04 yes because everybody's under that that feeling hearing those calls increase in volume and intensity as he's described
02:47:16 did that suggest to you that compartment ation across multiple floors had been breached it was a consideration it was a possibility if smoke had gotten to the
02:47:27 possibility if smoke had gotten to the levels other than the fire level it's an indication that the smoke is traveling and the compartment ation is designed to contain smoke and fire so it's a consideration it was something I needed
02:47:38 consideration it was something I needed to confirm or clarify did you have it you say it as a consideration did you think it I thought it was a realistic possibility right can I then ask you to look at page 19 of your first statement
02:47:50 look at page 19 of your first statement please 3/4 of the way down the page you say I was driving along
02:48:02 looking and people would just stick you lating it's over there I turned the corner and caught the first glimpse of the tower it seemed like it was on fire 3/4 of its height on one face or at least half of this height on
02:48:13 face or at least half of this height on one face there were visible flames I have never seen anything like that before ever can you just tell us which which face you're talking about there it
02:48:26 which face you're talking about there it would have been the east face it was the initial face that was involved in fire now I'm just going to show you another part of your statement mr. Walton take paragraph page 22 right at the top you
02:48:39 say I could see two lines of fire I called them ribbons of fire there was definitely two vertical separate vertical lines that were going from about the fourth floor up the building
02:48:50 about the fourth floor up the building separately and we're about 3/4 of the way up at that point first question is those two observations 3/4 of the way up and two vertical lines was that that was
02:49:04 and two vertical lines was that that was that those two observations or descriptions at the same time it was what you saw at the same moment is it my my recollection is two lines of fire up the building one on the right was from where I could see because my I couldn't
02:49:17 where I could see because my I couldn't see the bottom of the tower to the roof my recollection is the one on the left was from where my vision was to about 3/4 of the way up thank you guys care
02:49:29 3/4 of the way up thank you guys care could you see whether the fire actually penetrated the flats at the node you couldn't you say on page 21 of your statement you could just look at that
02:49:43 3/4 of the way down the page you say I looked as I looked at the building and saw that at least half of it on one side had visible flames so 3/4 of the way
02:49:56 had visible flames so 3/4 of the way Paige yes no yes I saw that at least half of it on one side had visible
02:50:08 half of it on one side had visible flames and thought I know what's happening here it's got balconies they've gotten a load of crap on the balconies there's been a fire in the flat it's gone on the balcony and it's gone up the balconies these are balconies on fire that's not a
02:50:19 these are balconies on fire that's not a problem and I was literally thinking he's over resourced this he's overreacted [Music]
02:50:30 why did you think or assume that the fire was jumping from ice installed on balconies two reasons I had a genuine belief from my
02:50:42 I had a genuine belief from my background that a fire wouldn't spread up the fabric of a building in that way and I had had a case study at one of the
02:50:53 and I had had a case study at one of the informal training sessions that we do as officers from an officer who'd attended a fire earlier I can't tell you the location where that was in effect what would what had happened fire had gone up
02:51:05 would what had happened fire had gone up the outside of a building on the balconies it looked really spectacular it got resourced as though it was a very major fire and yet it was dealt with
02:51:16 major fire and yet it was dealt with fairly easily because the fire was left the policeman for in a way that kept it on the balconies it never entered the building it never breached any compartment station even when you
02:51:30 compartment station even when you thought that it was balconies did any thought cross your mind regarding the safety of the residence in fats in flats facing the fire on the east face 100%
02:51:44 facing the fire on the east face 100% yes and did you think about the need for any kind of evacuation of those residents not evacuation my thought was that we needed to get fire crews to confirm that we were keeping the fire
02:51:56 confirm that we were keeping the fire out of the building was that as my thought process yeah we'll come back to that in probably after the break before we do can I then turn on to the next
02:52:07 we do can I then turn on to the next subject which is your arrival at the scene and the first thing I think is the command unit we don't I think have a status three time for you in our records
02:52:19 status three time for you in our records are you able standing there now to tell us even roughly what sort of time you arrived you I can refer to the time stamps that have been used by lfb in the
02:52:31 stamps that have been used by lfb in the operational response I've looked that document yeah they've estimated my arrival timers over 140 no I assumed that was because of her status 3 being sent I did send the status 3 I arrived
02:52:46 sent I did send the status 3 I arrived at the incident I could hear the FSG traffic I didn't want to block the radio traffic by looking in attendance with my radio
02:52:53 radio so I attempted three or four times to book in attendance by mobile phone and understandably it just rang out because it wasn't a priority to the control room
02:53:04 it wasn't a priority to the control room so eventually I was forced to go for going over the airwave radio and it took two attempts of calling up control before I was answered what I was
02:53:15 before I was answered what I was answered and I did book status 3 I don't know why it's not recorded in the log
02:53:23 and did you hear do you think did do you think you heard pumps 25 over the radio at any stage I hadn't got a recollection of that at the
02:53:36 hadn't got a recollection of that at the time when I approached mic down and did the handover one of the part of the handover was I said you've got 15 pumps right are you in Nice 25 no as you
02:53:48 right are you in Nice 25 no as you arrive at an incident you move out of your vehicle you're in normal day dress you open the boot of the car your fire kits in the boots and you get rigged in
02:53:59 kits in the boots and you get rigged in fire kit what I was doing that I was trying to phone control and then I went to using the radio to booking the state as 3 we control while that's happening I'm looking at the the visual situation
02:54:12 I'm looking at the the visual situation I'm listening to what's going on I'm smelling the fire and
02:54:21 your focus moves so my focus wasn't on the radio my focus was on the building so I've got no recollection of the make poms 20 or the main points 25 my guess
02:54:34 poms 20 or the main points 25 my guess is it was around that time right which again hopefully would give some sort of indication of when I attended ok let me try and get it a different way I think you've told us in your statement that you left at 1:15 yeah when the mic
02:54:47 you left at 1:15 yeah when the mic pumped six came over when it comes I was ready for that because I was monitoring and I was dressed and I knew which way I was going to go and everything else that we would normally do and so I started to
02:54:58 we would normally do and so I started to self mobilize tried to find control to someone I was data to then there's a informative message which came over so I stopped got my notepad a recorded the
02:55:10 stopped got my notepad a recorded the detail of the informative message to make sure I had a good understanding of what I was going to and then continued so I would say oh one thought 15 is when I was leaving the top floor of Fulham
02:55:22 I was leaving the top floor of Fulham fire stairs and the question is how long do you think remember it took you to get from Fulham Fire Station to the incident ground I didn't look at any clocks but
02:55:35 ground I didn't look at any clocks but if you as you've got if you refer to my statement
02:55:38 statement I had a route that I knew I was going to take when I was almost at the tower that route was completely blocked by roadworks there was a gas main or something like that being put in and the
02:55:50 something like that being put in and the whole width of the road was blocked and there were bollards on the pavements and I had no way of going around that so I had to do a u-turn I thought I would turn a left left again parallel run the
02:56:01 turn a left left again parallel run the original Road get back on to my original route and then get to where I was going when I turn that left it went into the really complex Street pattern of the estate that I'm not familiar with so in
02:56:15 estate that I'm not familiar with so in in answer I believe I believe it took me 20 minutes to get from fullen to the location
02:56:22 location thank you and you attended the command unit do you remember which number it was I didn't remember it at the time but I now know it was pulling there did you see you I'd see you a and how many
02:56:34 see you I'd see you a and how many command unit officers were on there do you remember I only remember seeing one Brian unit office you recall what he or she was doing they were at the whiteboard they seemed to be sorting
02:56:46 whiteboard they seemed to be sorting information I think they were filling in documents and I basically took you know gave me my board which is a we identify
02:56:57 gave me my board which is a we identify we're on it we're who's on in attendance and asked him for some information about who was in charge right and what did what were you told in answer to that question right I asked who's in charge they said I think it's still McDade him
02:57:10 they said I think it's still McDade him I said I've heard a Sierra callsign I heard or the station managers book in haven't you seen any other station managers they said you're the first station manager we've seen and I mean
02:57:22 station manager we've seen and I mean right I'm booked in and I threw my boarding because I was still in that pavement still right through my board in I went to town at the time
02:57:34 I went to town at the time okay I'm there may be a convenient place for a break mr. Jones yes well we'll have a break not miss Dawson so doing the wrestlers can have some lunch and please don't talk to anyone
02:57:47 lunch and please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room and we'll resume at 2 o'clock
02:58:07 to authorities