Further LFB evidence (18 September 2018 Pt 2 of 2)

Full transcript

00:00:33 all right ready to carry almost watch yes sir good thank you as well as welcome back and thank you for coming back to us I was going to proceed to the tower with you as it were your

00:00:45 tower with you as it were your recollection and I shall just repeat further body present before I do that I am going to be showing the witness a picture of the tower on fire in about ten minutes time so that if anybody

00:00:57 ten minutes time so that if anybody doesn't want to see it or if anybody has joined the room or the livestream since I gave the trigger warning at five to one then now is the time to have sent yourselves if you think it's going to be an upsetting sight mr. mr. weld can I

00:01:10 an upsetting sight mr. mr. weld can I put something to you that DAC O'Laughlin says in his statement and obviously as I say to all witnesses when I do this we'll have to explore this with him that his recollection of the meeting on on

00:01:23 his recollection of the meeting on on cu8 is that he told you he wanted you to take over command of the fire sector from Andy Wilson and he says he says I'm

00:01:36 from Andy Wilson and he says he says I'm quoting from his statement I checked that he'd seen the fire himself and I think he said he had but only at a distance because of his route in and then he says this I then explained what

00:01:47 then he says this I then explained what I had just seen in that the fire was affecting most of the floors from the third to fourth floors and up to the roof level and seemed to be on the outside of the building at that time do

00:02:01 outside of the building at that time do you remember having a discussion with da Co Locklin in which he told you that the fire was affecting most of the floors from the third to the fourth floor up to the roof

00:02:12 third to the fourth floor up to the roof level and seems to be on the outside of the building I have a vague recollection that that may have been part of off heed the brief that he gave me I couldn't be specific

00:02:23 that he gave me I couldn't be specific to the wording no but but just putting your recollection of a discussion of the discussion did have a deer's a O'Laughlin do you have your own recollection about talking about the fire being on the

00:02:35 talking about the fire being on the outside of the building that time I couldn't be clear on that now right okay now we'll always have to explore it with with him we've seen from

00:02:46 explore it with with him we've seen from the PRC minutes that you thought that the fire was on the outside he if he thought that I was on the outside and he loved new thought the fire was on the

00:02:57 loved new thought the fire was on the outside and neither of you thought the fire had penetrated does that is it the position that neither person with command was working on the basis that

00:03:08 command was working on the basis that the fire had penetrated inside the flats certainly for myself I would fix but ended with it saying we would have expected it to penetrate in some kind of way but not to the extent that we like

00:03:21 way but not to the extent that we like to became aware of for burns it wasn't it at that point that wasn't an issue here our tactics in fact it was so deeply within the building so can we summarize it this way the first far as you were concerned at the time of your conversation with DAC O'Laughlin you

00:03:35 conversation with DAC O'Laughlin you were of the view that to the extent that there had been breach of compartment ation it was it was limited yes right and you can't recall a discussion on that topic with him that you can't rule

00:03:47 that topic with him that you can't rule it out clearly okay now

00:03:54 going then to the topic which I was going to come to you which was your journey to the tower I think you say you went to the tower with station manager Mulholland group manager Steve cook no

00:04:05 Mulholland group manager Steve cook no so that should be station major Gareth Gareth cook and Matthew cook group major Matthew there were three cooks as it were the two our belief that the Steve waste I think you know infuse it so

00:04:18 waste I think you know infuse it so there's no Steve cook then there's no Steve cook like I taught English they can you say it's fine and that and that was on that was the first occasion was it that you've got to first clear glimpse of them clear look at the tower

00:04:29 glimpse of them clear look at the tower that's a first time I got the clear that of sorting the tariff yes right now I can I take you to your statement where you say on page five this is your first statement

00:04:52 you say on page five I left to see you with SML Holland GM Steve cook and another station manager Gareth cook do you think that Steve cook should be Steve West so now a finish should be me

00:05:04 Steve West so now a finish should be me that included cooking as we left I see that I could see the block and it was clear that it was the cladding on the outside of the block which was a light

00:05:13 now I think in your second statement you corrected that okay let's just look at see what you say in your second statement it's page three you just go to

00:05:25 statement it's page three you just go to that five lines down you've said on reflection it's wrong to say it's a

00:05:38 reflection it's wrong to say it's a third of the way there on reflection it's wrong to say in my original statement that it was clear that the cladding was alight as I did in my earlier statement I was aware that it was it was the outside of the building which was alight normally when one looks

00:05:49 which was alight normally when one looks at a fire in a building one will see that the windows have failed and flames escape through the opening in this case it was not the windows that were aflame but the outer structure above and below them now to be clear does this mean that

00:06:03 them now to be clear does this mean that the possibility of a cladding fire specifically is not something that occurred to you at that stage it hadn't occurred to me that he was cutting

00:06:14 occurred to me that he was cutting thought but it became clear that he was the outside of the building right what when you say in your witness statement your second witness statement that it was the outer structure as you do in the

00:06:26 was the outer structure as you do in the last line there what did you think was burning whatever the substance was on the outside the building I was aware without that was what exactly what that was at a time right waiver the building

00:06:39 was at a time right waiver the building had an exterior was look the repeater people was a lot okay now when you went to the tower and up to it and saw the fire could you see what could you

00:06:52 fire could you see what could you could you see or get an impression of how far if at all the fire had penetrated into flats individual flats no I don't recall seeing it until as she

00:07:04 no I don't recall seeing it until as she received the information from him in detail right can I show you a picture before I do didn't you I'm assuming that you approached the tower from the east or south east yes

00:07:15 or south east yes so the the elevate would it follow that the elevation that you got a clear look at was the East elevation and the self and the South so both as a entry and into it that's how it obviously ended from a self side here because I asked

00:07:28 from a self side here because I asked you to be shown a picture which is M et triple zero one two five nine three which is also figure 5 25 in professor

00:07:41 which is also figure 5 25 in professor lanes dr. Lin's first report and on that page there is a time mark of a

00:07:53 page there is a time mark of a photograph at a time of Oh 208 which is

00:08:01 the bottom right hand corner

00:08:07 if that could be enlarged please and just if you could just if it's possible just have that picture on the screen call

00:08:20 that now that is the East elevation and the South elevation photograph taken at o2 o8 so I think at that time you were

00:08:34 o8 so I think at that time you were still on cu8 and does that give us an impression of what you saw how similar was that to what you saw when you went to the time we aware of where it's a

00:08:45 to the time we aware of where it's a photograph taken from yeah well it's it's the east side of methanol Tower it looks like it's quite a distance away yes so there wouldn't have been the same

00:08:56 yes so there wouldn't have been the same viewed on a gauzy being at that that much closer I wouldn't have that that overlooking perspective me you can see from this photograph that but help me can you see from this photograph

00:09:08 can you see from this photograph individual flats on fire on both elevations so on the East elevation turret the first offical trauma like that out because there's ultimately flame from this angle and the self at

00:09:20 flame from this angle and the self at South eventually came to the forest penetrate into the building right so that's not what you saw is this right well don't think that that's an accurate account of what was signal right now

00:09:33 account of what was signal right now this be taken from some distance away so you you've got no impression at all on your visual inspection that there were individual files and individual flats I thought we cool actually yeah I think

00:09:46 I thought we cool actually yeah I think I would have done I don't recall actually thinking there are specific facts of life my overriding thought was it looks like the outside the building's a lie but I think my second role would have expected it to get into the flats

00:09:58 have expected it to get into the flats I'll have been shocked to be had right now you described in your statement came back to the first statement

00:10:11 this is the quarter of the way down page five as we reach the building I could see the east and south side and was horrified as it as it all appeared to be

00:10:22 horrified as it as it all appeared to be a light certainly on the east side to be clear do you do you mean that the entirety of the east face was was on fire yes nearly that's what looked yes

00:10:33 fire yes nearly that's what looked yes right and you then say you approached you said we approach the main entrance at the south side under a covered walkway but we could still see a lot of falling debris and we had to run to

00:10:44 falling debris and we had to run to avoid it now you then say go on to say having asked the firefighter where the bridge head was to be a PA the bridge

00:10:59 bridge head was to be a PA the bridge head is the BA entry control point beyond which no fart I should pass there was a concrete staircase leading from the ground lobby to the mezzanine etc these observations but they made in your statement trying to describe what you

00:11:10 statement trying to describe what you saw once you got inside the tower yes I see so having seen the east and south side of light did you go straight in yes I see now we have two CCTV images of you

00:11:23 I see now we have two CCTV images of you entering the tower if I can just show you those the first one is it inq 354 and this is taken on camera four

00:11:39 inq 354 and this is taken on camera four at adjusted time of o2 ten just so you're clear in your own mind camera four is one of a two CCTV cameras which

00:11:50 four is one of a two CCTV cameras which were operating on the night in the in the lobby at Granville Tower one faith on the looks towards the front door one looks away from it towards the back of the lobby this is camera fallen towards the front door just to identify yourself

00:12:03 the front door just to identify yourself can you identify yourself in that picture

00:12:06 picture yes we're in the white helmet you bet so you wearing a white helmet and it shows you've got as coming in as I say it and adjusted time of O to ten exactly can you confirm that time mark

00:12:18 exactly can you confirm that time mark do you think I've got no reason teletón right but that mean that would mean that you would have to have left the command unit some minutes before that yes remember how long it took you to go from the command unit to the base of the

00:12:29 the command unit to the base of the tower for maybe a minute or 90 seconds okay and go to the next crater which is at inq 355 this is camera 4 as well than

00:12:41 at inq 355 this is camera 4 as well than adjusted time of 8 to 10 0 to 2 this is 2 seconds later can you identify yourself in that picture yes I'm on the lift yeah and it's the

00:12:53 yes I'm on the lift yeah and it's the ocean major Gareth cook is on the right that's go that was my next question that's Gareth cook is it wearing the ICU and what tab out is that I'm not sure

00:13:04 and what tab out is that I'm not sure whatever always variant it thinks I came you may have came as a press officer said maybe a press liaison officer Ted Bart right what about ort do they have special tab ads they do that's not I wanti that's not it what is no arty has

00:13:16 wanti that's not it what is no arty has started didn't but all mine in fact I know that Gareth is nothing to do the other team right and in his witness statement station

00:13:30 and in his witness statement station manager Walton and again as I say we'll have to explore this with him too he describes a conversation that you had with him in which he says happened at the bottom of the staircase during which

00:13:41 the bottom of the staircase during which you told him that you were taking over from him as fire sector commander that's what he says what's your recollection I recall seeing and in there but I don't

00:13:52 recall seeing and in there but I don't it's another reason to doubt that conversation why don't we call it clearly now do you remember what if any information station manager Walton was able to pass on to you that many recollection at all

00:14:06 he also says that you instructed him to sort the balcony out do you remember giving him that instruction I do remember giving instructions someone to do that because there was a large number

00:14:18 do that because there was a large number of firefighters on the outside the on the mezzanine floor and casualties have been brought out and they were causing a bit of a Bevin or Zbornak so a trauma might make there some some spice up

00:14:30 might make there some some spice up there so casualties could be brought directly out would that be a slowdown right

00:14:34 right did you make him be a resources officer

00:14:39 the answer is yes I did I don't good course you haven't that conversation but I know that he's a devotee he carried out for okay they say don't remember specifically that conversation to does that mean you wouldn't if I asked you

00:14:50 that mean you wouldn't if I asked you whether you had given him any specific instructions about eg be a wearers and their deployment I'll remember moon remember that now on page five of your

00:15:01 remember that now on page five of your statement going back to it halfway down the page you say

00:15:17 that after the reference to the concrete staircase I was told the lifts were not working including the designated fire left which should have had and override allowing us to use it you say including

00:15:31 allowing us to use it you say including a designated fire lift did you actually know whether Grenfell had a designated fire lift no but it was my absolute expectation it would have on a hot light shower block you see your absolute

00:15:43 shower block you see your absolute expectation can you that's not sure what kind of a cooler time if I mean come across a building like rain fill tower when it wasn't a provision for a foil if dizzy my thigh

00:15:55 provision for a foil if dizzy my thigh lifts okay when you say designated file if do you mean firefighters lift firm yes right so lift that we can override them to come under our control right

00:16:07 them to come under our control right after the posted at Red Bull personnel and equipment up do you know tell you say I was told the list weren't working do you member who told you that all I think of it what about you Brian Oh Keith it's alright Akif

00:16:20 Oh Keith it's alright Akif tell me they were lit falls I'm working okay that would be when would that be when you got to the bridgehead at a second floor yeah which I would I wouldn't have used it for the lifts

00:16:31 wouldn't have used it for the lifts anyway no did that did the fact that the lifts weren't working as a fire lift or firefighters left and there may be a

00:16:42 firefighters left and there may be a difference between that but so far as control is concerned you couldn't control it did that make a difference to your approach to the fire sector job that you were going to going to do actually no I would even if her file

00:16:54 actually no I would even if her file firefighters had been working I wouldn't have used it because that we would always use that lift to get within two floors below the fire and at no point in that building could I guarantee we

00:17:06 that building could I guarantee we opportun firefighters to a place where they'd be to floor notify right because I'd seen so much as its are discounted to lift before I was even informed about it by that stage in the incident yeah before he walked in the building I was

00:17:17 before he walked in the building I was never gonna lose if I lift now you think it you then go on to describe going up the staircase to the bridgehead and seeing PA crews bringing casualties down and that's the

00:17:28 bringing casualties down and that's the next few lines of your statement and you say just below halfway down the page we got stuck in straight away taking casualties from the BA crews moving them

00:17:40 casualties from the BA crews moving them onto the mezzanine level and calling for assistance from fire fighters on the ground floor as it became crowded see

00:17:51 ground floor as it became crowded see that yes how long do you think you were doing that for how long were you moving casualties down for it felt like tourney

00:18:02 casualties down for it felt like tourney but I think really study was probably where was sporadic you know we get to a point where two corner fights old hands or old acres so we need as many people

00:18:13 or old acres so we need as many people as we could to take help take casualties we were right out of a staircase to take casualties from fire fighters we're bringing people down we run out of staircase to assist people walking down and then there may be a gap and then a

00:18:26 and then there may be a gap and then a few minutes later didn't happen again so that whole Prout the whole thing went on for probably I'm guessing we have somewhere around 45 minutes so you were you were physically helping with

00:18:37 you were physically helping with assisting casualties out yes right was that not a task that you could have delegated to somebody more junior than the rank of group manager inaudible jest

00:18:50 the rank of group manager inaudible jest but at that point we were using every resource available to us sending VI crews into the building right that any help that to assist there in green casualties out the only people who were

00:19:02 casualties out the only people who were going be a state were the senior officers right so given that you were involved on involved in bringing casualties down for a fort for 45 minutes or so did that mean that your

00:19:14 minutes or so did that mean that your task that you've been given by D I see a lot Lynn of of taking over fire as fire sector commander got delayed by 45 minutes no oh I arrived I spoke

00:19:26 minutes no oh I arrived I spoke to watch my dryer Keith asked him who was carrying it he was coordinating the search and rescue and firefighting that point I asked him what he was doing what his plan was

00:19:37 his plan was what he was committing what he needed for systems and I was happy with his plans we are talking to continue his pain and what what do you need from me I see so he's it's not very clearly a

00:19:49 I see so he's it's not very clearly a statement so it is the chronology this and I think what you just said does help me with this you you arrived in the building you go straight to the bridgehead is this right and then and talk to Brian O'Keefe first yes and then

00:20:02 talk to Brian O'Keefe first yes and then do your task of moving casual yes the tasks were moving casually wasn't continuous it must be a few minutes didn't it be a gap so you know I could go back to assist assisting Brian Austin when you didn't someone was share how

00:20:13 when you didn't someone was share how casual you know staircase and the rivers valuable would run and get that casually I see okay that's cleared out okay that out now in your statement you explained

00:20:25 out now in your statement you explained it on page five at the bottom that there were two watch managers and you say one of whom I now know is Brian O'Keefe who done a fantastic job but I told them that our ba crews would never make the

00:20:37 that our ba crews would never make the 24th floor from where they were said we needed to move the bridgehead out the way this appears in this with this statement makes it sound as as if this is the first thing you did when you got

00:20:48 is the first thing you did when you got to the bridgehead is that right no no we were first got to the bridgehead we there was there was it was an organized chaos

00:20:57 chaos it was a chaotic Arab it was it was very clearly organized Brian okay fit and louie's the silver who was a second watch manager did a done a brilliant job so my initial actions were assisting in

00:21:09 so my initial actions were assisting in because they had a good plan in place an assistant getting casualties out at some point during that time I've made the coming to Brian they actually we're never gonna better get the top of this we need to keep moving the bridger

00:21:20 we need to keep moving the bridger that's my plan was along with the alongside the FS J's was to find a fire or keep moving to Bridget a Horan Horan higher to make the travel

00:21:31 a Horan Horan higher to make the travel distance sure right when did you first conceived that plan within seconds of walking to building me that there's a more experience of high-rise fire for him that was the way forward okay do you remember how much

00:21:46 forward okay do you remember how much time you actually spend at the bridgehead while it was on the second floor before it was moved up to the third floor all estimate around for you

00:21:58 third floor all estimate around for you mate

00:22:05 right and what led you to think that BA as you say in your statement be a cruise would never make the 24th floor from where we were

00:22:14 were well because I then found that the bridge it was on the second floor so then knowing that they had at the time I didn't Roz it was twenty fourth floors I think was 20 so even then you know where

00:22:26 think was 20 so even then you know where were falls were left they were never gonna make that there and back safely or in sdp already behavior no matter no

00:22:36 watch manager O'Keefe and we touched on this earlier today watch manager a Keith's recollection as he told us was that the first discussion he had with you and you came up to the bridgehead on

00:22:47 you and you came up to the bridgehead on the second floor was about a DBA he says that you he asked you to get get him all the idibia in London and you said right

00:22:58 the idibia in London and you said right I'm on it

00:22:59 I'm on it all words to that effect did you remember that having that conversation I couldn't exactly place it where in in very short sort of five first five minutes it was but I threw him that conversation did what did you do in response all the EBI by doing what I

00:23:13 response all the EBI by doing what I think I've seen a runner back to to maybe a runner I'm sure it was including by radio asking free DBA right who did you speak to other did you speak to

00:23:25 you speak to other did you speak to someone in the command unit Jim yes which command unit you remember see you I see you eight and how did you make

00:23:36 I see you eight and how did you make that communication by far ground ready on your or on your diagram right here right on your fargo radio did you have any difficulties getting through to see you eight I thought member difficulties at that point difficulties with deaf

00:23:48 at that point difficulties with deaf experience later on but at that point it was it was still usable what and what instruction or command or ordering did you tell cu8 to you to to make or give

00:24:01 you tell cu8 to you to to make or give in order to get as many edpa to the incident as possible I don't recall exactly what I asked for a moment he clearly needed a to BIA at that stage we had crews and

00:24:14 ten to nineteen I'll just show you this it's on page 22 of the short incident log just following this up after you go

00:24:26 log just following this up after you go to page 22 of the short answers Arnaud you can see that a quarter of the way down the page a to 1911 we've got CDR that's Debbie real in the

00:24:41 we've got CDR that's Debbie real in the control room see you a makeup make fire rescue unit ten requested what sort of things I think it's actually before that

00:24:52 things I think it's actually before that you can see at the top of the page to it and see you ate from 16 to 16 yeah yes that's that's deep that's DAC O'Laughlin make throughs 10 well let me ask you

00:25:07 make throughs 10 well let me ask you about that then is does that does that bear any relationship do you think with your calling see you 8 and asking for all the EDB AZ thinking and they their hands on I don't remember exactly asking

00:25:20 hands on I don't remember exactly asking for hold it all lead EBI I moved the conversation later on as I said before there's a senior officer we have to try and balance the fact that we still it ba Lankans hen leaves us with five others

00:25:32 Lankans hen leaves us with five others covering the rest of London so we've got to try make a balance of how much we really need and if there wasn't the evening Brian is said to be already TBA we've gone it's my job as a more senior officer with further experience to make

00:25:45 officer with further experience to make that call with actually do we need everything or can we hold some back to the rest of it or not all right let me just see if I can cut through this because we may be across purposes a to 1658 we see a makeup CoA from dacl

00:25:57 1658 we see a makeup CoA from dacl Lachlan make throughs 10 and you can see at 219 make far as the unit 10 requested so we can see the radio message and the message came back to see you a was that

00:26:10 message came back to see you a was that in reaction to your message back to the see you to increase EDB a vomited secret was always this DAC a lot of doing it off his own bat I think that thanks for

00:26:21 off his own bat I think that thanks for more requests and that timing would be about right as well okay so you're at the bridgehead on the second floor by that is this right by

00:26:32 second floor by that is this right by the time or at the time to 1658 the seat the message comes from the ACA Lachlan to make fruisé ten yes okay looking at the previous photograph your show from

00:26:44 the previous photograph your show from the SC's TV yeah nothing was o2 team wasn't it was me America likes him seven minutes between like as you get that message them back to see you do we

00:26:55 that message them back to see you do we need that now how soon after arriving at the bridgehead which we can now see was around about two sixteen that's a little before that how soon after that did the bridgehead we got to the third floor to

00:27:07 bridgehead we got to the third floor to the best of your recollection how soon I think it was it within so I would get at premier within the next ten minutes then yeah okay now when you discuss the

00:27:22 yeah okay now when you discuss the question of EDB a with Braun O'Keefe did you have a discussion or any thoughts about the need to prioritize EDB a over st-pierre well at that point I think we only had two fire rescue units day I

00:27:33 only had two fire rescue units day I think we don't worry that some a some a debate had already been committed and and the golden round at the use of EVP a is we don't commit EDP I users and this

00:27:44 is we don't commit EDP I users and this we've got another crew of the same size size and protective site to the same P PAE standing by everybody to risk as an emergency crew so once we commit one one

00:27:55 emergency crew so once we commit one one crew we couldn't actually then committed fret second crew move out another crew being there so you need to for one at all times yes yeah

00:28:06 now just came back to your statements talking about the need to move up a floor you you say we've just seen this five lines up from the bottom of page

00:28:17 five lines up from the bottom of page five we needed to move the bridgehead up you see that yes was the reason for that

00:28:28 you see that yes was the reason for that to help be a cruise get higher up the tower

00:28:31 tower it's a shorten the travel distance rugby a crew shorten the travel distance okay that's because the closer to the fire you could get you could make the bridge at entry control the further up they could travel under air yes the intricate

00:28:44 could travel under air yes the intricate role will always be in a place in in safe air so the firefighters won't need to put to use there but they're breathing out raise to go past that so naturally at the higher that is then the

00:28:55 naturally at the higher that is then the less traveled is if we've got the top while the bridge head was still on the second floor did you take over command of the bridge head from survival to her immediately women are claims Bridget

00:29:06 immediately women are claims Bridget okay did you take out did you get a handover from Brian O'Keefe yes a formal handover yes did you say to him I am taking over yes once you've taken a

00:29:18 taking over yes once you've taken a handover from him well exactly let me back up and on to the prior question in that handover did Brian O'Keefe explained to you how far survival guidance information was coming to the bridgehead I like

00:29:31 coming to the bridgehead I like recalling me to shame me and the the how we were recording the first of all guidance information and then how he was dealing with those right how had he recorded it that at Toms are no 40th

00:29:42 recorded it that at Toms are no 40th Mashable right now

00:29:48 in any other way of recording it you remember not the horrid cold do you remember seeing any writing on the wall at that stage well the bridgehead is on the second floor I'm not sure if he did write on the wall or thinking might have done but there was definitely a point

00:29:59 done but there was definitely a point where I gave the instruction stop using the forward information board and start using them all when it became apparent that ball wasn't be big enough and that was all this while the bridgehead was still on the second floor I believe so

00:30:10 still on the second floor I believe so when you first took over not immediately now it was within the first ten minutes five minutes okay let me show you a picture can I ask the witness please to be shown a meaty triple zero eight one

00:30:23 be shown a meaty triple zero eight one eight seven four nine that's one eight seven four nine there what is that well this has been it this is a fourteen

00:30:34 this has been it this is a fourteen fireball with being used that record the officiers does the shape of what's written on there the box the manuscript does that trigger a recollection that

00:30:45 does that trigger a recollection that what that is what you saw when you got to thee when you were on me I couldn't say certainly exactly what sort of hoping to collect numbers and details now but that was it that would have been various the outgoing one unnoticed year

00:30:58 various the outgoing one unnoticed year can I ask you to be shown a meaty triple zero one three zero seven one this is an exhibit 11 - just a neighbor's

00:31:10 exhibit 11 - just a neighbor's firefighter it burns witness statement does this look familiar to you from your memory of the night

00:31:21 no Justin here burn gave evidence that he had written this information up on the wall or daily rate this information

00:31:32 the wall or daily rate this information had been written up on the wall while the bridgehead was at level 2 do you recall seeing this on that right you don't come you see him right in the wall but not this particularly leaving aside

00:31:45 but not this particularly leaving aside the methods of inscription did you gain any understanding of how FSG information was reaching the bridgehead while it was on the second floor I remember seeing Brian O'Keefe leave

00:31:58 I remember seeing Brian O'Keefe leave radio and so you perceive the information like that but as fries on the way that was the only so communicating that there might have been others did you sorry while the British was still on the second floor did you

00:32:09 was still on the second floor did you see anybody coming to the bridgehead with pieces of paper with FSG details written on them not that I recall we didn't see any crews holding this of paper not that I

00:32:20 crews holding this of paper not that I noticed but in there that was an extremely extremely busy time did you have any knowledge of a watch manager name of Sadler collating FSG information

00:32:32 name of Sadler collating FSG information outside the tower and then sending it into the bridgehead by radio not so did you have any information that he was creating effort SG outside the tower and sending it in by running on pieces of

00:32:43 sending it in by running on pieces of paper no did you note a watch manager name of Watson standing on the balcony at the head of the be a crew when he went up to the second-floor bridgehead how you watch manager right remember you

00:32:55 how you watch manager right remember you know there was several watch managers around but there were some officers on the balcony do you remember what you saw he was doing no he's given evidence that

00:33:06 he was doing no he's given evidence that he was standing at the head of the crew tasking ba whereas before they went through the door into the second floor bridgehead more than likely home I couldn't save definite but I do beg

00:33:18 couldn't save definite but I do beg watch my understand the front the crew you know front the waiting crews but I couldn't say exactly what he was doing you didn't see what he was doing sorry you didn't see what he was doing no no

00:33:29 you didn't see what he was doing no no did you speak to him yes probably I mean it definitely but I know what the conversation was right did you observe a watch manager in the lobby on the ground floor to the left of

00:33:42 lobby on the ground floor to the left of the door as you come in shouting up flatten floor numbers to the watch manager on the balcony on the second floor yes you do yes remember that yes I think otherwise

00:33:54 yes remember that yes I think otherwise I don't know who that was sitting me share with up to the same water major we just spoke off but I do remember the mention of to a watch manager did you see that

00:34:02 see that watch manager in the lobby it's doing that did you notice him doing anything bright on the wall he was running on the wall I believe so yes did you go down and ask him what he was doing and look at it in detail no I think it was quite

00:34:14 at it in detail no I think it was quite clear that he was gonna get it what hey who's passing up a fish achieved motion to the food but the lobby said if I should get sub Richard but did you see how he was receiving that information he

00:34:25 how he was receiving that information he didn't see runners coming to him or radio - did did did you speak to him I only thought sharing that information to each other if he thought was anyone there but there was no formal

00:34:37 there but there was no formal conversation now okay did can you explain whether you'd established by this point in other words by the time you took command from Brian O'Keefe at the bridgehead while it was on the

00:34:48 the bridgehead while it was on the second floor how many of the lower floors that you had cleared of fire okay

00:34:59 now still on the subject of the watch managers and the communication of FSG information watch manager Williams was the watch manager so we've discovered

00:35:12 the watch manager so we've discovered standing by the the wall on the left in the lobby by the entrances to come in and he's given evidence to the inquiry and he he says that it was you who tasked him with managing FSG information

00:35:25 tasked him with managing FSG information and he says when he came up to the bridgehead on the second floor and you told him to do that in the ground floor lobby

00:35:30 lobby that's his recollection is that the same as yours that may well be true cause I remember that you don't remember him okay you don't you don't you can't is it you you remember it not happening or you can't say well I couldn't say didn't

00:35:41 can't say well I couldn't say didn't happen but I don't I don't recollect it okay now we know that he started recording FSG information on the lobby wall to the left of the main door at

00:35:52 wall to the left of the main door at 2:15

00:35:55 2:15 I say we know that but that is what he's told us and there's a photograph which of the wall it says FSG at 2:15 my question is was he already running FSG

00:36:07 question is was he already running FSG in the lobby do you think when he came up to speak to you or you just got or can you remember

00:36:18 did you haven't seen him down there chatting up did you have any thoughts about why you needed to have a watch manager such as much manager William

00:36:29 manager such as much manager William standing in the lobby as an intermediary between the command unit and the bridgehead I think because at that point the bridge area where the British Airports was very small and we were

00:36:42 Airports was very small and we were committing an awful lot of firefighters through the Truvia to control point and as I mentioned earlier it's important to have a quieter area with more space to

00:36:53 have a quieter area with more space to conduct a collect the FSG information we had several in control boards run a bridgehead and I felt that Brian couldn't do both roles of trying to

00:37:06 couldn't do both roles of trying to oversee the board and effectively gather information did you ask anyone whether

00:37:20 information did you ask anyone whether it was Williams or Watson or any of the watch managers you were dealing with at the bridgehead or in the balcony or in the lobby did you ask any of them to report back the results of FSG deployments to the command unit I don't

00:37:35 deployments to the command unit I don't remember

00:37:36 remember we did not be important to do that yeah so when I say that remember I would fully expect that I would because that's what we would expect to do but I couldn't honestly say horns were having

00:37:47 couldn't honestly say horns were having that conversation with him right in general terms and still focusing on the time when the bridgehead was stood on the second floor so when you arrived there - 10 15 20 that sort of time

00:38:01 what did it did you think to yourself that it was important to make sure that once crews came down from deployment you've got a full debrief from them and then communicated that back to

00:38:14 then communicated that back to ultimately to control say that control could update callers so I could see the crews book in if they're a brief aim debrief when they came down brought it

00:38:25 debrief when they came down brought it and a system in place for clipped for Clayton information and I had no reason I believed he would not communicate that Bank did you observe any debrief yourself

00:38:33 yourself yes did we know were you satisfied that those degrees were full and satisfactory so I didn't see every single one because that's a little detail I didn't need to be involved in but from the debrief I

00:38:44 be involved in but from the debrief I did see I was more than happy with the information because they've been protected really I think the important thing they'd say is read a lot of firefighters come down who were carrying

00:38:55 firefighters come down who were carrying casualties so that debrief might been delayed somewhat while they were dealing with the casualty and we have firefighters the threat and I can tell you Jeff why not unable to speak because of there are only only certain and the

00:39:08 of there are only only certain and the effects from before yeah did you observe any firefighters suffering from the effects of metabolic heat stress yes were they were there a large proportion of small proportion can you give us an

00:39:19 of small proportion can you give us an idea of I would say what proportion they made up it's really really difficult site but it seen it both certainly for mine as far as it to command it was too

00:39:32 mine as far as it to command it was too many but maybe one in ten given that a number at least of a portion at least of firefighters were coming down suffering

00:39:45 firefighters were coming down suffering the effects of metabolic heat stress and some were dealing with casualties did he really feel abled to be satisfied in your own mind that you got this full and proper debriefs so that you get a clearer picture on the success or

00:39:57 clearer picture on the success or failure of deploying yes I was because that despite haven't seen their condition that some of the marine they were still telling us that horrendous conditions that are up there

00:40:09 conditions that are up there doesn't mean we stop we still keep committing no I want to ask you about found the bridgehead was functioning when it went up to the third floor

00:40:21 when it went up to the third floor before I do that let me slot in a question about which station manager Egan you'd I think tasked him with managing FSG calls from his c7 how did

00:40:33 managing FSG calls from his c7 how did you envisage that role fitting into what the other watch managers are doing in the building that you'd seen so Clayton

00:40:45 the building that you'd seen so Clayton the information cu7 and they've got the the room the spacer and the environment to be able to code information accurately and then it would be the role of the person I was seeing

00:40:56 be the role of the person I was seeing that to you to make sure that information you've got into the building primarily that would be by use of fire gram radio but also where that wasn't successful throughout that night and I

00:41:08 successful throughout that night and I was awaiting the runners are being used right run is being used to wherever to bring information into the building and out and out did you see runners taking

00:41:21 out and out did you see runners taking information out of the building I thought isn't that you run is ourselves taking a promotion at that building threat not did you throughout the night yes just give us this give us a clear picture of that did to you was that when

00:41:32 picture of that did to you was that when you were at the bridgehead on second floor third floor and ground floor probably not the second floor but when I sight that wasn't just around FSG information that was an information back

00:41:44 information that was an information back to settings to command them as the evening progressed the firearm areas became less effective because the amount of traffic and so there was certain

00:41:56 of traffic and so there was certain decisions and certain events happened that are made sure him pleasure for out the building as well was that information at any stage directed to the results of particular deployments into the tower to respond to specific FSG

00:42:08 the tower to respond to specific FSG calls

00:42:10 sorry are you asking did I send the result of FSG information building potency no I didn't write so the messages you use runners to send

00:42:22 the messages you use runners to send back with what but more around the edge of operational side of it and what how far would gain how we'll get on what we needed

00:42:27 needed I see was anybody else sending messages back out of the tower whether by radio will by runner with pieces of paper showing the outcome of deployment

00:42:40 showing the outcome of deployment success once the information the deep reach happening the information is in callate effective the outcome it would be it would be my full expectation that especially as a wash major level would

00:42:52 especially as a wash major level would make sure that information thing got back to see you but again that was the level of detail that hold would not normally have got involved in because I had no reason to expect to think that wouldn't happen was it not quite an important level of

00:43:03 was it not quite an important level of detail for you as officer in charge of the bridgehead commander the bridgehead to make sure that the results of particular deployments whether they were successful or more importantly

00:43:14 successful or more importantly unsuccessful were communicated back out of the tower to the to at least to the command unit so that the most important thing for me was getting crews to those

00:43:25 thing for me was getting crews to those people and leaders yes it was important that that motion every motion got back but that wasn't a number one priority priority was against those people and as long as the information came in so building my control over Kino came those

00:43:37 building my control over Kino came those people sue the people and they didn't need to help his employment to get information back but it's also importantly a trust my offices that that's being done there was so many tasks under my control at that point

00:43:48 tasks under my control at that point that to try and keep an eye on every single one of them was impossible nights yet to announce on sort of level of trust which is quite right or correct for watch manager but a level of trust

00:44:01 for watch manager but a level of trust only works if in fact it's it's actually working in practice let me put the question to you this way did you realize that people in the control room were dependent upon getting accurate information back from the fire ground

00:44:13 information back from the fire ground about where crews were in response to particular FSG calls so that so that when those call is called or call back to ask where where are the crews that the control room operators could

00:44:24 that the control room operators could give them accurate up-to-date fact-based information so I personally did send people were outside the building to send the information back on our progress and we were getting to in the building so

00:44:36 we were getting to in the building so that imp that would answer that information for those callers on the phone that we're in the building we can actually reach but the actual specific detail of what flats we got to them and

00:44:48 detail of what flats we got to them and what we hadn't got so was was was a responsibility of the person in charge of that wall and I've got I'll have no reason not to trust my officers that what happened the flip side of that is if that

00:45:01 the flip side of that is if that information wasn't getting back to come on Junie didn't oh I have no doubt all I heard about it that actually we're not getting information back from you but ultimately would you accept that it was

00:45:12 ultimately would you accept that it was your responsibility as the officer of senior officer in charge of the bridgehead to make sure that you could do what you could do to put the information coming out of the tyre at least into the system say that the next

00:45:23 least into the system say that the next person in the link in the chain could could receive it and then pass it on back up the child to accept that and no and you're correct that I'll agree to that but but what point in that system do I stopped you should be ensuring it's

00:45:35 do I stopped you should be ensuring it's getting there other than you know I'll make sure it gets back to the source it came from within the building but either can't then physically make sure it gets to the command unit I've got to have

00:45:46 to the command unit I've got to have faith in the system and in the the professional fire offices that are working that they're going to carry on with it and as is the norm in the fire service if it isn't working they've all let me know what did you do

00:45:57 they've all let me know what did you do though in your role as commander at the bridgehead at least to ensure that the information about results of deploy was was at least leaving the bridgehead to go to its next point of destination on the chain back to the conservative

00:46:09 on the chain back to the conservative room so we were told that the inflation came off with the wall in the ground-floor the results of the debrief that information was then passed back to their ground floor was it that's that's

00:46:20 their ground floor was it that's that's absolutely of what I saw happened how does it happen how does how did you see what so far I saw fire fighters coming through the breach a tonne and you add a roof and actually being sent to the ground floor and I saw a fire five at the

00:46:30 the for talking to the people working on that wall

00:46:37 now the Britta then moves up to the third floor and in your statement its page six at the top and then the bottom

00:46:54 page six at the top and then the bottom of page five and then top of page six and then in the middle of page six you

00:47:05 say SM cook and I return to the third floor is that Garrett cook yes and redrew the floor plan on a wall there I tasked a female watch manager and male

00:47:18 tasked a female watch manager and male crew manager as FSG and had them write details of all the FS G's receive on the wall so I could task the be a rescue crews so was it your idea to write FSG

00:47:31 crews so was it your idea to write FSG details on the wall when it got up to the third floor yes did you yourself record any FSG information on the walls personally can I ask you to be shown a

00:47:42 personally can I ask you to be shown a photograph M et triple zero one five eight one nine now Louisa DaSilva gave

00:47:54 eight one nine now Louisa DaSilva gave evidence to us that that was written there by her did you see that cannot wear this ball 'yes yes in relationship like i well let me let me see if I can

00:48:07 like i well let me let me see if I can keep show you a different photographic bias system

00:48:26 if you

00:48:37 let's gonna say go to and if you bear with me

00:48:57 I'll tell you what I will give you an answer well I'm struggling to save the attendants that makes more sense to five which is a photograph taken at 308 yes I

00:49:17 do recall what made silver rolling that one on that wall now that's taken at 308 when the bridgehead is moving down from the third floor to the ground floor

00:49:28 floor to the ground floor I'll come to that in a moment but you do remember that being written or than yes now do you know where she was getting the information from once on the third floor no do you know who was giving the

00:49:44 floor no do you know who was giving the be a cruise their instructions once the bridge had got to the third floor so from what I recall I through members seen much major still vote on a her for Graham right yet now I would make the

00:49:55 Graham right yet now I would make the assumption that's where she was receiving motion from what couldn't swear to that and then Brian O'Keefe was working one that BAE balls and staged major cook was there and they were they

00:50:06 major cook was there and they were they were dispatching the crews to the relevant floors much major silver was gathering that information and in Brahma Oak much made our keepers can be increased to those coals right who was

00:50:20 increased to those coals right who was actually giving the instructions that Brian O'Keefe or were the BA whereas going on the basis of information they had been previously given before they got to the bridgehead no it's Brian O'Keefe did you see any be a where as

00:50:33 O'Keefe did you see any be a where as coming to the bridgehead with pieces of paper in their hands not Laura a corner right not at that point did you have any system in place for determining which FSG calls would be responded to as a

00:50:45 FSG calls would be responded to as a priority at that point we we had a conversation around prioritizing a young elderly we would naturally prioritize those mobility issues and but that is

00:51:00 those mobility issues and but that is the standard practice but I remember having that conversation at the Bridget and that's other than that David there would be a privatized as we received it right let's just break

00:51:11 as we received it right let's just break this down a bit you say you would have had a conversation around prioritizing the young the elderly you would naturally prioritize those with mobility issues that's standard practice just

00:51:22 issues that's standard practice just breaking that up who do you have that conversation with what Louise did silver and I another crew major who was standing with her or don't know okay what was that when the bridgehead was on the third floor did you have a

00:51:33 the third floor did you have a conversation before that I think that was a third thought I think do you think you were at that stage getting enough information about the details of the occupants in the flats were from where

00:51:44 occupants in the flats were from where FSG calls were coming to be able to make an effective prioritization along those lines it was very difficult because the information we received him were floors flat numbers and numbers of people if we

00:51:57 flat numbers and numbers of people if we got further information which we did take on occasions I do remember hearing and seeing information where there were children involved but if we got the

00:52:08 children involved but if we got the information didn't that's how we prioritized it did you yourself proactively go out and ask anybody to

00:52:19 proactively go out and ask anybody to make sure that they hand it to you details of the occupants such as age any any mobility issues or any other matters that might require them make them a

00:52:31 that might require them make them a priority sorry I'm not quite sure I understand why would they hand it to me well if you have a system of prioritization but my question is did

00:52:42 prioritization but my question is did you yourself go out and ask anybody so that you made sure you had all the details to hand rather than relying on the information you were getting no I

00:52:54 the information you were getting no I didn't I'm not quite short moment on mr. pointer while I needed those details to hand well let me ask you just lazy maybe I've missed maybe I've always the question slightly unclearly

00:53:05 question slightly unclearly were you satisfied there with all the FS to information you were getting you were getting a clear steer clear information people in flats who were young who are

00:53:16 people in flats who were young who are elderly who have mobility issues or matters of that nature I was satisfied that watch majored Silvo the site was receiving as much information as control

00:53:27 receiving as much information as control capaz and that she was recording information correctly and I saw Casilla myself and that she was then prioritizing from there so yes I was a fob the system that was working now from

00:53:38 fob the system that was working now from what you could see where was Louisa the silvered getting the information she was writing up from I think it was kind of a fog around radio radio okay do you remember seeing any runners coming into the bridgehead with pieces of paper which they gave to anybody at BAE entry

00:53:51 which they gave to anybody at BAE entry control including news you never saw that much at that point no I've never seen it

00:53:56 seen it okay now in terms of your strategy for deployment of be a cruise while the bridgehead is on the third floor where all crews deployed in response to FSG calls and sent to specific flats and

00:54:07 calls and sent to specific flats and Falls or work with work crews committed purely for firefighting I think maybe initially so in a second floor but then maybe the first 10 or 15 minutes on the

00:54:20 maybe the first 10 or 15 minutes on the third floor maybe not that long but they were being sent for both so crews would be tipped that if history calls some abuse him before appointing and that the four I fight in took a back seat very

00:54:32 four I fight in took a back seat very quickly I was going to ask you that and there's my next questions and you say firefighting took a back seat very quickly before it took a back seat how did you decide which to what tasks to give give the next BA in from aware in

00:54:44 give give the next BA in from aware in their honor work their way up the building as we normally would put the fire out now this is in timeline times turns after the bridgehead and have gone

00:54:58 turns after the bridgehead and have gone to the third floor and we estimate that that was around 220 or so at that time do you remember any difficulties with

00:55:10 do you remember any difficulties with crews getting above the 15th floor I remember cruising difficult was getting to the upper floors like that the last

00:55:19 the last yeah from the 15 that would I couldn't I couldn't actually know it down to being the 15th per certainly the top floors right do you have any recollection at all while the British was on the second

00:55:30 all while the British was on the second floor are of there being a particular problem with crews getting above the 15th floor I don't member at that point a particularly with the 15th you say the

00:55:45 particularly with the 15th you say the firefighter took a back seat very quickly that I'm assuming then the priority then became FSG calls and a search-and-rescue yes yes I mean this fear fest you were always gonna be the priority and the search-and-rescue

00:55:56 priority and the search-and-rescue person would be priority but there was also the hope initially did we - should be able to put this far out right was there an upper floor limit that you would send an SD be a crew to once

00:56:07 would send an SD be a crew to once search and rescue took over as the priority and funnels identical action was that point we were trying to reach all floors at that point right did you have a system at that at that time well

00:56:21 have a system at that at that time well the bridgehead was on the second on the third floor for sending EDB a to higher floors and keeping st on remember exactly when we started using a DPI we had enough I know that a DBA had been

00:56:32 had enough I know that a DBA had been used before I took over as I said come on des and we started using again very quickly yes we've got enough resources I couldn't be sure exactly when that was while the bridgehead was on the third

00:56:44 while the bridgehead was on the third floor did you did you use a DBA whereas to prioritize the rescue of children elderly or immobile occupants I can't remember when we started using the DPA

00:56:56 remember when we started using the DPA if it was a funny word Smeaton yes you know I would be been using as soon as I could right I don't remember where that was a third floor or ground floor did there come a time when the bridgehead was still on the third floor that you

00:57:07 was still on the third floor that you didn't have enough e DBA whereas to respond to demand I like remember definitely using a DBA from the second from the third floor okay if I did then I don't send up we

00:57:20 okay if I did then I don't send up we were running out of 80 behind me now to be fair to you the most recently updated be a telemetry data that we've got rather suggests that most EDB a cruise that were committed during the incident

00:57:31 that were committed during the incident were were sent after three are tallied out after 305 which is just before the bridgehead appears to move down to the

00:57:42 bridgehead appears to move down to the ground floor now never mind those Passat precise details is that a generally accord with your recollection they would seem about right yes okay now I just

00:57:53 seem about right yes okay now I just want to pick out one or two who were deployed from the second floor we've got and I'd ask you to go to the be a time line the the telemetry data if you would

00:58:06 line the the telemetry data if you would which is

00:58:17 and go to be a time line for probably do this off the screen as easier go to be a timeline for and look at o2 44 where

00:58:31 timeline for and look at o2 44 where there is a crew Reddington and Upton 244 you see Reddington and Upton two from

00:58:43 you see Reddington and Upton two from Chelsea Evie be aware as to who tally out at two forty four a seven or two 44:39 you see that yes now according to their notes they were briefed for floor

00:58:56 their notes they were briefed for floor 21 so that's one example I put a couple of others too you know so you've got a good good group and I'll they'll ask you the question they're sent to floor 21

00:59:07 the question they're sent to floor 21 we've got a be a timeline six if you just go to that please Paul be a timeline six is a deployment at oh three oh three God and Joseph

00:59:26 I think Oh 303 you probably have to go back one

00:59:44 we can go to go to the tally out today 303 which we've not got on that page I

00:59:52 think you have to go oh it's time light in my mistake it's be a time line five

01:00:01 you've got Cod and Joseph Chelsea in Houston Edie be a who are Italian oh three oh three 2403 Oh 541 now they're brief for floor 22 we know that from

01:00:13 brief for floor 22 we know that from there they're notes and then finally we've got the houston trio which is be a timeline six at 3:05 we've got Rawlings

01:00:25 timeline six at 3:05 we've got Rawlings Brooks and Marco but more costs brief tally out at 3:05 also see those three or four or three or five three or five

01:00:36 or four or three or five three or five and they're brief for the fourth floor too far fight and protect egress now given the proportion of FSGS coming from

01:00:47 given the proportion of FSGS coming from the higher floors that we've seen on the third floor wall which we looked at before and we can get back to it if you want to see it where the vast majority of FSG calls come from the 12th floor and above which in increasing generally

01:01:02 and above which in increasing generally as you go towards the top of the building my question is this did you consider whether this rate a volume of deployment of edv a hue wearers at this

01:01:13 deployment of edv a hue wearers at this point in the night prior to and around 3:05 up to 3:05 was sufficient to respond to FSG calls from those higher floors

01:01:24 I would need to know how many resources of a dpi idea that at that point because without there I couldn't give an opinion of why okay I might Alameda didn't come here

01:01:35 here right let me just WCS mikeandjill slightly more slowly because I may have confused you with a long in fact rich question I've shown you a number of machinery three groups of deployments to

01:01:46 machinery three groups of deployments to up to 244 to 421 to at 3:03 for floor 22 and then a trio to go to a lower floor now if you can go back to LD you'll go

01:02:00 now if you can go back to LD you'll go back to MIT triple zero one five eight one nine which is the the wall information which was a photograph taken and about 308 we can see from that that

01:02:17 and about 308 we can see from that that by that time as I say most of the FSG calls have come in from the floor 12 and above and increased generally as you go up the building it seems to be a group

01:02:28 up the building it seems to be a group around the 14th or 15th floors a lot round 18 19 in and up to the top of the tower given that distribution by 308 of FSG calls coming from the top half if

01:02:42 FSG calls coming from the top half if you like of the building and comparing that with the deployments of edpa whereas it you had that we looked at my question is I put it again did you think at the time that that rate and volume of

01:02:54 at the time that that rate and volume of deployment of EDB a whereas was was enough to respond to the FSG calls that you were getting from the top half of the building at that point I would say yes because looking at that picture the

01:03:08 yes because looking at that picture the facts on the on the floor below was 17 the ticks would indicate that we've reached those floors and actually sit at 1.3 rescues so these the 80 bed we were

01:03:21 1.3 rescues so these the 80 bed we were sending to the upper floors as as you've shown was being used as it should be just

01:03:28 just absolutely extreme well I would assume the 80s dpi was being used at the flawed blow that and successfully rich in those facts do you know what those ticks represent as far as I remember they were represented that we did though that task

01:03:40 represented that we did though that task had been carried out that crews had been sent all crews have actually effected rescues I would cruise it effective risk use ninjutsu or forethought wingless its three rescue so oh yes for the crews of

01:03:51 three rescue so oh yes for the crews of effective rescues right now what it all search the FET and there's no one there and therefore come back the FSG is completed okay at the time did you understand that that's what what it's represented right now we looked at

01:04:04 represented right now we looked at rulings Brooks and more costs and their tally out of three or four and three or five I won't get back to that they were sent to the fourth floor to protect the exit do you remember if it was you who sent them to go to that floor none do you know who it was no do you know

01:04:18 do you know who it was no do you know why that EDB a crew would be deployed to go to a low floor and not to go to a high floor in response to FSG calls from higher floors I think that that I could not that's a bit cuiture personally

01:04:29 not that's a bit cuiture personally deployed them not might not have been a more sensible use of a needy be a crew seventh up the building rather than sending them to a floor immediately above the bridgehead I couldn't I couldn't a stack with without no no the

01:04:40 couldn't a stack with without no no the the reasoning behind it and I wouldn't make that judgment on somebody else's decisions right but it wasn't you who made that decision than that did you discover yourself that a needy be a crew

01:04:52 discover yourself that a needy be a crew had sent her been sent to a floor immediately above the bridgehead not till you just told me

01:05:00 mr. chairman I'm conscious that we've been game for more than an hour I've probably got five more minutes on this point after we talked to his switch topics going on in your statement to

01:05:13 topics going on in your statement to page 7 if I can just show you that paragraph 2 which is halfway down the page you say there and the the bridgehead then came down to the ground

01:05:24 bridgehead then came down to the ground floor and as I say as a time mark mr. Welsh we've got a rough time for me after 308 because that's the period of which look a point in time at which the photograph has taken of the BA at the

01:05:37 photograph has taken of the BA at the ground at the third floor be a intricate role now you say on the ground floor we had three ba entry control board setup because we had 30 and there's a three I

01:05:48 because we had 30 and there's a three I think it should be 3-0 firefighters deployed we started to use e DBA personnel to answer FSG calls received from the higher floors we use

01:05:59 received from the higher floors we use be a cruise with hoses to protect the staircase for the ingress and egress of their colleagues can I just ask you why was it only at the point when the bridge

01:06:10 was it only at the point when the bridge had moved down to the ground floor that you started to use e DBA personnel to answer FSG calls coming from the higher floors

01:06:17 floors what's her it's clearly incorrect going on on the initiative showed me earlier on that we were already committed to the high floors before then the number of e DBA commitments to the higher floors

01:06:29 DBA commitments to the higher floors there was was was was few I've shown you just a handful three yes crews and only two of which were committed to higher floors yeah we can

01:06:40 committed to higher floors yeah we can look back at the telemetry schedule if you like and see how many edpa crews were actually committed before three of eight if you like I remember pointing in the knob movement from the ground floor

01:06:51 the knob movement from the ground floor where we made a clear a conscious decision that there would be a point where a TBI would only go above there an SDP I would say below there right my question is why was it only at the point

01:07:02 question is why was it only at the point when the bridge had moved down to the ground floor that you made that decision and nothing for that I think that from what

01:07:07 what call that was a question of resources at by that point enough fire risk unit arrived so we had a good pool of ad value errors right that we could actually commit and have the backup necessary so tell me that this is not a

01:07:20 necessary so tell me that this is not a fair summary of your evidence does that mean that before the bridgehead move down to the ground floor you you didn't actually have enough EDB awareness to send them up into the tower to respond to the FSG calls from higher floors I

01:07:32 to the FSG calls from higher floors I think it's fair so I don't think it's fair so it didn't have enough we didn't have enough to be able to commit all of those and have a social system of work in place of emergency crews of the same

01:07:43 in place of emergency crews of the same size and same quantity to go and get those if anything went wrong noise so I think we had nothing but not not enough to be a complete a whole task that's your two for one again is it yes

01:07:54 that's your two for one again is it yes yes at what point do you think you did have enough EDB a whereas two compa to two as it were have a two for one down to the ground floor and station major

01:08:06 to the ground floor and station major Myatt was given the task of maintaining 20s DBA of 38 EBA wearers asserted from a time we moved to the ground floor at no point but to be ever run out of a

01:08:17 no point but to be ever run out of a debate or s DBA or was we ever told you what can we made a gold one or I've never told that but running short or we need to be careful what we were using so

01:08:28 need to be careful what we were using so some part of it from the ground thought we certainly enough right and it terms of how high up in the building you were reaching with be a crews on page seven you say we were getting FSG calls this

01:08:40 you say we were getting FSG calls this is the very top of the page I'm sorry we were getting FSG calls from the very top floors and it only reads the fourth and fifth floors at that point my first question is when you say at that point do you mean while the bridgehead was

01:08:51 do you mean while the bridgehead was still on the third floor or after it had moved down to the ground floor again I think that's incorrect I think that we've reached full four fifth floors like fire fighting at that point but the FS cheese we were clearly even a minute

01:09:03 FS cheese we were clearly even a minute I've got to Bridget we were reaching much other than that that's what it was on the third floor yeah well yet from the minute I arrived in the second floor we were reaching higher than that okay

01:09:17 while the that we've covered this a minute ago let's just get back to it while the bridge head was on the third floor was there any limit to the floors

01:09:29 floor was there any limit to the floors above which be a cruise that you had available couldn't go or couldn't reach a theoretical cruise having great

01:09:42 a theoretical cruise having great difficulty getting to the very top floors

01:09:45 floors I don't recall at that point a point where they said we can't get there at that point did you consider in relation

01:09:59 that point did you consider in relation to those upper floors particularly whether you should tell control to abandon statehood advice for those callers at that stage no is that because the conditions that I would be touched

01:10:12 the conditions that I would be touched by the debrief received and the be a cruise the conditions that were up there but unsurvivable if people come out in service since those hallways economic

01:10:23 service since those hallways economic becoming aware is where where the fire and the temperatures were um but um survived but I think with without protective clothing one

01:10:40 if they were unsurvivable then that would mean that the occupants of those optionals were by their none rescue able we were we would sit when I keep trying

01:10:51 we were we would sit when I keep trying them at that point we set up people on the phone on the phone lines so we were still trying to get sure but if that if the conditions at that stage in the

01:11:04 the conditions at that stage in the hallways in communal areas where the fire wasn't then the temperatures where was unsurvivable without protective clothing on that would mean that they couldn't escape is that right that's

01:11:17 couldn't escape is that right that's correct and after that the followed but Nitra effect they're making five Gordon's calls it was since they couldn't get out of their fence sure and if they if they couldn't escape then how

01:11:28 if they if they couldn't escape then how was any rescue crew going to bring them down cuz their choppers to my conditions better for them such as we could actually fit firefighters assess the the conditions and if need be trying for any fire in the indeed lobby areas that

01:11:40 fire in the indeed lobby areas that might be there to try and improve the conditions bring them how their face that would need water they wouldn't it it would and I think you say in your

01:11:51 it would and I think you say in your statement page six three lines up from the bottom we were committing teams with no communication and they water surly to snatch rescue sometimes above the fire

01:12:05 how high up in the building was there happening at any point

01:12:15 specifically when I'm talking that in that partner statement I think I was talking about floors below thoughts here 11 right that's not about that life I'm confident that was happening all

01:12:26 confident that was happening all different areas of the block that night did you ever think that you were going to be able to get to the upper floors floor 20 21 22 23 without water and be

01:12:38 floor 20 21 22 23 without water and be able to affect rescues without water

01:12:44 they were taunting like when we did win a cruise to get up set up floors over that wall yeah unfortunately what the conditions were getting worse and worse for us bother me

01:13:02 and you give Bridget on we knew we couldn't we'll take a break I think

01:13:09 thank you look I think we'll take ten minutes out of 25 past three views and no talking to anyone about our hosts if you don't mind Thanks so you don't give the Usher

01:13:30 25 past three days

01:14:40 you

01:19:27 you

01:23:03 now mr. wells you happy to carry on yes sir

01:23:06 sir if you'd like a stop at any other point just indicate thank you thank you for coming back now in your statement on page six

01:23:16 page six just below halfway down you say around this time group manager Pat Gould will arrive to assist me and he worked with my designated FSG team to brief the be a

01:23:28 my designated FSG team to brief the be a crews on safety issues and where they would be going now I think at that stage in your statement you're still dealing with the bridgehead when it's on the third floor that's correct okay when he

01:23:39 third floor that's correct okay when he gave evidence group manager Goulbourne said that he thought that he was on the bridgehead for 30 to 40 minutes or so couldn't be exact before it moved down

01:23:52 couldn't be exact before it moved down to the ground floor would that be your recollection possibly you know I really couldn't okay now if that's right that means that he would have arrived

01:24:03 means that he would have arrived sometime around 2:30 or perhaps a little bit after that does that sound about right to you so maybe ten minutes after you arrived okay now do you remember what group

01:24:15 okay now do you remember what group manager Goldwyn was doing when the bridgehead was on the third floor in general terms so he was working along the long side the last five Gardens war you know on the third floor and between

01:24:28 you know on the third floor and between them and then detailing crews of where I should go

01:24:33 should go getting debrief of them and overseeing that whole process right he was overseeing the process of what at the fire father God's coordination I see

01:24:44 fire father God's coordination I see didn't would he have been able to your way of thinking to observe how I firstly information was coming into the bridgehead I think he would ever be with more Chauncey no I yes his recollection

01:24:55 more Chauncey no I yes his recollection on that was to say the least hazy yet okay and would he to your way of thinking would were you satisfied that he was observing fully what Luiza - Silvo was writing on

01:25:08 fully what Luiza - Silvo was writing on the wall and understanding what it meant yes packs are very good officer and we've got to give him the past we've I've done a lot of work in East London so he's very experienced in high-rise fire fighting as well so I was

01:25:21 fire fighting as well so I was comfortable that Pat had a group that situation right let me just break this down a bit when group manager Goulbourne arrived what did he do to start with do you remember he off - I needed that what

01:25:33 you remember he off - I needed that what do you need what what helped you need from him or did you tell him I wanna start the asked him to the FSG I was seen that many Shulman meeting the crews for the right floors at right times right because there was a lot going on

01:25:45 right because there was a lot going on between near festoon and there and the intricate role balls which would no more than about a meter or so apart so there's a lot of noise in each needed I felt we needed a greater level of control now he his recollection was that

01:25:57 control now he his recollection was that he only started being involved with FSGS only shortly before the bridge had moved down to the ground floor and that before that he was essentially running tasks with equipment and things like that that

01:26:10 with equipment and things like that that might be the case of yard I'm recording my own tasks then I really recorded what I asked him to do with the FSG all right I see

01:26:26 and

01:26:31 when the bridgehead moved down to the ground floor or at the pad that the pointers before it did say do you remember having a discussion with group manager Goulbourne about about FSG in

01:26:43 manager Goulbourne about about FSG in general on how to manage those and how to manage deployments to fit with efforts geez is it possible to be more specific we've talked about the FSGS

01:26:55 specific we've talked about the FSGS assignment and how have they been processed but other than that anything more specifically group manager goal one gave it gave evidence along the lines of

01:27:08 gave it gave evidence along the lines of and I'm summarizing it that there was a discussion about changing the system for deployments in response to FSG calls but that discussion was interrupted

01:27:19 that discussion was interrupted effectively by the move down to the ground floor I summarized I thought you'd call it and I love to no doubt if if that's foot pack I wouldn't sit there it's quite likely but I would call that

01:27:30 it's quite likely but I would call that conversation a call okay now on page 7 of your statement third line down you say our third floor bridgehead began to get compromised by smoke I was told that

01:27:41 get compromised by smoke I was told that the fire was leaping about on the outside of the block and there was now a fire on the second floor met Sandeen level I had to move the bridgehead to the ground floor but was concerned that the VA crews already deployed from the third floor because we had no

01:27:52 third floor because we had no communications on which to tell them even the emergency button on the BA entry control board couldn't send a signal to the VA now a number of things though

01:28:02 though you say that it was for that reason the fire leaping about on the outside of the block and a fire on the second floor but the bridgehead was moved to the ground floor is that that is how you recall it yes when when we move to pick up a third

01:28:14 yes when when we move to pick up a third floor as far as I was concerned there was no four old floors below the third hate I felt was sight to moving up at this point an officer came to me I can't

01:28:26 this point an officer came to me I can't remember who it was let's hold me there's a foreigner flat on the floor below you the bridge it was already becoming slightly compromised by smoke but once I knew they were far

01:28:38 smoke but once I knew they were far underneath us that was one lady decision Smith who did now Pat Goulbourne actually called DAC Goulbourne now when he gave evidence

01:28:50 Goulbourne now when he gave evidence said that he'd had a conversation with you when the bridgehead was on the third floor about moving it down because it was it itself was becoming compromised with smoke is that something you recall

01:29:02 with smoke is that something you recall yes we did the conversation but then she'll be after that I mean I'm talking not maybe symptoms after that it was what I was told there's a fire but I was at a bridge for the Bridget and the third and it became compromise we smoked

01:29:13 third and it became compromise we smoked we were always in a stadium as long as we could the last thing that he was uh supposed to do was move to Bridget down and away from the fire yes we want to go opposite direction but the deciding factor was to its far below us

01:29:25 factor was to its far below us okay now you said you couldn't remember who told you that the fire was not below you on the second floor um let me see if I could help station manager Gareth cook gave

01:29:36 station manager Gareth cook gave evidence to us in July and he recalls telling he recalls you telling everybody that the bridge had needed to move down because the fire had spread below the bridgehead is that his recollection correct you

01:29:47 is that his recollection correct you think he would have been in the bridge at that point as well yes I would have heard that now you say as we've seen that the emergency button on the BA entry control board couldn't send a signal to them to

01:29:59 board couldn't send a signal to them to the BA can you explain why not whether they were using the ridge draw button on the control board which was in a signal to be a set to inform the bearer they need to withdraw and then of the

01:30:11 need to withdraw and then of the variable were they knew acknowledge its of that message and it would appear there was some issue with the the transmission between the bold and the

01:30:22 transmission between the bold and the BICS

01:30:23 BICS haulback the note said that Luke wasn't being completed was that a new thing or had that been happening for some time while the I think that was a start but it's not happening and so we didn't know

01:30:36 it's not happening and so we didn't know they were getting that message which is why when we did move the BA the edge of control point to the ground floor I remained at a third floor wait if the behavior is to come out because as far as I was aware they hadn't got that

01:30:47 as I was aware they hadn't got that signal and okay see now while on the subject of comms three lines up from the foot of page six you say we were committing teams with no communication

01:30:59 is that while the bridgehead was on the third floor or after it had moved down to the ground floor my rotation is a ground floor one thing once on the ground floor what was the problem with communications that you're referring to that I think partly it was on the fire

01:31:11 that I think partly it was on the fire Graham radios it was just excessive Youssef of radios because the the firefighters the work on the outside the building all have radios so they were

01:31:22 building all have radios so they were trying to communicate with each other and I think he was over Dogon that system and then within the building going vertically on the BI channel we were losing their signal as well we

01:31:33 were losing their signal as well we should put down through some kind of element of structure the building right was that the first time you you experienced that at this incident its first month experience that extinct it has happened it does happen but not -

01:31:45 has happened it does happen but not - thanks - did you give immediate thought to calling for repeaters to be put into the tower so that you could bounce the signal up I did ask for Peters and they were they were deployed but very little impact right now moving on then to move

01:31:59 impact right now moving on then to move the move down to the ground floor half way down page seven second paragraph and a third line you say I was still acting as far sector commander group manager Goulbourne was assisting a search sector

01:32:11 Goulbourne was assisting a search sector commander the station manager Pete Wolfington was now coordinating the FSG response and could you just first of all focusing on your Roland Pat Goulbourne role can you explain how they differed

01:32:23 role can you explain how they differed what was the difference between you being far sector commander and him being such sector commander this was this is the closest accumulation I could give you I was written it because in effect there was no social sector because under

01:32:35 there was no social sector because under the National it's a command system the service sector would be everything above the fire sector or in this case there was nothing about the for the whole building sir so there was no service exit okay so you've made a convoy and I

01:32:46 exit okay so you've made a convoy and I were working alongside each other which is unusual but because there was so much to do and so many tasks it was far too much one person to be Trombley in charge of so you're is it right to say

01:32:58 of so you're is it right to say therefore but your role and pack opens well completely overlapped there were very similar roles and we have assisted each other but I think it's also fair so that the chromatic album was more

01:33:10 that the chromatic album was more involved in the detailed deployment but we both we both do a bit of everything to trying to each other out because there was just so much to do right and can you explain what station manager

01:33:21 can you explain what station manager wolf and ins role was regarding FSGS he was working at the wall in the foyer as you walk through a door we talked about earlier would it be right to say that the search sector commander and the FSG

01:33:34 the search sector commander and the FSG coordination would require very closely A's on between those two roles between Goulbourne and Wilson death they would

01:33:45 Goulbourne and Wilson death they would they would require close liaison but I think it's import our face in the context of maybe associates commander is not a right type because there was no show sector but there's a communication

01:33:57 show sector but there's a communication between the FSG bull and the breach head that was the important link and we moved to town we moved Bridget down the ground-floor we we very clearly placed

01:34:08 ground-floor we we very clearly placed the Bridget work in one area and the FSG where different areas they were too close together there's a stand back and just examine with greater precision what to your way of thinking search sector

01:34:19 to your way of thinking search sector commander involved what in terms of functions we asking or expecting the penguin

01:34:26 penguin carry out so what Pat the main role the pact is really was in that area was a specific briefing and debriefing of Krause and that that was that was what

01:34:40 Krause and that that was that was what what he did a lot of but as I said I think so sick tomorrow is probably not quite a right title we were both running into that in that sector okay if his specific task was specific

01:34:54 okay if his specific task was specific briefing and debriefing of crews would that not require very closely azon almost call by call with pete Wolfington so that specific briefings would match

01:35:06 so that specific briefings would match the FSG call information pete Wolfensohn had and specific debriefings would go to people and and so that he could then pass them back up the communications chain

01:35:16 chain ultimately to the control room Pete Wolford them was receiving the information on that FSG wall and he was keeping that information to individual crews initially and the crews were coming to the bridgehead hold your net

01:35:28 coming to the bridgehead hold your net information so that on that piece of paper was that was the piece of paper that was written by the person who took here the FSG ball to the bridgehead so then that then that would brief him it

01:35:39 then that then that would brief him it of this is where we know the fire is this is what we know isn't like this is we know isn't like obviously the only information that people offer didn't wouldn't have had and as that crew came out we would stop them closing down

01:35:51 out we would stop them closing down safely debrief them and then send him to the wall to give that information better him right why were just following up on that last answer what why would Pat need

01:36:02 that last answer what why would Pat need to brief the crews if they were already coming to the bridgehead new pieces of paper with FSG information on it which people Pete Wilson had given them because I still wouldn't have taken the

01:36:14 because I still wouldn't have taken the up-to-date information on the condition of the fire so if they go into a floor we need every divert oh my email my encounter

01:36:22 encounter Gaines that floor they work they've given me the official information not being told what the condition to foreign positions are in a building I see okay well we'll come back to that in a moment just standing back and looking at the

01:36:34 just standing back and looking at the system once the bridge I came down to the ground floor itself settled in number of questions first of all when that happened did you know at that stage how FSG information

01:36:46 know at that stage how FSG information was coming to the ground floor lobby what the means of communication was I was I wasn't I knew there was there was some citizen papers being brought in by runners there was some radio traffic

01:36:57 runners there was some radio traffic very important but I couldn't ask you pinpoint I definitely knew how where it might was coming in because the role of the FSG command unit is to get that

01:37:10 the FSG command unit is to get that information to the Bridget that's not more responsibility to get it so as long as it's gained and it was coming in long it coming in thick and fast quite no reason to doubt that there was any issue

01:37:21 reason to doubt that there was any issue with the system in place when the bridge had moved down was watch manager William still writing on the wall at that point of belief so and how is the FSG

01:37:32 of belief so and how is the FSG information then coming from him to you at the bridgehead well I remember seeing Cruz coming with piece of paper right I don't know if they if they had never

01:37:43 don't know if they if they had never conflict in between the Bridget and him or not but kruseman but permantly coming in with that information and being committed can you describe the pieces of paper for us there's all sorts they've

01:37:54 paper for us there's all sorts they've all sorts from from piece of a notebook to a piece of a knife or paper whatever paper they had a bilingual students all they were used in a bring that information but most fit was on no paper that we carry as officers

01:38:07 that we carry as officers I'll show you an example possibly an example in a moment before I do did you see any a4 control information form sheets coming to the bridgehead not occult okay can I ask the witness to

01:38:19 occult okay can I ask the witness to please to be shown exhibit lfb quadruple zero one nine to nine it's also an exhibit to granny o keeffe's witness

01:38:30 exhibit to granny o keeffe's witness statement and here are some slips of paper some of which I think were written by Pete Wilson done and it's two of them but two of them by

01:38:43 it's two of them but two of them by station manager Watson that's why there are two different handwriting's do these look familiar to you the kind of emotion on them yes but I belong with a specific piece of paper not paper now these look

01:38:55 piece of paper not paper now these look some of them we've got time marks on them for ten yep four 3405 for 24 10 does that accord with your recollection

01:39:06 does that accord with your recollection of the source of pieces of paper that you saw coming to the bridgehead being brought in by crews I think that the the two that are different writing would be

01:39:19 two that are different writing would be more so why I would have recognized rather than lists of fat numbers right and who was bringing those pieces of

01:39:31 and who was bringing those pieces of paper to the bridgehead because it crews or was it Pete Wilson did all and somebody else more attaching screws okay did Pete Wilson to himself bring paper information about FSG calls to the

01:39:43 information about FSG calls to the bridgehead at any time do you think I think he may well have done yes but I can't be sure but I mean we were in and out so I would think so now um once the bridgehead was set up on the ground

01:39:54 bridgehead was set up on the ground floor you explained in your statement first date with paragraph 2 on page 7 and I've just shown you this already you say we have three entry control boards B

01:40:06 say we have three entry control boards B enter control boards set up as we have 30 firefighters deployed deployed we started to use e DB a personnel to answer FSG calls received from the higher floors getting back to our

01:40:20 higher floors getting back to our discussion that we had before the break does that mean that really prior to the move down to the ground floor the use of e DB a personnel to answer high floor FSG calls was not really not really

01:40:31 FSG calls was not really not really happening but did start to happen once you move down to the ground floor

01:40:37 yeah I think I think it's comes back to the comments I quit before the break that they'd hear laughing it with the bie bie bie crews were being committed but not not on great numbers until we move down to the ground floor and is

01:40:48 move down to the ground floor and is that is that because of resourcing avi DBA I can't actually recover it clearly the definite reason for it but but my

01:41:01 the definite reason for it but but my assumption would be yes there would be for resourcing if it's now we've seen a photograph before in evidence of the wall in the lobby on which there is a

01:41:12 wall in the lobby on which there is a marking below s DBA ten above ten EDB a I'll show you that it's a meaty quadruple zero four five seven seven

01:41:24 quadruple zero four five seven seven four you can see it there above ten a DBA below 10 SD brewing we're told the people from to wrote that on the wall

01:41:33 Pat Goulbourne evidence about that is that that was part of the tactical plan that you formed when you were on the ground floor that's what he told us is that consistent with your recollection yes at what point in the night do you

01:41:44 yes at what point in the night do you think that that decision was made only to committee DBA whereas above the tenth floor

01:41:49 floor sometime after moving down the ground floor couldn't are really can be any more specific than that long after or short after even roughly I would guess and it would be a guess it

01:42:01 would guess and it would be a guess it may be an hour after

01:42:05 do you remember any discussion about committing only up to the 11th and 12th floors yes or though that wasn't that was nothing later on on veteran right

01:42:17 was nothing later on on veteran right we'll come to that

01:42:22 do you know whose decision it was not to deploy SDB whereas above above floor 10

01:42:38 now we also heard from mr. Goulbourne about the strategy of systematic searching that you at the bridgehead started while it was on the ground floor and again summarizing his evidence very

01:42:51 and again summarizing his evidence very broadly he said that the bridge had started out by committing SD be a wearers for firefighting starting on the floor of the fire and then pushing edpa wearers to get as high as they could in the building that's a

01:43:03 as they could in the building that's a busier general yes pithy summary of his evidence is that your general recollection yes it is do you remember when you started this systematic floor-by-floor approach it

01:43:14 systematic floor-by-floor approach it felt it feels like it was later on after the FSG calls that the Lord's gone dead or the culture stopped there's a billion

01:43:27 or the culture stopped there's a billion more cohesion as well as that I'm guessing around four-ish right who made that decision to start the systematic floor-by-floor approach healthy there's

01:43:39 floor-by-floor approach healthy there's a conversation between pattern pattern only then we agreed it would stock will go out clearing every floor right and was your concern to ensure the safety of your search crews by making sure there's

01:43:51 your search crews by making sure there's no far below them the option on stage yes but that wasn't the case unlike because we've earlier they were points when I was sending crews above fire with no

01:44:02 sending crews above fire with no communications and no fire fire media but we were stretching the boundaries of safety and hopefully of God after the crews because if we lose crews then

01:44:13 crews because if we lose crews then isn't going rescue people that new recipe yeah did that decision to change to a systemic floor-by-floor approach change the way in which ba crews were

01:44:25 the way in which ba crews were thereafter deployed Noakes I think we were still deploying VI crews but what we were but alongside that what we started is this system ache so it floors

01:44:39 started is this system ache so it floors the wheat that we had never get to if this cheese we had an American so we were still trying to and still trying to reach those those FS J's but but behind that was a system of clearing each floor

01:44:50 that was a system of clearing each floor as began do you you remember who was actually briefing crews at the bridgehead once the method was changed

01:45:03 bridgehead once the method was changed to change to a systemic floor-by-floor approach I think perhaps doing some I did something right and sometimes we dedicated that down to the watch manage in charge of the in trouble right who

01:45:15 in charge of the in trouble right who was baitin who was an overall charge of of briefing crews at the bridgehead once that system change was it you as for Sitka Malden that would be more responsibility yeah but were you actually functionally in charge as well

01:45:28 actually functionally in charge as well as emotionally I was delegating authority out to others but I was also carrying some briefing and debriefing myself yes know when you made that

01:45:39 myself yes know when you made that decision to change approach do you recall telling the watch managers at the on the other side of the lobby who was writing writing FS to you information on the wall that you are now deploying

01:45:50 the wall that you are now deploying crews in a different way well that you changed your approach I think we were deploying cruising in additional way all right we didn't stop deploying crews to histories we just started

01:46:01 histories we just started digital arm with of the operation really because we had the results it's been do it okay they're coming back to my question did you have a discussion with the watch managers so Pete wolfen Dan

01:46:13 the watch managers so Pete wolfen Dan and watch manager Williams about the change or addition the additional approach that you were now adopting I thought we call having that conversation

01:46:25 thought we call having that conversation it didn't impact on their FSG work so I wouldn't necessarily need to it's a nice to know but I wouldn't I can't think the

01:46:36 to know but I wouldn't I can't think the way how it impacts all of what they were doing um do you did you at any point leave the bridgehead but we know where it was located at the foot of the stairs

01:46:47 it was located at the foot of the stairs by the green wall did you leave that area and move into the lobby and have a conversation with watch manager Williams and Wolfington about yes it was just continuous we were all really been into

01:46:58 continuous we were all really been into lobbying undetected under stay a caisson vice versa we weren't stuck at any one point right

01:47:10 point right we've got a couple of pictures I just want to see if this if this tallies with your recollection I can ask you to please to go to I am Q 3 1 3 and this is

01:47:26 please to go to I am Q 3 1 3 and this is camera 3 and an adjusted time of 418 12 so this is after 4 o'clock which is when are you roughly put the time at the change of strategy and we can see what's

01:47:39 change of strategy and we can see what's manager Williams on the very far left looking like he's waving and we can see Pete Wilson done to his right just by the sign they're grateful tower community room and there is a a white

01:47:52 community room and there is a a white helmet to their right and then a white helmet in the middle

01:47:58 do you recognize yourself in that picture I recognize myself the one that's better to be highlight yeah right the one further away from the hose all the one near the house yes one further a

01:48:09 the one near the house yes one further a wife's right in the middle of the picture okay yes and then turning to the next one three one four I a cue 3 1 4 this is CCTV camera 3 taken 1 second

01:48:20 this is CCTV camera 3 taken 1 second later that adjusted time of Oh 4 1813 where we can see that much Melanie Williams is right arm is now down people from Dennis got us back to us do we see

01:48:32 from Dennis got us back to us do we see you in that picture yes looks like something more hair tool that people often it right you've got something in your left hand what what is that or what might that be it looks like a piece of paper it does

01:48:44 it looks like a piece of paper it does what might be on that piece of paper of Nordic okay and then at page I in picture I in q3 one five which is five seconds later camera three so the other

01:48:56 seconds later camera three so the other camera in the lobby we can see from the right we can see watch manager Watson watch manager Williams station manager wolfen turn and then who is that white

01:49:09 wolfen turn and then who is that white helmet head looks like it's on me just having the same conversation yes cuts your face but it's a bit do you have a recollection of having this discussion this sort of time with these three

01:49:20 this sort of time with these three officers not and then the next one eight which is imq three five six which is

01:49:33 which is imq three five six which is fourteen seconds later camera four adjust a timer vote for 1832 we can see you beginning to walk I think that's you yes walking away from watch manager

01:49:45 yes walking away from watch manager Williams in the red shirt by the wall and Pete Wilson done and then there's Watson there to your your right yes holding something again what that might what might that be

01:49:56 what might that be it would like a piece of paper from a notebook okay just do these photographs trigger a recollection of discussions with the watch managers at the wall at around this time no I mean this is how I

01:50:11 around this time no I mean this is how I recall we have set this penalty for out the evening several people probably all go back to Ford's I don't recall that yours alright for this was a one-off this was this is part of the continuous activity music now do you remember when

01:50:24 activity music now do you remember when you started this new system if you gave consideration to where the outstanding live FSG calls were coming from I was aware of where that would be said life is Jesus and how high up the tower were

01:50:37 is Jesus and how high up the tower were they do you think no idea did you give consideration to whether you should start your systematic searching from the higher floors as high as you could get with a DBA whereas and work down rather than working up that

01:50:51 work down rather than working up that around that time was a talent when we were finding it impossible to get past it early floor right saying that what time would that be I couldn't say what

01:51:04 time would that be I couldn't say what son that was but on those around the same sort of time that so around four-ish

01:51:08 four-ish we would find very difficult in all of the games back from Cruz I couldn't get past it that they didn't right now

01:51:22 the 11th floor you say as far as I recall yes

01:51:31 do you remember whether that information was passed on to the command unit but around that time not at that time I'm sleeping where that was possible to come

01:51:43 sleeping where that was possible to come on you yes it was recalled in the waterfall in the kanji right okay well well thinks exactly let's just see if I can identify that with you

01:51:59 if you could please be shown a meaty triple zero one five nine three six I'll take this question slightly out of order because we've come to it but this is a

01:52:11 because we've come to it but this is a whiteboard from cu7 and we could see on it on the right-hand side the black it says from SM

01:52:24 side the black it says from SM Wolfington at o4 twenty-five be a crews committed to 15th floor and then at over 45 PA crews only committed up to 11th floor not 15 do you recall a time when

01:52:37 floor not 15 do you recall a time when well does this help you time when crew the crews were committed only to the 15th floor not above I think I think this those two solitude remains I think

01:52:49 this those two solitude remains I think the crews committed to 15th floor is a statement of that's how far how hard we were getting at that point right and I think the second of Bou bi crews only committed living floor not 15th was that

01:53:02 committed living floor not 15th was that as far as we could get a tow for 45 and

01:53:08 right okay give it given that those were the floor limits at those times as I think you're telling us did coming back to my question did you give consideration to starting off systematic search as high

01:53:20 starting off systematic search as high as you could go and working down no I was working out from the bottom so this is around around at Tom when when we stopped putting fire fighters above the

01:53:31 stopped putting fire fighters above the 11th floor at that point who couldn't get past it but it was also around the time that I record I faced Ajit cold has stopped or very very close to it and to

01:53:44 stopped or very very close to it and to do the other way around would be leaving firefighters above the fire for long periods of time which for me was beyond the realms of safety

01:54:01 still on this theme about floor limits do you remember perhaps I can show you MIT quadruple zero five seven seven six

01:54:21 now we can see that this is the white wall on the left of the lobby as you come in and you can see just behind the yellow cables this photograph was taken during daylight clearly not on the night

01:54:33 during daylight clearly not on the night in darkened darkness itself just behind the yellow cables you can see somebody has written oh 4:30 no one above 15 and that was Pete Wilson who wrote that on

01:54:45 that was Pete Wilson who wrote that on on the wall then do you have a recollection of that being the floor limit at or around that time yes we do how did you know that that was the floor

01:54:56 how did you know that that was the floor limit because that's not even by sliprock or did you decide that that should be the floor limit at that point this was full of odd this complications

01:55:08 this was full of odd this complications we've written a walk after a conversation that people still annoy had that was shown was told back for me last week incident Cory but at that

01:55:19 last week incident Cory but at that point we had crews who were unable to get any higher than that right and I be a cruise returning from trying to get past that in a physical

01:55:30 trying to get past that in a physical condition which I felt they were very close to losing their own lives and at some point and probably the hardest

01:55:42 some point and probably the hardest decision I've ever made me life is a hike to do a line where they were still safe when you drew that line did you take any steps to make sure that the

01:55:53 take any steps to make sure that the control room knew that you drawn a liner that the crews were not going to be going above those floors whether it was a 15th or the 11th the confirmation was

01:56:04 a 15th or the 11th the confirmation was sent back to the incident commander by a runner okay so I see where I was made aware of that but I think it's important to put in context it didn't mean we were

01:56:16 to put in context it didn't mean we were just gonna stop at the 15th move at that point we get to do we have to do something I deal with the heat barrier and those floors because otherwise firefighters will push and push and push and get

01:56:28 and get but in my opinion if they got through that they wouldn't come back so we have to deal with the fire on those floors before we could create carry on now just

01:56:39 before we could create carry on now just going having explored that question of limits going back to the timing of your change in strategy or your addition to the strategies you've put it to do a

01:56:50 the strategies you've put it to do a systematic floor-by-floor approach I come back to my question even though there may be limits did you ever give any thought to sending EDB a whereas up to the highest they could safely go in

01:57:01 to the highest they could safely go in your opinion and then working down the tower from there rather than working from the lower floors up there was too dangerous did you give any thought to it is my question and I think I would have

01:57:13 is my question and I think I would have consider but but I would a discounted extract line right why is that because it was to leave to put firefighters in that heat barrier they're experiencing

01:57:25 that heat barrier they're experiencing that heat barrier when they're content if history's and that the pure task when they're doing if it's cheese forget to try and get in and get the people get out to now ask them to stay up there and potentially put what could be six facts

01:57:37 potentially put what could be six facts a lot put all of those out that the punishment on their bodies and the he for me was beyond the line of safety of them return back safely know when you

01:57:52 them return back safely know when you made this decision to change this approach I think you said earlier and correct me if I've misunderstood your evidence mr. Welch but that it was after the FSGS are tailed off yes the I don't know whether you recall this

01:58:03 the I don't know whether you recall this but the the FSGS were continuing to come in and in until about 6:30 a.m. yes sir so from what I recall they had started

01:58:14 so from what I recall they had started sale off timing but asking people filled in for a list of all FS geez but I clearly if it was he living for the 15 and what was above so his face I

01:58:28 the 15 and what was above so his face I never hidden stopped but they were they were certainly a lot less than what they were earlier on the night no were you aware when you made this decision to

01:58:39 aware when you made this decision to change the approach if ba crews were still being allocated FSG slips by watch manager Williams Watson will fund them on the other side of the lobby they were still kidding they were still getting

01:58:50 still kidding they were still getting given those slips and bringing those to the Brigette and when they came to the bridgehead were you giving them sometimes a different brief some what they they'd be giving it to me break yes right

01:58:57 right and when they you gave them a different brief did you take any steps to tell watch manages Williams Watson a Wolfen done that you changed the brief more British they were told quite early about

01:59:08 British they were told quite early about the level of where we were came to an agreement was still carry on giving them that information crews would come to the bridgehead we would say that information including into an area we couldn't get to at that point we would retain that

01:59:21 to at that point we would retain that information right because that way with best kept and then give them a different task where would you retain the information at the Bridget it was great on a wall but digit by

01:59:33 it was great on a wall but digit by question is did you when you change the particular deployment so that the FSG information so that a floor wouldn't be reached did you tell the watch managers

01:59:46 reached did you tell the watch managers in the lobby so that they could at least inform the command unit you could in turn inform control yes in the command unit was informed on each occasion yeah well I personally seen runners back

01:59:58 well I personally seen runners back form the command unit of the whatsoever yes I say just get that right so you personally sent runners back from the ground floor bridgehead to directly to the command unit to say that call from

02:00:10 the command unit to say that call from the 23rd floor not big attend oh sorry I'm looking for my son satanic story that they were kept informed of the floors that we were reaching or not reaching who was kept informed the command unit I see in general terms did

02:00:22 command unit I see in general terms did sober mierda boo boo boo as if right can't get above the eleventh that was he media communicated better to come on Jimmy yes I see okay but but that but my question was more specific it was that

02:00:33 question was more specific it was that if a crew presented to the bridgehead with it with FSG information relating to a call forum for example the 20th floor but you then changed the brief so that

02:00:46 but you then changed the brief so that you weren't gonna send any be a where as to the 20th floor did you inform anybody including the watch managers on the wall in the lobby that that crew is not going

02:00:57 in the lobby that that crew is not going to be deployed in response to that FSG call my recollection that was communicated to the Bridget and Betsy FSG wall very quickly on the on each and every I can't save each and every

02:01:08 every I can't save each and every occasions I didn't come I would have been aware of each and every occasion right but that information was going back to him now could I can clarify one

02:01:21 back to him now could I can clarify one thing is I thought you said you asked people phone and for a list of the ethnicities above and below certain floors and did you receive that yes sir

02:01:33 floors and did you receive that yes sir and can you remember in what form you received it on a piece of paper more than one piece of paper after I only recall one piece paper this may be the reason I ask is because we we've seen

02:01:45 reason I ask is because we we've seen from time to time that sheet that a lot of little leaves from firefighters make those which are written in a certain way which suggests that they are list

02:01:56 which suggests that they are list some readers not individual FSG portals yes

02:02:04 yes I wonder whether it would be worth after people going back to that yes it's elevating wouldn't 199 mm mr. O'Keefe lease mr. Rickey what there were scraps of paper that mr. O'Keefe says he found in his tunic at the end of the night if

02:02:15 in his tunic at the end of the night if we could just have those up on the screen again just in response to Chairman's question do you just take

02:02:27 Chairman's question do you just take taking out the Chairman's question do you think that these were the lists that you asked people fronting to give you all these scraps of paper that were being brought in by crews um so the two

02:02:40 being brought in by crews um so the two that were in different ham right people would recognize being brought in by crews like yeah as you said before yes the other the others are I couldn't say I remember these specific pieces of

02:02:51 I remember these specific pieces of paper but that would look very much like a informational ask for right I see okay thank you now just getting back to the point about deployments I can and I just

02:03:06 point about deployments I can and I just want to put an example of a change of approach or changing in briefing to you um if I can ask you to go to the VA telemetry line time line five we have

02:03:18 telemetry line time line five we have eight a tally out time of 329 for two firefighters bright green bottom of page from Battersea EDB a wearer's maiden

02:03:30 from Battersea EDB a wearer's maiden Lundquist you see that yes and you could see they tally out owed three 2905 no 329 twenty-nine they say in their

02:03:43 329 twenty-nine they say in their evidence their witness statements that they were originally given a specific briefing to go to flat one one three on the 14th floor but then that was changed before they were committed and they were

02:03:54 before they were committed and they were asked instead to carry out firefighting on the fourth floor do you have a specific recollection of changing that brief none is that an example even

02:04:06 brief none is that an example even though you don't remember that typically of the kind of brief that you would give firefighters who come into the bridgehead with with with a brief to go to the 14th floor and you changing it to firefighting on the 4th for example I

02:04:20 would find out unusual and and the timings wouldn't wouldn't correspond with with with that with that discussion around the limit of the 11th floor well

02:04:31 around the limit of the 11th floor well that's that brings me back to ask you whether you're given that that is what they say whether you're sure confident perhaps about the timing of when you changed or added to the system to be

02:04:43 changed or added to the system to be sure about that tell I mean no no so is it possible that in fact that change in strategy happened really pretty soon after you came down to the ground floor no I don't think it you don't think it did why do you not think it did I just

02:04:57 did why do you not think it did I just don't recall it every night quickly nice it felt a bit later much later on to me now let me just push this a little bit more there's a second example of this I think help me here if you go to timeline

02:05:08 think help me here if you go to timeline six you can see a Wimbledon EBA EDB a crew Harold peacock friend and rice all tallying out

02:05:22 peacock friend and rice all tallying out at 331 and 332 rice maybe an outlier because he turned his other 358 so I'm not sure we linked him necessarily but sticking with sticking with Harold

02:05:35 sticking with sticking with Harold peacock and friend from Wimbledon they say that they were initially tasked with going to flat 203 on the 23rd floor and then the brief was changed to search and

02:05:46 then the brief was changed to search and rescue on the fourth and fifth floors and possibly the 6th floors again do you do you remember changing that crews brief no again is that an example

02:05:58 brief no again is that an example there's a kind of thing that was happening at that time round about half-past three mark um I'll be surprised but they're happy at that time all I would call that okay without a very good reason behind

02:06:09 okay without a very good reason behind it is it possible dates speculate but is it possible that those day briefs were changed but it was Pat Goulbourne I'm not you doing that change affecting that change it's possible and if it did it'll

02:06:21 change it's possible and if it did it'll be for good reason right um can you explain why EDB a resort sorry start again once that the system was changed

02:06:33 again once that the system was changed or as he would have it added to so that you are suite doing floor sweeps and moving up the building from low down can you explain why II D be a resources were being tasked to those lower floors no I

02:06:45 being tasked to those lower floors no I can't is there a good reason that you can think of I could probably think of several possibilities but I wouldn't be fair right or accurate okay

02:06:59 in general terms can you explain what the purpose of sending EDB a whereas to low floors to search and rescue would be it when you've got outstanding FSG calls

02:07:11 it when you've got outstanding FSG calls coming from high floors have you not committing to do that tough but I wouldn't be able to honestly evolve while it was done do you remember having a discussion which some of the witnesses have referred to as heated or passionate

02:07:23 have referred to as heated or passionate or enthusiastic with watch manager Williams and stand watch Manor and station manager Wolfington about who was in charge of committing Cruz I remember

02:07:35 in charge of committing Cruz I remember a heated discussion with station major wolf ndon I think it's over the passionate discussion because we weren't reaching the FSGS that he wanted us to

02:07:46 reaching the FSGS that he wanted us to reach and I remember that he discussion with him yes we do I like the call it being about who was in charge right the discussion was about what floor levels

02:07:57 discussion was about what floor levels was it yes okay so do you remember a discussion with him or Williams about a decision by bridgehead command not to

02:08:08 decision by bridgehead command not to commit any crews above a particular floor no that's not true right we've reached a punk movement as I've tried to explain that the Buddhist thought we couldn't reach it didn't mean that we

02:08:19 couldn't reach it didn't mean that we did it was never a constant we are not coming above it right it's not right now that's not safe we've got deal with that floor again and make that a safer working area coming back then to the question of floor levels and discussions

02:08:30 question of floor levels and discussions station manager wolfin delivers evidence was and I'm summarizing it again I hope fairly is that he came to speak to you when he heard that the bridgehead is not committing crews above the 10th floor

02:08:42 committing crews above the 10th floor and the result of the discussion you agreed to try to get crews up to the 15th floor does that does that discussion ring a bell with you does sell from it yes right I see do you remember roughly when you had that

02:08:53 remember roughly when you had that discussion actually not that now we've I've shown you the photograph with the yellow wires where it says 4:30 no one above the 15th floor does that assist in your recollection as to when

02:09:04 assist in your recollection as to when you might have had that conversation I blow up

02:09:06 blow up so I couldn't be sure they were frightened

02:09:17 and was that a separate discussion about who was in charge of who's another thing I remember there's been net the discussion or referred to earlier okay

02:09:28 do you have a recollection of station manager Egan coming to speak to you at the bridgehead when it was on the ground floor of the tower I don't remember seeing a station manager Regan within

02:09:39 seeing a station manager Regan within the building no now he gave evidence and said and again I'm commenting and for our record its transcript to the fourth of July at pages 17 to 19 that he

02:09:50 of July at pages 17 to 19 that he summarizing again he said that there was a discussion between him you and JC gold Goulbourne in which he expressed concern okay he expressed concern that too much

02:10:05 okay he expressed concern that too much focus was being put on trying to put the fire out and not enough focus on rescuing occupants of the building that's what he remembers do you remember that what time did he say this was

02:10:17 that what time did he say this was around well I'm not going to be able to tell you later on in later on so it's eliminated conversation and that would

02:10:29 eliminated conversation and that would be wholly accurate because he became very apparent very early on that this was no longer a thoughtful operation it was actually a rescue operation do you remember whether station manager

02:10:42 do you remember whether station manager you can expressed any frustration either to you or to anybody else that the command unit wasn't getting back any reports of the results of deployments I do not remember seeing stage manager even within the building do you remember

02:10:54 even within the building do you remember speaking him on the radio at all no did you have any conversations with station manager Regan in the night however vague recollection I've seen him at some point outside early on even before I even took over as valasek to

02:11:05 before I even took over as valasek to come on down but I mean really common safety limits home

02:11:12 now I want to just to turn to the question of the change in statehood advice can I ask you to look at your second statement thank you

02:11:30 second statement thank you can I ask you to look at your second statement please mr. Welch and ask me to go to please to page nine it's the final paragraph in fact do you say I think I

02:11:44 paragraph in fact do you say I think I became aware of a change to the Stapleton's I sometime around 8:00 a.m. and I think you changed that right at the start of your evidence to 6:00 a.m. Trillian so 3 a.m. I'm so sorry 3 a.m. um how did you become aware station

02:11:58 um how did you become aware station major cook sorry a tour group manager cook came in and told me right you came into the bridgehead did he yes that was

02:12:10 into the bridgehead did he yes that was when it was on the third floor was it ground floor I believe he's a really ground floor I thought was a ground floor who's every on that three anymore right

02:12:22 I mean we had don't have precise times for the move who we think the ground bridge head was being moved down at 308 that's why we have the picture of the third floor wall at that time I mean more regulation was understanding the ground floor what other information so

02:12:33 ground floor what other information so right maybe 330 oh yeah dude we're still trying to establish exactly what time it was changed but at the moment you can

02:12:44 was changed but at the moment you can give a range and say between 230 and 250 if that is right have you'd do you know we'll understand why you the bridge head only came to learn of the change in the

02:12:55 only came to learn of the change in the statehood advice after that so long after that Kamala D right

02:13:07 and say good group manager cook came in and told me do you know where he got that information wrong well he was threatened evening he was the main

02:13:18 threatened evening he was the main source of information conduit between the Bridget and collagen was he was he running all radio running running okay but did he did he this is Matt Cooke is

02:13:29 but did he did he this is Matt Cooke is it yes okay did he have pieces of paper in his hand at all with fights not not going mister details on it you don't remember um can I ask you to look at the

02:13:43 remember um can I ask you to look at the short incident log please page 22

02:13:57 and I want to show you the time mark of two 1736

02:14:07 or you could see a service request for a dangerous structure engineer and this is

02:14:22 dangerous structure engineer and this is not long after as you can see from the time to 36 not long after you had left cu8 and gone to come to the bridgehead and were you aware at the time that a

02:14:33 and were you aware at the time that a dangerous structure engineer had been called for or requested one you were the one who requested it and right just in

02:14:44 one who requested it and right just in case or I office for information to get back to command you to request a danger structure in jail I see okay so my right you thinking that this isn't something that originated from dacl Lachlan worthy

02:14:55 that originated from dacl Lachlan worthy some more real artists would go back to him and he would make the football Christine to control I see okay what led you to ask for a dangerous structure engineer protocols really in any form we

02:15:07 engineer protocols really in any form we have it here substantial building did this this last person you'd be involved in follow I would ask for a dangerous structure engine age situation took me a bit of overview of the integrity of that

02:15:20 bit of overview of the integrity of that building did you have any particular concerns about the integrity of Grantham tower at that point only the impact therefore of this or I would have a net billion right do you did you give any thoughts at that stage given that you

02:15:31 thoughts at that stage given that you were asking for a dangerous structures engineer to be called for did you have any thoughts about whether the stay-put advice was still a wise thing to be giving residents that's a no because

02:15:42 giving residents that's a no because they'd be more requests for the infrastructure engineer wasn't as a result to the specific concerns it was an overview of things that we should consider right I see so you didn't see any

02:15:56 I see so you didn't see any inconsistency between calling for a dangerous structure as an engineer and at the same time can maintaining the statehood advice in place to meet at uber unconnected and only to change

02:16:09 uber unconnected and only to change change as they put this they put advisor was

02:16:14 was so people who make you fast for guidance cause they're there view they're in more view their best chance was for us to go get them trying to prove the conditions for their route out to make it safe I

02:16:27 for their route out to make it safe I think if they impacted but changing asleep her visor and tended to get out into an area I didn't know was of a higher risk than they do on it trying to

02:16:38 higher risk than they do on it trying to get to them yes and that takes me to another question which is what very well I've got about five more minutes of questions so perhaps we can finish that off and then

02:16:49 perhaps we can finish that off and then take a well I appreciate that mr. Chen I'm just going to finish off this and a couple of other actual things gave me

02:17:00 couple of other actual things gave me mr. Welsh why might it be dangerous to change the statehood policy to an all-out because where people come out into an area that they've already deemed

02:17:12 into an area that they've already deemed like these unsafely to get out to we're not there to assist them we're not there to improve the conditions they're coming in to before they come out and and a large number of people coming down a

02:17:25 large number of people coming down a very narrow staircase pose own safety issues and also be at no way communicating it now there's a lot of

02:17:36 communicating it now there's a lot of FSG information on the walls and on pieces of paper do you have any particular recollections independently of any particular flat numbers so if I

02:17:47 of any particular flat numbers so if I were to ask you questions about for example flat 205 or flat 204 flat 74 would you be able to help me actually none no recollection of any individual numbers

02:18:02 then done stand out of your memory no I'm sorry okay mister whoops thank you very much you'll be glad to hear that I've come to the end of my questions what normally happens is that I ask the

02:18:14 what normally happens is that I ask the chair to rise for a few minutes just to make sure that I've covered all my notes and I'm going to ask it to do that yeah well I get the rise of five minutes it sometimes happens that there are further questions so could you please go with

02:18:27 questions so could you please go with the usher now obviously don't talk 21 but rather system they'll come back in five minutes and see whether there are

02:18:43 25 possible very much mr. chairman thank you

02:19:56 you

02:20:42 you

02:25:27 yes well here comes mr. Welch anyone

02:25:39 thank you well in there if there any more questions mr. Molina tell us now mr. wells in the usual way of things there are a few that temp I've been reminded to ask you very helpfully the first relates to PPV positive pressure

02:25:53 first relates to PPV positive pressure ventilation units can I take it didn't page 9 of your of your first statement please it's an equipment question and in the second line there you say that I

02:26:04 the second line there you say that I used a positive pressure ventilation unit PPV to try to push smoke up the stairwell so we get it we could get higher but it didn't work when you say

02:26:15 higher but it didn't work when you say it didn't work did the machine work yes so what do you mean that when it didn't work it was the method that didn't work and by the time that the PPV unit had

02:26:26 and by the time that the PPV unit had arrived and we could set it up unable to use it up on the staircase so now she has to be used in the entrance the main lobby which made it quite ineffective

02:26:37 lobby which made it quite ineffective because what you end up doing was drawing clean the clean area shatori behind it was actually the smoke from the burning debris around the building so it just increases smoking in the building

02:26:47 building oh I see so you're drawing in 38 dirty air from that side because of the unique situation about burning debris having come off the building yes what about a

02:26:58 come off the building yes what about a mobile extraction system us mobile smoke extraction system do you know what I mean by one of those it's not something I'm aware c'mon definitely with inject no in general terms are you aware that

02:27:09 no in general terms are you aware that mobile smoke extraction systems are available you can bring the tower blocks and suck the smoke out I've never seen one being used at all no no I'm sorry I

02:27:21 one being used at all no no I'm sorry I try that one self evacuation we have examples of occupants managing under

02:27:32 examples of occupants managing under their own steam to get out of the building we have one at four o'clock a family coming for 4 a.m. or so we have two ladies at evacuating by themselves at 4:40 were

02:27:43 evacuating by themselves at 4:40 were you aware that as late as that in the night individuals were self evacuating if so what yes did that tell you anything about whether it was actually possible to get people up to the higher floors I think the important thing to

02:27:56 floors I think the important thing to understand with issues that the condition is in a building like that with that that extent of fauna changed by the second so you know it may well be that that people may be able to get out in a very small window of time and make

02:28:10 in a very small window of time and make you but that would be a very small window of time because that condition would have changed 10 seconds 30 seconds later yes and so they were very lucky when they self evacuated did you

02:28:21 when they self evacuated did you yourself talk to them about what they'd found and what they'd experienced no that was made aware that they had done were you aware at the time vaguely I was aware was later on including other

02:28:32 aware was later on including other members surprised at that toilet they were made to get out did you get a or did you did the FSG team working under

02:28:43 did you did the FSG team working under you get a good debrief from them do you think which would inform further deployments as far as I'm concerned everyone that came out unless everyone came out that was from a fight from the

02:28:54 came out that was from a fight from the fire crews point of view that was in a fit state to be a rigorous debrief and from the residence point of view were also in a fitness day and good enough level of English then we were getting

02:29:06 level of English then we were getting debrief from every paper person there were the only things that may have got your way to prevent now or slow it down still on the subject of debriefing you say and this is page 7 I think of your

02:29:17 say and this is page 7 I think of your statement but we need to get back to it you say that when a ba crew didn't report back you would declare our firefighter emergency and then they would appear with their face masks off because they run out of air summarizing

02:29:30 because they run out of air summarizing what you say are you aware of any previous incidents where firefighters would arrive back at the bridgehead with their face masks off because they've run out of there that would be extremely

02:29:42 out of there that would be extremely rare and

02:29:43 rare and practice I believe on the night declare four or five million to three times which is a very serious issue for us that means at one of our personnel will poke under our control or in need of

02:29:55 poke under our control or in need of rescuing hmm but they is a very good indicator at the levels that individuals and in the risks the individuals that wouldn't take to try and rescue residents heroine Hotel have you ever

02:30:07 residents heroine Hotel have you ever been at an incident previously where multiple firefighter emergencies have been declared no now you I think say

02:30:19 been declared no now you I think say that you asked watch manager Williams to prioritize FSG calls is that is that right I remember having a conversation important major D'Souza

02:30:30 important major D'Souza I don't specifically specifically remember the conversation we force major Williams but I think if my recollection is that he would help me the hell out to prioritizing what's manager Williams

02:30:43 prioritizing what's manager Williams says that you told him to prioritize the calls it comes from his statement and he's given some evidence about that do

02:30:54 he's given some evidence about that do you remember having that conversation with him no you don't there's quite likely that provided okay do you remember giving him any specific instructions as to how to go about prioritizing the cords no but I'll suspect it would be the same [ __ ] gave

02:31:06 suspect it would be the same [ __ ] gave and watch given watch manages to earlier okay when giving instructions other to him or to watch manager D'Souza did did you have thoughts about whether the firefighting strategy would be improved

02:31:17 firefighting strategy would be improved by giving them by requiring them to collect FSG calls by floor or by flat number did you think about that

02:31:29 I do have recollections of be a crude being commits who flaws four FS J's yes I remember seeing it happening I don't

02:31:40 I remember seeing it happening I don't know if ever calls any wind it was happening but I do crew being kami to my floor rather than a threat until to search all threats on that floors just approaching the question of collation

02:31:52 approaching the question of collation and organization of FSG calls did you have a did it occur to you to ask watch manager decisions of watch manager Williams to make deployments in order of floor rather than the first come first

02:32:05 floor rather than the first come first serve basis no because and that something that's not practice I would encourage what it needs to becoming if we only get one so a floor then I don't

02:32:17 we only get one so a floor then I don't want them wait until they got two or three before we deploy well we will deploy to each one and they just as soon as we came right in wish me with these better practice right and what would you

02:32:28 better practice right and what would you do if on the way to a floor that you deployed them to firefighters would come across a rescue they needed to make urgently so never actually got to their floor and it happened to happen you know regularly and then they would

02:32:40 regularly and then they would communicate that back to the breach it either by radio or upon they return and and I witnessed then of a crew being deployed to the crews initial talks well you satisfied in your own mind that

02:32:51 you satisfied in your own mind that where they where crews have been diverted from their original deployment to a particular flat or floor a redeployment to that flat or floor occurred absolutely absolutely I was absolutely satisfied and absolute faith

02:33:04 absolutely satisfied and absolute faith with the crews working with Milla Bridget did that was happening were you reliant when doing that redeployment on getting accurate and satisfactorily detailed

02:33:11 detailed debriefings from cruisers they came down yes you get back to the question I asked you before you're satisfied you got that on each occasion are you yes I yes there's even the crews that weren't

02:33:23 there's even the crews that weren't fitting afraid did come down would mean it would get the information sometime later but they were they were cruiser had to had reached their task or beyond that so quickly quite often where we we

02:33:34 that so quickly quite often where we we would deploy crews to an it a flat fashion the residence that we moved so that you know the crews would come back in here people weren't sure that nobody in their fair because people were moving around a lot you know

02:33:48 yes this works thank you very much I've no further questions for you can i disturb you I'm very grateful to you for coming here and assisting us with our investigations it's very much appreciated very helpful thank you thank you so with your

02:34:00 thank you thank you so with your permission may I address the families years of course I've just got to say to the families that we're very sorry for the amount of people would also tonight

02:34:11 we could have done anymore we did everything we could and every one of us have waiting to that billion was willing to lose our lives to save your loved ones we didn't let you down the

02:34:24 loved ones we didn't let you down the building now us all down and I'm sorry for your loss mr. Wilson thank you very much I'm sorry this day has gone on

02:34:35 much I'm sorry this day has gone on rather longer than you may have wished or we might have hoped that it's really very valuable you've had your evidence and be very grateful tea for coming along thank you you're free to go thank

02:34:46 along thank you you're free to go thank you

02:34:59 and then we are for the day mr. village and I'm sorry that that took a little bit longer than I would have hoped if I'm grateful to be sitting a little bit later than we would normally tomorrow morning I'm told mr. kiler is taking yes

02:35:12 morning I'm told mr. kiler is taking yes taking charge and he hasn't off looked you up to ask is not an early sign ladies not nor is it providing me with any information that would lead me to make that application unprompted so for now I think thank you very much thank

02:35:25 now I think thank you very much thank you all very much then ten o'clock

02:38:23 you