Station Manager Richard Welch testifies about taking over as fire sector commander, his belief that cladding wasn't permitted, and the impossible challenges faced at the bridgehead.
00:00:14 yes could you ask mr. Wolfson to come back please okay
00:00:36 I'm a sportin ready to carry on thank you thank you for coming back to us can I go back to the Ord document that we looked at before the lunch break which
00:00:49 looked at before the lunch break which is lfp quadruple zero three one one six which is also accept 13 of our bundle and I'd like you to go to page seven in that please and this is what you find
00:01:02 that please and this is what you find under plans and images it's an aerial photograph of the tower itself and the a small part of its surrounding area is that what you would
00:01:15 surrounding area is that what you would normally expect to find on this document in terms of detailed plans and images it's not unusual to have a site image so
00:01:26 it's not unusual to have a site image so that you could consider that wing planning where aerial appliances pumps etc might be positioned however I wouldn't expect that to be the only
00:01:37 wouldn't expect that to be the only image that was there I would expect there to be some detail of the floor plans would an incident commander on his weight of an incident want rather more than an aerial shot of the premises that
00:01:48 than an aerial shot of the premises that you see there to be honest in that circumstance that's probably the most useful image on roots because you can look at where you're going to consider your initial appliance positioning if
00:01:59 your initial appliance positioning if it's somewhere you're not familiar with completely but once you're dealing with an incident I would say that site plans as in a floor plan would be more useful
00:02:10 as in a floor plan would be more useful well I was going to say I'm surely even the most general of floor plans would be more useful than an aerial shot like that to an incident commander on route once you're committing crews you would like to know what you're committing them
00:02:21 like to know what you're committing them into yes no month oppressive it surely an incident commander on route to an incident
00:02:26 incident at our block would want rather more by way of plans detailed plans than an aerial shot like that such as detailed plans of whether the hydrants were detail plans of where the dry rising
00:02:39 detail plans of where the dry rising main outlets were detailed plans of where the smoke vent system was matters of that nature if if I received that as a as an awed entry I'd send it back and ask for more detail plans to be wrong
00:02:50 ask for more detail plans to be wrong system right now can I ask you to be shown please iw s50 is 169 which is an
00:03:02 shown please iw s50 is 169 which is an email no no no not that
00:03:16 we'll come to it later Oh spend time looking for a document on my feet um can I then ask you to turn to page 21 of your state and you described at page 21
00:03:40 three-quarters of the way down the page how you say you looked at the building and I saw that at least half of it on one side had visible flames and I
00:03:51 one side had visible flames and I thought I know what's happening here it's got balconies they've got a little crap on developers and that we've seen that before I want to ask you about the visible flames very specifically my question is at that point you were
00:04:04 question is at that point you were running as you say down the road which elevation of the building were you looking at as it became determined later
00:04:15 looking at as it became determined later was the East face that was the original face that was on the original face of the park did you see where the fire had penetrated into flats at that point I didn't believe that this pirate got back
00:04:26 didn't believe that this pirate got back into the building no my question is did you see I didn't see any indication that the fire had got back into the building right now a watch manager called Norman Harrison attended this incident but if
00:04:38 Harrison attended this incident but if you know Norman Harris I don't know you don't
00:04:40 don't and he gave evidence yesterday he arrived at 1:50 and reached the base of the tower shortly after that and his evidence in his statement he has not put it to you he said as we got there I noticed the tower itself from the
00:04:52 noticed the tower itself from the initial side that I looked at from behind the school I could now see that it wasn't just the cladding the fire was coming from inside the flats from the fourth floor to all the way to the top now
00:05:03 now that was his vantage point in his sigh line of sight if he could see the flats were on fire could you not also see that flats were on fire I didn't see any flats on five minutes
00:05:18 now did you see at that point an aerial in the process of getting into position as I was speaking to Mike daube as part
00:05:32 as I was speaking to Mike daube as part of our handover process there was a turntable ladder positioned at the southeast corner over the building slightly on an angle and it was being
00:05:44 slightly on an angle and it was being raised off the bed and trained towards the building and as we were talking then a firefighting monitor came into operation so it started to put water
00:05:55 operation so it started to put water onto the side of the building how high up could that did that turntable that a reach in terms of the reach of the watch my recollection is they went to maximum elevation which
00:06:07 they went to maximum elevation which from my knowledge would we have eight ten floors and they played water against the columns of fire as it was elevated and then they swept back name from the
00:06:20 and then they swept back name from the maximum height they could reach and as the jet as the monitor jet hit the flame it seemed to have an effect on it and put it out and then as he moved away
00:06:32 put it out and then as he moved away it came back so the area where the water was hitting seemed to be being extinguished but as soon as the water wasn't being played on that area it realized it and you saw that too I
00:06:44 realized it and you saw that too I reckon so what did you think was burning when you saw that happen I had not got a clue what was burning I as I've said earlier I I had a belief that cladding
00:06:55 earlier I I had a belief that cladding would not be able to be on the side of a building that burns so it looked like it mr. clad in but I didn't know what it was that was actually burning I just I
00:07:06 was that was actually burning I just I didn't know you say that you believe that as you just told us that you could cladding wouldn't be on the side of the building just to get back to that well it was your belief as at the night
00:07:17 it was your belief as at the night town a fire that built the cladding wasn't allowed on the side of buildings now I believed you could clad a building but I didn't believe you could clad it in flammable material all right see was it do we take it from that that your
00:07:29 it do we take it from that that your impression opinion thought was that combustible cladding was not permitted yes even a limited combust ability
00:07:40 yes even a limited combust ability cladding not permitted that was my belief where did you get that belief from I'd spend time as a fire safety inspecting officer I'd had to look at
00:07:55 inspecting officer I'd had to look at regulation as part of that process I knew that against he's looking back but my belief was that flammable cladding was not allowed on the side of
00:08:07 cladding was not allowed on the side of a building over a certain height he could be allowed on lower level buildings because he obviously wouldn't have as much a potential of an effect but once he got over a certain height
00:08:18 but once he got over a certain height and I couldn't tell you what level that was but it would be any high-rise building it wasn't allowed to be applied in that way that was my belief my understanding have you ever had any training on approved document b I have
00:08:32 training on approved document b I have been trained as a fire safety inspecting officer at morton-in-the-marsh the National Fire Service College I completes its modules a B and C and F
00:08:43 completes its modules a B and C and F Sao d8 and what that means is I was trained in applying fire safety to buildings of public assembly through to residential accommodation and I had had
00:08:56 residential accommodation and I had had an introduction into understanding fire engineered solutions in buildings an introduction but my question I repeated have you had any did you have any training on approved document b on every
00:09:08 training on approved document b on every on the majority of those courses approved document b was referred to and i have had training on referring to approve document B and apply to building plans etc when what can you
00:09:23 to building plans etc when what can you give a date when you were trained last trained on approved document b prior to the ground filled tower fire probably about 2004 2005 right I was doing those
00:09:34 about 2004 2005 right I was doing those courses so is it right then that as at the night of the fire when you saw it I like your belief that it couldn't be cladding combustible cladding was based
00:09:46 cladding combustible cladding was based on your training on approved document b which went back to 2004 5 yes not only more recent up-to-date the versions of
00:09:57 more recent up-to-date the versions of approved document b no no just going back to the question of a turntable
00:10:09 back to the question of a turntable ladder did you know that it couldn't reach the fire or a fire at the top of this building I have been a turntable I
00:10:23 this building I have been a turntable I know operator I've also been an elf operator in my career and I was aware of the capabilities of the appliance and I knew that it was a 30 meter reach right and in effect the 10th floor was
00:10:35 and in effect the 10th floor was probably about the effective range of lack of lines so did you have any thoughts when you saw that as to how you were going or how the NFB was going to fight the fire externally above the
00:10:48 fight the fire externally above the reach of the turntable ladder as part of the handover with Mike doden we considered what our options were as I've stated earlier my focus would have been
00:10:59 stated earlier my focus would have been on getting crews to the inside of the building and preventing the fire getting back in
00:11:04 back in ie not fighting the external fire but trying to stop its effects and Mike mentioned that he tasked a fire rescue unit crew to go to the roof of the tower
00:11:16 unit crew to go to the roof of the tower and investigate if we could improvise any Jets from above down the face of the building between the cloudy to try and extinguish that fire and that
00:11:27 to try and extinguish that fire and that is completely outside of anything any of us had ever considered before Russ is the answer to my question as to as to whether you thought you were going to be able to fight the far from the exterior only by this roof method that
00:11:39 exterior only by this roof method that might think we had nothing in our toolbox to fight that fire we were improvising okay now let's go to your taking over from Mike down when you
00:11:53 your taking over from Mike down when you saw Mike dad wearing the incident the Tabard did you think he was still in charge the tamarod indicated that the first question on my approaches are you
00:12:05 first question on my approaches are you still in charge the reason I asked that was it sometimes an instinct commander is relieved of command and forgets to take the tub out of and I knew there was
00:12:16 take the tub out of and I knew there was other station managers because I've heard or a in the station manager on the instant inground because I'd heard the cooler side and I was just confirming that he hadn't been spoken to by that
00:12:27 that he hadn't been spoken to by that officer yeah what was your initial impression as to how Mike Dunn was coping as incident commander he was agitated but he was in control I I was
00:12:44 agitated but he was in control I I was as I approached he was in what I wouldn't a said it was the most ideal command position and I was thinking I'm gonna have to pull you back to a morgue position when you've got a better overview but as I was walking off he did
00:12:56 overview but as I was walking off he did that so he was tasking individuals at the tower where that task him would be really effective and then he brought himself away from that melee of people to where he could in effect review what
00:13:07 to where he could in effect review what he'd just initiated and I joined him in that position but what he was doing which made me think he was agitated was he he continually changed that position he kept moving between points so we I
00:13:19 he kept moving between points so we I was walking with him as we were doing the handover and I eventually made him stand still right and that was when we were on the grass maimed at the side of the tower
00:13:30 the tower grasp mount to the east of the tower yeah now we can go to the detailer part of the policy if you'd find it helpful but would you agree with me that the
00:13:41 but would you agree with me that the principal obligation of an officer taking incident taking incident command is to be given all relevant information by the incident commander who's being
00:13:53 by the incident commander who's being relieved near we have to achieve an effective briefing of the officer coming up yeah all relevant information yeah yeah and would you also agree that the incoming incident commander should also
00:14:05 incoming incident commander should also be made fully aware of all the identified hazards on the fire ground and peep and those people who are at risk of it from those hazards that's part of our processions now let's look and see what of what happened if you go
00:14:18 and see what of what happened if you go to page 23 of your statement you say just above halfway down the last paragraph break there I said I would I
00:14:30 paragraph break there I said I would I will be taking this off you so I want a really quick and dirty handover so did you say that yet almost the word and I think it then followed with I don't want
00:14:41 think it then followed with I don't want you to go anywhere else I'm gonna keep you with me while we finished the handover right and you say he started to talk so I said this is what I know and I
00:14:52 talk so I said this is what I know and I told him what I'd heard over the radio what I'd seen and I told him a lot of information and then I asked what else do I need to know and he started talking why was it that way round why did you
00:15:04 why was it that way round why did you start telling him what you knew rather than waiting for him to tell you what he knew normally and I mean normally that is something you do you deliberately let the officer-in-charge
00:15:15 the officer-in-charge speak and you let them give a frame their overview and then you ask clarifying questions to get any additional information that they haven't already covered I could see what this
00:15:27 already covered I could see what this looked like it was I needed to get to the point of knowing what it was and what we were doing so to speed that process up I thought it was quicker for me to tell him what
00:15:38 me to tell him what had already gathered and for him to add to that rather than for me to probably hear fifty percent or eighty percent that I already know to get to the twenty percent I needed right now you say a
00:15:50 percent I needed right now you say a little bit lower down you can't remember the detail we spoke about life I said I know you've got multiple efforts geez did you go into any further detail and
00:16:02 did you go into any further detail and tell him that those FS G's involved smoke or fire entry from higher floors no prior to that I'd ask Mike are you still in charge and he said yes I said
00:16:14 still in charge and he said yes I said haven't you seen another station manager I know there's other station managers here he said I have but that station manager had a quick overview from me and they took the FSGS so I knew there
00:16:26 and they took the FSGS so I knew there was a station manager who was dealing with the FSG information so it would have wasted time me going over that information because Mike didn't have it it was with somebody else
00:16:37 it was with somebody else so my process was to take over from Mike dodin and then I would find the station manager who was conducting FSGS and I would do a similar information gathering exchange with that officer did
00:16:49 gathering exchange with that officer did you ask Mike down the conditions were like inside the building it was part of my questioning I believe the way I phrased it was as a thing I've used the phrase before today I want to know are
00:17:00 phrase before today I want to know are the FS G's trapped or do they think they're trapped and what that means is I want bi crews to have gone to the locations and made an assessment of the conditions because if it sees just that
00:17:12 conditions because if it sees just that there's smoke that isn't normal to a member of the public and it's not actually trapping them they crew would give reassurance and we would deal with it after we put the fire out if it was that the conditions that they found
00:17:24 that the conditions that they found meant they made that call that this is untenable that's when they're trapped and that's where we would have then directed our operations to the rescue so asking are they trapped or do they think
00:17:36 asking are they trapped or do they think they're trapped is in effect what conditions allows people given what you had heard over the radio on the way enroute to the tower and did you not think given the volume
00:17:49 and did you not think given the volume of calls coming from around the tower and particularly on high floors that it was more likely than not what they actually were trap rather than simply thinking they were trapped yes
00:18:00 thinking they were trapped yes the fact that everybody would need rescue was in my mind in my thinking the fact that nobody could escape was he my thinking yeah so given that everybody believed rescues you just said having
00:18:11 believed rescues you just said having heard what you'd heard was it not then necessary as the next step to ascertain from my done what the smoke and heat and fire conditions were like in the lobbies
00:18:23 fire conditions were like in the lobbies and the and in the stair that's what I'd asked for right are they trapped or do they think they're trapped well that's not quite the same question it's easy in our parlance we understand that if an officer ask you I want be a
00:18:35 that if an officer ask you I want be a to the FSGS I want to know if they're trapped or they think they're trapped and the next part of the sentence is if they are trapped what do we need to get them out and that is the that is my standard phrase that I have said I've
00:18:48 standard phrase that I have said I've not dealt with an FSG incident before but I've dealt with them on every tactical exercise I've ever had and I was drawing on those exercises I believe every exercise I've ever had has
00:18:59 every exercise I've ever had has involved a high-rise and FSG and it is my normal process only is what do we need to get them out if they're trapped right okay I'm just building on that if
00:19:10 right okay I'm just building on that if I can just then take you to your contemporaneous notes at page 3 and we're looking at ma T triple zero Missouri quadruple zero five seven one
00:19:22 Missouri quadruple zero five seven one four which is the a for manuscript notes I'd like you to go please to page three of that and a half way down you say this
00:19:35 of that and a half way down you say this is part of the discussion I say do you have multiple FSG fast survival guidance calls taking place what other life risk are you aware of he said this is my
00:19:48 are you aware of he said this is my doubt and he said there could be the whole block just pausing they're going to come on to the rest of that in a minute but when he said there could be the whole block did
00:20:01 said there could be the whole block did you then have thoughts in your own head about whether a full or partial evacuation plan needed to be that needed to be looked at in my head if they are
00:20:13 to be looked at in my head if they are exposed in that way evacuations not possible the escape for them to be trapped escape is impossible they would die if they came out of their flats we had to rescue them that's where
00:20:26 flats we had to rescue them that's where my thought process women okay he then you then go on to say you asked about whether instead the incident involved just an external fire or whether it was also breaching multiple
00:20:38 whether it was also breaching multiple floors you see you say that yeah that's to try and again but I just lost my question okay that's why I'll show you what you said then I'll ask a clip that my question is why did you need to ask
00:20:49 my question is why did you need to ask him that question given the content of the FSG calls you have heard enroute because I hadn't heard anything bearing in mind I wasn't listening to the detail
00:21:00 in mind I wasn't listening to the detail of the FSGS there was that many of them I just
00:21:03 I just I started off trying to remember detail I then knew I wouldn't be able to retain the amount of information I was receiving so I just concentrated on knowing there was a lot of FSGS so none of the information I'd heard on
00:21:16 so none of the information I'd heard on the radio indicated that fire was in the flats with the individuals I hadn't heard that said what I'd heard was that people were saying they were trapped live I smoked in effect so the first
00:21:28 live I smoked in effect so the first question was are they trapped by smoke the second question was were they threatened by fire that's what that's asking because when I know that we're if I know where people are trapped by smoke
00:21:40 I know where people are trapped by smoke and if I know where people are threatened by fire that's going to determine how I promise at prioritize the response and we're going to prioritize fighting the fire and stopping it reaching those people or am
00:21:53 stopping it reaching those people or am I going to pry it because if the fire is not getting back in am I going to prioritize stopping it getting back in and getting those people out that attract boy smoke what what about smoke in the flats given the content or are
00:22:06 in the flats given the content or are given the at least the volume of FSG calls from people complete calling for fire survival guidance and did it not
00:22:17 fire survival guidance and did it not occur to you that many of them at least would be suffering the offense at least of smoke within their compartments even though farm might not have come back in they shouldn't have been the principal
00:22:29 they shouldn't have been the principal of that building was that the fire and the effects of the fire would be contained in the original compartments obviously when we fight a fire with our procedures we breach the fire door onto
00:22:41 procedures we breach the fire door onto the staircase without firefighting hose so it could be that they've seen smoke on the staircase from that and they've assumed they're trapped there was no indication that people were saying there
00:22:52 indication that people were saying there was smoke and fire in their flats so I had to determine did they think they were trapped or were they trapped did you ask Mike
00:23:04 or were they trapped did you ask Mike Dowden whether to the best of his knowledge there were calls coming in which indicated that there was smoke or fire in the flats no I knew NF SG
00:23:17 fire in the flats no I knew NF SG officer was holding that detail and I intended to liaise with him afterwards because you asked him what the life risk was and he said there could be the whole block did you assume at that point that
00:23:31 block did you assume at that point that he just meant that the farmers on the outside people might or might not be trapped by smoke or fire in the eggs in the exit route but their flats
00:23:42 the exit route but their flats themselves were clean of smoke or heat for that that was part of my thinking is that I hoped that the compartments ation
00:23:53 that I hoped that the compartments ation had held up enough that people who were in their flats were in clean air that maybe the lobbies were compromised because that's what the FSGS were indicating and if we got on top of the fire those people would be able to
00:24:06 fire those people would be able to remain to the point that we either rescued them or cleared the smoke from the lobby so risky wasn't required Mike's every flat that I've ever fought a fire in my experience is that people in the
00:24:18 experience is that people in the immediate vicinity can't get out of their flat because there's smoke on the lobby or in the staircase because of our firefighting operations and what if they stay in their flat we put the fire out
00:24:29 stay in their flat we put the fire out we clear the lobbies we clear the staircases and there's no consequence and and so I was expecting the building hoping the building was going to react
00:24:40 hoping the building was going to react in that way and that there had been smoke spread because why else would be getting so many FS geez but the the fire was the the main reason for that smoke
00:24:54 was the the main reason for that smoke always maybe considering and I'm this is a maybe that it was getting back in through open windows and it was getting into areas that way I didn't know how we could have smoke on so many different
00:25:07 could have smoke on so many different levels in one incident so earlier I just had no way of understanding that but if if you were maybe considering as you say
00:25:19 if you were maybe considering as you say the smoke was getting in through open windows that was surely indicate when we did that the apartments were being if were affected by smoke and therefore the occupants were suffering the effects of smoke inside their flats it's a it's a
00:25:31 smoke inside their flats it's a it's a consideration as I'm standing there but there's a level to officer without going into a long answer which obviously I'm trying to avoid but part of my job as a
00:25:42 trying to avoid but part of my job as a level 2 officer is to test the assumptions which have been made by the initial commander because I've got the luxury of arriving a bit later and there's possibly more information there than there was when they made their
00:25:53 than there was when they made their initial decisions so I check what information they knew I check what decisions they've made I had looked for corroboration and I try and make sure that any assumptions that have been made
00:26:04 that any assumptions that have been made are valid that the assumptions they've made at that time stand off a bit more Britany so all that means one of the things it could have been it's one of
00:26:16 things it could have been it's one of the things I had to consider and I have to go through the whole range as I'm taking over in a very very short space of time
00:26:24 of time sure and you say later in your statement and it's page 30 and we can look at it if we need to but you say if it was getting in that's fire we were in big trouble yeah so it would it be right to
00:26:35 trouble yeah so it would it be right to say that fire penetration from the exterior to interior flats was a game-changer for you for you right given that that was the case and given the scale of what you could see in front of
00:26:47 scale of what you could see in front of you did you not think to explore the risks about happening on whether that was happening with Mike Dowden I had a good idea what the risks were if that fire was getting back in on multiple levels yeah but did you know I didn't need to explore it Mike Dave and I was
00:26:59 need to explore it Mike Dave and I was going to be taking charge I would be the officer in charge that incident as soon as we'd finished our brief handover and if I had two main objectives that I wanted from Mike Dade and were the
00:27:11 wanted from Mike Dade and were the people trapped or did they think they were trapped ie what are the conditions they're experiencing and was the fire getting back in if either of those was a positive answer if people were trapped or if the fire was getting back in I was
00:27:23 or if the fire was getting back in I was dealing with a major incident and I was ready to declare that and take it there and that would have meant that it would have been a massive scale up because as far as I was concerned if either of those came back as a an affirmative
00:27:37 those came back as a an affirmative everybody in that building needed rescue and I would have to deal with that yeah so in answer to your question Mike said this is on your is on page three of your
00:27:48 this is on your is on page three of your contemporaneous notes and I read it to you he said he had be a committee to try and determine this no that's your recollection of what he said yeah was it
00:27:59 recollection of what he said yeah was it not essential to you at that moment given that you didn't know trapped or or not trapped penetration or no penetration instantaneously or as fast as you could to find out the answers to those questions rather than there's need to be
00:28:11 questions rather than there's need to be aware as to determine it normally you would have radioed to the officer in charge of the bridgehead and probably conveyed that as you were doing and over the radios were ineffectual
00:28:22 and over the radios were ineffectual there was that much traffic of different firefighters talking to each other confirming that water was in confirming that houses were in place that they'd
00:28:34 that houses were in place that they'd made access to whatever there was that much traffic you couldn't get in on the radios you would not you couldn't get a message through so what I said to my dad and was as soon
00:28:45 so what I said to my dad and was as soon as we finished this briefing I'm going to send you to the bridgehead and I want that information so it was what the first task I was going to give Mike Dowd and the first task I did give Mike down
00:28:58 and the first task I did give Mike down and once we've done the handover was go to the Bridget and get me that information because we had to rely on physically people moving from one location to another to get information to transfer from one location so when
00:29:10 to transfer from one location so when you have that handover with Mike dad and how close to the entrance to the tower will you stand it we were on the green on the grass mound at the east face of the tower probably about 15 meters maybe
00:29:22 the tower probably about 15 meters maybe 20 meters from the back of the turntable ladder and the ALP was positioning to our right as we were having the handover did you have any a lot of platforms positioning to our right as we had to hand over did you have a clear view of
00:29:35 hand over did you have a clear view of the main entrance to the town I couldn't see the main entrance on my view of the front face of the tower was over the turntable ladder I could see there was
00:29:46 turntable ladder I could see there was an appliance or maybe two appliances parked in front of the tower and I could see through the side glazing the foyer and crews moving up the staircase in I
00:29:58 and crews moving up the staircase in I couldn't see the front door okay you could but you could see into I could see in today's I could see into the atrium and the agent did you see any occupants of the tower coming down yes I've got
00:30:10 of the tower coming down yes I've got recollection of seeing you know members of the public walking out of the tower in the early stages right did you see whether they were suffering from the effects of smoke inhalation I couldn't say that from where I was it would have
00:30:23 say that from where I was it would have been my suspicion I know that Mike informed me that the original occupants of the flat had slight smoke inhalation and it was part
00:30:34 slight smoke inhalation and it was part of my brief into the lis later that that's where the occupants are they've taken in some smoke what sort of numbers could you see in terms of occupants evacuating it wasn't large numbers
00:30:46 evacuating it wasn't large numbers it was probably ones and twos a few minutes or you know 30 seconds a minute and there may be another one or two you say you had a suspicion that they were suffering the effects of smoke inhalation
00:30:58 inhalation would that not have told you that compartment ation would have had been breached and the smoke was getting right up the building no it was a suspicion I don't know where these people have come from I don't know if they've come from
00:31:09 from I don't know if they've come from below the fire above the fire I don't know where they from so I just saw members of the public leaving the building and because of what the fire looked like and I was trying to
00:31:20 looked like and I was trying to determine was it what it looked like my suspicion was that there's probably a lot of smoke spread in this building there's a good chance people coming out will be affected by smoke dude she's an
00:31:31 will be affected by smoke dude she's an assumption did you think to act on that suspicion go around the front and talk to them about where the smoke was I've got officers on the fire ground that are doing different jobs I don't do every job on the incident
00:31:42 I don't do every job on the incident ground I was taking over command I was in the process of getting the command briefing there were officers capable officers at the front that building they're not gonna let somebody soughing
00:31:54 they're not gonna let somebody soughing a smoke inhalation walk past them they're gonna take action right but you say you had a suspicion my question really was whether you acted on that suspicion and either you didn't do your self did you ask somebody to talk to the
00:32:05 self did you ask somebody to talk to the talk to the residents who are coming out and find out where the smoke was from the building from wouldn't have had the opportunity to but now I didn't okay now you did did Mike Duggan give you any
00:32:19 you did did Mike Duggan give you any kind of report as to anything the bridge had had told him at that point about internal fire or smoke spread no the questions I asked Mike about ba
00:32:30 questions I asked Mike about ba operations he hadn't got any detail of he said no that's that's at the bridgehead thank you so that was one of the reasons why I was going to send him to the bridge Oh to get that confirmation now getting back to page 23
00:32:41 confirmation now getting back to page 23 of your statement you say a quarter of the way down that you were told I'm
00:32:54 the way down that you were told I'm summarizing the Brett loft had taken FSGS off of Mike Downton and you said
00:33:05 you say he said his companies took the FSU's off me and said he'd given their first SM a quick overview what was happening as a result of this he said he was going to take on the FS G's he
00:33:16 was going to take on the FS G's he pointed to the towards the tower and said he's doing it from over there clear over where he was pointing the general direction of the Front's that they all do go I didn't I didn't see Brett loft you didn't see Brett was
00:33:28 Brett loft you didn't see Brett was right okay did you go and speak to red loft later on in the incident yes was there any discussion between you and you and Mike Darden about the strategy and kit that
00:33:39 Darden about the strategy and kit that you'd need safely to evacuate residents at least from the upper floors of the tower in case it turned out they weren't in case it turned out they were trapped no our procedure our process is to send
00:33:54 no our procedure our process is to send BA to where the calls come from and normally that standard duration reading that racist because that's what we carry on the front line appliances like every other service in the country and to not
00:34:08 other service in the country and to not put too fine a point on it the technique is you find a casualty you grab them you drag them through the hazard area as fast as you can and you get them outside because that's where they're going to
00:34:20 because that's where they're going to get their medical treatment they need and that that is the standard way of rescuing people sorry I only asked my question again my question was during this handover was
00:34:31 question was during this handover was there any discussion between you and Mike doubting about the strategy and the equipment that you need to be able safely to evacuate residents only I want BA to every FSG are the traps
00:34:46 I want BA to every FSG are the traps aren't they trapped if they are trapped what do we need to get them out ie if it's a group of five people I'd expect 10 BA to be required to bring five people 8 - for each person so it
00:35:00 five people 8 - for each person so it would be a big team that would be sent so that's the type of information that you expect the crews that make that initial contact to try and get back or if you get any information prior to that that's the sort of size of team you send
00:35:12 that's the sort of size of team you send to those types of locations was there a discussion about whether you would need EDB a to be able to reach the upper parts of the time we didn't discuss it it was in the back of my mind but I
00:35:24 it was in the back of my mind but I needed to get a better understanding of what was in front of me to be able to take that further I knew that a deeper that if our you crews had been requested I heard that on the way over and make up
00:35:36 I heard that on the way over and make up her - I think it was if are you units so I knew there was some a DBA on site but if we use the DBA we need additional ETA to act as emergency crews to be able to bring them out if they get into
00:35:47 bring them out if they get into difficulty because they've got that further reach so if I was going to switch to using a DBA as a tactic I would need to resource it correctly so I would need to have an idea about the
00:35:59 would need to have an idea about the level of a DBA commitment I required
00:36:04 if you go to page 26 of your statement please and look at a quarter of the way down and say that the bridge had been established on the second floor and three lines down from that you say I
00:36:15 three lines down from that you say I asked if he knew how many BA were in there
00:36:17 there he replied they didn't they were doing that at the bridgehead I asked if he knew what they were doing and again he replied he didn't nor did he know if they've got ba to the F s cheese all of
00:36:29 they've got ba to the F s cheese all of this information was held at the bridgehead I asked if he knew what was happening internally making sure the father wasn't getting back in and again he said that information was at the bridgehead so my question is and all of
00:36:45 bridgehead so my question is and all of those questions get answered in the way you've used you've said there my question is is the information that you'd asked for from my diagram information that you would expect him to give you as incident commander at a
00:36:57 give you as incident commander at a smaller scale incident he would have had de information what Mike had done was identified initially dealt with a normal flat flier and they put the flat fire
00:37:08 flat flier and they put the flat fire out that made pomp six they extinguish the fire it broke out of the window and got into the cladding once that happened he was chasing the incident and
00:37:25 what he did and I am okay to carry on what he did does the initial incident commander it was above and beyond anything that could have been expected
00:37:37 anything that could have been expected of him I I am I am gonna compose myself for a second and I would take your time
00:37:48 for a second and I would take your time stay rush
00:37:54 okay in my opinion Mike had made a lot of assumptions that turned out to be correct about the nature of that fire
00:38:07 correct about the nature of that fire and he had resourced it to give us the option to try and save I think we all
00:38:21 option to try and save I think we all take two minutes yeah well we'll break for 10 minutes you go with you sure and don't talk to anyone about the evidence
00:38:39 right Tim's three fuse
00:43:46 you
00:49:44 if should you like to ask mr. Walton to come back
00:50:03 where everybody's gone miss Walton yes I am thank you for your consideration that's all right now you you might find it less troublesome if you just give short answers without so much explanation because I've noticed simply
00:50:15 explanation because I've noticed simply sometimes it's giving the explanation that causes you to have difficulty and say don't be frightened about just yeah my only motivation in being here is to
00:50:27 my only motivation in being here is to give the answers that are needed yes well mr. Milich will tell you if he confused information all right yes sir
00:50:40 confused information all right yes sir all right as my instructions as well mr. Walton during your handover from Mike Dowden did you have any discussion with
00:50:52 Dowden did you have any discussion with him about whether there was a single staircase for evacuation if and when it was needed I asked what was the access to egress he told me there was only one
00:51:03 to egress he told me there was only one way in and out of the building and one staircase right and did that affect the way you thought you need to go about forming an evacuation plan were one needed it affected my tactics if this
00:51:14 needed it affected my tactics if this building has more than one staircase you tend to designate one as a firefighting staircase for the reasons of fire hose may breach doors etc but here we have
00:51:25 may breach doors etc but here we have one is an evacuation staircase you because then none of the hose will impede that evacuation right here we had one staircase so dizzy that there was a single staircase in the second strategy it meant that we had to use that
00:51:38 it meant that we had to use that staircase for firefighting and for any evacuation of rescues right and did that fact affect your plans
00:51:50 it was a fact that we had to deal with how did you deal with it we accepted the reality of the situation that there's
00:52:02 reality of the situation that there's nothing you can do if you've got one staircase there's nothing you can do about it
00:52:06 about it the the area was there it would always be a factor that you could perhaps go to if you needed to use the aerial for rescues if it was able to reach the particular window that was required
00:52:17 particular window that was required that's probably the only other option we've got is to bring in an appliance but that's only effective up to the tenth floor and only if you can get a pitch that gives you access to the the windows that it wouldn't need to go to
00:52:29 windows that it wouldn't need to go to did you have any discussion with Mike Davin about the involvement of the cladding in the fire and the implications of that for how to go about fighting the fire it would have been
00:52:40 fighting the fire it would have been very brief it was probably when I was saying is it in is it on the balconies Mike said there aren't any balconies I then looked at the building again and I
00:52:53 then looked at the building again and I said is what any I think he said I think it's in the cladding right and that was literally it and it is it right that that the involvement of the cladding
00:53:04 that the involvement of the cladding wasn't something that was obvious to you before that as I say I was on the the misunderstanding or the door the belief that because it was two vertical lines
00:53:16 that because it was two vertical lines two columns that it was jumping balconies as I approached that really became apparent in the very early part of that handover is one of the first questions yeah but when Mike said to you
00:53:28 questions yeah but when Mike said to you he thought it's going up the cladding as you've told us and it's in your notes that was the first time was it that you realized this wasn't balconies it was the cladding that was that's when that
00:53:40 the cladding that was that's when that became clear to me now um did you then go on to discuss with Mike how you were going to tackle the fire given that it was in the cladding or the cladding was the light I asked well I could see the
00:53:52 the light I asked well I could see the the TL monitor I could see there was a branch
00:53:55 branch trained a eject from the ground floor area and that was around the time that Mike mentioned that he touched the through crew to go to the roof and see
00:54:07 through crew to go to the roof and see if they could get water being applied from the book and and about the fruit crew when he told you about that what was your view about the viability of that operation I called into question
00:54:22 that operation I called into question whether it was a safe enough operation so I asked him what were the safe systems that were going to be put in place to allow a crew to be on the roof looking over the edge of a 22 storey
00:54:33 looking over the edge of a 22 storey building that's on fire what are the zones basically said it's the fruit crew that they're going up I said if they're going up there to do that I want a restraint system I want them
00:54:45 I want a restraint system I want them anchored lined on and restrained from going over the edge he said it's a fro crew that's what I asked them to do they know what they're doing they're aligned crew
00:54:54 crew okay and I let that happen my question was what was your view of the viability of that operation in other words what was it gonna work and either can extinguish or at least assist in
00:55:06 can extinguish or at least assist in extinguishing the exterior fire I think one of the lines might use was it's worth ago and I think it was probably that wording and it was worth ago it was an option now Tim page 26 of your
00:55:20 an option now Tim page 26 of your witness statement if I can just quickly take you to that at the very top of the page you say I was happy with the firefighting side of things just wait til
00:55:31 til that comes up page 26 top of the page I was happy with the firefighting side of things I felt we were on top of that it had been resourced up and we had an attack on the initial fire we had put
00:55:43 attack on the initial fire we had put that out we were now beginning to tackle the fire that was spreading up the outside but what led you to think that you were on top of the fire spreading up
00:55:56 you were on top of the fire spreading up the outside if that's what you mean what I'll explain is that I meant I was happy that we've done everything it was possible to do at that moment how I was
00:56:07 possible to do at that moment how I was directing operations to stop the fire getting back into the building we did we were doing everything we could to tackle the exterior fire and it was having no effect so I wanted our focus to be
00:56:20 effect so I wanted our focus to be preventing it getting back in and that's the tasking apart from the worth ago line crew going to the roof that we've discussed what was happening in terms of
00:56:33 discussed what was happening in terms of exterior firefighting at the top of the tower that led you to be happy if this is what you mean that you were on top of firefighting I think I've explained I wasn't happy with the situation I wasn't
00:56:44 wasn't happy with the situation I wasn't happy that we were being effective I was happy that we were doing anything that we could do with what we've got it was impossible to fight the fire on the exterior of the building on the upper
00:56:55 exterior of the building on the upper floors and what we could reach the water was having no effect right so when we when you say we I was happy with the firefighting side of things I was happy
00:57:07 firefighting side of things I was happy there was nothing else we could do when at that time right and we needed to move change tack and we had to try and stop the fire getting right and going back to your discussion with Mike dadan did you
00:57:19 your discussion with Mike dadan did you discuss with him whether stay put should be withdrawn and an evacuation plan implemented there is no option to evacuate a building where the building
00:57:32 evacuate a building where the building principle has failed to the extent that the means of escape don't exist did you think at that time during that handover
00:57:40 handover that the building had failed and the means of escape did not exist it was becoming more and more the assumption and I just needed the confirmation from
00:57:51 and I just needed the confirmation from BIA crews inside to either of those questions was it compromised to that level as far as the means of escape is concerned and was it compromised to that level regarding fire speed from external
00:58:03 level regarding fire speed from external back into the building right so that stage during your handover with Mike he
00:58:14 stage during your handover with Mike he was becoming you say more and more the assumption that I'm trying to rephrase your evidence that the the the the building had failed but my question is
00:58:28 building had failed but my question is really did during that discussion did you have a discussion with Mike Dunn specifically about how you were going to get people out the only way we've got of
00:58:41 get people out the only way we've got of getting people AIDS is to grab them and physically drag or carry them down the method that we've got of accessing in which is that single staircase and my question is did you discuss that subject
00:58:52 question is did you discuss that subject with Mike garden during all there's nothing to discuss it was the only option he would know that I would have been wasting time discussing that with him right we send the eisah where people are at the point of greatest danger so
00:59:03 are at the point of greatest danger so that's part of the process is determining who is at most risk that's why those questions are asked send BA to those people grab them first and then go down the list you know in an
00:59:14 and then go down the list you know in an order of privacy in that way but your only option is grab them drag them out the building and get into this the medical treatment they need so current correct me mr. Walton if I'm wrong or
00:59:26 correct me mr. Walton if I'm wrong or putting words in your mouth but are we to take it from that that by the time your handover from my dad was finished and you were in command as the incident commander you were of the view that the
00:59:39 commander you were of the view that the resources had to be deployed that you had available to send VA wearers into the tower and extract as many people as you
00:59:50 you I think Mike was at that point in his thinking when I took over and I was definitely of that opinion when I took command and both of us had been
01:00:01 command and both of us had been directing resources to that effect and that was the that was the tactic that I was going to continue employee right yeah just tell me how are you going to go about carrying that tactic out
01:00:16 relying on the professionalism dedication and determination of the
01:00:30 dedication and determination of the crews that were going to attend that incident now assuming doped out what you've said for a minute about the characteristics of individual firefighters they're assuming that that's entirely reliable my question
01:00:44 that's entirely reliable my question isn't so much about the people you've got but about the plan and I'll repeat the question having come to the conclusion as I think you've told us that you have to deploy be a wearers
01:00:57 that you have to deploy be a wearers into the tower to extract as many people as you could by what methods tactics strategies would you use the resources in order to carry out that that tactic so I needed to know where people are at
01:01:10 so I needed to know where people are at greatest risk in that building there are a lot of people who are indicating they believed they were trapped I needed to try and find out who was at greatest risk and they would be our priorities so
01:01:23 risk and they would be our priorities so it goes back to those questions what are the conditions inside where are they at their worst what do we need to get people out of those conditions and where
01:01:34 people out of those conditions and where is the fire threatening the most people earliest so where is the fire getting back in what can we do to slow that down or to stop it from happening so those are the those are the objectives that
01:01:48 are the those are the objectives that I'm trying to achieve finding out where people are at most risk and then prioritizing action to deal with them in that sort of order so that's why those questions were asked
01:02:00 so that's why those questions were asked that's why that information was so important and that's why I was driving the incident in that direction we were trying to stop the fire on the external as best we could
01:02:11 as best we could it wasn't working I needed to make sure we were stopping it getting back inside that would give us the time to get to the people and get them out right so
01:02:24 the people and get them out right so although you at that stage didn't know that fire was coming back into flats at that at that point I was notice put the question even though that was the case am I to take it that you thought it was
01:02:36 am I to take it that you thought it was such a sufficient risk that you that the tactic view you've just described should be undertaken again you don't try to put too much detail we make we only get a
01:02:47 too much detail we make we only get a certain amount of information in that really short time that we can gather it we get as much information as we can but we have to make decisions we haven't got time to wait for the full picture so
01:03:01 time to wait for the full picture so once we've got enough information to give us a very good indication we have to make assumptions and you initially deal with the incident based on those
01:03:13 deal with the incident based on those those informed assumptions part of my process as a level 2 commander is to check those assumptions of the initial commander and then build on those
01:03:24 commander and then build on those assumptions because if there is more information like I was asking for that makes your direction more certain and you can press further forward or if you get contrary information you can stop
01:03:35 get contrary information you can stop that action and take the correct direction so I have to ask those questions as a level 2 commander but they're not so much as the process we follow it's because it's the only way
01:03:48 follow it's because it's the only way you can deal with an incident in that dynamic early stage now having received the handover from Mike Darden you're now an incident command very briefly what
01:04:01 an incident command very briefly what did you do next in terms of step okay when I'd got my information off-mike
01:04:09 off-mike that process was continuing interrupted by vo crews and officers coming to Mike for taskings because I left Mike in the Tabard in charge while I was getting my situational awareness because he had got
01:04:21 situational awareness because he had got as much information I didn't have it all off him yet so I was comfortable to be on his shoulder in privy to the conversation and but let him be the focal point and him direct operations
01:04:33 focal point and him direct operations until I got that understanding when sight once I got to that point I took the tab out of him I directed him to go to the bridgehead I wanted him to get that information we've talked about
01:04:44 get that information we've talked about regarding the conditions for the FSGS what we needed to get him out if they were trapped get ba to the fire base and appointed to the face of the building there wasn't one face at the building
01:04:56 there wasn't one face at the building get ba to the fire face determine whether the fire's game back in or not if it looks like it's coming in stop it if we can't stop it can we hold it what
01:05:13 if we can't stop it can we hold it what do we need to do that so those are the taskings I gave Mike and I went to send him on his way yes another be a crew approached at the same time as the lis
01:05:24 approached at the same time as the lis initial response approached so I said to Mike you deal with the BA I'll brief the lis and I did a Jessup command briefing
01:05:37 lis and I did a Jessup command briefing to the na s to bring them up to speed and then directed Mike back into the building for Richard I know this is going on a bit but it will answer your question once I'd dealt with the LA s my
01:05:53 question once I'd dealt with the LA s my main priorities were I knew we got 25 pomp makeup I just had the conversation with the alias about where their triage point was and I knew they needed rainfall row keeping clear
01:06:04 they needed rainfall row keeping clear for ambulances we hadn't got her an RVP declared for the LA the lfb let alone any other emergency service that was a major priority to me that time because there was probably
01:06:16 that time because there was probably another 10 to 15 fire engines enroute plus all the additional officers and ambulance response that they were now initiating and I needed to have that
01:06:27 initiating and I needed to have that organized you can't do that without a map and finding where we can go so I needed to speak to a commanding unit operator to get the RVP put in if I had
01:06:39 operator to get the RVP put in if I had either of those questions answered in the affirmative it was going to be a major incident I didn't know the name of the road I was on and I needed that for the methane message for the major
01:06:51 the methane message for the major incident to be declared and I didn't know the RVP and I needed that for the methane message it's a declarative agent
01:07:03 methane message it's a declarative agent so those were in effect those were the operational priorities that I test Mike to deal with these were the incident management priorities that I needed to have happen ok so I was then looking to
01:07:15 have happen ok so I was then looking to try and close down those two areas did Mike down leave you to go to the bridgehead as you are as you had asked him to do before da co Lachlan arrived so as I turn from the ambulance stuff
01:07:28 so as I turn from the ambulance stuff and I'm thinking where's my command unit group I need to get this info I was looking then for any watch manager any crew manager to give them that task and
01:07:40 crew manager to give them that task and to get it to the command unit yes Mike was walking towards the tower with the be a crew he just asked and I turned
01:07:53 the be a crew he just asked and I turned looking for the Jo and I saw Andy a Lachlan right so I walked home the O'Laughlin I was in the Tabard he said are you in charge I said yes I've just taken over from that watch manager and Andy said come here and we both briefed
01:08:07 Andy said come here and we both briefed and Leo Lachlan at same time how many minutes do you think elapsed roughly between you're finishing your handover from my dad and having your initial conversation with and
01:08:18 conversation with and luckily the time it took for me to brief the lis and the time it took for Mike to brief the bi crew probably two minutes I could probably recount the briefing I gave the Elias and you could time you
01:08:29 gave the Elias and you could time you know it's okay yeah now as soon but we're physically were you at the point where you saw Andy o Lachlan I'd come
01:08:43 where you saw Andy o Lachlan I'd come off the grass mound because I'd I'd move down onto the paved area at the side of the grass bank and I was stood I believe on the footpath but it may have been in
01:08:54 on the footpath but it may have been in the road and I was speaking to the LA s at that point because it was literally will put the triage point here and I've taken about three paces from that back
01:09:05 taken about three paces from that back towards the building right when I saw Andy okay so you're more or less in the southeast southeast corner looking back probably about it's probably 20 to 30 meters from the base of the tower up to
01:09:16 meters from the base of the tower up to the southeast to the southeast corner so we're on grain fill Road where it bends into where the covered area was why was Mike down and present at any point of when you were talking to Andy Lachlan
01:09:28 when you were talking to Andy Lachlan yeah he was there the whole time as I say other than me saying I've just taken over that is the watch manager I've taken over from and the O Lachlan then Shaitan come here he turned around and he came
01:09:39 come here he turned around and he came back over okay so Mike was there for the majority of my handover briefing and the way it worked was I went through my standard framework that I gathered all
01:09:51 standard framework that I gathered all disseminate information and if I said something that Mike knew a little bit more information about or thought I might have essentially got wrong he
01:10:02 might have essentially got wrong he would chip in and correct it so Mike stood there and interjected when he had something he would add to the briefing I was given okay so it was basically handover by both of you to Andy a lot in
01:10:13 handover by both of you to Andy a lot in effect yeah I follow and as a side question were you aware at that point that group manager Welch was on the incident ground now okay
01:10:25 how long was the handover to da CA Lachlan do you think because I'd done the time Creek near the the time-consuming gathering situational awareness I think it was a lot quicker I
01:10:38 awareness I think it was a lot quicker I think it would probably be 90 seconds two minutes max I went I went through the life risk we knew about the fire hazards we knew about the other hazards we knew about what the priorities were
01:10:51 we knew about what the priorities were that I'd identified what the objectives I thought were and what I was going to be doing next and Andy took that on board yes a couple of clarifying questions which is the normal way and
01:11:03 questions which is the normal way and then said right this is what I this is my priorities this is what I want you to do any tests this did you tell Andy Lachlan that the fire was only on the
01:11:16 Lachlan that the fire was only on the outside of the building I told him that we had had a fully involved flat fire on the 4th floor be a crews had extinguished the fire but it had got out into the cladding we've now got this spreading fire at the safe face that you
01:11:28 spreading fire at the safe face that you can see there's nobody in the original flat fire we've got all of the life risk out of that original flat fire we're getting multiple FSGS throughout the building we've got ba crews trying to
01:11:40 building we've got ba crews trying to get to the FSGS to confirm what the conditions are I've asked for be a cruise to go to the inside faces their building and fight the fire my priorities are X Y Zed and that was the
01:11:51 priorities are X Y Zed and that was the sort of briefing that I gave so I'm trying to work out what the odds to make my question do - now focus on the piece they did you tell handy a Lachlan that
01:12:02 they did you tell handy a Lachlan that the fire was only on the outside of the building I told him that the initial fire was extinguished and we had to spread him fire in the outside his in his statement and clearly we'll have to explore this with him and he comes to give evidence but his recollection is that he what he got from
01:12:14 recollection is that he what he got from the briefing was that the fire was only on the outside does that what we could infer that because I've said the fire that was inside we've extinguished and we've got a fire that he's spreading on
01:12:25 we've got a fire that he's spreading on the outside did you discuss the effectiveness of the existing firefighting measures I don't think I need you to you could see from where we were what was actually I mean when the water hit the side of
01:12:37 I mean when the water hit the side of the building I didn't I didn't discuss how affected they were okay did you have a discussion about what additional firefighting measures might be necessary in order to attack a fire I did tell him about the crew crew had been tasked to
01:12:51 about the crew crew had been tasked to go to the roof and see if they could implement a and he had the same sort of questions as I had given about is that he's that safe and we gave him the same sort of reassurances that I'd been given
01:13:02 sort of reassurances that I'd been given and again he accepted them at face value and that was that that was happening as far as we were concerned did he give you the impression as to what he thought about whether that was a sensible use of VDB a resources he didn't stop it from
01:13:13 VDB a resources he didn't stop it from happening
01:13:13 happening it wasn't ad he wasn't it wasn't so much that they were ad be a cruise the through through units carry a DBA but they were service specialism and the unit that we were talking about was a
01:13:24 unit that we were talking about was a line rescue unit so they are skilled at setting up safe systems of work using ropes to restrain people from going over edges or to rescuing people using lines so it was that aspect of their skills
01:13:37 so it was that aspect of their skills it wasn't the a DBA that we were focused on it was the fact that they could implement the safe system to allow firefighters to go to the edge of the roof over 20 two-story block and not
01:13:49 roof over 20 two-story block and not fall off right was there any discussion on this topic between you Mike Darden and Andy Lachlan about about whether or
01:14:01 and Andy Lachlan about about whether or not the EDB a crew that was their crew I think five actually would have been better used going up the inside of the tower to effect rescues from the top most of the tower it wasn't part of that
01:14:12 most of the tower it wasn't part of that it was there anything why is there any reason you can think of as to why that wasn't even on the array were focused on a unique skill they had on the fire ground which was the line rescue element
01:14:24 ground which was the line rescue element and that's the only reason why I can think that how are they going to out of interest how are they going to extinguish or damp down the fire get by going to the roof and
01:14:37 going to the roof and attacking it from up there well they actually do the idea was that if you could introduce water between the cladding and the outside face of the building in effect get a wall of water
01:14:48 building in effect get a wall of water between the cladding and the building a water fall between the cladding in the building that could prevent it getting back in right was any thought given to how you would actually get water up to
01:14:59 how you would actually get water up to the top of the building drivers in Maine this is a there's a main that we use to get water to every level in that building without discussing it as we
01:15:10 building without discussing it as we didn't my assumption would be the crew would set in at the highest outlet run hose across the top of the roof rig it off probably last year off in position so it could be left and just put as much
01:15:22 so it could be left and just put as much water through it as they could now did they did you have any discussion during that handover of the need to get hold of
01:15:33 that handover of the need to get hold of a LPS aerial ladder platforms with a higher reach than that which the lfb had such as the sorry platform no did you
01:15:44 such as the sorry platform no did you talk about the number of FSGS when I submit other than there are multiple FSGS on every level in this building it was words to that effect I don't know the exact wording but it was I made the
01:15:55 the exact wording but it was I made the point that they are all over the place in this building there's not a cluster it's not a band they are through it but I didn't say that clearly I said there are FSGS
01:16:06 are FSGS all over this building did you tell did you all Mike Davin tell Andi Lachlan that a station manager great loft as it as it was had been tasked with running
01:16:17 as it was had been tasked with running the FSG yeah that was part my briefing you did tell him that yeah I said they're multiple FSG throughout the building there's a station manager who's in charge of FSG I don't know their name all I know is they're over there the base of the tower
01:16:28 they're over there the base of the tower that was where I was moving next and that was after I'd got the RVP and the dealer taskings in that manner that was the next thing let's get to the FSG
01:16:39 the next thing let's get to the FSG let's find out is the information getting to him is he getting from him to the ridge head did you discuss the strategy or tactic of how you were
01:16:51 the strategy or tactic of how you were going to send ba wearers into the tower and evacuate or extract as many residents as you could if the only way that we discussed that was at the moment everyone is rigging and everyone is
01:17:03 everyone is rigging and everyone is being committed right did you discuss the subject of what advice control room operators should be giving to callers no so the stay-put wasn't discussed devil
01:17:16 so the stay-put wasn't discussed devil isn't yet Knight wasn't no okay
01:17:27 mr. O'Laughlin says in his statement that he expected that the building should protect itself from burning planting did is that something he discussed with you do you remember I
01:17:39 discussed with you do you remember I can't remember that phrase being used right in addition to briefing and the allotment on what you knew do was he aware or did did as far as you know of
01:17:52 aware or did did as far as you know of whether there was feedback from the bridgehead to the command unit or the command unit of control about the success or failure of particular ba deployments I hadn't made contact with Brett Locker Brett loft at that point
01:18:05 Brett Locker Brett loft at that point that would have been one of the that was one of the things I was going to be trying to confirm did you have a discussion with Andy loitering about the effectiveness of radio communications as you were experiencing them on the air
01:18:17 you were experiencing them on the air and when I said what my priorities were one of them wasn't the top priority but one of the priorities probably at the third or fourth in what I said was the radios are completely ineffectual
01:18:29 radios are completely ineffectual they're swamped we need dedicated channels as fast as possible now I want to examine reviews
01:18:40 possible now I want to examine reviews in detail it's a specific subject and it's the ventilation civil smoke ventilation system if I can first you aware didn't even in general terms of a policy requirement that an incident
01:18:52 policy requirement that an incident commander shouldn't make any changes to a high-rise buildings ventilation or fire safety system without first taking appropriate advice from the responsible person such as a building owner or the
01:19:04 person such as a building owner or the tenant management organization or an appropriately trained FR a personnel yeah I'm aware of that view in reality it would be that you'd get a senior fire safety officer involved and you get them
01:19:16 safety officer involved and you get them talking to the responsible person and you'd take the word of the FS oh right at that stage were you aware of a man fr ray and fire safety person on the incident ground I knew there would be
01:19:27 incident ground I knew there would be one mobilized at that level of mobilization but I hadn't seen right did you think to have a conversation with them to looks the things they should be looking at such as DVF they'd have made themselves known to me
01:19:39 they'd have made themselves known to me that would have been one thing over the test okay now um can I just ask you to look at a CCTV CCTV image this is inq 343 and it's
01:19:56 CCTV image this is inq 343 and it's camera 3 there are two main cameras two cameras in the lobby of grande filter mr. Walton and this is camera 3 looking towards the back of the lobby from the door main door and this is taken at an
01:20:09 door main door and this is taken at an adjusted time of Oh 200 153 do you think you can see yourself in that image I'm probably the shortest person in the image in the middle is a picture with your left arm raised yeah and to your
01:20:22 your left arm raised yeah and to your right our left there's a another white helmet do you know who that might be I can't tell from that okay I think you
01:20:34 I can't tell from that okay I think you told us earlier in response to my question that you haven't seen the mobile data terminal to use the mobile data terminal on route so that means you hadn't looked at the ORD on route yes that right okay did you ask Mike Dowden
01:20:48 that right okay did you ask Mike Dowden to operate the smoke ventilation system do you remember yeah as that's an unusual layout the basement the base of the tower it's a sort of a two-story atrium and with a glass partition at the
01:21:02 atrium and with a glass partition at the side and it was that unusual layer that triggered my memory that I'd been in the building before for the smoke demonstration and so it was like a realization I've been here before right
01:21:14 realization I've been here before right then a realization as to why I've been there I looked around the lobby remembering that they demonstrated a smoke extraction system and there was a control panel and I thought it was in the lobby I saw a box on the wall and
01:21:30 the lobby I saw a box on the wall and again the sort of process thought process was well I wouldn't know to work that the local station might and I shared it to Mike Dave Mike because I knew he was the local station
01:21:41 knew he was the local station is that the smoke control panel is it working right and does this photograph capture at the moment or around the
01:21:53 capture at the moment or around the moment when you ask Mike doubt in that question I think it's probably slightly after I think because I was on I was on route to the base of the stairs which are on the right hand side they the
01:22:04 are on the right hand side they the stairs are where I'm looking yes and so I was moving to those stairs to make my way up to the bridge head and I think I had directed Mike to the panel
01:22:15 I think I had directed Mike to the panel and then I was I don't know what I'm doing I'm obviously giving some sort of instruction about what I want to happen in the lobby but my focus was on getting up to the bridge head but I wake my
01:22:26 up to the bridge head but I wake my recollection is I wasted at the base of the stairs is a glass doorway into the staircase enclosure and I waited there for the indication as to whether it was working or not because obviously that could affect the way we reused it and I
01:22:39 could affect the way we reused it and I can't remember how he indicated it I can't really shook his head or if he said it's not working or no but I know that as I went onto the staircase I knew the smoke extraction system was not
01:22:51 the smoke extraction system was not working now if you go to thank you if you go to page 30 of your witness statements and you say much the same thing but can I just direct you to the
01:23:05 thing but can I just direct you to the middle of a page you say
01:23:15 halfway down I thought I didn't know how to use it as I haven't looked I'd never thought I would know have to know how to use it as he was local you say I thought
01:23:29 use it as he was local you say I thought he might know how to use it so as he was on his way over to the left I shouted at him and said Mike that's a smoke control panel do you know how to use it he didn't say yes or no he just looked at it and I said check that panel make sure
01:23:40 it and I said check that panel make sure it's working he went over and looked at it and said no and went to the lifts and from that my assumption was that the smoke control system had failed and that was why there were FS G's because they
01:23:52 was why there were FS G's because they had got smoke logged staircases now all assumptions based on what I'd heard unseen okay then I suppose answers make my question is is it fair to say that
01:24:03 my question is is it fair to say that you assumed the smoke control system had failed but didn't yourself check it to confirm the position yourself I've sent an officer to check I take the answer I get I haven't got time to go and do the
01:24:15 get I haven't got time to go and do the jobs that I've tested that are equal to do so I trust Mike they do I had worked with him before I thought he was a competent officer I definitely still do and I took the answer at face value and
01:24:28 and I took the answer at face value and I've got no reason to doubt it did you see him or watch him attempting to operate it I saw him go to the panel he had his back to me and he turned around and gave the indication and I'm not
01:24:40 and gave the indication and I'm not again I cannot recall what the indication was I just know what I took from it right
01:24:57 you say you didn't see him as this right actually physically touched the panel trying to activate it yourself I don't have any recollection of seeing that happening right can I just ask you to
01:25:12 happening right can I just ask you to look at your email that you sent after the event it's it's MIT Tripp quadruple
01:25:23 the event it's it's MIT Tripp quadruple zero five seven one three this is an email you sent to Steve Apter on the 18th of June 2017 Steve actress director
01:25:35 18th of June 2017 Steve actress director of safety and assurance and copied and and also to Charlie Pugsley and you say sir I've just recalled an action or a mission by me in the early stages of the
01:25:46 mission by me in the early stages of the Greenville tower incident which I urgently bring to your attention and I'll read you this hill paragraph as I moved to take up the fire sector commander room I passed through the lobby and encountered watch manager Dowden an original incident command I
01:25:59 Dowden an original incident command I directed him to make sure the smoke extraction system was operating using the control panel on the wall in the lobby he went to the panel seemed to try and operate a touch pad on the screen
01:26:10 and operate a touch pad on the screen and came back to me and said something like it's not working or it's not operating I cannot be sure of the exact wording I know my understanding was that the system had failed and that what and that might and the watch manager Davin
01:26:21 that might and the watch manager Davin had tried to turn it on static wasn't responding we then continued up to the bridgehead to carry out the rules we'd been given now just just looking at that email it was sent four days after the incident is is what you said in in that
01:26:36 incident is is what you said in in that email correct or is what you're now sending is correct that you didn't see Mike operating that is more contemporaneous so I would say that is what I thought
01:26:48 what I thought right now Mike Darden's given some evidence to us about that when he came in June and he said that he didn't attempt to operate the panel only the key switch in the lobby and just for our
01:27:02 key switch in the lobby and just for our in reference that's transcript at the 26th of June 2018 at page 136 lines one to ten percent we've got that just in terms of his evidence do you think you were mistaken in your email when you say
01:27:13 were mistaken in your email when you say he attempted to operate the panel yeah yeah he's back to me though was he'll probably assumptions I made that he moved his arm towards the panel and I couldn't see what he was doing from
01:27:24 couldn't see what he was doing from where I was right so they're probably assumptions the key about that email was I is the next part of the the the email the the thing that I'm trying to draw to the attention and that's what I didn't
01:27:37 the attention and that's what I didn't know if I pass that information on in the command chain I can't remember if it was part of my briefing and that is key information to the next incident commander
01:27:48 commander it would have been key information to Richard Welch on the bridge ed when he took over from me you know as far as sector commander from me and I genuinely honestly believe I would have passed
01:28:00 honestly believe I would have passed that information on but I cannot remember and I thought it was it was too important not to make it known that I
01:28:11 important not to make it known that I can't remember if I passed it on that's why I send that email no I understand I understand I'm just just actually focusing on what you can remember about Mike Dan's actions in front of the panel did you recall at this moment did you
01:28:24 did you recall at this moment did you recall anything sorry at this moment when you were standing in front of the panel with Mike down if that is him just just after 2:00 a.m. on the morning of the fire did you recall anything from
01:28:38 the fire did you recall anything from your 2016 visit about how the system might operate no I remembered the panel was key to the operation in the system that's all and that's all I remember
01:28:49 that's all and that's all I remember okay
01:28:51 did you remember anything about the caretaker that you've been told I don't think I did I honestly don't think it went through my brain did you think to
01:29:03 went through my brain did you think to find out who the responsible person was who might know how to work but I was being I was taken over by sector commander I was focused on bear in mind what I've already said about how I got
01:29:15 what I've already said about how I got the opinion that everybody was trapped in that building and we needed to rescue them I was focused on getting up to where that was happening and taking charge of that right so again it's an
01:29:26 charge of that right so again it's an assumption but my assumption would be that the commander behind me who would probably be on the command unit would be going through those sort of processes because they've got the the luxury between the next step down the chain
01:29:38 between the next step down the chain they've had a little bit longer a little bit more information but that was an assumption you may be yeah it's an assumption we would all make is that as the incident progresses a new hand command on the commander behind you as I
01:29:51 command on the commander behind you as I said we might I've checked Mike's assumptions and try to fill any gaps that might be there the same thing would have happened with me with an do Lachlan and the same thing would have happened with him when he was taken over from him that each incident commander fills the
01:30:05 that each incident commander fills the picture that next step because it's so dynamic initially did you is there any reason why apart from trusting Mike down and would do it any reason why you
01:30:16 and would do it any reason why you didn't attempt to operate the smoke ventilation system yourself I know I hadn't paid attention to the detail I just made sure that it would have been captured and recorded as instructions so
01:30:28 captured and recorded as instructions so I knew I knew I hadn't paid attention to the detail and I'm not there to be focused on a panel I'm there to be focused on rescuing the people in the building that is the role I've been given in the command structure that's
01:30:40 given in the command structure that's the one I'm gonna deliver and that's what I mean to do right to the best of your knowledge who was the first lfb officer to attend the fire who would have been appropriately trained in the use of this smoke extraction system know
01:30:54 use of this smoke extraction system know that if the officer would have been trained in the to that smoke extraction system the fire senior fire safety officers are trained in general terms about fixed installations and they would use that
01:31:07 installations and they would use that general knowledge to interpret the system that they are encountering and that's where the local responsible person contact is so useful because they're applying a general knowledge and
01:31:18 they're applying a general knowledge and the local representatives got the specifics and they just apply that to what they're dealing with can we look at another picture which is inq quintuple zero four three three nine there it is
01:31:32 zero four three three nine there it is this is CCTV image from it with an adjusted time of 157 54 so I think that's just before you yeah go to it it's open and if we zoom into it I think
01:31:44 it's open and if we zoom into it I think we can see some written instructions on the bottom of the panel it's not that easy to see and we need to zoom a bit more well that's not I think is gonna
01:31:57 more well that's not I think is gonna get worse the place we get to the best of your recollection mr. Walton were there instructions on how to use this system I never went to the panel you know right
01:32:14 let me see if I can do a little better can I ask you please to go to be LA but I'm looking at the clock and I've been noticed by mr. Kenya mr. chairman perhaps this is an appropriate time for another short break I am happy to do a
01:32:29 another short break I am happy to do a little bit very yes sir we'll certainly stop the stop at the end of this topic then so if you could please be shame be la quadruple zero two nine six six this
01:32:43 la quadruple zero two nine six six this is a photograph taken by the inquiry of the inside of the smoke vent box and the instructions that are there the grand
01:32:56 instructions that are there the grand filter smoked extract system my question is do you reversed of all do you remember seeing these on the night and I
01:33:07 remember seeing these on the night and I said you didn't look inside the box these even familiar to you from your 2016 introduction to the system they weren't there in 2016 because that's why
01:33:19 weren't there in 2016 because that's why we asked them to write them yeah yeah that's basic how to use guide alright would those instructions be the sorts of things you would expect to be on the Ord
01:33:30 things you would expect to be on the Ord and available to an incident commander through the MDT yeah if I'd in case of that I would have got it onto the other okay now
01:33:48 you can see the various steps and the second step is override for manual control of individual floors whereby you
01:34:00 control of individual floors whereby you switch the main control panel from auto to on as you can see and then the second key to be used in yellow smoke extract key switch in each lift lobby to manually operate dampers on each
01:34:12 manually operate dampers on each individual all individual floors now I know you didn't see these instructions does that trigger a recollection as to the kind of thing you were told about
01:34:23 the kind of thing you were told about how to operate the system when he went in April 2016 when I was asked specific questions last week an image of those yellow box control panels was part of the question impact that was sent to me
01:34:35 the question impact that was sent to me it was saying that yellow box written would prompted a really really vague recollection and I mean really vague there was a system where you could that
01:34:47 there was a system where you could that affected the use of the fans on the floor but I couldn't tell you how he did it and I couldn't really tell you what the effect of it was right okay to the
01:34:58 the effect of it was right okay to the best of your recollection do you think anybody understood these instructions on the night of the fire that'd be supposition though I made what I didn't know they were there
01:35:13 now in your supplemental statement can I just ask you please to turn to paragraphs 42 and 44
01:35:33 you same Paragon 42 let's page 11 internally yes you you you recall Mike dad saying it isn't working and then you
01:35:44 dad saying it isn't working and then you say in the split second after he indicated this I took it to mean that the smoke extraction system wasn't operating removing smoke from the flammable diesel protecting the staircases no smoke entering them I assume this to be because the fans and
01:35:57 assume this to be because the fans and vents were not operating for some reason now that's an assumption is it yeah you made on the night completely sort as I as I moved from the lobby I assumed the fire was spreading up the outside of
01:36:09 the fire was spreading up the outside of the building in a way I didn't think he could possibly do I knew the smoke extraction wasn't working I knew the lifts weren't working I suspected the fire was going to breach on multiple
01:36:21 fire was going to breach on multiple floors and I had formed the opinion I couldn't rely on anything in that building and I was moving to the Bridgette as fire sector commander to
01:36:32 Bridgette as fire sector commander to initiate rescue and firefighting on that basis
01:36:35 basis can I just focus on two phrases in paragraphs 42 and 44 being shown you 42 you say in 42 three lines up from the end of the paragraph removing smoke from the flat lobbies or protecting the
01:36:47 the flat lobbies or protecting the staircases from smoke entry wall and then in 44 you say three lines down the system protecting the lobbies and staircase failed now my question because
01:36:58 staircase failed now my question because you're linking lobbies and staircases there my question is was it your understanding on the night of the fire that the system should have operated on multiple floors and also been capable of
01:37:11 multiple floors and also been capable of dealing with smoke in multiple lobbies and the staircase based on my contemporaneous notes that must have been my assumption because that's what I wrote in my contemporaneous notes focusing on my reflection since I was
01:37:23 focusing on my reflection since I was given specific detail and I revisited that that the realization visit in my mind I now believe that that system
01:37:36 mind I now believe that that system covered the lobbies and it was either inferred or stated that because it kept the lobby's clear it would keep the staircase clear so my
01:37:47 it would keep the staircase clear so my assumption was that that system would keep or was designed to keep the lobby and the staircase clear but I don't think the extraction was in the staircase I think it was in the lobby
01:37:59 staircase I think it was in the lobby now and they've covered this in part having been told by Mike Davin it's not working or words to that effect did you think to get someone to get hold off a building owner to bring them down
01:38:11 building owner to bring them down urgently to the tower to get it working or to find out why it wasn't working I was moving to fire sexy commander I was focused completely on the rescue and the firefighting I didn't think to get that
01:38:23 firefighting I didn't think to get that message out of the tower to the incident commander so what would happen then you might say it wasn't working you didn't pass the message on or get our bkc all the TM over there what were your
01:38:36 the TM over there what were your thoughts about how these make an extraction system could then be used I didn't know I still don't know if I briefed Richard Welch to that effect I can't recall if I did or I didn't right
01:38:47 can't recall if I did or I didn't right I would expect I did but I don't know I would expect but I don't know because I wasn't on the command unit that the subsequent instant commanders would get
01:38:58 subsequent instant commanders would get the Audion formation they would look at what fixed installations were in the building see if they were going to be able to be used and they would have been checking if they could use that smoke extraction was it operating could it
01:39:10 extraction was it operating could it work that's what I believe would happen and I've got no reason to think it didn't happen on the night would that be
01:39:21 didn't happen on the night would that be a good point was - yes yes it would and people have done the break now and so you gave the usher don't talk through it on
01:39:29 on it's peers and we'll be back at 10:00 to 4:00 the intent for them please
01:49:16 you
01:52:28 yes would you want some small team to come in please okay
01:52:48 but you have to carry almost awesome yes Wrigley this was a minute thank you for going back miss Dalton and can I just revisit one little topic
01:52:59 can I just revisit one little topic about the smoke vent system on the night and we're talking about what Mike Darden did with it his evidence was that he went to activate the point using the keys and switch it to manual but he
01:53:11 keys and switch it to manual but he decided against it because he didn't want to interfere with a fire solution in the building because it could worsen the situation for both residents and firefighters that that's that that's the gist of his evidence and he says that he
01:53:24 gist of his evidence and he says that he told you of his actions and then put the keys in to the smoke panel in the lobby area where he'd found them does that assist you with remembering what was
01:53:36 assist you with remembering what was said during your exchange with mr. Dabney in relation to the smoke vent system as I say I've got no recollection of any discussion any conversation we might after he went to the panel there
01:53:47 might after he went to the panel there was an indication it wasn't working I left the lobby and went to the the bridgeheads to take over fire sector commander right I didn't discuss anything with him I just went okay and that's my recollection okay now at peak
01:54:02 that's my recollection okay now at peak just turning to a different topic which is your journey to the bridgehead you go to the bridgehead I think shortly after this smoke vent discussion takes place
01:54:13 this smoke vent discussion takes place is that right after I tell them to go to the panel yes yeah so just after 2:00 a.m. yeah that would be that from the UK pick now a page 31 of your statement you
01:54:25 pick now a page 31 of your statement you say
01:54:30 a third of the way work alter the way down you ask who's in charge on this bridgehead and you say listen up who's
01:54:41 bridgehead and you say listen up who's in charge on the bridgehead station manager wants to know in an Irish voice someone I didn't know came from the corner I'm in charge so I shout to come to me and we headed towards each other I now know it was Brian O'Keefe but at the time I couldn't remember even though he told me his name mm-hmm I told him I
01:54:54 he told me his name mm-hmm I told him I was up there for fire sector commander and was going to be taking the sector I told him I was going to organize the bridgehead um no did he react what was his reaction to that I again the sort of
01:55:08 his reaction to that I again the sort of briefing it took place was I told him what I wanted to know I asked I asked him to show me where the behavior being directed from and he showed me the entry
01:55:20 directed from and he showed me the entry control points and a quick look at the entry control point and I could see there was information starting to go on the wall and I said we need more boards up here I don't want it on the walls I
01:55:31 up here I don't want it on the walls I want it on the boards and one of the officers who was actually writing the information on the wall told me there was too much information he wouldn't go on boards and I said it will if we get
01:55:42 on boards and I said it will if we get it off
01:55:43 it off summat like that there was that sort of discussion there I don't think it was with Brian O'Keefe I then said to Brian the tasking that I'd already talked about to my dad and so I said I want to
01:55:54 about to my dad and so I said I want to know about the FSGS are we getting ba to them are they trapped or do they think they're trapped if they're trapped what do we need to bring him in I want to know are we getting the a to this face and we were
01:56:05 getting the a to this face and we were stood facing this direction with the balconies behind me and so I pointed to my right to indicate the face of the building I was worried about I said are we getting behaviour to this face I want
01:56:18 we getting behaviour to this face I want to know if this fire which is going on the outside of the building is getting back in if it's getting back in can we stop it if we're going to stop it what do we need once you've got that I want
01:56:29 do we need once you've got that I want to know how many BA are in where are they what are their priorities where do we know he searched where do we know this fires and actually that that
01:56:42 know this fires and actually that that last part where do we know this voice I can remember if I said that but I did say where do we know where searched and what resources are you going to need I'll be back to you in about two minutes
01:56:54 I'll be back to you in about two minutes I want those answers where are the fit boards where's the FSG information be coordinated he said over there and I went over to the watch when she was doing the fit boards I didn't have a discussion as such I stated what I
01:57:07 discussion as such I stated what I wanted to know go and get it and then I moved away do you've given you've given us a long list of questions you asked him yeah did you get answers to each of those nope and I said I said do you I
01:57:20 those nope and I said I said do you I think it started off it would be something like do you know any bear you've got in and that was right this would be it I said how many behave we got in he said come over here I'll show
01:57:31 got in he said come over here I'll show you the boards and that's when I looked at the board's because that gave me an indication of any tallies ring the board's that gives me an idea of how many wearers are in and I thought well I'm not going to count the tallies and I'm not gonna look at the remarks column
01:57:42 I'm not gonna look at the remarks column of where they are so I said to him this is what I want to know get that information and I will come back to you and then I moved on to the feed boards because I was going to do the same sort of process with the fire soil guidance
01:57:54 of process with the fire soil guidance information and then I was going to go to the balcony and organize the balcony because I just come through that and it was not passable and I knew so that was the only staircase in the building and
01:58:06 the only staircase in the building and if any casualties were coming out they were gonna have to go across that balcony and I needed to get it clear so casualties clearly grace right let me let me see if I can break all that down a bit advice by reference to some specific questions
01:58:17 specific questions did Brian O'Keefe at that stage when you had this discussion with him tell you about these smoke conditions in the stairs I don't recall asking that
01:58:28 stairs I don't recall asking that information in that way I asked the are they trapped or are they trapped if they're trapped what do we need to get them out did he give you any information about the smoke conditions in any of the
01:58:39 about the smoke conditions in any of the lobbies it'd be the same answer I asked that question so he never gave me the answer right did you did he give you any information about how high up into
01:58:50 any information about how high up into the building BA whereas have managed to get thus far that was part of the way searched where we go he Nixon what was his answer he hadn't got it past him to have it ready when I got back to him in
01:59:01 have it ready when I got back to him in the next two minutes basically I was priming them what I wanted to know and I wasn't going to take the time while they got that information I was moving to the next task to prime them and then I was
01:59:12 next task to prime them and then I was going to do the rain robbing a game and get the information that I'd been requested it's it's a common way of doing this in my opinion I believe it is it's very I've always done it where you
01:59:23 it's very I've always done it where you you prime what you need to know and while they're doing that gathering that information you don't stand there and wait you move to the next prime then prime them and by that time you're ready for that
01:59:34 that time you're ready for that information to come okay let's go to the point at which you are ready for the information to come back to you from Brian O'Keefe at that point did he tell you about the smoke condition in the
01:59:45 you about the smoke condition in the stairs I didn't get to that point as I moved from watch manager to Silvo it was running the FSG information I walked from the lift lobby area back towards
01:59:58 from the lift lobby area back towards the balcony to get the balcony cleared enough for casualties to pass as I was adjacent to the base of the main staircase group manager Welch met me and I was still wearing the initial that the
02:00:12 I was still wearing the initial that the incident commander to Bart because when we had the handover VLAN do Lockland and he directed me to fire sector commander I said to him because I knew there was a lot of resources gone into the building I'm gonna keep this on until I get given
02:00:25 I'm gonna keep this on until I get given a fire sector commander that's how bad so that they know who's in charge up there right mr. walls I'm sorry it's getting late in the afternoon I don't want to we know that this is key because
02:00:37 violence the original question I went to go to the bridgehead about and I didn't get there and I was relieved of the fire sector commander
02:00:48 relieved of the fire sector commander role by group manager Welch who had been sent there to take that on and I got given a different role which was to become VA logistics on the balcony so I briefed group manager Welch with what I was doing and what I what my next
02:01:02 what I was doing and what I what my next task would be and the Rhino chief had been briefed to see how that information Luise - Silvo I'd checked if she needed any assistance and and we'd agreed that she could probably do with a couple of crew managers to her sister and I was
02:01:15 crew managers to her sister and I was now going to sort the balcony out he said right I'm taking over as far sector commander you go and sort the balcony and that so I didn't get back to Brian O'Keefe's that information never came so
02:01:26 O'Keefe's that information never came so is the short answer to my question about the list of but the answers to the list of questions that you posed to him that you didn't get the answers because you were deployed by Richard Welch to do the balcony yes right now you say on page 32 I'm going
02:01:46 right now you say on page 32 I'm going to come back to Richard Welch in in due course but you say on page 32 of your statement that you moved over to Luther Silver's his three lines down she had at
02:01:57 Silver's his three lines down she had at least two FIV boards running the one that was absolutely full had information such as flat numbers who was it in that sort of stuff and the one that was half full she was filling it and it appeared she was talking to people on the radio
02:02:08 she was talking to people on the radio getting information I didn't want to interrupt her but in between I said Lou are you overwhelmed by this or can he run this and she went I could do with a bit of help so I said I'd try and get her some crew managers to take some of the traffic now my first question is did
02:02:22 the traffic now my first question is did you get some crew managers to take some of the traffic I believe that was part of my hand over to Richard Welch okay so well do you know whether he did I don't know okay and now you say there were at
02:02:34 know okay and now you say there were at least two fi B's running one absolutely full with flat numbers and one half full you say I just wonder whether we can
02:02:46 you say I just wonder whether we can identify the full one can I ask you please to be shown M eet triple zero one five
02:02:52 five three five one five nine three five
02:03:05 that's not the ward that's not it was using the casualty poster the board that I initially saw its gridded for the
02:03:16 I initially saw its gridded for the purpose of FSG and that was the board that was being used by Louisa DaSilva when I got to the frigate I see do you recognize this item at all from your visit to the bridgehead when it was on
02:03:28 visit to the bridgehead when it was on the second floor well it's it's one of the boards that can be used as a forward information board we've got three or four different laminates that can be used one is the casualty poster which is designed specifically for FSG I remember
02:03:42 designed specifically for FSG I remember registering that she was using the FSG casualty poster so I knew it was a an organized controlled management of that
02:03:53 organized controlled management of that information right and on that casualty poster what zoomable in generic terms what detail there was that there were the column headings were being completed
02:04:05 the column headings were being completed in the correct manner so there were a number of flat numbers there were a number of indications of how many people were in there that's like a thing I didn't look at any of the detail I just wanted to make sure that information was
02:04:16 wanted to make sure that information was getting from the control to the incident ground and getting from the incident ground to the bridgehead and that was an indication that there was information getting to the bridgehead right I was going to come back and go into the
02:04:28 going to come back and go into the detail now you referred to writing on the second floor wall earlier on in your evidence this afternoon do you remember who was putting the writing up on the wall at the at the entry control point
02:04:41 wall at the at the entry control point on the left-hand side of the board there was I think a firefighter who was writing information at the side of the entry control boards and when I met
02:04:53 entry control boards and when I met Richard Welch and starts to give my hand over one of the first things he asked me for was a china graph and as I gave him my hand over he was writing key points on the wall at the base of the staircase
02:05:04 on the wall at the base of the staircase on
02:05:04 on that Commodore as I as I said stuff he was writing the key points down okay can I ask you to be share the photograph which is M et triple zero one five nine three so I'm so sorry
02:05:16 three so I'm so sorry triple zero one three zero seven four is that familiar to you do you think no nope
02:05:27 firefighter a burn gave the evidence that he was writing that on the wall on the second floor when the bridge head was there it could be I didn't see any of the detail at where that was happening I saw the the the act of
02:05:40 happening I saw the the the act of writing on the wall right and because of the training I had about Lacan or where they had to relocate the bridgehead and information where it was difficult to move information and that's where
02:05:51 move information and that's where forward information boards had come from and because I delivered back to basics training where that was a key aspect of it I didn't want that happening so I challenged it and said get more boards
02:06:02 challenged it and said get more boards up use the boards well I didn't see that actioned because I moved on and I never got back to check again okay did you see a watch manager writing FSG information
02:06:15 a watch manager writing FSG information on the wall on the back of the second-floor balcony when I got onto the balcony on my way in there was a watch manager at the end of the balcony I
02:06:27 manager at the end of the balcony I touch base with them in the same way as to expose with Brian O'Keefe etc so on my way in I said I'm up here is five six commander are you doing be a logistics the answer was yes I said right I want
02:06:38 the answer was yes I said right I want to know what be a we've gotten to balcony what equipment we've got I'm gonna come back to you in a minute I've that answer for me I'll be back in about two minutes then I went into Ryan O'Keefe same sort of conversation went to Louisa - Silvo
02:06:50 of conversation went to Louisa - Silvo and I was on that return leg when I met Richard Welch I see
02:06:57 do you remember to the best of your recollection whether you saw FSG information relating to higher floors inscribed on the walls or the forward
02:07:08 inscribed on the walls or the forward information board I can 100% say I never saw any FSG information on walls other than later an incident in the lobby where Glynn Williams was doing a
02:07:21 where Glynn Williams was doing a schematic and recording information on the wall there while I was doing the sort of Lobby sector commander role that I evolved into later in the incident tonight during the period that you were
02:07:32 tonight during the period that you were at the bridgehead after having come up there when first given the far sector commander role during that entire period before Richard Welch came did you learn that fire had penetrated into flats
02:07:47 that fire had penetrated into flats above the fourth floor I never had any confirmation regarding where fires were located in the building I never had any indication at all did you discover how
02:08:02 indication at all did you discover how high in the building the smoke had reached and I hadn't had that information back I'd asked for it I didn't get back to get the answer did you discover did you ever discover the smoke conditions in the lobbies No
02:08:19 was that do you think that was ever part of my responsibility I'd ask their questions I didn't get a chance to get the answers right because Richard Wells took over from you because I was no longer in that role I was on the balcony organizing the BI logistics
02:08:31 the balcony organizing the BI logistics to make sure we didn't run out of BA we didn't run over let's turn them to the hand over to Richard Welch can you remember first of all what time group
02:08:42 remember first of all what time group manager Welch appeared at the second floor bridgehead I haven't got a clue it would be of a because I spent seconds with the watch manager on the balcony
02:08:53 with the watch manager on the balcony probably about a minute we Brian O'Keefe probably about the same time we've Louisa - Silvo I would guess that it would be within five minutes of me going up the staircase I take over
02:09:04 up the staircase I take over did you hear a radio message on your fire ground right here or even your air wave radio for that matter that Richard Welch had taken over as incident commander I can't remember that message
02:09:17 commander I can't remember that message oh my god do you remember the declaration of a major incident I can't remember that being declared over fiber and radio okay when you first saw
02:09:28 and radio okay when you first saw Richard Welch at the second floor bridgehead did he come up to you we met on the corridor going in different directions okay so it was on the second
02:09:39 directions okay so it was on the second floor on the corridor adjacent to the staircase right did you did did you give him a hand over yeah at that point yep
02:09:50 him a hand over yeah at that point yep and as I summarize what I've just talked about I told him there's a watch manager running BA that I don't know but he seems to have a good grip of it I don't know his name he's got an Irish accent
02:10:04 know his name he's got an Irish accent there's a watch manager running fib boards with FSG information on her name is Louisa - Silvo I've been on jobs were in the past she did a good job and
02:10:17 in the past she did a good job and that's where I think I said she needs some crew managers to assist that well I can't be at 100% on that I said I've asked for what we've talked about
02:10:29 I've asked for what we've talked about from Brian Oh Keith said it again I've told him I'll be coming back to him in a couple of minutes I'm going to the balcony to get their balconies sorted
02:10:40 balcony to get their balconies sorted out
02:10:41 out as I was saying that I've been asked for the China graph and the key points were being written on the wall and then Richard Welch said the reason I mentioned the ICT but it's really
02:10:52 mentioned the ICT but it's really unusual to have an icy table are dynamic rigid and I've explained why I had it on and it was a conscious decision and so one of the first things he asked me was are you in charge and I explained why I was still in that
02:11:04 and I explained why I was still in that so Bart and he said well I'm taking over fire sexy commander so as he said that I peeled it off and I literally threw it in the corner because I wasn't gonna need it anymore no and and so we had that exchange he
02:11:17 no and and so we had that exchange he recorded the information and then he said right I'm taking over spice it's a commander I'm gonna make you be a logistics officer I want you to sort that balcony out I want to not run out
02:11:28 that balcony out I want to not run out of ba and I do not want to have any equipment go and make that happen during that exchange did you tell Richard Welch that Andy O'Laughlin had taken over as
02:11:42 that Andy O'Laughlin had taken over as incident commander I assumed I didn't tell him I assumed that he would have been tasked by an do Lachlan I didn't know he'd what how he'd arrived there
02:11:53 know he'd what how he'd arrived there anything like that I said my assumption was he was one of the gems that had arrived the incident commander who I knew was at neo Lockley had given him a task which was to relieve me which is
02:12:04 task which was to relieve me which is the normal process it was if a more senior officer is available and the circumstances of the incident make it appropriate the senior officer takes over in the different command roles did
02:12:15 over in the different command roles did you know that he Richard Welch had taken or thought he'd taken incident command from Brett Loftus station manager who he thought was incident commander
02:12:27 thought was incident commander right during your discussion they were called it a hand over did your discussion with Richard Welch at the bridgehead did you have a discussion with him about re-entry of fire into the
02:12:40 with him about re-entry of fire into the into the building I'd prefer to call it a handover because it was and I didn't have a discussion in somewhat jazz where I thought it may or may not be I didn't
02:12:51 I thought it may or may not be I didn't guess about reentry I said one of the tasks is to get ba to this space to confirm if the fire is getting back in and if it is to confirm whether we can
02:13:02 and if it is to confirm whether we can hold it and what we need to be able to do that now just get back to your second statement if we can at paragraphs 43 and 44 on page 11 you say in two places you
02:13:17 44 on page 11 you say in two places you discuss in two places the likelihood that the building design principle had for the high-rise had failed first of all you say that in the middle of
02:13:28 all you say that in the middle of paragraph 43 can I show you that you say and this is I think in in connection with your handover from Mike Dowden you
02:13:40 with your handover from Mike Dowden you say it made me draw the conclusion that it was likely that the building design principle for this high-rise premises had failed and conditions within the building's escape routes were compromised and likely not to be possible without be a failure of this
02:13:54 possible without be a failure of this stay-put building design principle could also indicate that the fire as well as smoke may be spreading to multiple compartments and levels if it had entered the building interior I feared this apparent smoke spread throughout
02:14:06 this apparent smoke spread throughout the building meant a compartment a tional separation was breached and then go on to power 44 you say in the middle of that picking it up in the middle of
02:14:19 of that picking it up in the middle of the paragraph the sister protecting the lobbies and staircases had failed we had multiple reports throughout the building the people were trapped and rest required rescue and this indicated the compartment ation and separation within the building had probably failed causing
02:14:31 the building had probably failed causing the lobbies on various levels to be impossible there was a rapidly spreading fire in the exterior fabric of the build on the east face and it's possible this fire was penetrating back into the building on upper floors through the windows I didn't know if the compartment
02:14:45 windows I didn't know if the compartment ation within the building was intact and able to check any subsequent interior spread allowing us to get ba crews in place to effect rescues and fight the fire simultaneously now I've shown you a lot of that because my question is this
02:14:57 lot of that because my question is this at the point at which you see Richard Welch at the bridgehead had the discussion with him did you tell him your thoughts about the likelihood that
02:15:09 your thoughts about the likelihood that the building design principle for Hine rights had failed and I'm summarizing that it was possible that the fire was penetrating back into the building I can't remember the exact wording but it
02:15:23 can't remember the exact wording but it was obvious that we've got multiple FSGS I told him what I was trying to confirm one way or the other in effect my
02:15:34 one way or the other in effect my assumption and I believe everybody's assumption on the fire ground was that that is what had happened I was trying to get it confirmed to make sure that everything we were doing based on assumption was reasonable and was
02:15:46 assumption was reasonable and was necessary and it was and that's that's the answer looking back on it we've got to the point where you've got a you call it a
02:15:58 point where you've got a you call it a handover with Richard Welsh at the bridgehead looking back on your time on the incident ground up to that point at what point do you think you come to the conclusion that the building design
02:16:09 conclusion that the building design principle for high-rise premises had failed in relation to this building and that it was possible or even likely that the fire was penetrating back into the building when I put my foot on the
02:16:20 building when I put my foot on the bottom step of the stairs after I'd had the report back from Mike this smoke extraction and failed at that point with everything else had seen smelt heard all
02:16:32 everything else had seen smelt heard all the information I've gathered the confirmation that that system had failed the lifts had failed I could see the fire was spreading on the outside of the building in a way it should be impossible for it to do so I had got
02:16:44 impossible for it to do so I had got that in my head at that point there I had some really earthy language about what that building was at that point I know it went through my mind the best working for it is this
02:16:55 my mind the best working for it is this building is compromised completely I cannot rely on anything did you then have a discussion with group manager Welch about how you were going
02:17:07 manager Welch about how you were going to deploy crews in order to assist occupants to evacuate from the building I didn't have it with watch my we his
02:17:18 I didn't have it with watch my we his group manager Welch I had it with Brian O'Keefe about what was his priorities and these priorities were we're getting ba to every FSG yeah so that was I knew that was happening and that was part my
02:17:30 that was happening and that was part my briefing at the moment we've got everybody arrived in Regan in BA I knew that from the briefing I gathered from Mike diodon they're coming in were holding him under on the balcony they're
02:17:41 holding him under on the balcony they're getting called in when they're needed and they're getting briefed to go to every FSG knows that was what was happening on that region to the best of your recollection on what you saw was
02:17:53 your recollection on what you saw was there any system for prioritizing among the FSG calls particular FSG calls I never saw a system for that when I was taking over that role when I was getting
02:18:06 taking over that role when I was getting my situational awareness as far as sector commander again going back to the questions I was asking that was about identifying who was at most risk and those would have been the priorities I wouldn't have been prioritizing about
02:18:19 wouldn't have been prioritizing about the numbers the age the mobility anything like that I would have been looking at who is at most risk of this fire getting to them first and they would have been the priorities and then
02:18:30 would have been the priorities and then those other factors would have come in as secondary factors to move people in that privatization and how would you I'm sorry I tried this did you have a discussion with a great manager Welch
02:18:41 discussion with a great manager Welch about how you would go about getting information accurate reliable information as to which FSG callers were the ones most acutely affected by fire or smoke we never had that conversation
02:18:52 or smoke we never had that conversation but the FSG process is the I control ask those questions and they gather that information and they send it to the incident brain so details about how many their condition their age the
02:19:06 how many their condition their age the conditions they are in is all part of that information gathering process and that's what comes to us on the control information forms and that's what should be being used to inform the breach head
02:19:19 be being used to inform the breach head and that's what's used by the be a coordinator to prioritise where they're sending people
02:19:31 during the period that you were far sector command did you ever consider the possibility that it would be impossible to extinguish the fire within the
02:19:42 to extinguish the fire within the building no we weren't we were gonna rescue everybody and we were gonna put fire it what did you consider the
02:19:56 fire it what did you consider the occasion during the pier that you were fire sector commander mr. Walton did you consider whether it would be preferable to focus your resources on firefighting
02:20:08 to focus your resources on firefighting as a priority or on rescue as a priority we had to do simultaneous action if we could stop the fire getting back in then there were no rescues that needed doing
02:20:20 there were no rescues that needed doing it would be a case of clear the staircases and people can walk out tomorrow so firefighting was a priority the likelihood and probably the the true
02:20:32 the likelihood and probably the the true truth of the situation which hadn't been confirmed yet was that the fire was probably back in in which case we needed to rescue so we needed to carry out both until we had a confirmation one way or
02:20:44 until we had a confirmation one way or the other as to what should be the priority so we're in a catch-22 but there was no escape route for the people to use themselves they had to be rescued
02:20:56 to use themselves they had to be rescued and we had to try and maintain that pathway for us to carry out those rescues let alone those people to try and use it themselves so that meant the firefighting was essential
02:21:19 yes mr. Walton thank you very much those are all the questions I have for you at the moment and there may be one or two which after a short break I might you'll have to ask but I hope not say mr. chairman might not be a
02:21:30 say mr. chairman might not be a convenient memory for a yes of course we'll Frank miss tools in it sometimes happens after mature reflection council funds there are other questions that need to be asked so I'm gonna rise for
02:21:44 my home sake let's go with five minutes if I need a little longer I'll get something I'll get a runner to send a message back and that will give today and then we'll get you back and see if
02:21:57 and then we'll get you back and see if several more questions okay like to give it the our own children colleges
02:22:16 but well I'll say up those four before when you send the actual for me to say it already
02:29:35 from mr. Willett I assume a few more just a few mr. Chanin yes could you ask mr. welcome to come back
02:29:58 thank you his tools and I think a few more mr. Linton thank you thank you for coming back to me first of all there was a reference in the document I wanted to show you earlier and I didn't find it
02:30:09 show you earlier and I didn't find it properly
02:30:10 properly can I please ask for it to be shown it's I WS five zeros 169 at page 91 I WS five
02:30:23 I WS five zeros 169 at page 91 I WS five zeros 169 at page 91 now you won't have seen this document before it's an email
02:30:35 seen this document before it's an email from Peter Madison at KC TN o to a number of people at our B KC and indeed
02:30:46 number of people at our B KC and indeed others and complaints at KC TM o as well and also copied in fact to a gentleman called Edward Devon who is a resident and it's addressed to mr. Devon and it
02:30:59 and it's addressed to mr. Devon and it says dear mr. Devon thank you for your message I would respond to this as you raise as follows and if you can have that scrolled down to the foot of that page where the title to the paragraphs
02:31:12 page where the title to the paragraphs is activation of the automatic opening vents aov and it says the automatic opening vents are designed to disperse smoke in the event of a fire the old
02:31:23 smoke in the event of a fire the old system was beyond repair and the new system serving floors 5 and above was commissioned in January 2016 then it says this the system does not
02:31:35 says this the system does not automatically contact the fire brigade when activated as the brigade does not provide a response in such circumstances and then it goes on to discuss a phone connection and then it says this the fire brigade are aware that the system
02:31:48 fire brigade are aware that the system is not yet fully automated and have confirmed that they are comfortable with the way that the system currently operates now that is what was being said
02:31:59 operates now that is what was being said in this email and I should just have indicated that the date of this email you go to the top is 18th of April 2016 so 10 days before
02:32:12 is 18th of April 2016 so 10 days before your visit my question is were you aware either at the time of your visit or after that that as is said here the fire
02:32:25 after that that as is said here the fire brigade are have confirmed that they are comfortable with the way the system currently operates next question still
02:32:38 currently operates next question still on the subject of the ventilation system and you described quite graphically for us not real long ago in your evidence about the moment you took the first step on the stairs that's when you realize the building failed and one of the
02:32:49 the building failed and one of the contributing factors was that the smoke vent extractions where the Smeg extraction system wasn't wasn't working if the smoke extraction system had been working do you think that would have
02:33:00 working do you think that would have assisted self evacuation by residents and assisted firefighters in effecting evacuations from what you knew of it it was designed to do that on the floor that activated so nobody expected to
02:33:12 that activated so nobody expected to right now I want to ask you just a number of questions about a specific floor and flat but before I do that can
02:33:24 floor and flat but before I do that can I just ask you in general terms do you have any recollection from the night of any particular rescues particular flats particular floors no when I went to the balcony fairly soon after that I carried
02:33:37 balcony fairly soon after that I carried a casualty from the building on my way back into the building I realized that the only way in and out the building was going to get compromised by the falling debris so I then took over the role of
02:33:50 debris so I then took over the role of using police riot shields over our heads to be able to access and egress the building so I stayed in the lobby and managed that and stayed in that role for
02:34:02 managed that and stayed in that role for the next six hours something like that and so I never was involved in actually engaging with any of the rescues did you
02:34:14 engaging with any of the rescues did you did you where you were where or did you become aware during the night that there was a occupant of the tower on the 22nd floor flat 193 as it turns out who came
02:34:28 floor flat 193 as it turns out who came down and escaped without breathing equipment or without PPE just after 3:00 a.m. I would have been in that Lobby role at that time and I've got no
02:34:40 role at that time and I've got no recollection of anybody coming out when I was in that Lobby role no without the assistance of fire service so I wasn't aware of that now on the basis that that is what happened how are you how are you
02:34:53 is what happened how are you how are you able to explain that a survivor could come down in those conditions the crews can't go up I can't explain that I never saw it so I can't find out were you
02:35:04 saw it so I can't find out were you aware or did you become aware that occupants of the building had phone for help and that two hours into the fire they still hadn't been rescued I was
02:35:18 they still hadn't been rescued I was aware that FSGS were going on well into the incident so but by extrapolating that yes I was aware that there were people interested in FSG situations went
02:35:29 people interested in FSG situations went into the fire did there come a time when you became aware that firefighters were struggling to get above the 15th floor I can't remember being told that but because of the way we were in I was
02:35:41 because of the way we were in I was involved in the implementation of additional fire mains that type of thing it was obvious that we were having difficulties and the way I was being asked to supply additional a DBA and SDB
02:35:52 asked to supply additional a DBA and SDB I where astray at the night
02:36:06 now we discussed earlier in your evidence the deployment of EDB a whereas the line crew to go to the roof what eventually happened to that idea I never
02:36:17 eventually happened to that idea I never heard anything more about that I don't know if it was achieved or you know if I'm talking from my knowledge I had no knowledge of that being achieved from
02:36:29 knowledge of that being achieved from what I've seen elsewhere in the inquiry I know it didn't happen right did you ever discuss with Richard Welch where he came to the bridge heavens and you started talking about getting people out of the building to put it loosely did
02:36:41 of the building to put it loosely did you talk about a strategy whereby you'd work from the top down or from the bottom up no we we prioritize the people at most risk so that would have been what we talked about I was telling him
02:36:53 what we talked about I was telling him how we were going to identify who was at most risk with the questions that I'd asked and then he would decide on what the priority loss for rescue on that information did he ever discuss with you a strategy whereby you would do floor
02:37:04 a strategy whereby you would do floor sweeps and work your way up the building when I was on the be a lobby sector so I was on the balcony on the second floor controlling bioresources there the
02:37:16 controlling bioresources there the message came back to me to brief the crews that were waiting on them on the landing that in order to be able to reduce the travel distance as we gained control of the fire situation on the
02:37:27 control of the fire situation on the floor we would advance the bridgid with the idea that we would systematically put the fire out on the floor above move and take that ground and we would advance up the building so I was to warn
02:37:39 advance up the building so I was to warn crews that although they may have dispatched from say the second floor as the breach head when they returned the bridge it may be on the third floor it may be on the fourth floor so make sure
02:37:50 may be on the fourth floor so make sure you you're aware of that situation and if you come back to where you think the bridgehead is that could be the reason why and it was an absolute you to type of briefing I was part of the briefing I
02:38:01 of briefing I was part of the briefing I was giving some Baker's while they were waiting right you see is that when you were on the be a lot be a logistic so it's the title that Richard Welch gave it so I was on the balcony and I was
02:38:15 it so I was on the balcony and I was making sure that the crews that assembled there had the minimum level of equipment that I wanted them to have there's a be a team that they knew where the additional equipment was and that
02:38:27 the additional equipment was and that they were fully switched on to the conditions they were going into I remember briefing crews on that balcony that this was a really serious fire the
02:38:39 that this was a really serious fire the only way anyone's going to come out of this building is if you bring them out with only you know the conditions that you're working in make sure that you
02:38:51 you're working in make sure that you don't die trying to do the impossible but don't do it lightly because the only way that culminates is if you get him and just to be clear in terms of timing
02:39:03 and just to be clear in terms of timing that was when the bridgehead was still on the second floor yeah well it moved to the third floor I was probably on that bridgehead or on that area for about 10 maybe 15 minutes before and as
02:39:17 about 10 maybe 15 minutes before and as a spate of casualties arrived and the available firefighters without breathing apparatus on who were being used as casualty carriers were exhausted they
02:39:29 casualty carriers were exhausted they were used taking casualties out so I had to take a casualty from the building on my return was where I realized the exterior compromised the main or the
02:39:42 exterior compromised the main or the only way in and out of the building and I improvise using shields
02:39:52 as to all - thank you very much and keep I have no further questions for you I just want to say thank you to you for coming here today and assisting us with our investigations we're very grateful to you thank you thank you yes I add my
02:40:03 to you thank you thank you yes I add my thanks to that mr. Olsen it's been a long day for you and I know that from time to time it's been quite distressing but I'd like you to know that your evidence is very helpful to us you say
02:40:14 evidence is very helpful to us you say we're very grateful to you for coming along to give it but now it's over you're free to go thank you sir thank you very much
02:40:32 yes mr. Bennett well mr. chairman that concludes the evidence for today I'm grateful to you mr. chairman for sitting a little bit later than we otherwise would normally but we start again if we
02:40:43 would normally but we start again if we may and 10 o'clock Monday morning yes with da Co Lachlan well thank you all very much
02:40:50 very much yes well we break now and resume at 10 o'clock on Monday morning thank you thank you very much