Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Further LFB evidence (18 September 2018 Pt 1 of 2)
00:00:10 good morning everyone and welcome to today's hearing we're going to hear another firefighter witness today mr. work ethic yes good morning mr. chairman and may I now please call group manager
00:00:22 and may I now please call group manager Richard Welch thank you
00:00:55 thank you very much with - yes mr. wells good morning morning can you please give the inquiry your full name Richard Fredrik Welch and can I start by saying
00:01:08 Fredrik Welch and can I start by saying thank you very much to you for coming here and giving evidence to the inquiry and helping us with our investigations it's very much appreciated if any of my questions are incomprehensible to you I'm very happy to put the question again
00:01:21 I'm very happy to put the question again or ask the question in a different way just all you have to do is ask me and if you need to break at any time just signal and we can take a break first of all can I ask you to take your two
00:01:33 all can I ask you to take your two statements please which will either be in front of you or in a small bundle or more conveniently on the screen on the desk to your right which is where you it's best to look at them or displayed on the screens at the back of the room
00:01:45 on the screens at the back of the room and the first one is dated the fifth of July 2017 and that is M et quadruple zero seven five two five and the second
00:01:56 zero seven five two five and the second one is dated the 30th of March 2018 and that is M et triple zero one three double zero seven have you read both of
00:02:07 double zero seven have you read both of those statements recently yes I haven't have can you confirm for us that the contents are true and accurate and there are actually two you know preceding the first statement of one in the second statement right okay well if I don't
00:02:18 statement right okay well if I don't pick those up someone will remind me of them we may find that there are more than that okay but perhaps we can cover those now if you want to look at the first statement which is the inaccuracy
00:02:30 which is the inaccuracy the first one is in a statement which is obviously I was informed of a Tim pump fire initially I believe that to be actually a night pump for the right formed of we'll come to that I think
00:02:42 formed of we'll come to that I think yeah thank you second part the second one was within my statement it's is that the Asian male was rescued at our e100 Ahlers not blade that's B I was 606 m press
00:02:53 that's B I was 606 m press again thank you very much and in the second statement in the second statement I state that the ology informed the change of state policy I work hundred and I believe that to be oh three
00:03:04 and I believe that to be oh three hundred I was going to ask you about that and that's clarified that already thank you very much um it's subject to those Corrections that you very helpfully just made can you confirm
00:03:15 helpfully just made can you confirm again that the contents are true and accurate yes okay thank you and have you discussed your statements or your evidence that you're going to give to us with anybody today before coming here as a core participant I have discussed it
00:03:26 a core participant I have discussed it with the legal team appointed to me by the Foreign Office Association the events of the night but not the evidence I'm telling you today right now you are a borough commander for Lambeth I wasn't
00:03:38 a borough commander for Lambeth I wasn't no longer what are you now I'm now at the petitioner commissioner when were you promoted on the first night of ember 2017 right and as at the 14th of June 2017 you were a borough commander for
00:03:50 2017 you were a borough commander for Lambeth s correct your callsign I think was a 109 that's correct is it still your call is that still your callsign no it's now echo five is matt 'if i've echo five i see as at the 14th of June 2017
00:04:04 five i see as at the 14th of June 2017 you had been I think an employee of the lfb for some 22 years yes correct and it was all of that frontline service yes and you explained in your witness
00:04:16 and you explained in your witness statement your first witness statement in the first main paragraph that because of the areas you've been based in and I'm summarizing because of the areas
00:04:27 I'm summarizing because of the areas you've been based in as borough commander in particular new amande tower hamlets in London you have had a lot of experience of high-rise fires is that right that's correct okay and in terms
00:04:39 right that's correct okay and in terms of high-rise training that you've received or delivered can you tell us in general terms first of all whether any of that has covered the specific subject of ignition of the facade of a building
00:04:50 of ignition of the facade of a building a high-rise building no not aware of it and has any of the training that you received or delivered covered the ignition and fire bread of over cladding on the exterior
00:05:04 bread of over cladding on the exterior of a building again not that recalled now have you ever given or received training in strategies for either full or partial evacuation of a high-rise
00:05:15 or partial evacuation of a high-rise residential block as part of all Horrors policy that we do consider a full evacuation of a building but that's usually of a commercial GUI not
00:05:26 usually of a commercial GUI not necessarily residential right have you ever done let's start with the practical training exercise have you ever done a practical training exercise involving full or partial evacuation of a
00:05:37 full or partial evacuation of a high-rise residential block not Oracle right and it do you know of
00:05:49 right and it do you know of circumstances in which you would consider implementing an evacuation of a high-rise residential building which had a stay put policy in place from
00:06:01 a stay put policy in place from operational knowledge that it would be that if the stay-put policy is no longer effective then we would move to removing that and evacuate the building right possible have you ever had an experience as an operational frontline officer of a
00:06:14 as an operational frontline officer of a time when the state book policy was as and put it no longer effective no apart from Greenville tower up in Greenville town do you ever recall seeing or
00:06:30 town do you ever recall seeing or receiving any training on on something called a tall buildings facade slide show I've become aware of it recently but I don't record it you can try anyway no okay just so be clear we can put up
00:06:41 no okay just so be clear we can put up the front page it's tab 10 of the master documents bundle and it's NFB all that is first tall buildings to start well that carries the date of the 13th of July 2016 all that drop that's I think a
00:06:52 July 2016 all that drop that's I think a draft the actual date were told that it was finalized and and disseminated in the NFP was October 2016 awesome never fun right now if you look
00:07:06 awesome never fun right now if you look at the first paragraph on page one of your statement and look at the first look at the end of this end of the last I'm sorry the last sentence on that paragraph other training of note you say
00:07:19 paragraph other training of note you say is that I am a qualified breathing apparatus instructor Bai does that mean that you are qualified to train firefighters on the use of both
00:07:30 train firefighters on the use of both SDB a standard and EDB a extended British roads yeah and and again in general terms are you able to tell us when you would need to use a DBA
00:07:43 tell us when you would need to use a DBA specifically as an incident rather than s DBA a DBA would only be used when there's extensive travel distances so to summarize it really would be that the
00:07:54 summarize it really would be that the Vincennes is required to travel further and stay longer at an instant but not usually for full authority have you ever had an experience where you needed to deploy large amounts large numbers of
00:08:07 deploy large amounts large numbers of EDB a whereas into a tower block none is there any training available or was there any training available as a June
00:08:18 there any training available as a June 2017 on that kind of activity deploy mass deployment of e DBA whereas into a tower block not to the extent that we used to run for town or not
00:08:31 now I want to turn to you your mobilization and journey to grenfell on the night of the fire if you turn to page 2 of your statement please
00:08:40 please or first statement I'd like you to get to 11 lines off the bottom of that page and you say invert and it's just not
00:09:00 and you say invert and it's just not that easy to find it's just below halfway down he said I went to bed around midnight and then at o1 18 hours on 14th June 2017
00:09:11 on 14th June 2017 I received a pager message informing me of a fire at flat 16 fourth floor Grenfell tower with six pumps attending but also requesting an aerial and making it persons reported now you say you got
00:09:27 it persons reported now you say you got that at oh one 18 hours when you did this statement were you looking at the document in order to get that time no that was a ton that was recording on my pager I said that he's possible to turn
00:09:38 pager I said that he's possible to turn the page it could be inaccurate that was on your pager I see okay now we've got a recorded time for your pager message that was sent to you in the short incident log and I
00:09:49 you in the short incident log and I wonder if I could just ask you to be shown that please at page 13
00:10:08 on that page we see just below halfway done the list of officers attending the incident and we see your name about a third of the way down that list a 109
00:10:19 third of the way down that list a 109 Richard Welch Welch Richard you see that yes okay 14th of June 2017 assigned at 1 1927 would that be the time that you were paged informing you of the incident
00:10:31 were paged informing you of the incident at Granville tower I would say these units out there and now you say in your statement just going back we'll come back to the short answer that log a number of times I think during the course of today but just put that on one
00:10:42 course of today but just put that on one side - the moment came back to your statement you say that you were told in the request and this is 3/4 of the way down the page that you would probably be
00:10:54 down the page that you would probably be needed to attend in my in my role you say as both media advice of BMA you say probably was that that was your your
00:11:05 probably was that that was your your estimation or understanding was it yes so when there's 6 appliances in instant the bulk media is your call whether you think you're needed depending on what were the instant is but once it becomes a your Provinces then your attendance is
00:11:18 a your Provinces then your attendance is compulsory and if you go back to the short incident log at page 17 and look please at the timestamp of oh one 21 33
00:11:33 please at the timestamp of oh one 21 33 it says agency II 109 GM Welch paged as tab or ta B what does ta B stand for that's the code you
00:11:45 ta B stand for that's the code you control aesthetical advisor bulk tactical advisor bulk is that the same as bulk media advisors okay and you go on to say in your statement main statement of a page to a half way down
00:11:58 statement of a page to a half way down the page and sorry with jumping around because it jumps around a bit you say as group manager I carry an additional tag
00:12:09 group manager I carry an additional tag to borough commander which is belt media advisor it's exactly halfway down the page
00:12:18 responsible for the large delivery straight removal of water as incidents this means that I am notified of any incident where six pumps are requested and I can choose whether I need to attend but if eight pumps eight or more
00:12:30 attend but if eight pumps eight or more pumps are requested than I am required to attend just just focusing on what you say about responsible for the large delivery or removal of water at incidents there mr. world can you explain to us in layman's terms what
00:12:42 explain to us in layman's terms what that means so if there's lots of appliances there which are using a large amount of water or aerial appliances which user a large amount water then pump meter advisors role is to advise the incident commander on the best
00:12:54 the incident commander on the best configuration to get the most amount of water in it the high general where the water source is available but the removal part is related to floodings so if we need to remove a lot of water from an area then we'll also get involved to
00:13:06 an area then we'll also get involved to help up against a commander advising to come on down here do that I see is one of the tasks to remove water which has been applied by the brigade only if it
00:13:18 been applied by the brigade only if it causes flooding not usually the most organizations that run away naturally a bit because of funding we can assist for that I see and would you all role also cover their dealing with any kind of
00:13:29 cover their dealing with any kind of issues about water pressure it's an incident so if there were if there were water pressure issues at grenfell tower you would be the officer in charge of
00:13:40 you would be the officer in charge of sorting those issues out it would be advertising needs to command on the best configuration of how to how to get the most amount out of their borders available from the hydrant working with the water ball to increase the pressure
00:13:51 the water ball to increase the pressure if necessary or find in larger hydrants further away where we can get the water from so if there were generic issues with water pressure a grand thought I would you be the officer who would be responsible for liaison with the water
00:14:02 responsible for liaison with the water board yes right and did you then I could I didn't carry out that role in the night did anybody else there was another bottle
00:14:11 bottle Casa de came later on - manager Chris painting I believe right I'm so sorry there was a could you just repeat the name again I'm actually got it down the
00:14:22 name again I'm actually got it down the station manager Chris planks inability claim as you thought me to advise a later on right now in the same passage of your statement in the next part of the sentence you say and I've read it
00:14:33 the sentence you say and I've read it out already that means it means you're notified of any incident where six pumps are requested we've seen that on the screen and we know that by the time your pager message went at oh one nineteen as
00:14:44 pager message went at oh one nineteen as we've just seen the incident at grenfell had been made up to an eight pump fire and then by the time you spoke to control 124's will come to see it was a ten pump fire um a question is at that
00:14:56 ten pump fire um a question is at that stage by 124 when you knew that it was a 10 pump fire did you know whether other group managers have been asked to attend or told their to attend so that our
00:15:08 or told their to attend so that our mobilizing policies once we make pumper 6 then we require station may just take over incident and a group major is automatically mobilized to monitor the station may just so my something would
00:15:19 station may just so my something would be yes there would be a group major attending right and looking back your statement just below halfway down you say you received your pager message and we've seen this already informing me of
00:15:31 we've seen this already informing me of a fire a flat 16 fourth log rental Tower with six pumps attending was that what your pager message told you that it was on the on the fourth floor I couldn't
00:15:42 on the on the fourth floor I couldn't recall it word for word but that's why center Ecole yes right would a pager message normally tell you the exact address or location of the farm that you
00:15:53 address or location of the farm that you help try and give as much of measure Ken on that pager message yeah now you also say and it's still paid to and it's
00:16:04 eight lines up from from the bottom also this request told me that I'd probably be needed to attend this PMA and with persons reported as well I had already decided to attend before I called into
00:16:16 decided to attend before I called into our control room in Merton as required where my pager message is received you your reference that a person's reported that did you get that or on the pager do
00:16:29 that did you get that or on the pager do you think I believe so either because what we do when you got the pager it would just give me an initial PR right looking back at the short incident
00:16:41 right looking back at the short incident lock if I could just take you back to that the persons reported message comes this is page 18 the top of page 18 in
00:16:53 this is page 18 the top of page 18 in the short incident on the persons reported message come to ou 128 40 if you just look at the top there sa descends the service request at over 128 14 at Sharon Darby service request
00:17:04 14 at Sharon Darby service request created IUP g27 one persons reported and so just in terms of timings to Welch it looks as if that request was created at
00:17:15 looks as if that request was created at that stage at least on the vision system do you think that you could be wrong about the pager telling message telling you that it was a person's reported failure clear yeah I think I could be wrong there okay
00:17:26 wrong there okay now going back to your statement a page it's really you say at 125 I was already in my vehicle ready to leave when I
00:17:39 in my vehicle ready to leave when I received a second page informing me it was it was now a 10 pump fire and that an aerial have been requested I think it was that the area of your state what you
00:17:51 was that the area of your state what you wanted to correct well no cuz when I was about to control though tell you these Tim come fire yeah but then as its as these two increases they will keep paging you it's all that was spoken to the military now as Tim
00:18:03 was spoken to the military now as Tim pumps you don't still send me a pager message to let me know that I'm following just can I just just look at page 17 then of the s il which ought incident log he was that's going fast the page and look
00:18:15 that's going fast the page and look please at the time Martin of no.1 24:34 you can see there that Sharon Darby s ad
00:18:27 you can see there that Sharon Darby s ad is shown Dom she's the radio operator inserts into the system make up IUP from g27 will make pumps 10 so we've got the timing of that do you think you had left
00:18:42 timing of that do you think you had left for the incident before or after the make up to 10 I think that was a rare around the same kind of time considering the time I was paged okay now as you
00:18:55 the time I was paged okay now as you started your journey what communications equipment did you have with you what air wave radio was it on yes did you hear the make ups as you drove yes do you think therefore that is
00:19:08 drove yes do you think therefore that is possible that you have the persons reported radio message as you Kylie now going back to page 2 of your statement you you can see we can see them and then editors going back in time a little bit
00:19:19 editors going back in time a little bit you'd called into the control room this is 3/4 of the way down page 2
00:19:29 and
00:19:33 you set the foot of the page you kept the call short do you remember whether you were told during that call to the control room that there were multiple calls coming in from persons trapped in
00:19:45 calls coming in from persons trapped in the tower I recall being told that at that time I'm ringing at the call being told it that we have multiple codes right now but that wasn't involving
00:19:56 right now but that wasn't involving people from within the tower it's quite it's quite usual when we've got a large file I will get lots of calls from surrounding areas and people who see it during that call were you told or given
00:20:07 during that call were you told or given the impression that any of those calls were fire survival guidance calls even at that early stage not that Ricola okay now going back to the top of page three
00:20:18 now going back to the top of page three of your statement you saved I began my journey to the incident by the time I reached the a to only a couple of miles from my home I heard on my vehicle's
00:20:29 from my home I heard on my vehicle's Iowa radio that pumps have been made 15 a few minutes later I heard pumps made 20 and a few minutes after that they were made 25 did that rate of increase
00:20:43 were made 25 did that rate of increase of makeups of appliances tell you anything at that stage about the nature of the fire or its spread it made me very clearly the incident commander at at saw him had a very serious floor in
00:20:55 at saw him had a very serious floor in front of him it was it was growing quickly because of the quick of my cups right did you have any thoughts in that moment about what kind of building it was what sort of tactics should be
00:21:06 was what sort of tactics should be adopted well at that point I was trapping there I was going there as a bottle meteor visor so my thoughts were around what what the miles might be might only provide water further
00:21:18 might only provide water further sternness growing that quickly right did the rate of makeups of appliances make you think that your role at the incident would be rather more than about media advisor that actually had to be incident
00:21:30 advisor that actually had to be incident commander when you arrived that does happen and I was aware that that could happen but a girl tells quite a distance there's travel together it was quite extensive so I didn't think I would be the first fruit
00:21:41 didn't think I would be the first fruit manager to arrive now I follow now then you say in the next paragraph this around this time I heard control inform
00:21:53 around this time I heard control inform officers at the scene that they were receiving fire survival guidance FSG phone calls from people in flats within Grenville tower and providing flat numbers and number of occupants you say
00:22:08 numbers and number of occupants you say around this time that's on route yes do you remember hearing actual floor numbers I mean then being passed across
00:22:19 numbers I mean then being passed across radio but I don't remember any specific floor numbers all flexed you say you you remember flat numbers do you remember any specific plant numbers no are you sure that flat numbers were
00:22:31 are you sure that flat numbers were actually being passed across the radio I seem to recall those flat numbers being possible across the radio but throughout most of my journey that information was being given though both concentrating on
00:22:43 being given though both concentrating on driving on a bow tie and and controlling contra-asset knave I was aware that they were coming in but I wasn't going there was a stir commander so I wasn't trying to recall those figures those numbers
00:22:55 to recall those figures those numbers right
00:22:56 right do you have a recollection of having any particular impression of whether these calls were coming from anywhere particular in the building and high up or all no down I've another remember that's all okay now
00:23:11 we could just take a sample or two of these take this very quickly if you go to page 18 please at the short incident log just just to make sure we've got got
00:23:24 log just just to make sure we've got got this clear clear and turn to on page 18 look at the time mark of a 131 38 this is a service request made by it made by
00:23:40 is a service request made by it made by Big Daddy RT 4 so it's made by radio g27 one further call to save fire on 20th
00:23:51 one further call to save fire on 20th floor also people trapped now I think you were on route at that at that point do you remember or does that trigger a recollection in only of general messages I was here in my life specifics in terms
00:24:04 I was here in my life specifics in terms of general messages you were hearing did you get the impression that there were repeated calls about the same about the same flats or same floors I don't remember that did you get the impression that there were people trapped on high
00:24:16 that there were people trapped on high floors even at that early stage it was clear they were people trapped by the fact that I make you fight oh god I don't recall what floors overrun right
00:24:25 and then if you go back to your statement please and look at page 3 towards the bottom of the page you say there's three quarters of the way down as I came off the a40 and on to the West
00:24:39 as I came off the a40 and on to the West cross route I started paying more attention to my sat-nav to guide me in the West cross route just help me I believe that's as you can learn a
00:24:50 I believe that's as you can learn a faulty and then turn left down towards roundabout horrible events the echos right okay so where's where the West field is on the right yes yes throughout the journey I had heard more and more
00:25:01 the journey I had heard more and more FSG calls coming in and it made me feel horrible but also focus my mind and got me to draw on my high-rise experience which is to focus on reading for locations and the FSGS
00:25:12 locations and the FSGS there was minimal radio traffic back from the scene which told me they were up against it
00:25:19 now when you say to focus on reading the locations of the FSGS could you just explain what you mean by that I think that it's built into us as as experience
00:25:32 that it's built into us as as experience fire offices that when you do start hearing of histories coming in you've tried to remember what you can hear right although you know you know it's being recorded at the scene but you're still trying to recall some sort of information from it did you know I
00:25:46 information from it did you know I couldn't remember the information it's not an area unfamiliar with I was concentrating it on as I can hear the efficiencies the urgency of gave me and trying to follow away in to the area I
00:25:58 trying to follow away in to the area I thought I may have remember that's all I recall when you know in their information now okay what was your because you say in your statement you would you you were prompted to draw on your high-rise experience which is to
00:26:09 your high-rise experience which is to focus on reading the locations of fs cheese let me ask a different question and then come back to it in your high-rise experience have you ever handled multiple FSGS from a single
00:26:21 handled multiple FSGS from a single incident I would chain the prune level two or three any instant right was handling two or three a frequent experience as a frontline officer not frequent right okay but no more than two
00:26:33 frequent right okay but no more than two or three say yes coming back to and what was the most recent incident at which you had to handle multiple FSGS prior to Grand Vitara do you remember
00:26:45 prior to Grand Vitara do you remember probably more than two years ago right prior to instant and was that a high-rise residential was yeah from what I recall
00:26:53 I recall Halla Rogers didn't East London in East London yeah just going back then to your statement where you say you were drawing
00:27:04 statement where you say you were drawing on your high-rise experience which is to focus on reading the locators of the FSGS did you dip on route did you focus on reading the locations of EFS cheese and I would have done that Teresa yes I
00:27:16 and I would have done that Teresa yes I think I can't come to say yes but I was also aware that the information was getting passed to the scene it was big it's been acknowledged by D people receiving it so I was aware that he's
00:27:27 receiving it so I was aware that he's being recorded so that's like that's comforting for an officer to know that that's being received acknowledged so when you get there there will be a list right so we can work from now you're hearing more and more FS G's coming in
00:27:40 hearing more and more FS G's coming in or calls coming in do you remember having any thoughts at that time we are still on route quite near the incident but did you remember having any thoughts at that time about what these FSG calls
00:27:53 at that time about what these FSG calls meant in terms of fire spread or smoke spread well on my journey after hearing the number of these coals actually made a phone call to station manager
00:28:04 a phone call to station manager McNaughton there was the I watts heels from Annoying and because I knew he was he was the only officer and I've worked close to him before in a past I made a very very brief discussion and it was around the
00:28:16 brief discussion and it was around the shock of how many calls were coming in and they actually come some what they got what is it right because it sounded quite strange yes well you you you deal with that in your statement halfway down the page let's
00:28:28 statement halfway down the page let's just look at that you say when I heard about the FSG calls this is just at the end of the second main paragraph there mr. wellick you say I phoned McMahon Holland station manager ort on my
00:28:39 Holland station manager ort on my hands-free mobile phone just pausing there was that your Brigade mobile yes he was also on route to the scene and we had a brief conversation about how he hoped it was just a watch manager who had panicked was that call before or
00:28:53 had panicked was that call before or after you'd heard the more and more FSGS coming coming in I think I think enduring that was that was during that period but within the first
00:29:04 during that period but within the first five 10 minutes of my journey what I see okay but did you at any stage during your journeys have any thoughts about
00:29:15 your journeys have any thoughts about whether compartment ation in this block had been breached did you have any thoughts about whether you needed to consider or assist in the consideration of a tactic involving
00:29:26 consideration of a tactic involving evacuation at that stage in love now you say it's still on page three of your statement in the third paragraph just at
00:29:42 statement in the third paragraph just at the beginning as I drove along the a40 towards the scene I could see the glow from the building my first thought was that the fire must have been from the
00:29:53 that the fire must have been from the netting used in scaffolded buildings this burns very quickly but then dies down however as I continued on with a forty Westway passing traffic which had pulled over to watch I realized there
00:30:04 pulled over to watch I realized there was no scaffolding on the building so you were going east to west east to west yes right on the right on the left hand side of the carriageway and you had a block on your left on your left
00:30:15 block on your left on your left did you get a clear view of it do you think from your car only as I got quite close to it I was initially shocked to see Carla she stopped on the i-40 and
00:30:26 see Carla she stopped on the i-40 and pulled up to look and just before we turn off the I thought you get quite good clear he was good next but I realize there was no scaffolding no building Rutan right did you think at
00:30:42 building Rutan right did you think at that stage and I know you're still on Rue but did you have any thoughts at that stage whether the calls from occupants higher up in the building reporting smoke and fire that you'd
00:30:53 reporting smoke and fire that you'd heard over your airway of radio was consistent with this being a scaffolding fire or netting fire it wouldn't be unusual to the public to
00:31:06 it wouldn't be unusual to the public to make those calls because the Knitting on scaffolding burns quite spectacularly but for not very long so as a resident Nick I understand that that would be very very distressing and worrying and
00:31:17 very very distressing and worrying and there be a lot of smoke coming off of it and so I wouldn't I wouldn't be shocked today right but you then say as I continued on the Westway errors there
00:31:28 continued on the Westway errors there was no scaffolding on the building at that moment when you realize there was no scaffolding on the building did you have any positive thoughts about what it actually was that was on fire no I just
00:31:39 actually was that was on fire no I just felt chilled because I couldn't work out what was what was what was seemed right and yeah just a feeling of oh [ __ ]
00:31:55 right that's very expressive but I thought I might bring any other white really there miss it was a real feeling of there's people in that building but just to
00:32:08 people in that building but just to press my my question a little bit more did you actually have any thoughts about what it actually was them was burning nobody know anything that at that point we also driving now I didn't because it
00:32:21 we also driving now I didn't because it was a quite quick glucose I saw in the building and I think they back on what I think needed strange is they seemed to be outside but I was waiting for the nearer to try and assess what what he
00:32:33 nearer to try and assess what what he was right then in rough terms do you do you remember how long it took you to
00:32:44 you remember how long it took you to drive to the incident I would estimate around 20 minutes 25 years if you go to
00:32:55 around 20 minutes 25 years if you go to the short incident log at page 13 we have a status three time for U of O 157
00:33:10 have a status three time for U of O 157 21 you can just see that there against your name 157 21 does that sound about right to you yes it does right and then
00:33:22 right to you yes it does right and then if you go back to your statement and turn to page 4 you say at the very top as I ran up grenfell Road I saw a
00:33:37 as I ran up grenfell Road I saw a command unit see you in Babel Road and as it was protocol I think that must be for senior officers I reported there first
00:33:46 first as it is where the incident commander would usually be just to be clear on which Cu that was there's a map which I
00:33:57 which Cu that was there's a map which I think we can use so that you can indicate to us where it weathers that Cu is part it's MIT yes that is the 1m et triple 0 1 6 8 5 4
00:34:09 that is the 1m et triple 0 1 6 8 5 4 could you just indicate for us where the Cu that you went to first was we've got Grenfell road running down to the southeast of the tower and then where it
00:34:22 southeast of the tower and then where it says cycle higher station that's been more Road yes that's very was it see you I I'll see you ain't inside yeah oh right thank you and it was it on the right side of the road on the left if
00:34:33 right side of the road on the left if you tell you from Greenville roads on the left-hand side yes thank you so that's see you 8 now after you arrived at CU age but before you checked
00:34:46 arrived at CU age but before you checked in there as it were did you take a good look at the fire no I didn't get a very good view of it other then we're not going to buy more roll off I call it was a bit but right it wasn't a clear view I
00:34:57 a bit but right it wasn't a clear view I see but even with that glimpse could you tell us what you saw pretty pretty much confirm what seen from the iPhone which appeared like that the east side of the building was largely a lie right could
00:35:09 building was largely a lie right could you see even in that glimpse whether the fire penetrated from the exterior back into flats not that you couldn't often it did you know that stage before you
00:35:22 it did you know that stage before you checked in whether you were thus most senior officer at the scene no you didn't know what what assumptions make you miss senior sorry I assumed that I
00:35:33 you miss senior sorry I assumed that I was tender spot leader adviser they've been very few mysteries coming back from this scene because they might have pressure I wonder but I assume that by that point it'd be at least a group manager in charge I see you assumed that
00:35:45 manager in charge I see you assumed that by that point there be a group manager in charge did you then take a step back and work out what was in front of you so that you could get a clear picture of the tasks that you have to perform they were prop my priority was Guild's
00:35:57 they were prop my priority was Guild's the command unit and it needs to command and though that was there and ask what help you needed pushing now and you'll say the statement you go on to say and it's top of page four I was followed
00:36:08 it's top of page four I was followed into the Cu 3 lines down from the top for I was followed into the sea you by the ort Matthew cooked Mick Mulholland and Steve West did you all go in
00:36:22 and Steve West did you all go in together as a group I think that I was probably just barely in front but they work they work with seconds behind I see okay and where did you first see them on
00:36:34 okay and where did you first see them on the command unit on the command unit now you go on to say in the next line or the next sentence the only person in the sea you was an was an operative one
00:36:46 you was an was an operative one operative when I would usually expect a minimum of two preferable three do you know what do you remember who that
00:36:57 know what do you remember who that operative on the sea you was it was are you familiar with a watch manager called Daniel Marek familiar the name but I'll probably recognize him right do you
00:37:08 probably recognize him right do you recall a watch manager Kentfield
00:37:12 do you know watch manager Kentfield know you know do you remember what the operative that was on the sea you and he went in was doing he was seen at the
00:37:23 went in was doing he was seen at the front end of the sea you where they wouldn't usually sit use the radio channels right did you see what he was doing I remember now
00:37:34 doing I remember now did he speak to him I did I asked him who was in charge right and he told me the station manager Britt loft right he said it was Brett loft okay when you spoke to him you don't
00:37:46 okay when you spoke to him you don't remember what he was doing I don't have the radiation to know right now you say that it was Brett loft that he told you was in charge now I should just put this
00:37:59 was in charge now I should just put this to you what manager Merrick has come to the inquiry and given us evidence and he told us and I'm summarizing it that he didn't know anything about station
00:38:10 didn't know anything about station manager lovers involvement in the incident
00:38:14 incident so just to get back to your recollection are you sure that well how sure are you that he told you the station manager Loft was in charge I have a clear recollection of ask him who's in charge because that's the first question is
00:38:25 because that's the first question is what leader of all I want to know right you said to me he may have said it is or I think but he's definitely said to me better social major Brett Lofton do you know station manager Brett loft yes are they right and Union before the incident
00:38:38 they right and Union before the incident yes
00:38:39 yes say mister did I think I know the answer this next question but did did anybody tell you at that point that Mike Dowd and remained in command and Brett Loft was actually in charge of FSG no did
00:38:53 was actually in charge of FSG no did anybody mention Andy Walton to you as somebody present did you ask the operative where Brett loft was well ask him who's in charge telling Brett loft I
00:39:05 him who's in charge telling Brett loft I explained to the operative because it was 25 pump files and most senior offered a whole will be taken over a drew net conversation a station energy loss to claim on City come on Jimmy
00:39:23 so how long after you arrived just following that last answer up did youth do you think station manager loft came onto the command unit I would estimate to be within a minute or two
00:39:35 to be within a minute or two through the middle - do you know where he came from no did you ask him no he came into the
00:39:49 no did you ask him no he came into the command unit I explained to myself Brett is 425 I'm the first GM here so I will be taken over tell me what you know right we'll come to that because we will look at
00:40:01 come to that because we will look at that in some detail in a moment before we do can I ask you this what you say in your your statement six lines down from the top of page four I was surprised
00:40:14 the top of page four I was surprised because normal protocol is for a watch manager to be in charge up to four pumps a station manager to six pumps a group manager to ten pumps a Deputy Assistant Commissioner to 15 pumps and a director
00:40:26 Commissioner to 15 pumps and a director above that just just on direct him what's a director is that any assistant assistant commissioner above you so you say you were surprised did you check
00:40:40 say you were surprised did you check with control whether any other more senior officers had booked in the status three no I didn't I I was surprised because I've traveled from southeast
00:40:51 because I've traveled from southeast London to West London that I was the first one there I knew I'd driven it quickly because the agency but other group managers started arriving very quickly behind me right so at the moment is this right that at
00:41:03 so at the moment is this right that at the moment station manager loft comes on board cu8 and you see him and discover the he's incident commander you did you assume that you were the first group manager on scene I asked the command
00:41:16 manager on scene I asked the command unit operative I'm on a first GM and they said Jessica right
00:41:26 did you know that Pat Goulbourne was already there love did you know about whether dacl Lachlan was already there at that point I didn't know that no okay no um so you you took everything
00:41:42 no okay no um so you you took everything you knew about who was present and who was in command from Brett loft in that short conversation yes I mean the concession was a last breath I think I my words were what you know I think this may be where the confusion may have come
00:41:54 may be where the confusion may have come in because I told me it was 25.4 I was taking over what do you know he told me very little about what he knew because he what he knew was very little actually but at no point was it Mike peeler he
00:42:08 but at no point was it Mike peeler he wasn't me mr. commander did he tell you himself that he was incident commander so you got that from the operative yes but not from not from Brett Loftus correct
00:42:18 correct I see okay we'll come back to that well I want to do next is to focus on what you did while incident commander you say on page four of your statement and this
00:42:33 on page four of your statement and this is lines nine to ten down from the top that he said I told the CEO opportunity this that you were taking over and
00:42:44 this that you were taking over and requested that a message to that effect be sent to control I also requested messages to be sent to make pumps forty
00:42:55 messages to be sent to make pumps forty declare a major incident and make sea use four and you go on to explain your your thinking will come back to I have a number of questions though about that
00:43:06 number of questions though about that about those messages when you made those decisions to send those messages or asked to see you operative to do so how do you yet taken over or have had a
00:43:18 do you yet taken over or have had a handover of incident command from Brett loft that you hadn't now let's just not explore this a bit can I ask you to go please to the PRC
00:43:31 can I ask you to go please to the PRC notes which are at tab 24 of our master documents but he put theirs on the screen for you and I wanted you to look at the manuscript
00:43:42 wanted you to look at the manuscript notes at what we have is internal manuscript page 13 this is LSB three one
00:43:53 manuscript page 13 this is LSB three one one seven and I want to look at the manuscript notes at page 13 with sure his it's four on from that so I think
00:44:04 his it's four on from that so I think relativity reference page 17 pull now I should just explain what this this document is it's some way into it this
00:44:16 document is it's some way into it this is a record of a PRC meeting in relation to Granville Tower which was held at eight o'clock in the morning on the 3rd of July 2017 and I believe you were
00:44:28 of July 2017 and I believe you were present at it but can you just confirm I was you were and there was a log Asst taking a note and we have it in manuscript here and on this page we can
00:44:41 manuscript here and on this page we can see your name at the top Richard Welch paged at 8 p.m. as BMA ape on fire BMA we've already explained do you remember
00:44:54 we've already explained do you remember being in the meeting and speaking about your role a vaguely but yeah doing it being a pivot foot forward reviewer Claude right and do you remember that what you said was taken down by some of
00:45:05 what you said was taken down by some of this in handwriting yes well did you get ever get a chance to review these notes after the meeting sometime afterwards yes right did you make any corrections to them do you think not that Ricola ok well let's
00:45:18 think not that Ricola ok well let's proceed and see how we go for lines down you say in that note got on see you asked who was I see told it was Bretton
00:45:30 asked who was I see told it was Bretton oft told I was first GM Breton elf got on to see you he told me about FSGS no couple would come to that I told him I was taking charge
00:45:44 to that I told him I was taking charge but I can't read the next accurate I think it says Oh 204 and then he then declared major incident asked the main control Brett loft now it looks from
00:45:58 control Brett loft now it looks from this as if you took a handover of incident command from Brett loft before sending these messages is that is that
00:46:09 sending these messages is that is that right the way I recall it is that I asked to see you operative to City as one message my request was one of mic pumps thought we means that commander
00:46:20 pumps thought we means that commander Major instant makes a use for I believe that to be before us boats Brett but I could be incorrect right when you were
00:46:31 could be incorrect right when you were asking the operative to send these messages were you essentially assuming incident command without yet having had a handover from yes person who you were
00:46:42 a handover from yes person who you were told was the incident commander yes I see
00:46:51 and in your statement just gave just to clarify and perhaps nail this point down in your statement do you say on page four in the middle of the page immediately after the messages were sent
00:47:02 immediately after the messages were sent Bret loft arrived back at the Cu I asked for a handover current situation what he'd done it looks from that that the you set the messages even before Brent
00:47:13 you set the messages even before Brent loft arrived at the Cu which isn't what the notes of the PRC meeting say could you clarify for us I think it I think
00:47:24 you clarify for us I think it I think that I gave the instruction to the command unit operative at that's what I wasn't seen around the time Britt came on right that's how I recall it okay so
00:47:36 on right that's how I recall it okay so when we look at the notes of the meeting I wonder which is the right foot which which is right the notes of the meeting we were looking at say that Brett Loft
00:47:47 we were looking at say that Brett Loft got onto the see you he told you various things you told him you were taking charge and then you sent the messages but in your statement you've sent the messages before he got on you say and looking back on it now
00:47:58 on you say and looking back on it now which is correct did you send the messages before he got on or after he got on I think I asked the message to be sent before Brett gone okay why would you send those messages before formally taking a
00:48:10 messages before formally taking a handover of incident command from the officer you thought was incident commander because as a high-ranking officer I could recognize that this was a major incident and actually had a
00:48:22 a major incident and actually had a performance review of commander I was it was highlight positive action for me if I should recognize the major instant and I didn't at that time of waiting for the four brettly's that want to come on and
00:48:33 four brettly's that want to come on and talk to me for me it's more important to implement my drinks with interesting procedure and get more resources on their way whilst [ __ ] still with a handover because I not were arrived
00:48:44 handover because I not were arrived instantly I see now I'm gonna come back to the details of the handover in due course as the Welch but before I do I just what they want to ask you some detailed questions about these messages
00:48:57 detailed questions about these messages did you ask the operative we will call him that to inform control that you were taking over yes and to make puns for tea yes and declare a
00:49:09 make puns for tea yes and declare a major incident and make CEUs at the same time is that a single message improving one statement - he must add issue what I want you to send right it's not it's quite usual they would be sent in two or
00:49:21 quite usual they would be sent in two or three different messages but I've had enough hold on once you did okay and did he remain on the see you to do that yes he did I specifically remember a few minutes like return to him and anchor
00:49:33 minutes like return to him and anchor and confirming had those messages been synced
00:49:35 synced they said yes I see do you remember how long you've been on the CEO when the operative sent the message messages I thought I would solve that estimate five
00:49:47 thought I would solve that estimate five six minutes maybe before he could confirm to me that they've been seen right now I want to look at the way in which each of these four requests were actually recorded on the state and the
00:50:00 actually recorded on the state and the short incident log so we've got taken command mate pumps 40 major incident and make command units for can I ask you to be shown the short incident log at page 21
00:50:23 but first of all we've got at page 21 a time stamp of o2 o3 41 make pumps 20 as says make pumps 25 and I think we could all
00:50:35 make pumps 25 and I think we could all recognize that that should say 40 but could you just confirm that for us I
00:50:43 believe that make post 24-hour hood on route so yes it would be before that yeah I don't think anyone's said that there's any difficulty about that and then the next message at 2:04 20 so some
00:50:59 then the next message at 2:04 20 so some 40 seconds 39 seconds later it's a separate message informative see you 7gm welch
00:51:08 welch now I see now
00:51:21 I just want to ask you to go back first to the message there's all to compare them where you are where pumps are made for tea and here the audio for that
00:51:34 for tea and here the audio for that first of all if we can which is audio file to 946 and I may have to play this a few times it's very short but I'm looking at what I'm looking out for is
00:51:46 looking at what I'm looking out for is who is the speaker okay that's so Paul if we could just play that audio file that's two nine four six seven make
00:52:01 that's two nine four six seven make pumps all right and to make it plain perhaps slightly easier can I have on the screen at the same time the second hour o RR at page 1 to 7 with the time
00:52:16 hour o RR at page 1 to 7 with the time mark of OTA 3:13
00:52:25 I played it to you once just to get the impression of it now if you look at the foot of the page Oh to a 3-13 it says cu7 sends an assistance message to the radio operator
00:52:36 assistance message to the radio operator of brigade control FM from charlie uniform 7 make pumps 40 further traffic over so we've got the text up there now Paul if you'll play the audio again Mike
00:52:54 do you recognize that voice no you don't can you explain why that is said to be coming from cu7 make pumps for you when you were as you say on cu8 the only thing I can add a
00:53:08 say on cu8 the only thing I can add a bit may have happened is one of the other operatives from cu7 may have come to see you 8 and maybe they've got these off can you send this message for me and he's sending it from
00:53:21 message for me and he's sending it from nice to see you sir I have no explanation today ok well let's look at the next message which is where you are now I see this is on the short incident
00:53:32 now I see this is on the short incident log it's 2 o 2 O 4 24 if I can have up on the screen the ORR ii our report which transcribes that radio message and
00:53:45 which transcribes that radio message and that's again page 1 to 7 a time marked o 203 44 so I've given you the wrong references page 1 to 8
00:53:59 the second from the top Oh 203 44 you just highlight that now if we could also play the audio file which is lfb to 6 7
00:54:10 play the audio file which is lfb to 6 7 0 7 good manager well she just now into the commander Charlie first ever again
00:54:21 the commander Charlie first ever again dude can you tell us who the speaker was carrying for might make to you Todd do you again do you know why that message was sent from cu7 icon explain you get
00:54:32 was sent from cu7 icon explain you get to ourself please so you two start from a fright you're sure that's not your voice could I hear again yes absolutely
00:54:42 7 good manager well just air into the commander charlie through 7 mister voice
00:54:51 then going to the third of these four making making it a major incident on the short incident log it's page 21 with a time mark of o2o6 38 we just knit back
00:55:06 time mark of o2o6 38 we just knit back to that that says make up IUP
00:55:18 tastes like it's Oh - a 638 Sharon Darby makeup IUP cu8 from Jim Welch this is a major incident you see that there yes
00:55:29 major incident you see that there yes now we'll put up the text of the message so if you've seen that got the time lock there we put the second hour o RR up at
00:55:40 there we put the second hour o RR up at page 135 at Oh to a 603 I saw a page of it I'd say so no page 134 should be Oh -
00:55:56 it I'd say so no page 134 should be Oh - OH - a 603 the text says cu8 sends a formative message to the radio operator breguet control FM from Charlie uniform 8 from group manager Welch I declare this as a major incident charlie uniform
00:56:07 this as a major incident charlie uniform 8 if you can play the audio please poor ed two to five zero seven
00:56:21 I thought some charity for making good money to well declare disturb major incident for my over do you know who sent that message now okay
00:56:33 sent that message now okay did you recognize the voice and do you know why that mrs. rose this time sent from cu8 whereas the other two the first to consent from cu7 them the crest
00:56:44 to consent from cu7 them the crest request that I made was to this dolphin cui right how that was doing communicated better control what I don't know okay well we can take this last one quickly which is the makeup of the
00:56:55 quickly which is the makeup of the command unit of for just for the transcript that's page 21 again of the short incident log at time mark oh 208 21 coming from cu8 it's an on the ORR @o
00:57:12 21 coming from cu8 it's an on the ORR @o 205 exactly we just put that up down on the screen
00:57:34 it's page one to nine there is a two at five see you send an assistance mission to the radio operator at the great
00:57:45 to the radio operator at the great control FN from Charley uniform eight makes use for Charlie inform a over again if we can hear that audio file fall it's two six nine seven event from
00:57:57 fall it's two six nine seven event from challenging for mate actually use for Italian if I may over again do you recognize knows the speaker in that I played you in the audio files and
00:58:09 played you in the audio files and showing you the entry on the ORR because it looks from that the two different officers sent these four messages to each from two different command units
00:58:20 each from two different command units can you explain assuming that to be right why that is I can't explain it as at that point as I'm taking over it is the commander more priorities get that
00:58:32 the commander more priorities get that information back to control I wouldn't get involved in detail how that gets their own those is the confirmation that that has been seen were you aware at the time you send the messages or had the
00:58:44 time you send the messages or had the confirmation back from the operative on cu8 that they've been sent the cu7 was also in attendance I do have a vague recollection of seen so you seven seeing it seeing it but being told about it
00:58:56 it seeing it but being told about it before you saw it do you have nothing I saw it first right do you remember way saw it party grenfell wrote
00:59:07 do you remember whether that was closer to the tower or closer to the tail so when you parked and went first to see you ate did you go past cu7
00:59:18 you ate did you go past cu7 no no no because I came from from them from the opposite direction my first command unit not come across was CUA right but you say you stopped that you didn't go further past the you said or
00:59:29 didn't go further past the you said or did you not until later on no as I said you're walking to buy more right you could seat down great railroad yes so when you went on to see you aid that's and and then worked on cu8 sending those
00:59:42 and and then worked on cu8 sending those messages at that stage did you know that sea of seven was in attendance the leaf so I couldn't be served I believe so how did you know that I think I'd seen it on the way walking in to see walking towards to you I see so you can see it
00:59:53 towards to you I see so you can see it in the distance yes I said you know it's e7 or just as implies another see you as I see it yeah see mr. chairman is 11 o'clock and we began for an hour and I'm in the middle of a topic and I've got some way to go
01:00:04 of a topic and I've got some way to go save now is as good a time as any a good time yes like a break now when you mister well thank you sir we'll have 10 minute break please don't talk to anyone about your evidence whether you're after the room and we're resume at Temple
01:00:29 ten festivities
01:09:12 all right mr. Welsh ready to carry on yes sir sorry we were on cu8 and we've just been discussing the sending of messages at the point when you were
01:09:24 messages at the point when you were deciding to send these four messages which we've seen and heard had you at that stage yet stood back and taken a good look at that at the tower and what was happening not only from old
01:09:35 was happening not only from old information I had was bored seen in the drive-in right and white heard over the radio right can I just ask you why you did decide to send these messages including the major incident message on
01:09:46 including the major incident message on the basis of only what you'd seen I say only and the basis of what you'd seen on your own route without going up to the tower and having a good look at it first if I can address it in two holes for the
01:09:57 if I can address it in two holes for the mic pumps fault you know major interesting right the make pumps faulty our kids for market see they say the majority of that all of one side was alight it was clear from the radio traffic and that they
01:10:08 from the radio traffic and that they were persons involved in quite a large number of fights lot of guidance calls service PA was gonna be a very large firefighting operation and I thought that maybe 25 times was enough I always
01:10:21 that maybe 25 times was enough I always will convey stuff I draw a ruler more than I need and send them back if necessary but let's get them there in the first place so my space was faulty and because it was a populated residential block the major instant cold
01:10:34 residential block the major instant cold was a discussion I had we make cook I won't say officer and Mulholland yet when we agree to actually we were gonna need the help and assistance from many other agencies and therefore it
01:10:45 other agencies and therefore it qualified for me as a major incident now just following up on two aspects of that last answer that the first thing you say there is you could see that it was certainly the majority if all of one
01:10:56 certainly the majority if all of one side was alight when you say that which side are you talking about the East Side east side what about the rest of the building all
01:11:07 what about the rest of the building all I remember very clearly ECE how much follows on the east so I don't really recall definitely whether the south side it actually called okay can I ask you to look at your contemporaneous note which is FAO seven
01:11:23 contemporaneous note which is FAO seven zeroes - and then go to and get a paragraph or page one on that in that document paragraph eight on that first page and the question is can you
01:11:34 page and the question is can you describe the scene on your arrival then do your answer at the top of page two is I could see a high-rise tower block which looked like it was fully engulfed in fire now when you use the expression
01:11:46 in fire now when you use the expression fully engulfed in fire and given what you just told us is that correct I think it's poor explanation of not a fully engulfing but from one side and what could see right no you made these
01:12:01 what could see right no you made these contemporaneous notes how soon after the incident you remember about two or three days after the incident so when you use the words fully engulfed in fire was that a was that a more accurate
01:12:12 that a was that a more accurate description of what you recall given that it was closer to the time you made it on or I think when I wrote these years client in fact though I'd always seen instant I knew how it ended up but
01:12:24 seen instant I knew how it ended up but the fully engulfed in fire was fully engulfed of why could see which was one side on the only approach all right it's probably not correct to sites for the engulfed in fire it was one side okay
01:12:35 engulfed in fire it was one side okay well we'll come back to fully engulfed in due course and we look at the question of penetration the second thing which follows or entre tant's on so you gave about making it up to 40 pumps is
01:12:46 gave about making it up to 40 pumps is what specifically prompted you to decide to go from 25 to 40 at that point I were always told that we believed it was about 20 floors yes from what I could
01:12:58 about 20 floors yes from what I could see it's only on one side it was involving every fall pretty much I did 425 I was enough to deal with that fell out or the 50 calls alongside the far as
01:13:11 out or the 50 calls alongside the far as well so I thought 40 was more appropriate what were you going to do with the extra 15 pumps that you were calling on it was clear it was going to be a major extensive pregnant right assistant so it
01:13:24 extensive pregnant right assistant so it was largely for brilliant writers and for I find from the outside if we could write so would it be right to summarize your evidence to say that the extra 15
01:13:36 your evidence to say that the extra 15 was going to be primarily is this right for search and rescue yes lost would always come first so the priority was to get the people but now you say in your witness statement on
01:13:50 you say in your witness statement on page four if we can just get back to it
01:14:03 and it's it's it's 15 lines also down I considered 50 pumps but decided to get 40 it's just about two-thirds of the way down that page where we've got it there
01:14:15 down that page where we've got it there as we needed a lot of breathing apparatus trained personnel each pump carries between four to six be a trained personnel can you explain what why the
01:14:26 personnel can you explain what why the need to get ba whereas there as soon as possible
01:14:29 possible stopped you from requesting 50 pumps so I didn't have all the information I needed at the time kind of fleeting thought what should I call 50 also where
01:14:41 thought what should I call 50 also where they actually we still had the rest of London's and protect so the more resources we take out another large incident coming in on in London it would impact upon that so I was comfortable
01:14:52 impact upon that so I was comfortable that 40 was going to be sufficient okay no did you at that stage give any consideration to whether those resources needed to be EDB a specifically rather
01:15:04 needed to be EDB a specifically rather than s DBA so with a when you ask that number of appliances you'll get a certain number of fire rescue units come anyway as part of the priest summon attendance so I know we'd have a DBA
01:15:15 attendance so I know we'd have a DBA coming
01:15:16 coming unfortunately a DBA we could we carry a whole lot more SDP item into a DBA pdbs quite early media resource so I knew it would be on its way and available to me so the answer is yes I was aware that
01:15:29 so the answer is yes I was aware that would be there okay and were you doing anything even at that early stage to make sure you monitor the number of e DBA where is that you you thought you might need not at that point
01:15:41 might need not at that point okay now did you think at that stage about requesting more Fr use immediately I thought good call thinking that but on
01:15:52 I thought good call thinking that but on my way that I'm not sure of conversation between the AC a lot and I myself but I do recall it quite soon afterwards if I use a mate six yes but it wasn't my
01:16:03 use a mate six yes but it wasn't my don't believe that was my corner no so going back to the point about the extra 15 pumps that would bring you a lot of is this right SDP whereas to the but no edpa wearers it would bring us
01:16:16 but no edpa wearers it would bring us four things I don't know how many if I use come with the preservatives and make pumps faulty but we'd certainly have at least two or three if I use on their way anyway yes but he not okay so the stage
01:16:27 anyway yes but he not okay so the stage when you are you made up by an extra fifteen can you explain why you didn't at the same time also call for fr use given that you as you told us could see
01:16:38 given that you as you told us could see that at least the eight East face of the tower was fully engulfed and you were going to have to affect rescues from the highest floors of the tower so we would usually not use a DBA for firefighting
01:16:50 usually not use a DBA for firefighting weekend a bit with usually not and SDB ie in a building that behaves in the way we expect the building to be high you've would usually be sufficient for that with AEDPA would be a fall back fall
01:17:03 with AEDPA would be a fall back fall back right when your experience prior to ground floor tower had you ever had - had you ever successfully sent s DBA whereas up some sixty seven meters not
01:17:16 whereas up some sixty seven meters not without moving it Britain up with it breach in following up behind it no I've never experienced anything like rent hotel in every home and like any of us
01:17:28 hotel in every home and like any of us have so there's a lot that happen at night that we've never experienced before in in twenty-two twenty-three years so that prompts my question when you looked and saw what you needed and in terms of make up the question really
01:17:40 in terms of make up the question really is well why didn't you also request further fr use in order to make sure you had enough edpa wearers to get up to the high reaches of the tower so as a web we would have summary DBA there and I think
01:17:52 would have summary DBA there and I think that could be made on a game gathering further information when I get to the tail because we only have fifteen appliances a carry a DBA so even in the
01:18:04 appliances a carry a DBA so even in the initial six of the they asked for the contracept and even though I'm protecting the rest of London so maybe we have to consider the balance between those and very early on we realized we needed more and we asked them what
01:18:16 needed more and we asked them what further information would you need from the tiles
01:18:18 the tiles to make the decision that you needed to call in F I use to provide more edpa when I go into Terrence boats who watch Pedro Keith and found that much I've got
01:18:29 Pedro Keith and found that much I've got much better situational awareness of when what with what the aims of what I difficulties were then we could start making the calls of other resources that we may need right but that was later on that was what I going to tell yeah well
01:18:41 that was what I going to tell yeah well we'll come back to that did you seek to establish how many FR use had already been requested made up no i didn't in
01:18:52 been requested made up no i didn't in fact it looks as if only two had arrived at the time you send your messages Paddington a 2:16 and Chelsea g2g two three four six does that ring a bell with you I thought
01:19:03 does that ring a bell with you I thought we were seeing them but I know they were there later in the evening and in fact we look at the short incident log that took page 21 just go to it the request
01:19:16 took page 21 just go to it the request for a makeup an increased makeup for fi use wasn't actually made until two eleven or so you go to page 21 you can
01:19:27 eleven or so you go to page 21 you can see the furry-foot of that page 211 46 makeup IUP cu8 make through six I think I'm right in saying that wasn't and
01:19:38 I'm right in saying that wasn't and you've confirmed this that wasn't your decision not well that was D I see a lot of those TSA locked in my question is why didn't you make that decision earlier in the very short space of time the violent its of a mind shift from
01:19:50 the violent its of a mind shift from becoming a pop media advisors who needed a commander that was a literally a few minutes I ordered many other resources off the work I would need but didn't clearly didn't have time to finish all
01:20:03 clearly didn't have time to finish all of my resources which absorbs requirements because I hadn't carry enough information about instant at that point right do you recall the conversation with station manager Egan
01:20:14 conversation with station manager Egan about EDB a no you don't remember him saying we need or anybody saying we need all the EBA in London and you saying right I'll do it no I'm ending the conversation later on right
01:20:25 right Brian O'Keefe Brian Keith okay now at the PRC meeting after the incident we could just go back to the notes of that this is lfb three one one seven who just have 24 of the master dock in this
01:20:37 have 24 of the master dock in this bubble you say
01:20:51 what it is recorded with you saying and this is in relation to mp40 it's five lines up from the bottom of the page
01:21:02 lines up from the bottom of the page that's I should give you the full context you say why didn't you MP fifty next to the Kuna two-thirds of the way down
01:21:11 down why didn't you MP fifty don't know believe Andy and Richard handover was 211 because and he made through six to see you six and through ten by Andy
01:21:22 see you six and through ten by Andy that's Annie McLaughlin I think yes and then you say I considered what we do with the forty thought ten pumps per external sector and fight fire externally and then you say this still
01:21:35 externally and then you say this still thought fire was just an external face on external face just pausing at that point is that right that at that stage
01:21:48 point is that right that at that stage when you call for forty pumps you still thought the fire was on me the external face yes stereo yeah does that mean that you didn't take a good look at what was
01:22:00 you didn't take a good look at what was actually on fire even from outside we're at that point I'll only seen East Side on the way in like there's hide no and major get any closer to the building did you ask yourself how you thought that
01:22:12 you ask yourself how you thought that was consistent with what you'd heard over the radio about occupants being trapped in the tower well let me you June it was warm you'd expect windows to
01:22:23 June it was warm you'd expect windows to be open so I fully expect residents but gets Mike coming into the building and and panic over there right did you ever at the other early stage hear a message being sent from the
01:22:35 hear a message being sent from the control room to the incident round that there was a fire on the 12th floor not that or occult right there what about fire on the 22nd floor I don't recall specific mysteries all that before you sent these messages and
01:22:48 that before you sent these messages and made pumps forty did you yourself seek to find out what the conditions were actually like inside building I had another point no why is that because as I said I arrived as a
01:23:01 that because as I said I arrived as a bot meter advisor very quick yet to change off one for thought process to me it's in commander and the mic pumps thought it was around if it if it has been easy to build it then we're gonna need those people those firefighters in
01:23:12 need those people those firefighters in there today at that point I'd no idea of any fire court call any famous bread being made away to be inside the building
01:23:19 building did you but by the time at the time you arrived you arriving has belt media advisor but you then were taking over or going to take over as incident commander
01:23:31 going to take over as incident commander and I know you say you did that after you sent the messages but in sending those messages wasn't not important for you to establish what the conditions were like inside the tower as well as what you could see on the exterior it is
01:23:43 what you could see on the exterior it is that my priorities was get more resources or more firefighters they're planning for a worst-case scenario that actually might need all these fell I thought is in breathe out right this to go and get residents from the tail right
01:23:55 go and get residents from the tail right but and and did you seek to find out at that point where the crews were actually already affecting rescue successfully no
01:24:07 already affecting rescue successfully no again is there a reason why you didn't it was around priority thinking really and my priority was to gather all that information before asked more resources would have delayed that was also
01:24:19 would have delayed that was also arriving and so initially it was to get what I thought the bare minimum that we might need there and then start doing for me why should gathering did you think to make contact with the
01:24:31 think to make contact with the bridgehead for commanders of a bridgehead to what to find out what they were actually doing before you sent these messages no again why is that okay now go back to
01:24:43 no again why is that okay now go back to if if I would the faulty pumps and got information for bridging it and decided then decide we didn't need them I was rather be in a position of having to send them back didn't have a wipe that
01:24:55 send them back didn't have a wipe that extra time to file with them but wasn't it important for you to match resources with the actual need as dictated by understood by those who are at the bridgehead and actually
01:25:07 are at the bridgehead and actually affecting deployments inside the tower yes but I drew my own experience of a worst-case scenario just to get the
01:25:18 worst-case scenario just to get the resources on rope and then all of this thoughts and decision-making was in a very very short space of time and there's an awful lot of pressure and my
01:25:30 there's an awful lot of pressure and my priority was let's get what I think more native right and would it follow that you also didn't seek to find out whether crews were having any difficulties at that stage getting to the higher floors I didn't know that that and again there
01:25:42 I didn't know that that and again there was a is the reason the same thing we were just focused on much would've had the opportunity to get them just to find out that piece of information would probably take two or three minutes right there was two or three minutes that we
01:25:54 there was two or three minutes that we were stopping it resources on getting there I understand the circumstances but would it be fair to say that tell me if this is not fair but tell me is it fair to say that you were bringing on resources really without regard to the
01:26:05 resources really without regard to the actual needs you deceit you've sought to establish first I was printing resources based on on drawing upon my experience of what I thought we may need in an
01:26:17 of what I thought we may need in an ideal well would it would be much nicer for name information at first but that's that but and that would always only happen at an instant that there was this was not an ominous turn and then it was clear from very early on hmm now you say
01:26:33 clear from very early on hmm now you say not a normal incident but I think at that stage you still think the fires on the external face does that mean that at that stage you didn't think that fires had penetrated into individual
01:26:45 had penetrated into individual compartments and I would expect it to it done because the this thought saw the default but just for the fact that it was the outside of the building that was a lie makes it not a normal instant right there's something I've never seen
01:26:57 right there's something I've never seen before
01:26:57 before okay now going back to your statement at page four we'll come back to the PRC notes in
01:27:04 notes in of course but going back to your statement 10 lines up from the bottom of page for you that say of that you asked
01:27:15 page for you that say of that you asked Steve West to propose a methane message to control because I had to turn a major incident and you explain what methane is
01:27:27 incident and you explain what methane is in the rest of that paragraph that now I just want to put something that's Steve West says in his witness statement he's
01:27:40 West says in his witness statement he's given to the inquiry he says he started to write the methane message on the whiteboard in the Cu but before he could complete it he was he was tasked with setting up channel 2 as a command
01:27:51 setting up channel 2 as a command channel that's his recollection what's your is your recollection the same or do you have a no recollection of the Koran that cut that channel to being set up whilst I was on the c'mon Jimmy right do you recall Steve West starting to write
01:28:03 you recall Steve West starting to write the methane message on the whiteboard in cu8
01:28:05 cu8 yes did he complete that job I don't recover very completely don't know because I mean it was related to command and it took on another role right now we can't find any record of that methane
01:28:18 can't find any record of that methane message actually ever being sent on the night do you know if you're yourself whether it actually was it wasn't simply while souls instant commander it wasn't sent while you were inserted come on do you know whether it was ever sent after that no I don't know can you explain
01:28:32 that no I don't know can you explain what the what effect the failure to send a methane message would have had on the assumption that it wasn't sent so the thing is probably easily if I explain
01:28:43 thing is probably easily if I explain the benefit of it really because it's a recognized message recognized format of message across emergency services of the type of things that we've gotten is it
01:28:55 type of things that we've gotten is it Resort breaks down paints a picture that we will wonder stained oak what is that looks like and so it is important that that information is transmitted so that
01:29:06 that information is transmitted so that shaping our agencies as well and if the message hadn't been sent would that mean that the other agencies would have to play catch-up or it can be sent in a
01:29:18 play catch-up or it can be sent in a different format we can still send me a formative message which would paint the same picture but that's just an agreed format that we have got silent have any form of informative miss we do the same job but that's the equity form that we
01:29:30 job but that's the equity form that we should use right did there come a time when you realized from what was happening around you that that methane message hadn't been sent no no I was I was in the tail all right very quickly now can I ask you to go to your
01:29:43 now can I ask you to go to your contemporaneous note and go to page go to page page two of that
01:29:55 I look at point 10
01:30:02 you say halfway through the paragraph and point 10 starts with the question what were you tasked to do for that we're doing on your arrival and halfway down that paragraph you say I then asked
01:30:19 down that paragraph you say I then asked SM Walton to identify a suitable RVP area wrong coming appliances and asked another station manager to begin the process of establishing be a main control
01:30:31 do you remember speaking with station manager Walton at this point I have a recollection of speakers placement of ordinary came onto the upon City command unit I remember asking him to find a
01:30:43 unit I remember asking him to find a suit suit the rendezvous point the uncommon appliances and I think I actually recommended it maybe we should use paddington fellow station right for that I think you told us earlier that you didn't recall the involvement of
01:30:54 you didn't recall the involvement of stems of Walton at the point where not when our boys in a command J I was a legislation major what was there right but are you saying that he came on to the command unit after you've been there uh belittling was that before or after
01:31:06 uh belittling was that before or after you sent the messages after was it before or after you took a handover from station manager loft as I recall was after I say so you was it therefore quite soon after you but before you left
01:31:18 quite soon after you but before you left to see you yes I say we say you had a face-to-face discussion with the station manager Walton did you a very very brief did he say anything to you that's in
01:31:30 did he say anything to you that's in that very brief conversation about who was incident commander not a tree corner he didn't say I'm incident commander no
01:31:40 did he do you remember whether he and station manager aloft had a conversation together at that stage not that I noticed
01:31:47 noticed okay
01:31:52 now can I turn then to the topic of the handover from Brett loft that we parked earlier on yeah looking again if you would please at the PRC notes which you
01:32:04 would please at the PRC notes which you were involved in again plate yes at the page 17 you say halfway down the page
01:32:18 page 17 you say halfway down the page this is after sending the messages I asked for larger our VP you see that yes
01:32:33 asked for larger our VP you see that yes just there consider a 21 what is that a reference to a 20 wise is Paddington forestation okay and our VP with does that mean you
01:32:45 okay and our VP with does that mean you were considering Paddington Station geographically or physically as a rendezvous point for something further on come appliances good food because of these small roads around brain film
01:32:57 these small roads around brain film there was a way that we wouldn't move a block up all the roads yet it any reason maybe they should complain there because quite often an incident like this it's not actually the pumping of polishes we need is the personnel yes I see so it's
01:33:11 need is the personnel yes I see so it's not that's not a reference then to the discussion with Andy Walton about our VP for BA wearers sorry the concise mover Andy walk in and the conversation of nd after 21 is the same right so it's the
01:33:24 after 21 is the same right so it's the the RV p f-- thought i'll saying de morgan's what if i wasn't for BA wearers it was the pump replenish you are right and that is what you say in your contemporaneous note that that's my mistake but the question I think remains
01:33:36 mistake but the question I think remains the same is the reference here in your in the PRC a reference to the rendezvous point for appliances which was the subject of your discussion with Andy Walton yes Malaysia I thought it now
01:33:47 Walton yes Malaysia I thought it now moving on done to the next item you then say Andy a Lachlan got on CEO and told me he'd taken over from another SM believed to be owed to 11
01:34:02 do you know who that SM was obscene found it to be an Ewok what but that on the night did Andy Lachlan tell you who
01:34:16 the night did Andy Lachlan tell you who the SM was that he'd taken over from her nephew G said I've already taken over right did he did you ask him well how
01:34:31 right did he did you ask him well how come you've taken command from an SM I've just taken command from an SM now I think the confusion here what happened was we must have arrived a very similar time I've come to a command unit as
01:34:45 time I've come to a command unit as Pogue we should and checked in there but for maybe the direction and II approached from he's gone to town first so he thinks he's taking over their home I think I'm psyched over to come on unit
01:34:57 I think I'm psyched over to come on unit right now
01:34:59 right now did you seek to explore with Andy O'Laughlin how come he had taken ya incident command over from Andy Walton
01:35:12 incident command over from Andy Walton but you had taken incident command over from Brett loft at that point now you didn't did do you know whether Brett Loft was still on the command unit at
01:35:23 Loft was still on the command unit at the time and Andy a Lachlan came on I don't recall did you ask did you get a chance to ask Brett loft how come he was stationed he was and hence no commander
01:35:35 stationed he was and hence no commander when it looks as if and you're not going to take an incident command from somebody completely different at that point that wasn't a priority program we had this conversation that took seconds
01:35:47 had this conversation that took seconds and Andy a lot one was a higher rank than I so it was you know I told me missed your sin he agreed that actually he was gonna in seven sending the same messages right so
01:35:59 seven sending the same messages right so we were on the same page said him move on as quickly as possible well I appreciate that but just just just at that moment in that very short period does it mean that there were two insolent commanders operating in
01:36:12 insolent commanders operating in ignorance of each other's role the station manager Walton from whom Andy a Lachlan took incident command over from and Brett loss from whom you took incident command they were from now I
01:36:25 incident command they were from now I think the information I was given that Brett Loft was in charge was an assumption and it was incorrect so gotta follow where station major lost never as she thought that he was in charge himself till he were notes that the two
01:36:40 himself till he were notes that the two station managers didn't both think they were in charge because Brett I think near the command unit opportu minder sumption and and that wasn't the case okay
01:36:52 okay did you know at the time that Brett loft didn't think he was incident commander no I didn't and that was never communicated to me don't ever sit it was days later that I found out brick wasn't
01:37:04 days later that I found out brick wasn't in charge but you say you took a handover from him I think I think the words I used would tell me what you know right so maybe I didn't do but I should have used was give me a formal handover
01:37:15 have used was give me a formal handover and that might have identified him to say I shall not a challenge so were you assuming that he was incident commander and therefore assuming you were taking a formal handover yeah I had no reason to
01:37:27 formal handover yeah I had no reason to not believe the information I've been given right um can you just help me why were the escalations of command not clearly known to you at the incident
01:37:39 clearly known to you at the incident sorry I understand it yes what the escalations of command the more senior officers taken over why was that not crystal clear to everyone at the incident including you so my only
01:37:50 incident including you so my only concern is person on take over from I'm told attestation major so once I got from that station manager I think they made a big big confusion from myself and angel Lachlan we went to
01:38:03 from myself and angel Lachlan we went to do tutoring places I went to college in it and he went to the tail I think that's where the confusion Casey see it just to be clear you didn't actually ask station manager loft
01:38:14 station manager loft are you incident commander I didn't I didn't I said to him it's now 25 pump fire I will be taking over Tim we know most lawyers I just assumed that he wasn't used to client excited no reason
01:38:25 wasn't used to client excited no reason not to believe it because you've been told that by the operator on cu8 you did never explore whether that was right or not now
01:38:40 did you I think it would follow the officers no but let me just put this to you it would follow with it that as far as you were concerned you never knew
01:38:51 as you were concerned you never knew that
01:38:51 that Brett loft although he was senior to Mike Dowden who was the watch manager who had incident command from the start of the incident you never knew that in fact station manager loss never took
01:39:03 fact station manager loss never took command but left Mike Dowden in charge I wasn't aware elect right you didn't know that's is this right the Brett loft had taken over the role of handling FSG calls pause aware that either right
01:39:16 calls pause aware that either right did did Brett off never tell you that not that I recall right now when Brett loft came to give evidence to the
01:39:27 loft came to give evidence to the inquiry he said that the only conversation he had with you was when you tasked him with taking over be a main control and that was outside the tower on the southeast corner that's his
01:39:38 tower on the southeast corner that's his recollection I'm aware of that I saw us all there that's not my recollection so what's your recollection if he's as I've said that break I was told Brett Loft was in charge he came on to the command
01:39:49 was in charge he came on to the command unit and we had the conversation not just record and then I asked him to go start setting up be a main control for me did you ever have a conversation with Brett loft outside the tower not that I
01:40:02 Brett loft outside the tower not that I remember but that doesn't I didn't happy because there was a lot going on that night right my question really is do you think you could be mistaken about meeting Brett loft at the command unit my memory is quite clear on that and do
01:40:16 my memory is quite clear on that and do you think you could be mistaken about taking incident command from him no my memories very clear okay now do you agree that the standard policy
01:40:27 you agree that the standard policy requirements lfb policy requirements for carrying out a handover under incident command policy 2 3 8 require the person taking over to use
01:40:39 require the person taking over to use the words I am taking over well I am now taking over yes I am did you use those words yes I did you did and did he say anything in response to those words
01:40:51 anything in response to those words Nokes I remember saying I'm taking over so could tell me what you know but and that's what he told me
01:40:59 see I think where we've got to is that you your discussion with Brett loft you assume is a handover of command yes
01:41:12 assume is a handover of command yes without actually establishing with him whether he was operating on the same assumption yes so you could have been cross-purposes yes that's it in fact it sounds like these if you were at cross-purposes yes which I suppose would
01:41:25 cross-purposes yes which I suppose would mean that you although you thought you were incident commander you actually weren't so formally I was seems to come on access the mission you've got sent to control yes and and by you not by me by
01:41:37 control yes and and by you not by me by this by the command unit on your command on my command and and thank the NDA Lachlan who also thought he was in command we both made the same assumption as results if we need so no negative
01:41:50 as results if we need so no negative impact on the instant right
01:41:57 now in terms of the content of the handover and I think I better put hand over inverted commas because because of the cross purposes but in it the conversation in terms of the contents of
01:42:09 conversation in terms of the contents of the conversation that you had with Breton off where he gave you everything that he knew can I just ask you to look at page four of your statement twelve lines up from
01:42:20 of your statement twelve lines up from the bottom where you you say it was
01:42:39 the bottom where you you say it was really quick but I got everything he knew I told him I was taking over and assigned him to set up the MA in control just focusing on the words it was really
01:42:50 just focusing on the words it was really quick but I got everything he knew can you tell us what you remember standing here today Brett Loft was able to tell you oh I caught him telling with their numerous FSGS going on and that the fire was up
01:43:03 FSGS going on and that the fire was up the outside the building and that was pretty much it that they were trying to fight that for any outside I got a feeling that Brett had been there very long either right and that was it was it
01:43:15 long either right and that was it was it that'll warm ember yeah okay no it's not to explore that a bit and just ask you what thoughts you have taking on the role you thought you were taking on the role of incident commander
01:43:27 taking on the role of incident commander about a tactical about tactical plans from what you'd seen so far at the incident and what you knew about the number and location of FSG calls that you'd heard even in general terms over
01:43:38 you'd heard even in general terms over the airwave radio on your way to the incident at that point when you take over from Brett loft did you have any thoughts about what strategies you were going to adopt to deal with what you had
01:43:50 going to adopt to deal with what you had seen my strategy would be have any efficient sarfaroz beats you've reached as far as lava gardens called as possible and removing from the bill we don't get into a safe place did you
01:44:06 we don't get into a safe place did you have any thoughts about whether the stay-put policy well let me ask it this way did you know what advice was being given by the control room to FSG callers
01:44:17 given by the control room to FSG callers or any callers who were calling in saying they were affected by Smokies or far so fully aware at the cyber policy in a residential building of this type of policy would be the default position I've no reason to suspect of that that
01:44:30 I've no reason to suspect of that that would be changed at that point you have no reason to suspect that it would be changed at that point from what you had seen and what you'd been told by Brett loft even though brief did you have any
01:44:42 loft even though brief did you have any thoughts about whether that state policy should be revoked and changed with an all-out now I didn't is there a reason why that is I had no reason to think that the the building component ation
01:44:54 that the the building component ation would be failing and if I would be sprinting across that way because it's not something that whether we see so stay put policy works time and time and time again so I believe in that policy no that last answer would rather suggest
01:45:07 no that last answer would rather suggest that you were operating on the assumption that compartment ation was holding up yes did Brett laughs not tell you that there were lots of people
01:45:18 you that there were lots of people trapped in their in their flats by fire heat or smoke and could tell they were taking to table not high number of FS geez but that that was about all the
01:45:29 geez but that that was about all the information that he had at that point right at that stage did you not think it right to ask somebody who knew more about the conditions inside the building in order to establish whether
01:45:40 in order to establish whether compartment ation really had been breached or not breakfast on eyeball keeping that information I believe he had it and I wouldn't be received that information to actually got to speak to be a cruiser to come out or speak to the
01:45:52 be a cruiser to come out or speak to the Bridget
01:45:59 did you consider a total or partial evacuation of the building at that stage on the laces what you knew no I don't no reason to thinking that was necessary at that point and that's nice that can be
01:46:11 that point and that's nice that can be quite a dangerous call if the situated situations and conditions hold correct did you seek to contact control or ask the operator on see you a to get hold of
01:46:23 the operator on see you a to get hold of control and speak to the operations manager in the control room to find out more precisely what the conditions - like inside the building I've no opportunity to do that just purely because of timing of the time
01:46:34 purely because of timing of the time spelling to see you I could have very short face time with a very large number of a big decision made in a very quick succession and then I was off to see you I see did you consider whether you had a
01:46:47 I see did you consider whether you had a sufficient understanding at that stage of the layout of the building I didn't have a cell didn't have state information at that point now did you ask for it when I got to the building when you got to the building right did
01:46:59 when you got to the building right did you consider looking at that stage still don't see you a4 or finding out whether there was what they called a pip apip there was no opportunity for me to be at
01:47:10 there was no opportunity for me to be at do they that tight what about building plans again there we've been those opportunities where do Donuts on did you have a did you have any thoughts about how you were going to evolve some kind of strategy on taking over without
01:47:21 of strategy on taking over without knowing what the layout of the building presented you with so although always people that Bridgett's have that that information if we have any if we haven't got the information in baby would serve at hand we could any information from
01:47:33 at hand we could any information from residents coming out but at that point like more pure concern was to be a resource enough enough for us to be able to rescue to pay for an ad rescued did you know at that stage even whether
01:47:46 you know at that stage even whether there was but whether the exit route was simply a single main staircase in that you didn't even know that no
01:47:58 so you took over Kasumi command this is right which wasn't actually come on from Brett loft on the on the basis of that but really very limited information yes
01:48:10 but really very limited information yes did you think at the time that that was enough information to be able to allow you to form a tactical plan there's nothing information for me to draw my experience to calling the resources I thought we may need as a
01:48:22 resources I thought we may need as a minimum but yes I certainly would have liked more and more information and I know you weren't there for long and clearly the situation's will he was did
01:48:33 clearly the situation's will he was did you recall in that moment though all those moments policy three for one decision-making model yes I mean that's it they that is on our natural way of
01:48:45 it they that is on our natural way of making decisions and it does give us a very clear breakdown of the things we should consider before making decisions yeah can I just ask you very briefly to look at that it's tab thirteen of our policy bundle it was lfb two three eight
01:49:02 policy bundle it was lfb two three eight just want to explore one or two things about it you say it's a natural way of making decisions can I ask you please to go to paragraphs three and four
01:49:19 paragraph three it's on page five I got three says and perhaps to be fair to you
01:49:35 three says and perhaps to be fair to you actually able to start with two to two gathering and thinking the functions within the two main activities of the decision-making mother explained as follows gathering and thinking and
01:49:48 follows gathering and thinking and you've got deciding and acting and a rather complicated flow chart underneath it which we can go through you looks like you evaluate and then you inform on progress
01:49:59 progress gather and think objectives plan communicate control outcome and then you've done the gathering and thinking it says under paragraph III it's often
01:50:10 it says under paragraph III it's often not possible to gather all of the information about a task or event before it's necessary to take action and then to for and seeking to achieve safe systems of work it's vital as sufficient information is gathered upon which a
01:50:22 information is gathered upon which a reasoned decision can be made in order to achieve safety systems of work a key factor will be the nature of the task or event and the time pressures that are associated with it so it gives you the
01:50:34 associated with it so it gives you the context then I want to ask you about information gathering at three one during the initial stages of any decision-making process it's necessary to gather relevant information there are four sources of information that should be considered information on the task
01:50:46 be considered information on the task event resources risk and benefits and progress when you spoke to Brett loft on
01:50:57 progress when you spoke to Brett loft on the cu8 was he the only source of information that would fit with information gathering under this paragraph he was the only source party
01:51:08 paragraph he was the only source party was me and that solemn on those command-u right what information did you get out of him on the event task or event so my only if most recovery before
01:51:21 event so my only if most recovery before I saw him was he was a high-rise follow yeah we should cover that carries its own home issues and he's most I've got from him was the number of there was a high number of flights public gardens calls and the outside of the building to
01:51:33 calls and the outside of the building to be alike was that do you think that was detailed enough to be able to be sufficient information to lead you into the decision-making model now after I believe that's the only information at
01:51:44 believe that's the only information at Brigade at the time and the decision-making model is he's an excellent song really written into the policy but policy is a guidance and and
01:51:55 policy but policy is a guidance and and doesn't always fit every interesting now we know you've had information on resources but information on risks and benefits do you think that Brett Roth gave you enough information in that
01:52:06 gave you enough information in that brief handover to be able to allow you to assess risk and benefits for the purposes of operating the dynamic risk assessment yeah believe it did because the risk the risk we ate was it was fast
01:52:17 the risk the risk we ate was it was fast father gardening and there was picked in there that needed us to help him repel brisket him right and that was the biggest risk to us did in broad term syrtis certainly well what about some
01:52:29 syrtis certainly well what about some detailed information on differences between callers in the tower so that you can allocate resources accordingly such as working out where the smoke was where the farm was and who was most at risk within the building
01:52:41 within the building I don't believe Brett had a information to give me who would somebody on the incident ground only ask it this way would anybody else on the incident ground have that information to give you
01:52:52 ground have that information to give you do you think if that information had been passed from controller to us then yes that would be better would be given to the vehicle coordinator for guidance my question then is why didn't you call
01:53:03 my question then is why didn't you call control in order to supplement the information that Brett loft had given you so that you could gather the information in order to be to operate the dynamic decision-making model so I knew that hid much from
01:53:14 model so I knew that hid much from becoming at some point because of if it's been passed fast then we're gonna get there but I can't stress enough how quickly all this happened on that command unit within within minutes all
01:53:28 command unit within within minutes all these decision made is concise my head and they know what's related what come on an information on progress again the same question is there a reason why you couldn't have called control or spoken to the bridgehead about the progress or
01:53:39 to the bridgehead about the progress or fire survival guidance calls in general terms so that you could then form us at least an outline strategy based on what you knew you up-to-date which is exactly what I did do when I'm a should get to the bridge in to speak to the personal
01:53:50 the bridge in to speak to the personal charging 4.1 information about the task or event the first stage in the process
01:54:02 or event the first stage in the process involves gathering relevant information whilst making the best use of the time available it must be recognized that information gathering is the key to effective decision-making the following
01:54:14 effective decision-making the following are some examples of information about the task or event of the personal persons following the process should be considering what is the environment what is happening is the situation statical developing what was it that led up to
01:54:27 developing what was it that led up to the event who is involved in other and immediate risks to anyone in your interactions with Brett loft and then deciding what to do next
01:54:40 deciding what to do next did you get enough information about any of those but it points they're not believe I'll go enough information about majority of those points there further information is always a benefit by go
01:54:53 information is always a benefit by go enough to make decisions all night did you get any detail about specific efforts jeez from Brett loft no in the absence of detailed and specific information about specific floors or
01:55:05 information about specific floors or even sections of the building how are you able to have enough information to be able to make a decision even it even generally in accordance with the decision-making model because my view was decision I made was
01:55:18 because my view was decision I made was to ask for the more resolved Caesar thought when I even need but it was to get resources there so as that information comes in we can't if we get that information we can't I should deal with most do anything with it if we
01:55:30 with most do anything with it if we haven't got the resources paddlers see Tibet help did you ask Brett loft well is the situation static or is it developing it was clearly developed I didn't need to ask that you need to ask that and and
01:55:49 ask that you need to ask that and and having got the information you've got what was the decision that you made as a result of pushing the information through the through the decision-making model that you say you use naturally I
01:56:00 model that you say you use naturally I didn't have that opportunity I was relieved to come home to that pretty much at that point so does it come to this that you know you had what you had but actually never got a chance to make any decision output there was no
01:56:13 any decision output there was no decision output that would have been it would have been reached if in fact you've got to the end of the process I didn't reach the end of the process to make a decision out pop from the information that Brett given me that was
01:56:25 information that Brett given me that was that that's that section of the earth to the information I hadn't reached its season output right um I want to examine in a little bit of detail and they what what what information he gave you about
01:56:36 what what information he gave you about FSG if I can put the decision-making model policy away for the moment run for
01:56:48 model policy away for the moment run for another I yet of course but I expect this would like a break at something would you have fun no now you start this topic yes I think that's wise we'll have
01:57:01 topic yes I think that's wise we'll have a short seven twelve ten ten past twelve gonna give you ten million sir scripture liver and you come back at ten past twelve t-cell talk to anyone about your
01:57:13 twelve t-cell talk to anyone about your evidence for anything to do with it when you're out of the room thank you it's nice to give you the option
02:02:29 you
02:09:30 right have you to carry all this too much take certain yes yes well thank you very much for coming coming back to us can I just pick up where I left off which was I wanted to explore with you
02:09:41 which was I wanted to explore with you what information Brett loft gave you about FS geez when you when you took over from her from him as it were um when he gave evidence he said that the
02:09:52 when he gave evidence he said that the discussion that you had with him which he says took place at the base of the tower I know that's not the same as your recollection but he says that the discussion was about whether there were firefighters in the tower who were above
02:10:05 firefighters in the tower who were above the level of the fire without any firefighting media do you remember that no you don't remember any discussion about that at all right that was not
02:10:18 about that at all right that was not part of his hand over a snow globe recollection of that my conversation with brick no just in general terms were you aware that station manager loft had been up till that point dealing with FSG
02:10:30 been up till that point dealing with FSG calls no you didn't even know that no can I ask you to get back to the PRC notes then same same pages before to page 17 of the relativity reference page
02:10:43 page 17 of the relativity reference page 13 internally
02:10:48 a quarter of the way down the page where you say told it was Brett loft Brett loft got onto the sea you you know just
02:11:01 loft got onto the sea you you know just just above that stop stop together a quarter the way down the page Brett loft got onto the sea you
02:11:15 near the top of the screen Brett loft got onto the sea use for five lines down from the top of the screen he told me about two FS geez is that right
02:11:31 told me about two FS geez is that right he told me that would take a long time but if this chase night can you do you recall him saying any anything else about FSG calls right when this is this
02:11:47 about FSG calls right when this is this this is a description he told me about FS geez do you remember any detail at all about what he told you oh I remember he told me what a large number of FS geez he may have given more information
02:12:00 geez he may have given more information net but I don't recall it did you not interrogate him about well give me a bit more detail where they're coming from what kind of flats how high in the tower you didn't know I didn't know is there a reason why you didn't explore the detail
02:12:11 reason why you didn't explore the detail of the FSG calls that he'd been handling with him again if I don't mind it was instant command that I would be information I would want yeah but that's all I'm it was to be minimum of information they won't give me a large
02:12:24 information they won't give me a large number of histories oh I believe he didn't have that information you didn't you didn't know because you didn't give yourself a chance to ask him about it didn't ask him know but if given that FSGS was as I think you said earlier the
02:12:35 FSGS was as I think you said earlier the priority over firefighting wasn't it important to you to extract from him as much information as you could about the FSG calls he'd been handling in terms of volume content location in the building conditions so the initial priority for
02:12:49 conditions so the initial priority for me was those def histories were being addressed and not believe they were on there they were being addressed and I think if it be a minute or two later and I was I kept the command Impala females
02:13:00 I was I kept the command Impala females come right up on the white board or get me my
02:13:03 me my elsewhere all the efficacy propagating while waiting at that point was where we're committing crews to go and get these people right and let's just
02:13:14 these people right and let's just explore a little bit more about the detail that you did get from him if you look at the foot of the page in the PRC notes you say or it says I didn't know
02:13:27 notes you say or it says I didn't know how many FS geez thought 10 or 15 I knew original fire dealt with and you then go
02:13:43 original fire dealt with and you then go on to say in the last line on that page thought FSGS would be dealt with quite quickly first of all do you remember saying that at this PRC meeting I'll
02:13:55 saying that at this PRC meeting I'll have a clear recollection of it but it's likely that a spoke what I say the best ones recall DJ's right you've got no reason to challenge the renowned right do you remember trying to find out from Brett loft how many FSG calls had
02:14:07 Brett loft how many FSG calls had actually been taken not the horrid quorum give me the information yet we were taking a large number but I don't know if he said to me we've got about 10 or 15 or maybe so number I'm much bigger
02:14:18 or 15 or maybe so number I'm much bigger than with knowledge that were used to right because you say here thought 10 or 15 and my question is where does that come from I don't know if that was made why I heard on the on the radio on the way or if Britain actually told me that in that conversation okay as at June
02:14:33 in that conversation okay as at June 2017 how many FS G's have you actually experienced that a single incident we know one two or three or three said earlier on and therefore 10 to 15 would represent with it a magnitude five times
02:14:46 represent with it a magnitude five times up to five times greater than your experience yes so even on 10 to 15 that would that would be something that would have an impact on you with it it would it would it would stretch my experience
02:14:58 it would it would stretch my experience of what that the world that would before yes right and I've asked you this before but in light of what we now see in the note did you seek to us I think we you didn't seek to establish contact with
02:15:09 didn't seek to establish contact with brigade control to get a feel for what was happening you've told us that on the basis of ten to fifteen was that not why did you not do that the guy control were very busy
02:15:20 do that the guy control were very busy trying to arrest me the information to the command unit of those FSGS the time that they had was but they were trying they were doing an incredible job of
02:15:31 they were doing an incredible job of really changing time so I vote absolute faith in control that they will give us all the information they possibly can on cu8 and there was an operator doing
02:15:44 cu8 and there was an operator doing something did you ask the operator on cu8 about what what information he was receiving from the control room if any no I knew that he would be received would be recording it as much information as they they were able to
02:15:56 information as they they were able to give him did you seek to find out what systems have been couldn't put in place to deal with these multiple FSG calls I saw they information as soon as I'll go
02:16:07 saw they information as soon as I'll go into town wanted up and spoke to preach it but that was after that was after you left see you ate his only reason why you didn't do that while you were on see you ate time purely time Missy
02:16:22 now if you look at
02:16:34 we lost ask this question I think I'm right in saying that so far you haven't got any details of any specific effort she calls my from Brett loft know now
02:16:47 she calls my from Brett loft know now his evidence in nm summarizing it is that he was he was given an a4 sheet on a clipboard which set out FSG calls and his recollection is that he brought
02:16:58 his recollection is that he brought those back to the stew this for the command unit do you remember him having a piece of paper with FSG calls in his hand I have no recollection of that if
02:17:09 hand I have no recollection of that if that maybe that was before or after but I don't remember seeing that so if you notice I couldn't say he didn't have it on him but I would call seeing it do you remember seeing any pieces of paper with lists of FSG calls on them at that point
02:17:21 lists of FSG calls on them at that point in cu8 not on that point now do you remember seeing any control information forms or other pieces of paper being written on by the operator in cu8
02:17:32 written on by the operator in cu8 note where that where they actually sit to use the the radios and received it the motion from control is behind a small partition wall at a TV screen I so I wouldn't be able to see what they're
02:17:44 I wouldn't be able to see what they're doing at our desk do you remember seeing any runners or firefighters coming to see you aids and taking away pieces of paper no do you
02:17:55 taking away pieces of paper no do you remember seeing anybody on cu8 using the radio to communicate with the bridgehead or anybody else on the incident ground the command gene operative using the radio but couldn't I want don't know who you talked I didn't
02:18:06 want don't know who you talked I didn't recall recall the information right
02:18:12 can I ask you to look at well first of all I should ask you are you familiar with policies 794 survival guidance College yes yeah now can I ask you to look at that it's
02:18:23 now can I ask you to look at that it's type 5 of our policies bundle and if you go please to paragraph 9 point 1 which
02:18:34 go please to paragraph 9 point 1 which is on page 5 it says it is vital that control is kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG call the fact that control is aware of the actions being carried out on the
02:18:45 actions being carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice given to FSG callers were you was that principle alive in your mind when
02:18:56 that principle alive in your mind when you're on cu8 and taking over or as you thought
02:19:00 thought come on where that principle yes yes you are did you do anything to comply with that policy and keep control informed of what actions were being taken to resolve each FSG core my priorities gimmick
02:19:14 each FSG core my priorities gimmick motion back to control was a mess a message and I didn't have I wasn't allowed the time to be advocates is part in the process of ensuring that your fighters getting back to see you is that
02:19:25 fighters getting back to see you is that motion getting them to see you back to control right my question is was it a was it was it a priority to you on taking over incident command having been
02:19:37 taking over incident command having been told by Brett laughs there there are 10 or knowing there are 10 to 15 FSG calls 5 times more than your previous experience that the first thing you do
02:19:49 experience that the first thing you do is to find out from the tower what actions were being taken to resolve each FSG call
02:19:58 it's more priority would be to [ __ ] to ensure the committin Cruiser to retry muchos FSG calls as with many instance
02:20:09 muchos FSG calls as with many instance we trust in our offices so there's no I had no reason to believe the norm didn't even let me know if we weren't reaching them it would be absolutely expected
02:20:20 them it would be absolutely expected they were receiving FS cheese movie comedic remover can be increased to as if it's Jesus as we were were you working on an assumption that the cause well they're trying to pick it more vocal what did you actually know in your
02:20:36 vocal what did you actually know in your own head at that moment at that time about what steps were being taken to resolve each FSG call I knew that we were receiving them and I had absolute
02:20:50 were receiving them and I had absolute faith in the officers on the ground that they would be they would be addressing here and Rick try reach those people if if they weren't the first thing they would do there was our stamina if they were unable to do that so if I'm sorry
02:21:04 were unable to do that so if I'm sorry if I'm terrified be further you know yes as time went on you gave the information what what facts we've been - what haven't we been - what we're doing about it and that's that's all the emotion that that you carry on during a
02:21:15 that that you carry on during a continual information gathering but in those very short few minutes I did I did as much so good for as many as I could in the sense that all we are we getting
02:21:26 in the sense that all we are we getting in there have we got enough to be a to be a carry on getting in there hmm were you working on an assumption because the FSG calls have been received
02:21:37 because the FSG calls have been received therefore they were being dealt with by crews effectively yes I was an insane way that in that's confident the trust and belief in our offices in it if we
02:21:48 and belief in our offices in it if we attend a fire we assume they're putting more money to put it out so you know if they were unable to do that then they would tell us so good yes I was what I'm really trying to get a feel for is why you trusted that all worked on that
02:22:00 you trusted that all worked on that assumption in circumstances where you were confronted with an incident that you've told us was outside your and numbers of FSG calls that were outside your experience given that those
02:22:13 outside your experience given that those facts my question is why didn't you sort of working on an assumption pick up the radio or get someone to do so and get some actual hard information from the
02:22:24 some actual hard information from the bridgehead about whether these multiple FSG calls were actually successfully being dealt with so that's exactly what I did do in time allowed I've covered
02:22:37 I did do in time allowed I've covered the motion from the best source I hated which was the breach aid but I've got absolute complete faith in our officers and our officers are very very professional and I know that they will
02:22:49 professional and I know that they will do everything they can to reach those people and if they can't they would tell me so I was assuming that's what they were doing because I know that's what they would be trying to do right and
02:23:00 they would be trying to do right and that assumption is this right that assumption held good even though you and they your officers were confronted with an extraordinary incident it's
02:23:11 an extraordinary incident it's absolutely true today no matter what worked what were confronted with we're never not gonna try so but they would always do what's in training trained in all of us earth to rescue people who have why the cost but trying is one
02:23:23 have why the cost but trying is one thing succeeding is another and if they're extraordinary given the extraordinary situation you were confronted with with my question really is all given that why didn't you actually seek hard facts rather than relying on an assumption it's actually
02:23:35 relying on an assumption it's actually right you know trying is one thing succeeding is another if they were unable succeed they're not I know they would have told us they know I know there were times they've got a sheep we can't get to this point or this point at this point it's like you're on happen
02:23:48 this point it's like you're on happen now I think the next thing you did
02:23:56 was to task station manager loft with be a main control you're right yes okay do you remember do you remember that
02:24:07 you remember do you remember that tasking SM loft with the a main control and do you remember tasking SM Kipling station manager Kipling with that as well you don't like it do you remember
02:24:20 well you don't like it do you remember that do you know station man what did I miss
02:24:22 miss do you remember his involvement I don't really cool seeing him at that point Houston did you discuss with Brett loft the importance of marshaling EDB a
02:24:34 the importance of marshaling EDB a wearers no did you discuss with him the importance of ensuring that they were sent to the tower on arrival immediately
02:24:45 sent to the tower on arrival immediately as a priority no at that point my my priority for him was to establish barely in control now that can take that period saw him that the far exceeded the time
02:24:56 saw him that the far exceeded the time that I was in command right do you remember station manager Egan coming onto the command unit while you were still there see you ate I've seen see evidence his evidence that he did but I don't the
02:25:07 evidence that he did but I don't the coolsonian me and his evidence to the inquiry was that he came on to see you eight when he first arrived and then a you tasked him with taking over management of of FS cheese do you
02:25:21 management of of FS cheese do you remember that no you don't the autists sorry I recalled giving somebody the task of managing of his cheese I don't record beaten data station major Regan right he also said that you told him to
02:25:33 right he also said that you told him to go and set up FS G's in cu7 I recall telling somebody to do that but I don't recall we've been doing I couldn't it's a faceless character in me but okay but you do remember telling
02:25:44 but okay but you do remember telling somebody to go and set up ever cheese and see you seven years right
02:25:52 why did you do that why did you say that the FSU should be handled from c7 and not continue to be handled from cu8 because it is our common practice that
02:26:03 because it is our common practice that we will have a dedicated come on jr. purely dealing with FSGS and the commandery that I was on was what I believed to be used to command come on Julian why not make cu7 the command unit
02:26:16 Julian why not make cu7 the command unit it would have been an option but at that point that that's where the hub of activity was around the whole instant and for the FS Jersey is fought we have
02:26:27 and for the FS Jersey is fought we have absolute hunter sink concentration so a command unit had nobody else on it at that point as far as I was aware it seemed like a perfect location for it we've covered this earlier this morning but just just just go back to it at the
02:26:39 but just just just go back to it at the stage when you told Dan or told somebody to go and set up cu7 as the FSG you need were you aware by that stage that FSG calls were coming in from control to the
02:26:51 calls were coming in from control to the incident ground to see you eight I wasn't aware I couldn't I was a consciously aware they were coming to see you I knew that comes to be interesting ground I see can you explain
02:27:03 interesting ground I see can you explain what information you were able to give the person you tasked about the FSG calls that have come in so far that they were going to go and set up and see you something I don't recall giving it the
02:27:14 something I don't recall giving it the date information now I clearly remember stencil in the south at this gene so you seven so you nearest the building but I don't recall whatever part of a conversation we might see weren't able
02:27:25 conversation we might see weren't able would it follow that you weren't that you didn't perhaps weren't able to give them a briefing about what systems for handling FSG calls were already in place I think fits I thought did he I'd like
02:27:37 I think fits I thought did he I'd like the call what further conversation we had now one of the operatives of C's 7 March manager harrison norman harrison who ended up
02:27:48 harrison norman harrison who ended up working on cu7 with Dan Egan he says that he recalls coming on to see you eight not long after his arrival at the incident and there were three senior
02:28:00 incident and there were three senior officers on the see you two station managers in one group manager if the firm I take further lots of material to take onboard my first question is do you know or would you
02:28:11 question is do you know or would you recognize his watch manager Norman Harrison I would probably recognize him my document the name doesn't doesn't mean anything do you remember whether he came on to see you eight when you were there not that Rico okay
02:28:23 now let me see if I can trigger a recollection in a different way he says in his statement to the inquiry and he this made me have to be explored with him but he says that when he was on cu8 he announced to everyone that he thought
02:28:37 he announced to everyone that he thought the advice being given by the control room operators to tell people to stay inside stay put ought to be changed and that there was then a discussion about that do you have a recollection about that I've got
02:28:48 a recollection about that I've got absolutely no recollection of that and I think is that a following if I'd overheard that conversation that is something that would have been a record okay
02:29:06 now
02:29:09 in your statement if you go back to page four these four lines up from the bottom you say at this point DAC and EO Lachlan entered the Cu and
02:29:24 DAC and EO Lachlan entered the Cu and this has probably got garbled I because of where I think I should be I became aware that he had arrived before me but gone direct to the block and had taken
02:29:35 gone direct to the block and had taken charge from station manager Andy Walton although no messages have been passed to control about that to be to be clear is
02:29:46 control about that to be to be clear is this after you requested the four messages that we've discussed to be sent yes and how long after those messages were sent do you think da CA Lachlan came onto the see you I would get some
02:29:58 came onto the see you I would get some and a minute or so right was that before or after you had your hand over from Brett loft after after so
02:30:09 hand over from Brett loft after after so that would mean with it that these Center messages and then had the the the handover from Brett loft and then dear see a lot and arrived all of the space
02:30:21 see a lot and arrived all of the space of a few minutes yes is that right no one told me yes okay no in the PRC notes
02:30:33 one told me yes okay no in the PRC notes just to get back to them and this is a timing question you say halfway down and here Lachlan got on see you and told me he'd taken over from another SN but
02:30:46 he'd taken over from another SN but believed to be owed to eleven now why do you well first of all do you remember saying at this meeting there's a PLC meeting 3rd of July 2017 that you believe that that was a 211 now I don't
02:31:02 believe that that was a 211 now I don't do you know
02:31:05 if you did say what would have prompted you to recall that being the time when auntie Lachlan got on the CEO I would suspect that that's probably been recorded following some conversation at plc of trying to work out who where
02:31:17 plc of trying to work out who where everyone was at what time right I think if the last person who grabbed these these nodes with a moist me or or for
02:31:29 these nodes with a moist me or or for their own records now hello 2:11 it's certainly after you'd sent the four messages
02:31:50 just to see if we can pin this down can I ask you to go to the short incident log tab 23 pool page 21 we might be able to work it out from
02:32:02 we might be able to work it out from this together at o2 1146 foot of the page you could see that Sharon Derby in puts a makeup message IUP cu8 make
02:32:14 puts a makeup message IUP cu8 make through six who made through six I believe that was the ACA earlier Brooklyn right so does that tell us
02:32:28 Brooklyn right so does that tell us does that give us a time mark for when he came on to see you eight I would do this quite loudly yes no don't speculate no I think you're bored yes yeah but the best of your recollection yes you do you
02:32:39 best of your recollection yes you do you remember him giving the instruction to the operator on CUA to make through six I have a vague memory over that the words beneath my gums pray for you six right now going back to your statement
02:32:53 right now going back to your statement you say and I've just shown you this he told you he'd taken charge from station manager Walton and we've seen paragraph
02:33:05 manager Walton and we've seen paragraph 10 of your contemporaneous notes where you had a conversation with with station manager Walton about setting up a rendezvous point for incoming appliances we've seen that this morning my question
02:33:16 we've seen that this morning my question is when you spoke to DAC a Lachlan did you ask him who was incident commander at that point Norah corner did you what assumptions
02:33:30 Norah corner did you what assumptions did you make at that point when he first saw him as to who the incident commander actually was as far as I was away it had a pinprick loft and then I would take back my until a neo look like Rob does it actually no he had taken over at a
02:33:42 it actually no he had taken over at a block right now four lines up from the bottom of the page we've just looked at it you say I said I because of where said by the way it should be I became
02:33:54 said by the way it should be I became aware that he had arrived before me how did you learn the DAC a Lachlan had arrived before you because a brief conversation we had was
02:34:06 because a brief conversation we had was talking I'd say no very said but I've already been to Bachmann taken over so from now some was it was either same solemn as me before me Oh SEC you learnt it from him yes not
02:34:17 Oh SEC you learnt it from him yes not from anywhere else what briefing were you able to give DAC a Lachlan well from the brief conversation yet it was clear
02:34:29 the brief conversation yet it was clear that he had more information about the hotel than I did so my addition to his information was what I've done at the command G if I were pressing more is obviously declare a major incident right
02:34:43 given that he'd taken command from station manager Wilson well let me ask you this did during that conversation you clearly became aware as he say that he'd taken charge from station manager
02:34:54 he'd taken charge from station manager Andy Wilson did you have a conversation with DAC a Lachlan along the lines of what hang on how come because I've just taken command from Brett loft-like the give Kenya quite clear that he made it
02:35:06 give Kenya quite clear that he made it clear to me to heat them straight to the tower and I didn't try to command you so it was clear where the confusion had happened right did it not consider it caused you concern to discover that there had been some confusion in who people thought the
02:35:20 some confusion in who people thought the incident commander was it was a it's unusual and it's a you know it's not the way we know we do for any means but the important thing was to resource the instant that that's something you can be
02:35:31 instant that that's something you can be dealt with afterwards that we can talk about as we did it appear I'll see how that confusion it happened but they had no detrimental effect on the incident and said oh we were both on the same page so I whilst it wasn't good practice
02:35:44 page so I whilst it wasn't good practice it hadn't caused any problems at yeah well you say hadn't caused any problems how did you know that because our view of what we needed to resource that incident was the same mmm okay and what my decisions had no detrimental effect
02:35:56 my decisions had no detrimental effect on his he's a command decision because what I was done that was resourcing what he thought we needed well right okay now did he give you an impression
02:36:10 okay now did he give you an impression or an understanding about what he had learned so far about the incident more so when he then he told me is being a fighter commander and tell me what he
02:36:21 fighter commander and tell me what he said before I wasn't there for what the size of my sector complete okay well we'll come to that shortly but in this conversation were you able to talk to him about the number and location of FSG
02:36:32 him about the number and location of FSG calls oh no only that I told him that I was aware that we had a high number of if it's G calls he confirmed that and then I told him that who I've given each role to to self FSG to self be a man
02:36:44 role to to self FSG to self be a man control etc did you have a discussion with him about how if SG information was getting to the bridgehead no did you have a discussion with him about how many be a crews have been committed so far no did you have a conversation with
02:36:56 far no did you have a conversation with him about how high ba crews have been committed into the building not I don't believe that that conversation with him I know that conversation shortly after but not with him or anything did you have a conversation with him about whether there were any particular floors
02:37:08 whether there were any particular floors above which ba whereas were not really not not getting no all it all that all of that information was being held at the bridgehead no it wasn't so and he was aware of it
02:37:19 no it wasn't so and he was aware of it but that was my source of information like that was priority for me to get there okay he had been into the tower did he give you any kind of impression as to what was actually happening in the bridgehead yeah it didn't and I wasn't
02:37:30 bridgehead yeah it didn't and I wasn't aware that he had been in it since our airport did he didn't he didn't tell you did he not I recall I thought I thought he did
02:37:36 he did did he tell you what the firefighting plan was not that remember could you discuss evacuation not that remember did
02:37:48 discuss evacuation not that remember did you discuss the wisdom of maintaining the stay-put advice no okay I don't recall and all of this I can't say it didn't happen but I remember I mean it what what did he tell you I told him
02:38:02 what what did he tell you I told him what I'd done he told me taken over from the tower so therefore I knew that he had more information about the incident that's how the denied I hate so in effect really all I did was his
02:38:14 effect really all I did was his information gathering to assist him to make command seizures and what information did you give him what I'd done on to see you around the increase
02:38:25 done on to see you around the increase in resources and they clear in my dream student that's all is it and and the the talking about I knew is we're at a high number of history cause II confirm yes we have and so it was more me feeding
02:38:38 we have and so it was more me feeding him information did you have a conversation with dacl Lachlan about the nature of the fire spread at that time we may have
02:38:50 fire spread at that time we may have done I mean I would we may have that a conversation it's a peasant be on the outside but I don't I couldn't recall for definite their conversation look just follow that that last answer a little bit more detail you ask you to
02:39:03 little bit more detail you ask you to get back to the PRC notes same page page 17
02:39:23 we've seen five lines up from the bottom already this morning that you say still thought fire was just an external fire and then a line up from the bottom you
02:39:34 and then a line up from the bottom you say I knew original fire dealt with so I I'm so sorry my mistake immediately underneath the line where it says thought fire wasn't an external face I knew it was cladding alight did you have
02:39:48 knew it was cladding alight did you have a conversation with JC Lachlan about what you thought was a light namely the cladding no I think it's unfair incorrect my comment there I think
02:40:00 incorrect my comment there I think that's in reaction to media coverage cut following the fire I said at the time you didn't have anything I knew is the other side right - so you think the reference the cladding there is wrong is it it's pretty ugly it's not fair to say that I think that was spreading to media
02:40:12 that I think that was spreading to media all right um but then still focusing on still thought fire was just on external face um were you in this meeting when and ER Lachlan gave his version remember
02:40:25 and ER Lachlan gave his version remember hearing this if you turn to page 19 of the PRC note
02:40:44 you could see where he starts his report of his own recollection of the incident there and just below halfway down it
02:41:00 says I was surprised I was taking it from Andy a station manager and the attorney just taken over
02:41:11 attorney just taken over I think that's Andy Walton what we build together from you this morning do you remember in your conversation with dacl Oxley not when he came on to the see you
02:41:24 Oxley not when he came on to the see you him telling you that he'd been surprised to take over from Andy Walton who was the station manager no I don't and it says was clear where fire started
02:41:35 and it says was clear where fire started fire was in flats no clear indication of how many involved do you remember having a discussion with dacl often about whether the fire had penetrated from the
02:41:47 whether the fire had penetrated from the exterior into individual flats no Andy would have been given the same information as I always suspected that
02:41:58 information as I always suspected that it was in a specific threat initially which I would suspect that's probably what he referred to there
02:42:15 well the note says fire was in flats no indication of how many involved obviously we'll have to ask DAC a lot in about what he meant by that but my
02:42:27 about what he meant by that but my question just showing you what he said at this meeting and based on what he said at this meeting is that when you spoke to the ACA Lachlan when he came on to see you eight did you have a discussion about whether the fire was
02:42:38 discussion about whether the fire was still only on the exterior as it appears you thought from your what you were saying in the meeting or what actually penetrated into flats plural and I
02:42:49 penetrated into flats plural and I recall that conversation okay I think I think put it in a context important to say that that it wouldn't be it wouldn't be unexpected for it to being threatened and it's quite as soon as the fire
02:43:01 and it's quite as soon as the fire started in a flat and as the Tommy year and everything else to lock windows open it wouldn't be that unusual to see the fire spread so flat above maybe even a flat above there because the fall I walk
02:43:13 flat above there because the fall I walk walk come out and get back in to search for fuel but what was completely different on this night was the outside the building was the fuel we're normally far Brown you try and get back in to
02:43:25 far Brown you try and get back in to find more fuel and I think that there's a big differential different difference between what we used to be saw in a 14th of June right so that leads me to this question do you at that stage so we're
02:43:37 question do you at that stage so we're on cu8 and you're talking to DAC a lot I mean it's just come on did you have a have any thoughts yourself or any discussion with the AC unlocking about whether the fire even if only on the
02:43:49 whether the fire even if only on the exterior had breached compartment ation no we didn't I don't remember having the discussion but as I wouldn't have been surprised have been to learn that it
02:44:01 surprised have been to learn that it would have gotten to know in fact because the mainly because it's all year windows open so summarizing it did you have was your view at that stage that compartment ation was still holding up
02:44:12 compartment ation was still holding up or was your view that compartment ation had begun
02:44:15 had begun fail it's at that point I had no reason to doubt that the compartment ocean was still holding up as I say would have got back into the fats but then each fat busy some compartment and I had no
02:44:26 busy some compartment and I had no reason to believe it was it was breaching outside of those compartments it's printing internally okay now we're going to come to to look at that in a
02:44:37 going to come to to look at that in a moment about what you saw on the outside when you go to the tower and I appreciate that this stage you haven't had a job that hadn't had a good look at it but so we'll come back to that
02:44:54 he CSEA Lachlan says in his witness statement and again we'll have to explore this with him his recollection with him but he says that he told you that he had asked he had requested fr
02:45:06 that he had asked he had requested fr use so that the EDB a cruise would be able to get to higher floors do you remember yourself being told that by da CA Lachlan and now I have the rotation there do you remember the AC
02:45:23 rotation there do you remember the AC Lachlan telling you how many F values he had requested prior to coming onto the sea I know I seem to recall being present when when the request was made for making it for you six you were
02:45:40 and at that time was it clear to you that he was the incident commander yes we didn't we'd had that hand over and he drew he'd taken control right and
02:45:52 drew he'd taken control right and therefore had to hand over was one from Andy Moulton earlier and now that host handed over from you yes so so he's your mind he's come on he's incident commander at all by two eleven when he
02:46:04 commander at all by two eleven when he sends that through six message yes now can I pick you back your statement page four and over to the top of page five you say that he told me is the bottom of
02:46:19 you say that he told me is the bottom of the page that he had made SM Walton far sector commander but he now wanted me in that role and told me my parameters were the whole block that what did you
02:46:32 the whole block that what did you understand that you were specifically being asked to do in terms of an overall strategy so I was giving them wrong with Fayette commander as far as it come or did you do me be given an area which in
02:46:44 did you do me be given an area which in a horror eyes would be the fire floor what I pop one below it might clear to me to actually because it involved the whole building then the whole building was the father sector we discussed I
02:46:57 was the father sector we discussed I couldn't tell you details but we discussed it that's on this people we've got you so far with it and in on Michael Wayans to building together more information right
02:47:08 information right did he give you any indication of whether you needed to be focusing on rescues or focusing on firefighting he wouldn t accumulate information that dates this our first call was always
02:47:20 dates this our first call was always life therefore rescues would always come first
02:47:22 first did he give you any indication as to how you should be deploying your be a resources
02:47:27 resources EDB AST be a focusing on which was more important no he's he's Robert instant Claude would be to have a overall plan it would be the fire commanders job to
02:47:39 it would be the fire commanders job to to start looking at detail and the best way to carry that plan out did he give you any impression as to what the conditions were like inside the building at that stage no melodical did you ask him I didn't
02:47:51 no melodical did you ask him I didn't always know where they've been in the building now we get to the point when you you leave for the tower with your brief from DAC Lachlan to run the fire
02:48:02 brief from DAC Lachlan to run the fire sector we've gone through this morning this this question of who was incident commander and there being two are apparently two at the same time and you
02:48:15 apparently two at the same time and you said it didn't have any what didn't cause a problem because he was still resourcing the incident I'm summarizing our evidence is it right that neither
02:48:26 our evidence is it right that neither you nor DAC or Lachlan knew what the other was doing for a period of time before he came onto the Cu and you discover that he was I see yes it's true
02:48:38 discover that he was I see yes it's true but the reality of who's - aggression bugs doing the same thing we both recognize the need but and and if
02:48:51 you
02:48:54 did you that does that mean that neither of you knew what the other was thinking seeing in terms of how that fire was behaving da so looked when was getting a
02:49:07 behaving da so looked when was getting a better view of that and I was right
02:49:11 aye-aye-aye steps of resource in the instant as quickly as I possible as I possibly could but it was actually did I say Lachlan who had probably more information than I around how the farmer
02:49:23 information than I around how the farmer was behaving what we what was happening in the tale right when you discovered that he had effectively been incident commander for a period of time before
02:49:35 commander for a period of time before you saw him on cu8
02:49:40 did it occur to you that that might have caused a problem because you were resourcing the incident knowing less than what he knew or perhaps different things from what he knew it had the
02:49:51 things from what he knew it had the potential to cause problem certainly but one the very first part that conversation we had was when I told him that was also asked for and he confirmed that's exactly what he intended to do that that that that dismiss that Decker
02:50:03 that that that that dismiss that Decker saw because actually we were both doing the same thing that I in fact he probably made it quicker because I ordered it before he had the opportunity told me so toxins actually some time was saved it because we were both all during
02:50:16 saved it because we were both all during the same thing but I've done it faster than II could get that message back right but you didn't know what his view was about whether there was failure cough compartment ation no nor his view
02:50:27 cough compartment ation no nor his view about what the status of any individual rescues or deployments was no or how he was reacting to the volume and content of the FSG calls I didn't once we share
02:50:40 of the FSG calls I didn't once we share that information he'd be reacting the same way that I need to correct they're asking for the same Simon assistants
02:50:49 and what if anything did you do perhaps I should ask this did you do anything to put Brett loft and DSA Lockland together
02:51:01 put Brett loft and DSA Lockland together so the brett loft could give DAC a Lachlan a clear a detailed brief about FSG call handling and content and detail so I don't believe that Brett had that
02:51:14 so I don't believe that Brett had that information at that point really vacate immediately information he'd received but while setting up be a main control whilst waiting for further commanders to arrive he's rolled would they would be
02:51:27 arrive he's rolled would they would be at the command unit doing that so unlike I who was going to leave the command unit hit for the tower Brett was gonna be at the ecology so I didn't formally
02:51:38 be at the ecology so I didn't formally put them together because that's not the normal thing to do nobody was not gonna take my hand out from the person you're taking over from which Vandy and I would be initially it was only woman for him
02:51:49 be initially it was only woman for him and then from me but the opportunity was there if necessary rice do you say the opportunity was there what did you do to
02:52:01 opportunity was there what did you do to ensure that that opportunity was taken so that DAC a Lachlan sorry so that you were satisfied in your own mind that DAC a lot had got as much information about FSG call detail as you could get from
02:52:14 FSG call detail as you could get from Brett loft so go back to the fact I have faith in my officers and I fight I fight that brick loft gave me as much information as he had and I gave thingo that one to Andy right so as far as I
02:52:26 that one to Andy right so as far as I was concerned Brett I trusted Brittany told me if he knew and I passed it only as much tied to a knee what did you tell Andy Lachlan about FSG cause do you remember that we'd had a large number of them coming
02:52:39 we'd had a large number of them coming in there might be more information that the brick gave me that are passed on but I've recalled it now did you have a discussion with him about what the route of FSG information was from control room
02:52:52 of FSG information was from control room into the into the ground ground up to the bridgehead not every corner I go to turn on to the next topic
02:53:04 corner I go to turn on to the next topic which is your move to the tower with Gareth cook and Mick Mulholland that you described in your statement and mr. Chanin I might be able to get through this in six minutes but I might not it may be sensible to
02:53:15 but I might not it may be sensible to have a break now and or I can try you know I suspect you're right it people have a break now
02:53:25 yes and actually can I make this point about three minutes into this line of questions or so I am going to be showing a photograph to the witness which is of
02:53:36 a photograph to the witness which is of the building on fire and so I want to give that as a trigger warning so that if anybody is not comfortable about seeing a photograph it is a still of the building on fire they
02:53:47 is a still of the building on fire they they perhaps ought to excuse themselves from the first ten minutes to make it yes but I think you repeat that warning I'll do that as soon as I joined because people may have come in who abide it yes
02:53:59 people may have come in who abide it yes just tell me how you getting on and can we say two o'clock which will be safe fun I think we can we can say two o'clock treat myself to an extra five minutes good thank you right we're gonna break now have some lunch that will
02:54:12 break now have some lunch that will resume at 2:00 o'clock keys and don't talk to anyone please about your evidence why there are still thanks so much
02:54:19 much right together the auction
02:54:28 [Music] mm please