Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Further LFB evidence (19 September 2018 Pt 1 of 2)
00:00:03 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing we came to hear more evidence from firefighters I think right mr. Cooney that's right sir good morning I'm first of all mayor Corps firefighter
00:00:14 first of all mayor Corps firefighter Adam Johnson good thank you
00:00:51 thank you very much mr. Johnson you like to sit down make yourself comfortable thank you very much yes mr. Claire would you please confirm your name for the record Adam Peter Johnson thank you thank you
00:01:03 Adam Peter Johnson thank you thank you very much first of all for coming to the inquiry to give evidence day your help is much appreciated in front views of blue folder and if you open that blue folder and turn to the first tab there
00:01:14 folder and turn to the first tab there should be your statement that you gave to the police date of the 22nd of January of this year is that right
00:01:25 using date and if you turn to the second tab there should be your contemporaneous note is that right yes and if you turn to the final tab there should be your
00:01:37 to the final tab there should be your exhibit which show which is a map of the area surrounding the tower is that right yes have you read those documents recently yes and you confirm their contents are true yes and you content
00:01:48 contents are true yes and you content for those documents to stand as your evidence to this inquiry yes mr. Johnson if at any time you require a break please say so that's not a problem perhaps more importantly if at any time
00:01:59 perhaps more importantly if at any time my questions are unclear please say so and I'll rephrase them now if I can deal with some basic details first of all you're at the time of the fire you're a firefighter based at Soho is that right
00:02:12 firefighter based at Soho is that right yet great and you've had your experience of some 10 years as a firefighter that's correct
00:02:16 correct and on the night of the fire you rode a pump appliance whose call sign was alpha-2 for two is that right now out for two for one two for one thank you and as to your timings you were
00:02:28 and as to your timings you were mobilized at zero on 30 and you were mobile at zero one 36 does that sound about right now we don't have a time for your arrival at the Tower however the lfb records indicate that
00:02:40 however the lfb records indicate that your F DBA was disconnected from the appliances zero 145 now how soon after arrival did you disconnect yes da I would imagine knew enough when we
00:02:52 da I would imagine knew enough when we got straight off the appliance to be firm
00:02:55 firm thank you and was looking at your timings of ba use the lfp records indicate that the set was switched on at zero 159 and you tallied out of the bridgehead at zero - zero - does that
00:03:07 bridgehead at zero - zero - does that sound about right a bit more thank you now in terms of the questions I'm going to ask you today you were deployed within the tower on a number of occasions however my questioning will focus on two particular
00:03:19 questioning will focus on two particular deployments your first one to the fourth floor yeah and then the second one to the 19th floor an apple now if I can deal first of all with your entry to the bridgehead as you entered the tower you
00:03:30 bridgehead as you entered the tower you say there was a watch match or a station manager managing the queue to the be a holding area on the balcony can you remember whether that officer was a man or woman male but I can't remember who
00:03:42 or woman male but I can't remember who it was okay and in relation to other crews who are waiting in the lobby do you remember any of them wearing EDB a
00:03:51 not a former member but they could will happen now you then went up to the bridgehead and if I could ask Paul to
00:04:02 bridgehead and if I could ask Paul to bring up page five of your witness statement the third paragraph and the fourth line you given instructions by what amounted to silver to go to flat 14 on the fourth floor as there was an FSG
00:04:15 on the fourth floor as there was an FSG and someone needed rescuing first of all is that a correct summary of the instruction you were given by the watch manager yeah flat full time full floor were you given any further detail by the
00:04:27 were you given any further detail by the watch manager not awful remember did she mention anything about number of occupants or the gender of the occupants who are then the focus on are going
00:04:38 who are then the focus on are going shall not fingers who still keep his fretful waiting on the fourth floor for survival I was calm were you given any guidance as to these smoke conditions first of all on the stairwell not specific nothing anything on the
00:04:50 specific nothing anything on the conditions on the fourth floor itself now as you went up from the bridgehead to the fourth floor is it right that the stairwell on the first wall not two floors above the bridgehead
00:05:01 floors above the bridgehead clear but thereafter the conditions deteriorated yeah one or two floors above the bridge eight and then the condition started gradually getting worse and worse Frankie went up to tell and can you help
00:05:12 Frankie went up to tell and can you help us with how those conditions got worse first of all what color was the smoke you encountered I mean one or two floors above the Brigid would have been light very light wispy very light wispy hazy
00:05:23 very light wispy very light wispy hazy smoke and then obviously the thicker up it would have got the further he went up the tower and could you see where the smoke was coming from no not specifically in this field long enough
00:05:34 specifically in this field long enough some people have described the smoke is hot can you remember the was the temperature something that you remember not to be qualities no ignored at that
00:05:45 not to be qualities no ignored at that point other witnesses have said that they could taste the smoke is that something you remember experiencing nah I've been taster smugglers to pudding
00:05:56 I've been taster smugglers to pudding you got to the fourth floor can you remember whether the door between the stairwell and the lobby was open or closed I don't remember whether did lobby door was open or closed any
00:06:08 did lobby door was open or closed any fear and you went on to the lobbying is it right that you carried a search of every flat on the floor and found no one what on the fourth floor yes we went into the lobby area and in where it was
00:06:20 into the lobby area and in where it was only light wispy schmuck up there you could see straight across and we went round the doors to check to see where we could find fresh Fontaine we found flat 14 in the door was wide open today and
00:06:32 14 in the door was wide open today and did you were can you remember whether the flat entrance doors were open or closed on the 4th yeah that was the door which was Island but were they all open just the entrance door ok now once
00:06:46 just the entrance door ok now once you've completed the search is it right that firefighter routes tried to radio report to the bridge head but there was quotes too much chatter on the radio for firefighter ruse to be able to give our update yes to it now you've found the
00:06:59 update yes to it now you've found the door to flat 14 wide open yes you could see the doors front those of the other flats could you know yes I mean looking right here yeah and
00:07:10 yes I mean looking right here yeah and where they can you remember where they open or closed up being honest I can't remember whether they were open or closed I think a couple more I've been closed but that would it wouldn't be a
00:07:21 closed but that would it wouldn't be a hundred percent accurate so thank you we were discussing the radio comms I think fart you say firefighter routes tried to radio down an update but you couldn't yet get law through what's the
00:07:33 couldn't yet get law through what's the position that you just couldn't break through the radio traffic in order to provide an update to the bridgehead for father Bruce I had the Barry sit for the BI so he was trying to get through on
00:07:45 BI so he was trying to get through on the radio and was telling me there's a lot of chair on it and there was lots of kinda backwards and forwards so it was hard to get a break to get our message across okay at this point do you know
00:07:56 across okay at this point do you know whether you actually got the message through had any no we didn't know you went back down to the bridgehead and as you went down did you close the lobby door between the fourth floor
00:08:07 lobby door between the fourth floor lobby and the stairwell did you close it after you alcântara as you went down the stairwell from the fourth floor to the bridge head had conditions stayed the same deteriorated
00:08:18 conditions stayed the same deteriorated since your ascent up litter it was still fairly low up wispy schmuck so you can you remember seeing any casualties being brought down the tower as you went back down to the bridgehead there were
00:08:29 down to the bridgehead there were casualties being brought there by other firefighters but our concert specifics on it do you remember any being assisted down with the use of a secondary ba says no and are you able to remember anything
00:08:43 no and are you able to remember anything about the condition of the casualties that were being brought down I've been paid a massive amount of attention to the casualties being bulled there it was more tasks focused on what we were to do
00:08:55 more tasks focused on what we were to do at hand go back to the bridge a get another task now carry on Fournier you got back down to the bridgehead was it you or firefighter routes who gave the debrief of the bridgehead
00:09:10 I can't remember it mom well up in Michelle food gave the date brief can you if it was you oh can you member who you gave the debrief to back to the original watch manager who give us our
00:09:21 original watch manager who give us our brief and I know it's difficult given the time that's passed by but can you remember precisely what you said to her well the gist of what you said her as part of the debrief that we've been to fretful Lane on the fourth floor we've
00:09:34 fretful Lane on the fourth floor we've searched on the whole of the compartment and we found no casualties up there the door was wide open so we've come back down for a second to be brief would you've given her any detail of the
00:09:45 you've given her any detail of the precise conditions you'd encountered on the fourth floor the state of fire damage the state of MOOC content at that point in time we more I said that it was law at least lightly smoked out there
00:09:56 law at least lightly smoked out there like which be smoke but there wasn't massive conditions out there to refit okay now if I can turn to the second set of instructions you were provided with yeah that's the deployment to the 19th
00:10:08 yeah that's the deployment to the 19th floor now was it it was the same watch man who gave you these instructions as that Robert is correct and can you remember the detail of the instruction you have given what did she say to you at least the June what she said to you
00:10:20 at least the June what she said to you we've got another force of our gardens called for you and he's flat one six one on me 19th floor but you can take your discretion obviously if you've got enough air to get there so and that the extent of the
00:10:34 get there so and that the extent of the availability of air to get up to the 19th floor was something she specifically raised with you was it it's like getting your own discretion so can they still have it to you did you say did you discuss whether you
00:10:46 did you say did you discuss whether you had enough air to get to be sergeant every we had a quick go and you're sick of what common issues crack on we've got to ask I am the moss which is Craig on did the watch manager give you any further details first of all as to
00:10:58 any further details first of all as to the occupants of flat once I'll remember than their did you give any detail about number of occupants did she give you any detail about conditions and the
00:11:10 detail about conditions and the stairwell from the bridge at going up
00:11:15 did you specifically raise with the watch manager the use of e DBA to get up there did you expressly refer to you DBA that you may need it in order to get up
00:11:27 that you may need it in order to get up to the ninth floor are you trained in IDI I'm not trying to no vbi only standard duration bonobos do you think it would it have been practicable to have taken up a secondary set of BA to
00:11:38 have taken up a secondary set of BA to help you bring any casualties down from the 19th floor
00:11:46 maybe yes I know I mean in my opinion to show up there but that we can know what the conditions would be like up there or how far or how long it takes to get up
00:11:58 how far or how long it takes to get up there anyway so in my circumstance I would have said it that's all I'm not oh did you discuss either with the watch manager or with fire fighter routes whether you needed anything any
00:12:09 routes whether you needed anything any particular bits of kiss or equipment to her marine casualties down what we did though we grabbed from the part of equipment which was on the side we grabbed an enforcer Halligan bar and a thermal-imaging camera we didn't take any water media with us
00:12:23 we didn't take any water media with us Paul would you be able to put up a photograph met triple zero one three zero seven four
00:12:35 mr. Johnson do you remember seeing this written on the wall at the bridgehead at the second floor
00:12:49 not specifically not can I ask you do you remember being aware of that before you were deployed two flat one six laundromat are taking in would you have
00:13:01 laundromat are taking in would you have read the notes that were written on the wall before you deployed at the time probably not you can have a lot to
00:13:13 probably not you can have a lot to answer would you evaluate open would you have noticed what was written on the wall is you came back down do you think would you've looked at it no other thing I'll be honest now I'd now like to talk
00:13:26 I'll be honest now I'd now like to talk to you about your ascent to the mutter floor itself now at page seven of your witness statement first big paragraph line two you say that we were on the seventh or eighth floor I can't remember
00:13:38 seventh or eighth floor I can't remember exactly which both the stairs and the lift lobby was heavily smoke logged again it's useful to try and get some further details the conditions can you describe the color of the smoke you
00:13:49 describe the color of the smoke you encountered on the seventh or eighth floor big black smoke okay can you remember whether whether the temperature of the smoke was something that you noticed as being remarkable temperature
00:14:01 noticed as being remarkable temperature I think we call and as you went from the seventh or eighth floor up to the 19th floor did conditions stay the same improve deteriorate what as we went
00:14:16 improve deteriorate what as we went further up into the tower it was just heavily heavily black smog built now as you were going up can you remember whether the stairwell was lit
00:14:27 remember whether the stairwell was lit or not no economy minute now you arrived at the 19th floor yes you got to the lobby and you heard someone banging and screaming to the
00:14:38 someone banging and screaming to the right is that after you've gone through you don't you've gone through from the stairwell open the lobby door and gone into the lobby itself yep we've gone all
00:14:49 into the lobby itself yep we've gone all the way up to ninth open the lobby door heavies come to me right off branched off a little bit to the left and service it II could hear someone for my over every way I saw it I'll
00:15:02 for my over every way I saw it I'll confirm with him we could hear someone so we decided to go over and find the flat and how far away was firefighter roots from you when he indicates to you that he'd heard banging bombs lympha and
00:15:15 that he'd heard banging bombs lympha and did he go first to make it to make his way to try and find local industry obviously now you went you've got two flat 165 is that right it's correct and you've got to the entrance door of flat
00:15:28 you've got to the entrance door of flat 165 yeah what happened next we send out was coming from there so I'll give it a good boat on the door and a gentleman's voice and what did he say and we said
00:15:40 voice and what did he say and we said what we were saying to him is for of a guy and he was saying I can't remember specifics off the top of my head but asked how many did was he still smoking
00:15:51 asked how many did was he still smoking you fret so which you've applied now he told me that it was himself he's wife and he stopped were you able to see into
00:16:02 and he stopped were you able to see into the flat from where you know the doors collapsed okay
00:16:06 you're in your witness table you say you told them to put wet towels on their head block the doors of wet towels while she went to the neighbors flat is that right okay so this stage just be
00:16:17 right okay so this stage just be absolutely sure you haven't seen what conditions were like within the flat and you were shouting through the door we'd asked what conditions were like in and that was you know it's right that you found flat 161 we did because we tailed
00:16:31 found flat 161 we did because we tailed 165 we'll be back for you but we have to go and search for one here neighbors in 161 because that's the call we've been given and the door was closed and you had to force it is that right right yeah
00:16:44 had to force it is that right right yeah was the door Chloe was I take it from that the door was locked clear down locked what conditions did you encounter with in flat one six one one six one was heavily heavily smoke
00:16:57 one six one was heavily heavily smoke logged
00:16:58 logged floor so you were the conditions worse than those and the laws it was a level at one were in one six one and you could feel the hate when you open the door and Modi Utley was it was it was the smoke
00:17:11 Modi Utley was it was it was the smoke heavier and den in the flat the no I mean it more I've been a little bit but it was very heavily smoke logged in an obvious workshop I didn't take too much time I judge the difference between the lobby
00:17:22 judge the difference between the lobby and the little flat in the area so apologies for asking this question but how far ahead of yourself could you see within flat one six one um very yummy
00:17:35 within flat one six one um very yummy very very limited lot has distance for me finally now I think in his witness statement mr. roots describes the flat is not fully alight but it was well
00:17:47 is not fully alight but it was well involved is that some it's at a description you'd agree with yeah he says that the windows were completely gone is what's your memory of the state
00:17:58 gone is what's your memory of the state of the windows within that um I can't remember too much about the window scenario but there was definitely a large amount of flying down one end
00:18:10 large amount of flying down one end can you remember whether the the window frames were alight or has it all had the windows simply fallen out then I couldn't show it because it was that smug love being here and I have my phone with me she came out to look at having
00:18:21 with me she came out to look at having today did you find any casualties within the flat not researched as far as we could inside the flat so we were met with the fourth only other in and we'd
00:18:33 with the fourth only other in and we'd come across no casualties not saw has a knife in it and how far within the flash had you been able to get see fruit a doorway I think we turn left inside of
00:18:45 doorway I think we turn left inside of the flat and was shuffled along as far and as we could get but I couldn't say precisely how far into the threat and were you shouting um again partisan may be an obvious
00:18:58 um again partisan may be an obvious question but what were you shouting just a for guide hell I was anywhere near and
00:19:06 you found no one and then went back to flat 165 is that right that's correct neck now we're now going to turn to your evacuation of the occupants of flap 165
00:19:17 evacuation of the occupants of flap 165 that one
00:19:18 that one now is it right that there were two casualties within the flat you took the woman to mr. Bruce took the man down as that rice corrected him and I think in your statement you describe the woman is
00:19:29 your statement you describe the woman is obviously frail is that a fair description of the condition which you've been found and as you took her is it right that she collapsed almost immediately near enough immediately when she come out at all
00:19:41 she come out at all you were able to take both casualties you and firefighter routes down the stairs is that right it's correct yeah and first of all had the conditions
00:19:52 and first of all had the conditions within the stairwell had they stayed the same deteriorated for never very much the same as he was before to speak black smoke
00:19:59 smoke now as you were going down the stairwell to the bridge head is it right that at some stage you lost sight of firefighter routes near enough when you come
00:20:13 routes near enough when you come straight out in from the lobby into the lift into the stairwell itself you'll you could hear each other but you very hard to see each other from where you were and was he leading the way or were
00:20:24 were and was he leading the way or were you leave I was leading the way the woman behind me and then it was followed up by the gentleman and in Terry behind him okay and as you went down the
00:20:37 him okay and as you went down the stairwell did you encounter any other casualties being brought down no no no I don't know is it right that you encounter the team from Fulham Fire Station at some stage on your descent
00:20:49 Station at some stage on your descent down the tower yeah I did indeed and what happened that what happened when you've were canted them obviously by the time we got down I think I can at Fulham
00:21:01 time we got down I think I can at Fulham its crew round about the 10th floor and I'll totally lost where Terry and the gentleman was by this point and we didn't care at Fulham on all had a
00:21:13 didn't care at Fulham on all had a casualty which I was taking down the stairs and the door to the lobby bursts out and in it was two crew four or five
00:21:24 out and in it was two crew four or five foot which I think night at saw in front of us and were there whistles sounding the SD be aching remember I know more I was but uh it could well possibly break yelling there were a but but nonetheless
00:21:36 yelling there were a but but nonetheless you are able to successfully evacuate the two occupants of flat 165 actually every letter below now you return to the bridgehead and I think it's right say
00:21:48 bridgehead and I think it's right say that you thought your priority was to get your casualties out and then you've got them out of the tower then return to the bridgehead to give your debrie is that right and now who to whom did you give your debrief when you return to the
00:22:00 give your debrief when you return to the bridgehead I think it was Kenseth as governor with its own though which was watch miniature okay that's right Irish accent they and your end of where is at
00:22:12 accent they and your end of where is at 0 234 does that sound about right rod yeah
00:22:16 yeah and are you able to give us the detail of the debrief you gave to watch mojo Keith I can spike it word for word but please we that we I couldn't state it
00:22:27 please we that we I couldn't state it word for word but we was told he move into one six one that we'd searched this as far as possible inside the
00:22:38 as far as possible inside the flat before we hit therefore and then we had no more needed to extinguish it so it was still a lot in that flat and we'd found two occupants in flat 165 but
00:22:51 found two occupants in flat 165 but we've taken down did you see what he apologies I just don't go did you see what he did with the information you provided to him
00:23:04 when you gave your debrief to the bridgehead was it on the second or the third floor by that state can you remember
00:23:10 remember I know it appreciated moved back home remember which people don't think Paul could ask you to put up a met photo in its met triple zero one five eight one nine now you'll see mr. Johnson the
00:23:29 nine now you'll see mr. Johnson the painted numeral three in the cases is on the third floor do you remember seeing this writing on the floor up on the on the wall not on the third floor and if you see look at the top of the num
00:23:43 you see look at the top of the num column of numbers and you'll see the fifth entry there is nineteen tick one six one two out do you remember seeing that written on the wall at any stage could I ask you
00:23:58 the wall at any stage could I ask you all to put up a second photo it's met triple zero one five nine three five now this is a forward information board
00:24:12 this is a forward information board would you remember seeing a board with that information on at the bridge hood or anywhere else I'm not specifically okay can you see the second box from the
00:24:27 okay can you see the second box from the top the third entry is tick one six one nineteenth floor yeah okay so you have that information doesn't ring a bell written on any line and even anything you saw
00:24:42 final question do you recall encountering any casualties in or about the 18th floor as you because today when
00:24:53 the 18th floor as you because today when we were coming down with four fire roofs and the two casualties from flat one six five
00:24:59 five I believe my children stomach which could have been a person so we explained to four four roads that I'm gonna have to hand over the cash will be and your
00:25:10 to hand over the cash will be and your f2 carry on going down and I have to catch you up and check the floor I'd have to see we're not deep checkered floor there was someone on the floor which I picked up and him dragged then
00:25:22 which I picked up and him dragged then as all the way down to the bottom but what I do believe as evidence since then he's it might well have been the casualty from the threat with taking out a route collapsed over what was on the
00:25:33 a route collapsed over what was on the floor okay sir I have no further questions for the moment I might ask you to briefly rise for five minutes so that I can see whether there are any further matters well mr. Johnston sometimes happens as
00:25:44 well mr. Johnston sometimes happens as on reflection council discover there are other questions that need to be asked so I'm gonna rise five minutes well I'll say until 25 to 11 and then when you come back we'll know whether or not
00:25:56 come back we'll know whether or not while you're out of the room please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything to do all right good if you like to go over the options yes thank you
00:26:13 right 25 - 11 that means
00:34:23 yes mr. Kidd says some very brief sacramentalism yes right
00:34:47 yes disciplines I think there are a few more questions for you yes miss Johnson thank you very much for coming back um first of all the MDT yes enroute to the
00:34:59 first of all the MDT yes enroute to the tower do you remember whether the MDT in your appliance is working or not I thought were cold too much about the MDT world sitting on the back what
00:35:11 world sitting on the back what information did you have on route as - first of all the tower how many floors the physical built that components of the building you were you're about to
00:35:23 the building you were you're about to all um always stated across the back was obviously coming from our watch manager and he was telling us it's a high-rise incident multiple priors he's only
00:35:35 incident multiple priors he's only because he was 20 pump for which we actually got sent on so and it's in the leopard Grove area there was various bits and pieces of detail but okay they
00:35:47 bits and pieces of detail but okay they might have flaws in a building the one you mentioned in your witness statement and earlier on that you had all the firefighter routes had the thermal-imaging camera yes did you use that when you carried out your search of
00:36:00 that when you carried out your search of flat 161 yes sir he was in front of me with the thermal-imaging camera are you able to say whether use of that camera helped was any benefit to your search
00:36:11 helped was any benefit to your search off flat one six one yeah the thermal-imaging cameras always gonna help in any two officers unit situation third question is have you ever been
00:36:22 third question is have you ever been trained on the use of secondary ba sets ie to use them to assist the evacuation of casualties in a farm we've been trying on secondary shapes but it will
00:36:33 trying on secondary shapes but it will generally be for the purpose of fire fire emergencies and finally on leaving a a flat you've searched is it normal practice to close the entrance door
00:36:44 practice to close the entrance door after you've completed the search of that flat no it's more reasons beyond that will to give me and Terry a bit of protection from the flying in the fire which was actually in that fact but you
00:36:56 which was actually in that fact but you can close off the component so just mike my question was is it standard practice so after you've completed a search of a flat yes I'll close the door often you feel poisoning
00:37:07 close the door often you feel poisoning you mr. Johnson those are all the questions I've got for you so the final thing I've got to say is thank you for coming on to give up and stay it's been very much appreciate really important to
00:37:19 very much appreciate really important to us to hear from people who went into the town what the conditions were like when they were there and where they were so it's helpful to us thank you very much for coming to tell us about it
00:37:40 yes sir the next witness is watch manager Shawn Cole trous and there's a need to rearrange the furniture well so it's easier if this could be done and in
00:37:51 it's easier if this could be done and in your absence from the lot and I've made like youtube rice brief although as long as it's best so to rearrange things and you can send the ashes who's your it thanks thank you very much
00:40:25 yes mr. Canino might I call watch manager Sean contras thank you
00:40:55 I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be betrayed so will he truth from the whole dream the whole truth indicate
00:41:06 the whole dream the whole truth indicate or nothing by the truth good thank you very much mr. Contras yes mr. K first of all would you be able to confirm your name for the record Sean Michael call tres miss Cortez good
00:41:17 Sean Michael call tres miss Cortez good morning thank you very much for coming on to give evidence today is much appreciated on the lectern in front of you is a blue folder if you open that folder behind Tab A there should be your witness statement dated the 2nd of
00:41:29 witness statement dated the 2nd of February of this year is that right that's right and if you turn to tab B you should find your contemporaneous notes is that right it is yeah and if
00:41:42 notes is that right it is yeah and if you turn to the final tab tab see there should be the exhibit to your police statement yeah thank you have you read
00:41:54 statement yeah thank you have you read those documents recently aha and you confirm their contents are true I did yeah and do you contend for those documents to stand as your evidence an inquiry
00:42:02 inquiry I am mr. Coulter's if any time you want a break
00:42:08 a break please say so that's not a problem secondly if any time my questions are unclear again just say so and I'll rephrase them now to start off with what I'd like to do is just establish some
00:42:20 I'd like to do is just establish some basics about your background first of all is it right that you're a control room officer between April 2009 and August 2010 yes I was and were you
00:42:31 August 2010 yes I was and were you employed by the lfb in that capacity I was yes and is it right that you've been a firefighter since August 2010 I have yes and employed by the lfb I have yes at the night of the fire it's right that
00:42:44 at the night of the fire it's right that you're a watch manager station - Shoreditch yes Bret and on the night you're in command of a pump ladder appliance of the callsign Foxtrot two for one
00:42:53 for one yeah that's correct now as to timings the LF P's records indicate that you're mobilized at 0 to 0-5 you are on the road 0 to 0-7 and you arrived at the
00:43:04 road 0 to 0-7 and you arrived at the tower
00:43:04 tower 2:21 does that sound about right to you it sounds right yet thank you now just in terms of do you understand the the scope of my questions today you deal with a whole number of matters in
00:43:16 deal with a whole number of matters in your witness statement but the matter I want to focus on primarily is your role in handling the FSG calls on the night now
00:43:25 now the first topic I'd like to discuss with you today is FSG training now at page 2 of your witness statement in the fifth paragraph and the last two lines you say
00:43:37 paragraph and the last two lines you say that you understand training for control room officers on FSGS has become has quotes become more structured since you received your training in April 2009 are you able to explain for us your
00:43:49 you able to explain for us your understanding of the changes in CRO training well as a control officer when I was one
00:43:55 I was one FSG training was more in my opinion experience led so experience control officers would would you know tell you their experiences give you their best
00:44:06 their experiences give you their best practice on how to handle a fire Survival Guide it's called there was also a online resource on the intranet if you like called rifts reference
00:44:17 if you like called rifts reference information files which gave you some advice on questions to ask and how to respond to those questions depending on the answers and you know those risks would help you help guide you through a
00:44:29 would help you help guide you through a fire survival garden school rounds control officer going on from that through speaking to some of my ex colleagues um I understand that fire survival guidance now had you know not sure if
00:44:43 guidance now had you know not sure if it's a training package but it was more structured in terms of the initial the initial course that control officers would take there would be a real structured part of training that you
00:44:55 structured part of training that you know would include what was in the reference information files as I knew them but form or part of the initial training and was was more resolute if you like and with these changes brought
00:45:06 you like and with these changes brought in following lack as I leave they were can I now turn to the FSU training you received as a firefighter what training were you provided with capacitive so naturally
00:45:19 provided with capacitive so naturally we've got the policy which we do training on in terms of post lack and all and what happened some of the things we brought in as a result of that there
00:45:31 we brought in as a result of that there was changes to how we would respond to fire our guidance training and I believe it was part of the luck and all house high-rise package where there was
00:45:43 high-rise package where there was additional training on fire survival guidance my memory serves me correct but also I remember specifically as part of that attending a medium to large-sized exercise down in southwest London way
00:45:56 exercise down in southwest London way with eight fire engines and a couple of commands units you know specifically for the fire survival guidance stuff which gave me a chance to you know get to grips with the new procedures that had
00:46:08 grips with the new procedures that had come into place and was that training instant was that whilst you were a control room officer or reserve or were you then a firefighter that was as a firefighter and as part of that incident training were you involved in the
00:46:20 training were you involved in the handling of FSG calls at all no not so not speaking to any what anybody but up as part of that training it so it was an exercise we you know so it was the
00:46:34 exercise we you know so it was the scenario involved a mock fire survival information not the cause themselves and I was on the command unit and part of the team that was dealing with that and
00:46:45 the team that was dealing with that and beyond that particular exercise have you had any further training and dealing with FSGS in the context of a large incident I wouldn't say I've had any centralized training but in terms of
00:46:57 centralized training but in terms of ongoing training on the watch you know there's part as part of the training program that would happen from time to time but invariably that would be myself delivering that as I was about to ask you is watch manager you tend to be
00:47:09 you is watch manager you tend to be responsible for providing the training have you provided training to to your crews in relation to as G calls have to handle them and how to respond to them as a watch manager
00:47:20 to respond to them as a watch manager that's something I would have done yes and was that something you'd have done before the fire yes so that would have you know that would have formed part of the package that we had on our online
00:47:31 the package that we had on our online system that I would deliver so I wouldn't be dealing with the content you know that content was there for me about delivering the content you know potentially adding a bit of experience you know inviting people to contribute
00:47:44 you know inviting people to contribute their experiences to get a bit debate up so we understand how each other work in how we could you know apply the best practice around the policy to deal with the viable guidance should we find
00:47:56 the viable guidance should we find ourselves an incident where is required and with the context of that training be provided by policy seven nine zero the fire survival Courtin guidance called for in conjunction with yes okay may be
00:48:11 for in conjunction with yes okay may be useful given your previous experiences of control room officer whilst you were in that aspect of your career can remember what the highest number of FSGS was that you ever dealt with at a
00:48:22 was that you ever dealt with at a particular incident at one and same question but in relation to your career as a firefighter from memory I can't remember having dealt with multiple fire
00:48:36 remember having dealt with multiple fire survival Gardens calls you know I would say one and I would say that only ever happened once or twice as well in my experience so it's not something that I found myself having to deal with in any
00:48:47 found myself having to deal with in any regularity thank you still staying with training if I could ask you to turn to page three of your witness statement and it's the fourth paragraph on that page mr. Coulter's
00:48:58 paragraph on that page mr. Coulter's Paul rather helpfully brings up your witness damage on the screen you may find it easier to look at it brought up on the screen nopal could identify the fourth paragraph where you say this
00:49:10 fourth paragraph where you say this there was an addition five-day course to progress to watch manager in a virtual incident suite which you learn how to manage instant in a virtual environment as opposed to real life scenarios on the course I did in Bristol
00:49:21 scenarios on the course I did in Bristol which involves setting things alight and creating instance to deal with first of all dealing with the virtual incidents suite can you give us an idea of what that training involved so that training
00:49:34 that training involved so that training is led by our training provider Babcock you know with some really experienced people who invariably used to be part of the fire service in command brawl so there's a large amount of experience
00:49:46 there's a large amount of experience been that it within the people that I deliver in the course involves you know doing some theory around incident command and then some of some of the
00:49:58 command and then some of some of the procedures some of the roles that you could potentially be given and as somebody trained in incident command and as as someone who could form part a command structure and what it is basically go in a room and you've got
00:50:10 basically go in a room and you've got from floor to scene in a projector which sort of what within the walls makes a make-belief incident ground if you like so there's all sorts going on it it
00:50:22 so there's all sorts going on it it might very well be a building with smoke from from the second third floor except for those people who come up to you and there's somebody else in a remote location who will be controlling some of
00:50:34 location who will be controlling some of the characters who come up to you that will make the characters do what you ask etc but also the people facilitating in the room the trainer's themselves may come and speak to you in and roleplay
00:50:47 come and speak to you in and roleplay some some of those characters so what it does is you know it gives you quite a lot to think about a few things to deal with and you know you're coached for it as well so I'm also an FSG element to
00:51:01 as well so I'm also an FSG element to the training you have given given the focus on instant command to miss responsibilities I can't be certain but I imagine I imagine there was you know he for me you're thinking about it that
00:51:14 he for me you're thinking about it that there was quite often in FSG element if if I'm being honest because in my mind I can always think to myself if it FSG comes in give it to somebody to deal
00:51:25 comes in give it to somebody to deal with with their crew straightaway though don't hold on that so yeah we played it was in discussing the responsibilities of incent command were you provided with
00:51:36 of incent command were you provided with any training as to how best to operate how to manage a team so that firefighting plans were effectively implemented FSG calls could be efficiently managed and understood and responded to so it would certainly be
00:51:50 responded to so it would certainly be discussions at the incident command course to watch manager please know that was just disgusting that would be supplemented by a yearly de you know to refresh as as they call
00:52:04 de you know to refresh as as they call it but also you know there are other training events back to basics which would include a number of appliances and a senior pyro management where
00:52:15 a senior pyro management where discussions would be had so you know a lot of our training we had the packages that would be delivered but also a lot of the training would then involve
00:52:27 of the training would then involve conversations with people but for experience because experience is a great way to learn so you know if people have experiences that they can give to other people and say in this situation this
00:52:38 people and say in this situation this worked you know it's another it's another weapon in your arsenal if you like so that's where it looked like for me let's you thank you miss quarters now leaving training go into a very separate
00:52:50 leaving training go into a very separate topic and that's the question of the high-rise firefighting bag now if I could ask you to turn up page 6 of your witness statement and it's the very last paragraph on that page and you say this
00:53:02 paragraph on that page and you say this the high-rise firefighting bag was a pilot skiing at the time of the fire at Greenville tower and we were one of the five stations Charlie the high-rise kit bags is this the rent is this the fire
00:53:14 bags is this the rent is this the fire bag that was brought into service after the fire it is yes so that's one of things I was going to do was correct because it's not actually the high-rise firefighting Bagby but you know
00:53:25 firefighting Bagby but you know high-rise is one of the places where it's extremely helpful but it's the fire initial response equipment bag so it can also be used for traveling long still it is to fire in places such a hospital whose chief stations and
00:53:37 hospital whose chief stations and obviously high-rise buildings yeah did you use the contents of the bag on the night of the fire at ground fall personally I didn't but I know on our arrival I instructed my crew to make
00:53:48 arrival I instructed my crew to make sure that um we took the bag that later at the bag onto the fire ground to make use of some of the equipment that was in there because it was my opinion that that you know was probably gonna help them in their endeavors have you
00:54:00 them in their endeavors have you received any feedback from your crews so the usefulness of the contents of the bag no in relation to the incident itself I can't recall but um you know
00:54:11 itself I can't recall but um you know that bag was was being trialed on the appliance before I was posted to Shoreditch so whilst they were training me on on the bag and its contents they
00:54:22 me on on the bag and its contents they were able to tell me give me feedback of times they successfully used it and they they were very positive about the bag and some of the stuff it it could allow them to do does the bag contain any access keys
00:54:34 access keys there is a pouch for the access key so all fire engines carry a bag of access keys with the fire bag itself there was
00:54:45 keys with the fire bag itself there was a pouch for the keys that would have already been on a planet so I would say it doesn't carry any additional keys that you wouldn't find on most frontline appliances that we have and when we say access it do I understand that to mean I
00:54:56 access it do I understand that to mean I access into and out of a building and more than that main mainly lift keys but lift rock keys quite often can double up and give you access to a building we
00:55:08 and give you access to a building we wouldn't carry electric fobs if you died and that kind of thing mainly lift keys in the fire brigade metal keys for padlocks etc thank you now I'm now going to turn on to the fire survival go
00:55:21 to turn on to the fire survival go against calls first of all you're turning up reporting at cu8 now if I could ask you to turn to page 8 of your statement and it's the first long
00:55:32 statement and it's the first long paragraph on that page you say that on arrival at CUA to you're recognized by someone at cu8 is having quite a unique set of skills dealing with fire survival calls close quote and so you're asked to
00:55:43 calls close quote and so you're asked to report
00:55:44 report you seven which is handling FSGS is other first summary oh yeah now in the same paragraph you mentioned that you experience difficulties communicating the fact of your assignment to your crew
00:55:56 the fact of your assignment to your crew due to congestion on channel 1 two questions really arrived in that first of all is radio congestion a common issue at the larger instance you have to
00:56:08 issue at the larger instance you have to attend it can be it can be I mean I would say that as firefighters we're all used to radio congestion you know it's not something that will catch us off-guard and if you like you know it's
00:56:20 off-guard and if you like you know it's something that I would say we've all experienced I suppose the second question which arises from that is what training are you provided with to minimize the problems caused by radio congestion what would work around to you
00:56:32 congestion what would work around to you I would I wouldn't say we've been trained with any particular workarounds what I would say is that again experience gives you work around you know briefings and contribute to
00:56:45 know briefings and contribute to workarounds okay I'd now like to ask you questions about what happened when you reported to see you seven now first of all to whom did you report when you got to see you
00:56:57 you report when you got to see you something I couldn't tell you it was a station manager but I don't know who it was male female male could it have been watch manager good or no if so group
00:57:08 watch manager good or no if so group manager good or is it a little later on but crew managed good or from my recollection was not there when I first arrived what role were you given so my
00:57:23 arrived what role were you given so my role was to assist so there was outside the tower on you know the best way to describe it is on is on a body of a car because that that's where we were very
00:57:35 because that that's where we were very close to the tower probably within 20 meters or so there was a small team of people who were collating fire survival guidance information led by a watch manager
00:57:46 manager from Lambeth read watch my role was to assist them collating that information and initially run information between cu7 the fire survival gardens Comanche
00:57:59 cu7 the fire survival gardens Comanche in it and that that carbonic FSG place okay and apologies for any disrespect
00:58:10 okay and apologies for any disrespect but you're effectively a runner between a cu7
00:58:13 a cu7 that's exactly why was again pressing my luck on disrespect are you a little senior to be a runner I suppose my question I wouldn't say so you know an
00:58:26 question I wouldn't say so you know an incident of that type you know there there were a number of jobs to be done you know there were a number of jobs be done the person who was leading the
00:58:37 done the person who was leading the station manager initially was in charge on a command unit he was senior to myself and it was somebody of the equal rank who was leading the team I went to support so there wasn't a command role
00:58:49 support so there wasn't a command role if you like within that for me to take because there were people he was senior or at equal rank so in in that case you know I I'm a trained firefighter I can
00:59:00 know I I'm a trained firefighter I can revert back to what a firefighter may normally do and if there's a job to be done and I'm the only person I wouldn't take that as you know I'm too senior or it's a disrespect it's always there's a job to be done and right now I'm the
00:59:11 job to be done and right now I'm the best person to do it when you were briefed were you given an explanation as to why FSG information wasn't radioed from cu7
00:59:20 from cu7 directly to the bridgehead and i couldn't tell you if I was but and by virtue of what happened as soon as I got into a fire ground I knew and you know we've worked here at a time the radio
00:59:32 we've worked here at a time the radio channels were were we're extremely busy and you know this is critical information that you know we've got potentially just that my estimation because I got ordered 40 pump fire my
00:59:45 because I got ordered 40 pump fire my estimation would be additional people that come on to an incident at that up I would estimators probably about 350 firefighters on the fire ground you know sharing a few channels and this
00:59:56 you know sharing a few channels and this is critical information that needs to get between three points so for me to guarantee that this information is going where it needs to go a run-up is that
01:00:08 where it needs to go a run-up is that that's the reason why we've got runners because I can come back to you and say explicitly you've asked me to take this to this person at this location I've done that trying to trying to achieve
01:00:19 done that trying to trying to achieve that on the radio part of what could potentially be a long message if if you're saying the number of people you're saying the conditions and the flat the floor you know while other people could have priority messages to pass as well people
01:00:31 priority messages to pass as well people are going to come over you the message could get lost you might not get your acknowledgement so for me runners come into their own in that sort of situation given the radio congestion that was
01:00:43 given the radio congestion that was encountered given the critical nature of fhd information were you told at your briefing and cu7 whether there was a dedicated radio channel devoted to FSG
01:00:54 dedicated radio channel devoted to FSG communications no I don't remember being told that and that's based on the fact that I was still operating on channel 1 which is the main handheld radio channel that people use on the incident ground
01:01:05 that people use on the incident ground you arrived at the Tower of zero on 21 always apologized to ask people about timings can you remember roughly how long after arrival you started your
01:01:19 long after arrival you started your runner role I would estimate somewhere in the region of 10 to 15 minutes it took it took me around about 5 minutes to find the initial command unit it's hand in the nominal roll board and you
01:01:31 hand in the nominal roll board and you know that's quite important then when I get to work without without a command unit knowing that shortage we were on the fire ground like were you given any briefing at the detail of the FSG system
01:01:42 briefing at the detail of the FSG system that was being operated at the fire ground I know I would I wouldn't say so other than you know being told this is what we've got operating on the fire
01:01:54 what we've got operating on the fire ground in terms of where I ended up working so that was explained to me that watch manager sample is out there he's got a couple of people with him them there Clayton FSG calls they're making sure that the information is
01:02:06 making sure that the information is going into the building and making sure the informations coming back to the command unit so that part of the system yes
01:02:12 yes how that fit into the overall system I'd probably say no okay were you given any idea of how many FSG calls have been received by that stage in the evening so
01:02:23 received by that stage in the evening so that to 30 to 35 given your previous experience as a crow did you have any
01:02:34 experience as a crow did you have any concerns regarding the efficiency of the system to the extent is explained to you as part of your briefing no I wouldn't say so and at this stage were you shown any FSG slips themselves yes so FSG
01:02:48 any FSG slips themselves yes so FSG slips for essentially where I was while i was running at the part of the briefing where you've shown were you given FSG slips immediately I can't remember I want to say yes but I can't
01:03:01 remember I want to say yes but I can't guarantee that it's like could I ask you to turn now to page 9 of your witness statement and it's the last paragraph on that page and you describe you before
01:03:14 that page and you describe you before you start at the running roll you're required to do other tasks which are set out in your witness statement news but you come back to start your role than the FFG system you say this I then return to running the fire survival paid
01:03:26 return to running the fire survival paid paperwork from the command unit to the forward fast viable point and a search coordinator and the building and helping with casualties coming out at the building now first of all was the FSG
01:03:38 building now first of all was the FSG information you were taking from the sea from the command unit written on controlled information forms it was yes most of the time I've been initially initially there was a one or two bits of
01:03:50 initially there was a one or two bits of notepad but then when I got to what I would turn the forward fire survival point that would then be transferred on to the control information forms before going into the building for the search coordinator now you took the FSG
01:04:02 coordinator now you took the FSG information you say there to the forward fire survival point and the search coordinate and the now just to be clear so so people who are watching from outside the forward fire survival point and the search
01:04:14 fire survival point and the search coordinator were two different positions to different locations so the forward fire survival point is a term that I gave what we was doing outside on a car burn it with forward information boards
01:04:25 burn it with forward information boards that's not a recognized location within policy as far as I'm aware but that's the best term I could call it because it was you know that was a sort of adapt and overcome situation with regards to
01:04:36 and overcome situation with regards to where fire survival guidance information was being received from can I now ask you to turn to page 10 of your witness statement and it flows on really from the answer you gave some moments ago and
01:04:48 the answer you gave some moments ago and that's the paperwork you were taking from the command unit to the bridgehead now the second paragraph on that page you say this I was running the information backwards and forward to the fire survival guidance paperwork there
01:05:00 fire survival guidance paperwork there are three copies of the fire survival guidance paperwork one copy stayed with the command unit another copy went to the forward survival point outside the building and another to the search coordinating officer inside the building now you've
01:05:13 officer inside the building now you've referred to this point earlier on the forward survival point was under the raised walkway and was under the control of watch mattis Sadler that's right us yeah yeah and the search coordinating
01:05:24 yeah yeah and the search coordinating officer was initially based in the tower as that right yes so because initially when I started doing it was just between cu7 and the forward point I think there
01:05:35 cu7 and the forward point I think there were other people who were going into the building later on well not that much later but then it developed a bit and now I was going between the free locations of her location being
01:05:47 locations of her location being researched coordinator who by now was in the lobby at the ground floor with a team there's been some discussion with previous witnesses about the various
01:05:59 previous witnesses about the various differently colored bits of paper and can you help us to confirm which college which sheet what was the color of the sheet that was retained by the command unit first of all can you remember I can't I would imagine it was probably
01:06:11 can't I would imagine it was probably the white top piece that would be retained by a command unit and you have up leaves of green and pink which which would go up no yellow sorry and yellow and green which would go
01:06:24 and yellow and green which would go elsewhere and what color would be retained by the forward information point I imagine it was the yellow but if I'm being completely honest I'm I'm not
01:06:36 I'm being completely honest I'm I'm not sure it mad you know what was important is that the information was where it needed to be and again it's an answer to adversity earlier on but just to put the point expressly were you aware of any
01:06:47 point expressly were you aware of any other runners operating first of all between the command unit and mr. Sadler yeah I believe initially there was two of us and I know who the other one was
01:06:58 of us and I know who the other one was no did you talk any stage yes yes so within that team at the forward point there was probably between five and seven of us so we all had conversations
01:07:09 seven of us so we all had conversations with each other to make sure we one stood each other's role and who who was doing what because you know there was critical information coming in we didn't want to duplicate each other's role but also for me and to two of them also were
01:07:23 also for me and to two of them also were acting sort of as like a quality assurance
01:07:25 assurance around someone by survival stuff because you know normally in in our experience of fire survival fire fire was normally normally only coming from one place and that's going to be the
01:07:36 one place and that's going to be the telephone into our control room here we had we had that going on albeit in larger volumes we had police officers outside the commands unit who would knock on the door and give us
01:07:47 knock on the door and give us information from their control room or fire survival Gardens cause that they've got in progress so that needs to be captured and and also we had a number of people on the fire ground itself you
01:07:59 people on the fire ground itself you know presenting on on the phone to people who were trapped within the building who are unable to get out so that's not something that we generally experience so by having that forward
01:08:10 experience so by having that forward point outside for me that allowed us to to capture that stuff because a member of the public you know that are they going to know to present to that command
01:08:21 going to know to present to that command unit cu7
01:08:22 unit cu7 on the gravel road which is where it's being coordinated know that they're gonna see a fire fire and they're gonna want to speak to them and we were able to capture a lot of those people know there's a lot in that answer sorry and
01:08:35 there's a lot in that answer sorry and if we can just take it step by step first of all you said there were two individuals carrying out a Quality Assurance role is that a fair summary of your recollection um yeah that's what I would call it you know so we phone stops
01:08:47 would call it you know so we phone stops sorry phone stop you know but the next question is can you remember who they were those two individuals are carrying out their the only the only people that I remember as part of that team I was working in a watch range of Sadler and
01:08:58 working in a watch range of Sadler and crew manager Bobby I don't remember any of the others but those two individuals weren't carrying out what you describes the Quality Assurance role is that right I'm not I'm not sure I couldn't tell you
01:09:10 I'm not I'm not sure I couldn't tell you exactly what they were doing now the two individuals who you thought were carrying out to Quality Assurance role where were they based during the course of the evening when they basic
01:09:21 course of the evening when they basic cu7
01:09:21 cu7 where they base with Sadler or they base within the tower so they were based with us it's sad to say I think it would be pertinent with usually with you the car bonnet yeah okay now you say they'll
01:09:34 bonnet yeah okay now you say they'll carry out a Quality Assurance role you have a number of sources of FSG information which you've summarized can you explain to us what you how they were carrying out the Quality Assurance
01:09:46 carrying out the Quality Assurance process yes oh so when I say what the quality assurance process for me what that looked like on the night was setting up information it could be as simple as saying you know we've now got
01:09:58 simple as saying you know we've now got information about this flat we can we can see we've already got information on that flat okay is this this new information does it tidy up saying okay this this flat is on you know I'm just
01:10:10 this this flat is on you know I'm just gonna pluck say for instance flat 100 and we've been told that's on the temp floor we've already been told about flat 100 did that person tell us it was on the 10th floor as well did that person
01:10:21 the 10th floor as well did that person say there were two people required risk ruining in flat 100 making sure that the information was the same because if there are discrepancies in sending crews to potentially look for two people in there might very well be
01:10:33 two people in there might very well be free free people require rescuing that's something that we needed to capture and and give us a search for now so for me that's what the Quality Assurance aspect of it looked like know if you were
01:10:44 of it looked like know if you were getting repeated FSG information in respective of the same flash and you've used the hypothetical flat 100 here to what extent was mr. Sadler or any of the
01:10:57 what extent was mr. Sadler or any of the other two individuals responsible for quality assurance to what extent were they saying listen we've had a number of calls from this flat to what extent were they registering those calls as a priority so
01:11:10 registering those calls as a priority so I don't remember prioritizing in the forward point I know the commands in it were prioritizing fire Survival Guide has caused nothing stop you there mr.
01:11:21 has caused nothing stop you there mr. Sadler's point we were aware of any justa pressure on this a prioritization of lower floors above higher floors at any stage in the evening no week from
01:11:34 any stage in the evening no week from from what I remember we weren't prioritizing at that point we were solely ensuring that the information that we received with regards to our survival was captured at a command unit
01:11:45 survival was captured at a command unit and captured within the building where where they were committing crews now you said they're prioritizing and the command unit what criteria were they applying to prioritize FSG from what I
01:11:57 applying to prioritize FSG from what I remember it was based on those with children those with elderly and infirm
01:12:05 now flowing from that the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is the extent to which the incident commander and cu8 were keeping informed of the progress of
01:12:17 were keeping informed of the progress of deployments in response to FSG calls now the first question arises from that is when you when your role is expanded to take information to the search
01:12:28 take information to the search coordinator within the tower when you are were you ever given information by him to relay back to the command unit 8 or 7 as to the
01:12:39 or 7 as to the particular FSG deployments no that never happened you never give him the detail of any outcomes not not back not that I can recall that didn't form part of my
01:12:50 can recall that didn't form part of my role I believe there was another structure that was not privy to do you know whether any FS G's the detail of FSGS were passed to the instant commander any state again that that
01:13:01 commander any state again that that wasn't for me no could I ask Paul to turn up FSG policy seven nine zero its
01:13:12 turn up FSG policy seven nine zero its LF be quadruple zero one two five seven underscore triple zero three given your previous life you'll be well familiar
01:13:24 previous life you'll be well familiar presumably with the contents of this policy now I think there are three points which arise from it which I'd like to discuss with you first of all for the voice of debt are you familiar
01:13:35 for the voice of debt are you familiar with the contents of policy seven nine zero and now are you aware of the requirement in paragraph five point nine that all FSGS must be passed the IC yes
01:13:47 that all FSGS must be passed the IC yes yes again were you aware thirdly of what arrangements were in place to ensure that the incident commander was appraised of the detail of the number
01:13:59 appraised of the detail of the number and detail of FSGS during the course of the night no but in relation to that that statement there I would say we've in my role to that when
01:14:11 would say we've in my role to that when getting perceiving FSG information I'm within the command chain going up to that so that would go back to the Cu which has been delegated to group
01:14:22 which has been delegated to group manager Tom good or at a time I was working so for me there the chain would have come above my level thank you can I now turn to discussing the forward information point
01:14:34 discussing the forward information point which we've discussed to some extent already now if I can ask Paul to turn to page 9 of your witness statement and it's the first paragraph and it's the penultimate line of that paragraph you
01:14:46 penultimate line of that paragraph you say this watch manager Sadler was running the forward information point and your understanding was that quote he acted it's quality assurance that CEO and search coordinator had all the relevant information now first of all
01:14:58 relevant information now first of all was that your understanding based on a briefing you were given at CU seven or was it your analysis of the event of seeing what was being done that was my analysis okay now you say
01:15:11 that was my analysis okay now you say there that mr. Sadler was acting as quality assurance given what you've said we've been discussing today about the two other entities I said mrs. Sadler was in charge of the team but part of
01:15:23 was in charge of the team but part of the team would act as a quality assurance as I described it not necessarily mr. Sadler himself now when you presented the FSG
01:15:34 now when you presented the FSG information to mr. Sadler can you take us through what would he do with the information you provided him so from from what I could remember we had a number of lists of flats that we had
01:15:47 number of lists of flats that we had information on obviously naturally we had a large amount of them pieces of paper you know the copies of control information form that that we had as
01:15:59 information form that that we had as well and we would make sure that it was inside the building with a search coordinator and that one piece went back to the command unit where the overall fire survival guidance operation was
01:16:11 fire survival guidance operation was being run from so it was important to make sure that we didn't have any information that the command unit was not aware of because they were Callay in overall figures overall numbers and as
01:16:23 overall figures overall numbers and as as far as I was concerned were liaison with with the engineering commander or the operations commander as to you know what was needed to be done says it first say that you were running
01:16:36 says it first say that you were running control information slips that were created at the forward information point yes the command unit there were a number created a forward information point which is why I think it was important that we're out there because members of the public were presenting on
01:16:47 members of the public were presenting on the phones to people and giving us information that needed to be captured yeah one point that's been a theme and some of the evidence is whether the forward information point was an
01:17:00 forward information point was an additional but unnecessary link in the chain of communication of FSG calls what would be first of all your response was it something that served a useful
01:17:11 it something that served a useful purpose and a munication of information it was certainly additional because it's not something we would normally play in place however what I would say is the incident the scholar was in my opinion
01:17:24 incident the scholar was in my opinion it necessitated it and that's purely because of where the fire survival information was coming from if there's a member of public on the fire ground of which there there were quite a few who
01:17:35 which there there were quite a few who were talking to residents who were trapped in the tower for me I'm straight away I'm going to ask the question had we not been there where's that going to get captured how is that going to get dealt with effectively you know there
01:17:47 dealt with effectively you know there were there were police officers around and you know no disrespect to the police officers but do they know the structure that we've got in place for the fire survival guidance you know dedicated Komachi at that point
01:17:59 you know dedicated Komachi at that point beyond the police officer that was stood outside it taking the police information I would probably say no so what that additional forward information point allowed us to do was capture that
01:18:11 allowed us to do was capture that additional information that was on the fire ground you know live information information that we need to be able to try and effect these rescues that allowed us to capture that and without
01:18:22 allowed us to capture that and without that I'm not sure how we would have we would have captured that in the most efficient way by the most efficient way from me did not look like a member of the public trying to find cu7 which was a fire survival guidance commands in it
01:18:33 a fire survival guidance commands in it and they wouldn't have been able to get into the tower watching to cordons and being stopped them so it would have been able to give it to a search coordinator Eva so um you removed that forward information point and as far as I'm
01:18:45 information point and as far as I'm concerned we've lost that link so I think that link was pretty integral in terms of what it done it was it was a small role but I think it was important and so
01:18:56 and so to summarize that is it fair to say that you considered the fact that the forward information point was outside and not in a command unit was a benefit to the efficient communication of FSG
01:19:07 efficient communication of FSG information I would definitely say say when you first started running messages to the search coordinator can you member how far after arrival at the tower you
01:19:20 how far after arrival at the tower you started doing that all no not exactly you know I started running probably about about 15 minutes after my arrival
01:19:31 about about 15 minutes after my arrival and initially it was just between the forward point and the commands unit and then and then that progressed to support those that were running into the building itself I would hazard you know
01:19:43 building itself I would hazard you know and this was purely be an estimate maybe about 4550 minutes I mean it's difficult because when you're in an incident like that time goes really quickly and it's
01:19:54 that time goes really quickly and it's really difficult to plot timings I polish it it's a lawyer's question so I apologize for that who did anyone briefed you or instruct you to take up the task of communicating FSG information to the search
01:20:07 FSG information to the search coordinator inside the tower and can't remember for sure but I believe at one point what Amanda Sadler said can you take this these pieces of paper into the
01:20:18 take this these pieces of paper into the tower to search coordinator for me and then from that point my role just group you just got on with it yeah yeah you know that's that's critical information that needs to go in in the building I'm
01:20:29 that needs to go in in the building I'm not going to question in that can I ask you to turn to page 10 of your witness statement and it's the last paragraph on that page and you say I was doing I think resume to me you mean they're running of FSG messages for a long time
01:20:41 running of FSG messages for a long time and must have made the trip between the three points at least 20 to 30 times taking up to four sheets of paper at a time the information I took on paper to the tower has been recorded on the forward information boards now could I
01:20:53 forward information boards now could I just ask you about those forward information boards and first of all Paul would you be able to bring up a photograph met triple zero one five nine three five
01:21:08 that's well that is a forward information board yes can you remember seeing this particular board at any stage in the evening first of all within the tower now with a
01:21:23 of all within the tower now with a command unit cu7 no we've been cu7 I would I would remember seeing the boards that are actually on the walls of cu7 itself which are M a lot larger than the
01:21:35 itself which are M a lot larger than the forward information book okay did you see anyone recording information on fib s at any stage yes yes we had fib to support the operation at the forward point they had forward information built
01:21:47 point they had forward information built inside the building as well a forward information point who's responsible for recording the information on the F like these I couldn't tell you who it was at the search coordinators point q remember he was doing in there no I think turning
01:22:00 he was doing in there no I think turning to the search coordinator individual initially was he based on the ground floor by the time i am i was running information into the building yes and
01:22:12 information into the building yes and was that group magic Lynn Williams he was the search coordinator hired States I'm not sure male or female can remember their met can you remember the rank I fall in my mind it's a station manager
01:22:25 fall in my mind it's a station manager but I know Glen Williams is a watch manager can I ask you to now turn to page 11 of your witness statement and it's the top paragraph fourth the line and you say there that in addition to
01:22:38 and you say there that in addition to FSG information being recorded in the fib the information was being written on the wall now a number of questions flow from this first of all Gloria asked Paul to put up photograph met triple zero one
01:22:49 to put up photograph met triple zero one five eight two one
01:22:57 now what's the wall upon which the information being recorded the beige wall on the left-hand side of this photo can you remember I'm not sure we feel it
01:23:09 can you remember I'm not sure we feel it because I can't plot I can't orientate myself from from this picture do you remember you can see there the green wall on the ground-floor remembering that that's what's causing
01:23:20 remembering that that's what's causing the problem if you look above there's a green wall on the mezzanine as well do you remember first of all any writings or witnessing any recording of information on the ground floor the writing that I remember
01:23:31 ground floor the writing that I remember was on a beige wall in the ground floor okay do you member there been an fib on the ground floor being used by the
01:23:42 the ground floor being used by the search coordinator I imagine so I think I've got a picture of one but that's more based on I know I saw forward information boards being used and was
01:23:53 information boards being used and was the person who's writing information on the f3 the same person who's writing the information on the on the beige wall no from what I remember you had the search coordinator who was sort of a paste back
01:24:04 coordinator who was sort of a paste back from the wall and there was two or three firefighters I think there may have been a crew manager there who was sort of as his team who were scribing on the wall who was describing on the forward information board and that was
01:24:16 information board and that was simultaneous action you were bringing over slips of paper you remember what was done with those slips of paper once you did you delivered them from what I can remember they would be given to
01:24:27 can remember they would be given to those people who were scribing who would then update the wall or the board if you like with the additional information you know there were a number of times the information I was bringing may well have
01:24:38 information I was bringing may well have been a duplicate a flat that they were aware of so may not require you know I'm not sure if they would update that and say right we've got even more
01:24:49 say right we've got even more information or where they say that flat still confirmed we still know people are in there but did you see what happened to the actual sleep pieces of paper no
01:25:01 was FSG information being written on the same wall throughout the time you were running FSG messages to the search coordinator I'm not sure sure
01:25:13 coordinator I'm not sure sure now you say in relation to the information report on the wall that they had some sort of system although I'm not sure what it was as I was not involved in it and do you think you needed to
01:25:24 in it and do you think you needed to understand how they were recording information in order to do your job as a runner of efficient office FSG information you know for me I had a
01:25:41 information you know for me I had a specific task to make sure the information was was in there um you know with with the right people who were then going to do whatever we needed to do to commit crews to the right places whoever
01:25:53 commit crews to the right places whoever or not I needed to know how they was going to do that - to UM you know make my role more efficient I'm not so sure you know for me my role was about
01:26:05 you know for me my role was about information make making sure that you know the right people had that information what they did with that afterwards was another part of structure setup you know I had my only task and
01:26:16 setup you know I had my only task and that's what I was carrying out because for me it wasn't right to get involved in their task because then what I was doing before things might get missed Thanks and now that we've touched on it
01:26:28 Thanks and now that we've touched on it slightly earlier can I now talk about prioritization yet FSG cause Paul if I could ask you to bring up lfb quadruple zero one nine six 8 underscore double
01:26:40 zero one nine six 8 underscore double zero 44 now first of all do you remember this particular slip I'll let you read it so whilst I don't remember the
01:26:53 it so whilst I don't remember the particular slip I recognized flat one month free now if I can ask a couple of general questions first of all in the top middle of that page the word
01:27:04 top middle of that page the word priority is written was that B where the word priority would always be written on F
01:27:10 F she slips to alert the recipients of the information that it was a priority no and I would say the reason for that is because quite often we don't have to
01:27:22 because quite often we don't have to deal with a situation where we're having to prioritize firesquirrel guidance calls like I said in my experience as both of control officer and as a firefighter you're gonna get one maybe
01:27:33 firefighter you're gonna get one maybe two fire survival Gardens cause and you know we're gonna get crews to those people simultaneously at the same time there's not often a need for a priority which is why I'd imagine there's not a
01:27:45 which is why I'd imagine there's not a tick box for a priority if you like could ask when the when an FSG stick was handed to you would the individual either see you seven or the fort information point say Shawn this is a
01:27:57 information point say Shawn this is a priority
01:27:58 priority yeah and would that then be repeated by writing word priority at the top of the slips I never wrote Priory honestly so if I had any slips with a priority I
01:28:09 if I had any slips with a priority I would I imagine that would have been there already I do remember being in Cu seven when I was given a few slip they had on the whiteboard in cu7
01:28:21 had on the whiteboard in cu7 alongside so on one side you had all of the flats where fire survival garden schools were live and then there was a separate small Ernest which would look to me like a priority list and it's a
01:28:32 to me like a priority list and it's a track these flats are priority knows with ones as far as I can remember where there was elderly and infirm or children potentially involved okay when you were taking the priority slips
01:28:44 when you were taking the priority slips when you handed them in the first instance to individuals at the forward information point did you say this as a priority yes and again when you took the information of the search coordinator do
01:28:56 information of the search coordinator do you say this is a priority yeah yeah and did you explain why it was a priority or do you simply know that it's a priority so I would explain why it was a priority that would happen really quickly these
01:29:08 that would happen really quickly these these are priorities because very very oddly or infirm and got children and the information you relied on for sales priority would you simply be repeating what you'd been told at cu7 or would you be studying the
01:29:22 at cu7 or would you be studying the contents of the note as well no I made no decisions on what was a priori and what was not that was given to me by Cu 7 which was a which was being led by an officer senior to myself they had
01:29:34 officer senior to myself they had decided how they was going to prioritize his calls and I was going to deliver that information where I needed to go now first of all when you were handling priority messages and handing them to and first instance the forward
01:29:45 and first instance the forward information point did the individuals the forward information point handle these messages differently to those that weren't priority sorry keeps the PS
01:29:56 weren't priority sorry keeps the PS course you've got a priority message you're handing it in at the forward information point did the people at the forward information point handle that information differently to non priority
01:30:07 information differently to non priority calls and if so how no no I think the difference was for when it went to search coordinator so whoever you know when that information was going to those briefing crews to go
01:30:20 was going to those briefing crews to go in they could make those decisions to maybe push a flap up the list if you like but in terms of what was happening outside and a forward point it was that was information that needed to go into building it just so happened that that
01:30:32 building it just so happened that that piece of information had an additional priority tag but it was going to go in the building as quickly as we would we were getting them in anyway now when I
01:30:43 were getting them in anyway now when I put this up on the screen you said you remembered the flat now there's obviously two flat numbers there's 1 2 3 and 1 1 3 which flats do you remember
01:30:57 and 1 1 3 which flats do you remember and one one free on the 14th floor and why do you remember that earlier it's one that stuck out for me for a number of reasons that flat appeared on a piece
01:31:08 of reasons that flat appeared on a piece of paper more than once the flat was prioritized because because of a young child
01:31:15 child and probably the most vivid part of it was the gentleman who at the time I thought was a brother of somebody who is trapped in that flat broke through the
01:31:28 trapped in that flat broke through the cordon and was essentially trying to run it run towards a building to effect to rescue himself again as part of that he
01:31:40 rescue himself again as part of that he was coming past our forward point and that was one of the reasons I said the fourth point was important because we were then able to capture that live information because he was on the phone to a lady in flat one one free on the
01:31:53 to a lady in flat one one free on the 14th floor and I was able to confirm that we are aware of flat one I'm free because I've seen that flat number of one on one of my sheets already we'll come on to that anymore in more detail but is flat warm on three the only flat
01:32:05 but is flat warm on three the only flat that sticks in your memory or were there others that stick in your memory no just one more free that sticks in my memory of me do you recall flat 142 at all that
01:32:16 of me do you recall flat 142 at all that did you at any stage here that FSG deployments were not getting we're not reaching particular floors although having difficulty getting through to particular floors yeah foot can you
01:32:28 particular floors yeah foot can you remember whether any specific floor was married I know it's difficult because I've seen part of the inquiry you know
01:32:39 I've seen part of the inquiry you know it's almost like I know the correct answer if you like but do remember speaking to crews and thinking that s DBA are having difficulty going anywhere beyond the sixteenth row
01:32:55 thank you know
01:33:07 can I just just for the sake of ensuring I've covered off these particular points you mentioned earlier and please correct me if I've got this wrong that at no time did you relay reports of
01:33:21 that at no time did you relay reports of failed FSG deployment to the results of any FSG deployments from this search coordinator to the command unit is that right yes correct did you relay any information about the outcome of FSG
01:33:32 information about the outcome of FSG deployments to the forward information point no so sorry it's cut you sort of the information I had wasn't about specific deployments that information
01:33:45 specific deployments that information wasn't related to me the information I had was more a generalization of how far crews were getting or not getting rather than oh this happened at this flat this brawl we can get there so I didn't have
01:33:57 brawl we can get there so I didn't have that information to give to anyone so I don't I'm in your hands as to whether it would be an appropriate time for a break now we are on track I'm in your hands
01:34:11 now we are on track I'm in your hands are now about to move to a separate topic but I'm in the witnesses in your hands to next time alright well have you got any idea how much longer you like you to be with this witness I think
01:34:22 you to be with this witness I think probably so Court on our twenty minutes we'll have a break now I might get mr. kotis yeah mr. one spike yeah okay well we'll have a ten-minute break that give you a chance to stretch short notes a
01:34:34 you a chance to stretch short notes a cup of coffee or whatever I please don't talk to anyone about your evidence when they're out of the room and we'll review my foot
01:34:41 my foot - 12 all right let's give the option thank you thanks it right course the
01:34:54 thank you thanks it right course the total tease
01:46:06 mr. Koh stresses on his way makes it
01:46:23 right miss cultures Quinta all right carry on yeah miss cultures thank you very much
01:46:29 very much the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is the particular information the contents of the FSG slips that you are communicating between either cu7 and the forward information point in search
01:46:40 forward information point in search coordinator now first of all to what extent did you read and digest the information set out on the FSG slips you are carrying I wouldn't say I read them
01:46:53 are carrying I wouldn't say I read them in you know great detail obviously time is of the essence and it was important for me to get them to Wehling me to go I wasn't able to read them while I was on the move due to the amount of debris
01:47:04 the move due to the amount of debris that was falling from the building and if you remember we were you know probably at the forward point certainly within about 20 meters of the building itself so there was a lot of risks not
01:47:17 itself so there was a lot of risks not risk to worry about whilst I was transporting that information and that didn't allow me to read it that well notwithstanding that we able to get a sense of any patterns developing in the
01:47:30 sense of any patterns developing in the FSG calls the information that you are communicating to the various points it's a calls from higher floors becoming more pronounced more frequent anything of that nature no I wouldn't say so for
01:47:44 of that nature no I wouldn't say so for me the information and you know just just looked annoyed you know here there everywhere if you like and so again and your earlier evidence
01:47:55 and so again and your earlier evidence before our break you said it was any flat one one three the stuck on your mind and that's because of the later telephone conversation that you overheard is it therefore bright to say
01:48:06 overheard is it therefore bright to say just to clear this up that you don't have any recollection of the detail of any other flats none that I could you know um they is obviously information about flats but I couldn't attribute
01:48:19 about flats but I couldn't attribute that to a specific flat so you know I could quite easily sit here and say you know there was a flat where there were one person or there was a flat wave there's two people but can you know confidently attribute that anyway
01:48:30 confidently attribute that anyway just flat 175 ring any bells at all um potentially but again other than one one free there's no flat could
01:48:41 one free there's no flat could confidently talk about okay could I now turn to the telephone conversation in relation to flat one one three and in your witness statement its page eleven to twelve we don't need to
01:48:52 page eleven to twelve we don't need to turn it up unless you'd like to you set out there a conversation that was had between crew major battledore and zainab Dean who's in flat one one three is that
01:49:03 Dean who's in flat one one three is that right
01:49:03 right yes now when was mr. bachelor or holding the phone was having the conversation yes so with relation to that him in my
01:49:15 yes so with relation to that him in my statement I wasn't privy to much of the conversation I knew he was on the phone and I knew he was on the phone too he had taken the phone from the gentleman so I knew it's flat one man free
01:49:26 free how much of the conversation were you able to catch no sir I didn't catch any of the conversation there's a slight reference to part of it in my conversation but at the pursuit of being
01:49:37 conversation but at the pursuit of being helpful that was secondary information I had heard and and then added up to my statement I didn't actually hear that myself so the information regarding the contents of the call you derive presumably from mr. bash shell door is
01:49:49 presumably from mr. bash shell door is that right no from those that did overhear the conversation okay and so when just asking a basic question first when did you first become aware that
01:50:03 when did you first become aware that zainab Dean was in flat 1 1 3 was that at the time of the conversational shortly thereafter only after the event itself so in terms of the question there's probably two ways I could answer
01:50:15 there's probably two ways I could answer it depending what you're actually after so there was when I first became aware of flat one one free let's take let's take that one yeah so so by the time the gentleman who was on the
01:50:28 the time the gentleman who was on the phone to her before the phone was taken I remember I was already aware of flat one month free and that there were people in there required rescuing and I
01:50:39 people in there required rescuing and I told the gentleman that we were aware of it because I was at that point I was certain we already had that information which allowed me to you know confirm it was on the 14th floor and how many
01:50:52 was on the 14th floor and how many people were actually in there and I had if I could stop you there the gentleman to whom you said that he's the gentleman you thought who was then AB Dean's brother as yes yes sorry to interrupt ladies no that's not define and at that
01:51:05 ladies no that's not define and at that point I would estimate that I had seen flat one weren't free on a piece of paper
01:51:10 paper maybe maybe 30 to 40 minutes earlier you know as I said earlier to time does move very quickly at these incidents it's hard to gauge time but it did feel like
01:51:22 hard to gauge time but it did feel like I had known about flat one month free for a while and what the gentleman speaking to me beyond the phone did was sort of personify that for that now a little bit which is where I remember it so vividly and did you overhear any
01:51:36 so vividly and did you overhear any discussion as to who else was in flat warm on three with her so I asked him one or two questions as part of a confirmation process and as part of that and it asked how many people were in the
01:51:48 and it asked how many people were in the flat so I could update that information and what answer did you receive I couldn't tell you for sure and obviously now through various media reports I now
01:51:59 now through various media reports I now know the answer so I don't want to do you know just give that to you okay but you in terms is it possible likely that he told you gave you a number of people who were yes yeah yeah because he he was
01:52:12 who were yes yeah yeah because he he was in direct contact with her at the time and I don't think that that she was at that time massively distressed Oh see there was distress from being trapped in the fire button in terms of being
01:52:23 the fire button in terms of being overcome by the elements of smoke and he I don't think that had started to massively take its toll as yet so she was coherent it would appear doing the best you can can remember the number of
01:52:35 best you can can remember the number of occupants within the flat that was referred to when you're discussing it at the time I would say it was the lower number so around four but again that's
01:52:47 number so around four but again that's always gonna be tinged with what I now know but I would if I had to commit to the lower number and at that stage were you aware that a number of people had in
01:53:00 you aware that a number of people had in fact been rescued from flat one one three no no in your witness statement refers to checking whether Zana was
01:53:11 refers to checking whether Zana was still listed as being trapped and did you ask that confirmation from someone at the bridgehead or the search coordinator no the information was captured again that information went
01:53:22 captured again that information went into the building to update what they already had if I didn't stop you there did you communicate that information to the search coordinator or did you get someone else to do it now from what I
01:53:34 someone else to do it now from what I can remember I went back in to the building itself and remembers seeing flat one one free on on on the wall and from what I can remember I think there was a slight discrepancy with with the
01:53:47 was a slight discrepancy with with the number of people and that was able to be updated you know discrepancy by about one either way and to whom did you report the information that that was to the search cordon air okay and at that
01:53:58 the search cordon air okay and at that stage was it mr. Williams I'm not sure like I said I'd never recall it having been mr. Williams but very well may have been did you see the information being updated whether on a wall or any other
01:54:10 updated whether on a wall or any other soil yeah um I remember being satisfied that the information that the information I had brought had been captured in the right way okay you then went left the term went back outside the
01:54:23 went left the term went back outside the tower did you go back to mr. battledore be able to find him no I don't think I saw him for a while after he had taken the fight were you able to communicate
01:54:34 the fight were you able to communicate the fat
01:54:35 the fat that you'd confirmed with the bridgehead that they knew that Zainab Dean was still within flatworm three and confirmed that information to the man you thought to be her brother so I would have communicated that back to my
01:54:46 have communicated that back to my colleagues that are forward the forward point whether or not I communicate to the brother I I'm not sure it's because my my interaction with him is is sort of
01:54:59 my my interaction with him is is sort of merging together so I remember putting her hands on his shoulder and telling him they know they know they've been told by I can't remember if that's at the beginning when I already was aware
01:55:10 the beginning when I already was aware of um I'm free or after I had gone in and update the information were you aware of whether a crew had actually been deployed in response the updated information you gave did you see that
01:55:21 information you gave did you see that deployment take notes I was I was I was aware we were able to seek clarification as to whether crews have been sent up to flat one one three after you'd given
01:55:32 flat one one three after you'd given that information no I wasn't asking for updates on on the different flat so I mean there were a large number of flats of information that was taken and for me you know it didn't seem right to just
01:55:46 you know it didn't seem right to just hone in on one flat and that was going to sort of take me away from from the tasks that needed doing Paul could I ask you to bring up document lfb quadruple
01:55:58 you to bring up document lfb quadruple zero one nine six 8 underscore zero one seven do you remember seeing this piece
01:56:10 seven do you remember seeing this piece of paper before
01:56:19 be fair that looks a lot a bit like my ham rain if I'm honest I've been blunt about that is that your handwriting it
01:56:30 about that is that your handwriting it could be um can be saying Q member who gave you this piece of paper or rather that's wrong question did you have a
01:56:43 that's wrong question did you have a notepad on you on which you inscribed this information um I carry a notepad that size quite often I don't remember using my notepad but there's every possibility whilst I was speaking to the
01:56:54 possibility whilst I was speaking to the gentleman that I might have pulled that out because that was a unique situation I found myself in and with that have recorded the information he gave you quite possibly and then that would've been transferred on to the control
01:57:05 been transferred on to the control information form would you have handed over this piece of paper to the bridge into the search coordinator I'm quite possibly would you have used it as an
01:57:16 possibly would you have used it as an aide memoire whilst we're briefing the search coordinator would you've handed it over to the search coordinator can you remember I would probably have transferred that onto a control in
01:57:28 transferred that onto a control in information form or got somebody at the search coordinator to transfer that and to control information important for me to be taking the details on a notepad like that if I was doing it is twofold
01:57:41 like that if I was doing it is twofold one to capture the information which is really important but also it's a very visual representation for the for the gentleman who's clearly distressed to show that this information he's given me is not going to be lost about his loved
01:57:53 is not going to be lost about his loved one that that's being captured and we're gonna do the right things with it I think you say you would have done transferred that control information form or able to say whether it's possible likely probable that you would
01:58:05 possible likely probable that you would have done that I'm saying that that that's the way I work could I ask Paul to bring up lfb document quadruple zero
01:58:16 to bring up lfb document quadruple zero one nine six 8 underscore double zero double four
01:58:26 now again this is the document we went to before do you know whether this records the information you transferred from the previous note now it doesn't
01:58:39 from the previous note now it doesn't appear as though it does could ask Paul to turn to double zero for five s over the page as it were you'll see in the
01:58:50 the page as it were you'll see in the additional information box second entry flap 1 1 3 4 person left building first of all is that your handwriting no that definitely isn't is the handwriting anyone you recognize from that your work
01:59:02 anyone you recognize from that your work on the FSGS on the night not that I'm aware of that did you do you remember whether you had any involvement in running these two slips do you remember
01:59:15 running these two slips do you remember that no and I don't remember any slip having been updated with a result if you like okay could I now turn to some other
01:59:26 like okay could I now turn to some other FSG slips
01:59:28 FSG slips mr. Colter s yep first of all we referred with discussing earlier on whether you had any relation of recollection of flap 175 and you indicated it was possible could I was
01:59:40 indicated it was possible could I was Paul to bring up document lfb quadruple 0 1 9 6 8 underscore 12
01:59:53 now first of all I'll let you just read that information
02:00:08 with relation to one-seven-five with us five one adult is that eight children AC we think so yeah I mean certainly if I
02:00:19 we think so yeah I mean certainly if I saw something that said eight children I would imagine that would stick with me remember
02:00:23 remember do you recognize that piece of paper though no can I ask Paul to bring up lfb document it's lfb quadruple zero one
02:00:34 document it's lfb quadruple zero one nine six 8 underscore 28
02:00:44 now just I'll let you read that mr. Colter's to say familiar with it
02:00:55 you know it doesn't it doesn't spark any memory we think that's a list of calls from the Northwest fire control and it passed a cu8 but you don't recognize the
02:01:06 passed a cu8 but you don't recognize the piece of paper no mask Paul to turn over to page 29 I'll let you just read that
02:01:19 to page 29 I'll let you just read that too familiar with it
02:01:26 I mean that looks really sister make in the way that's been written and I don't recall having seen anything that clear and systeme okay could I take you to a
02:01:40 and systeme okay could I take you to a few more documents let's see whether you recall them Paul could I ask you to turn to met document triple zero one six nine six seven I'll let you just read that
02:01:56 six seven I'll let you just read that first of all mr. cultures I can see there that says Breton off I see at the top if if that so that just probably
02:02:07 top if if that so that just probably been written around the time he was incident commander and that was before I arrived can I just ask you something I'll let you just read it first can you to say familiarize yourself with it do
02:02:20 to say familiarize yourself with it do you recognize this document from the night
02:02:22 night no thank you now in answer to an earlier question I asked whether you remembered
02:02:33 question I asked whether you remembered flap one for to having gone through some of these slips do you remember one for two at all
02:02:45 do you remember any slips concerning what's been called the heli telly and a reference to a heli tally and he slips concerning it no justice you if seeing
02:03:02 concerning it no justice you if seeing the document triggers any recollection Nepal could bring up LFP document quadruple 0 1 9 6 8 underscore 41
02:03:25 I'll let you read that
02:03:28 does that ring any bells mr. cultures potentially mark couldn't be CERN if I could ask Paul to turn up lfb document
02:03:42 could ask Paul to turn up lfb document quadruple zero one nine five five underscore 13 I'll let you just read that
02:03:58 do you have any recollection of that flat and that priority that looks more familiar now on the piece of paper it
02:04:10 familiar now on the piece of paper it does look more familiar but you know again I couldn't give you a hundred percent confidence but seeing that like that does feel a bit more familiar we
02:04:21 that does feel a bit more familiar we discussed earlier what you did when documents were endorsed with the word priority given that this is endorsed a priority would you have followed the
02:04:32 priority would you have followed the same path yeah I would eternal so when taking a priority into the building I would have made sure that when liaison with young search coordinator that that would have been shown Prarie turning to
02:04:47 would have been shown Prarie turning to a separate flat that's flat 122 does that first of all ring any bells with you now could I was Paul turn-up lfb document quadruple zero one nine five
02:05:00 document quadruple zero one nine five five underscore three
02:05:09 now this looks like it's paper written on a notepad similar to the flap warm on three note that we referred to earlier on does that piece of paper look familiar to you now
02:05:24 could I ask Paul to turn up alleppey document quadruple zero one nine five five underscore one
02:05:42 I'll let you read us
02:05:49 does that paper look familiar to you no the piece of paper doesn't look familiar now um can I turn to a another flash and that's flat one two four does that do
02:06:01 that's flat one two four does that do you have any recollection of that flat and any calls in relation to that flat no as I said you know I made the trip a lot of times so I didn't get much time to read the four pieces of paper to be
02:06:13 to read the four pieces of paper to be taken in the detail no just just to see her yeah perfect can I ask her called to turn up LFP document quadruple 0 1 9 6 8 underscore 44
02:06:31 apologies that's one we apologize that's Michael that's one we've gone to earlier on could I ask you finally to turn up notebook pages lfb quadruple zero one
02:06:42 notebook pages lfb quadruple zero one nine to nine underscore war now this is a bank of extracts from a notepad
02:06:53 a bank of extracts from a notepad do any or all of those pieces of paper look familiar - no mr. Colter's those are all the questions I have for you for
02:07:04 are all the questions I have for you for the moment and sir my towels for the usual break of five minutes I can review the situation see if there's anything else yes well mr. Coulter's we normally give counsel a chance to consider whether there are further questions that
02:07:15 whether there are further questions that he needs to ask so I'm going to break down to a quarter past twelve and ask you to go with the usher please don't talk to anyone about your evidence and
02:07:26 talk to anyone about your evidence and they'll come back twelve right thank you very much
02:07:37 thanks to 1215 inches
02:13:55 ja Spartacus has to come back geez
02:14:14 but I think just a few more questions for you mr. Kolchak right yes miss courtesans only a few first of all in terms of the collation of duplicate information how would you
02:14:26 of duplicate information how would you identify duplicate information from further information and from what I could recall there were separate lists being run on even notepads or them what
02:14:39 being run on even notepads or them what we would normally term the message in pad I think one and last when you're showing the last set of pictures one of those was actually on a message in pattern you know from time to time a
02:14:50 pattern you know from time to time a message Pat does sort get used as a multi-purpose and Pat because it provides a lot of writing space who was running the system which identified duplicate from Thurman's so again if I
02:15:04 duplicate from Thurman's so again if I take you back to the Quality Assurance part as I turned it um I believe it would have been those guys because not everybody was running there were two guys who were sort of tunics off on on
02:15:16 guys who were sort of tunics off on on the floor hands and knees stuff you know update in Italian they look like it was cross-checking stuff now if that application of duplication system has
02:15:29 application of duplication system has been carried out the forward information point was that was the duplicate information being first of all reported back to see you seven so they knew what had been identified as duplicate rather
02:15:40 had been identified as duplicate rather than further information and I don't think it was okay that would have assisted they wouldn't it in terms of the management of FSG calls at cu7 having that information I would I would
02:15:52 having that information I would I would I would say so modern more than likely nothing like I said before for us or for the forward plan with that process was about confirming numbers and changing it over
02:16:04 confirming numbers and changing it over so the Priory was officer to make sure that the killer didn't know but yeah I'm not sure I don't think you has gone back to the see you could ask was the duplicate information forwarded to the search coordinator so
02:16:16 forwarded to the search coordinator so he knew what was duplicate on what wasn't further information yes yes and what that if that belief so you remember who was communicating that information who was the runner no I can't my movie
02:16:29 who was the runner no I can't my movie was to run up like that there were a number of runners going back and forth and you know as we arrived back if there were further bits to go we it was almost like a queueing system if you were next then you would take the next bits of
02:16:41 then you would take the next bits of information that would need to go into the building did you run any information that identified the duplicate as opposed to further calls to bring that to the search coordinators attention I believe I took the one one free extra
02:16:55 I believe I took the one one free extra information in from what I can remember and update and that's why I remember there was a you know a slight discrepancy between what we was aware of before with numbers and what we now had
02:17:07 before with numbers and what we now had from the lady on the phone can I now talk about further information being provided and respective a flat if further information were received for example at the forward information point
02:17:19 example at the forward information point was that then communicated to the search coordinator as far as I'm aware as far as far as I as far as I can remember a
02:17:31 as far as I as far as I can remember a lot a lot of the information that we dealt with was was the information ever coming from the command unit or from the fire ground itself with people who were speaking to but I'm you know they did
02:17:42 speaking to but I'm you know they did appear some duplicate stuff and with the further information be communicated from the forward information point back to see you seven I'm not sure it would and so from what you've said lines of
02:17:55 and so from what you've said lines of communication were there between the forward information point and the search coordinator but information may not have been communicated from the forward information point to see you so only in regards to duplicate information okay so
02:18:07 regards to duplicate information okay so any brand-new information went back to see went back to to see you thank you one final question mr. Coulter's Paul could ask you to put up a meta photograph net quadruple zero one seven
02:18:21 photograph net quadruple zero one seven five
02:18:22 five 9:7
02:18:33 and mr. gorgeous I'll let you just familiarize yourself with that photograph first
02:18:45 do you remember seeing this writing on a wall at the tower I remember seeing writing on the water tower where I was
02:18:56 writing on the water tower where I was liaison with a search coordinator bringing information in but I didn't pay any great attention to the detail if I could ask you to support to concentrate
02:19:08 could ask you to support to concentrate on the far left-hand column and the top where it says 1 1 3
02:19:21 now do you remember seeing any when you the context for this is when you were updating the bridgehead with the info such coordinated with the information you've received from Zainab Dean's
02:19:32 you've received from Zainab Dean's brother did you see and you were satisfied that the information that there were for pasta for left within the flat us Asif I'd that information have being taken on board did you see any
02:19:44 being taken on board did you see any information being written on this wall it's because of information being written while I was satisfied that it had been taken on board what exactly was written I'm not sure
02:19:55 what exactly was written I'm not sure mr. Coulter's those are all the questions I have for you the only thing that leaves me say say thank you very much for the assistance you've provided very grateful yes thank you very much for coming to give your evidence mr. Cole Tracy it's really helpful to us to
02:20:07 Cole Tracy it's really helpful to us to know what was going on what your part was in the events of that night and so thank you very much indeed free to go thank you for it thank you
02:20:28 yes mr. clear sir the third and final witness for today's watch manager Norman Harrison there is due to be another restructuring of the domestic furniture so might I ask you to rise for this to
02:20:39 so might I ask you to rise for this to be done yes very well ask you to come and get me as soon as you earlier
02:24:00 yes mr. Canino sir may I call watch manager Norman Harrison thank you
02:24:30 I swear that I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth
02:24:41 but the truth thank you very much for Tara so sit down make yourself comfortable
02:24:48 yes first of all would you confirm your name for the record yes it's Norman Edward Harrison miss Harrison good afternoon thank you very much for coming on to give evidence today it's very much appreciated there
02:24:59 today it's very much appreciated there is a blue folder in front of you if I could ask you to open that folder and look behind Tab A and there should be two statements behind that tab and first
02:25:11 two statements behind that tab and first of all your long statement of the 18th of November 2017 and then a one-page statement at the very end of that have dated the 20th of November 2017
02:25:28 yes I'll see them and behind the next tab ought to be two sets of contemporaneous notes dated the 14th and 15th of June 2017 yes a bite there and
02:25:48 15th of June 2017 yes a bite there and you have read those documents recently I have and you confirm their contents are true they are yes and your content for those documents to stand as your evidence think wiring I am yes and just for the clarity sake mr. Harrison in
02:26:01 for the clarity sake mr. Harrison in your second shorter statement of the 20th November you refer to two sets of written notes that you say a date of the 14th and 15th of November the correct dates are 14th 15th of June that's right
02:26:12 dates are 14th 15th of June that's right Thanks
02:26:12 Thanks right as I've said to other witnesses mr. Harrison if at any time you want to break please say so that's not a problem secondly if I'm unclear please say
02:26:23 secondly if I'm unclear please say you're unclear and I'll train rephrase the question now if I can just deal with your position and experience as a firefighter first of all is it right
02:26:34 firefighter first of all is it right that at the time of the fire you were a watch manager stationed at Wembley I am yes yeah and you still are from Siam and you were on Wembley's command unit on the night of the incident and that's ce7
02:26:45 the night of the incident and that's ce7 that's correct in you and there were two of you on cu7 who was driving first of all I was the driver that night and who was the other the other officer was watch manager
02:26:56 the other officer was watch manager called Tony Peckham who was a standby officer from Islington thank you now we have recorded times for cu7 be mobilised at 0 1:15 on the road at 0 123 and
02:27:08 at 0 1:15 on the road at 0 123 and arriving at the instant about zero 142 so those times sound about right to you they do yes if I could ask you to turn to page 2 of your first statement and
02:27:21 to page 2 of your first statement and it's the 12th line down you say this as we turned into Grenville Road cu8 were already there off a road on the right I recognise mark ken field and down America's officers from Fulham but to be
02:27:34 America's officers from Fulham but to be clear are you saying here that you've spotted the to watch managers from Fulham whilst you were stood in your vir or looking for somewhere to park or you referring to later now that that is these later I knew we're not go on the
02:27:45 these later I knew we're not go on the cu8 later on I recognized the pair of them but not as I drove past night so they now you describe in your witness statement what you saw the fire on your approach and when you arrived and if we
02:27:56 approach and when you arrived and if we look at page two of your statement eight lines from the bottom you say this we were near a college or school in Seoul Chester Road and I could see the tower block was fully alight this is from the fourth floor to the top floor which
02:28:08 fourth floor to the top floor which appeared to me at the time to be around 20 stories or more high the fire appeared bright yellow and I've never seen a fire like it normally one would turn up to a fire or shout and you can make out individual features within the building you will see a window and a
02:28:20 building you will see a window and a door and you'll see bits that are not alight but what was unique was that from the fall to the top it was the same uniform color the same right across the width of the building also so I couldn't make out any features
02:28:32 also so I couldn't make out any features of the building at all like windows or stair cases or anything like that now first of all can you confirm if what you're describing here is what you saw when your approach to the turret when you were driving or as it wants you to
02:28:44 you were driving or as it wants you to parked out and had left your beer yeah it was on the approach to the tower just as we drove down the road where the school was I think the road bent about 90 degrees to the right
02:28:56 to the right I caught a glimpse at the taillight just in person as I looked over my left shoulder but the actual view of the tower was only for a couple of seconds now given that given you spotted the
02:29:07 now given that given you spotted the uniformity of color and the absence of any visible features of the building what thoughts did you have on seeing that for compartment ation at that time I I was hoping because I had seen video
02:29:20 I I was hoping because I had seen video footage of fires in the Middle East before of towers that are on fire with cladding on the external and I proposed when I saw that I I assumed that it was
02:29:33 when I saw that I I assumed that it was the exterior of the building that was alight but because I couldn't see anything beyond the yellow I didn't know if there was any compartment ation issues at all at that time you referred
02:29:44 issues at all at that time you referred there to having seen that you refer to it in your statement having seen some fires in Dubai yes when you had that thought
02:29:50 thought what did the word planting enter your mind did you think it was a cladding fire it did yes at that time what knowledge did you have of cladding fires and the particular risks that they pose
02:30:03 and the particular risks that they pose for firefighting just that you could get very rapid external spread of fire I I remember thinking at the time the is the sort of thing that I wasn't expecting to
02:30:14 sort of thing that I wasn't expecting to see in this country because I thought the regulations would preclude putting sup on the outside of the tower that would propagate flame quite so easily did you articulate these thoughts you
02:30:26 did you articulate these thoughts you were having about cladding being involved to watch manager Peckham for example no did you discuss it with anyone else once you derived at the scene any senior officer no now looking
02:30:37 scene any senior officer no now looking at page three of your witness statement from the six line downwards you say you parked your appliance and made your way to see you age where you report it to the team leader who is watching manager at Kent field now first of all can you
02:30:50 at Kent field now first of all can you remember who else was on cu8 at the time yes it was there was only two people there @tsmart Kent field and watch man should ban Merrick do you remember whether the cu8 was operational when you
02:31:04 whether the cu8 was operational when you first entered it yet the lights were on I think that van Merrick was possibly at the sort communications area of the unit and I believed that the the PC was on
02:31:18 and I believed that the the PC was on the computer they would normally do our mapping on a CSS and stuff like that you say what amount of Merrick was at the dealing with the communications you know can you remember precisely what he was doing as you entered see you know I was
02:31:30 doing as you entered see you know I was aware that he was was I think he had some device to his ear well I have no idea what it was he was done were you aware from what you could hear that he was taking FSG information no but did
02:31:44 was taking FSG information no but did you speak to him at this stage no so the only person you spoke to was Mark entry that's right thank you what was mr. Kent field doing when you first entered to see you eight he looked like he was
02:31:57 see you eight he looked like he was about to exit the the see you I don't know what he was going to do but I asked him what
02:32:04 him what he would like me to do and then you accompanied him to the fire gram that's why you say come down to the basement and did you ask him of what he wanted you to do I think I did but I don't recall what his answer was
02:32:16 recall what his answer was did you have any further discussion with mr. Kent field at this stage as you were going to the fire ground itself we would have discussed something but I can't recollect and she was and did you say to
02:32:28 recollect and she was and did you say to him at that stage for example I've seen fires like this in Dubai that is the cladding I think given that was the first immediate thought you had is the
02:32:39 first immediate thought you had is the reason why you didn't say to him mark for example this looks like one those do by far the the original view I had of it I was hoping it was just the externals and I know by going down to the base of
02:32:51 and I know by going down to the base of the tower I'll be able to gather more information together a fuller situational awareness so I didn't think there's much point in speculating on the way down there to him you went with mr.
02:33:02 way down there to him you went with mr. Kent field is it right to assume that mr. Peckham stayed within the cu8 as far as I know yes can you remember how long
02:33:13 as I know yes can you remember how long you'd actually be Nancy you ate before you left with mr. Kent field to go to the fire it was immediate I didn't even get in the top step okay did you see mr. Kent field take anything with him for
02:33:24 Kent field take anything with him for example at the clips of FSG slips or anything like that I don't recall him specifically carrying anything but I would presume that he would have carried something with him
02:33:35 something with him you got to the tower and you say it pays three of your witness statement and it's from the end of the tenth line as we got there I noticed the tower itself from the initial side I looked at from behind
02:33:46 the initial side I looked at from behind the school I could now see that it wasn't just the cladding the fire was coming from inside the flats from the fourth floor all the way to the top now
02:33:57 fourth floor all the way to the top now just to clarify where you were when you were looking at the tower at this point and it may be more useful if I was Paul to bring up met document triple zero one
02:34:08 to bring up met document triple zero one six eight five four
02:34:17 mr. Harrison I don't know there's a bigger screen behind you yeah I don't know whether you can stand up and identify for us on that largest screen where you were when you looked up at the tower and saw that fire had penetrated
02:34:30 tower and saw that fire had penetrated the interior okay standing there - so the north northeast corner yeah just in
02:34:42 the north northeast corner yeah just in front of the Academy yes
02:34:52 when you were looking up at the tower you saw that the exterior was engaged you also saw that fire was engaged in the interior what thoughts did you have as to how you lfb were going to fight
02:35:05 as to how you lfb were going to fight that fire I was truly shocked that such a severe fire over so many floors okay I could see the flames coming out quite
02:35:17 could see the flames coming out quite some distance from the from the flats on the lower floors and it was as high so I took a look I'm so close to the tower I couldn't actually see the top of the tower but I from what I could see I
02:35:28 tower but I from what I could see I presumed it went all the way to the top I knew that the way that we normally fire fire in a high-rise we expect a fire to be contained within one
02:35:39 fire to be contained within one compartment so to have a fire over multiple floors was going to be extremely challenging did you articulate your shock and the reasons for your shock to mr. Kent field no I'm not sure
02:35:51 shock to mr. Kent field no I'm not sure what mark was doing he was not standing next to me when when I had this view so
02:35:58 I didn't articulate it to him did you seek out any for example do you seek to identify here the incident commander was at this stage not at that time there did you identify any other senior officer to
02:36:09 you identify any other senior officer to raise your concerns with no what thoughts did you have about stay put an evacuation of this initial stage immediately I knew that stay put policy
02:36:20 immediately I knew that stay put policy should no longer apply in this building because the the mistake of policies predicated upon an assumption that someone can stay in their flat safe from
02:36:32 someone can stay in their flat safe from the one compartment that is a light somewhere else in the building and they're not going to be affected by the fire either flames heat or smoke I could see that that that just didn't apply
02:36:44 see that that that just didn't apply here anymore you'd arrived at 142 or thereabouts how soon after arrival were you standing at the northeast corner and formed the view you've just outlined I would say that
02:36:57 you've just outlined I would say that because once we arrive we have to get rigged in our fire gear which takes about a minute I would say probably around Oh 150 now
02:37:09 I would say probably around Oh 150 now you mentioned evacuation what thoughts did you have if any about how to execute an evacuation of the tower given your views on the nature and scale of the
02:37:20 views on the nature and scale of the fire well I didn't actually mention an evacuation stay put an evacuation or without they're connected they are slightly different things but if you felt that stay put was no longer appropriate durations the next thing
02:37:31 appropriate durations the next thing isn't it
02:37:31 isn't it it would be it would it would follow on but initially what I'm aware is that our control operator could be on the phone to people phoning up who within the building saying there
02:37:42 up who within the building saying there is a fire in our building and I know that our control operators will follow national guidance which says that your safest to stay in your in your flat safe
02:37:53 safest to stay in your in your flat safe in the assumption that we would be dealing with a fire as far as the control operators were aware in one compartment that's elsewhere but then once we know that its operational firefighters now given your experiences
02:38:08 firefighters now given your experiences of firefighter have you ever had need to evacuate a high-rise tower in Europe in your career before a full evacuation yes I've done it and not necessary from a
02:38:21 I've done it and not necessary from a fire I remember taking part I was actually not in charge of a an evacuation a small block of flats or six storeys due to a gas leak and I remember
02:38:34 storeys due to a gas leak and I remember how long that took it's actually complete because it was at the middle of the night firefighters are going around knocking on doors and a lot of people just don't want to answer the door so that I would estimate that particular
02:38:47 that I would estimate that particular scenario took about 15 minutes to execute and that was without any flames or smoke in a staircase and given these
02:38:58 or smoke in a staircase and given these views given your previous experience of a full
02:39:00 a full a QA ssin why didn't you see care to senior officer to submit your views known at that stage I may have glanced
02:39:11 known at that stage I may have glanced around the incident ground itself there wasn't that many offices or firefighters apparently the only ones I can really remember there was two members of the
02:39:22 remember there was two members of the crew of a turntable ladder that was on the grass and the only ones other people I saw were actually in the base of the towers or some firefighters rigged in BA in the lobby and going up the stairs I
02:39:33 in the lobby and going up the stairs I didn't I can't remember seen anything officers there could ask you staying on this topic to turn to page three of your witness dangers the bottom two lines and it really flows on from what we've been
02:39:45 it really flows on from what we've been discussing you say this my initial assessment to reach the top floors if LF be stuck within normal operating procedures would take approximately six hours or so now when you say that it
02:39:57 hours or so now when you say that it would take the alipio approximately six hours to reach the top floors do you mean that it would take va crews that long to get up to residents on the top floors in order to evacuate people or are you referring to how long it would
02:40:08 are you referring to how long it would take to extinguish the fire it extinguish the fires is quite a big statement but to actually if I find your way to the top of the building I believe if you put followed up rate brigade
02:40:19 if you put followed up rate brigade procedures which mean you don't go be under fire and you don't go into the fire without any firefighting media we would have to fight our way up the tower and I was estimating and it was only a
02:40:31 and I was estimating and it was only a rough estimate it would take at least 15 minutes per floor to fight our way to the top of the tower and when you say fighting the fire it would be fighting the fire and executing rescue missions
02:40:43 the fire and executing rescue missions and vanities it adjust to fighting the frostbite fighting the fire okay could I ask you to turn to your second contemporaneous no data the 15th of June
02:40:56 and I don't know the port has can get that up on the screen maybe easier for you to turn to the paper copy mr. Harrison oh there we go
02:41:08 it's really second page at the 15th of June notice 15 lines on the bottom somewhat unhelpful steer where you say this you give a different figure as to
02:41:19 this you give a different figure as to your approximation of the time it would take to reach the top floor as you say there 10 hours and there you expressly that this was to extinguish the fire was
02:41:31 that this was to extinguish the fire was there any particular reason for referring to 10 hours there as opposed to 6 hours in your witness statement yeah I think extinguished the fire and firefighters on your way to the top of the building I've used two different things because we could knock the fire
02:41:45 things because we could knock the fire down to use fire per day parlance and progress up the tower and you would leave small pockets of fire still burning because they wouldn't pose that much of a risk to you but I have to make
02:41:56 much of a risk to you but I have to make it to fully extinguish the tower in its entirety would take a minimum of 10 hours the point is I gave you the wrong reference page - if I can also Paulsen over the page 2 page 3 just so everyone
02:42:07 over the page 2 page 3 just so everyone knows what we're talking about and again you'll see just below halfway you'll see the 10 hours figure apology so everyone just that everyone's got the context
02:42:25 and that's what for the reasons I said I believe we could knock the fire down sufficiently to reach the upper floors within six hours but to and again it's only a ballpark estimate to actually
02:42:37 only a ballpark estimate to actually extinguish this fire which was a major fire I think they were taking my assumption at times they take at least 10 hours to do that thank you could I now return to page four of your
02:42:49 could I now return to page four of your witness statement and it's the top line and you say that I know that flats are designed to compartment and contain fire and smoke but they're designed with only a 60 minute fire resistance time period
02:43:00 a 60 minute fire resistance time period so if it was going to take us six hours to reach the top floors and that was a very optimistic six hours to reach the top floor I felt that it would be far too late to save anybody on the upper
02:43:11 too late to save anybody on the upper floors now just looking here what you say they're about compartment ation and the 60 minute fire resistance period given your previous observation that the fire was coming into the flats from the
02:43:23 fire was coming into the flats from the fourth floor all the way to the top hadn't compartment ation already been breached it had been a vertical sense obviously the tower is a square and I was aware that they may still still be
02:43:35 was aware that they may still still be some horizontal fire protection so the people on the opposite side from where the fire is is already in their flats had a possibility for horizontal partial evacuation moved from the dangerous part
02:43:47 evacuation moved from the dangerous part of the building to the sacred part of building and that one out compartment ation may it's a big may may still have been valid taking on from that if we
02:43:58 been valid taking on from that if we stay on page for the first paragraph from the last three lines there you say that because of everything you're observing there would not be an opportunity to rescue people on the upper floors and you felt that the state put advise needed to be changed do you
02:44:10 put advise needed to be changed do you remember when you were looking at the tower and having these thoughts if what's magic Kent field was with you he wasn't you know I know he was at least 15 feet away so you could see him I
02:44:22 15 feet away so you could see him I think and it's only to the best of my memory I think he may have been talking to someone near a cop who's a locker given what you were seeing given your concerns given he wasn't that far away
02:44:34 concerns given he wasn't that far away from you did you think of calling over to him saying listen ma my view is that I've got a window now and I could ask you why you didn't articulate your thoughts to mr. Kent filter having said
02:44:47 thoughts to mr. Kent filter having said I knew that the decision to change state policy would have to be made by an incident commander mark King field was the same rank as me so it'd be like a little bit like talking to myself I suppose the question that flows from
02:44:59 suppose the question that flows from that did you did it cross your mind think let's identify the incident commander I want to go see him there no I think on the way down possibly Mark had told me it was a watch manager that was still in charge and I felt that a
02:45:11 was still in charge and I felt that a decision of this magnitude needed to be taken by a more senior officer who I suspected but I didn't know would have arrived and be reporting to see you eight at this time now as I understand
02:45:22 eight at this time now as I understand it you moved from the northeast corner of the town you return back to see you eight is that I went directly yes I don't even recall telling mark to come with me you do may have followed on you headed straight to see I went straight
02:45:33 headed straight to see I went straight there now staying on page four of your statement is the second paragraph on line two you say that you think what magic Kentfield came with you looking back now are you able to I can't be any
02:45:45 back now are you able to I can't be any more definite than that and he definitely didn't walk alongside me but I know he did turn up on a command unit within very short distance of time for a short time after I arrived there you
02:45:59 short time after I arrived there you arrived at about 142 again apologies for the loyalty question can you remember roughly how far how long after you'd arrived that you went back to see you
02:46:10 arrived that you went back to see you eight and it's only an estimate it's very hard to be precise I would imagine I got back to see you ate some time around Oh 200 and how long had you been at the base of the tower at the
02:46:22 at the base of the tower at the northeast side you remember I didn't stay there that long if you take the time to walk down from CUA and walk back call that to message that I direct direction I wouldn't have been at the
02:46:33 direction I wouldn't have been at the base of the tower for longer than three or four minutes now you've got back to see you eight and there were more people aboard see you eight by this time you had what managers American
02:46:44 time you had what managers American Peckham as that right yes correct and there were two station managers and a group manager yes well were there any other people there not on that command unit night and
02:46:55 there not on that command unit night and looking back now are you able to help us on identifying one or both of the station managers you saw no are you able to help us identify the group manager I
02:47:08 to help us identify the group manager I believe that the group manager was group manager Welch do you remember a station manager Eagan I do I don't think he was on the unit at that time okay he arrived
02:47:20 on the unit at that time okay he arrived very shortly after as you entered cu8 um can you remember what watch manager merrick was doing at the time well both of my see uconn he's watched manage america and watch manager Peckham
02:47:32 manage america and watch manager Peckham were both at the communications area again they were either on the phone or on the main screen radio and did you know what information they were taking did you know for example it was FSG or I
02:47:44 did you know for example it was FSG or I didn't know now staying on page for the second paragraph the fifth line down you say this I announce to all of them that I believe the advise our operators were
02:47:55 I believe the advise our operators were giving out to people trapped in the building needed to be changed I suggested that someone tell our control operators to change that advice as soon as possible I recall that some discussion took place now looking at the
02:48:08 discussion took place now looking at the elements of that paragraph do you remember telling everyone about what you'd seen when you'd what you witnessed from the northeast corner of the tower
02:48:19 from the northeast corner of the tower did you mention that in your view the fire was now inside the flash and the fourth floor upwards did you make any point regarding cladding and your view
02:48:32 point regarding cladding and your view that cladding may well be engaged on exterior
02:48:37 and who precisely was involved in the discussion that you initiated the this is the strange thing the the people on
02:48:48 is the strange thing the the people on the command like that I know you've seen the the layout of the unit before when I got onto the unit I stood blocking the staircase so none could leave and no one could get on without I was direct in my statement
02:49:01 without I was direct in my statement really towards the senior officers who abide the bench some people behind me outside I believe it was one of those people that actually engaged me in
02:49:12 people that actually engaged me in discussion it was not the people on the command unit harvest directing my statement tours so although you were looking directly at them yes neither group neither the group manager nor the
02:49:24 group neither the group manager nor the two station managers engage with you that's correct it was the person behind you who engage with you can you remember first of all was it a man or a woman it's a man and to my recollection I
02:49:35 it's a man and to my recollection I think I recognized his voice as a colleague from his inkstand command unit and I believe it was watch manager Pat Delaney Delaney yes did you turn your
02:49:48 Delaney Delaney yes did you turn your back effectively on the group marriage and the two station managers and talk to mr. Delaney now I carried on looking at the group manager in the station managers and so it was mr. Delaney when you say you
02:49:59 it was mr. Delaney when you say you entered into a discussion with him was he basically shouting his views from the outside yes and can you remember what mr. Delaney said if you can give us the detail at least the gist of what he said he he said that there was gonna be hoes
02:50:15 he he said that there was gonna be hoes in a staircase and his only single staircase and it's smoky mr. Delaney set out his views did either the group manager of the two station managers
02:50:26 manager of the two station managers engage with what mr. Delaney said no did you respond to what mr. Delaney had said I did I posed the question can we not
02:50:37 I did I posed the question can we not use and I use an acronym which used to be in familiar use in the fire service I said can we not use ease and what does it
02:50:44 it Easy's used to stand for emergency air supply equipment we now call it a second set bag and when you made that observation again were you still looking
02:50:55 observation again were you still looking to the interior of the Cu unit and looking at this group modules yes and did any of them respond to that observation in that did mr. Delaney respond to that observation so how did
02:51:08 respond to that observation so how did this if I put it statement conclude then considering you hadn't heard anything back from the group manager or the two station managers there was no response from them at all I then moved over to
02:51:20 from them at all I then moved over to the computer and I I knew that I'd make my point and I started to populate the command support system the organisation
02:51:31 command support system the organisation shot did you press your point whilst you're at the computer did you say for example do any of you have a view I I
02:51:42 example do any of you have a view I I didn't get your the opportunity to because directly after I think I made about two mouse clicks and then I was asked to leave the command unit by the group manager along with station manager
02:51:54 group manager along with station manager Egan to carry out FSG duties and who said to you that you were leaving to go conduct FSG do I believe I mean they
02:52:05 conduct FSG do I believe I mean they actually use my first name so this is where I think mark came took may have arrived back on the unit but I think the actual instruction would have come from the group manager that was I'd had the
02:52:16 the group manager that was I'd had the previous conversation with can you describe for us the tone that in which you made your statement in which you expressed your view it was quite loud
02:52:29 expressed your view it was quite loud very direct and unequivocal and Phatak very
02:52:37 very did you get any response to what you'd said from the group manager or anyone else who accompanied you out of the Seenu unit no was mr. Delaney still
02:52:51 Seenu unit no was mr. Delaney still behind you as you left the command unit I believe he was standing outside the command unit and did he try and engage you in any further discussion about the difficulties of evacuation no at that
02:53:05 difficulties of evacuation no at that stage when you entered the Cu unit and expressed your opinion did you know who the incident commander was I I believe I do and I think it was Mike Bowden at
02:53:17 do and I think it was Mike Bowden at that time and where had you got where what was the basis of that belief that mr. Darden was still I think I think that Mark Hinkel told me that as we were
02:53:28 that Mark Hinkel told me that as we were walking down to the town now you also say page four of your statement it's the second paragraph and three lines from the bottom it flows from what you've
02:53:40 the bottom it flows from what you've just told us I then asked if it was possible to use our emergency air supply equipment we call it a second setback to be given to members of the public I never got answered now we've heard
02:53:52 never got answered now we've heard evidence that the second set bag is a bag containing a spare the a set is that what you were referring to here yeah it is yes and again I just as have absolutely confirm your evidence on this
02:54:04 absolutely confirm your evidence on this was there any further discussion about that bag why should I see you unit no was there any further discussion about that bag as you walked out of the SI
02:54:15 that bag as you walked out of the SI unit to take up FSG duties no
02:54:21 given what you'd see from your external view from the northeast corner of the tower did you think that sending up crews where the second setback was a
02:54:32 crews where the second setback was a practicable option given that you hadn't been inside the tower as well I would say yes it would be very difficult because it's quite heavy to carry yes it
02:54:45 because it's quite heavy to carry yes it is practical now we have a record of two messages being sent from cu8 to control at about the time you were in there the first is at zero to 0-6 declaring a
02:54:57 first is at zero to 0-6 declaring a major incident and the second was at zero to 0-8 requesting for command units now I don't know Paul whether you can bring up it's at page 21 of the short
02:55:08 bring up it's at page 21 of the short instant log it may assist you to see the main movement but do you remember either these messages being sent whilst you're in the command unit no do you remember
02:55:20 in the command unit no do you remember being informed that those messages had been sent I think when we when I was on my own command unit cu7 someone did tell me that we were now a major incident and
02:55:33 me that we were now a major incident and this is the short instant log and if we look at zero two zero six
02:55:44 is 0.38
02:55:52 does that trigger any memory I think that we we possibly were walking between the two command units when that message may have been transmitted okay and again just looking just for the sake
02:56:03 and again just looking just for the sake of completeness of nothing else zero two zero eight zero five is the second message I asked you about and again I don't remember that one at all thank you
02:56:15 don't remember that one at all thank you sir it is according to that clock four minutes
02:56:18 minutes to warn ya I'm about to start a new topic it I went completed in four minutes
02:56:23 minutes and so that might be an appropriate time to adjourn for lunch yes well that sounds sensible and I think there are more questions we didn't need to ask you mr. Harrison but at this stage you'll have a break we can all have some lunch
02:56:35 have a break we can all have some lunch while you're at the room and please don't discuss their evidence with anyone else okay and we will resume at two o'clock please okay all right let's give the option
02:56:54 at a time please