Continuation of testimony from Watch Manager Harrison (LFB) describing his work in command units CU8 and CU7, managing FSG (fire survival guidance) information. Harrison explains the grid system for tracking trapped residents, communications with the bridgehead, and technical failures including generator problems and inability to access helicopter footage.
00:00:07 yes could you ask mr. Harrison to come in please
00:00:29 all right mr. Harrison yes thank you good to carry on yeah miss Harrison thank you before we leave
00:00:35 leave see you eight as it were what did you take from the absence of response from group manager Welsh and two other station Manchester your expression of opinion it's hard to take anything to be
00:00:47 opinion it's hard to take anything to be fair I knew that I didn't pressed upon him that was my view I knew that the incident commander an incident has got an awful lot to consider and a this
00:00:58 an awful lot to consider and a this incident and that was off the scale the amount of things I had to consider but I knew that my opinion was at the forefront of his his mind when he would come to formulate his plan and how did
00:01:11 come to formulate his plan and how did you know at the forefront of his mind due to the way that I delivered the statement there was it was impossible not to have heard it and having said your piece you went to the computer
00:01:23 your piece you went to the computer yes nearby and then you were tasked with FSG duties I was and how long after going to the computer will you tasked with FSG duties 15 seconds who tasked
00:01:37 with FSG duties 15 seconds who tasked you with FSG duties as I said earlier I believe someone used my first name I think it was Mark Kent field but it was
00:01:48 think it was Mark Kent field but it was as a result of an instruction from the group manager okay now a station manager Egan said in evidence when he arrived at cu8 and we have a status three time for
00:01:59 cu8 and we have a status three time for him I think it's zero 158 you were already recording FSG information on a white board does that sound right to you I didn't record any FSG information on a
00:02:10 I didn't record any FSG information on a white board on see you ate thank you at any time during any time
00:02:20 did you see anyone marking any boards in cu8 while you're in the air not that I can recall okay
00:02:35 could I ask you to look at a photograph of a laminated sheet and Paul could you bring up met triple zero one five nine three zero do you remember seeing this
00:02:53 three zero do you remember seeing this at all at any stage in the evening yes and where did you see it I saw it on cu7 because I wrote it and this was were you
00:03:07 because I wrote it and this was were you recording the information in cu7 as opposed to see you ate the information is on there was transcribed from I think approximately thirty pieces of paper
00:03:18 approximately thirty pieces of paper that station manager Egon had brought with him from cu8 to see you seven and this was the way that he wanted me to record the information from the cache we
00:03:29 record the information from the cache we in summation forms we would normally be on a casualty poster but because of the number there's on the casualty post there's only seven slots but I think there's probably around thirty different
00:03:40 there's probably around thirty different forms he had already identified that the casualty post that we normally use would not be sufficient to handle that sort of information so as I recall and I've
00:03:51 information so as I recall and I've called it quite well this was the original thirty pieces of paper that he had taken with him from cu8 what flows from that evidence and just so people have a references at page 4 of your
00:04:03 have a references at page 4 of your witness statement the third paragraph do you remember who gave those pieces of paper to station manager Egon did you see that no no do you know who had been
00:04:14 see that no no do you know who had been recording the information on the pieces of paper that were then given station manager readings it was recording was definitely recorded on cu8 so the young people that were there what my Cu
00:04:26 people that were there what my Cu colleagues Toni Peckham and van Merrick so it would have been one or both of them and do you remember what formed the information was in was it in the control information forms or was it on plane she
00:04:37 information forms or was it on plane she it was a control information for key now once you're on cu7 you say this is page four of your witness statement and four lines from the boss of that page that you were joined by group manager Goodall do you remember
00:04:49 group manager Goodall do you remember how long you been on cu7 when group major Goodall arise I didn't think it was very long and my recollection is that almost as soon as I finished writing that list you just sat
00:05:01 finished writing that list you just sat up on the screen group major Google appeared and he then he realized that wouldn't work and he asked me to draw a grid so 5-10 minutes no more than ten minutes maximum
00:05:12 minutes maximum now you explained as you've just said the group magic Goodall asked you to draw a grid of the tower on the board to record the FSG information the group manager when he gave evidence said that initially you were just listing the
00:05:24 initially you were just listing the flats on the board yes you weren't operating the grid system immediately on cu7 again that seems to be consistent with your reckless courageous and do you think that the laminated sheet that we've just looked
00:05:36 laminated sheet that we've just looked at and we can look at again if that helps could you could have been what you're initially using on cu7 as well no no okay and it certainly wasn't brought
00:05:48 no okay and it certainly wasn't brought over from cu8 in your view no wasn't
00:05:56 Paul could you bring up Matt triple zero one five nine two four I'll just let you look at that photograph mr. Harrison do
00:06:09 look at that photograph mr. Harrison do you recall seeing this board at any stage in the evening yes might reduce port and again is this the grid system that the group magic good all the pages compiled
00:06:25 now we're trying to fix a time at which you started to compile the grid system you arrived at 142 how long after arrival do
00:06:40 arrived at 142 how long after arrival do you think you started compiling the grid system the time is a quite difficult to pin down without any great degree of accuracy but that that grid would have
00:06:52 accuracy but that that grid would have been drawn within 10 minutes meat of me arriving on Cu 7 I would suggest around 2:15 in the morning could I ask Paul to bring up a document
00:07:04 could I ask Paul to bring up a document met triple zero one five nine three four
00:07:15 now if Paul is able to focus on the board at the far right of that photograph at first blush that looks
00:07:26 photograph at first blush that looks like the start of the grid system mr. Harrison yes and we have a time stamp of that photo for 0 300 hours does that
00:07:37 that photo for 0 300 hours does that help you at all with the time when you started to compile the grid system it's quite surprising to me to be fair I thought we started to use that grid system a lot earlier than that who I'm
00:07:49 system a lot earlier than that who I'm not sure who took this photograph I'm not sure as that comes from yeah is it it's time we know it's time-stamped 0 300 hours but you think it was earlier
00:08:02 300 hours but you think it was earlier as that is you're ever that's my memory okay
00:08:04 okay now you were populating the grid with information is that right that's correct and you were holding the pen yes most of the time and who else when you weren't
00:08:15 the time and who else when you weren't doing it who else was it would have been possibly dan merrick or Tony Peckham now could I ask Paul to bring up another photograph and that's met triple zero
00:08:26 photograph and that's met triple zero one five nine to seven now in the right hand corner of that photograph is a
00:08:37 hand corner of that photograph is a floor plaque do you remember seeing this on cu7 at all yes do you know who got hold of it I think I brought it from cu8
00:08:48 hold of it I think I brought it from cu8 do you want to know who got it from the tower if you know yeah I believe it's MOC cane field okay and did you use the information on that floor plaque when putting your grid together yes if I didn't have that the grid would have
00:09:00 didn't have that the grid would have been inaccurate and at this point who was taking information from control the the tooth the way it was set up my two colleagues Tony Peckham and then Marik
00:09:12 colleagues Tony Peckham and then Marik were taking information from control they would announce it to me and then back up with the casualty information form I would populate the grid and station manager Egan was behind me
00:09:24 station manager Egan was behind me looking at the grid and forwarding that information the bridgehead okay and were they any stage handing over slips of paper - yes yes I said they they took the information they would verbally call it out I would have it on on the board and
00:09:37 out I would have it on on the board and they would back it up with with the actual form itself okay so the initial call then confirmed to the PC would you verify the contents of the slip to ensure that it accorded with the verbal
00:09:48 ensure that it accorded with the verbal yes call now in relation to how the FSG information reached the instant ground you say at paragraph five of your statement and it's the top line that station magic Egan was passing the
00:10:01 station magic Egan was passing the information over to another colleague at the bridgehead now we think that that direct line of communication between mr. Egan and mr. wolf ndon at the bridgehead was set up around 4:00 a.m. now do you
00:10:14 was set up around 4:00 a.m. now do you know how FSG information was being passed from cu7 to the incident ground before 4 o'clock and my assumption was there was going to the bridgehead all the way throughout
00:10:25 the bridgehead all the way throughout the incident I didn't know at any point it wasn't going to the bridgehead did you know how the information was communicated runners radio I know we use the mixture I was aware of runners
00:10:37 the mixture I was aware of runners coming onto the unit and also station manager Egan was on his something on the handheld radio and possibly on his mobile phone as well and you've heard
00:10:50 mobile phone as well and you've heard you may have heard some discussion through the course of the evidence as to whether relying upon runners was more efficient than rely upon radio do you have a view as to the competing
00:11:01 have a view as to the competing efficiencies of those two means of communication I think that it would be quicker normally to use the radio and or telephone if for whatever reason that's not working you have to fall back to a
00:11:14 not working you have to fall back to a runner so if for example the radio channels are congested then a runner would be a practical if that's the only way we can do it we have to do whatever we can to get information through could
00:11:26 we can to get information through could I jump slightly ahead in your witness statement to page 7 and it's the third line down and you refer there to feedback that you were getting from the instant ground and you say that I might
00:11:37 instant ground and you say that I might quote when people came out especially from the
00:11:40 from the we received feedback from the crews informing us how many people have been rescued and we marked on the board now how much feedback would you say you were receiving in relation to FSGS a lot less
00:11:53 receiving in relation to FSGS a lot less than we would have wanted to and it was painfully slow but that was a testament to how difficult the conditions were
00:12:05 to how difficult the conditions were inside the tower it didn't come as a surprise to us considering we could see the tower and fire from our from our unit so it wasn't a surprise can you give us an idea of what was coming out
00:12:16 give us an idea of what was coming out coming back to you what type of information was coming back to you it was literally if and I only remember it from the lava floors and again we put it on a grid when we did have information it would be gone to whatever
00:12:28 information it would be gone to whatever flat it was and people rescued or evacuated or not there and then we would put an indicator on the on the grid that there was no one left in that flow
00:12:39 there was no one left in that flow anymore
00:12:39 anymore we've given precise numbers in some cases yes but not in all and how is this feedback reaching you was it a combination of runners plus radio or just runners just radiate and I can't
00:12:52 just runners just radiate and I can't McCall would you get some information from crews coming directly to your command unit no apologies could I jump ahead again in your witness thing this
00:13:04 ahead again in your witness thing this times page nine and it's the third paragraph from the top and you say that you think that around zero four hundred hours a group magic good all informed you that a decision had been made to
00:13:15 you that a decision had been made to stop committing firefighters above the twelfth floor do you remember hearing of any other decisions made by the bridge had not commit above a particular floor yes I think that Pete station major wolf
00:13:28 yes I think that Pete station major wolf ndon communicated with us a couple of times and asked us to record when people were not being committed above certain floors and I believe it was me that wrote that on the
00:13:41 wrote that on the and again we T communicate will it be done via run already communicate directly via radio I can't pin that down exactly I can't remember do you remember anything particular about the 15th floor for example any message in that regard
00:13:54 for example any message in that regard yeah I think that that was one of the ones that the people from then it passed over to us I remember it was green writing on the board and there was two to particular timings and they were both
00:14:07 to particular timings and they were both after 4:00 in the morning and I've got to know about 15 or 20 minutes apart thank you finally do you remember what watch magic Kent field was doing whilst you were working on cu7 no he he was the
00:14:20 you were working on cu7 no he he was the team leader from the main incident command unit periodically he would come into our command unit to check on progress I have no idea other than that
00:14:31 progress I have no idea other than that what he was doing so okay do you know whether they had any involvement in those dealing with FSGS are you able to at this point neither okay can I move on to separate topic certain technical issues that arise can
00:14:46 certain technical issues that arise can I apologize again going back in your witness statement this time to page 5 and it's the first long paragraph on that page and seven lines up from the bottom
00:14:54 bottom you were further to trying unsuccessfully to get a link from the police heli tele when you heard reports that there were people on the roof do you remember roughly what time this was they hadn't
00:15:06 roughly what time this was they hadn't any I actually tried as soon as I got on the command Janus is what we do normally anyway there was no link normally so on channel 5 and I scrolled through that up
00:15:18 channel 5 and I scrolled through that up and down 30 channels there's 16 of them and when the helicopters up it automatically would link the helicopter was definitely out cause if we could hear it clattering overhead all night long there was no connection and that
00:15:31 long there was no connection and that remained the case throughout the way through as I said I tried it as soon as I got on the command unit and I know group manager Goodall tried it as well later on and then at this juncture when
00:15:42 later on and then at this juncture when we had reports of people in the roof I attempted it again but there was no heli Telepictures whatsoever can you remember about can you remember how often thereafter you try to get a
00:15:53 how often thereafter you try to get a link through them then I would say that I tried it twice initially and at this point and group mentor Goodall had tried it
00:16:02 it prior to this as well so that was three times that we tried and did you mention the difficulties of all the failures to get through to say good and grim measure good or group magical have tried himself
00:16:13 good or group magical have tried himself and at one point he tried to relocate the unit there's a number of reasons why heli tele doesn't connect all of which some of which may have applied on the night if you're parked under a tree we
00:16:24 night if you're parked under a tree we were parked under a tree if there you're close to high buildings we were close to high buildings if you don't have direct line-of-sight we didn't always have direct line-of-sight with a helicopter if it is encrypted or if you're on the
00:16:37 if it is encrypted or if you're on the wrong channel we tried the wrong channel scenario we went through all of them so it had to be one of the other four reasons for it not connecting thank you now you also set page five in the first paragraph and it's five lines from the
00:16:49 paragraph and it's five lines from the bottom they also tried to get access to the BBC or Sky News but the LF period cut the connection due to a previous virus attack can you explain how having access to news channels would have
00:17:00 access to news channels would have helped you yes again at this point because we were getting reports of people on the roof of the building we need to confirm or otherwise if that was
00:17:11 need to confirm or otherwise if that was the case if we had had access to the Internet and could have accessed either of those news channels quite often they'd have helicopters up and they will extreme pictures we could have accessed
00:17:23 extreme pictures we could have accessed the pictures on screen and possibly made an assessment as to whether or not there were people on the roof you also say and this is at page 6 of your witness
00:17:35 this is at page 6 of your witness statement the second paragraph second line that whilst you're on their command unit the onboard generator failed about three times can you explain the effect that the three time failure
00:17:48 the effect that the three time failure of the generator had on your activities the onboard generator provides electricity supply for the lighting the radios and the computers it been a known fault for a number
00:17:59 fault for a number months I believe that the actual generator on our commander had been changed twice in the previous two years it still consistently failed with the
00:18:10 it still consistently failed with the when it failed you get a two hour battery backup UPS batteries uninterruptible power supply so the the generator itself failing won't be an issue but two hours down the line when
00:18:22 issue but two hours down the line when you run out of power it will be an issue when it did fail I said to the group manager I'd warned him in advance this it was likely to happen I also told him
00:18:33 it was likely to happen I also told him that we would have a two-hour battery backup but when it did fail to conserve some of the power I was shut down the computers and we shut down half of the lights so we would preserve battery
00:18:44 lights so we would preserve battery power but the more essential things such as the radios and maintain some lighting and handled it the battery loss thought it lost the tour's well after an hour we
00:18:55 it lost the tour's well after an hour we turn the generator on again so it started to work again for about an hour that charged the battery up again but it failed three times and eventually after I had left the command unit the the crew
00:19:06 I had left the command unit the the crew took over they told me that the generator failed and the power all ran out of the batteries as well okay so what affected that that these issues have though and on your ability to carry out your job none at the time but it was
00:19:19 out your job none at the time but it was a concern there was at the back of our mind I know the group mentor Goodall was preparing for the worst that we would have to get another command unit into c2 to carry on the FSG task and Mack that
00:19:32 to carry on the FSG task and Mack that would be very very difficult because of the congestion in the streets was the problem with the generator a problem particular to that individual command
00:19:43 particular to that individual command unit or as there's a more generic problem with generators that are used on the command units I believe it is fairly widely known across all of their command units and how long can you remember how
00:19:55 units and how long can you remember how long this has been a problem at least known to the staff who operate see use and four years and actually and have you raised it with those further I've sent
00:20:06 raised it with those further I've sent it up the defects and yes that one that we've had Al's changed on two occasions and I suspect it across other units it's been changed as well there are a few other questions I have for you
00:20:18 are a few other questions I have for you mr. Harrison and apologies for going back to the cu8 where you expressed your views and you were having a exchange
00:20:29 views and you were having a exchange also with mr. Delaney now I hope I could remember it fairly that he informed you that there was only one stairwell now given he wants he'd given you that
00:20:41 given he wants he'd given you that information how did you factor that into your assessment of the practicability and the risks arising from an evacuation of the tower whether total or partial I
00:20:52 of the tower whether total or partial I knew it's going to be an extremely difficult task to achieve and there would be no easy easy way of achieving it and what would be to your mind and
00:21:07 it and what would be to your mind and bearing in mind your experience and what would be the particularly significant difficulties confronting evacuation there is because the staircase is full
00:21:18 there is because the staircase is full of smoke
00:21:19 of smoke the residents as they try to evacuate from there from their flat will be exposed to an arrest revolt atmosphere as they come down the stairs final
00:21:31 as they come down the stairs final questions for now mr. Harrison in your second contemporaneous note I don't know whether poor can get a sir on the screen and it's the met allocated page number
00:21:43 and it's the met allocated page number six which is internal page four
00:21:50 Mette page six who needs go on two pages internal for and I think it's something like six lines from the top you refer
00:22:03 like six lines from the top you refer their that about the zero six thirty hours spotting a a man seen waving from a towel at a window of the building and he's report to be on the eighth ninth
00:22:14 he's report to be on the eighth ninth tenth and eleventh floors are you aware what the source of that information was did it come from a member of the public did it come VAR controlled or did you just see it I believe the original
00:22:25 just see it I believe the original report was was as a result of someone viewing it on on TV at home and they said they've someone phone someone on on command unit said have you seen there is a man waving a towel at the window and
00:22:38 a man waving a towel at the window and did you have any particular further particular information about the gentleman any vulnerabilities or any particular evidence as to where precisely was in the tower no and you know what was done with the information
00:22:49 know what was done with the information once had been communicated to you yeah and station manager Egan took strenuous efforts to establish where exactly it was that you may even have left the unit to go and physically look but this is
00:23:01 to go and physically look but this is another example if if we'd had the internet working and could have access the TV pictures we may have been out to get the answer ourselves without having having station mentor even having to take extra efforts to try and find it
00:23:13 take extra efforts to try and find it out and I think that the station mentor Egan did establish where he was and ensure that the crew was committed to the correct floor and the man was rescued thank mr. Harrison knows all the
00:23:25 rescued thank mr. Harrison knows all the questions I've got them all now so my task for the usual five minutes so I can see where they're only further lines which ought to be covered yes well it's convenient now to have a five minute break so counsel okay the question so
00:23:36 break so counsel okay the question so I'd like to go in the Asha then talk to another bunch for evidence and we'll be back and hop on students
00:23:48 right too sensitive thanks it
00:31:16 here's a few more questions sir yes I finally for the sake of consistency yes yes please
00:31:40 alright Peterson yes thank you just a few more mr. Harrison thank you very much
00:31:46 much first of all in respect of the Haley tally itself are you word that you could have established a direct radio channel to the heli tele are you aware of Echo Sierra 3 no could
00:32:00 are you aware of Echo Sierra 3 no could I ask Paul to bring up lfb document two three five one underscore treble zero one
00:32:20 I'll just let you read that it's a transcript of a call I just let you read it
00:32:35 on its face that appears to suggest a direct channel to the Hellion early are you aware of that I wasn't aware of this message or that we could actually go on to P glom here kcra3 thank you
00:32:49 to P glom here kcra3 thank you final question mr. Harrison was the viability of using helicopters to affect rescues discussed in cu7
00:33:00 rescues discussed in cu7 we it was not in cu7 I think it was on outside when one of the senior officers I can't remember which it was either the incident commander or the operations
00:33:12 incident commander or the operations commander came round hunting for the information about whether or not there was anyone on the roof he wanted confirmation a discussion was then undertaken as to if there were people up
00:33:25 undertaken as to if there were people up there how could we get them off and you say this this conversation was outside science I believe so yes and did you were you within cu7 and overheard it or at that stage where you outside saying I was at the door I've got a I've got a
00:33:39 was at the door I've got a I've got a feeling and it is quite hazy memory group manager good or possibly station major Wolfington was there and I do vividly remember I don't know who said
00:33:51 vividly remember I don't know who said it but the the mention of possibility the Coast Guard provided a helicopter or contacts be made with RAF Northolt to see if they had any helicopters that could be used did the exchange reach a
00:34:03 could be used did the exchange reach a conclusion as to the viability of helicopter use no again the the negatives of possibly using it in a well-ventilated fire if you get a downdraft from a helicopter it could
00:34:16 downdraft from a helicopter it could turn a fire into a blowtorch so had there been people still alive in the building who weren't on the roof but they're actually trapped in flats he
00:34:27 they're actually trapped in flats he could have turned what was already a very very severe fire literally into a blowtorch mr. Harrison those are all the questions I've got for you thank you very much for attending today to give evidence is very much appreciated thank
00:34:39 evidence is very much appreciated thank you
00:34:39 you thank you again mr. Harrison becoming to give you sir evidence it's really valuable to us to hear in detail what was going on that evening in different aspects of the work and so your evidence will contribute to that thank you very
00:34:51 will contribute to that thank you very much indeed if I may yes and could offer my condolences to the family and friends of all the victims of the tragedy yeah
00:35:03 of all the victims of the tragedy yeah and I hope you get the justice you deserve thank you thank you very much thank you
00:35:22 yes mr. clear so that concludes today's business all right sir tomorrow we have mr. Walton attending to give evidence yet there is no application for an early
00:35:34 yet there is no application for an early start so I'd ask you to sit at ten o'clock
00:35:37 o'clock all right well thank you very much well we come to an end today rather earlier than we would normally expect to that may be welcome in some quarters I don't know I'm sure you can use the time effectively and we'll sit again tomorrow
00:35:49 effectively and we'll sit again tomorrow at ten o'clock then please I think 10 o'clock tomorrow please thank you